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THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH
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PART II. THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH
FORMULATION OF THE PLAN AND DATE FOR EXECUTION 
The evidence tends to indicate that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed early in January of 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet, who at that time ordered Admiral Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have told Onishi about February 1,  "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the United States Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed."  During the latter part of August 1941, all feet commanders and other key staff members were ordered to Tokyo by Yamamoto for war games preliminary to formulation of final operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, and on September 13 an outline incorporating the essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as *Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1*, was completed. On November 5, 1941, this operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders. The date, November 5, is in consequence properly to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.
Under the heading "Preparations for the outbreak of war," operation order No. 1 provided that " when the decision is made to complete over- all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the *approximate* date (Y-day) for commencement of operations and announcing 'first preparations for war.' " The order further provided that "the time for the outbreak of war (X-day) will be given in an Imperial general headquarters order." The details of the plan with respect to the Pearl Harbor attack were worked out by members of the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff, and first air fleet operations staff.
Admiral Yamamoto on November 7 issued combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2 relating: "First preparations for war. Y-day will be December 8." Consistent with the definition of Y-day as given in operation order No. 1, December 8 (December 7, Honolulu time) was thus established only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. The imperial general headquarters,
 The chief sources of information concerning the attack are translations of captured Japanese documents, interrogations of prisoners of war, and reports submitted by general headquarters, supreme commander for the Allied Powers, comprising questionnaires filled out since VJ-day by former members of the Japanese naval high command. See committee exhibits Nos. 8, 8A, 8B, 8O, and 8D.
For purposes of convenience, the term Hawaii is used throughout this report as synonymous with the Territory of Hawaii.
 Unless otherwise stated the time indicated is Tokyo time. To obtain the corresponding time in Washington and Honolulu, 14 hours and 19 1/2 hours, respectively, should be subtracted from Tokyo time. See committee exhibit No. 6, item 4.
 See committee exhibit No. 8D.
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however, issued an order on December 2 stating, "The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on December 8," thereby announcing X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. The tentative approximate date for the attack selected on November 7 and defined as Y-day in consequence became the final precise date, X-day.
The Japanese imperial headquarters navy section, in discussions prior to November 7, generally recognized December 8 as a propitious date from an operational viewpoint and decided upon this date in conjunction with the leaders of the combined fleet. It was noted that from the standpoint of a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area December 10 would have been suitable in view of the dark of the moon. But it was expected the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter Pearl Harbor on Friday and leave on Monday. Sunday, December 8, was therefore decided upon with the understanding that, to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible; that is, approximately 1 hour before sunrise. An imperial naval order issued on December 1 stated: "*Japan * * * has reached a decision to declare war ors the Untied States of America, British Empire, and the Netherlands.*" 
NATURE OF THE PLAN
Three possible avenues in approaching Hawaii for the attack presented themselves: The northern course, which was used; a central course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands; and a southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south. Because of the absolute requirement that the element of surprise be a factor in the attack, the northern course was selected since it was far from the United States patrol screen of land-based aircraft, and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels.
Screening destroyers were to be sent ahead of the Japanese Fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the force was to make a severe change in course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the striking force was detected prior to the day before the attack, it was planned to have the force return to Japanese waters without executing the attack. On the other hand, should the force be detected on the day before the attack, the question of whether to carry home the attack or to return was to be resolved in accordance with local conditions.  If the attack should fail, the main force of the Japanese Navy, located in the Inland Sea, was to be brought out to the Pacific in order to return the striking force to home waters.
According to Japanese sources interviewed since the defeat of Japan, the sources of information employed in planning the attack included public broadcasts from Hawaii; reports from naval attaches in the Japanese Embassy, Washington; public newspapers in the United States; reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack; and information obtained from crews and passengers
 See committee exhibit No. 8D.
 Had the American Fleet left port it is reported that the Japanese force would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around Oahu and was prepared to attack. If the American Fleet could not be located the striking force was to withdraw. See committee exhibit No. 8.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 55
of ships which had called at Honolulu in mid-November.  It also appears that Japan was receiving the same type of espionage information from its Honolulu consul as from other Japanese diplomatic establishments. 
The Japanese plan of operation was predicated on certain assumptions with respect to the United States Pacific Fleet: (1) That the main body of the fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, Hawaii time; (2) that a carrier could be moved from Japanese home waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance; (3) that should the two foregoing assumptions be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet (4) that a powerful carrier air strike against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effective, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet, and (5) that such a strike could achieve also the destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.
Incident to preparations and discussions on September 6 and 7 relating to operation order No. 1, it was decided that no landing on the island of Oahu should be attempted since (1) it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing within less than a month after the opening of hostilities; (2) it was recognized that the problems of speed and supply for an accompanying convoy would have rendered it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; and (3) insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on Oahu impractical. In formulating the final plans it was determined that a torpedo attack against ships anchored in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method of putting the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area out of action for a long period of time. Two obstacles to a torpedo attack were considered: The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow; and the fact that it was probably equipped with torpedo nets. In order to overcome the first difficulty it was decided to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from extremely low altitude. Since the success of an aerial torpedo attack could not be assured because of the likelihood of torpedo nets a bombing attack was also to be employed.
 It is reported that Japanese agents in Hawaii played no part in the attack. See committee exhibit No. 8.
The location of the anchorages shown on the maps recovered from the attacking force was determined on the basis of the indicated sources beginning in the early part of 1941.
It has been reported that the intelligence section of the Japanese naval general staff was having a most difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian ea. Because of this, the intelligence section had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from naval officers at Washington, newspapers and magazines published in America, American radio broadcasts signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and similar sources. According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training was deduced. By combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of United States Fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, the training areas of the fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplanes at Hawaii were deduced in the same way. From newspapers and magazines published in the United States, material was obtained for deduction of America's war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, Army strength at Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, and other places.
It is reported from Japanese sources that the reports from foreign diplomatic establishments and commercial firms in foreign countries were regarded as not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a "special write-up, and were considered on their own merits." See committee exhibit No. 8C.
 See committee exhibit No. 2.
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The complete plan of the attack was known in advance to members of the Navy general staff, the commander in chief and chiefs of staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet headquarters. Portions of the plan were known to the Navy Minister, the Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers. It has been reported that the Japanese Emperor knew in advance only the general outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials in the United States, including Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything concerning the plan prior to the attack.
The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were based on the desire for military conquest, security, and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural resources. With respect to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation Order No. 1 stated: "In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight." 
DEPARTURE FOR THE ATTACK
On or about November 14  units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force were ordered to assemble in Hitokappu Bay, located in the Kurile Islands,  this operation being completed by November 22. On November 25 the commander in chief of the combined Japanese Fleet issued the following order: 
(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order).
Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against enemy counterattack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.
(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.
(c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November 26 and advance to 42 N. And 170 E. (standing-by position) on the afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling. (The actual time of departure was 9 a. M. November 26, Japan time-1:30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.)
Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the striking force consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, including the Akagi, the flagship of Admiral Nagumo; 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 8 train vessels, and approximately 360 planes, which
 Other factors included (1) rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the South Seas operation, including the Philippine Islands, and (2) the defense of Japan's mandated islands. See committee exhibit No. 8.
 Other information obtained indicates that the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued the following order on November 7 ("The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret will assemble in Hitokappu Bay by November 22 for refueling." Committee exhibit No. 8.
 Also referred to as Tankan Bay (Etorfu Islands, Kuriles), and Tankappu-Wan.
 See committee exhibit No. 8.
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participated in the attack. Other submarines had proceeded from the Inland Sea independent of the striking force. 
At 9 a. m., November 26,  the Japanese Fleet departed under complete radio silence from Hitokappu Bay for its destination 200 miles north of Oahu. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were posted, but no searches or combat air patrols were flown.  The anticipated difficulty in refueling at sea because of weather conditions did not materialize, since the weather proved uniformly calm. On or about December 2 all ships were darkened, and on December 4 the rendezvous point (42 north; 170 east) was reached and the combat ships fueled to capacity from the tankers. The cruise had been entirely uneventful, no planes or ships having been sighted. 
The green light to execute the attack had been sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his flagship, the Yamato, on December 2. The message was "Niita Kayama Nobore," translated "Climb Mount Niitaka," which was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack." 
EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK 
On the night of December 6-7 (Hawaii time) the "run-in" to a point 200 miles north of Oahu was made at top speed, 26 knots. Beginning at 6 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. M., December 7, a total of ;60 planes were launched in three waves. The planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes, it is reported that two type Zero reconnaissance
 The following allocation of forces for the attack was made (see committee exhibit No. 6, item 17):
Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO
BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (HIEI, KIRISHIMA), 2 BB
CarDiv 1 (KAGA, AKAGI)
CarDiv 2 (HIRYU, SORYU)
CarDiv 5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU) 6 CV
CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 CA
DesRon 1 (ABUKUMA, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.
8 Train Vessels.
ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SHIMIZU.
ISUZU, YURA, 2 CL.
KATORI, 1 CL-T
I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3) (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 SS.
Midget submarines, 5 M-SS.
6 Train Vessels.
 The corresponding time in Washington would be 7 p m. November 25.
 A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, staff communication officer of the striking force. Admiral Nagumo and his staff believed that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since stations KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still oblivious of developments. For several days prior to the attack the Jap force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the southwestern sector from Oahu. Committee exhibit No. 8D.
 To disguise the move against Pearl Harbor the main Japanese force in the Inland Sea area and the land based air units in the Kyushu area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the task force was still in training in the Kyushu area. See committee exhibit No, 8.
 Committee exhibit No. 8d.
 The time hereafter indicated is Hawaiian time unless otherwise specified.
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seaplanes were launched at approximately 5 a. m., December 7, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the attack, reaching their destination about 1 hour before arrival of the attack planes. 
The Japanese aircraft participating in the operation included 81 fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo bombers. Five distinct phases were noted in the execution of the attack, as recounted from the Navy point of view: 
Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from 7:55 a. m. to 8:25 a. m.
Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a. m. to 8:40 a. m.
Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m. to 9:15 a. m.
Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 a. m. and 9:45 a. m.
Phase V. Warning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.
The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore. In the statement submitted for the consideration of the committee and in his testimony, Rear Adm. R. B. Inglis set forth a review of the various phases of the attack: 
"Phase I: 7:55-8:25 a. m. Combined Torpedo Plane and Dive Bomber Attacks
"The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time (namely, 7:55 a. m.) Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island and concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.
"At the time of the attack Navy planes (patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type) were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then, as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship California and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight. However, 33 of the Navy's best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.
"As soon as the attack began, the commander of patrol wing 2 broadcasted from 1. Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is *not* drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.
"At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low- flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.
"About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes, similar to one of the Navy's light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. No. 3 hanger received a direct hit during this attack, and
 See committee exhibit No. 155
 For a description of the attack as obtained from Japanese sources since VJ-day, see committee exhibits Nos. 8 and 8B, p. 10.
 Committee record, pp. 85-103.
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our planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 36 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack; 6 of these were damaged, and 3 were in the air on patrol south of Oahu.
"Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It was delivered by 2 squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machinegun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the treetops, reverse their course and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon Navy utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the marines themselves.
"Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had subsided. Pilots aching to strike at the enemy in the air viewed the wreckage which until a few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. Altogether 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter lanes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.
"Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, *the torpedo planes did the most damage*. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy hip objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of the fleet. At least in the great majority of eases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.
"Four separate torpedo plane attacks were made during phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes, which swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low altitudes (within 50 to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the southeast side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships (namely, the Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California) were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.
"During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.
"The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and the minelayer Oglala both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of the Oglala. Submersible pumps for the Oglala were obtained from he Helena but could not be used since no power was available because of damage to the ship's engineering plant.
"The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the seaplane tender Tangier, the target ship Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and Detroit The Raleigh was struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a. m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh would capsize. Orders were thereupon given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.
"The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40 degrees, the order was given to abandon ship This order was
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"executed with some difficulty, as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah. With cutting tools obtained from the Raleigh a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman, second class, who had been entrapped in the void space underneath the dynamo room.
"An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and Raleigh were placed, were designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9.
"The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.
"It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in these 4 attacks was 21.
"In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs were employed light, medium, and incendiary.
"During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14- inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.
"The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California, she had to be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Tennessee, where he organized a party of West Virginia survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the Tennessee and Ford Island.
"The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.
"Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in 4 groups were active during phase I.
"Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the Oklahoma, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the Pennsylvania, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking condition; the California was down by the stern; the Arizona was a flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.
"Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action on the part of the feet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of less than 5 minutes, practically all battleship and antiaircraft batteries were firing. The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.
"During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer Helm, which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was just outside the harbor entrance when, at 8:17 a. m., a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8:19 a. m., when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.
"Phase II: 8:25-8:40 a. m. Lull in Attacks
"This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued, although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, and various light cruisers and destroyers.
"Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.
"At 8:32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.
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"During phase II there was still relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at 7:51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact the Ward in defensive in sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the Curtiss and Tangier, the Monaghan proceeded a high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.
"The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that the Monaghan got under way, the destroyer Henley slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel.
"Phase III: 8:40-9:15 a m. Horizontal Bomber Attacks
"The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area.
"During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a ire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.
"The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the California with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.
"Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated n earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.
"Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 8 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.
"It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.
"During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.
"During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the Curtiss' gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship, spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.
"Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m. The Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the South channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to each open water they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to, make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.
"Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten under way at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about 9:40 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.
"Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9, but shortly thereafter she capsized.
"At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.
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"Phase IV: 9:15-9:45 Dive Bomber Attacks
"During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal bomber attacks described in phase III.
"Phase V: 9:45 Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid
"By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading Navy aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any American units."
An outline review of the Japanese attack on Army planes and installations is as follows: 
"(Army planes at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast with approximately 10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.)
"First attack (lasting about 10 minutes): At about 7:55 a. m. nine dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and three additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven more dive bombers attacked the hangar line from the east.
"Second attack (lasting between 10 and 15 minutes): At about 8:25 a. m. between six and nine planes attacked the No. 1 Aqua System, [21a] the technical buildings, and the consolidated barracks. During and immediately after this bombing attack, Army planes on the parking apron were attacked with gunfire. About 8:26 a. m. a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, possibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area.
"Third attack (lasting about 8 minutes): At 9 a. m. from six to nine planes attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed. At about the same time from seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated barracks, the parade ground and the post exchange.
"(Army planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.)
"First attack (lasting approximately 15 minutes): At 8:02 a. m. 25 planes dive-bombed the hangar lines, machine-gun fire was also employed during the attack.
"Second attack (lasting less than 5 minutes): At 9 a. m. seven planes machine-gunned Army planes being taxied to the airdrome.
"(The P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals; the reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater intervals)
"First attack: At 8:30 a single Japanese fighter machine-gunned the tent area.
"Second attack (lasting about 15 minutes): At about 9 a. m. nine fighters machine-gunned the Army planes."
Haleiwa Field was not attacked and after 9:45 a. m. there were no further attacks on Army installations. The evidence indicates that a maximum of 105 planes participated in the attacks on the airfields, it being noted that some of the planes included in this number may have taken part in more than one attack.
Prior to completion of the surprise attack the advance Japanese expeditionary force of submarines was under the command of the striking force commander, Admiral Nagumo. The precise move-
 See testimony of Col. Bernard Thielen, Committee Record, pages 104- 111.
 A hydrostatic pass for the fuel-pumping system. See committee record, p. 105.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 63
ments of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed that most of these units departed from Japanese home waters in late November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area by way of Kwajalein. A few of the submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, proceeded directly to Hawaii. The functions assigned to the submarines in operations order No. 1 were: 
(a) Until X-day minus 3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and report on any strong American forces discovered.
(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force in advance of the movement of that force to insure an undetected approach.
(c) Until X-day minus 5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.
(d) On X-day the submarines in the area were to "observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will be pursued and attacked."
With orders not to attack until the task force strike was verified, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions on the evening of December 6 in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the Pacific Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air raid. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor, discharging its torpedoes harmlessly. None of the five midget submarines rejoined the Japanese force. 
The I-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian area after the attack and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain he status of the American Fleet and installations. In the event of virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the operation plan provided that one submarine division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic. At least one submarine (the I-7) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or bout December 13.
WITHDRAWAL OF THE STRIKING FORCE
Upon completion of the launchings of aircraft at 7:15 a. m., December 7, the fleet units of the Japanese striking force withdrew at high speed to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. And 1:30 p.m., whereupon the force proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving on December 23. En route two carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers were detached on December 5 to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. The
 See committee exhibit No. 8.
 All midget submarine personnel were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. Committee exhibit No. 8.
64 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
original plans called for the retiring force to strike at Midway if possible but this strike was not made, probably because of the presence of a United States task force south of Midway. 
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK
Of the vessels at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7,  the following were either sunk or damaged: 
Type Name Extent of damage
Battleships Arizona Sunk.
West Virginia Do.
Nevada Heavily damaged.
Light Cruisers Helena Heavily damaged.
Raleigh Heavily damaged.
Destroyers Shaw Do.
Cassin Heavily damaged (burned).
Repair Ship Vestal Badly damaged.
Minelayer Oglala Sunk.
Seaplane Tender Curtiss Damaged.
Auxiliaries Utah Capsized.
The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and forty-nine wounded survived. None were missing. [26a]
A total of 92 naval planes (including 5 scout planes from the carrier Enterprise) were lost and an additional 31 planes damaged.  At the Ford Island Naval Air Station one hangar was badly damaged by fire and another suffered minor damage. A complete hangar, in which planes were stored, was destroyed at Kaneohe Naval Air Station along with the planes therein and the seaplane parking area was damaged. At the marine base at Ewa a considerable amount of damage was suffered by material installations, machinery tentage, and buildings. Damage at the base to aircraft was extremely heavy inasmuch as the primary objective was aircraft on the ground, the attacks being made on individual aircraft by enemy planes using explosive and incendiary bullets from extremely low altitudes. 
 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be separated from the wide-scale operations of which it was a part. On the evening of December 7, Japanese forces struck Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine Islands, Wake and, on the morning of December 8, Midway.
 The vessels in Pearl Harbor included 8 battleships: 2 heavy cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 29 destroyers; 5 submarines; 1 gunboat; 8 destroyer minelayers; 1 minelayer; 4 destroyer minesweepers; 6 minesweepers, and 24 auxiliaries. Committee exhibit No. 6.
 Units of the Pacific Fleet not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack included: (1) Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island. (2) Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was about 460 miles southeast of Midway en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. (3) Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown, consisting of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer minesweepers, had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft. (4) Other units of the fleet were on isolated missions of one type or another. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 52-55.
 See committee exhibit No. 6.
[26a] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 131.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 128, 135, 136.
 See committee exhibit No. 6.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 65
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK
The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in action and 360 wounded. 
A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action this figure including aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes which were subsequently stripped for parts. 
In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on Army installations as reflected by photographic evidence submitted to the committee. 
It has been estimated by our own sources, that the Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of them being dive-bombers and torpedo planes, as a result of Navy action. Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each, carrying two torpedoes, were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered. From reports available it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. One officer, an ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the submarine which grounded off Bellows Field. 
General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire. 
Information developed through Japanese sources indicates, however that a total of only 29 aircraft were lost and all of the 5 midget submarines.
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF LOSSES
As a result of the December 7 attack on Hawaii, military and naval forces of the United States suffered 3,435 casualties; Japan, less than 100. We lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. We suffered severe damage to or loss of 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines. The astoundingly disproportionate extent of losses marks the greatest military and naval disaster in our Nation's history.  The only compensating feature was the many acts of personal valor during the attack.
 In addition 22 were missing in action, 2 died (nonbattle), 1 was declared dead (Public Law 490), and 21 died of wounds. Committee exhibit No. 5.
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130. In a statement by General Short concerning events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, a total of 128 Army planes are indicated as having been damaged in the raid. See Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7.
 See committee record, p. 130; exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 128.
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 139
 Committee exhibit No. 8B.
 The Japanese estimate of losses inflicted was: 4 battleships, 1 cruiser, and 2 tankers sunk, 4 battleships heavily damaged; 1 battleship lightly damaged; and 260 planes destroyed. Committee exhibit No. 8.
 In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired. References to individual valor are replete with such acts as:
(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment while they themselves needed help.
(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from flooded compartments.
(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.
(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships were sinking.
(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off their own sinking vessels.
For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses. (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 131, 132.)
On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 66 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the December 7 attack. ( Testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record. p. 133.)