The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegations

Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 7:42 am

PART 2 OF 2

The 79th Precinct Investigation

In early April 1989, at Friedland's request, Trimboli met Friedland at FIAU headquarters. There, Friedland took Trimboli for a walk in a nearby park. He told Trimboli that Chief Gallagher wanted the PBBN/FIAU to initiate an immediate investigation into activities within the 79th Precinct. According to Friedland, Gallagher said he had received information from a confidential source known only to Gallagher that the 79th Precinct had a "possible small 77th Precinct-like situation in existence" (See Exhibit C). Friedland directed Trimboli to undertake the investigation immediately, even if it meant diverting attention from the 75th Precinct case.

Although he feared expressing his views at the time, Trimboli saw this new assignment as another attempt to stop his investigation into the 75th Precinct. Trimboli's conclusion again has merit. After all, the new assignment could not have come at a more crucial time. Trimboli was preparing to use Royos as an undercover -- his first pro-active opportunity to penetrate the drug ring that was paying off Dowd and Eurell. Moreover, when Trimboli asked to meet Gallagher's informant, Friedland said Gallagher would not divulge the identity of the informant nor allow Trimboli to debrief him. When questioned by Commission investigators, Gallagher could not remember the identity of the informant nor recall when or how he received the information about the 79th Precinct. What he did remember, however, differed significantly from what he told Friedland at that time. According to Gallagher, his concerns about the 79th Precinct involved racial divisions among the officers in the 79th Precinct and had nothing to do with drug corruption. On Gallagher's and Friedland's orders, Trimboli spent over six weeks looking into the 79th Precinct. After many hours of surveillance, he did not detect a single patrol violation, let alone an indication of a 77th Precinct-like situation.

The Commission does not believe that it was mere coincidence that Chief Gallagher diverted the FIAU's time and attention from the 75th Precinct investigation, just at the time Trimboli's investigation showed the most promise of breaking another large police corruption scandal in Brooklyn North. Chief Gallagher must have had the fate of Chief Taylor in mind when he gave the order to redirect the FIAU to the 79th Precinct. After all, it was Gallagher who replaced Taylor as the Brooklyn North borough commander after the 77th Precinct scandal sidetracked Chief Taylor's career.

While Trimboli was made to chase red herrings in the 79th Precinct, his hopes of using Royos were dashed. Daniel Landes, the OSSP attorney working with Trimboli, informed him that he had learned from federal authorities that Adam Diaz had fled the country. In Landes's view, Diaz's absence made Royos useless to the investigation. He told Trimboli he was removing himself from the case and assigning it to Betsy Barros, another OSSP attorney. Trimboli strongly disagreed with Landes's conclusion that Royos no longer had value to the investigation. In Trimboli's view, IAD's refusal to assist him and the OSSP's decision to abandon the Royos plan in April 1989 killed any prospect for a successful investigation.

But Trimboli remained undeterred. He was determined to continue the investigation until every possible avenue had been tried. He undertook surveillance of Dowd and his associates on his days off and in his own car. He even ate his Sunday dinner in his car while observing Dowd's house on Long Island. And, during this time, he never once had an offer either from IAD or his FIAU superiors to provide him with any assistance.

Yurkiw 's Offer To Cooperate

Trimboli's last prospect of apprehending Dowd came from the same cop who triggered his investigation of Dowd fifteen months earlier: Walter Yurkiw. In October 1989, while Yurkiw was incarcerated for the R&T Grocery Store robbery, he had a telephone conversation with Trimboli from prison. Yurkiw agreed to talk about "the cop with the red Corvette" and others if he was visited in prison. When Trimboli advised the OSSP of Yurkiw's offer, Landes reentered the case. When Trimboli informed IAD of Yurkiw's willingness to talk and his intention of interviewing him, IAD prohibited Trimboli from doing so.

When Trimboli informed IAD about Yurkiw, IAD's Captain Nakovics told Trimboli that IAD investigators would conduct the interview of Yurkiw and that Trimboli was not invited to attend. Nakovics even ordered Trimboli to suspend his investigation until IAD had completed the interview. He required that Trimboli confer with him every two weeks to determine when Trimboli's investigation could be resumed.

Again, Trimboli was dumbfounded. IAD had once again intruded into his investigation at a critical juncture not to assist him but only to disrupt its progress. In Trimboli's view, there was no legitimate reason to prevent him from participating in the debriefing of Yurkiw, unless to control the information and thus the success of his case. For a month, Trimboli heard nothing from IAD about the results of the Yurkiw interview. But he did discover that IAD dispatched Sergeant Bradley and another IAD investigator by helicopter to the Oneida Correctional Facility in Rome, New York to interview Yurkiw. Obviously, despite their repeated assertions that they had no resources to spare Trimboli, IAD apparently had the resources when they wanted them.

By the end of November 1989, Trimboli had not received even a synopsis of the information IAD acquired from Yurkiw. Instead, what he received from IAD was yet another separate corruption case based on Yurkiw's allegations against ten current and former police officers in the 75th Precinct involved in the illegal use of narcotics (corruption case no. 89-2385). IAD was again fragmenting the case and assigning it out of IAD. When Trimboli reviewed the work papers, he found, to his amazement, no worksheet on Yurkiw's debriefing. He telephoned IAD and explained that if they expected him to investigate Yurkiw's allegations, he would need to see the results of the interview.

Finally, over a month after the debriefing took place, Trimboli received Bradley's worksheet. Incredibly, it was a brief, one-page summary providing no more than the barest account of Yurkiw's allegations against six officers in the 75th Precinct and one in the 105th Precinct (See Exhibit D). Even more incredibly, it contains not a single mention of Michael Dowd, although Yurkiw's offer was to talk about the cop "with the red Corvette."

To Trimboli and Commission investigators, Bradley's worksheet reflects a superficial interview of Yurkiw with no real interest in obtaining useful information about Dowd or any other corrupt police officer. In fact, the language of the worksheet attempts to minimize the credibility of Yurkiw's allegations. No wonder IAD excluded Trimboli from the interview. When interrogated by Commission investigators about the surprising lack of any information on Dowd, neither Bradley nor Callahan could explain it. Bradley testified that he asked questions about Dowd, but could not remember what Yurkiw said. As discussed below, a lack of memory about critical events was a common affliction among a number of IAD officials the Commission interviewed.

Final Developments

Even after IAD squandered the opportunity to acquire evidence on Dowd through Yurkiw, information about Dowd kept coming to IAD. In January 1990, IAD received yet another allegation about Dowd, this time from the Drug Enforcement Task Force ("D.E.T.F."). The D.E.T.F. reported that one of its informants, on personal business at the Whitestone Pound, recognized Dowd as a police officer he had seen sampling drugs in Auto Sound City with a drug dealer named Baron (Baron Perez) in April 1989. [8] Of course, this new information was consistent with all the other allegations IAD had received about Dowd and drug corruption. And consistent with their past practice, IAD's commanders treated the allegation as a new and unrelated case, gave it a fresh corruption case number (corruption case no. 89-2617), and assigned it to PBBN/FIAU where it became the twelfth Dowd corruption case IAD assigned to the FIAU and the seventh for which Trimboli was made responsible.

Like all the other 75th Precinct investigations assigned to Trimboli, this latest one was doomed from the start without IAD's resources and assistance. Although the D.E.T.F. cooperated with Trimboli, for security reasons, they could not make their informant available to testify.

As a result, the D.E.T.F. allegation against Dowd, like all the others, was closed as unsubstantiated. In fact, by December 1991, the PBBN/FIAU closed as unsubstantiated thirteen separate corruption cases against Dowd. Each of those closings was approved by Chief Gallagher and IAD's commanding officers Chiefs Moran and Beatty. Dowd, in the meantime, remained in uniform continuing his career of corruption -- this time in the 94th Precinct, where he had been assigned since February 1990.

Even as IAD and the borough commander were approving the unsubstantiated closing reports on the Dowd corruption cases, IAD continued to receive reliable evidence of Dowd's crimes. In March and April 1991, Callahan (who had been promoted to Executive Officer of IAD), dispatched IAD investigators to interview two informants [9] who were cooperating with the United States Attorney's Office in Manhattan in an investigation of a major drug organization.

In essence, both men told IAD investigators that in 1987 and 1988, the boss of their drug ring paid thousands of dollars each week to police officers fitting the description of Dowd and Eurell for protection and information about impending drug raids. The informants reported that the officers often dealt with a middleman, Baron Perez, who paid off the officers inside his store. Besides protection, the officers provided the organization with police radios and shields and transported drugs for Perez in their police car. The officers also sold Perez drugs that they robbed from competitors. One of the informants even identified Michael Dowd from a photo array.

By this time, these allegations should have had the strong ring of familiarity and the mark of reliability for IAD. Here again were two apparently reliable informants telling IAD that Dowd and Eurell were drug dealers -- not cops -- involved in serious crimes: protection rackets, robberies, and drug trafficking. Yet, despite this new information and the mountain of information already accumulated on Dowd over the years, shockingly IAD did not initiate a full-scale corruption investigation of Dowd or anyone associated with him. Instead, they classified these new allegations as a "preliminary investigation." [10] If by the Spring of 1991, IAD had still not determined whether a full-scale investigation of Dowd, Eurell, and other corrupt officers associated with them was warranted, it should not have been in the business of corruption investigations.

The preliminary investigation lasted for a year. Based on our review, the entire case folder contained only memoranda of the interviews of the informants. No other investigative activity took place. IAD never communicated this information to Sergeant Trimboli, despite his years of frustrated attempts to apprehend Dowd. In fact, he first learned this information during an interview with Commission investigators. He was visibly distraught.

Happily, in the Spring of 1992, Dowd made a critical mistake. Suffolk County police, while investigating a drug operation in Suffolk County, intercepted Dowd's, Eurell's, and other corrupt New York City police officers' criminal telephone conversations. In March and April 1992, the Suffolk County police made two reports to IAD that they had evidence that New York City police officers, including Michael Dowd and Kenneth Eurell (who had by this time retired from the Department with a tax-free disability pension) were subjects of an ongoing narcotics investigation. After the second call (IAD assigned the first allegation to the PBBN/FIAU), IAD assisted the Suffolk County investigation. On May 6, 1992, after six years as an open and notorious drug dealer and racketeer in uniform, Suffolk County detectives finally arrested Dowd, Eurell, and four other police officers. Trimboli could only read about it in the newspapers.

Comments

Trimboli's experiences raise questions that go to the heart of the competence and commitment of the Department's anti-corruption operations: how could the Department's internal investigators have failed to apprehend Dowd despite six years of clear indications of serious corruption and crime? Why did IAD fail to initiate a single investigation of Dowd and other officers assigned to the 75th Precinct despite extensive evidence of corruption? Why did IAD withhold critical information, witnesses, and resources that the FIAU needed to apprehend him? Why did IAD refuse to assist the FIAU to apprehend Dowd despite direct and repeated appeals for help?

The Commission was not satisfied with the Department's answer to these questions. By simply faulting the investigative structure and its lack of coordination and communication, the Department's Report on the Dowd case failed to address the full dimension of the problem. After all, the Commission found that there was plenty of information flowing from the FIAU to IAD but, curiously, not from IAD to the FIAU. In fact, IAD investigators withheld critical information from the FIAU investigators and denied them access to critical witnesses and resources.

Every one of the allegations against Dowd, furthermore, first came to IAD where its commanders reviewed and recorded the information before sending them piecemeal to the FIAU, which they knew lacked the basic resources to investigate cases other than minor misconduct. They monitored Trimboli's 75th Precinct investigation and received regular updates on its progress. On three separate occasions, moreover, the FIAU directly appealed to IAD's superior officers for help, and help never came. They knew the scope of the corruption problems in the 75th Precinct and never once even considered opening a broad 75th Precinct investigation. If IAD's commanders had wanted to, there was every opportunity to communicate and coordinate with the FIAU. The reason for the persistent failure of IAD's commanders to do their job cannot simply be blamed on just a bad structure. It necessarily calls into question IAD's resolve to pursue and root out serious corruption where its commanders knew it existed.

Nor can the blame for failing to apprehend Dowd be shifted to the OSSP. The OSSP was not the Department's internal investigator nor its inspector general. That role belonged to IAD and the FIAUs, which collectively had approximately five hundred investigators specifically assigned to root out police corruption. By comparison, the OSSP was a prosecutorial agency that, by 1986, employed only twelve attorneys and thirty investigators with city-wide jurisdiction over the entire criminal justice system, of which the Police Department was but one component. The OSSP, therefore, depended on the Department's internal investigators to conduct police corruption investigations and generate sufficient evidence to support a criminal complaint. When the prospect of generating such evidence existed, such as the plans to use Royos, the OSSP acted to further the investigation. To be sure, the OSSP was apprised of most of the information generated about Dowd by IAD and the FIAU. But much of it came to the attention of OSSP attorneys months after its usefulness expired.

Nonetheless, the OSSP cannot escape all blame for the failure to apprehend Dowd and other officers of the 75th Precinct. In a word, the OSSP's failure in this case was not to recognize that if the investigation were to succeed, it could not depend on the Department alone, without outside pressure and guidance, to generate the evidence. In light of the information it had about corruption in the 75th Precinct, its experiences with the 77th Precinct, and its own 1986 analysis of drug corruption trends, the OSSP should have pressured the Department to assign a team of investigators with adequate resources to launch a precinct-wide investigation, especially after the Yurkiw robbery case.

But whatever omissions and missed opportunities may be imputed to the OSSP, none relieves the Police Department of its responsibility to effectively police itself. To determine the cause of IAD's startling refusals to act in the face of such a compelling accumulation of information of serious corruption in the 75th Precinct, Commission investigators reviewed hundreds of documents, questioned dozens of IAD, FIAU, and other Department officials. Responses to the Commission's questioning followed a predictable pattern of shifting blame.

Lower-ranking IAD officers, such as Sergeant Bradley, said they knew Dowd was a criminal and IAD should have made strong efforts to apprehend him. But, as junior officers, they had no authority over how or whom IAD would investigate, especially because the command structure at IAD was so strict that even high-ranking investigators had very little input into IAD's policies or decisions.

Middle managers, like Callahan and Pietruntu, while asserting that the Department ought to have made a case against Dowd, shifted the blame to the FIAU. In their view, their role as IAD investigators was to investigate only the allegation assigned to them and nothing more. If IAD's commanders assigned a case to the FIAU, it was the FIAU's and the borough commander's responsibility to insure the success of that investigation. According to them, if IAD were to expand an investigation beyond the four corners of the original allegation, that order could come only from the commanding officers of IAD, Chief Moran, Chief Beatty, or their superior, the Chief of Inspectional Services, Chief Sullivan. They had no view of corruption as a Department problem that IAD and the FIAUs -- as a team -- were commissioned to root out.

As the lower and middle-ranking officers pushed the responsibility up the chain of command, those at the top of the chain pushed it back downward. According to Chief Moran, his subordinates never informed him about critical developments in the Dowd case, like the plans to use Royos and information from other informants. But what he did know about Dowd, he communicated to his boss, Chief Sullivan. According to Moran, even as commanding officer of IAD, he could not make the decision to initiate a case into the 75th Precinct without Chief Sullivan's approval.

For his part, Chief Sullivan repeatedly described IAD's failure to act against Dowd as "glaring omissions." But when asked why such glaring omissions occurred under his watch, Sullivan claimed that his subordinates never informed him about Michael Dowd until 1992, when IAD received reports of corruption from the Suffolk County Police Department. When he was showed an August 1988 memorandum addressed to him from Chief Moran summarizing numerous allegations against Dowd at that time, Sullivan claimed never to have seen the document. In fact, during the course of his testimony at the Commission's public hearings, Sullivan either denied knowledge or had no recollection of significant events over thirty times.

But what Sullivan did remember provided the answer to our original question about why IAD refused to act in the face of such overwhelming evidence of corruption. As the Department's chief internal investigator for six years, Sullivan was in a position to know the unspoken policies that guided the Department, the policies that are not printed in the Department's manuals or operations orders. What he knew, or believed, was that the Department -- in fact, the Police Commissioner himself -- wanted to avoid corruption scandals at any cost.

The Commission has concluded that high-ranking members of the Police Department including IAD's top commanders as well as the Brooklyn North Borough Commander scuttled Trimboli's investigation into corruption within the 75th Precinct. When asked at the Commission's public hearings why the Police Department was unable to apprehend Michael Dowd, Trimboli responded:

Question: Based on your first-hand experiences in conducting these investigations, have you reached a conclusion that there were other reasons that the NYPD was unsuccessful in apprehending Michael Dowd?

Trimboli: I believe, based upon my experience, and obviously this is something that was discussed in my office among investigators who were aware of what I was involved in, that there was a lack of resolve to go after these individuals because it would involve initiating a scandal to what had occurred in the 77th precinct and that it would be a tremendous embarrassment to the New York City Police Department. (Tr. 124)


Obviously, Sergeant Trimboli was a victim of his own Department's misdeeds. The list of victims, however, is a long one. The vast majority of honest officers in the 75th Precinct and throughout the Department, who rightfully expected the Department to protect their safety and reputation from the likes of Michael Dowd and his associates, and above all, the citizens of New York, who rightfully expect the Department to serve and protect them, suffered most.

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EXHIBIT A

STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL STATE PROSECUTOR OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Charles J. Hynes
FROM: Hershey, Hawkins and Mangum
RE: Corruption Allegations By Precinct
DATE: August 5, 1986

A review of all corruption allegations involving police officers and drug operations for the period from January 1986 through June 1986 demonstrated that a significant number of such allegations came from certain precincts. The following is a numerical breakdown of those allegations.

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An analysis of the allegations from the precincts (the 77th, 113th and the 9th) reveals common elements that may be characterized as corruption indicators. For example, in the 77th, where we have independent information regarding corruption, the allegations over the sixth-month period identify [DELETE] Restaurant (a.k.a. [DELETE] Restaurant) at Troy and Lincoln as a drug location which is frequented by unidentified police officers, one of whom is known as "Blondie". This information comes from three sources, two anonymous (a phone call and a letter) and one a registered confidential informant. Using the information from 77th to construct a model, the factors that should be considered in analyzing allegations from other precincts are as fellows:

• the source of the information
• specific drug locations
• the identities of drug dealers
• the identities of police officers
• the type of activity.

Utilizing these factors for an analysis of the 113th Precinct, there are a number of allegations that should be investigated. For example, two anonymous callers (1/29 and 6/1) report that unidentified police officers frequent the [DELETE] Grocery Store, at [DELETE] Guy Brewer Blvd, which is a drug location. The "twins" who run the spot have been seen sitting in an RMP with unidentified police officers. Three anonymous callers (3/12, 3/13 and 4/13) allege that unidentified police officers in an RMP enter a drug location at [DELETE] 115th Road and exit putting things into their pockets. One anonymous caller (3/13) and the president of a block association allege that drugs are sold from a house at [DELETE] 118th Road, which is owned by a police officer (identified as [DELETE] There are a number of other allegations that are similar to the ones received from the 77th, the most substantial of which involves a DEA investigation that point to two police officers involved with a female correction officer who sells drugs. (This case is assigned to [DELETE].

In the 9th Precinct, seven drug locations are identified, and the names of dealers are given in three of the cases. At least 3 police officers are identified as having some contact with certain locations, and a number of unidentified police officers are alleged either to be protecting drug spots or to have taken drugs from dealers.

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EXHIBIT B

POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

From: Sgt. William Bradley

Command: CIU #1

Case Number: 69 s 88

Accompanying Investigator(s): Det. Edward Addison

Subject: 75 PCT BODEGA ROBBERY

Time: 1330 hrs.

Date: Wed 11-30-88

On the above date and time the assigned investigators were present at [DELETE] [DELETE], Brooklyn to interview [DELETE], Yurkiw's former girlfriend [DELETE] [DELETE] stated that Yurkiw had verbally threatened her life if she did not provide him with an alibi for the night of 7-2-88 (night of robbery). She stated that he should tell [DELETE] (Yurkiw's attorney) not to worry that she would alibi for him. [DELETE] also stated that Yurkiw told her he would "get" Sgt. Bradley because he was romantically involved with her.

[DELETE] also told the undersigned that Yurkiw had told her that a contract is going to be put out on the members of the [DELETE] and [DELETE] families. Yurkiw told her that he could not hit [DELETE] or [DELETE] directly because the cops would know who did it.

It is also alleged that there is a group of about 25 cops assigned to the 75 Pct who at one time or another would rip-off known drug locations and bodegas that deal in drugs. [DELETE] said she knew this because Yurkiw had told her that at least 2 female cops are involved. One of the females is alleged to be the girl friend of PO Michael Dowd (currently on modified assignment assigned to the Whitestone Pound). The other female is described only as f/w with blond hair. [DELETE [DELETE] also stated that prior to the robbery at 923 Livonia ave she observed that address and others on a list that Yurkiw kept in his car of known drug locations within the East New York area. (alleged crack or heroin traffic at 923 Livonia).

[DELETE] stated that on 11-25-88 Yurkiw was in the process of picking up a package (cocaine) for Dowd at a house in the East New York section when a group of cops burst in and announced "Police". At this point the cops ordered all the people (15-20) to lay on the ground and systematically robbed them. Yurkiw was one of the "victims". Once the uniformed cops found out who Yurkiw was they returned his property to him. [DELETE] said that this practice has been going on since about 2-87. At the time of the alleged rip-off Yurkiw was in the process of picking up drugs for PO Michael Dowd and his brother PO [DELETE] currently on modified assignment and participating in the alcohol abuse program). It was also stated that Yurkiw and the two Dowds are couriers for major drug traffickers in the East New York area. They are alleged at this time to be skimming from the kilos of cocaine and dealing in "eight ball" (1/8 oz of cocaine). This practice has been going on for about two to three months.

During the course of the interview [DELETE] alluded to the fact that she has on occasion used drugs with Yurkiw and some of her friends. She stated that the last time was on 11-28-88 when Yurkiw came to her apartment with 2 "eight-balls". Yurkiw did one by himself and fell asleep. While there he allegedly got up during the night and broke almost everything in the apartment. [DELETE] then called her friend, unidentified, who came over and helped put Yurkiw back to sleep. Both females then consumed the second "eight-ball" of cocaine. When Yurkiw awoke that morning he became violent because the cocaine was not there and struck [DELETE] [DELETE] numerous times about the body. Yurkiw then left and returned on two occasions on 11-29-88. [DELETE] then notified the 62 Pct and formally filed a Complaint against Yurkiw (62 Pct 61#15505= Det Flynn assigned).

REGARDING [DELETE]

ALL INFORMATION CONCERNING POLICE MISCONDUCT WAS TOLD TO HER BY YURKIW

SHE NEVER WITNESSED ANY MISCONDUCT EXCEPT FOR YURKIW'S DRUG USE AND HARASSMENT PROPERTY DAMAGE CONCERNING HERSELF

SHE HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING POLICE MISCONDUCT: E.G. IDENTITIES, LOCATIONS, TIMES.

SHE IS AN ADMITTED COCAINE USER.

SHE DESCRIBES YURKIW AS A HEAVY COCAINE USER SUBJECT TO FITS OF VIOLENT TEMPER.

SHE ADMITS TO A CHANGEABLE ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP WITH YURKIW.

HER CREDIBILITY AND ALLEGIANCES ARE SUSPECT.

Invest. Off. Rank & Sign. SGT. WILLIAM A. BRADLEY

Supr. CAPT. GUY K. SING

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EXHIBIT C

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

From: Joseph Trimboli

Command: PBBN/FIAU

Case Number: SG 89-1000

Accompanying Investigator(s) None

Subject: Initiation of Investigation

Time: 1230

Date: April 4, 1989

On this date the Commanding Officer of FIAU, Captain Friedland, advised this investigator in the presence of Sergeant Smalls that he had a conversation with Chief Conroy on April 3, 1989. During the course of the conversation Chief Conroy told Captain Friedland that a confidential sourse had reported to him (Chief Gallager) that the 79 Precinct has a possible small / 77 Like / situation in existence. The Chief asked that this unit monitor specialized units of the 79 Precinct including the Late Tours, Anti-Crime, CPOP, Sneu, and Topac. He asked that this patrol be monitored with a radio. Cpatain Friendland indicated that sme of our attention will have to be diverted from the Operation 966 (75 precinct) in order to comply with this new investigation. In addition the Chief provided Captain Friedland with the names of three officers formerly assigned to the 77 precinct whom he feels also bear watching (formulate an SG on each officer). These officers were P.O. [DELETE], 83 Precinct, P.O. [DELETE], 83 Precinct, and P.O. [DELETE] of the 81 precinct.

Captain Friedland's discussion of his conversation with the undersigned took place on 4/4/89 the morning after his initial conversation with Chief Conroy. on 4/[ILLEGIBLE] Captain Friedland had a second conversation with Chief Conroy and Chief Gallager during which they reviewed the strategy formaluated for this investigation by the undersigned.

On 4/5/89 the undersigned had a second conversation with Captain Friedland relative to this investigation. I.O. expressed concern over whether or not IAD had been notified that this investigation was about to begin. I.O. felt that the notification should be made before the investigation beins. Captain Friedland indicated that he did not know that the Chief had not already contacted IAD about this matter. I.O. also asked Captain Friedland whether or not the Chiefs source had given him specific information that would be of value to this investigation and was told that the Captain felt that we had been given all that the Chief was privy to.

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EXHIBIT D

POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

From: Sgt. William Bradley

Command: CIU #1

Case Number: Prelim 223/89

Accompanying Investigator(s) Lt. John Shields

Subject: EX-PO YURKIW/ALLEGED POLICE MISCONDUCT

Time: 1300 hrs.

Date: Mon 11/13/89

On the above date and time the assigned investigators were present at the Oneida Correctional Facility, Rome New York, and interviewed ex PO Walter Yurkiw. Yurkiw stated that he had reached out to his street contacts and that only one would supply information to him. This unidentified person also said that he would not talk to the Police until he gets arrested for something. Basically all of Yurkiw's allegations were things that occured while he was still a Police Officer. A synopsis of the interview follows:

A= Stated that PO [DELETE], 75 Pct Anti-Crime, and ex-Po's [DELETE] and [DELETE] [DELETE] deal guns in the 75 Pct. Yurkiw was asked for other independent witnesses who could verify this and said that the only one would be a guy named [DELETE] who lives on Halsey st in Brooklyn. No further information. Also reports that [DELETE] drives expensive autos.

B= PO [DELETE], 75 Pct, has a drug problem. No further information.

C= PO [DELETE], 75 Pct, runs drugs for an individual named [DELETE] from a bodega on Blake ave named [DELETE. [DELETE] was arrested in 1988 for drugs and at one point was debriefed by members of this division and SAAG Dan Landis. MR Landis deemed his information at the time believable but again unverifiable. No further information.

D= PO [DELETE, 75 Pct, uses marijuana. No further information.

E= PO [DELETE], 75 Pct, drinks on duty. No further information.

F= PC [DELETE], unknown Pct, has a cocaine problem. The assigned check the printout for NOS and no [DELETE] was discovered. No further information.

G= PO [DELETE] [DELETE] 105 Pct, was allegedly observed by Yurkiw in the winter of 1988/89 at Madison Square Garden in the mens room snorting cocaine. No further information.

H= Sgt. [DELETE], 75 Pct, does ripoffs of people in the 75 Pct. Yurkiw informed the assigned that [DELETE] did ripoffs of people in the 75 Pct and that EX-PO [DELETE], told him that [DELETE] used to do the same thin in the 30 Pct. Yurkiw said that [DELETE] did not wish to relate this allegation to IAD at this time.

NOTE: Yurkiw also stated that Lt. [DELETE] and Sgt. [DELETE] directed him to stop making drug collars out of his sector at known drug locations. Yurkiw said that [DELETE] and [DELETE] had ulterior motives for doing this but did not specifically say any misconduct was involved.

On 11/16/89 the following logs were refered to the field:

Log #89-10994 refered to Queens FIAU (subject-PO [DELETE], 105)

Log #89-11783 refered to B.N. FIAU (subjects: POs [DELETE] [DELETE])

Invest. Off. Rank & Sign: SGT. WILLIAM A. BRADLEY

Supr. LT. JOHN SHIELDS

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Notes:

1. In the wake of the 77th Precinct disclosures, Chief Taylor, his executive officer, two captains, seven lieutenants, and fourteen sergeants were administratively transferred by Police Commissioner Ward. The precinct's commanding officer was demoted and transferred.

2. Farrell was the commanding officer of the 75th Precinct from April 1984 through December 1986.

3. By that time, Dubois had resigned from the Department. According to Dowd, Dubois resigned, ironically, because he believed that he, Dowd, and other officers of the 75th Precinct would soon be arrested based on rumors of a large number of imminent arrests of police officers in Brooklyn North. Little did Dubois know that the arrests would occur (four months later) in the 77th Precinct and not in the 75th. Dowd, on the other hand, continued his career of corruption for another six years until May 1992 when he was arrested not by the Department, but as the result of an investigation conducted by the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office.

4. A Command Discipline is a notation of a minor infraction noted in precinct records. It may, or may not, be accompanied by a penalty.

5. Because of the possibility of their continuing cooperation with law enforcement, the names of these informants will be withheld.

6. The name of this informant has been changed to protect his identity.

7. The informant's name is withheld to protect his identity.

8. This was precisely the time Trimboli planned to use Royos in the investigation against Dowd.

9. Because of the possibility of their continuing cooperation with law enforcement, their names are withheld.

10. IAD conducts a preliminary investigation in certain cases to determine whether a full-scale investigation is warranted.
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