The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegations

Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

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CHAPTER THREE: POLICE CULTURE AND CORRUPTION

"We must create an atmosphere in which the dishonest officer fears the honest one, and not the other way around."

-- Detective Frank Serpico, Testifying before the Knapp Commission, December 1971


More than twenty years after Frank Serpico's testimony, this Commission found that the dishonest officers in the New York City Police Department still do not fear their honest colleagues. And for good reason. The vast majority of honest officers still protect the minority of corrupt officers through a code of silence few dare to break. The Knapp Commission predicted that the impact of their revelations would significantly weaken the characteristics of police culture that foster corruption. In particular, they hoped that their success in persuading a number of corrupt police officers to testify publicly about corruption would forever undermine the code of silence, the unwritten rule that an officer never incriminates a fellow officer. Unfortunately, their hope never became reality.

Police culture -- the attitudes and values that shape officers' behavior -- is a critical component of the problem of police corruption today. This Commission, therefore, was not satisfied simply to examine the types of police corruption we found to exist. The more difficult question we asked is why such corruption exists, what are the root causes and prevailing conditions that nurture and protect it, and how they can be effectively addressed. Only by examining the variety of influences and attitudes that contribute to corruption, can we assess and formulate strategies to stop it.

The code of silence and other attitudes of police officers that existed at the time of the Knapp Commission continue to nurture police corruption and impede efforts at corruption control. Scores of officers of every rank told the Commission that the code of silence pervades the Department and influences the vast majority of honest and corrupt officers alike. Although police officers who look the other way while colleagues steal property, sell drugs, or abuse citizens' civil rights may not be directly involved in corruption, they nonetheless support and perpetuate it by abandoning their professional obligations.

These aspects of police culture facilitate corruption primarily in two ways. First, they encourage corruption by setting a standard that nothing is more important than the unswerving loyalty of officers to one another -- not even stopping the most serious forms of corruption. This emboldens corrupt cops and those susceptible to corruption. Second, these attitudes thwart efforts to control corruption. They lead officers to protect or cover up for others' crimes -- even crimes of which they heartily disapprove. They lead to officers flooding Department radio channels with warnings when Internal Affairs investigators appear at precincts, and refusing to provide information about serious corruption in their commands. Changing these aspects of police culture must be a central task if corruption controls are ever to succeed.

The realities of police work bolster these corruptive features of police culture. As a society, we expect more of police officers than any other public servants. We call upon them daily to accomplish a variety of competing responsibilities. We expect them to be daring crime fighters as well as patient mediators. We call upon them to stop crime in our neighborhoods, to resolve our domestic disputes, and to act as obedient members of a paramilitary organization. Most of all, we expect them to confront physical danger and risk their lives to protect our lives and property. After a time, particularly in high-crime areas, they begin to identify the criminals they must confront every day with the community they must serve. They begin to close ranks against what they perceive as a hostile environment. Consequently, many officers lose sight of the majority of law-abiding citizens who live in their precincts. When this happens, corruption becomes easier to commit and to tolerate.

Citizens often return this hostility. With crime, drugs, and guns rampant in parts of our City, the public incorrectly faults the police. When incidents of police corruption are disclosed, the community incorrectly assumes that this is the norm. When police officers interfere with citizens' activities, the public often resents it. Police officers feel this resentment. What the Knapp Commission observed in its time is just as applicable today:

Nobody, whether a burglar or a Sunday motorist, likes to have his activities interfered with. As a result most citizens, at one time or another, regard the police with varying degrees of hostility. The policeman feels, and naturally often returns, the hostility. [8]


Faced with this resentment, the dangers of their work, and their dependence on other officers for their mutual safety, police officers naturally band together. Often to such a degree that officers become isolated from the outside world. They socialize with and depend upon fellow officers not only on the job, but off. An intense group loyalty, fostered by shared experiences and the need to rely on each other in times of crisis, emerges as a predominant ethic of police culture.

This loyalty ethic itself is not corruptive. Loyalty and trust are vital attributes that promote effective and safe policing. We cannot ask police officers to abandon their loyalty to each other while simultaneously demanding that they confront danger for us.

But group loyalty often flourishes at the expense of an officer's sworn duty. It makes allegiance to fellow officers -- even corrupt ones -- more important than allegiance to the Department and the community. When this happens, loyalty itself becomes corrupt and erects the strongest barriers to corruption control: the code of silence and the "Us vs. Them" mentality.

The Code of Silence

The pervasiveness of the code of silence is itself alarming. But what we found particularly troubling is that it often appears to be strongest where corruption is most frequent. This is because the loyalty ethic is particularly powerful in crime-ridden precincts where officers most depend upon each other for their safety each day -- and where fear and alienation from the community are most rampant. Thus, the code of silence influences honest officers in the very precincts where their assistance is needed most.

The pervasiveness of the code of silence is bolstered by the grave consequences for violating it: Officers who report misconduct are ostracized and harassed; become targets of complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear that they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis. This draconian enforcement of the code of silence fuels corruption because it makes corrupt cops feel protected and invulnerable. As former police officer Bernard Cawley testified at the public hearings:

Question: Were you ever afraid that one of your fellow officers might turn you in?

Answer: Never.

Question: Why not?

Answer: Because it was the Blue Wall of Silence. Cops don't tell on cops. And if they did tell on them, just say if a cop decided to tell on me, his career's ruined. He's going to be labeled as a rat. So if he's got fifteen more years to go on the job, he's going to be miserable because it follows you wherever you go. And he could be in a precinct, he's going to have nobody to work with. And chances are if it comes down to it, they're going to let him get hurt. (Tr. 138)


Rat: A member who violates the Omertá.

-- Italian Mafia Lingo, by fanabala.com


In his public hearing testimony, another corrupt officer, Kevin Hembury, concurred:

If you're labeled a rat, especially early in your career, you're going to have a difficult time for the remainder of your career in the New York City Police Department. You do not want to be labeled a rat. You will be the recipient of bad practical jokes, even things more serious than practical jokes. Then, to leave or request to leave the environment that you were in, wouldn't be the end of this labeling that you had. Phone calls would be made to wherever your final destination was in the Department. Your name traveled with you. It was something you couldn't shake. (Tr. 87)


Dozens of honest officers similarly told the Commission about their fears of breaking the code of silence. Lieutenant Robert McKenna, a highly decorated Lieutenant with twenty years experience in the Department, testified about this view at our public hearings:

Question: What is the consequence of breaking this silence?

McKenna: The cops are ostracized at times. They're held away. They're pushed off to one side. They're kept away from the rest of the group. I could almost say it'd be like the effects of a divorce. You're separated from your family. You're alone over here. Your family, the cops, are over there. (Tr. 80)


The Commission interviewed a number of officers who suffered the penalties of being labeled a rat. Their names will be withheld for obvious reasons. A captain we interviewed spent thirteen years as a police supervisor, a Field Internal Affairs Unit investigator, and a duty captain, or "shoefly," in Brooklyn. He was a stern disciplinarian who often disciplined his subordinates for misconduct and reported allegations of corruption to Internal Affairs. During the course of his career, he was assigned to thirty-eight different commands throughout the City. In almost every case, on the very day he arrived to report for duty at his new command, he found evidence that his reputation had preceded him. At one command, his locker was burned; at another, his car tires were slashed; at another, he received threats of physical harm.

In another case, a detective who served in Internal Affairs was transferred to a precinct detective squad. In his first week, his new colleagues made sure he knew that he would be alone on the street. They placed dead rats on his car windshield, stole or destroyed his personal property, and told him directly that he could not count on them in times of danger. The constant harassment eventually led the detective to seek psychological counseling and restricted duty.

The inculcation of police culture begins early in police officers' careers, as early as the Police Academy. Police Officer "Otto," an officer assigned to a high-crime precinct who agreed to testify publicly before the Commission only in disguise because of the code of silence, told us that he learned about the code of silence while he was still a recruit at the Police Academy:

Question: How do police officers learn about this wall or code of silence?

Otto: It starts in the Police Academy, and it just develops from there.... It starts with the instructors telling you never to be a rat, never give up your fellow officer. It starts with other recruits telling you they'll never give you up, and it just goes on down the line as you go through N.S.U. [Neighborhood Stabilization Units] and into a precinct. (Tr. 14)


And, while still recruits, police officers learn the harsh lessons of violating the code of silence. One former recruit told us that while in training at the Academy, she made a complaint to Internal Affairs about the lewd remarks an Academy instructor constantly made to her and other women recruits. Despite assurances of confidentiality, Internal Affairs informed Academy supervisors of her complaint. Within days, she was ostracized by her fellow recruits (even those who had been her friends) and Academy personnel. Her isolation was made so complete that she was forced to finish her Academy training on her own. When she graduated, the Department assigned her to Internal Affairs because it was unlikely she would be accepted anywhere else in the Department. Her dream to become a cop became a nightmare because she made a single complaint about a fellow cop. Within a year, she resigned from the Department.

The fear of violating the code of silence can even lead an officer to accept the blame and punishment for the acts of a fellow officer. Hembury testified to an incident when, still a rookie, he and a partner stopped a motorcycle for a number of traffic violations. Because the driver became irate, Hembury's partner thought he would teach him a lesson by removing a spark plug coil to disable the engine. Eventually charges for damaging the motorcycle were wrongly brought against Hembury, not his partner. But the code of silence compelled Hembury to accept the punishment -- a loss of fifteen vacation days -- for something he did not do. Hembury knew that the punishment for breaking his silence would be far worse than the punishment for police misconduct:

Hembury: ... And the spark plug I had nothing to do with. But yet these charges were brought against me. I took the hit [punishment], lost my fifteen days, and that was the end of it.

Question: So you took a fifteen day hit all because you just could not be labeled a rat and tell the truth about who was really responsible for damaging the motorcycle?

Hembury: That's correct. (Tr. 89)


There is a tragic irony to the code of silence which provides both the greatest challenge -- and hope -- in combatting corruption. Although most honest cops will not report serious corruption, they despise corrupt cops and silently hope that they will be removed from the ranks.

Hope cannot be a virtue any more than fear; one fears and one hopes, according as one receives a promise or a threat. As for charity, is it not what the Greeks and the Romans understood by humanity, love of one's neighbour? this love is nothing if it be not active; doing good, therefore, is the sole true virtue.

-- Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary, by Voltaire


Recently, the Internal Affairs Bureau's Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit shared with the Commission the results of a series of enlightening discussions conducted with groups of police officers about their perception of police values and corruption. Remarkably, although patrol officers openly expressed disgust over corruption and hoped corrupt officers would be fired, they nonetheless are highly reluctant to report corruption, even if it involves drugs and weapons. The Internal Affairs report states:

Extremely serious allegations including drugs and weapons were not viewed differently by most of the participants. Members were consistent in their reluctance to officially report these transgressions. Officers were of the opinion that the discovery and the official reporting of criminal allegations and serious misconduct would not elevate them in the eyes of their peers. These officers believed they would be perceived as 'rats,' not to be trusted. The consensus was that if an individual reported serious matters they would likely report minor infractions as well. The fear of being labeled a 'rat' and subsequently divorced from police culture has a seemingly powerful, negative impact on reporting corruption. This reveals a whole new dimension to the code of silence: it does not always reflect solely tolerance for corruption or a misplaced group loyalty. In many instances it is motivated purely by self-interest and self-protection: a fear of the consequence of breaking the norms of loyalty and silence.


Thus the most devastating consequence of the code of silence is that it prevents the vast majority of honest officers from doing what they inwardly want to do: help keep their Department corruption free. It is not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off the job. The consequences of corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints their reputations, destroys their morale, and, most important, jeopardizes their very safety.

What is surprising is that despite these devastating consequences, honest cops refuse to help eliminate corrupt cops from their Department, even though they are the principal victims of police corruption. Again, Police Officer Otto, like scores of his colleagues, made this point clear:

Question: What is the impact of corruption on honest cops?

Otto: It hurts them. It disheartens them. It makes them not want to work.

Question: Do you believe that it endangers their safety on the street?

Otto: Well, put it this way. I wouldn't want to run across a drug dealer who's been ripped off one time too many.


Despite corruption's threat to their safety and their genuine desire to work in a corruption-free Department, officers view reporting corruption as an offense more heinous and dangerous than the corruption itself.

Honest officers who know about or suspect corruption among their colleagues, therefore, face an exasperating dilemma. They perceive that they must either turn a blind eye to the corruption they deplore, or risk the dreadful consequences of reporting it. The Commission's inquiries reveal that the overwhelming majority of officers choose to live with the corruption.

And they have not been reluctant to admit this to the Commission. Indeed, the facts bear out what officers have been telling us for the past twenty-two months: despite years of open and frequent corruption by officers like Michael Dowd, Bernard Cawley and others, virtually none of their colleagues or supervisors reported this corruption to Internal Affairs.

If the Department ever hopes to make lasting improvements in corruption control, it must do something it has failed to do in recent history: acknowledge that the code of silence exists and take steps to overcome it. It must rescue its members from the grip of their self-created predicament. From first-line supervisors to Internal Affairs, it must provide constant support and recognition to officers who, by reporting corruption, choose to do what is right rather than what their culture expects of them. The Police Commissioner must make it clear that those who expose corruption will be rewarded, and those who help conceal it punished.

Finally, the Department must provide the same confidentiality protections to officers who report other officers, as it does to civilians who provide information about criminals. There is a widespread perception among officers that this is not the case. Many officers told us that they would not report corruption because the Department does not provide the same basic protections to officers as it does to civilians assisting the Department. This communicates a powerful message: that the Department is not really interested in enlisting the police in the fight against corruption. Until this changes, no reforms will ever change the attitudes that underlie the code of silence.

"Us vs. Them"

The code of the "blue fraternity" extends beyond the "blue" and into the communities they police. The loyalty ethic and insularity that breed the code of silence that protects officers from other officers also erects protective barriers between the police and the public. Far too many officers see the public as a source of trouble rather than as the people they are sworn to serve. Particularly in precincts overtaken with crime, officers sometimes view the public as the "enemy." Officer Otto explained:

Question: Is there an attitude prevalent among police officers that ... protects them against other people who might report corruption on their part?

Otto: Yes. It's an 'Us vs. Them' mentality. See, we're all blue, and that we're in this together and we have to protect each other no matter what.

Question: And I suppose what you're saying is the police officers are the 'us,' and who is the 'them'?

Otto: Everybody else.


While the "Us vs. Them" mentality is most powerful in crime-ridden precincts, often with large minority populations, it is not confined to these precincts. We found that this attitude exists, in varying degrees, in many precincts in the City -- and begins to develop early in an officer's career. The Commission's inquiries show that, like the code of silence, the "Us vs. Them" mentality starts when impressionable recruits and rookies are led to believe by veteran officers that the ordinary citizen fails to appreciate the police and that their safety depends solely on their fellow officers. Officers learn early on that they must protect themselves from the public. This includes always having an excuse ready for citizens' complaints:

Question: Did you learn anything right at the Academy about the attitude or mentality of being a police officer?

Dowd: Well, yeah. Certain things you do pick up, and I guess you would say it was an 'Us against Them' theme .... [T]hat was one of the terms used in the Academy, 'CYA,' -- I'm sorry -- was the way they phrased it. In other words, have an answer for any situation you come across; and, if you have an answer, it always helps to have another police officer there to back it up....

Question: Who imparted this message to you, Mr. Dowd?

Dowd: Our instructors. (Tr. 32)


This attitude is powerfully reinforced on the job when recruits become full-fledged officers and interact with the public every day. It creates strong pressures on police officers to ally themselves with fellow officers, even corrupt ones, rather than reaching out to the public to create supportive and productive relationships with the communities they serve. In his public testimony, Cawley gave an example of how the "Us vs. Them" mentality works in a real-life situation. He explained, in his experience, the treatment a civilian would receive at the precinct if he attempted to report an officer's brutality:

He [the Desk Officer] would give [the complainant] the paperwork to fill out. Then they'd ask him for a pen. He'd tell you listen there's a bodega across the street, go there and buy it. I'm not helping you. Then if they needed any help with [the complaint form], he wouldn't help them. Then if the person went through all the aggravation to fill out the complaint report ... they'd tell you, 'Listen, we have to get it typed now. There's a waiting line for the typing. It's going to be about three hours, so sit right there and wait.' Half the time people would say, 'Three hours, you got to be crazy', and they would leave. As soon as they left, he'd crumple it up and throw it right in the garbage. (Tr. 130)


We also found that the "Us vs. Them" mentality is not directed solely to members of the public. So strong are the bonds that unite officers that even other members of the Department who threaten the well-being of a fellow officer are viewed with distrust and disdain. This is one reason why Internal Affairs officers are viewed as the enemy, "unfriendlies" as they are sometimes called, who patrol precincts only to bring charges of misconduct against hard-working officers. Many officers told us that corrupt and honest officers alike attempt to thwart Internal Affairs' efforts by broadcasting their presence in their precincts, and by refusing to cooperate with its investigations.

The Commission found the code of silence and the "Us vs. Them" mentality present wherever we found corruption. This helps explain how groups of corrupt officers can openly engage in corruption for long periods of time with impunity.

***

Most discussions of police culture end here. But police culture is not the only corrupting influence in a contemporary police officer's life. The pressures and influences of police work, social and political demands, as well as some of the Department's own management policies also threaten the integrity of our police by perverting their fundamental values, increasing their cynicism, and causing disillusionment about the Department's real commitment to integrity.

The Erosion of Values And Pride

Each day, New York City police officers must face the challenge of criminals, the pain of their victims, and the lure of drugs and money. Corruption is a daily threat to veteran and inexperienced officers alike. And with good reason. Today, thousands of officers face the most menacing and prolific form of corruption police officers have ever had to face: the drug trade. In precincts around the City, drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money that can be easily stolen and just as easily offered by drug dealers. Drug money is everywhere. Officers stop cars with trunkloads of cash, search apartments with closets stacked with money, and meet drug dealers who will gladly pay them thousands of dollars just to be left alone. Because many drug dealers are illegal immigrants or individuals with criminal histories, they are unlikely to complain if a police officer takes their money. When the wages of corruption are so incredibly lucrative and relatively safe, the appeal of corruption is proportionately more alluring.

Finally the Amadeus missions are the single most important piece of investigative work, other than my own experience, which I have to add to this investigation. My investigations into Amadeus have detailed the life of Albert V. Carone, a retired New York Police detective who, at his death from "chemical toxicity of unknown etiology", held the rank of full Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves. I refer you to EXHIBIT 10. I have held this man's personal phone book in my hands. In it I found the home addresses and phone numbers of DCI William Casey, Paul Helliwell, a long establish CIA covert operative connected to drugs, General Richard Stillwell and many other CIA figures.

I also found the home addresses and phone numbers of a number of Mafia figures including Pauly Castellano, head of the Gambino crime family and many other known Mafia figures. This is hard documentary evidence which is available to this Committee.

In the years before his death Carone made open statements -- admissions against interest -- to family members not only about the hands-on drug dealing roles of such figures as Oliver North, Richard Secord, Elliot Abrams, George Bush, John Poindexter, Felix Rodriguez and Chi Chi Quintero but about murder and torture. Carone frequently referred to Amadeus as the CIA umbrella governing his laundering of drug money through a host of banks worldwide. Some bank records and account numbers connected to the Bahamas and the Jersey islands still remain. He also described the operations of such Iran-Contra era drug kingpins Rafael Caro Quintero and Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. When he died in 1990 he left behind records, a passport and a great many leads which totally substantiate these allegations.

Carone and an associate, James Robert Strauss, went on many covert missions to Mexico and Central America. After one such mission to Mexico in the Spring of 1985 Carone returned home, disheartened, and told of how CIA operations had directly resulted in the murder of a DEA agent and his pilot. He was referring, of course, to Agent Kiki Camarena.

We have since obtained tape recorded statements from James Robert Strauss that Amadeus was none other than George Herbert Walker Bush. That tape is safely stored, awaiting an opportunity to be presented to the American people directly for their judgement by Carone's daughter, Dee Ferdinand.

Travel records of Strauss' insurance firm show that Strauss, a small time insurance broker and manager, routinely made frequent trips, sometimes just days apart to such cities as Paris, London, Johannesburg, Dharan, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Jedda, Lisbon, Madrid, New York and the Bahamas. In his own words he did it under orders. I have provided copies of those travel records to your committee. A former FBI agent who once served as my lawyer reviewed the records and stated that such travel expenditure could only occur on a GTR government account. I refer you to EXHIBIT 11.

Insurance executives, in statements made to me, have confirmed that Strauss was terminated in 1987 as an agency manager for his involvement with drugs. I have those statements with me now if you want them.

When Al Carone died in 1990 a funny thing happened. His NYPD pension disappeared. His military records disappeared. His life insurance policies disappeared. His joint bank accounts, held with his daughter, disappeared. Even his New Mexico driver's license and car registration disappeared. His family and his daughter were left on the brink of bankruptcy -- wiped out. Carone was buried in a New Mexico cemetery with the rank of Staff Sergeant, the highest rank he attained during the Second World War. The Army said he had never served a day since. Everybody said they had never heard of him. Nonetheless, his official military record in St. Louis is now the copyrighted report I wrote on his life in 1994 and which I have provided to this Committee.

Now for some circumstantial evidence which serves as utter damnation. Bill Tyree and the daughter of Colonel Ed Cutolo, when shown a photograph of Albert Carone, both identified him and provided Carone's daughter, Dee Ferdinand of Corrales New Mexico, with information about him which had previously been unpublished and unknown to any outside his family. Tyree confirms a direct link between Carone and the Watchtower missions in Panama as well as illegal domestic operations run from Fort Devens.

I visited Dee in 1993. At the time I told her that there was only one man who could help her. That man was a retired, but still very active, Deputy Director of CIA, Ted Shackley. Within approximately ten days of Dee's first contact with Shackley Carone's headstone was changed from Staff Sergeant to full Colonel. She possess a copy of the order so directing. She has had a number of conversations with Shackley in which Shackley has admitted to having known and worked with her father. She is only too eager to testify about them.

-- Written Statement of Michael C. Ruppert to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, by Michael C. Ruppert


Regular exposure to these and other conditions can erode the values, principles and loyalties of even initially honest and dedicated cops. Stealing money, falsifying arrest papers, protecting corrupt colleagues begins to seem less wrong, and risky. The Department has provided little pressure or support to counter these conditions in the past. Indeed, its management practices have often fueled an officer's suspectability [susceptibility] to corruption.

Officers' career paths, or lack of one, for example, have much to do with the pride and loyalty they give to the Department, and thus their ability to resist corruption. Officers who feel they have nowhere to go in the Department may also feel they have nothing to lose by stepping outside the law -- especially when there is a seeming fortune to be gained on the other side.

In many interviews, officers repeated their belief that the Department neglects to support and acknowledge them in performing their difficult and dangerous jobs. This sense of abandonment undermines officers' ability to face the challenges to integrity they face on the streets. Concern for abandonment appears worst in precincts where high crime, the rampant drug trade, and unbridled violence place officers in a position of unrelieved exposure to the temptations of corruption and brutality; and where the constant onslaught of crime makes many lose hope in their abilities to fight crime within the limits of the law. It is precisely in these high-crime precincts where temptations and frustrations are greatest, that officers most strongly believe that the Department cares little for their plight, let alone their careers.

This perception has some basis. Transfers out of these "dumping ground" precincts are difficult. Officers know that they have years ahead of them under these conditions. One way to cope, we were told, is simply to give in; to succumb to the temptations of money and drugs that surround them.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that the most notorious police corruption cases in recent years arose in the crime-infested precincts of the Brooklyn North and Manhattan North Patrol Boroughs. We recognize, of course, that it is in these precincts where the opportunities for corruption most abound. But this only explains part of the problem.

There is a widespread perception in the Department that Brooklyn North, like other crime-ridden precincts, was used as a "dumping ground" for misfit, incompetent, and undisciplined officers, many with past corruption histories. What is worse, these crime-ridden neighborhoods, where the opportunities for corruption are most plentiful, are where the need for effective policing is most urgent. It is precisely where problem, corruption-prone cops should not be placed -- and where effective, proven officers should be.

Through discussion groups, the Department has recently discovered that this combination of factors creates in officers a perverted pride in their bad reputation causing them to act it out in uniform. A recent Department report states:

One group [of police officers] in particular [... from Brooklyn North] believed that their Patrol Borough is considered a 'dumping ground' within the agency. They stated that they are regarded by officers from other Boroughs, as well as by the Department's executive cadre, as a collection of misfits, incompetents, malingerers, and undesirables inhabiting a series of 'shithouses.' This perception coexists with, and perhaps has created, a strong group identity marked by an undercurrent of perverse pride in their deviant status. Subtle evidence also emerged that at times these officers act out their deviant status for the benefit of other officers, often in a bid to demonstrate affinity for the group identity.


In the Commission's view, this dangerous self-perception is likely to exist among officers not only in Brooklyn North, but wherever the same conditions prevail and wherever the Department leaves such officers without effective supervision and support.

The magnitude of this problem was made particularly clear through the testimony of Kevin Hembury. Like so many other police recruits, Hembury joined the Department with all the right qualifications and all the right intentions. His first permanent assignment was to Brooklyn North's 73rd Precinct, a neighborhood overrun by drug dealing and violent crime. Within two years of patrolling that precinct, his world had ceased being the world of the thousands of honest police on the streets of New York, and had become a world of "scores" and "raids" -- stealing drugs, money, and guns, and conducting warrantless assaults on drug locations for personal profit.

Hembury's corruption is, of course, the result of his own bad judgment. But the lesson the Department must take from Hembury's experience is that constant, unrelieved exposure to the opportunities and temptations of corruption spawned in neighborhoods rife with drug dealing and violence may infect and destroy even the initially good cop, not just the "rotten apples." Even an officer with pride in the Department and in being an honest cop might eventually succumb to the constant nurture of a criminal environment.

The drug plague is an area in which the national interest requires results. Illegal narcotics are one of the most important causes of the dissolution of American society at the present time. To interdict the drug flows and to prosecute the drug money launderers at the top of the banking community would have represented a real public service. But Bush had no intention of seriously pursuing such goals. For him, the war on drugs was a cruel hoax, a cynical exercise in demagogic self-promotion, designed in large part to camouflage activities by himself and his networks that promoted drug trafficking. A further shocking episode that has come to light in this regard involves Bush's 14-year friendship with a member of Meyer Lansky's Miami circles who sold Bush his prized trophy, the Cigarette boat Fidelity.

Bush's war on drugs was a rhetorical and public relations success for a time. On February 16, 1982, in a speech on his own turf in Miami, Florida, Bush promised to use sophisticated military aircraft to track the airplanes used by smugglers. Several days later, Bush ordered the US Navy to send in its E2C surveillance aircraft for this purpose. If these were not available in sufficient numbers, said Bush, he was determined to bring in the larger and more sophisticated AWACS early warning aircraft to do the job. But Bush's skills as an interagency expediter left something to be desired: by May, two of the four E2C aircraft that originally had been in Florida were transferred out of the state. By June, airborne surveillance time was running a mere 40 hours per month, not the 360 hours promised by Bush, prompting Rep. Glenn English to call hearings on this topic. By October, 1982 the General Accounting Office issued an opinion in which it found "it is doubtful whether the [south Florida] task force can have any substantial long-term impact on drug availability." But the headlines were grabbed by Bush, who stated in 1984 that the efforts of his task force had eliminated the marijuana trade in south Florida. That was an absurd claim, but it sounded very good. When Francis Mullen. Jr., the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) criticized Bush for making this wildly inaccurate statement, he was soon ousted from his post at the DEA.

In 1988, Democratic Congressman Glenn English concluded that Bush's "war on drugs" had been fought with "little more than lip service and press releases." English wrote: "There has been very little substance behind the rhetoric, and some of the major interdiction problems have yet to be resolved. The President assigned...Bush to coordinate and direct federal antidrug-abuse programs among the various law enforcement agencies. However, eight years later it is apparent that the task has not been accomplished." [fn 1] No observer still stationed in reality could dispute this very pessimistic assessment.

But the whole truth is much uglier.

-- George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography, by Webster G. Tarpley & Anton Chaitkin


What made matters worse for Hembury and other officers like him was their belief that the Department had abandoned them to the criminal sub-culture that beset them everyday. In such a precinct, an officer who feels that the Department fails to care is more likely to relinquish loyalty to the Department and become corrupt, so at least his all-too-human greed can be satisfied. In Hembury's case, he made five applications for transfer out of the 73rd Precinct. Ironically, the Department finally granted his request on May 6, 1992 -- the day of his arrest.

We are, of course, making no excuses for corrupt cops. No one is to blame for their corruption but themselves. Indeed, even in the worst precincts, most cops resisted the temptations of crime. But there is an important lesson to be learned from the evidence: most corrupt cops do not join the Department to become criminals or to line their pockets with cash. The conditions they confront on the job change this view; and change their basic attitudes and principles. This is a problem not only for the corrupt cop, but for the entire Department. The Department must necessarily share the blame for this situation. It failed to take the necessary actions to keep its honest cops honest, through effective supervision, training, deterrence, personnel management and other means. It must not fail to do so in the future.

Police Cynicism

Even when faced with the powerful and frequent temptations of corruption, we rightly demand that police officers enforce the law without violating it. But the Department and society at large must acknowledge the obligation to support those who want to perform their duties honestly. In the average police officer's view, that is an obligation that is often not met. Those failures make officers cynical and, therefore, more prone to crossing the line toward corruption. We observed a good deal of cynicism among many police officers we interviewed, especially among those officers who succumbed to corruption.

For most of these officers, the reasons for their cynicism arise from the jarring contrast between what the Department and society say they want from police, and the experiences they have as police officers every day. For those officers who turned to corruption, their cynicism provides a rationalization for their corrupt activities; for those officers who remain honest, it supplies a reason to remain silent. For the police officer immersed daily in a criminal sub-culture, crime is not a political issue, it is an every day reality.

While the Department's commanders, government officials, and community groups urge police officers to be aggressive crime fighters, officers often believe that the criminal justice system is too soft on criminal behavior. Because of evidentiary rules and prison overcrowding, defendants, who officers risk their safety to apprehend, are frequently released from custody and put back on the streets within days. They see their authority being undermined and society's demand for law and order as a sham when the drug dealer they arrested on Monday is back on his street corner on Wednesday. They come to believe that true justice can only be served by their nightsticks or by insuring that the drug dealer will never enjoy his profit after they have taken it for themselves. Even officers who never resort to force or theft will close the gap between the requirements of the law and the demands of reality by falsifying the basis for arrests or searches to insure that the charges stick in what they see as the unrealistic rules of the courtroom. Simply put, they believe that integrity often makes them the only fools in a hypocritical system.

Another cause of cynicism is officers' views of Departmental policies and practices. Many officers we interviewed believe that the Department suffers from a large measure of hypocrisy. They believe that the Department's commitment to integrity is more rhetoric than reality. They also believe the Department is more responsive to political influence and media pressure than the needs and attitudes of its own officers. When officers view themselves and their superiors as political pawns rather than impartial officers of the law, they resent it and question the integrity and motivations of the very Department whose uniform they wear. Regardless of the truth of the perception, the point is such impressions are widespread and have a corrosive impact on morale, character, and integrity.

Officers' cynicism about the Department's commitment to corruption control is justified. As testimony at the Commission's public and private hearings made clear, supervising officers tip off subordinates about pending investigations or citizen complaints. On some occasions, desk officers reminded officers to add resisting arrest charges for suspects brought to the stationhouse with too many visible bruises. Obviously, a corrupt officer who sees his superiors condone his wrongdoing necessarily takes the message that being caught in the wrong is worse than doing the wrong itself. Officer Otto testified that although his commanding officer knew about corruption in his precinct, his only message to his officers was not to get caught:

I remember on one occasion, the Commanding Officer gave a speech at roll call. He stated that some of you may have problems that are so bad that you feel you have to do certain things in order to survive. And if that's the case, then do what you have to do. But if you ever get caught, don't say anything .... His message was that it was all right to steal as long as you felt that you could do it and get away with it ...


Obviously, after hearing a speech like that from a precinct commander, even the most ardent calls for integrity from a Police Commissioner will fall on deaf ears.

Favoritism is another source of officers' cynicism about the Department's commitment to integrity. Whether rightly or wrongly, many patrol officers believe that merit and seniority have much less to do with career advancement than the proverbial "hook." According to large numbers of officers, it is not what you know or how well you do, but who you know that determines advancement within the Department. Even worse, many police officers believe that for the favored "boss," the same rules of integrity do not apply. In their view, while the Department will quickly penalize street cops for minor infractions, it protects favored commanders from their own incompetence and indiscretions.

There seems to be some truth to this perception. In the past, commanders have rarely been held accountable for corruption on their watch, and some have even been promoted despite poor performances in this area. Patrol officers told us they see hardworking officers trying to scrape together a living while chiefs retire with tax-free disability pensions for ancient injuries.

Officers' cynicism toward the Department fuels the worst aspects of police culture. It further makes officers' bonds of loyalty to fellow officers, honest and corrupt alike, greater than their loyalty to the Department, and often the law.

The Department can do much to strengthen the resolve of each officer to resist the opportunity and tolerance for corruption by attacking the deep-seated cynicism too many officers feel about the Department and replacing it with an abiding respect for their Department. To do that, the Department must convince its officers that it is ready to enter a new and inviolable pact with them: unremitting support, guidance, rewards, and incentives in exchange for their professionalism and pride in a Department that is renown for its skills and integrity.

Moral Character and Fitness

Over the last ten years, rising crime and rampant fear in our communities have created a demand to place large numbers of new police officers on the streets of New York as quickly as they could be recruited and graduated from the Academy. In the 1980s, the Department graduated recruit classes numbering in the thousands. This year alone, four thousand new officers will hit the streets by summer's end. Of course, the grip of crime gives the public and public officials every reason to enlist more officers for our City. But we cannot overlook the consequences.

The moral character of an individual recruit has a great deal to do with the course of a police career and the ability to resist the erosion of values and the cynicism that come with police work. Family upbringing, education, and community values shape the character of any individual. And, as in any other walk of life, the character and integrity of our police officers will reflect the moral climate of our society. Despite this, our analysis of the Department's recruitment and screening practices revealed that the Department often does not complete recruits' background checks before they become fully-fledged police officers.

The Department thus puts scores of new officers on the streets of New York each year before determining whether they have the moral values and psychological stamina necessary to meet the demands and temptations that police officers confront each day. Overwhelmingly, officers interviewed by the Commission believe that the Department's recruitment and hiring standards have declined. They believe that many people with questionable backgrounds and character are allowed to become their fellow officers because of political pressures to hire more and more police. They believe this practice dilutes the quality of their profession and leads to corruption. Our analysis reveals that this may not be far from the truth. Of over four-hundred officers that were dismissed or suspended for corruption over the past five years, we found that a large number of them should never have been admitted to the Department -- based solely on information in the officer's personnel file at the time of application. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Most new officers, moreover, assume the responsibilities and power of a police officer before they reach the age of twenty-three. For some of them, the power that comes with the gun and the badge makes them view police work as a series of thrills and electric moments of danger rather than as steady and responsible service to the citizenry. Currently, 31 percent of the police force has five years or less experience; with the addition of four thousand new officers this year, the figure will climb to nearly 42 percent. Untested by life's experiences and striving to provide financial security for themselves and their families, the appeal of corruption and its easy profits can understandably make young, inexperienced police officers ignore their duty. It also makes them particularly suspectable [susceptible] to the most corruptive aspects of police culture. The Department must recognize the new demographics of its present-day members and take every step to insure that impressionable young officers are not indefinitely abandoned to the pressures of police work that make corruption the easy choice.

Police Unions

Police unions and fraternal organizations can do much to increase the pride and professionalism of our police officers. They also can do much to help change the corruptive features of police culture and to reorient the attitudes of their members to nurture mutual respect between society at large and police officers. Unfortunately, based on our own observations and on information received from prosecutors, corruption investigators, and high-ranking police officials, police unions sometimes fuel the insularity that characterizes police culture.

At the outset, we were disappointed at the negative reaction that some police unions had toward the Commission's work. Instead of seeing the Commission as a possible vehicle for reform for the benefit of their members, some unions automatically saw it as a threat and a device of partisan politics. For example, only a month after the Commission began its inquiries, the Captains Benevolent Association ("C.B.A.") initiated a lawsuit to dissolve the Commission and thereby thwart the Commission's investigation into police corruption. While the C.B.A. and its officers are entitled to their opinions, the Commission thought it unfortunate that a police union representing high-ranking members of the Department would attack a Commission whose mission was to investigate police corruption and to recommend means to combat it. The unfortunate result of such action is first to create a negative attitude on the part of its members toward fighting corruption within the Department and at the same time to reinforce the public's cynicism about the members of the Police Department and the officers' sense of insularity against the public. This is particularly egregious coming from the union representing the highest-ranking members of the Department. By contrast, we invited and met with many high-ranking officers of the Department who expressed great concern over the issue of corruption and their readiness to assist in formulating lasting solutions to the problem.

During the course of our work, we held discussions with officers of the Detectives Endowment Association, the Sergeants Benevolent Association, and the lieutenants Benevolent Association to gain their insights into the issue of corruption and corruption control. [9] Invariably, they all denounced corruption as a grave threat to the reputation and safety of their members.

Nonetheless, in the course of corruption investigations and Departmental administrative proceedings, police unions suffer from a conflict of interest between protecting the interests of the individual officer and promoting the larger interests of their members. Consequently, according to Department managers and prosecutors, police unions help perpetuate the characteristics of police culture that protect corrupt officers.

In particular, past and current prosecutors and Department officials told us in informal interviews that P.B.A. delegates and attorneys help reinforce the code of silence among officers who have committed or witnessed corrupt acts. According to these sources, P.B.A. attorneys often represent both targets and witnesses involved in the same corruption probes. This irreconcilable conflict of interest results in counseling their members against cooperating with corruption investigations. Of course, their advice against cooperation is automatically enforced since the same P.B.A. attorneys and delegates represent all the witnesses and targets of an investigation. Any officer who breaks ranks from this common representation is immediately known to be a cooperator. This not only impedes but, at times, imperils the progress of an investigation and may lead to stigmatizing the officer who decides to cooperate with investigators.

Of course, P.B.A. representatives must represent their members zealously. But what the P.B.A. has failed to understand in such circumstances is that its own conflict of interest does great disservice to the vast majority of its members who would be happy to see corrupt cops prosecuted for their crimes and removed from the job. Thus, by advising its members against cooperating with law enforcement authorities, the P.B.A. often acts as a shelter for and protector of the corrupt cop rather than as a guardian of the interests of the vast majority of its membership, who are honest police officers. Furthermore, the multiplicity of representation may result in the P.B.A. representative providing advice and guidance which is against the best interest of individual officers as well against the best interest of membership as a whole.

During the course of the Commission's tenure, we have observed or received information about events illustrating the wrongheaded message sometimes delivered by P.B.A. representatives. In March 1994, for example, as a result of a joint investigation with the Commission and the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District charged three officers of Brownsville's 73rd Precinct with extortion, conspiracy, and civil rights violations based on a series of unlawful searches and seizures and thefts of drugs, guns, and money. P.B.A. officials immediately denounced the arrests. In particular, one P.B.A. officer denigrated the reliability of the former police officers (all of whom were themselves members of the P.B.A.) who decided to cooperate with federal authorities, and claimed that the prosecution was orchestrated simply to justify the existence of this Commission. He described federal investigators' attempts to have the arrested officers cooperate with the investigation as "Nazi tactics." The P.B.A.'s goal should be to encourage the removal of corrupt officers rather than engaging in rhetoric designed to protect them. To the average police officer, the P.B.A.'s message was clear: the world is out to get cops so cops have to protect themselves against the world. Thus, cynicism and divisiveness grow and prosper. This serves no legitimate union interest, and certainly not the interests of its members.

The Commission received information, moreover, that certain P.B.A. delegates have attempted to thwart police corruption investigations. In one instance, according to a prosecutor, P.B.A. officials frustrated plans to use a cooperating police officer in an investigation into drug-related corruption. These P.B.A. officials had a police officer review the records of room rentals in the hotel used to debrief the cooperating officer to ascertain his identity and to verify his secret cooperation with the Bronx District Attorney. When the officer found receipts for a room rented to an official of the District Attorney's Office, it became widely known that the officer had agreed to cooperate, rendering him useless to the investigation.

In another instance, Commission investigators received information that a P.B.A. delegate warned officers in a neighboring precinct that two defendants made narcotics corruption allegations against them. The delegate not only tipped off the officers about the allegation but agreed to show them photographs of the complainants.

Police unions and fraternal organizations are powerful organizations that wield great influence among their members and in the halls of our legislative chambers. Their authority brings the obligation to educate their members about the dangers of dishonesty and corruption. In promoting and furthering their members' interest, we strongly urge police unions to join in partnership with the Department's leadership in effectively fighting corruption. With an unequivocal voice, police unions must encourage their members to report corruption and cooperate with the Department and other law enforcement agencies when it comes time to prosecute, so long as their legitimate interests and their rights are protected. If they do so, they will do much to flatten the highest barrier that exists between corruption and its most promising solution: the honest cop.

Conclusion

The code of silence and the "Us vs. Them" mentality were present wherever we found corruption. These characteristics of police culture help explain how bands of corrupt officers can openly engage in corruption over long periods of time with impunity. To achieve lasting success against police corruption, the Department must insure that its systems of corruption control strike at the root causes and conditions of corruption and not just its symptoms. To do that, the Department must transform police culture and redirect its power against concealing and perpetuating corruption. It must create a culture that demands integrity and works to insure it; an atmosphere in which dishonest cops fear the honest ones, and not the other way around -- as Detective Frank Serpico warned twenty years ago. Without it, no system of corruption control is likely to succeed. The Commission believes that such change is possible. It believes such possibility is enhanced by an independent commission trusted by all concerned.
_______________

Notes:

8. City of New York, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, Commission Report (New York: December 26, 1972), p. 6.

9. Of all the unions, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Captains Endowment Association declined our invitation to participate in discussions.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Thu Jul 10, 2014 5:26 am

PART 1 OF 2

CHAPTER FOUR: THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CORRUPTION CONTROLS

"All parts of the Department's corruption systems had been functioning terribly for years ... top commanders in and outside of Internal Affairs didn't seem too concerned about that however because it guaranteed no bad headlines ... but when they heard an independent monitoring Commission was being set up to see how they were doing in the corruption area, things started quickly changing...."

-- IAD Supervisor, Private Interview with Commission Staff, September 23, 1993


To fulfill our mandate to investigate the quality of the Department's corruption controls, the Commission made numerous requests for documents and information that set forth the Department's anti-corruption practices and performance over the past decade. We were astounded to learn that -- unlike other commands in the Department -- virtually no information on the overall performance of the anti-corruption systems existed, and the little that did was largely inaccurate. We then subpoenaed officers of all ranks who were assigned to and supervised portions of the Department's anti-corruption apparatus. We were again astounded to learn that many did not know how certain anti-corruption systems were supposed to work or how certain programs and units, many established during the Knapp Commission era, were functioning today.

The Commission therefore started from scratch in investigating and auditing what should have been the principal components of the Department's anti-corruption systems. These include: (i) command accountability and supervision; (ii) internal investigations and intelligence gathering; (iii) recruitment and screening; (iv) training; and (v) the police attitudes and culture that nurture and protect corruption. This had never been done before because -- unlike other City agencies -- the Department had been allowed to police itself alone, with no independent oversight to insure it was doing its job well.

Our investigation found a system that had virtually collapsed years ago -- and that was more likely to minimize or conceal corruption than uncover and uproot it. We found that the New York City Police Department had largely abandoned its responsibility to police itself and had failed to create a culture dedicated to rooting out corruption.

The reason for this collapse can be summarized in a few words: a deep-seated institutional reluctance to uncover serious corruption with no independent external pressure to counter it. From the top brass down, there was an often debilitating fear about police corruption disclosures because it was perceived as an embarrassment to the Department, and likely to engender a loss of public confidence. From the top brass down, there was a widespread belief that uncovering serious corruption would harm careers and the Department's reputation. As a result, avoiding bad headlines, and tolerating corruption, became more important than eradicating it.

This attitude infected the entire Department, manifesting itself in different ways throughout the ranks. It encouraged the Department's top managers to allow corruption controls to wither through neglect and denial of resources, and to allow the principle of command accountability to collapse through lack of enforcement. That encouraged local field commanders -- who can best prevent and uproot corruption because of their daily interaction with and authority over the vast majority of officers on the streets -- to ignore evidence of corruption on their watch or to transfer problem officers out of their commands. When this happens, the Department loses a powerful tool for changing the culture of the Department. It also sends a powerful message to patrol officers who are most susceptible to corruption's allure: that despite obligatory rhetoric to the contrary, corruption is tolerated in the stationhouses of this City.

This fear of corruption disclosures infected the Department's internal investigative apparatus as well. Officers of all ranks in the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD") and the Field Internal Affairs Units ("FIAUs") testified in the course of our investigation that the commanding officers of IAD -- and the top managers of the Department -- wanted to minimize the likelihood of uncovering serious corruption. One IAD detective, to whom we promised confidentiality, said he was expected to have a "see no evil, hear no evil" approach to corruption investigations. A former IAD supervisor told the Commission that IAD investigators and supervisors understood that their mission was "damage control", not uncovering serious corruption. The six-year chief of the Department's Inspectional Services Bureau, Daniel Sullivan, confirmed that the highest levels within the Department wanted Internal Affairs and local field commanders to be toothless in fighting corruption. He testified at the Commission's public hearings that:

There was a message that went out to the field that maybe we shouldn't be so aggressive in fighting corruption because the Department just does not want bad press. (Tr. 25)


Numerous officers told us that the Department's desire to minimize corruption disclosures became particularly intense after the 77th Precinct scandal of 1986, when thirteen officers were indicted on charges ranging from larceny to sale of narcotics. Although the Department's Internal Affairs Division and the Office of the Special State Prosecutor [10] investigated that case aggressively, there was a pervasive perception throughout the Department that the negative publicity it generated harmed the Department and undermined public confidence in it. The former Commanding Officer of the Manhattan South FIAU, Captain Charles Luckner, for example, told us in a private interview:

Q: What would the reaction be when there was a precinct-wide scandal? Was there some embarrassment about that?

A:. Oh sure. They didn't want it.

Q: Who didn't want it?

A:. Nobody. The Department didn't want it. [Laugh] I would say the Department didn't want it from the Police Commissioner down ... I think one of the big things, if I remember correctly, was when they had the one in Brooklyn's 77th [Precinct]. And Ward was the Commissioner. He took that as a personal affront and he wanted to know how come this thing came about. Why did this blow up into a big thing like this? Why didn't they chip off one, two, three, or four or five [police officers] . . . and it wouldn't have been a big thing. You understand. Instead of making a wholesale arrest of four or five or six officers, you know, you take one here, one there, one there, one there .... It don't make headlines [Laugh] ... That seemed to be the underlying, you know, message that sort of came down.


Chief Sullivan confirmed Luckner's conclusion. He similarly testified that "the 77th Precinct case was a black eye for the Department, and they certainly didn't want to have another one of those." (Tr. 26)

There is no mystery to the Department's reluctance to uncover corruption. No institution wants its reputation tainted by corruption and scandal. This is particularly true of police departments where top commanders typically believe that careers and morale will suffer as a result of corruption revelations.

There is another reason for the Department's reluctance to uncover corruption: its success in uprooting corruption is often viewed as failure. When it comes to uncovering corruption, the Department sees itself in a no-win situation. If it succeeds in uncovering corruption, the public and the press often take these revelations as evidence of widespread management and integrity problems. On the other hand, if it fails to uncover corruption, the Department's integrity problems fester and scandal is the inevitable result. This creates little incentive to have zealous anti-corruption efforts.

An ineffective anti-corruption system, unfortunately, gives top commanders a way out of this dilemma. As long as the Department believes that success in uncovering corruption will be viewed as a graver failure than allowing it to exist, the institutional incentive to ignore evidence of corruption will only grow. A truly independent oversight monitor offers a solution. While pressing the Department to aggressively police itself, such a monitor can also assure the Mayor and the public that corruption disclosures are evidence of the Department's success in maintaining integrity.

During the hearing, Kerik stood to answer the judge's questions about his competency to enter the plea, admitting that he'd recently been under the care of a doctor.

Then, facing the prospect of admitting to eight separate crimes, he sat down, placed his hands on the table and read from a prepared statement in a firm but quiet voice.

Although he did not admit to the first count of the indictment -- conspiring to sell his office -- he acknowledged:

* Hiding a $255,000 secret payment on his apartment renovation from a mob-linked contractor.

* Speaking with city investigators looking at the contractor's ties to the Gambino crime family.

* Lying to the White House about his involvement with the contractor when President Bush nominated him to run Homeland Security.

After his plea, Kerik was returned to the Westchester County Jail. His lawyers said they will ask that he be released in the coming days.

Kerik's plea leaves a permanent stain on the reputation of his mentor, ex-Mayor Rudy Giuliani, a potential Republican candidate for governor.

Giuliani appointed Kerik to run city jails in 1998, then to head the NYPD in 2000. Both were hailed as heroes after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and, for a time, Kerik was President Bush's nominee to run Homeland Security.

-- Bernard Kerik Pleads Guilty to Lying About Payoff: He's First NYPD Commish to Admit to Crime, by Robert Gearty





The Department's corruption controls are no longer in a state of neglect. As has been the case historically, the Department swiftly strengthened its ability and will to police itself after the creation of an independent Commission. An anti-corruption apparatus that had been neglected for a decade became the focus of resources and reforms under the glare of outside scrutiny. We applaud this commitment and have recommended measures to insure that the pressure created by independent oversight and public attention does not abate over time.

But much can be learned by examining how badly the Department allowed its anticorruption systems to unravel. It shows the inevitable consequence of leaving anticorruption efforts solely within the control of a Department that has a natural incentive to believe it will be embarrassed and harmed by the very success of those efforts.

I. THE CREATION AND CORRUPTION OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INTEGRITY SYSTEM

To understand how the Department's anti-corruption apparatus failed to work, one must first understand how it was originally supposed to work, and compare that to its actual function.

Spreading Accountability

In response to the Knapp Commission investigation of the early 1970s, Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy reorganized the Department's anti-corruption system by distributing responsibility for fighting corruption among local commanders and in a centralized Internal Affairs Division. This was the system the Department had in place until the creation of this Commission.

Both the Knapp Commission and Commissioner Murphy understood that to successfully root out corruption in the New York City Police Department, something more than just a strong central investigative capacity would be required. Strong central investigations by skilled and determined corruption fighters was important. It was a powerful way to show the Department's commitment to dealing with corruption, and to make determinedly corrupt cops think twice before engaging in corrupt acts.

But they also believed that central investigations by themselves would not be enough to deal with the problem. In their view, corruption could be successfully prevented and detected only if field commanders played an integral part in fighting corruption and were held accountable for corruption on their watch. A completely centralized anti-corruption system could not work because it concentrated accountability for corruption control too narrowly: in a centralized Internal Affairs Division, rather than in the field. Simply put, in Murphy's view, centralizing total responsibility for anti-corruption in IAD let local commanders off the hook and eliminated the best opportunity for effectively fighting corruption.

To produce a greater impact on corruption in the police department -- to find a way to penetrate and ultimately crumble the blue wall of silence -- the Knapp Commission and Murphy believed that they had to find a way to mobilize the Department's managers, supervisors, and officers into corruption fighters rather than corruption tolerators. The cornerstone of this idea became the principle of command accountability: that all commanders are responsible for pursuing corruption in their commands and will be evaluated firmly but fairly on their performance.

The difficulty was finding some way to make this abstract principle a reality in the daily lives of the managers, supervisors and officers of the Department. The principle had to become real rather than rhetorical. To achieve this, Commissioner Murphy made some important organizational changes in corruption control within the Department.

To hold commanders responsible for corruption in their commands, they had to have the tools and resources to effectively uproot it. Murphy believed this could best be accomplished by giving them an investigative capacity. He created the FIAUs -- local, field internal affairs units -- that investigated corruption in the patrol boroughs and special commands. They reported directly to both the local borough or field commander and to IAD. In principle, the FIAUs therefore were a crucial component of the anti-corruption apparatus, that existed until the time this Commission was created.

Murphy also recognized the need for some centralized entity to conduct important or sensitive investigations and to assist the FIAUs. He therefore established a centralized IAD with three primary functions: to oversee and assist the FIAUs; to investigate serious, complex and highly-sensitive allegations of corruption; and to conduct intelligence-gathering and trend analysis for the FIAUs and IAD. This system was touted as the premier anticorruption structure in the nation -- and was emulated by law enforcement agencies both nationally and internationally. This system existed unchanged until it was restructured during the Commission's tenure in January 1993.

Despite the virtues of this system, there were two fundamental flaws that contributed to its downfall. First, although command accountability was the linchpin of the anticorruption apparatus, no institutional mechanism was ever put into place to enforce it. Its enforcement depended solely on the Police Commissioner's dedication and adherence to that principle. If the Police Commissioner did not enforce a policy of holding commanders accountable when corruption was detected, no other person or unit within the Department accepted responsibility for carrying out that important function. Over time, enforcement of command accountability completely broke down.

Second, although IAD was responsible for overseeing the entire FIAU structure and insuring its effectiveness, no institutional mechanism was ever put into place to oversee IAD and insure its successful performance. [11] The assumption was simply that the top brass would be responsible for overseeing IAD and the Department's entire anti-corruption apparatus. That worked fine for a time. But the system relied exclusively on police managers' commitment to integrity, rather than on institutionalized oversight. Once public attention and Departmental priorities shifted elsewhere, the Department's interest in corruption control began to wane. So too did any oversight of and commitment to IAD -- or to any component of the anti-corruption apparatus. Over time, the system began to decay. Officers in and out of Internal Affairs adopted the attitude that its work was not only unimportant, but that its success was perceived as a thorn in the Department's side.

When IAD's performance began to wither, so too did the entire FIAU structure. Vital resources were denied to IAD and the FIAUs; quality officers, for the most part, avoided assignment to these units; and the performance of these operations was well below what would have been tolerated in any other command. Given the Department's natural reluctance to uncover corruption, no top commander within the Department attempted to reverse the system's decline -- or, of course, alert the public as to the state of its corruption controls.

The specific time when the Department's corruption control system collapsed is difficult to answer. The erosion was gradual. Interest in integrity issues was naturally at its height during the Knapp Commission era and slowly diminished over time. Our inquiries focused primarily on the past decade, largely because of the availability of documents, files and witness recollections.

By the time this Commission commenced its inquiries in September 1992, only the skeleton of Murphy's system remained. Units and systems existed only on paper and had no direction or responsibilities in practice. This state of affairs was allowed to continue because it appeared to protect the Department and satisfied its top commanders. No one in the Department had any incentive to fix what had broken, until their feet were held to the fire of public scrutiny.

The New Anti-Corruption Apparatus

Early in the Commission's life, after the revelation of officer Michael Dowd's corrupt activities as uncovered by the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Commissioner Raymond Kelly completed his own investigation of the state of the Department's corruption controls. He too found that the anti-corruption apparatus had completely collapsed, and that the FIAU structure had eroded. He decided to reform the system and centralize the Department's internal investigative function. He therefore combined the FIAUs and IAD under one new bureau called the Internal Affairs Bureau ("IAB"). IAB is responsible for investigating all allegations of serious corruption, intelligence-gathering, and corruption trends analysis.

Some have argued that in centralizing the investigative apparatus, the Department has eliminated its only tool for keeping local commanders accountable: the FIAUs. But this assumes that a field investigative capacity is the only way to keep local commanders accountable. We do not necessarily agree. While we are convinced that command accountability is vital to corruption control, we do not believe that a decentralized investigative structure is the only way to reach that goal. Indeed, we found that placing the investigative capacity for police corruption in the control of local commanders was often counterproductive. Field commanders have a built-in incentive to contain corruption disclosures, and not pursue corruption with zeal because of fear of an adverse impact on their careers.

We found that many of the FIAUs were so overwhelmed with work and had so few resources that it was virtually impossible for them to investigate police corruption. This was no secret to some borough commanders who, along with IAD, were responsible for overseeing the FIAUs' operations and allocating resources and personnel to the FIAUs. But ineffective FIAUs served a protective function for borough commanders: they minimized the likelihood of serious corruption disclosures. We also found that, in practice, the FIAUs were rarely used as a management tool to keep borough or precinct commanders accountable. Although the FIAUs initiated some of their own investigations, they primarily investigated complaints assigned to them by IAD.

We are convinced that corruption controls can only be effective if local field commanders are made responsible for fighting corruption. We have concluded, however, that other means exist for decentralizing responsibility for fighting corruption and for fairly enforcing command accountability other than the FIAUs. For example, we believe the Department can accomplish this critical task by making commanding officers, from borough commanders to local precinct supervisors, responsible not for investigating corruption -- which they rarely did in practice anyway -- but for undertaking consistent efforts to prevent, detect and report it to IAB for analysis and investigations. If borough or precinct commanders believe they have a corruption problem in their command, they must be held responsible for reporting that information to IAB, and for assisting IAB in any ensuing investigation.

In sum, we believe that the current centralized investigative structure can work so long as the Department successfully decentralizes responsibility for preventing and reporting corruption throughout the Department. We are convinced that the application of the principle of command accountability is the only way to spread the values and incentives necessary to combat corruption successfully.

***

That the Department has now reformed its internal investigative apparatus should not give us total comfort. The source of the past failures has not been eradicated, just pushed aside. As an institution, the Department will always view corruption disclosures as painful and harmful. It will always be reluctant to vigorously pursue corruption among its own; it will always hope that the investigative net it casts reels in as few corrupt cops as possible. The best evidence of this underlying institutional attitude is to look at how badly the system crumbled when there was no independent oversight. In the following sections, we present the evidence to demonstrate just that.

II. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY

Although the success of command accountability hinges on making commanders accountable for preventing and uprooting corruption in their commands, we found that the principle of command accountability had virtually collapsed in past years. Police Commissioners and their subordinates rarely evaluated a commander's anti-corruption performance, either regularly or during periods of scandal. Nor did they typically sanction or reward commanding officers for their performance in fighting corruption.

Indeed, even in the face of significant corruption disclosures in precincts like the 75th Precinct, the 73rd Precinct, and the 46th Precinct, we are aware of no commanding officers or supervisors who were sanctioned for permitting such conditions to exist in their commands.

Even worse, we found that one of the basic principles of command accountability -- that diligence in uncovering corruption will be rewarded -- had been completely perverted. In recent years, a message had filtered down from top commanders -- including Police Commissioners -- that disclosure of corruption, even that resulting from vigilant corruption fighting, would be viewed as a management failure.

That this attitude came from the top is clear. Chief Sullivan testified publicly that the message from the Department's top commanders "that went out to the field [was] that maybe we shouldn't be so aggressive in fighting corruption because the Department just does not want bad press." (Tr. 15) He went on to testify:

Some field commanders might feel it was more prudent not to address or dig out corruption faced with their impression of what the intentions of the Department was [sic] _ There was a disincentive for [field commanders] to root out corruption and, you know, to the depth that it was in the 77th Precinct _ They did not work as diligently as they could have in rooting out corruption. _ [There was a concern] that if they're going to generate bad news, and it may not be accepted at the top, this would be harmful to their careers. (Tr. 26-27)


Thus commanding officers and supervisors alike were often more interested in whether their troops were discreet than honest. In the 30th Precinct, for example, at least one high-level commander openly warned his officers to be careful if engaging in corruption: his message was to avoid getting caught, rather than to avoid the wrongdoing. In other precincts where we found extensive corruption, few supervisors had ever pursued or reported corruption even when they should have suspected or known it existed.

We also found that precinct and borough commanders viewed corruption more as a local managerial problem than a Departmental one. If they had suspicions about a corrupt officer in their command, they often attempted to solve the problem, and protect their careers, by reassignment or transfer to maintain the stability and performance of their precinct or borough. The Department should no longer allow this to occur. The Police Commissioner should clearly inform his field commanders that corruption is a Department-wide problem -- not a local one -- and local commanders' desire to solve the problem by administrative transfer must bow to the Department's desire to remove corrupt officers from its ranks.

There are three primary reasons for the collapse of command accountability. First, its enforcement is complicated and time consuming. It means more than occasionally rolling heads when corruption is disclosed so the Police Commissioner can look tough in the midst of scandal. Such a strict liability stand -- which has been the Department's sole means for dealing with command accountability in the past -- only provides incentives to conceal, bury or transfer corruption, rather than uproot it Second, no mechanism was ever instituted to enforce command accountability beyond the counter-productive, and often unfair, "heads must roll" approach. To truly enforce command accountability successfully, and to motivate commanders to uncover rather than conceal corruption on their watch, the Department must conduct inquiries into whether corruption disclosures are evidence of commanders' poor performance in maintaining integrity or good performance in uprooting it. This requires a complete overhauling of the system of command accountability.

A third reason for the collapse of command accountability is that in the recent past, no one in the Department was eager to enforce it. Neglecting command accountability serves a self-protective function for the Department. It sends a message to local commanders everywhere that uprooting corruption need not be a concern; that turning a blind eye is acceptable. This, of course, insures that police commanders will not aggressively pursue corruption throughout their precincts -- which minimizes the chances of scandal. Consequently, one of the best tools for spreading the fight against corruption, and changing the culture that tolerates it, is lost.

We recognize that enforcing command accountability is not easy. It requires regular and special case evaluations of anti-corruption performance; it requires factual inquiries into culpability rather than reactive head rolling; and a commitment from the Department's top commanders to insure its enforcement.

In sum, successful enforcement of command accountability requires a complete reinvention of the systems for enforcing it. This is precisely what we recommend in the next chapter.

III. INEFFECTIVE FIELD SUPERVISION

Few deny that strong supervision is critical to effective corruption controls. Despite this, at the beginning of our inquiries, honest and corrupt cops alike reported that in many precincts in our City, police supervision was in a state of crisis. The Commission therefore devoted much effort to investigating the state of supervision in the Department and the attitudes and practices of supervisors today. To accomplish this, we focused on supervision in our field investigations, in interviews with corrupt officers cooperating with the Commission, and in formal and informal interviews with supervisors and commanders of all ranks in the Department. We also initiated a special supervision project in which we reviewed the Department's practices and performance in this area, and held a series of private hearings with lieutenants and sergeants who serve in precincts around the City, and whose experience in the Department ranged from nine to thirty years.

Our investigation revealed a widespread breakdown in supervision which fueled and protected the corruption we observed. In fact, in every precinct where we found corruption, we found ineffective or sparse supervision -- and a willingness by certain supervisors to turn a blind eye to corruption which they knew or strongly suspected existed. In fact, many supervisors did not believe that uprooting corruption was part of their responsibilities.

These supervisory failures are a major contributing factor to corruption and the climate of tolerance that makes it possible: it protects cops who are corrupt; emboldens those contemplating corruption; and sends a message to all that the Department is more concerned about officers being subtle than honest.

Willful Blindness

The reason for supervisors' willful blindness varies. Some believe that their superiors want them to be good administrators, not effective corruption fighters. Others believe that uncovering corruption would harm rather than help their careers, as the collapse of command accountability has proven. Other supervisors -- particularly inexperienced ones -- not only believe that their reputations would suffer by uncovering corruption, but that their lives would be made miserable by their subordinates. They find it difficult to make the leap from patrol officer to "boss." They still want to win acceptance and cannot shake their concern that they would suffer repercussions from their subordinates for reporting corruption. So powerful are these attitudes, that many sergeants admitted that they would not openly report even serious corruption among their troops.

The facts bear this out. Despite the open and frequent corruption of Dowd, Hembury, Cawley, and many 30th Precinct officers, Department records and interviews indicate that their supervisors did not report their knowledge or suspicions about corruption to Internal Affairs. While most supervisors claim ignorance of the facts, the Commission finds it hard to believe that at least some supervisors failed to know about the open, group corruption of these officers. [12]

Performance Evaluations

Not only have many supervisors neglected their anti-corruption responsibilities, but many have even abandoned their responsibility to evaluate officers in their command -- and to flag "problem" officers for the Department. Indeed, in our supervision project, supervisors admitted that performance evaluations were typically boilerplate, and not intended to flag problem officers for the Department or their superiors. Indeed, we found that performance evaluations often covered suspected corruption problems. The case of Michael Dowd presents a classic illustration of this problem. Michael Dowd testified that when he had reached the height of his career as a corrupt officer, was using drugs and drinking on the job daily, had not made a single arrest in one of the most crime-ridden precincts in the City, was driving a red Corvette and living an openly lavish life-style from his illicit drug profits, his supervisor gave him a "meets standards" evaluation and said he could one day be a "role model" for other officers. His evaluation was as follows:

Image

NYPD EVALUATION OF MICHAEL DOWD, 1987 (75TH PRECINCT)
RATER COMMENTS: This officer has excellent street knowledge: relates well with his peers and is empathetic to the community. This officer could excel within the New York City Police Department and easily become a role model for others to emulate if he maximized his inner drive to fulfill job responsibilities to the fullest. Must improve attendance and arrest activity. Good career potential.


The supervisor's explanation for this evaluation at a private hearing was that although Dowd was a disciplinary problem, he was changing his ways. Dowd, like many other openly corrupt officers with whom we spoke, reported that this lack of strong supervision and many supervisors' apparent willful blindness made him believe that he could "do just about anything and get away with it" (Tr. 150)

Resource and Management Failures

But field supervisors are not the sole culprits here. The Department's management is largely to blame for this state of supervision. Indeed, it is the Department's past Police Commissioners and top managers who, through their inaction and silence, permitted this situation to exist. It is the Department's top commanders who let supervisors off the hook and let command accountability wither. It is true that past Police Commissioners had other important priorities and concerns and they carried these out with skill and efficiency. But that does not excuse their failure to maintain strong supervision and command accountability.

The Commission found that supervisory conditions and resources were often so poor that even supervisors committed to fighting corruption could not do so successfully. For example, although sergeants are often in the best position to know about, confront, and deter corruption, conditions often prevented them from doing so.

We observed a critical shortage, and misallocation, of sergeants within the Department. This caused unmanageable ratios of supervisors to subordinate officers ("spans of control") in many precincts. Virtually all of the sergeants we interviewed testified that their spans of control were too large to effectively supervise their subordinates. Despite the fact that experts informed us that the proper ratio of sergeants to officers should be one sergeant for every ten officers, we found that in some precincts, sergeants were routinely responsible for supervising over thirty patrol officers spread throughout the precinct.

It was also not uncommon for supervisors to be responsible for simultaneous supervision of officers assigned to two separate precincts. Indeed, one former sergeant in the 75th Precinct testified that during her probationary period as a new sergeant, she was routinely the only sergeant on duty responsible for supervising the crime-ridden and corruption-prone 75th and 73rd Precincts where Dowd, Hembury and their corrupt colleagues were assigned. One lieutenant assigned to a busy precinct had recently been given the impossible task of being the sole supervisor for three precincts on a Saturday night. The only support the lieutenant was provided: two walkie-talkie radios. What this means is that in reality a vast number of officers, often in the most corruption-prone precincts, carry out their jobs without any supervision at all -- as these officers know all too well.

To make matters worse, we also found that sergeants typically perform a host of administrative duties that require them to devote more time to paperwork than to the field. In many high-crime precincts, sergeants do no supervising at all. Besides their long list of administrative duties, many sergeants were routinely responsible for handling calls for service ("radio runs"), not in a supervisory capacity, but merely to fill in for busy patrol officers who are supposed to handle these calls. One sergeant from a Queens precinct testified in a private hearing that it was not unusual for her to respond to a number of runs in a single tour: "The only difference between me and one of my people in that situation was that as a sergeant I got driven to the job by a driver." A patrol sergeant in a busy Bronx precinct indicated that it was not unusual for him to handle ten radio runs himself while simultaneously attempting to carry out his long list of supervisory duties. Even worse, the evidence indicates that this problem is often most severe on weekends and on late tours of duty -- when corruption opportunities are more frequent -- because fewer officers are available to handle the volume of radio calls. Under such conditions, it is practically impossible for sergeants to know what their subordinates are doing at any given time.

Moreover, sergeants have suffered a considerable dilution of authority over recent years. When forced to perform the duties of their subordinates, it is difficult for sergeants to establish the authority they need to be effective supervisors. As one patrol sergeant testified: "The result is that cops look at the sergeant running around handling the same jobs they are. He's not supervising; he's just another pawn and his authority suffers."

The Commission found additional reasons for this dilution of authority among supervisors, particularly sergeants. In today's Department, sergeants are younger and less experienced, and often have strong allegiances to the officers under their command rather than to the Department's management. Currently, an officer may take the sergeant's examination after only eighteen months of experience -- i.e., immediately after his term as a probationary officer expires. As a result, many sergeants have great difficulty establishing credibility and command authority. They find it difficult to effectively control and discipline officers with whom they are friendly, or seasoned veterans by whom they are intimidated. In short, in many commands throughout the Department today, sergeants are no longer perceived by officers -- or themselves -- as "bosses."

What is particularly troubling about these supervisory failures is that they are often most acute in those crime-ridden precincts where corruption opportunities most abound, and where effective, experienced supervisors are most needed. Many officers reported that Department commanders often assigned sergeants and other supervisors to high-crime precincts without regard to prior experience, training or the needs of the particular command. Too often, inexperienced, probationary sergeants were assigned to busy, corruption-prone precincts where experienced and proven supervisors were most needed. This practice is even more alarming because the Department also often sent those officers with disciplinary problems, those most susceptible to corruption and most in need of effective supervision, to these crime-ridden precincts -- which are widely perceived as the Department's "dumping grounds.

Integrity Control Officers

We also found that the Department failed to support the very supervisors responsible for helping to insure integrity in our City's precincts: the Integrity Control Officer ("ICO"). This is the one precinct supervisor responsible for assisting commanders with corruption detection and prevention. What began as a sensible program to minimize corruption has become an administrative failure. The ICO position is currently regarded as one of the least desirable and rewarding positions in a precinct. Most lieutenant ICOs we interviewed candidly told us that they spent little time controlling corruption and most of their time tending to paperwork and administrative matters. They typically described their job as a secretary to the precinct commander rather than as corruption fighters. Most ICOs had few resources, and received little training in what their duties are, much less in how to conduct corruption investigations. In fact, ICOs are rarely, if ever, consulted about internal investigations in their commands -- even though many have valuable information that could assist Internal Affairs investigators.

Some claim that ICOs have been kept ignorant of corruption investigations to prevent leaks of information. Furthermore, IAD never perceived the ICOs as part of the anticorruption apparatus. This practice should change. ICOs must be selected on their ability to be trusted with confidential information, and they must be given the resources, training and authority to carry out their important jobs throughout the Department.

***

The Commission recognizes that policing is an activity that inevitably makes "close supervision" more of a myth than a reality. We also recognize that even close supervision will not be a panacea to end corruption: determined corrupt officers will succeed even under the best supervisors. But effective supervision is a vital element of corruption control. That element has been sorely lacking in the past.

In recent months, the Department has moved to correct many of the supervision problems identified by the Commission in its Interim Report and public hearings. An important function of the independent outside monitor we recommend will be to insure that this important component of the anti-corruption apparatus does not again collapse -- particularly in those precincts where corruption opportunities most abound and effective supervision is most needed.

IV. THE DETERIORATION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE STRUCTURE: THE COLLAPSE OF IAD AND THE FIAUS

The Internal Affairs Division


We found that IAD had virtually abandoned its primary functions over the past years: to investigate serious, complex and sensitive corruption cases; to oversee, assist and insure the quality of the FIAUs; and to conduct analysis on corruption trends to assist the FIAUs and itself in investigating corruption. And most alarming, no one in the Department seemed to care.

From the beginning of our inquires, IAD investigators cooperating with the Commission told us that the work ethic in IAD was to close cases with as little effort as possible. Most IAD investigators, we were told, did nothing all day. One officer told us they sit around and "eat donuts and do crossword puzzles" -- and the supervisors and commanders did little more. Indeed, the Commission conducted an anonymous survey of the work conditions and attitudes of IAD investigators which revealed that almost half of IAD investigators' time was spent on non-investigatory matters -- and most of their "investigative" work was done without ever leaving their office. The perception that most officers outside of IAD had of it was similar. IAD suffered a deserved reputation for attracting poor investigators, of focusing on petty misconduct rather than serious corruption, and on conducting "armchair investigations" -- in the comfort of their offices rather than in the field.

The facts confirmed IAD's do-nothing reputation. To begin with, it handled a negligible number -- 5 percent -- of corruption cases each year. Although IAD had approximately one hundred and fifty officers, ninety of whom handled cases, it kept a mere one hundred thirty-three corruption cases a year for itself -- and assigned all the rest to the over-burdened FIAUs. Thus, IAD investigators handled an average of two new cases a year. It is important to note that IAD's top commanders from 1986 through 1992 -- Chief Daniel Sullivan, Assistant Chiefs John Moran and Robert Beatty, Deputy Chief William Carney and Inspector Michael Pietrunti and Deputy Inspector Thomas Callahan -- were responsible for selecting or approving the quantity and quality of cases IAD and the FIAUs would handle each year.

In contrast, IAD assigned the FIAUs -- which had woefully insufficient resources and personnel -- 95 percent of all the Department's corruption cases: over twenty-five hundred a year. FIAU investigators consequently handled what even their commanders conceded was an impossible caseload: an average of 18 cases per investigator, with investigators in high-crime precincts where corruption is most frequent handling up to thirty to forty cases at any given time. The following exhibit makes this clear:

Image

IAD & FIAU: TOTAL CORRUPTION CASES/INVESTIGATORS, 1988-1992 AVERAGE
5% RETAINED BY IAD
95% SENT TO FIAUs


This massive discrepancy in caseloads could possibly be justified if IAD bad been fulfilling its mandate to retain and investigate only the most serious and complex corruption cases. The facts showed the opposite was true.

Many of the cases that IAD's top commanders decided to retain for IAD were the simple, easy-to-solve "ground ball" cases that did not require much investigative effort. In fact, we found that approximately one-third of all cases that IAD's commanders retained were allegations of petty misconduct including: officers being off-post, sleeping on duty, or misusing police parking permits. The following exhibit makes this clear:

Image

Of approximately 2,700 police corruption allegations filed with the N.Y.P.D. on average each year:
ASSIGNED TO FIAU: 95%
RETAINED BY IAD: 5%
Of the 5% retained by IAD from 1988-1991 approximately 30% are minor misconduct/abuse of department regulations including:
• Free pizza
• Off-post
• Personal use of department vehicle
• Misusing police parking permit to avoid paying tolls
• Off-duty employment as security guard
• Working out while on duty
• Drinking on duty
• Sleeping on duty
• Spends time in restaurant on duty


When questioned on this matter, however, Chief Sullivan testified that not only would IAD not keep such minor cases, but many of them should never even have been classified as corruption cases. Moreover, although IAD's chiefs received daily summaries of all IAD cases, many indicated they were unaware that IAD had so obviously abandoned its mission to investigate serious corruption.

After the creation of this Commission, IAD swiftly began to remember its mission. It began to investigate more serious cases, and retained 40 percent fewer petty misconduct cases in the year following the Commission's establishment than in the previous four years. The former Commanding Officer of IAD's Records Section, Sergeant Steven Webber, testified that he attributed this decline to the existence of scrutiny independent of the Department's chain of command.

Despite the petty nature and small quantity of IAD's cases, it nevertheless closed as unsubstantiated more than 60 percent of its cases, indicating its investigators found insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove the allegation. Most alarmingly, our investigation revealed that many of these cases were closed as unsubstantiated before all basic investigatory steps were taken.

We also found that the number of cases IAD claimed in Department records to have substantiated every year was inflated and inaccurate. To investigate this issue, a team of Commission investigators reviewed every case IAD closed as "substantiated" over the past five years. We found that in many of these cases IAD had closed the main corruption allegation as unsubstantiated, or recorded as its own an allegation substantiated by another law enforcement agency. In other words, IAD bolstered its statistics by including successful corruption investigations undertaken outside IAD.

Equally disturbing, we found that IAD's claimed substantiation rates were inconsistent, and were calculated in a manner that Lieutenant Donald Poliseno, the Commanding Officer of the IAD Analysis Unit, testified "doesn't make any common sense." In sum, although IAD's reporting lines and practices looked good on paper, in practice, they were largely a sham.

IAD's top commanders had unbridled control over the Department's investigations with no accountability. No other Division in the Department had such unreviewed discretion. Obviously when no one reviews performance or demands results, performance wanes -- as the Department's top commanders no doubt knew, or should have known.

The Field Internal Affairs Units

The Department also allowed IAD's oversight of the FIAUs to erode -- and the entire FIAU structure virtually to collapse. Although an entire IAD unit (the Staff Supervisory Unit) was, in theory, charged with overseeing and assisting the FIAUs, our inquiries revealed that IAD hardly attempted to carry out this critical task. To the contrary, the evidence shows that IAD withheld vital assistance, information and resources from the FIAUs. Numerous IAD and FIAU officers reported that IAD would not even share essential information or witnesses with the FIAUs; and that the "unwritten policy" was to deny the FIAUs access to IAD investigative files -- even those with information on officers that the FIAUs were investigating.

For example, when investigators from Manhattan South's FIAU were questioned in private interviews about a large corruption investigation they had conducted in the 9th Precinct, they learned for the first time, through the Commission's inquiries, about an IAD investigation into the very same precinct at around the same time as their investigation. In the Michael Dowd investigation, Sergeant Joseph Trimboli, the FIAU investigator who pursued Dowd for five years, testified that he first became aware of vital information that IAD had about Dowd in the course of the Commission's questioning at a private hearing.

When interrogated about this senseless practice, IAD commanders denied knowledge of this "no access" policy -- which was widely known and acknowledged by lower-ranking IAD officers and by FIAU officers of all ranks. One IAD detective, to whom we promised confidentiality, who had served in the IAD unit that purportedly oversaw and assisted the FIAUs, testified in a private hearing: "There was no sharing of information between [IAD] and the FIAUs. IAD did not trust the FIAUs at all ... [there was] fear of disclosure of confidential information that could be an embarrassment to the Department ... The evidence suggests that the secrecy IAD built around its cases was designed not to protect confidentiality, but to limit the scope and the success of the FIAUs' investigations. It also created a deep hostility and distrust that divided the Department's entire investigative apparatus.

Department commanders also crippled the FIAUs by denying them adequate resources and personnel. FIAU officers of all ranks -- from the former Commanding Officer of Brooklyn North's PIAU to officers in Manhattan South's FIAU -- testified that they simply did not have the basic equipment needed to investigate police corruption in their boroughs. One PIAU investigator told the Commission that the lack of available resources got so unbearable that she went to a local magic shop to purchase a disguise so she could conduct surveillances on foot because the FIAU cars and investigators were so well known among cops in the high-crime precincts she was investigating.

Insufficient resources, however, was only part of the problem. The volume of serious cases that IAD's top commanders -- including Callahan, Carney, Moran, and Beatty -- routinely assigned or approved for the FIAUs, coupled with the FIAUs' understandably dismal performance in investigating so many cases, further suggests that the Department knowingly sent many police corruption cases to the FIAUs to die.

For the top commanders in IAD and the Department to knowingly allow the FIAUs to become the graveyard for the overwhelming majority of police corruption cases again reflects the Department's preference to bury rather than confront the problem of police corruption.

V. FRAGMENTING, MINIMIZING AND CONCEALING POLICE CORRUPTION CASES

The New York City Police Department is nationally renown for its skill and accomplishments in criminal investigations. It aggressively pursues complex criminal investigations, employs creative and advanced investigation methods, and gathers information from every available source. This is true, we found, in all areas of investigation other than police corruption.

Minimizing Corruption Through Investigations

IAD officers and others who assisted the Commission told us early in our tenure that the Department's approach to investigating police corruption was to minimize potentially embarrassing cases by closing them before all basic investigatory steps had been taken, by fragmenting broad patterns of corruption information into isolated allegations, and by minimizing the scope of corruption they would pursue.

The evidence bore this out. We found that police corruption cases were often closed prematurely, minimized, and fragmented into separate parts, which insured that the nature and extent of corruption uncovered would be minimal. The difficult issue was to determine whether this reflected a knowing cover up, simple incompetence, or both. The Department maintained -- until our public hearings -- that the failures of the system reflected a mere lack of coordination and resources rather than willful neglect or a reluctance to uncover serious corruption. Our findings suggest that was not always the case.

Two matters presented at the Commission's public hearings illustrate how investigations intentionally were prematurely closed or fragmented to avoid a large corruption scandal.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

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PART 2 OF 2

The Michael Dowd/75th Precinct Investigation

The first is the case of former police officer Michael Dowd. The FIAU sergeant who handled this investigation for approximately five years, Sergeant Joseph Trimboli, testified both privately and publicly that commanding officers of IAD had intentionally thwarted his efforts to uncover widespread, serious corruption by Dowd and other corrupt officers in the 75th Precinct. Trimboli testified publicly that he believed that high-ranking members of the Department "did not want this investigation to exist. They wanted it to go away" because they feared another embarrassing scandal "like what had occurred in the 77th Precinct.... " (Tr. 124-25)

The Commission's investigation of the Dowd case -- which included studying thousands of Department documents and files and interviewing dozens of IAD and FIAU officers, Dowd's supervisors and precinct commanders, prosecutors, and Dowd himself -- confirmed this conclusion. It revealed that IAD knowingly withheld from Trimboli vital information and witnesses, denied him essential resources, and refused him the assistance they knew he needed to successfully investigate the Dowd case. As a result, neither Trimboli nor anyone in the Department ever substantiated a single one of the thirteen complaints filed against Michael Dowd during his ten years as a police officer. After a long career of corruption in the Department, Dowd was finally arrested in May 1992 by the Suffolk County Police Department -- not the New York City Police Department.

Former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly conducted an inquiry into the Department's failed investigation of Dowd following his arrest, at the direction of then Commissioner Lee Brown. He concluded that the failures he found were evidence of a failed investigative structure.

Our investigation revealed that the Dowd case exemplified far more than Commissioner Kelly's report acknowledged. We found that it revealed a concerted effort on behalf of the top commanders in IAD to minimize disclosure of serious, and possibly widespread, corruption in the 75th Precinct in the years immediately following a notorious police corruption scandal in the neighboring 77th Precinct. We found that the Dowd case presents a glaring example of the Department's institutional reluctance to detect and aggressively investigate corruption among its own.

Because of the historical importance of the Dowd case, and because the Commission's conclusions differ significantly from the Department's, a detailed report of the Commission's findings about that investigation is set forth in the Appendix to this Report.

The Ninth Precinct Case

The failed Dowd investigation, unfortunately, was not an isolated event. Another case presented at the Commission's public hearings shows how the top brass in the Department ordered a case prematurely closed to avoid uncovering widespread corruption in the 9th Precinct -- like the 75th, a high-crime precinct, with an active drug trade. In the Allan Brown/9th Precinct case, FIAU investigators of the Manhattan South FIAU and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office had developed a case of possible widespread narcotics-related police corruption, which was likely to uncover corruption among a closely tied network of approximately fifteen police officers, including Allan Brown.

The 9th Precinct investigation began in March 1991 when a reliable informant reported widespread narcotics-related corruption among a group of officers to FIAU investigators. The informant testified about the development of this case at our public hearings under the pseudonym, "Mr. X" Mr. X, who ran a shop in the precinct and was friendly with several of these officers, told investigators that a group of them regularly used drugs and alcohol on duty, and stole cash and drugs from local street dealers, often selling the drugs back to local dealers.

As the case developed, the objective was to infiltrate an upcoming party at Brown's home, where at least a dozen police officers with prior allegations of drug use were expected to use cocaine and engage in incriminating conversations. Mr. X had been invited to attend that party. Twenty-two days before the event, plans to infiltrate the party were complete: Mr. X and another undercover officer had been invited to the party and agreed to wear body recorders to capture conversations; the District's Attorney's Office was preparing search warrants; investigators had conducted surveillances of the location; photographs of the area had been taken; and plans for a female police undercover to attend the party were being finalized. In preparation for the arrests, under the direction of the FIAU and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, Mr. X had on three occasions successfully purchased drugs from Allan Brown.

The FIAU sergeant and detective running the investigation, Sergeant Kenneth Ferguson and Detective Alex Ferrugia, testified that they expected the case to be a huge success and possibly one of the largest police corruption cases ever made by the Department.

But the investigation was prematurely closed. Twenty-two days before the party, the Commander of the Manhattan South Patrol Borough, Assistant Chief Thomas P. Walsh, ordered the prompt arrest of Officer Brown. His order, made at the request or with the approval of IAD's commanders, gave the other 9th Precinct officers notice of the investigation, and eliminated the opportunity to make a potentially large-scale corruption case in his borough.

The FIAU investigators running the case testified that the order to arrest Brown and prematurely end the investigation was made despite the strong opposition of the FIAU investigators and the prosecutor handling the case. Ferrugia, for example, testified that his colleagues and the Assistant District Attorney assigned to the case were "dismayed" over the decision because it "eliminated the opportunity to make a precinct-wide corruption case." (Tr. 188) Moreover, none of the investigators or IAD commanding officers we interviewed could describe a single legitimate investigative reason for the order. More significant, when asked in private hearings and interviews about who directed the order, the top commanding officers in IAD and the borough, including, Chief Daniel Sullivan, Deputy Inspector Thomas Callahan, and Chief Thomas Walsh, all suffered from memory lapses.

What is clear, however, is the Department policy that governed. An order to arrest a police officer would have required the approval of the Chief of Internal Affairs, Robert Beatty, or the Chief of Inspectional Services, Daniel Sullivan. Yet both contended in private hearings and interviews that they had no recollection of who approved the decision to arrest Officer Brown. [13]

Several investigators and supervisors told the Commission that they concluded the investigation was put to a premature end to avoid a precinct-wide corruption scandal and its consequences to the Department. The evidence supports this conclusion. From the beginning of the investigation, IAD showed a special interest in this particular case. In fact, as the investigation progressed, IAD called an unusual high-level meeting with various officers, including Detective Ferrugia, Captain Charles Luckner, his commanding officer, and high-ranking IAD officers, including Deputy Inspector Callahan, and IAD's Executive Officer, Deputy Inspector Daniel Byrne. In Ferrugia's ten year career in the Manhattan South FIAU, he had only been called to IAD for such a meeting once before. That too was in the course of another potentially large corruption case.

IAD's top commanders also were well aware of the potential scope of the 9th Precinct case. At that meeting, the FIAU officers briefed IAD about the potential scope of its investigation. FIAU investigators made clear that it had the potential to be another 77th Precinct case. The IAD commanders asked to be briefed regularly on the details and progress of the case -- which they were. The evidence indicates that IAD's top commanders knew about the target party and that the success of this investigation hinged on it taking place.

Captain Luckner told the Commission in a private interview that, although he personally was not influenced by this attitude (as his subordinates confirmed), the top commanders in IAD and the Department did not want large scale cases -- like the 9th Precinct -- to succeed. The message from the top was to "fragment" cases: "instead of making a wholesale arrest of four, five, or six officers you ... take one here, one there .... It don't make headlines," he said.

IAD's Deputy Inspector Thomas Callahan confirmed Luckner's perception. He testified that when he heard about the case and the planned infiltration of the barbecue, he thought about the embarrassment and "sensational" headlines it would cause. He testified that the publicity would have been "outrageous," especially because the event was to take place in Staten Island:

Question: When you said before it would get into some headlines when they got to the party, what did you mean?

Callahan: Well it would be outrageous that so many, if there were what was alleged, that there was going to be a group of officers, was it cocaine or marijuana?

Question: Yes.

Callahan: It was cocaine. It would be just, unbelievable, basically. I mean sensational, especially in Staten Island where it's, you know, stories -- if a police officer sneezes over there, they put that on the front page. This would be outrageous to have something like this occur. Because, you know, to think that officers would be engaged in this kind of activity and so many at an open event in the backyard. Interesting in that way. I live there. I'd have to walk around probably explaining. I mean that goes on now. The conduct of officers in the Bronx and Queens and Brooklyn and so forth, with people that I know, because when the story hits the paper, sensational cases, everybody looks to you, the police department, as something's wrong. You're part of this kind of thing.


Finally, when asked why the case was shut down twenty-two days before the target date, not a single IAD commanding officer could provide a legitimate investigative reason. Some commanders, including Chief Walsh, said the order might have been issued because once they had evidence of an officer using drugs, the Department usually arrested the officer immediately. The evidence, however, suggests that this was a mere pretext for stopping a potentially scandalous case.

The Department had hard evidence of Brown's drug use thirty-two days before the order was issued, when Mr. X first bought drugs from Brown and captured incriminating conversations on tape. Department records also indicate that there were numerous allegations of drug use against former officer Brown spanning more than ten years. Moreover, three years earlier, it was recommended that Brown be terminated from the Department. Instead, he was placed on disciplinary probation for one year. During his probation, he was found to be in possession of false documents, was given a "below standards" evaluation, and there were allegations that he was regularly intoxicated while on duty and associated with known felons. Nonetheless, he remained on the job.

To argue that the Department suddenly decided that they had to dismiss him immediately -- twenty-two days before he could lead the Department to a large group of other allegedly corrupt officers -- is hardly convincing. If removing one drug-abusing corrupt officer from the job was so important, eliminating over a dozen drug-abusing officers should have been a dozen times more important.

Concealing Corruption Through Filing and Classification Systems

The Department gave IAD complete, unreviewed power to control police corruption investigations by allowing it total discretion to decide what corruption allegations should be officially recorded and sent to prosecutors. The Commission found evidence of abuse of that power.

The Tickler File

Early in our investigation, the Commission made a request to the Department for all IAD files. In response to that request, the Department failed to produce the "Tickler File." Subsequently, the Commission received a telephone call from an anonymous IAD investigator who urged us to investigate the Tickler File. He told us this file was used to conceal corruption allegations from the other divisions of the Department, and sometimes from prosecutors. He also said that concealing corruption cases in the Tickler File, and by other means, was not uncommon in IAD.

The evidence largely bore this out. Although IAD top commanders -- including Chief Sullivan -- testified in private hearings that the Tickler File contained no unrecorded corruption cases because such a practice would be "tantamount to killing" a case and concealing it from prosecutors, our investigation showed that this statement was untrue.

The Commission found in the Tickler File approximately forty corruption cases over the past five years that had never been recorded in IAD's official records, or sent to prosecutors. Approximately half of these corruption cases involved allegations against IAD or high-ranking officers, or their families; in the remaining cases we could detect no pattern to explain their inclusion in the Tickler File. Many of the Tickler File corruption cases were quite serious in nature, ranging from sale and use of narcotics, protecting drug dealers, accepting payoffs from organized crime figures, to perjury and leaking confidential information.

For example, one Tickler File case presented at the public hearings -- noted as the "Biker Babe Case" in IAD files -- contained allegations that a police officer, who was the daughter of a ranking IAD officer, used drugs, and associated with and leaked confidential police information to drug dealers. The case was never entered into official Department records, never received the "mandatory" log number that all corruption allegations purportedly receive, never appeared in the officers' personnel file, and was never referred to the Special Prosecutor's Office. Eventually, the case was closed as "unsubstantiated" without any productive investigatory steps ever having been taken. As a result, the officer is still on the job today -- with an integrity record that, until our public hearings, appeared virtually spotless. In fact, because of the concealment of these narcotics corruption allegations, this officer was assigned to a Narcotics Unit -- where she lasted about a month before being transferred for making false statements in connection with a narcotics case.

That this concealment was intentional is not in dispute. At the public hearings, former Chief Beatty conceded that the case was handled improperly and could offer no justification for its place in the Tickler File. Not a single IAD officer denied that this concealment was intentional. For good reason: the files contained a note from Chief Sullivan to Chief Beatty directing, "Don't enter this one in any records until later. Assign to whoever you think is best."

That note reads as follows:

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DANIEL F. SULLIVAN, Chief of Inspectional Services

Chief Beatty: Bob -- Don't enter this one in any records until later. Assign to whoever you think is best fit to handle it.


Interestingly, shortly after this Commission began its inquiries into the Tickler File, the Department notified us that it had been abolished.

Other Cases Not Sent to Prosecutors or Not Officially Recorded

The Commission found evidence of other police corruption cases not being recorded in official IAD files or sent to prosecutors.

First, as evidence presented at the public hearings demonstrated, although the Department is supposed to notify each District Attorney about all serious police corruption cases within his jurisdiction and provide daily "logs" of all allegations of serious corruption, we found this was not always done. Our investigation revealed that during 1991 and 1992, IAD failed to provide approximately 230 cases of serious corruption to prosecutors. These cases ranged from officers associating with and protecting drug dealers, to running license plate checks for organized crime figures and conducting unlawful raids.

Second, although all corruption allegations are supposed to receive "C" numbers [14] and an official entry into Department records we found some serious corruption cases that were given "No C" designations by IAD's commanding officers, including allegations of officers dealing drugs, protecting drug dealers, committing thefts. One "No C" case included an allegation of theft against Alfonso Compres, an officer recently arrested in the 30th Precinct. A "No C" designation means the case does not contain a specific corruption allegation, is for information only, and is not to be sent to prosecutors. Thus, IAD did not forward these cases to prosecutors or enter them in official IAD records. When questioned in a private hearing, an IAD officer who supervised the unit that handled some of these cases, lieutenant John O'Brien, testified that he did not know why some of them were given "No C" designations, which were approved by IAD commanders.

Third, we also found that IAD all too readily classified police corruption allegations as "police impersonation" cases, and sent them to investigative commands outside Internal Affairs where they typically "died on the vine," as Sergeant Webber told us. In past years, approximately 10 percent of all allegations that came through the Action Desk were classified "police impersonations," often on no other basis than the Action Desk officer's uninformed judgment. IAD classified approximately 1,500 police corruption allegations each year as police impersonation cases.

The Commission's review of 4500 police impersonation cases for one year revealed many serious corruption allegations that IAD should not have categorized at the outset as police impersonation cases. Indeed, an early case against a former police officer and convicted murderer, Robert Cabeza, was incorrectly labeled as a police impersonation case. Other allegations classified as police impersonation cases included officers protecting drug dealers, unlawfully raiding apartments, and using drugs -- the identical type of wrongdoing the Commission uncovered through its field investigations. The result of these misclassifications: the total "official" number of annual police corruption allegations is minimized, and many police corruption cases are never investigated as such.

On the morning of Sunday, November 27, 1989, just after first light, the call came over Detective William Oldham's radio. "Ten-thirty," the dispatcher said. "Robbery in progress, 560 Wadsworth Avenue, cross streets 183 to 184, apartment 5G." Oldham was pulling out of the precinct parking lot on Broadway and 182nd Street in the Washington Heights section of upper Manhattan on his way to breakfast at his favorite diner. A Sunday-morning robbery was unusual, Oldham knew, and 7 a.m. was far too early for most criminals to be out and about. The call sounded like it matched a pattern of impersonator robberies he had been working for months. Two male Dominicans, mid-thirties, one short and muscular and carrying a large black automatic, the other tall and skinny and armed with a silver revolver, were robbing drug dealers by impersonating NYPD narcotics detectives. They operated first thing in the morning, like real cops out to hit a stash house, giving themselves the element of surprise and the appearance of authenticity. The performance of the impersonators was so convincing that the victims sometimes couldn't tell if they were being stuck up by cops or robbers.

Oldham turned uptown and picked up his radio. "Three-Four RIP responding," he said. The 34th Precinct, or Three-Four, covered the west side of upper Manhattan in a stretch from 155th Street to 225th Street, making it one of the largest precincts in the city. Oldham was assigned to Three-Four RIP, the Robbery Identification Program. In the late eighties, the area known as Washington Heights was the cocaine capital of the United States, making it one of the most dangerous and crime-ridden places anywhere. Crack, the admixture of baking soda and coke that makes a crackling sound when cooked (thus the name "crack"), was invented on the streets of Washington Heights. A predominantly Hispanic neighborhood, the avenues were lined with grand old nineteenth-century apartment buildings fallen on hard times. Known as Little Dominica, the area was densely populated, saturated with restaurants, money remittance shops, and bodegas, many of them fronts for laundering illegal money made by peddling cocaine. Dealers were everywhere, operating openly on stoops and in lobbies and on street corners. The police in the Three-Four were overwhelmed, so there was no shortage of action for an ambitious young detective like Oldham.

A "pattern" amounted to two, three, or more robberies with the same modus operandi and physical descriptions of the suspects. Oldham had been investigating these particular impersonators for months. The last robbery in the pattern had occurred a week earlier, another dawn raid of a drug dealer's residence. Oldham had arrived at the scene of that crime as the ambulance pulled up. The dealer was discovered dead, his back welted with burn marks. His daughter, a five-year-old, had her mouth and eyes duct-taped, and had been hog-tied by her ankles and wrists. Oldham had tests run on the hair and fibers on the duct tape. He had canvassed the streets for witnesses. He had talked to his CIs -- confidential informants. He had used the descriptions of the perps to eliminate other robberies he thought were unrelated -- some of them possibly the work of real cops, in particular a police unit nicknamed "local motion."

The investigation revealed that the pattern crew operated like narcotics detectives. They talked to their snitches in the neighborhood, gathered intelligence on dealers, sat in cars on upper Broadway running surveillance. They went after crack dealers, money launderers, people who ran the local su-sus -- the informal banks where the poor people of Little Dominica borrowed small sums of money. The impersonators were often mistaken around the neighborhood for real plainclothes cops. They had detective shields, scanners, NYPD raid jackets, bulletproof vests in case they got in a shootout with the drug dealers -- or the cops who came to arrest them. They often forced the doors of apartments, weapons drawn, and entered with the speed and precision of experienced detectives. Once inside, they rousted the bleary-eyed dealers and worked methodically. First they cuffed their victims with the cheap toy metal cuffs for sale in local bodegas -- the cops called them Mickey Mouse cuffs. They duct-taped the dealers' mouths. They gathered the occupants into one room, leaving a member of the crew to guard the prisoners while the others conducted the search for a "trap" -- the compartment built under the floorboards or into a closet or wall where cash and cocaine were stored. Dondi estan Lasdrogas? they yelled. Where are the drugs? Dondi esta la caja? Where is the money box?

Impersonator robberies had become a plague in Washington Heights in the late eighties, going down once or twice a day. It was impossible to know the true numbers because the victims were often drug dealers and they would rarely report a robbery, unless a neighbor called 911 or they were shot or stabbed or a large amount of money or drugs was taken -- and the sums involved were frequently huge, involving hundreds of thousands of dollars and kilograms of cocaine. For the most part, the so-called victims would take care of the problem themselves by trying to find out who had ripped them off and going after them themselves. The main reason the robberies came to the attention of the police at all was that midlevel dealers needed to get a complaint report number from the police so they could prove to their suppliers they had truly been stuck-up. Having been fronted drugs with little or no money down, as was a common practice in the cocaine business, the dealers were terrified that their wholesalers would think they had staged the robbery themselves to avoid payment.

Oldham's crew of impersonators were particularly vicious. If the dealers resisted, or refused to give up their trap, the crew tortured them. The Dominicans -- "Domos," cops in the Three-Four called them -- used hot irons and knives heated on stoves to burn the backs of the dealers. Once, they drilled a three-inch drill bit into the back of a man's head and left it there after they fled with his stash. In the end, if the dealers still wouldn't give away their trap, the perps might shoot everyone in the apartment, murdering three and four people at a time.

By mid-November, the impersonator pattern had gone fallow. It was one of three patterns Oldham was working, along with a dozen single robberies of liquor stores and bodegas in the neighborhood. Cases came and went in the normal rhythm of the robbery squad in the Three-Four. Waiting for a break was a big part of police work. There was pressure from superior officers to close cases quickly -- to say a complainant was uncooperative, or all leads had been exhausted, or to reclassify the pattern as larceny or burglary so it was no longer on the books of the Robbery Squad. But Oldham dragged cases out. It was his nature. He didn't see the point of getting rid of cases. The aim was to solve the problem, not accumulate good stats or impress the bosses. The longer he had to look at a case the more he would understand the pattern and its elements. Playing for time gave him greater odds of getting lucky. Not an early riser, Oldham had come to work early that Sunday morning by chance but he was still thinking about the pattern and he was ready to take advantage of a break. Luck was like that: you make your own.

The call to Wadsworth and 183rd Street was only three blocks north of the precinct house. Oldham sped through the deserted Sunday-morning streets, making it to the job in under sixty seconds. The building was an eight-story tenement, with a dingy, cavernous yellowed marble lobby covered with graffiti. There was an elevator but Oldham didn't take it; he didn't want the elevator to open and find himself face-to-face with the bad guys. Oldham drew his gun, a five-shot Smith & Wesson, and took the stairs up five flights. He stood outside the door of apartment 5G listening. Inside, a man was screaming in Spanish. He was being beaten and pleading for his life.

Waiting for backup, Oldham had no way of knowing exactly what was going on inside the apartment. Two uniformed officers responding to the call emerged from the stairway and joined Oldham in the hallway. Oldham banged on the door loudly and identified himself: Police! Polida! The screaming stopped. A few seconds passed and then the door opened. Oldham and the two other cops backed away, guns aimed at the door. A heavyset Dominican man, bleeding profusely from the head, his hands cuffed behind him, was shoved out and fell to the floor. The door shut again. One of the uniformed cops started kicking and beating the victim for no apparent reason other than the fact that he was probably a drug dealer and, therefore, no victim at all. Oldham turned for a moment and watched the random, brutal violence -- the kind of thing that happened in the Three-Four all the time -- and returned to the door and the job. Usually, when the police arrived at an apartment, the perps knew there was no way to escape and would give up. This time, it was going to take force to get whoever was in there out.

Oldham signaled and stepped aside and let one of the uniformed cops kick the door open with one sharp blow near the lock. A dimly lit twenty-foot hallway lay ahead, bathroom to the left, living room at the end. Oldham and the other cop entered the hallway. Police working Washington Heights made forced entries often. The frequency and routine led to a dangerous nonchalance. Oldham had not waited for more backup. He did not gain cover by taking the bathroom first. The truth was that he was half expecting to find real narcotics detectives in the apartment. Making his way along the hall, the last thing Oldham wanted was to get in a shootout with fellow officers.

-- The Brotherhoods: The True Story of Two Cops Who Murdered For the Mafia, by Guy Lawson & William Oldham


Regardless of the motive, quantity or nature of these concealed cases, the critical point is that such systems, practices, and policies were permitted to exist at all -- and for so many years. Numerous witnesses from within IAD as well as a variety of law enforcement agencies testified that had an independent oversight entity regularly audited IAD, this abuse of authority would not have persisted.

Favoritism Toward High-Ranking Officers

The Commission also found that IAD applied a double standard when it came to investigating corruption allegations against high-ranking officers. This is no secret in the Department. Throughout our investigation, officers told us that the regular practices and procedures do not apply in investigating ranking officers. We found that this is often true. For example, as Chief Beatty testified in a private hearing, when a high-ranking officer who is the subject of a corruption investigation is questioned as part of the investigation, the normal rules do not apply. Although Department guidelines mandate that the questioning of all subjects be recorded, this is not always adhered to for high-ranking officers. Moreover, such questioning is typically conducted not by the Internal Affairs investigator handling the case, but by an officer of at least equal rank -- who might have no other involvement with the case. The potential for abuse is clear.

Two cases in particular illustrate the problems of favoritism and special treatment.

Scalabrino Case

The first is the case of Inspector Peter Scalabrino, the former Commanding Officer of the Staten Island Detective Bureau. In that case, Scalabrino was accused of improperly interfering with a homicide investigation involving the son of a long-time friend. who was reputedly a member of organized crime. Allegedly, after meeting the suspect's father in his office, Scalabrino called in the two detectives assigned to the investigation. He told the detectives that his friend had accused them of harassing his son. At around the time of this meeting, the homicide investigation ground to a halt. IAD initiated an investigation of Scalabrino's actions and closed it as "unsubstantiated."

A team of Commission investigators examined this case. They received all of the investigative files and worksheets, and conducted a series of private hearings with the IAD officers who investigated and supervised the case. The Commission concluded that IAD superficially investigated the Scalabrino case. One important basis for closing the case as unsubstantiated was an interview of the subject by Inspector William Carney. Although documents indicated that the interview had been recorded, no records of that interview were in the case files. When the Commission subpoenaed the actual audio tapes of the interview -- which are a crucial part of the investigatory file and case record -- we were told the tapes had disappeared. Nor purportedly did any transcript exist.

Our investigators further concluded that IAD never fully investigated Scalabrino's actions, and, in fact focused more on the actions of the homicide detectives -- although they were not even part of the complaint. Indeed, the IAD closing report, signed by Chief Beatty, stated that while Inspector Scalabrino might have exhibited poor judgement, he did not act improperly. The two homicide detectives, however, were far more harshly criticized for their performance in the case. The case illustrates what many have said was the attitude among IAD's top commanders: that Chiefs can do no wrong.

Simonetti Case

Another case that illustrates practices of favoritism is the case of Assistant Chief Tosano Simonetti. In December 1993, IAD received an anonymous allegation that Chief Simonetti, the Commanding Officer of the Staten Island Patrol Borough, had abused his authority by improperly voiding the arrest of a campaign worker who was arrested on Election Day for, among other things, unlawfully campaigning within one hundred feet of a polling place and harassing voters in violation of New York State Election Law. Shortly after the arrest, Chief Simonetti called the precinct house and directed that the arrest be voided. The allegation claimed that Simonetti voided the arrest in response to promises of political favors by the candidate on whose behalf the arrested individual had been campaigning. The allegation was closed by IAD as unsubstantiated.

What we found most significant about the case was how the investigation of a high-ranking officer was conducted. Although a case memorandum from the Captain supervising the case, George Templeton, indicated that the investigation had indicated violation of certain regulations in the voiding of the arrest, the case was still closed as unsubstantiated. [15] That final disposition was made only after Chief Beatty conducted a private, off-the-record interview with the subject. There were no witnesses to the interview, no recordings, and no notes summarizing it. After the interview, Chief Beatty drafted a one-page memorandum stating that no Department charges should be prepared -- without ever sufficiently providing the details for his conclusion, which differed from some of the evidence in the case file on the validity of the voiding of the arrest.

When Chief Beatty was questioned about these unusual practices in a private hearing, he confirmed that the normal practices and procedures do not necessarily apply to investigations of high-ranking officers. And, most troubling, that he knew before the interview that the case was meritless -- based on instinct, not facts. But instinct should, of course, never serve as a substitute for facts and investigations -- regardless of who the subject of an investigation might be.

VI. THE DEPARTMENT'S FLAWED INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING EFFORTS

The Commission's evidence indisputably establishes that an anti-corruption system that relies primarily on the receipt of corruption complaints -- i.e., a "reactive" system -- will grossly underestimate the extent and nature of police corruption today. The reason is simple: most victims of and witnesses to corruption and brutality do not report it to the Department.

Despite this, the Department's investigative and intelligence-gathering efforts were almost entirely reactive. The Department made little effort to gather information about corruption from sources other than complaints. It made no effort to solicit information from informants, the community, or even its own officers who know best about corruption in the Department. Indeed, the Department did virtually nothing to encourage officers or supervisors to come forward to report corruption or to break the code of silence.

The Failure to Employ Pro-Active Techniques

The Department's investigative approach to police corruption investigations minimized the likelihood of uncovering the full extent of corruption. In reviewing hundreds of police corruption investigations, the Commission found that internal investigators routinely failed to use basic pro-active investigative techniques that are routinely relied on in all other criminal investigations conducted by the Department. Internal Affairs failed to initiate its own investigations, as its mandate directed, even when faced with indications of serious corruption as in the 75th and 46th Precincts.

IAD had, in theory, a twelve-person "Self-Initiated Investigation Unit" whose function was to conduct self-generated investigations. Despite its mission, that unit conducted not a single self-initiated investigation for the five years prior to the Commission's creation. When one former commander of this unit was questioned about this blatant neglect, he indicated that no one in IAD ever expected or directed the unit to act otherwise.

Moreover, we found that IAD's investigative system reacted solely to isolated complaints. It did not pursue patterns of corruption and conspiratorial wrongdoingas was done in investigative commands other than IAD. Of course, such an approach guarantees that the full scope of corruption will never come to light.

Failed Undercover Programs: Field Associates and Undercover Operatives

The highly-touted "undercover" programs that the Department has claimed it had in place to solicit information looked far better in print than in practice. The well-known Field Associate Program -- which has the potential to be an invaluable source of intelligence and deterrence -- was poorly used and developed. This program purported to consist of hundreds of unidentified officers, who provided the Department with information about corruption in their commands. We found the Department dedicated few resources and little energy to cultivating Field Associates and developing their information to fight corruption.

Most important, we found that the Department often failed to even react to the information Field Associates provided at great personal risk. In the 30th Precinct case, for example, a field associate provided the Department with detailed information about extensive corruption in the precinct, and nothing was done about it. In fact, on one occasion he even gave IAD a sensible investigative plan to apprehend a group of cops who were raiding drug locations. He was told that IAD officers could not implement his plan because they did not have the resources and because they believed it was too dangerous.

IAD's Undercover Operative Program, which purported to place officers in corruption-prone precincts to gather and develop information on corruption and eventually testify against corrupt officers, was little more than a "paper program." Our investigation found that IAD inflated the "official" number of active undercovers, that many were never placed in corruption-prone precincts, that the program was more interested in petty misconduct than serious corruption, and that over the program's ten-year existence, it provided information which led to the substantiation of four cases -- two of which were for charges of minor misconduct.

But most troubling, we found that the undercover program often buried information about serious corruption. Certain documents from the Undercover Operative Unit, as well as the testimony of the unit's former commanding officer, Lieutenant John Becker, and information from a former IAD undercover operative, revealed that information about serious corruption was often never investigated or even officially recorded -- despite the fact that it came from one of the most reliable sources existing: fellow officers whom IAD commissioned to gather such information.

As a result of these intelligence-gathering deficiencies, the Department's official statistics on corruption reflected merely the tip of the iceberg, and inevitably its investigative efforts missed much of the problem.

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JUST THE TIP


The IAD "Action Desk"

The Action Desk serves as IAD's central in-take center for all police corruption allegations. It is where most of the 2,700 police corruption allegations are reported each year, typically by telephone. The Action Desk was repeatedly described to us as the "nerve center" of IAD. Many of IAD's top commanders, including Chiefs Beatty and Sullivan, testified that it was a vital component of an effective corruption control system. They also agreed that a poorly operating Action Desk, especially one that did not effectively solicit information from complainants, would be tantamount to "hindering" and even "killing" police corruption cases before they began.

Despite the importance of the Action Desk, our investigation revealed that for years it routinely operated in a manner that minimized the receipt of corruption information -- and actually discouraged complainants from providing information.

To assess the severity of these deficiencies, the Commission conducted an audit of the Action Desk's performance. A team of our investigators conducted a series of twenty-five tests in which they called the Action Desk at various times of the day, allegedly to report serious police corruption. To assess the Action Desk officers' efforts to solicit vital information, the investigators told the Action Desk officer that they could not decide whether to provide their names or their information.

The former Commanding Officer of the Action Desk, Sergeant Steven Webber, testified that a critical responsibility of Action Desk officers is to aggressively solicit as much information as possible from complainants, especially information on the complainant's name, subject's name and nature of the allegation. If a complainant says he or she does not know whether to provide the information, the Action Desk officer is supposed to encourage the caller to provide as much information as possible. Without obtaining such information, Webber testified, vital information could be forever lost.

Despite this, in the majority of cases, the Action Desk officer made no effort to encourage Commission investigators to provide even basic information like the complainant's name, the officer's name and precinct, or the type of corruption involved. The Action Desk officer often spoke in harsh tones that would encourage a caller to hang up. On some occasions, investigators were put on hold for long periods of time.

The following transcripts from recordings of a Commission investigator calling the Action Desk make these deficiencies clear:

IAB Officer: Internal Affairs --

Commission Investigator: Ahh, yes, ah... I'm calling because ah... I have some information about some serious corruption by ah- by two cops, but ah- you know I'm trying to decide if I should tell you- you know, to tell you people about it or not. I don't know if it's gonna be worth it or not.

IAB Officer: Well, that's your decision.

Commission Investigator: Ahhh. I don't know. I-you know, I just can't decide what- what to do, I mean.

IAB Officer: Well why did you call?

Commission Investigator: Because ...

IAB Officer: You called to tell me that you can't make up your mind whether you wauna give us information or not?

Commission Investigator: I want to -- what you think I should do?

IAB Officer: No, I can't advise you. This is your choice.

Commission Investigator: Now if I wanna - if uh- if uhm- if I wanna stay anonymous, you know, is- that better or, or . . .

IAB Officer: Excuse me?

Commission Investigator: If I wanna stay anonymous, you know ...

IAB Officer: That's your choice also.

Commission Investigator: Then ah- I don't know. I just don't know.

IAB Officer: Well when you make up your mind, if you decide to give us any of the information then call back, okay? I can't stay on the line while you try to make up your mind. We have other people calling here, who do wish to give a complaint and I have to take it, okay? I can't stay on- you're holding up the line. Either you're gonna give the information or you're not going to give it. Do you understand?

Commission Investigator: Yes, yes. I understand.

IAB Officer: Okay so, when you make up your mind. if you're going to give it then you can call back, okay, but right now you're holding up a line.
Commission Investigator: Okay. (March 5, 1993. Transcript of call)

_________

IAB Officer: Internal Affairs --

Commission Investigator: Yes, Hi, Mmmm ... I have some information regarding ah, a boss ah, in the Police Department and ah ...

IAB Officer: A what?

Commission Investigator: A boss. Mmmm ... he's Mmmm ... like a a big boss ...

IAB Officer: Right.

Commission Investigator: ... in the Police Department I'm just like, trying to decide, Mmm ... I don't know what to do really ... It's just, I haven't been able to decide what I should do with the information. It has to do with Mmmm ... him - I know he's doing so many bad things. Mmmm ... I just don't know ... Ahh ... what do you think I should do?

IAB Officer: Oh, I don't know. You have to do whatever you feel, is right. Whatever you think, you know ... It's up to you.

Commission Investigator: I know he's like heavily in corruption and - and I know his name and everything. I just - I just don't know.

IAB Officer: Well when you have the information, ahhh, let me know if you wanna decide, whenever you decide, gimme a call. Call this number anytime.

Commission Investigator: I haven't decided if I should remain anonymous.

IAB Officer: What?

Commission Investigator: I- I- could I remain anonymous?

IAB Officer: Yeah.

Commission Investigator: I think I'd feel more comfortable if I don't give my name. I know his name, I-I just-I'm just not sure if I should disclose all this information.
IAB Officer: Well, you know, I mean I can't make you. Ah hold on a minute, I got another call. Hold on.

Commission Investigator: Okay.

PUT ON HOLD 6:55 minutes

IAB Officer: Hello?

Commission Investigator: Yes.

IAB Officer: Make up your mind yet?

Commission Investigator: No, No. Ah, I was hearing like a beep. What is that?

IAB Officer: That's a tape recorder.

Commission Investigator: Oh because -- does that mean I could be identified?

IAB Officer: Ahh, not really, I mean there's voice identification. I mean ah, there's a lotta ways, if you wanna be identified. They could ah ... press a button, you find out what ah number you're calling from. There's that and there's voice identification, ya know. Hold on a minute. I got another phone call, all right.

PUT ON HOLD 3:35 minutes

IAB Officer: Hello?

Commission Investigator: Yes.

IAB Officer: Make up your mind yet?

Commission Investigator: I- I still don't know what I should do.

IAB Officer: Well can you call me back when you make up your mind because I have other phone calls coming in here. I'm pretty busy. TOTAL TIME PLACED ON HOLD 10:30 minutes. (January 9, 1993. Transcript of Call)


Moreover, despite the diverse population of New York City, the Action Desk was usually not capable of taking complaints in languages other than English. When our investigator attempted to report corruption in Spanish, the Action Desk officer told her, "No, no Spanish here. Call back 'manana.'" When she called back the next day she was similarly instructed to call back "manana." The IAD Action Desk was one of the few complaint in-take centers in the entire Department that was unable to accept complaints in languages other than English.

Sergeant Webber reported that the Action Desk's poor performance meant that potentially crucial information on police corruption was routinely lost. He agreed that such a state of affairs could not have existed had an outside entity regularly reviewed the Department's intelligence gathering efforts. The Commission is similarly convinced.

VII. THE DEPARTMENT ABANDONED ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO CHANGE THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION

We found a police culture that often tolerates and protects corruption. We also found that the Department completely abandoned its responsibility to transform that culture into one that drives out corruption. It made little effort to change the attitudes that foster corruption among the rank and file, supervisors or commanders; and it made little effort to convince anyone that its occasional pronouncements on integrity were more than obligatory rhetoric.

The Department also has done little to attempt to penetrate the wall of silence, although it is one of the major barriers to identifying and uncovering corruption. The Department never aggressively solicited information from its members. It did not reward courageous officers who came forward with valuable information; or penalize those who failed to report evidence of widespread or serious corruption about which they had personal knowledge. And it did nothing to try to educate its members as to why reporting and not tolerating corruption is essential to the Department and to them.

Indeed, we found that the first time the Department's top managers made an affirmative effort to solicit any information on corruption from its members was when this Commission attempted to do so. In July 1993, the Commission sent a letter to all members of the Department, urging them to come forward with any information they might have about corruption. That letter was to be distributed to all members of the Department with their paychecks. We later learned that another letter was attached to the front of the Commission's letter: a statement from former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, reminding all members of the Department about their obligation to report all information on corruption to Internal Affairs.

The Commission also found that the Department's practices actually discouraged members from coming forward. Many officers told us that they believe the Department did not really care if they came forward with information about corruption -- and some went further and told us they did not believe the supervisors wanted its members "ratting" on each other.

This belief has some justification. Although officers took great risks in reporting corruption, no special protections were afforded to them. Indeed, the evidence indicates that police officers who reported corruption had fewer confidentiality protections than criminal informants. It was not, for example, surprising for information about officers who reported corruption to be leaked to their precinct.

Nor did the Department make any effort to educate its recruits or veteran officers about the Department's commitment to integrity, and officers' duty to help fight corruption. We found that integrity training at the Police Academy often relied on outdated materials from the Knapp Commission era, focused on corruption hazards like gambling pads that no longer exist, and was presented as an appendage to other "more important" topics. The integrity film that was shown to thousands of recruits for years all too clearly epitomized the Department's lack of commitment to anti-corruption: a tattered, black and white film from the 1970s that focused on issues of little relevance to cops on the streets today.

Integrity training was also taught primarily by IAD officers -- some of whom had little experience in other commands within the Department. This was a mistake. Placing integrity training solely in the hands of Internal Affairs sends the wrong message to the Department about corruption controls. It fuels the perception that uprooting corruption is primarily the responsibility of Internal Affairs -- rather than the personal responsibility of every member of the Department. It fuels the perception among officers and supervisors that corruption is Internal Affairs' problem -- and not theirs. In sum, it hinders the acceptance and implementation of accountability and integrity principles that are vital to successful corruption controls.

In-service integrity training was similarly ineffective. We found that some "required" in-service integrity training was never even provided. What was offered was typically viewed by officers as boilerplate or mere prattle. In sum, we found that integrity training at all levels did little to enhance the integrity of members of the Department. It did little to encourage officers to resist the temptations of corruption. And, perhaps most important, it did little to transform a culture that tolerates and protects corruption into one that supports and rewards honesty and integrity.

Finally, the Department's action -- or inaction -- did much to nurture the climate of corruption. The collapse of the anti-corruption apparatus does more than minimize the likelihood of uncovering corruption, it fuels it. It sends a powerful message to officers of all ranks that the Department does not care about corruption; does not care about supervisors' integrity duties; does not care about police corruption investigations; and does not care to enlist the Department's vast majority of honest officers in the fight against corruption. And it does nothing to insure that officers' commitments to their Department are greater than their loyalties to their corrupt colleagues. Until the Department undertakes aggressive efforts to change these attitudes, they will continue to grow and to block integrity efforts.

The Department has begun to take its first steps in recent history to transform this culture. It is essential that these not be the last.

***

Many have suggested that such a number of simultaneous failures of the Department's corruption controls are no mere coincidence. We believe there is some truth to that. Ignorance of the full extent and nature of police corruption is perceived to protect the Department: it enables the Department to avoid acknowledging that police corruption is a serious problem in our City, enables it to deny anti-corruption efforts vital resources, and it minimizes the likelihood of uncovering widespread corruption.

The failures of the Department's corruption controls reflect the inevitable consequence of allowing the police to police themselves alone. Many of the deficiencies could have been identified and, to a large extent, prevented or remedied years ago if an independent entity had been aggressively auditing these anti-corruption systems. More important, many of these failures would never have occurred if the Department knew its anti-corruption systems would be subject to independent outside scrutiny and review -- the Department knows better than any other organization how best to police itself when it is forced to do so. The challenge we face is to create a long-term mechanism that encourages the police to successfully police themselves and to strengthen the fight against corruption on all fronts throughout the Department. We believe the internal and external reforms that follow will accomplish that objective.

_______________

Notes:

10. The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in 1972 at the recommendation of the Knapp Commission. It had city-wide jurisdiction over allegations of corruption within the entire criminal justice system, including the police department. Its sole functions were investigative. It had no responsibility or authority to oversee or audit the Department's self-policing efforts.

11. Although the Chief of the Inspectional Services Bureau, of which IAD was part, theoretically oversaw IAD, in reality no one provided an independent oversight role.

12. The Commission cannot at this time disclose the names of these supervisors because we expect that many are or will be subjects of Departmental inquiries.

13. In a private hearing, Chief Walsh testified that he could not recall who had directed the order. At a private hearing and at the public hearings, however, Chief Beatty testified that in a conversation he had with Chief Walsh after the 9th Precinct case was presented at the public hearings, he and Walsh remembered that it was Walsh who had directed the order. Beatty could not recall with certainty if and when he had approved it.

14. A "C" number signifies that IAD has classified the allegation as a corruption case requiring investigation. A "No C" designation indicates the allegation does not involve corruption.

15. In a private hearing, Captain Templeton maintained that he believed that the memorandum was a draft, and that he was not certain whether he or one of his investigators had drafted it. There was, however, evidence indicating that the memorandum was drafted by Captain Templeton, or at his direction.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

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PART 1 OF 2

CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CORRUPTION CONTROL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

"The People of New York City must know they can count on the members of their Police Department to be as honest as they are brave and able. They must know they can count on the Police Department to track down and drive from our ranks those who violate their oath and break the law."

-- Former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Testimony before the Mollen Commission, October 6, 1993


The Department must remain primarily responsible for successfully policing itself and keeping its own house in order. It must "track down and drive from" its own ranks officers who violate their oath and the law, as former Commissioner Raymond Kelly testified at our public hearings. We believe that this requires a dual-track approach: reform of the Department's internal systems for preventing and uncovering corruption, and an external, independent monitor to insure those systems are successful. The independent monitor is discussed in Chapter Six. Our recommendations for internal reforms are discussed here.

During the tenure of the Commission, the Department has begun to take significant steps to strengthen its corruption controls. The bulk of these reforms, however, has focused on improving and expanding detection and investigative efforts. While such reforms are essential, the Commission believes that the effective control of police corruption must focus on prevention as much as detection; on the root causes and conditions of corruption as well as its symptoms. Police corruption is not a problem that will be solved solely by successful investigations and prosecutions. It is a problem that must be addressed on many fronts and in the daily operation of the Department, including:

• I. Police Culture and Management
o Commitment
o Recruitment and Screening
o Recruit and In-Service Performance Evaluations
o Integrity Training
o Corruption Susceptibility and Police Management
o Police Unions
o Drug Testing
o New York City Residency
• II. Command Accountability
o Supervision
o Enforcement of Command Accountability
• III. Internal Investigations
o Internal Affairs Operations
o Recruitment of Qualified Investigators
o Intelligence-Gathering Operations
o Investigative Approach
o Organizational Structure
o Command Liaisons
o Civil Rights Investigations
• IV. Heightening Deterrence and Sanctions
o Discipline
o Department Advocate's Office
o Disability Pensions
• V. Community Outreach
o Community Policing and Community Outreach

It is these areas that are the focus of our internal reform recommendations. While the Department has begun to adopt and implement a number of these reforms during the tenure of this Commission, our objective is to guarantee their long-term success, and to set forth the full scope of reforms we believe are necessary to combat corruption and the culture that tolerates and protects it.

I. POLICE CULTURE AND MANAGEMENT

Commitment to Integrity


At the core of the Department's corruption control reforms must be an unwavering commitment to insure their success now and in the future. Without such commitment, no anti-corruption system, no matter how well devised, has a chance to succeed. The abysmal state of the Department's corruption controls that we found existed over past years should provide a lasting lesson of the absolute necessity of such commitment -- and a lasting lesson about the consequence of its absence.

Commitment to integrity cannot be just an abstract value. It must be reflected not only in the words, but in the deeds, of the Police Commissioner, the Department's top commanders, and the field supervisors who shape the attitudes of the rank and file. It must motivate all of them to send an unequivocal message throughout the Department that corruption will not be tolerated. It must make the consequences for breaches of integrity the rule, not the exception. It must result in providing integrity controls with sufficient resources and high priority in the Department's operations. It must result in all officers understanding that their loyalty to the Department's integrity must be greater than their loyalty to corrupt colleagues.

Recruitment and Screening

The integrity of the Police Department is related to a large extent on standards that insure its new recruits are honest and able. Rigorous admission standards help accomplish that objective. They also send a message throughout the Department about the absolute sincerity of the Department's commitment to integrity and the special position police officers occupy in our society. Cops must know that not everyone can become a New York City police officer if we want them to have pride in their profession and their Department.

That is not always the case. There is a widespread perception among officers of many ranks that hiring standards have fallen dramatically over the years -- and that virtually anyone can become a New York City police officer.

To assess the adequacy of the Department's recruitment and screening standards and procedures -- and to determine whether we could identify profiles of corruption-prone recruits -- a team of Commission investigators conducted an extensive analysis of the personal backgrounds of approximately four hundred officers dismissed or suspended for corruption or serious misconduct over the past six years. [16] The analysis was based on information from the officers' personnel files, the Department's background investigations, and recommendations and evaluations at the time of application. We also examined for comparative reasons general demographic and background information of random samples of officers and conducted interviews with those responsible for various aspects of recruitment and screening. We are aware of no other analysis of this magnitude ever before conducted by the Department in this area.

Applying a degree of scrutiny absent from many background investigations done by the Department, we concluded that approximately 20 percent of the officers suspended or dismissed should never have been admitted into the Department. This is based merely on information available in these officers' personnel files at the time of hiring. Numerous others should never have been admitted until certain problem areas flagged in their application, which had been ignored, were investigated. For example, 24 percent of the officers dismissed or suspended had a prior criminal arrest record. In many of those cases, there was sufficient information from witnesses, victims, arresting officers, and other sources to call into question the character and ability of the officer -- but the officer was admitted without pursuing these leads. Many other officers were admitted despite youthful offender adjudications on charges as serious as robbery, narcotics and weapons possession, and assault. One officer, for example, had been arrested and indicted for three separate robberies and pleaded guilty to armed robbery in the first degree which was subsequently converted to a youthful offender adjudication. When asked in his application why he committed these crimes, he readily admitted that he committed the robberies for the "thrill" and "excitement" of robbing someone. Eleven years later, he was dismissed for theft.

Overly lax admission criteria are partly responsible for this problem. For example, an applicant with a youthful offender adjudication for a felony is eligible to become a New York City police officer. As a result, applicants with felony assault, weapons, robbery or narcotics charges resulting in either misdemeanor convictions or youthful offender adjudications became police officers despite the underlying gravity of their conduct, only to be dismissed or suspended years later for corruption. Since the Department admits applicants as young as twenty years old and therefore has only a two-year time span in which to evaluate an applicant's adult criminal history, it must take youthful wrongdoing into greater account in admission procedures.

The Commission also found that the Department has routinely admitted applicants to the Department -- and put them on the streets as sworn officers with guns and shields -- before their background checks are complete. Eighty-eight percent of the officers in our study, for example, entered the Police Academy before the completion of their background checks -- and thus prior to a reliable determination that they were fit to be police officers. Approximately one-third of all officers were placed on the streets, before completion of their background investigations. Thus, there is a wealth of vital information that is typically unknown when an officer is given a gun and shield. For example, investigations into an applicant's work history and behavior patterns, including interviews with relatives, neighbors, friends, employers and others, are often not completed until after the applicant becomes a sworn police officer. There is rarely an opportunity, therefore, to check prior job performance, attendance records, gaps in employment or unusual behavior patterns -- all important indicators of a person's fitness to become a police officer.

This is particularly troublesome because by the time recruits have graduated from the Police Academy and become sworn members of the Department, much time, energy and money has been invested in them. Consequently, the focus of the incomplete background investigations shifts from the question of whether the applicant is qualified to be a New York City police officer to how the Department could justify dismissing a sworn police officer which carries a heavier burden of proof.

The Commission also found that even "completed" background investigations are often hastily conducted. Certain potentially problematic information is not pursued and inquiries are often superficial. Ironically, investigative standards that would not be accepted in other commands in the Department are standard operating practice when it comes to investigating potential members of the Department.

Other tools exist to strengthen background checks which the Department currently disregards. For example, unlike many law enforcement agencies -- including the New York State Police, Nassau and Suffolk County Police Departments, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation -- the Department does not subject applicants to polygraph examinations for certain topics. The Department, therefore, neglects a reliable means to ascertain whether an applicant has lied about such critical matters as drug abuse, psychological problems, past employment problems, or violent conduct -- and whether certain areas should therefore be further investigated before acceptance. In fact, the Department rejected some applicants only after it learned that other police departments had rejected them on the basis of admissions made during their required polygraph examinations. For example, one officer -- who had already been on the street for a year -- was ultimately dismissed after the Department learned that the Nassau County Police Department had rejected him after he admitted to smoking marijuana approximately 1,600 times on a required polygraph test.

In addition, although personal drug use is a widespread problem among young adults today, the Department conducts no random -- unannounced -- drug tests of applicants. They receive only the scheduled health services test which gives applicants sufficient advance notice -- and thus ample opportunity to cleanse themselves of any trace levels of narcotics. There is no reason to believe that the Department's applicant pool should significantly differ from the general population studies on drug use.
Indeed, our study showed that approximately 40 percent of all dismissals and suspensions over the past five years were drug-related, 26 percent for failing a drug test. Given the drug-related temptations and opportunities that regularly confront officers, thorough screening efforts for drug abuse are especially critical.

Although effective screening of applicants is a critical component of anti-corruption efforts, we found that applicant investigators were more committed to processing paperwork, than conducting thorough background investigations. The Department blames these delays and oversights on the heavy workload of applicant investigators. This may be so, especially since in the last two years alone, 4,000 new officers have graduated from the Police Academy -- and over 2,000 more will graduate in August 1994. But larger classes and heavy workloads do not justify sacrificing thorough screening and background investigations of Department applicants. No applicant should take the oath of a police officer before a thorough background investigation is completed by the Department. If this is not feasible, then the Department should consider contracting a portion of its background investigations to private investigative companies, as do other law enforcement agencies such as the United States Drug Enforcement Administration and the United States Customs Service.

Background investigations and admission criteria must focus more on the applicant's likelihood to be an honest officer, not merely on the minimum qualifications necessary to do the job of policing. While the evidence suggests no typical profile of a corruption-prone officer, it does suggest that certain factors sometimes indicate an officer's ability to better withstand the temptations of corruption.

For example, our study revealed that officers with a prior felony arrest record are three times more likely to become corrupt than those without such records. Six percent of the dismissed or suspended officers in our study had prior felony arrest records, as compared with 2 percent from the general Department population. This is a significant finding. It shows the need to subject these candidates to a heightened level of scrutiny in their background investigations before admitting them to the Department.

Moreover, numerous supervisors told us that older recruits and recruits with a college education or military experience are often less susceptible to corruption, have fewer absences, and achieve more rapid advancement. Many have suggested that this is because these factors often reflect a more mature, experienced and disciplined applicant. Since the minimum age requirement for New York City police officers is twenty years of age, some officers have never held a job before joining the Department. They therefore often lack the maturity, confidence and experience needed to resist peer and other pressures leading to corruption. Education and military experience also are often linked to fewer corruption incidents, not only because of what educational or military experience provides, but because the successful completion of these endeavors itself reflects a discipline, character, and level of ability.

To keep the Department's applicant pool as diverse as possible, however, minimum educational requirements ideally should be raised concomitantly with expanded opportunities to satisfy those requirements. Such opportunities already exist. The City University of New York -- N.Y.P.D. Cadet Corps ("Cadet Corps") and the Police Department's own Police Cadet Corps ("Police Cadets") currently provide promising programs that integrate a college education and police-related training for police applicants. The CUNY Cadet Corps is sponsored by the City University of New York and is administered by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in cooperation with the Police Department. It is a two-year program that allows applicants to earn their Associate of Arts degree, while participating in special supplemental classes and internships related to police work and community service. The Police Cadet program is administered by the Department and offers a similar program for those applicants who have completed two years of college toward earning their Bachelor's Degrees.

In our view, these programs produce not only better educated officers, but officers more aware of community needs and problems related to police work. When the Cadets complete their education, those who pass the final Cadet examination are admitted into the Police Academy with their degrees already in hand. These programs also provide other advantages. First, they offer the Department a two-year period of evaluation to screen out individuals poorly suited for police work.

These programs have also been highly successful in recruiting minority police recruits. Currently 59 percent of the Cadet Corps are African-American or Hispanic and more than 37 percent are women. The Police Cadet Corps has been similarly successful in recruiting minority candidates. These programs therefore offer a mechanism already in place to raise both the educational standards and opportunities of police recruits from a diversity of backgrounds.

The Commission believes that raising certain hiring standards and improving applicant screening will have a considerable impact on reducing corruption and enhancing pride in the Department. We therefore make the following recommendations:

• Raise the minimum entry age requirement from the current 20 years of age to 22 years of age.
• Raise the minimum education requirement from a high school diploma to a two-year college Associate Degree. The Department should support the CUNY /NYPD Cadet Corps Program and the New York City Police Cadet Corps Program as a primary means to satisfy that requirement and raise the education level for recruits. This will require expanding the Cadet programs for police recruits. Cadet Corps and Police Cadet graduates who have received their Bachelor or Associate Degree before reaching the age of 22 should be eligible for immediate entry to the Police Academy.
• The Applicant Processing Division must recognize concern for integrity as a principal criterion for the selection of recruits.
• Require all applicants to submit to a polygraph examination on selected topics before hiring, as do other law enforcement agencies, to identify potential problem areas that should be investigated before acceptance.
• Require random, unannounced drug testing for all applicants rather than administering drug tests as part of pre-scheduled recruit health examinations.
• Require that background investigations be fully completed before a recruit enters the Police Academy. The Department should allocate sufficient resources to insure thorough background investigations are conducted for the number of recruits to be hired. The Department should examine the benefits of employing private entities to conduct thorough and timely background investigations, as do other law enforcement agencies.
• Make misdemeanor convictions based upon felony arrests for violent and drug-related crimes and felony youthful offender adjudications for violent and drug-related crimes presumptive hiring disqualifications based on grounds of moral fitness, unless the background investigation reveals circumstances that do not justify disqualification.
• All candidates with a prior felony arrest, regardless of the disposition, should be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny by applicant processing investigators.
• Amend New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 720.35(a) to allow the Department statutory access to all official records and papers relating to an applicant's youthful offender adjudication, to permit adequate evaluation of a candidate's fitness.
• The Department's Candidate Review Board should be required to issue a statement of facts and conclusions when it rules to approve an applicant who has been rejected by the Applicant Processing Division, which conducts the background investigations.
• Expand recruitment efforts from the military services and administer Department entry examinations on military bases.
• Require applicants to furnish tax returns and other financial records of applicants to provide the basis for an analysis of the applicant's financial condition for possible use in future investigations.

Recruit And In-Service Performance Evaluations

As the Knapp Commission recognized a generation ago, often the most reliable predictors of an officer's performance first appear in recruit training and during the eighteen-month probationary period. [17] The probationary period should therefore be used as an active component of the screening process. Yet, in the past, the Department rarely used this period for effective screening. Recruits or probationary officers are seldom dismissed except for the most flagrant misconduct, which of course defeats the whole purpose of "probation." In the Commission's study of 314 officers dismissed or suspended for misconduct, forty-eight of them -- 15 percent -- exhibited poor performance at the Academy.

If the Department makes its evaluation standards more rigorous for recruits and probationers, and dismisses those who exhibit a lack of fitness or ability during these periods, it could winnow out an appreciable number of ineffective and potentially corruption-prone police officers. By doing so, the Department will not only raise the caliber of its officers, but it will underscore its message that only the finest may become New York City police officers.

But the Department's screening process should not end after an officer's probation period expires, as it currently does. In-service performance evaluations for non-probationary officers also afford the Department important opportunities to identify, screen and, where appropriate, dismiss problem officers. Despite this, evaluations are almost never used for this purpose. They are boilerplate forms that simply litter personnel files. We recognize that performance evaluations pose special problems. They are necessarily subjective and include the evaluator's personal judgments of the officer's skills, efficiency, and personal traits thought to be crucial for good performance. Therefore, performance evaluations are only as good as the evaluators who write them. For example, at the height of his corrupt activities in 1987, Michael Dowd received an evaluation that described him as having "good career potential" and as a "role model" for other officers. But performance evaluations have enormous potential to help identify problem officers. If the quality and usefulness of evaluations is to improve, the Department must hold evaluators, at all levels, accountable for their performance evaluations. Of course, no one is infallible. But evaluators must be held accountable for the honesty of their judgments and the reliability of the basis for the evaluations they endorse. We therefore make the following recommendations:

• The Department should use an officer's eighteen-month probationary period as a rigorous screening period, to evaluate, identify and reject unqualified officers.
• The Department should actively identify and screen problem officers throughout their careers and dismiss those with unacceptable performance records.
• Supervisors should be held accountable for making reasonable efforts to provide reliable and accurate performance evaluations, which should include an assessment of corruption indicators pertaining to the officer. These evaluations should be used to help police commanders identify problem officers, whose performance should be closely monitored to determine fitness for the job.

Integrity Training

Today's police officer faces temptations of corruption that require thorough training and a strong code of ethics. The Commission believes that effective training and education are critical tools for shaping officers' attitudes and motivations, generating lasting pride in their profession and their Department, and inculcating the professional and personal values necessary to create more corruption-resistant police officers.

Over the last decade, the Department's training and education programs have failed to achieve these goals. The vast majority of police officers we interviewed harshly criticized the quality of anti-corruption training they received at the Police Academy. Most officers found that their instructors were mediocre; that they lacked teaching abilities and practical experience; that they relied almost exclusively on materials from outdated lesson plans with little relevance to the challenges facing officers today; and therefore lacked credibility with their classes. They also reported that the integrity training itself was unrealistic, even comical, when compared to the opportunities and nature of corruption today. Until recently, corruption training at the Academy was still based on the kind of corruption uncovered during the Knapp Commission. To cops facing the daily temptations of the drug trade, training about gambling "pads" and vice rackets has little relevance, and sends a clear message about the Department's lack of interest in or knowledge of integrity matters.

Even worse, many officers told us that it was at the Academy where they first became immersed in the attitudes of a police culture that promote and protect corruption. In both public and private hearings, officers testified that interaction with instructors and other recruits at the Academy began their acculturation into the dynamics of police culture and the perceived necessity of self-protection and tolerance for police misconduct. Of course, it is critical that this change. Integrity training must enhance the resolve of each officer to resist the seduction of corruption and to make every effort to remove from the job those who fail to resist. That resolve must start with recruits at the Police Academy.

But it cannot stop with recruits. It must be brought to the officers already on the beat, in radio cars, and special squads who know the hard realities and temptations of police work. The Department must therefore use its field training and in-service programs to penetrate the commands and assignments where resolve against corruption is most immediately needed. Despite its critical importance, the Commission found that the Department offers little or no integrity training in field and in-service training programs. Indeed, field training instructors -- who are supposed to serve as monitors and role models for recruits during their six-month field training program -- sometimes promote attitudes that foster corruption and rarely make integrity an important priority in police training.

The message about integrity's importance must not come solely from Internal Affairs. To truly spread the enforcement of corruption controls, officers must hear that message -- convincingly -- from respected supervisors in the field as well as the Department's "corruption fighters." This will also help reduce the division between Internal Affairs and the rest of the Department.

Recently, the Department has begun to reform its recruit and in-service training programs and policies. For example, Police Commissioner Bratton has called for a civilian board of directors to oversee the curriculum and faculty of the Police Academy. Adding civilian oversight to the Police Academy could help reduce police insularity and attitudes that often lead to corruption and corruption tolerance. The Police Academy faculty should also be supplemented with civilian experts who will contribute additional insights.

As the Department begins to reshape its training programs, it must keep in mind that anti-corruption cannot simply be buried under other subjects taught at the Academy and in the field. It must have a high priority in the Department's scale of values -- and that fact must be communicated to the rank and file. Corruption can no longer be perceived as simply a matter of academic interest or a required appendage to the more "important" policing matters taught at the Police Academy or in the field. The Department can no longer regard corruption solely as a matter of individual conscience. Its training programs must treat corruption as an occupational hazard and Departmental problem. Training must expose the harsh realities of the nature and extent of police corruption today. It must inform recruit and veteran officers alike about specific corruption hazards and the reasons and means to avoid them. The Department must candidly tell officers that there have been corrupt police officers, that a number of them may still be on the job today, and that they are responsible for helping the Department to root them out.

Officers must also be taught to fear the consequences of corruption. They must learn about the devastating impact of police corruption on them, their families, the Department, and society at large. And they must be convinced -- not just taught -- about the Department's intolerance of corruption and its desire and ability to uproot it wherever it exists.

At the same time, Department training must instill in officers a deep sense of pride in their profession and their Department. They must be taught the great history and traditions of the New York City Police Department and come to identify their pride and their personal reputation with the professional reputation of the finest Police Department in the nation. All of these efforts must be repeated and reinforced regularly throughout an officer's tenure. Only then can officers' loyalty to the Department be greater than their loyalty to corrupt fellow officers. The principal goals of the Department's training programs must be to instill values of high integrity in new officers and to reinforce these values during the course of every officer's career. Ultimately, it is the integrity of the individual officer and his commitment to the integrity and honor of his Department that will best protect the Department from corruption.

During the course of our studies and interviews with law enforcement officials, we found that the Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is renowned throughout the world for its outstanding scholarship and instruction in law enforcement. It graduates agents who take lasting pride in their profession and have a life-long commitment to upholding the reputation of their agency. With the necessary resources and support, there is no reason the Academy of one of the finest police departments in the world cannot achieve the same results.

With these considerations in mind, the Commission recommends the following reforms in police integrity training and education:

• The Department should require in-service integrity workshops for all officers at regular intervals throughout their careers. The training sessions should be organized as problem-solving workshops that make participants explore corruption hazards, confront their own attitudes about corruption, and reach conclusions about how to deal with corruption and the pressures of police culture in connection with corruption and corruption tolerance.
• The Department should require special integrity training workshops for all newly promoted supervisors and commanders that focus on a variety of anticorruption issues including their personal responsibility and accountability in corruption matters, and how they can prevent and identify corruption-related problems.
• The number of hours devoted to integrity training at the Police Academy should be increased and integrated in other areas of training so that it is perceived as an important part of the curriculum, rather than a required appendage to "real" police training.
• Police Academy and In-Service integrity training should address issues of brutality and other civil rights violations, which have traditionally been ignored in integrity training.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity training should focus on confronting and solving real-life corruption problems with particular emphasis on overcoming corruptive features of police culture, particularly the code of silence and insularity from the public.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity training should be realistic and vivid. The lecture method of instruction must be supplemented with interactive methods such as workshops, group discussions, and role playing to increase the impact and believability of corruption hazards police officers face.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity courses should include presentations of real evidence of corruption, such as tape recordings, video recordings, and other material evidence gathered in internal investigations.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity training should include personal or recorded presentations by former police officers convicted or dismissed from the Department because of corruption. A central message should be the devastating consequences of corruption on these officers, their families, and the Department as well as the importance of reporting corruption.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity training should include instruction on real-life profiles of both corrupt and honest officers to demonstrate how officers should and should not behave when presented with opportunities for corruption.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity training should also focus on deterrence, including the likelihood of detection, certainty and severity of sanctions for serious corruption, as well as penalties for those who fail to report it.
• The Police Academy should require a course in the history and traditions of the New York City Police Department designed to develop pride and loyalty in the Department.
• Police Academy and In-Service Integrity instructors, including Field Training Unit supervisors, must be selected on the basis of their abilities to teach and their experience and reputation within the Department. These instructors should include high-ranking members of IAB, and should be of a caliber that will be respected and taken seriously by their audience. Integrity training, however, should not be exclusively conducted by IAB.
• The Department should use civilian faculty to conduct segments of the police training currently provided at the Police Academy, in subjects such as Law, Social Science, and Ethics. This would expose recruits to non-police viewpoints, help civilianize the learning process, and minimize in-bred group acculturation.
• The Department should seek to avail itself more fully of the excellent resources and facilities available at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
• The Department should institutionalize regular focus group discussions with officers and supervisors to keep abreast of attitudes and perceptions regarding corruption and brutality. These findings should be incorporated into Academy and In-Service integrity training.
• A recruit mentor program should be established to allow and encourage recruits and new officers to have access to experienced, honest and respected officers selected for this program. The program should be structured to encourage participation on a confidential basis by any officer with integrity concerns.
• The Field Training Program for probationary officers should be strengthened and integrity should be made an important component of that training.
• The Police Commissioner should take a personal role in addressing recruits and veteran officers on matters of integrity and the Department's commitment to fighting corruption, including personally addressing recruits and newly promoted supervisors, and periodically sending videotaped messages to field commands.

Police Personnel Management

Over the course of the Commission's inquiries a number of issues of police personnel management have stood out as conditions that either promote corrupt behavior or fail to properly acknowledge officers for their integrity. One of these issues is the steady tour/steady partner policy; another is the perception among certain officers that a number of police commands are used by the Department as "dumping grounds" for incompetent and undisciplined officers.

Most officers we interviewed believe, and our field investigations have confirmed, that steady tours have a divisive impact on a precinct and cause intensely loyal cliques to emerge among officers who constantly work and socialize together. We have observed, and many officers agree, that steady tours intensify the insularity that facilitates corruption.

Officers placed in commands they believe to be a dead end to their careers, furthermore, have little incentive to be loyal to the Department or, for that matter, to their oath. In fact, as we discussed in Chapter Three, Department inquiries have demonstrated that officers assigned to dangerous, high-crime precincts take a perverse pride in their deviant reputation and are convinced that Internal Affairs investigators and strong supervisors will not even venture into their dangerous and crime-ridden territory. They thus feel that they have free rein on the streets of their precincts.

As many police officers, police management experts, and our own investigations indicate, constant exposure to communities overrun by drug dealing and violent crime all too easily infects even the best-intentioned officers -- not just "rotten apples" -- and influences them to take the first steps toward succumbing to their worst instincts. It is unwise and unfair to leave officers exposed to this kind of environment indefinitely. Regular rotation to less intense patrol areas will do much to protect vulnerable officers from corruption.

Many police officers have also complained, moreover, that the Department does little to recognize officers who perform conspicuous acts of integrity. The institutional message they take from the Department's failure to recognize honest officers is that integrity is not a valued Department priority. The Department must do more to publicly recognize and reward honest cops.

In light of these findings, the Commission believes that the Department must dispel the belief that certain precincts are used as "dumping grounds" and must make every effort to prevent fractionalizing precincts into insular groups of officers. In addition, the Department should regularly monitor and explore police officers' morale and their prevailing attitudes and opinions about integrity and other job-related issues. It must also make officers believe that honesty and integrity are indispensable qualities of any good police officer. We recommend the following steps toward addressing these problems:

• The Department should establish a system to rotate officers' command assignments within a borough every three to five years to reduce exposure to command conditions that foster corruption.
• Implement a rotating tour of duty system to reduce the insularity that fosters corruption. Police officers should not be assigned to steady late tours for more than two years.
• Precinct commanders should rotate partners where indications of corruption exist.
• Assign proven and experienced supervisors to high-crime, corruption-prone precincts.
• The Department should insure that police officers transferred for disciplinary or administrative reasons are re-assigned equally among all precincts.
• The Department should use its program of "focus groups" to provide field commanders information regarding officers' morale and attitudes about integrity and other job-related concerns.
• The Department should establish a system to reward honest officers, and those who assist in identifying and uprooting corruption, with choice assignments, promotions, and commendations.
• The Department should conduct an annual integrity award ceremony day to publicly acknowledge officers for conspicuous acts of integrity.

Police Unions

While respecting the right of police unions to represent the interests of their members zealously, the Department must make every effort to enlist the support of union leadership in assisting the fight against corruption. And, for their part, police unions must help the Department rid itself of the men and women who do not deserve to be New York City police officers. The vast majority of police officers are honest and not corrupt. By their actions, police unions must demonstrate that the vast majority of honest officers are among the principal victims of police corruption.

Police unions speak with an especially powerful voice to their membership. Most officers see their union organizations as the guardians of their rights and interests in the face of Department rules and regulations, and an often hostile public. Consequently, unions have a high obligation to their members and the people of our City to join the Department in condemning police corruption with one voice.

Recently, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association has given a fine example of this critical message. Ten days after the arrests of fourteen officers of the 30th Precinct, the P.B.A. published a full-page message in local newspapers praising the heroism of police officers, condemning police corruption as "disgraceful and intolerable," and pledging its support to assist the Department in ridding itself of "those criminals in a blue uniform." All police unions must convey this message, not only through newspaper announcements, but in their daily dealings with their members. For example, unions would do much good by addressing the topic of police corruption at membership meetings to help educate officers about the danger corruption brings to their safety, their reputation, its impact on their families and on their capacity to perform their job effectively.

Unions can make important strides too in assisting the Department and the District Attorneys in conducting successful investigations by encouraging their members who are witnesses -- not subjects -- of such inquiries to cooperate with investigators and prosecutors. According to prosecutors, Department officials, and in the Commission's own experience in questioning police witnesses, police union representatives and attorneys advise such witnesses to give no statements unless the immunity provisions of Patrol Guide Procedure No. 118-9 [18] are in effect.

While this may be sensible advice to officers who are targets of an investigation or to those who face a risk of self-incrimination, in the case of the witness officer, it only serves to prevent law enforcement authorities from obtaining reliable evidence from those they should expect it most -- their fellow public servants. What is worse, such blanket advice puts enormous pressure on the guiltless officer -- who may want to answer questions -- not to stray from the common practice of abiding by union advice and remaining silent. In our view, police officers who are witnesses to events under investigation by a District Attorney have a special obligation to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, so long as they are allowed to consult with counsel and are given assurances that their statements will not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.

In some cases, especially those that have received public attention, silence harms innocent officers more than it helps because suspicion about their complicity grows in the absence of factual contradiction. In other cases, even officers who are subjects of investigations may see their best interest in cooperating and assisting Department investigators or other law enforcement authorities. In some instances, therefore, police officers might better protect their interests by seeking counsel independent from that provided by their union who labors under a potential conflict of interest. In light of these circumstances, the Commission recommends that the Department gain police unions' support for the following initiatives:

• The establishment of a panel of volunteer attorneys drawn from law firms throughout the City who are able and willing, on a pro bono basis, to advise and represent police officers who desire counsel independent from police union attorneys during the course of Department or other law enforcement corruption investigations.
• The promulgation of a Department order requiring police officers who are witnesses in investigations conducted by a prosecutor to cooperate and answer questions related to the matter under investigation, unless the answers to such questions might tend to incriminate the responding officer. During such interviews, officers should have right to counsel and a guarantee that any statements made in response to such questioning will not be used as evidence against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Refusal to abide by this order should result in Departmental charges.
• Police Unions should be encouraged to play a more active role in educating their memberships about the dangers of corruption to them and the Department, and in changing police attitudes that foster corruption, including the code of silence.
• Police Unions should encourage their members who are witnesses, not subjects, of criminal investigations or Departmental inquiries to cooperate with investigators and prosecutors.

Drug Testing

Overwhelmingly, police officers we interviewed expressed great concern about any drug use by fellow police officers. They understand the great danger that drug-using officers present to them and to the members of the public. Because of this, they support increasing random drug testing and a policy of immediate termination for officers who abuse drugs.

The Commission agrees. Our study shows that, in our day and age, personal drug abuse among police officers is a growing problem as it is in most other professions. Unfortunately, supplied with guns, batons, and the power of arrest, police officers who abuse drugs not only risk their own lives -- as all drug abusers do -- but the lives of their colleagues and the public. We need only conjure up the image of Michael Dowd snorting cocaine off the dashboard of his patrol car to vividly understand the great danger of drug abuse among police officers.
Random and "for cause" drug testing have proven to be effective means to remove unworthy police officers from the Department. They can also be effective tools for preventing and deterring drug use among officers. As Michael Dowd told Commission investigators, during his career of corruption he feared a drug test much more than Internal Affairs. A recent Commission study, moreover, shows that of 369 officers dismissed or suspended from the Department over the last six years, 26 percent failed a drug test.

Despite the importance of drug testing, we found that in the past such tests were given far too infrequently and were sometimes not difficult to circumvent or "beat," as some officers put it. We recognize that administering drug tests costs money. Given the grave consequences of drug use among officers and the great benefits derived from an aggressive drug testing program, however, we have concluded that this must be a priority in the Department. In light of these considerations, the Commission recommends the following initiatives:

• Increase both random and "for cause" drug testing for all members of the Department, including probationary officers.
• The Department must consistently enforce its policy of immediate dismissal for officers who fail or refuse a drug test.
• Integrity training should include instruction on the signs of drug and alcohol abuse, and the responsibility of officers and supervisors to report drug and alcohol abuse by fellow officers.
• The Department should tighten its drug testing procedures to minimize the possibility of circumventing drug tests, including enforcement of the time limitation between notification and administration of the test.
• The Department should call upon police unions and fraternal organizations to endorse publicly an aggressive drug testing program.

New York City Residency Requirement

Many have suggested that a New York City residency requirement would reduce incidents of corruption within the Department. In our study of the backgrounds of four hundred officers dismissed or suspended over the past six years, we found no correlation between residence and corruption. In fact, 77 percent of the dismissed or suspended officers we studied resided in one of the five boroughs at the time they applied to the Department.

The Commission has, therefore, concluded that while a residency requirement for police officers has other important virtues, corruption does not appear to be one of them.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sat Jul 12, 2014 2:27 am

PART 2 OF 2

II. COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY

Enforcement of Command Accountability


One of the most pervasive managerial failures the Commission has observed in the Department over recent years is its failure to maintain the system of command accountability. The cornerstone of the Department's anti-corruption strategy, command accountability requires a comprehensive commitment to successful corruption control throughout the Department, especially from field commanders. Ideally, the entire Department should be infused with values that discourage corruption. But at the very least, field commanders should be held responsible for the state of corruption within their commands. If corruption control fails, field commanders, as well as internal investigators, should answer for it. If it succeeds, they should be commended.

Successful command accountability is particularly important because it can, as it has in the past, change the organizational culture of the Department. Command accountability forces corruption control to be the responsibility of all the Department's managers and pushes anti-corruption priorities out into the field. Under this principle, protecting the integrity of police officers is vested not just in Internal Affairs but in every stationhouse in the City.

Without the principle of accountability becoming standard operating procedure throughout the Department, no system of corruption control, no matter how well devised and equipped, is likely to succeed. When the public sees groups of police officers arrested for crimes they committed while on duty and in uniform, it demands an answer to the question of how such corruption could possibly have occurred without police supervisors detecting it and making every effort to stop it. The Department must provide an answer to that question if it ever hopes to restore the public's confidence in its integrity and good faith. It also owes that answer to its own rank and file who feel they are the only targets in corruption probes, while the bosses are never called to account.

Some have argued that with the elimination of the FIAUs -- which, in theory, served as the investigative tool for field commanders to uncover corruption -- field commanders cannot fairly be held accountable for corruption on their watch.

We do not agree. As discussed in Chapter Four, the FIAUs were rarely used as a management tool by borough or precinct commanders to effectively fight corruption -- nor were they used by the Department as a basis for enforcing command accountability. We believe that command accountability need not depend solely on commanders investigating corruption through field units. Commanders can and should be held accountable for their efforts in preventing and detecting corruption, reporting it to IAD, and assisting with any ensuing investigation. They must make it clear to their subordinates that they will not tolerate corruption or the code of silence in their commands; that they will reward those who come forward to report corruption, and, when appropriate, sanction those who do not; they must insure that supervisors vigorously pursue and report their suspicions about corruption; and in particular they must use their Integrity Control Officers to monitor and identify corruption problems in the precinct, including through such means as monitoring the precinct radio, spot checking arrest scenes and identifying other corruption hazards and problem officers. When they want their suspicions pursued, commanders still have an investigative arm: the Internal Affairs Bureau. In sum, we believe the basis for fair and firm enforcement of command accountability exists -- even without the FIAUs -- if the recommendations that follow are carried out.

Enforcement of command accountability, however, is not easy. It does not simply mean that a superior officer's head must roll for every instance of corruption -- as the press and others often demand. After all, disclosure of corruption can be evidence of good, as well as poor, performance in fighting corruption. A strict liability standard -- imposing sanctions whenever corruption is uncovered -- is not only unfair but it creates incentives to conceal or transfer corruption rather than uproot it. On the other hand, subjective, conclusory decisions on liability made by commanders or chiefs is also unfair. The Department must make commanders understand that they will be judged fairly and regularly for their anti-corruption attitudes; that they will be rewarded or penalized on the basis of their actual performance in uncovering corruption -- not on the fact that corruption exists. But making such determinations requires time and effort. It requires factual inquiries and investigations, not just conclusory pronouncements on culpability or diligence. It requires an investigation into what commanders knew or should have known and the measures they took or failed to take to prevent or uncover corruption in their command. Without making such genuine determinations, command accountability will continue to be mere rhetoric rather than actual practice.

A major failure of the Department's past approach to command accountability has been that no mechanism was ever put into place to enforce it. No person or unit was ever responsible for determining when corruption disclosures reflected supervisory neglect or vigilance. Most people presume the Police Commissioner enforces command accountability, but no Commissioner ever instituted a mechanism to monitor commanders' performance and, when necessary, determine culpability. As a result, such determinations were rarely made.

Command accountability also requires that commanders understand that they will be judged regularly, not only during scandals, for their anti-corruption performance. A tool that was initially intended to help keep commanders accountable was the annual Corruption Assessment Report. Since the 1970s, precinct commanders and heads of police units have been required to report the state of corruption and corruption hazards within their commands by submitting this Report to the Police Commissioner. The Commission's inquiries showed that, over the last decade, what began as a possibly useful integrity control and command accountability tool has become useless boilerplate. Commanding officers file essentially the same report year after year with only superficial changes.

The Department should reform this potentially useful tool. It should require all commanding officers, including borough, precinct and unit commanders to participate in an annual Corruption Assessment Review; a face-to-face briefing session with Internal Affairs commanders to apprise Internal Affairs of the following information: (i) corruption hazards within their commands; (ii) intelligence information about corruption-prone officers; (iii) the level of supervision within the command; (iv) efforts to prevent corruption; (v) management problems that impede corruption control; and, (vi) any need for additional resources or assistance from IAB to deter or uncover corruption. We recommend that the commanding officer be required to memorialize the substance of the Corruption Assessment Review in a brief report that should be submitted to the First Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs.

We expect such personal briefing sessions will serve a number of important purposes. First, they will insure regular monitoring and evaluation of commanders' anti-corruption performance. Second, they will motivate Internal Affairs and field commanders to engage in productive relationships to control corruption and help overcome the isolation and mistrust that has long divided field commanders and Internal Affairs officers. They will help encourage commanders to view IAB as a management tool they can use to fight corruption rather than as potential trouble-makers. Third, they will compel commanders to take a more active and personal role in deterring and reporting corruption within their commands. Fourth, they will force commanding officers to give careful consideration to the corruption hazards in their commands and their plans to address them, rather than allowing them to rely on outdated and repetitive written reports. Finally, they will allow command accountability inquiries to focus not only on a commanding officer's knowledge and actions, but on the adequacy of Internal Affairs' response. In the event corruption comes to light in a command where a field commander or Internal Affairs commander failed to address the problem, they should be held equally to account for their omissions.

Commissioner Bratton has begun to make the importance of command accountability clear to police supervisors. In the wake of the 30th Precinct investigation and the Commission's findings on the collapse of command accountability, he has stated publicly that scrutiny of supervisors has been lax over the past decade and that police supervisors who turn a blind eye to corruption do so at great risk. The Commission has seen a considerable effort on the part of the Department to revitalize genuine command accountability. The challenge is to sustain and reinforce that effort over the years. To accomplish that, the Commission has concluded that the principle of command accountability must be completely reinvented. To help achieve this goal, we present the following recommendations:

• The Police Commissioner should make clear his total commitment to enforce the principle of accountability to all police commanders and supervisors.
• Establish a special Command Accountability Review Unit to conduct post-corruption disclosure investigations to identify the supervisors and commanders who knew or should have known about corruption within their commands and failed to take adequate measures to prevent and report it, as well as those who performed diligently in this area. The unit should also determine whether commanders provided appropriate assistance to internal investigators during a corruption investigation. The unit should operate under the direction of the First Deputy Commissioner and should include a representative from our recommended external independent monitor, should one be created.
• The performance of the Command Accountability Review Unit should be monitored by the independent external monitor.
• The Police Commissioner should provide for sanctions, including demotion or dismissal, for supervisors who failed in their duties, as determined by the Command Accountability Review Board.
• The Police Commissioner should publicly reward supervisors who have demonstrated their commitment to integrity, as determined by the Command Accountability Review Board, or by other means.
• The Department should factor superior corruption control performance in promotion and assignment practices.
• The Police Commissioner should require commanders to participate in yearly Corruption Assessment Reviews with Internal Affairs commanders which insures that commanders will be regularly monitored and assisted with their anti-corruption performance.
• Train police supervisors and commanders in the indications and conditions suggesting corruption is taking place so that they make accurate assessments of the corruption hazards in their commands.
• Internal Affairs should keep precinct commanders informed of the existence and developments of corruption investigations within their commands and require them to assist in investigations.
• The Command Accountability Review Unit should also review and determine the adequacy of Internal Affairs' response to information on corruption received from supervisors and commanders, as well as the adequacy of its assistance to supervisors and commanders. Internal Affairs commanders should be held accountable for poor performance in this area or rewarded for outstanding performance.

Supervision

In the course of the Commission's investigations into precincts where corruption existed, we found sparse and ineffectual supervision at every turn. The failure of effective supervision has been a major contributing factor not only to corruption but to the climate of tolerance that makes it possible. As we stated in our Interim Report, many supervisors of all levels acted as if it was better not to know about, much less, report corruption. If the Department has any hope of minimizing corruption in future years, that attitude must change. The Commission recognizes that the demands of police work inevitably make close supervision a very difficult goal. But effective corruption control must begin with strong supervision.

While the Commission found, in most instances, no hard evidence that most supervisors were directly engaged in corrupt acts, in precincts such as the 9th, 30th, 46th, 73rd and 75th, and where groups of police officers engaged in outright criminal activity, it is hard to believe that supervisors were ignorant of the corruption of their subordinates. In fact, a number of supervisors knew or should have known about corruption within their commands and did nothing to stop it.

Of all supervisory positions, sergeants, as first-line field supervisors, were in the best position to know about corruption. Unfortunately, in too many cases explored by the Commission, sergeants failed to serve as a deterrent to corruption. There are a number of reasons for this, not all of which reflect poorly on the abilities or commitment of individual sergeants and other supervisors. These reasons, plus additional findings on supervision failures were discussed in detail in Chapter Four. A brief summary of these deficiencies follows.

To begin, sergeants have suffered a dramatic dilution of authority in recent years. They are increasingly young, inexperienced, and often feel more loyal to their subordinates than to the Department's managers. They are eligible to take the sergeants' examination immediately after their term as a probationary officer expires, which means after only eighteen months' experience as a police officer. Establishing their credibility and authority is thus often difficult.

There is also a critical shortage of sergeants in many precincts within the Department causing an unmanageable span of supervision, or ratio of supervisors to patrol officers. While police experts have recommended a supervision ratio of one sergeant to ten officers, we found in some precincts, sergeants were responsible for supervising more than thirty officers in any given tour. It was not uncommon, furthermore, for sergeants to be assigned supervision of patrol officers in two separate precincts in the same tour. Under such conditions, it is practically impossible for sergeants to know what their subordinates are doing at any given time -- which is no secret to officers on the streets. Even in precincts with manageable numbers of subordinates to supervise, sergeants must perform a host of administrative duties that require them to devote more time to paperwork than to active field supervision.

In many high-crime precincts, sergeants do no supervising at all. Besides their supervisory and administrative duties, sergeants assigned to such precincts routinely handle calls for service during busy periods, which are the responsibility of patrol officers -- which further undermines their authority.

Department commanders often assigned sergeants and other supervisors without regard to prior experience, training or the needs of the particular command. Inexperienced probationary sergeants were often assigned to busy, corruption-prone precincts where experienced and proven supervisors were most needed.

Even more troubling, many supervisors and commanders do not perceive corruption control as part of their responsibility. In past years, the Department did little to suggest otherwise. It rarely trained supervisors on corruption control or held them responsible for their performance.

The Department also did little to support the precinct Integrity Control Officer ("ICO") who is responsible for assisting precinct and unit commanders with corruption issues. ICOs spend most of their time controlling paper rather than corruption. They are also isolated from IAD and are rarely provided with information about corruption in their commands. In sum, they have become clerks rather than corruption fighters.

To reverse the problem of ineffective supervision, the Department must first make clear to all supervisors that they have a critical role in preventing and detecting corruption. That message must start with training and must be reinforced by application of the principle of personal accountability. In the past, the Department's training of supervisors was inadequate. Most sergeants and lieutenants we interviewed harshly criticized the Department's management training courses. They claimed they taught them nothing about how to manage and supervise subordinates -- and were basically a mere patrol guide refresher course that failed to realistically address the practical problems supervisors face in today's environment. Moreover, supervisors, received no training in how to detect and prevent corruption on their watch or how to identify corruption-prone officers. They received no message about the importance of carrying out their anti-corruption duties.

The Department must also train supervisors on how to effectively communicate with a diverse patrol force. Such training, especially with a growing minority contingent is vital to any diverse group. It is especially important to groups that spend hours together. Our investigation revealed that certain minority officers sometimes feel themselves to be outsiders in a basically white Department. While it is not uncommon for minorities in any large group to feel this way, various studies suggest that human interaction training can heighten morale and loyalty and lessen alienation.

In recent months, the Department has moved swiftly to correct many of the supervision problems identified by the Commission. Recently, the Department promoted approximately four hundred new sergeants and has begun to reform supervisory training by establishing a Sergeants' Academy that provides anti-corruption training and in-service leadership seminars for supervisors of all ranks.

In light of the Commission's findings on police supervision, we offer the following reform recommendations:

• Require officers to have at least three years of service experience before becoming eligible for promotion to sergeant.
• The Department should reform its supervisory staffing model to insure that appropriate numbers of experienced and proven sergeants are assigned to the most corruption-prone precincts and that supervision in such commands be maintained at an appropriate ratio of sergeants to officers.
• In precincts where sergeants are required to perform patrol duties or nonsupervisory functions, a second sergeant should be assigned exclusively to supervise officers on patrol.
• The Department should increase the number of field supervisors during midnight tours of duty in corruption-prone precincts.
• The Department should not require sergeants to supervise more than one precinct during the same tour of duty.
• The Department should examine whether certain administrative tasks of patrol sergeants and ICOs can be eliminated or curtailed to allow them to devote more time to field supervision.
• The Department should promulgate a clear policy on the duties and responsibilities of ICOs that focuses on their responsibility for precinct integrity controls. ICOs should be used to reinforce professional values, detect evidence of corruption, and ferret out wrongdoing and inefficiency.
• ICOs should receive specialized integrity control training and the resources necessary to perform an active anti-corruption role in their commands by gathering intelligence, monitoring precinct corruption hazards, monitoring the precinct radio, spot monitoring arrest scenes, communicating with Internal Affairs, and investigating allegations of misconduct.
• ICOs should be required to conduct precinct corruption-prevention audits by reviewing arrest reports, requests for overtime pay, stop and frisk reports, declinations to prosecute, copies of criminal court complaints, and other documents to determine patterns of questionable arrests and identify other indications of corruption. ICOs should advise precinct commanders where levels of supervision need to be increased.
• The Internal Affairs Bureau should establish regular, in-command liaison with ICOs and use their services in intelligence-gathering and investigations.
• The Department's recently established Sergeants' Academy should include a course of instruction that emphasizes practical management skills, establishing command authority, integrity control methods, and leadership qualities necessary to be an effective first-line supervisor. The course of instruction should be based on interactive methods of instruction and field work in the City's busy, high-crime precincts. All new sergeants should be trained in identifying indicators of corruption, brutality, and substance abuse.
• Require periodic in-service training for all supervisory ranks in corruption, brutality, and substance abuse detection and prevention. The training should include realistic, interactive instruction based on profiles of corruption-prone officers and commands.
• The Department should establish regular in-service leadership seminars for all police supervisors, including racial and cultural diversity training.

III. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS

Internal Affairs Operations


Over the past two years, this Commission, the media, and recently, the Department itself have focused a great deal of attention on the litany of failures of the Department's internal anti-corruption apparatus. As the Commission has reported, our investigation revealed a corruption investigation system that often minimized and even concealed corruption rather than rooted it out. Oversight of Internal Affairs was virtually non-existent, intelligence-gathering efforts were negligible, corruption investigations were often deliberately limited and prematurely closed, and the appearance of integrity was more important than the reality. In short, genuine commitment to fighting corruption had virtually disappeared and Internal Affairs had abandoned its mission to remove serious corruption from the Department.

The Department has come to acknowledge the vast problems infecting Internal Affairs identified by the Commission, and the Department has begun to act. Under the leadership of Commissioners Kelly and Bratton, Internal Affairs has gone through many important changes. Internal Affairs operations have now been centralized into one Bureau headed by a civilian Deputy Commissioner, Walter Mack, an experienced and skillful former prosecutor who has done much to energize and expand the Department's internal investigations. The organizational structure of the Internal Affairs Bureau has changed a number of times as the Department seeks the best structure to support Internal Affairs' mission. A large turnover in personnel has occurred with many of the complacent and incompetent executives of Internal Affairs either having retired from the Department or been transferred from the Bureau. Some experienced and respected investigators have joined Internal Affairs and the Bureau has been allocated over two million dollars in advanced investigative equipment and a new computerized case-tracking system.

Most important, the Commission has detected a heightened commitment and assertiveness on the part of Internal Affairs investigators. While uncovering the largest police corruption case in recent history, Commission investigators worked side by side with investigators of the Internal Affairs Bureau. At every turn in the investigation, the Internal Affairs investigators worked tirelessly to uncover the full scope of corruption within that precinct and were unwaveringly committed to acquiring the necessary evidence to root it all out. We recognize that the Department acted in this manner under the light of outside scrutiny by this Commission. But the point is with such oversight it acted with skill and uncompromising zeal.

Fundamental problems, however, do remain. First, while we certainly detected an increased commitment and effectiveness on the part of Internal Affairs commanders and investigators with whom we worked, we cannot be certain that this new attitude has spread throughout the Bureau. We continue to see the need for continued emphasis on swift and efficient decision-making and the placement of operational authority in the hands of the investigators most familiar with case strategy, focus, and goals.

Second, most officers still have little trust or respect for Internal Affairs. Overwhelmingly, officers of all ranks interviewed by the Commission and the Department continue to view Internal Affairs as a group of petty, inexperienced, and incompetent investigators with no knowledge of the demands of real police work. They contemptuously describe Internal Affairs as a "white socks and no hats" operation that focuses on pestering hard-working officers with petty infractions rather than aggressively pursuing allegations of serious corruption and criminality. Officers express great concern that Internal Affairs' failure to investigate allegations fully and its tendency to close cases as "unsubstantiated" or by noting minor misconduct unfairly hurts their chances for choice assignments and promotion.

Even worse, officers remain very skeptical about Internal Affairs' handling of police informants and its ability and willingness to insure confidentiality to officers who report corruption. A great many officers believe that Internal Affairs will disclose the identity of complainants or turn the focus of an investigation toward the very officer who made the allegation. An officer willing to violate the code of silence to report corruption will hardly turn to investigators he believes to be incompetent, unsupportive, and even vindictive.

Internal Affairs must first and foremost re-establish its credibility among members of the Department if it hopes to fight corruption effectively. Only by regaining its credibility will it recruit respected investigators and proven commanders, overcome the code of silence, and help spread a climate of intolerance for corruption throughout the Department.

To do so, the Department must assure Internal Affairs sufficient personnel, resources and support to prove itself a serious and sophisticated investigations unit that focuses exclusively on serious corruption and criminality and gains a reputation for success in removing corrupt and criminal officers from the job and exonerating honest officers from baseless allegations. Internal Affairs must become an investigations unit that launches investigative initiatives based on intelligence and analysis without relying on a reactive, complaint-driven system. By its actions, Internal Affairs must make police officers understand that it will vigorously pursue officers involved in crimes and serious corruption even if their colleagues and associates remain silent. Successful self-initiated investigations will quickly convince officers that their reliance on silence as a shield for wrongdoing is gravely misplaced. In short, it is imperative that Internal Affairs earn the respect and support of the entire Department.

In light of our analysis of Internal Affairs' past failures and its urgent need to regain the confidence of the police and the public alike, the Commission offers the following recommendations for reform. We believe implementation of these reforms will go a long way in protecting the Department's system of internal investigations against future decay.

Recruitment of Qualified Investigators

• Internal Affairs must improve the quality and reputation of its investigators. The Department should offer incentives and rewards to attract the best investigators available. Until such time as Internal Affairs attracts highly qualified volunteers, the Department should continue its recent policy of allowing Internal Affairs first choice of supervisors seeking assignment to an investigative unit. Internal Affairs should continue its policy of rotating its staff to avoid stagnation and increase the number of supervisors with corruption investigation experience throughout the Department. Service in Internal Affairs should be viewed as a positive factor in the career path of a police officer.
• The Police Commissioner should make every effort to recruit as commanders of Internal Affairs officers who have a Department-wide reputation for varied experience, management and investigative skill and outstanding leadership ability.
• The Department should recognize the outstanding performance of Internal Affairs investigators with citations, commendations, and promotions as it does for officers assigned to other commands.

Intelligence-Gathering Operations

• Internal Affairs must immediately strengthen its intelligence-gathering analysis operations. All witnesses, complainants, and informants must be assured absolute confidentiality or anonymity. This is particularly crucial for police officer complainants or informants. Any Internal Affairs officer who breaches confidentiality must be sanctioned severely.
• Debriefing informants and cooperating defendants on police corruption should become a regular practice among all investigative units within the Department, such as the Detective Bureau and the Organized Crime Control Bureau. Such investigators must actively pursue information on police corruption. All such information should be promptly reported to Internal Affairs.
• Internal Affairs must recruit and operate a cadre of undercover officers in the most corruption-prone precincts and commands. Their role should be to gather information on corruption within their commands and provide the basis for integrity tests, electronic surveillance, and other pro-active investigative measures. Members of the Internal Affairs undercover squad must be prepared to testify and swear to court affidavits or warrant applications if necessary.
• The Internal Affairs Action Desk personnel must be trained and regularly evaluated on being courteous and encouraging to complainants. The Language Line translation service must be made available to the Action Desk, as it has been to other commands within the Department.
• The Voluntary Assistance Program, better known as the Field Associate Program, must be reinvigorated, expanded, and placed under the direct control of the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs. All reports from Field Associates should be recorded and regularly reviewed for appropriate action by Internal Affairs.
• All information from complainants, informants, undercovers, field associates, and other sources should be made available to the Internal Affairs Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit. That unit should use this information to insure effective case tracking, and produce complaint correlations, corruption trend and subject analysis, and corruption profiles that will be used as a basis to commence pro-active investigations of corrupt officers.

Investigative Approach

• Internal Affairs must focus exclusively on cases of serious corruption and crime. Internal Affairs must pursue police officers suspected of crimes and serious corruption with the same intensity as any other criminal activity outside the Department.
• Internal Affairs must adopt a chiefly pro-active investigative approach. While continuing to respond to complaints of corruption, the bulk of Internal Affairs investigations should be self-initiated and targeted where intelligence analysis suggests serious corruption exists.
• Complaints received by Internal Affairs should not be investigated in isolation. The focus of Internal Affairs investigations should expand beyond isolated allegations against an individual officer to focus on groups of potentially miscreant officers and patterns of corrupt activity.
• In pursuing corruption investigations, Internal Affairs must employ the full panoply of investigative techniques used in every other investigative division within the Department. Internal Affairs must use, as appropriate, undercover officers, criminal informants, and court-ordered electronic surveillance.
• Internal Affairs must never be reluctant to turn one corrupt officer against another. Because of aspects of police culture that conceal corruption, Internal Affairs should design their investigations to achieve the cooperation of corrupt officers against others, both to acquire evidence and to help undermine the code of silence on which corruption relies.
• Internal Affairs must increase the number, regularity and quality of targeted and random integrity tests. These tests must be carefully administered under the guidance of a prosecutor, well devised and tailored to the type of corruption under investigation, and aimed at officers or commands exhibiting a reasonable basis for suspecting corruption.
• Integrity tests should focus only on acquiring evidence of serious corruption and criminality. Tests that result only in minor infractions should be referred to local commanders.
• Internal Affairs must seek the assistance and legal counsel of the appropriate prosecutor at the earliest stages of a corruption investigation. The Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs should insure notification of prosecutors when internal investigators conduct field operations in their jurisdictions.
• Patrol Guide Procedure No. 118-9 should be amended to allow internal investigators to interrogate police officers under oath and with penalties for perjury.
• Investigations of serious corruption should not be closed until all evidence of corruption is uncovered or determined to be baseless. Cases with no investigative merit should be disposed of swiftly to avoid unnecessary backlog. All closings of cases of serious corruption should be reviewed by the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs and his staff. Any Internal Affairs officer who prematurely closes a case or approves such a closing, or has failed to employ sufficient investigative measures and resources, should be held to account. The basis for case closings should be regularly reviewed by the external independent monitor should one be created.
• Every allegation of corruption that is reported should immediately be recorded and receive a log number.
• District Attorneys should get copies of all corruption case logs on a daily basis.

Organizational Structure

• Internal Affairs' organizational structure should adopt the module team structure used by the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The structure must allow for more efficient decision-making authority and a more streamlined chain of command. Investigators actually conducting the case must be allowed operational authority. Investigative teams should be assigned to investigate geographic areas and special commands so that investigators acquire expertise in local corruption conditions and develop productive, trusting relationships with prosecutors. The final decision-making authority should reside with the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Affairs.

Command Liaisons

• To rehabilitate its reputation within other commands of the Department and educate the Department about its reformed philosophy and goals, Internal Affairs commanders with particularly strong reputations and experience in other commands should address police commanders, integrity control officers, and roll calls about corruption, civil rights violations, and the objectives of Internal Affairs.

Civil Rights Investigations

• Internal Affairs should immediately establish a Civil Rights Investigations Unit dedicated to the investigation of brutality, perjury, false arrests, and other types of civil rights violations. This unit should conduct its own self-initiated investigations as well as assist the Civilian Complaint Review Board in investigating force allegations lodged with that agency.
• Internal Affairs must examine correlations between corruption complaints and complaints of excessive force lodged with Internal Affairs and the Civilian Complaint Review Board.
• Command accountability must extend to acts of excessive force and civil rights violations. Corruption Assessment Reviews must include civil rights violation as a corruption hazard category.
• Recruit and In-Service integrity training must address excessive force and civil rights violations. Instruction must include alternatives to the use of force in policing and not merely instruction when force is justified as characterizes current training.

IV. SANCTIONS AND DETERRENCE

Effective sanctions and deterrence are also crucial components of corruption control. In the past, deterrence has been lacking from the Department's integrity controls, both because of the Department's own negligence as well as the obstacles imposed by existing laws. Many of the reforms we recommend throughout this chapter will heighten deterrence by increasing the risk of detection of corrupt activities. But there are a number of legislative and other reforms that can help strengthen the Department's detection and sanctioning efforts. Before leaving office, former Police Commissioner Kelly recommended a number of proposals designed to make discipline more effective. The Commission strongly endorses these proposals as sensible measures to insure that legal technicalities do not allow corrupt officers to "beat the system." These proposals, along with the Commission's recommendations in this area, are as follows:

Discipline

• Amend New York City Administrative Code, Section 13-246 to provide for a minimum period of ninety days notice to the Department before an officer is permitted to retire with full pension. The current minimum period of thirty days fails to allow the Department sufficient time to complete disciplinary proceedings before an officer retires and escapes the consequences of misconduct.
• Amend Public Officers Law Section 30(e) to allow for the revocation of lifetime pension benefits for officers convicted of a felony or federal law equivalent committed while in the performance of their duties. Corrupt officers should not be allowed to retain such benefits after such convictions.
• Amend Criminal Procedure Law Sections 160.50 and 160.55 to allow the Department statutory access to the sealed records of police officers who have been the subject of criminal proceedings. Such access is currently allowed with respect to police applicants and should not be denied in the case of sworn police officers who have been accused of crimes. In addition, Section 296 of the Executive Law should be amended to exempt such access and use as a discriminatory practice under the Human Rights Law.
• Amend Civil Service Law Section 75, Subdivision 4 to restore the statute of limitations for Department disciplinary proceedings to three years from the current eighteen months. The current statute of limitations defeats the goals of long-term corruption investigations.
• Amend Civil Service Law to allow for the demotion in rank and salary of sergeants, lieutenants and captains who have engaged in corruption or failed to carry out their supervisory duties. Current law precludes such demotions.
• Amend New York City Administrative Code Section 14-115 to provide the Police Commissioner with additional penalty options after an officer is found guilty in a Department disciplinary proceeding. Current law forces the Police Commissioner to choose between two narrow options: forfeiture of thirty days pay or dismissal from the Department. This problem can be corrected by permitting the Police Commissioner to impose the following penalties:
o 1. Suspension without pay for a period up to one year (the current maximum is thirty days)
o 2. A monetary fine of up to $25,000 (no monetary fine provision currently exists in the Administrative Code)
o 3. Demotion in grade or title, with a commensurate reduction in salary ( currently no demotion provision exists in the Administrative Code)
• On-Line Booking Sheets should be revised to require arresting officers to attest to the circumstances of the arrest under the penalties of Penal Law Section 210.45 relating to false written statements.
• The Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs should have an opportunity to submit recommendations to the Department Advocate's Office on the appropriate disposition of charges and sanctions for officers involved in Departmental disciplinary proceedings.

Disability Pension Abuse

The Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund has the authority to approve lifetime pension benefits to any police officer who is found to be physically or mentally unable to perform police duty. A police officer retired in this manner is entitled to a tax-free annual pension. If the officer is found to have sustained a total permanent disability in the line of duty, the amount of the annual tax-free pension benefit is no less than three-quarters of the officer's annual salary at the date of retirement. [19]

The Commission inquired, and learned from police officers, doctors, and other sources about the potential for abuse in the area of disability pensions. They painted a picture of a police pension system flawed by vaguely defined standards and overtones of favoritism. A police officer who is legitimately injured in the line of duty and suffers a disability should receive the full extent of the pension benefits available. However, evidence reveals that the law governing police pensions and related procedures does not reward only those who deserve it.

Officers told us that they were aware of officers who deliberately injured themselves to apply for disability pensions. Commission investigators were also told of occasions in which officers who received off-duty injuries falsely claimed that they were received while on duty. The Commission also detected a widespread perception among rank and file police officers that the Police Pension Board fails to aggressively investigate disability pension applications of high-ranking officers. They view the pension system as providing superior officers with a tax-free "brass parachute" when they retire from the Department.

Although the public is understandably disturbed when they see seemingly able-bodied officers receive tax-free lifetime pensions, it does not necessarily constitute corruption. As the pension laws are currently written the standard for determining whether an officer is disabled is vague. Recently the Department's Deputy Chief Surgeon, Dr. Gregory Fried, has undertaken a review of officers deemed disabled from 1991 to the present. In an interview with a Commission staff member, Dr. Fried stated that he found significant flaws in the current system of awarding disability pensions. Because there are no well defined medical criteria, he described the entire system as a "crapshoot." Because the standards are so vague, he believes they fail both to support legitimate claims and to winnow out fraudulent ones. As Dr. Fried put it, "Liars have a better chance of getting a disability pension. It creates police welfare for the phoney."

According to Dr. Fried, there is currently no coordination of effort among Internal Affairs, the Department Surgeon's Office, and the Department Advocate's Office to detect police officers who submit fraudulent disability pension claims. While it was beyond the mandate of this Commission to conduct an investigation of the police pension system, we note this as an area of concern for future inquiry.

V. COMMUNITY OUTREACH

Community Policing and Community Outreach


As the Department expands the implementation of community policing, many law enforcement officials, including police officers, have expressed their concern that officers' close relationship with citizens required for successful community policing will also expand the opportunities and incidence of police corruption. We believe that community policing may increase opportunities for corruption. Nonetheless, the value of the program to effective law enforcement and its commensurate benefits to the community far outweigh the risks involved. Community policing will, however, require that Internal Affairs be ever vigilant of the risks community policing presents.

Officers determined to engage in corruption will seek and find opportunities to do so whether or not they are community policing officers. Recent investigations conducted by the Commission and other agencies turned up corrupt officers assigned to a variety of commands, such as patrol, anti-crime, and the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The predominant forms of corruption we found, furthermore, offer opportunities to all officers working in drug-infested, cash-laden precincts regardless of their assignments. The police attitudes and pressures that foster and conceal corruption apply equally to all officers regardless of their particular assignment. In light of these circumstances, police corruption controls must be applied equally to whatever commands or individuals are susceptible to corruption.

Nonetheless, there are specific corruption control measures the Department should adopt in light of the characteristics of community policing. In particular, these measures should focus on educating the community about corruption hazards that officers face and their role in identifying and reporting suspected wrongdoing among the police officers on their beat. Having an educated and watchful community is particularly important for reducing the corruption risks of community policing. Because community policing must allow officers to have flexible tours of duty and sufficient discretion to determine the time and manner of their patrol, it presents special problems for close supervision. Consequently, the Department must achieve partnership with citizens to oversee the conduct of community policing officers.

To accomplish this, the Department must teach the public about what constitutes police corruption, how to report corruption they may observe or suspect, and support them when they make a valid complaint. More than anything else -- through its precinct commanders, precinct councils, and community affairs programs -- the Department must overcome the public's cynicism about the Department's commitment to integrity and its willingness to take their complainants seriously. If community policing is to succeed, mutual respect and cooperation between the police and the community must be achieved.

On the other hand, the Department must also educate citizens that police corruption does not exist in a vacuum and that those who solicit corrupt acts from police officers or assist them in engaging in corruption will be arrested and prosecuted. The 30th Precinct investigation demonstrated that citizens, whether they be drug dealers, shop owners, building superintendents, or local residents, participate in and assist officers in corruption schemes. Through arrests, prosecutions, and community outreach, the Department must put such people on notice that corruption investigations will focus on their activities as well as on the corrupt officers with whom they associate. As in the 30th Precinct case, the Department must show the public that it will arrest and prosecute citizens who are accomplices to police corruption.

In light of these observations, the Commission recommends the following measures:

• Expand and promote the Citizen's Police Academy program and other community outreach efforts, to educate citizens about corruption hazards and the role of the community in minimizing corruption.
• Community policing supervisors should provide information to local residents and businesses about corruption hazards and how to report corruption to the Department.
• Community policing supervisors should regularly interview local residents and business persons about the performance of the officers in their units.
• Commanding officers and Internal Affairs representatives should address precinct community councils on police corruption, the community's role in reducing corruption risks, and the means of reporting corruption to the Department.
• Internal Affairs should conduct pro-active investigations, including integrity tests, against individuals who create corruption opportunities or assist officers in engaging in corruption.
• Precinct numerals and other identifying marks on radio motor patrol cars should be made larger and more easily recognizable to citizens and police supervisors.
• Internal Affairs investigations and intelligence-gathering should focus on individuals who act as accomplices to officers in corruption schemes.

***

The Commission believes that the implementation of these procedural and policy reforms will considerably strengthen the Department's integrity controls and help insure the public's confidence in the Department's ability to police itself.

No integrity controls, however, will last forever without the demand of the public and the commitment of the Department to insure that they remain effective. We cannot, as we have done too often in the past, place absolute faith in any set of reforms to insure integrity and defeat complacency for the next generation and beyond. Too often, our faith turned out to be blind. Without integrity controls rooted in the Department's own pride and commitment, no set of reforms -- no matter how creative and well devised -- can work. History has taught us that the Department cannot sustain reform efforts without incentive and support from the outside. Thus, an external entity independent of the Department must provide continual monitoring and pressure to insure that the Department makes successful integrity controls a high priority now and in the future. The Department and the public deserve no less.

_______________

Notes:

16. The total number of officers in the study was four hundred thirteen. Fewer officers are sometimes referred to for particular aspects of the study. This is because for certain areas we examined, information on all the officers was not available.

17. The probationary period consists of six months of Police Academy training and twelve months in a field training unit.

18. This procedure requires the Department to confer immunity from criminal prosecution before interrogating officers.

19. New York City Charter and Administrative Code Section 13-206.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

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CHAPTER SIX: HELPING THE POLICE TO POLICE THEMSELVES: THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT

"A considerable momentum for reform has been generated .... After previous investigations, the momentum was allowed to evaporate. The question now is: Will history repeat itself? Or does society finally realize that police corruption is a problem that must be dealt with and not just talked about every twenty years?"

-- Knapp Commission Report, December 26, 1972


Since the creation of this Commission, the Department has made important progress toward correcting its fundamental problems of corruption and corruption control. An anticorruption apparatus that had been allowed to collapse is being resurrected for the first time in a generation. On the investigative front, the Department has aggressively assisted this Commission recently in a number of cases we brought to its attention. In the 30th Precinct case, for example, Internal Affairs investigators worked side-by-side with Commission investigators, and federal and local prosecutors, to ferret out extensive corruption in the 30th Precinct. Commitment to uncovering the full extent of corruption there was unflinching. The Department now seems to recognize that the appearance of integrity is no longer more important than its reality.

The question now is -- as twenty years ago -- will this momentum for reform continue after this Commission has disbanded and public attention turns away from issues of police reform? History strongly suggests that there is little chance for an affirmative answer to that question unless the momentum for reform becomes institutionalized within and without the Department. The erosion of the Department's corruption controls is an inevitable consequence of its recurring reluctance to uncover corruption -- unless some countervailing pressure compels the Department to do what it naturally strays from doing. As happened in the wake of the Knapp Commission, the mere establishment of this Commission created such a pressure and commitment that improvement resulted. But the findings of this Commission also show that the vigilance of the last generation failed to survive the Department's natural desire to protect itself from scandal. Our challenge is to preserve the Department's new-found vigilance and commitment from the inimical forces of history.

For the past century, police corruption scandals in New York City have run in a regular twenty-year cycle of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal. In 1894, a New York State Senate Committee, known as the Lexow Committee, found systematic extortion and bribery among New York City police. Almost twenty years later, the Curran Committee, appointed by the New York City Board of Aldermen, found systemic police extortion of gambling and prostitution houses. Twenty years later, in 1932, Samuel Seabury, counsel to a State legislative committee, conducted an investigation that found widespread police extortion of gamblers and bootleggers. Two decades later, on September 15, 1950, the Kings County District Attorney's Office arrested Harry Gross, the leader of a large-scale gambling racket, who cooperated with the District Attorney and inculpated seventy-eight police officers for participating in an intricate and lucrative bribery scheme that included high-ranking members of the Department. In 1972, the Knapp Commission issued its Final Report that declared police corruption to be a standardized and Department-wide phenomenon.

How to break this cycle has been the focus of much of the Commission's deliberations. The Commission carefully considered a number of proposals aimed at institutionalizing a lasting commitment to integrity. Underlying our consideration of these proposals was our firm belief that the Department must remain chiefly responsible for policing itself if lasting reform is ever to be achieved. The fundamental principle that guided our deliberations is that the Department must deliver itself from the scourge of corruption. To allow otherwise will only renew complacency, diminish institutional accountability, and scuttle commitment to integrity.

We believe it is impossible for the Department to bear that responsibility without the help of independent external oversight. As history has taught us, the Department will always be vulnerable to the powerful internal pressure to avoid uncovering corruption. Only independent oversight will compel the Department to accomplish what it naturally wants to avoid: uncovering corruption among its own ranks. Only the existence of an independent, external, effective corruption control monitor outside the Department's chain of command will serve as a continuing pressure upon the Department to purge itself of corruption. At the same time such an independent monitor will serve to assure the public that corruption disclosures signal a vigilant Department rather than a wholesale failure of its integrity. Only such a permanent institutional structure, we believe, will break the historical cycle of scandal, reform, and backslide.

In determining the appropriate model for independent oversight, the Commission considered and rejected several models.

I. DEFICIENCIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE STATE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR MODEL

One such model was the Office of the State Special Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor's Office was established at the recommendation of the Knapp Commission in September 1972. Contrary to the perception of many who have advocated reestablishing that office, the Special Prosecutor's functions were, in practice, limited primarily to prosecutions. It had no responsibility -- or authority -- to oversee or assess the effectiveness of the Department's corruption controls, and the conditions that allow corruption to flourish.

The Knapp Commission premised its recommendation of a Special Prosecutor on its fundamental belief that a principal concern in the fight against police corruption was the prosecutors. They found that because the District Attorneys depended largely on police officers to conduct investigations and prosecutions, they suffered from an inherent conflict of interest in bringing prosecutions against corrupt officers. That Commission also found that the close alliance between the Department and the District Attorneys caused great distrust among the public and honest police officers about the willingness of the District Attorneys to entertain and investigate allegations of police corruption.

This Commission does not believe that local or federal prosecutors are reluctant to investigate and prosecute corrupt police officers today. Nor have we found that the public typically questions prosecutors' ability to aggressively pursue such cases. On the contrary, we found that both federal and local prosecutors were eager for us to refer evidence of police corruption to their offices for prosecution and that they are moving forward based on our evidence.

Indeed, since the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor's Office in October 1990, the District Attorneys have committed resources and personnel to special corruption units dedicated exclusively to investigating and prosecuting official corruption. Some of the District Attorneys have even housed these units in locations away from their main office to encourage complainants and assure confidentiality. The District Attorneys have financed these measures from their own budgets despite not having received the additional funding that was to be redistributed to them from the budget of the Special Prosecutor's Office.

Some have suggested that the prosecutors' interest in police corruption cases began only after the creation of this Commission -- and only after police corruption cases became the center of public and media attention. While it is true that the number of police corruption prosecutions in our City increased after the establishment of this Commission, it does not appear that prosecutors ever refused to pursue corrupt police officers. We do not believe it necessary or desirable to supplant the authority of local prosecutors with yet another prosecutorial agency. We do believe it essential to devise a mechanism to sustain and heighten prosecutors' interest in police corruption after this Commission completes its work. The independent oversight model we recommend will help accomplish just that.

We would further note the fundamental problem with reinstituting the Special Prosecutor's Office is that it will not remedy the principal corruption control deficiencies we have identified. It is a tough-sounding idea that will not cure the problem. A Special Prosecutor's Office will -- by dint of its mandate -- do just as its name signifies, and no more: prosecute. While no one disputes that successful prosecutions of corrupt officers is a vital component of corruption control, it is not the exclusive one. As we have shown throughout this Report, effective corruption control must penetrate all operations of the Department and cannot depend solely on prosecutions. Quality prosecutions will do little to improve commitment, recruitment, screening, training, supervision, accountability and all the many other necessary ingredients of successful corruption control.

To achieve that goal, there must be continuous, external scrutiny of the patterns and causes of corruption, and the policies and procedures the Department employs to combat them. There must be regular inquiries and audits of such areas as recruitment, screening, training, supervision, police culture, and command accountability as well as methods of prevention and deterrence. The Department does not merely need more surgery to root out the cancer of corruption, it needs large doses of preventive medicine to insure that its commitment to integrity does not again atrophy. A prosecutor's office, by nature, simply cannot provide that kind of therapy. Since its mandate -- as well as its public reputation and budget -- will inevitably focus on its prosecution record, it will be dedicated to prosecuting rather than providing what the Department really needs. A Special Prosecutor will not insure that the Department conducts regular and aggressive integrity tests; that supervisors effectively oversee their subordinates; that commanders are held accountable for their willful blindness; or that conditions of police culture that nurture and conceal corruption disappear. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the best remedy to deal effectively with the problem of police corruption would not be the recreation of a Special Prosecutor's office.

II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL MODEL

Another model that the Commission considered was the establishment of an Inspector General's Office to replace Internal Affairs in the investigation of corruption within the Department. Some urge that the Department has consistently demonstrated its inability and unwillingness to police itself successfully -- and should therefore no longer have the responsibility or authority to do so. The creation of an inspector general, many asserted, was the only way to root out corruption that the Department naturally prefers to minimize or conceal. All levels of government, they point out, have recognized the value of an independent inspector general. Virtually all federal, state, and local agencies are investigated by an inspector general's office that is independent from the agency it oversees. In New York City, in particular, the Department of Investigation employs a cadre of independent inspectors general responsible for investigating corruption in every City agency -- except the Police Department. It is urged that the Department no longer remain the exception to the rule of independent investigative oversight.

While we are convinced of the necessity of independent oversight, we rejected the Inspector General proposal because it wholly strips the Department of its capacity -- and, most important, its responsibility -- to investigate itself. We believe that the Police Department is the entity best able to prevent and investigate corruption among its members. It is the Department that best understands the corruption hazards facing cops, the culture that protects it, and the methods that can most effectively uncover it. The challenge is to devise a structure that compels the Department to do just that. The Inspector General model does just the opposite: it lets the Department off the hook in the battle against corruption, and eliminates its accountability for battling it successfully. Corruption would no longer be the Department's problem, but the Inspector General's problem. The fight against corruption can only be won if the Department itself is committed to aggressively investigate and uproot corruption on all fronts. We believe the dual-track model that we propose will insure that the Department does just that.

III. THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT MODEL

Combining these two necessary principles of lasting reform -- independent oversight and command accountability -- was the challenge we faced in formulating a means to make vigilance and zeal enduring features of the Department's internal integrity controls. An effective program of reform must both heighten the Department's ability and will to combat corruption internally, and must create an external independent mechanism to insure that such ability and will do not meet a quick demise.

The Commission therefore urges a dual-track strategy for improving police corruption controls. The first track, addressed in Chapter Five, focuses on strengthening the Department's entire anti-corruption apparatus with equal emphasis on improving the quality of recruits, enhancing police training, strengthening supervision, upgrading methods of prevention, strengthening internal investigations, enforcing command accountability, and attacking the root causes and conditions that spawn corrupt acts.

The second track urges the creation of a permanent external Police Commission, independent of the Department to: (i) perform continuous assessments and audits of the Department's systems for preventing, detecting, and investigating corruption; (ii) assist the Department in implementing programs and policies to eliminate the values and attitudes that nurture corruption; (iii) insure a successful system of command accountability; and (iv) conduct, when necessary, its own corruption investigations to examine the state of police corruption. This Police Commission would make recommendations for improving the Department's integrity and will deliver periodic reports of its findings and recommendations to the Mayor and the Police Commissioner for appropriate action. In essence, the Police Commission would serve as a management tool for the Mayor and Police Commissioner, and a watchdog for the public. It would identify problems of police corruption and corruption control that need immediate attention and insure that the Department will not again fall victim to the pressures that work to corrupt its anti-corruption systems.

The Police Commission must have its own investigative capacity to carry out its mission of gauging the state of corruption, assessing corruption controls, and identifying corruption hazards. It must be empowered to conduct its own intelligence gathering operations, self-initiated investigations, and integrity tests. But, unlike a traditional inspector general, this capacity is not meant to replace the Department's or other law enforcement corruption efforts. On the contrary, it is designed to insure that the Department continues to police itself effectively by aggressively pursuing corruption where it likely exists and that it becomes -- for the first time -- accountable for doing so to an authority outside its own chain of command. At the same time, such an arrangement leaves the responsibility for corruption control clearly with the Department, without the risk of blurred responsibility or institutional buck-passing that might result from the creation of a special prosecutor or inspector general.

The power to undertake investigations is crucial to the Police Commission's task of insuring the high performance of integrity controls and the swift identification of corruption trends. During the course of this Commission's work, for example, we observed a number of police commands with substantial corruption hazards that Internal Affairs had made little or no effort to investigate. Having an investigative staff allowed us to probe some of those commands and thereby compel Internal Affairs to undertake a full-blown investigation or risk having the Commission bring a case to fruition without its participation. We found that this strategy quickly motivated the Department's anti-corruption machinery. Without such a capacity, we believe it unlikely that the Department would have responded to the Commission's evidence -- or attempted to generate its own -- as quickly or aggressively as it did. The new Police Commission, moreover, will insure that evidence of corruption is promptly referred to the appropriate prosecutor with whom it would cooperate and monitor the progress of the prosecution. In that way, it will help produce swift and certain prosecution of corruption without the need for a special prosecutor.

The Police Commission's investigative capacity, furthermore, is necessary to provide the Mayor and the Police Commissioner with the ability to call upon an independent agency to assist in conducting special projects or investigations. For example, if a high-ranking member of the Department or an Internal Affairs official is implicated in wrongdoing, the Mayor or Police Commissioner could call for the participation of Police Commission investigators to insure the integrity of the investigation. The Police Commission should also assist the Department to conduct command accountability inquiries in the wake of corruption disclosures, such as in the 30th Precinct, and insure that favoritism and Department politics play no role in determining the management or supervisory failures of police commanders. By having an investigative arm, therefore, the Police Commission can provide the Mayor and Police Commissioner with an independent look at a variety of corruption issues without having to depend exclusively on information from within the Department's own chain of command.

At the same time, we are mindful of the fiscal restraints under which the City must operate. We do not recommend the creation of a large and costly bureaucracy. We recommend that the new Police Commission be headed by five reputable and knowledgeable citizens appointed by the Mayor who will serve pro bono. We further recommend that the Commissioners have a limited, staggered term of office to guarantee turnover, avoid staleness, and prevent the development of a long-term bureaucratic relationship with the Department that could compromise the Police Commission's independence.

To accomplish its tasks, the Police Commission should have unrestricted access to the Department's records and personnel. It should have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents; the power to administer oaths and take testimony in private and public hearings; and the power to grant use immunity.

With the aforementioned powers, the Police Commission could perform its work, as did this Commission, with a small staff of approximately ten to fifteen people with varied expertise, including attorneys, investigators, police management experts, and organizational and statistical analysts. To the extent additional personnel is required, the Police Commission should be free to draw upon the resources of other agencies on an as needed basis, as this Commission has done.

The Police Commission must cooperate with and assist the Police Commissioner to implement and evaluate integrity programs and policies, neutralize the corruptive effects of police culture, maintain strong accountability among commanders, and enhance productive relationships with the community.

As we set forth in our Interim Report, the Police Commission should assume a variety of functions in overseeing the policies and procedures for preventing and detecting police corruption. The Police Commission's oversight and reporting duties will focus primarily on the following three areas:

Monitoring Performance or Anti-Corruption Systems

The Police Commission should:

• undertake studies and analyses to assess the quality of the Department's corruption controls;
• insure that the Department has effective methods for receiving and recording corruption allegations and assuring the confidentiality of complainants and witnesses;
• insure that the Department performs regular and effective corruption trend analyses that are used to identify areas for self-initiated investigations;
• assess the quality of investigative resources and personnel, and insure that the Department employs effective methods and management in conducting corruption investigations;
• insure that the Department consistently uses pro-active investigatory techniques and no longer relies on a reactive investigative system that narrowly focuses corruption investigations on isolated complaints and individual officers;
• insure that the Department has successful intelligence-gathering systems in place, such as effective undercover, field associate, and integrity testing programs;
• evaluate Department policy concerning command accountability and supervision, including levels and quality of first-line supervision, training of supervisors and integrity history in determining assignments and promotions;
• insure the Department involves field commanders, supervisors, and integrity control officers in corruption investigations and enlists their assistance;
• insure that the Department successfully enforces a system of command accountability;
• insure that Internal Affairs maintains a productive liaison with field commanders about corruption hazards and corruption prevention within their commands;
• require the Department to produce reports on police corruption and corruption trends including, analysis of the number of complaints investigated and the disposition of those complaints, the number of arrests and referrals for prosecution, and the number of Department disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions imposed; and
• conduct performance tests and inspections of the Department's anti-corruption units and programs to guarantee that the Department continually enhances its capacity to police itself.

Monitoring Cultural Conditions

The Police Commission should:

• undertake studies and analyses of the impact of police culture on matters of integrity;
• insure that the Department acknowledges and makes efforts to reform the conditions and attitudes that nurture and perpetuate corruption;
• assess the effectiveness of recruit education, integrity training, field training operations, in-service training programs, and the integrity standards set by supervisors;
• insure that the Department works to eliminate corruption tolerance and the code of silence;
• evaluate the Department's efforts to overcome police attitudes that isolate them from the public and often create the appearance of a hostile and corrupt police force;
• evaluate Department efforts to pursue and uncover brutality and other civil rights violations and their connection to corruption;
• investigate whether the Department routinely assigns officers with discipline problems to only certain commands within the Department, such as high-crime, minority precincts;
• evaluate the effectiveness of the Department's drug and alcohol abuse policies, prevention treatment, and detection efforts; and
• maintain liaison with community groups and precinct community councils to provide the Department with input from the public about their perception of police corruption and to obtain information for the Commission's recommendations for reform.

Monitoring Corruption Trends

The Police Commission should:

• identify through intelligence sources and integrity tests patterns of corruption and corruption-prone officers and commands;
• evaluate and report to the Department the extent of complicity in detected police corruption among fellow officers and supervisors, either by their participation in corrupt acts or by their silence; and
• conduct any investigation or inquiry into corruption or corruption-related issues as requested by the Mayor or Police Commissioner.

Conclusion

The consequences of police corruption are devastating for our police officers, our government, and our society. When charges of corruption are levelled at the police, we as a society are justifiably alarmed and become cynical about the rule of law. And rightly so. With crime uppermost on the minds of citizens today, we look to our police more than ever as our primary protectors. When the integrity and commitment of the police are called into question, the community is doubly harmed. When police credibility is tarnished, officers' ability to enforce the law is hampered on the streets and in the courtrooms. Cooperation and mutual respect between the public and the police are vital to effective law enforcement. When that erodes, so too does the Department's ability to fight crime. A foundation of our criminal justice system thus begins to crumble.

The community is further harmed because we lose the peace of mind we depend on law enforcement to provide, especially when crime and violence are rampant. When we learn that police officers are more interested in profiting from the community than protecting it, our confidence in the Department's ability to protect us understandably wanes.

And so it is incumbent on the public to continue to demand that the Department and our elected officials do everything necessary to insure the integrity of our police. The creation of a permanent independent police monitor will fulfill that responsibility.

But it is still the Department's vast majority of honest and dedicated officers who have the greatest incentive -- and ability -- to insure the Department's lasting integrity. It is they who know where corruption might exist; it is they who suffer the most immediate consequences of their colleagues' corruption; and it is they who can best help uproot it. For these reasons, the honest officer, most of all, must work to stop corruption or be prepared to feel the quiet pain expressed by lieutenant Robert McKenna during the Commission's public hearings:

But you know what really hurts? It's when he [the honest officer] goes to pick up his kids from school. Because parents talk, kids listen; they're at school, they talk among themselves. A little kid comes in, he sits in the back seat. He's got bright eyes and he looks at his Daddy. He says, 'Daddy, do you steal money?' The cop's stomach tightens. Some cops cry silently. Others just wish it was a bad dream, and it'll go away.


It is the Commission's hope, and belief, that this Report's findings and recommendations will put an end to that bad dream for the people of our City, for our police officers, and for our children -- both today and in generations to come.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:01 am

APPENDIX

Exhibit One


Executive Order No. 42 issued by The Honorable David N. Dinkins. Mayor of the City of New York, on July 24, 1992, Appointing the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department

Exhibit Two

Opening Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen, Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993

Exhibit Three

Mid-Hearings Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen. Commission Public Hearings, October 4, 1993

Exhibit Four

Exhibits presented at the Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993

Exhibit Five

Letter dated December 27, 1993 to Mayor David N. Dinkins from The Honorable Milton Mollen

Exhibit Six

Commission's Interim Report and Principal Recommendations, dated December 27, 1993

Exhibit Seven

New York City Police Department, Map of Patrol Precincts

Exhibit Eight

The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd: The Dowd Case Revisited

• The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd
• Sergeant Trimboli and the Brooklyn North FIAU
• Trimboli and the 75th Precinct
• The R&T Grocery Store Robbery
• Corruption in the 75th Precinct
• The Trimboli Investigation
• The Pro-Active Plan
• The 79th Precinct Investigation
• The Yurkiw Investigation
• Final Developments
• Comments

EXHIBIT ONE

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE MAYOR NEW YORK, N. Y. 10007

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 42

July 24, 1992

COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI -CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

WHEREAS, an honest and efficient police force is essential to the well-being of the City and the implementation of the Police Department's innovative community policing strategies; and

WHEREAS, during the next two years the Safe Streets, Safe City Program will add more than two thousand officers to the Police Department of the City of New York, most of whom will be assigned to patrol the streets of the City; and

WHEREAS, allegations of corruption have been made against some members of the Police Department, and the effectiveness of the practices, procedures and methods used by the Police Department to prevent and detect misconduct and to maintain integrity have been questioned; and

WHEREAS, an investigation by the Police Department of those allegations would be subject to question by the public; and

WHEREAS, the misdeeds of a few must not be allowed to sully or taint the reputations and sacrifices of the vast majority of honest and dedicated men and women who serve on the police force;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the power vested in me as Mayor of the City of New York, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Establishment of Commission. There is hereby established a Commission to (1) inquire into and evaluate the existing

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practices, procedures and methods for investigating specific allegations of corruption and the existing practices, procedures and methods designed to prevent corruption and maintain integrity; (2) recommend improvements in these practices, procedures and methods and make any additional recommendations that will ensure the integrity of the Police Department and prevent corruption; (3) take evidence and hold whatever hearings, public and private, the Commission may deem appropriate to ascertain the necessary facts.

Section 2. Members. The Commission shall consist of the following persons, who shall serve without compensation, and who are hereby appointed as members thereof: Milton Mollen, Chairperson; Harold Baer, Jr. [1]; Herbert Evans; Roderick C. Lankler; and Harold Tyler.

Section 3. Powers. (a) The Commission, its Chair and such agents as the Chair shall designate, shall have all powers necessary to conduct as complete an investigation as it finds necessary, including but not limited to the powers to administer oaths and affirmations, to examine witnesses in public or private hearings, to receive evidence and to preside at or conduct such hearings and investigations.

(b) The Commission, its Chair and such agents as the Chair shall designate shall be designated by the Commissioner of Investigation as agents of the Department of Investigation, pursuant to Section 805 of the City Charter, with all powers to conduct investigations as provided therein.

(c) The Chair of the Commission shall be appointed a Deputy Commissioner of Investigation, pursuant to Section 802 of the City Charter, with all powers pertaining to that office, including but not limited to those specified in Section 805(a) of the City Charter.

(d) The Commission may also cooperate with any criminal investigation, as may become necessary, pursuant to its powers under this Order.

(e) Within the scope of the general responsibility of the Commission set forth in Section 1 of this Order, the Commission shall have authority to examine and copy any document or other record.
_______________

Notes:

1. Upon his retirement as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

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prepared, maintained or held by the Police Department of the City of New York, and any other agency of the City, except those documents or other records which cannot be so disclosed according to law.

(f) The Commission shall have authority to require any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee or any former member of the uniformed force or any other former officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City to attend an examination or hearing concerning any matter related to the performance of his or her official duties, and to require any person dealing with, or who has dealt with, the Police Department of the City of New York or its officers and employees to attend any examination or hearing concerning such dealings, and to require any person who has or may have knowledge relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission to attend any examination or hearing concerning such matter. If any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City, or any person dealing with the Police Department of the City of New York declines to answer any question which is put to him or her, the Commission shall have the authority to advise the person that neither his nor her answer nor any information or evidence derived therefrom will be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution other than for perjury arising from such testimony. The refusal of any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City of New York to answer questions on the condition described in this paragraph shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty. The refusal of any person dealing with the Police Department of the City of New York to answer questions on the condition described in this paragraph shall, pursuant to the appropriate provision of any contract, constitute cause for cancellation or termination of such contract with the Police Department of the City of New York or the City and its agencies that said person or any firm, partnership or corporation of which he or she is a member, partner, director or officer has entered into. The Police Department of the City of New York and the City and its agencies shall not incur any penalty or damages because of such cancellation or termination.

Section 4. Cooperation with Investigation. (a) Pursuant to my power as Mayor all heads of departments or agencies of the City shall make every reasonable effort to insure the full cooperation of all persons employed or supervised by them with investigations or inquiries conducted by the Commission.

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(b) All departments or agencies of the City shall make available to the Commission such facilities, services, personnel and other assistance as may be necessary for the conduct of its investigations.

(c) All departments or agencies of the City shall provide to the Commission upon request any and all documents, records, reports, files or other information relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of tile Commission, except such documents as cannot be so disclosed according to law. To insure full availability of such documents, records, reports, files or other information to the Commission, all City departments and agencies shall make and retain copies of any documents, records, reports, files or other information provided to state or federal prosecutors, or other investigative bodies, pursuant to subpoena or otherwise.

(d) All officers and employees of the City shall cooperate fully with the Commission. Interference with or obstruction of the Commission's investigations or other functions shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty.

(e) All officers and employees of the City shall have the affirmative obligation to report, directly and without undue delay, to the Commission, any and all information concerning conduct which they know or should reasonably know to involve corrupt or other criminal activity (i) by any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department, which concerns his or her office or employment, or (ii) by persons dealing with the Police Department, which concerns their dealing with the Department, and shall proceed in accordance with the Commission's directions. The knowing failure of any officer or employee to so report shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty.

(f) The obligation to report information regarding corruption or criminal activity to the Commission shall be in addition to the reporting obligations imposed on City officers and employees to report such information to the Department of Investigation, pursuant to Executive Order No. 105, dated December 20, 1986.

Section 5. Construction with Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall he construed to limit the powers and duties of any department or agency under the City Charter or as otherwise provided by law.

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Section 6. Effective Date. This order shall take effect immediately.

David N. Dinkins
MAYOR
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:09 am

EXHIBIT TWO

THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION

17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10004 (212) 487-7350 FAX 487-7361

MILTON MOLLEN, CHAIR
HAROLD BAER, JR.
HERBERT EVANS
RODERICK C. LANKLER
HAROLD TYLER

JOSEPH P. ARMAO, CHIEF COUNSEL

Opening Statement by Judge Milton Mollen, Chair at Public Hearings

Monday, September 27, 1993

On August 3, 1972, the Knapp Commission published the first installment of its final report. In describing the momentum for Police Department reform that existed at the time, that Commission issued a prescient challenge to future generations:

"The present situation is quite like that existing at the close of previous investigations. A considerable momentum for reform has been generated, but not enough time has elapsed to reverse attitudes that have been solidifying for many years in the minds of both the police and the public. After previous investigations, the momentum was allowed to evaporate.

The question now is: Will history repeat itself? Or does the society finally realize that police corruption is a problem that must be dealt with and not just talked about once every twenty years?"


Unfortunately, almost precisely twenty years later, it has become clear that the Police Department is still grappling with the corruption problem. On the basis of information brought to his attention, Mayor Dinkins found it essential, in the public interest, to appoint this Commission, with a mandate to ascertain the extent of corruption and to determine and recommend the best means to deal with it most effectively.

For over a century, the history of police corruption investigations in New York has run in twenty-year cycles of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal. Despite what some cynics may say, we believe that this cycle is not inevitable, and should not, and cannot be accepted as inevitable. While it is imperative that we learn from history, we must be determined not to repeat its mistakes. Although no commission could hope to totally eliminate corruption among police -- or I should point out, in any other profession or occupation -- much can be done to deal more effectively with the problem.

For the last twelve months, the Commission and its staff have studied thousands of documents and interviewed hundreds of police and civilian witnesses in an effort to analyze the nature and causes of the corruption problem facing the Department in the past, the procedures the Department uses to combat it, and recommendations for lasting improvement in those procedures. The purpose of these hearings is to present our findings to the public. Thereafter, we will present a report with our recommendations to Mayor Dinkins and the public.

It is of critical importance that the public be made aware of the corruption hazards which confront the Police Department, its managers, its officers, and the citizens of New York City.

The Police Department is not a private business. It is a public trust that must always remain accountable to the public it is sworn to serve and protect. For most of us, a police officer is the law and a symbol of justice. In a civilized society, it is imperative that the members of the public have confidence and faith in the integrity of the members of the Police Department. As a society, we have given the police officer special powers, not the least of which is the power to arrest and deprive someone of his liberty. Everyday, we allow our police to judge our conduct as citizens and, consequently, we citizens expect their conduct to adhere to the highest standards. When charges of corruption are levelled at the police, the public has a right to be alarmed and to demand an accounting and a solution. That is what this Commission, through its hearings and final report, intends to provide. We hope that by focusing the public's attention on the nature and causes of corruption and on the Department's performance in addressing the problem, the public will give its support to official action taken to insure a lasting remedy to the problem.

For its part, the public owes an obligation of respect and support for the police. Despite recent revelations of police corruption, this Commission can confidently report that each day throughout the year the vast majority of police officers throughout this city perform one of society's most important, sensitive and dangerous jobs with efficiency and integrity. The public can also be reassured by the fact that Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has focused a great deal of his time and attention on addressing problems of corruption and discipline within the Department. Since the publication of his report on the Michael Dowd investigation, the Commissioner has implemented a number of important reforms that, we expect, will strengthen the Department's corruption controls. He is to be commended for his diligence and commitment to improvement. We believe that the Commission's public hearings and recommendations will provide the Commissioner with further impetus and guidance in continuing his campaign of reform and will encourage the public to support him in putting his reforms into effect.

However, as the Commissioner noted in his Dowd report, this Commission's mandate is to provide a broader analysis of corruption-related problems than the Police Department has provided so far. To that end, the Commission divided its work into three phases: an investigation of the nature and causes of corruption as they exist today, an analysis of the Police Department's systems for detecting, rooting out and preventing corruption, and a formulation of recommendations to remedy the problems that our investigations and analysis have disclosed.
These hearings, accordingly, will be divided into three segments. The first segment will focus on the nature and causes of police corruption and the failure of the Department during past years to aggressively investigate and prevent it. You will hear testimony from a number of former and current police officers, and others who, for the first time, will publicly disclose the full extent of their experiences and knowledge of the kinds and causes of corruption that afflict the Department and the Department's inability to deal with the problem effectively. The witnesses will relate their individual experiences and observations in matters of police corruption and corruption investigations. The Commission has selected these witnesses to appear at this hearing not solely to focus the public's attention on their individual experiences, but because their individual experiences illustrate the broader issues of corruption and corruption control that confront the Department.

The second segment will address the failure of the Department's anti-corruption controls in past years. You will hear testimony from former and current police officers who have served the Department as internal affairs investigators, as supervisors, and as integrity training instructors. These officers have made the courageous decision to come forward to reveal for the first time their insider's view of the failures of the Department's anticorruption controls and their judgment about why such conditions were allowed to exist.
These officers, who, in the public interest, are demonstrating great moral courage, should be highly commended by the Police Commissioner, by the vast majority of police officers who are honest and incorruptible, and by the public at large, for stepping forward and breaching the traditional blue wall of silence.

The third segment will present recommendations for reform and more effective means of combatting corruption. The Commission unequivocally believes that the prime responsibility for insuring the integrity of the police rests unconditionally with the Department and its Commissioner who must retain the ultimate authority in order to be effective. The Department must remain responsible for keeping its own house in order but, at the same time, with that responsibility comes a total obligation to the public to perform its job honestly and efficiently. Thus, institutional reforms necessary to keep the Department's corruption controls ever-vigilant and accountable to the public will be the focus of the third segment. Furthermore, the Commission, on the basis of its investigation and analysis, has concluded that in order to assure the effectiveness and long duration of the reforms in combatting corruption instituted by Commission Kelly, as well as the additional steps he may take as a result of these hearings, thought must be given, by the Mayor and the public, as to the necessity for some form of outside independent oversight of the effectiveness of the Department's efforts in deterring and combatting corruption within the Department. Such outside entity may take one of several forms. Toward that end, we have examined the necessity for a dual track approach, namely, improved effectiveness of internal policing within the Department on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an independent outside entity. We will hear testimony from a variety of people including former and current law enforcement officers, public officials and academic experts who will present their recommendations as to the best means to ensure that the Department's internal corruption controls become and remain effective for the long haul and do not again fall victim to the Department's historical enemies of backslide and scandal.

At the outset, I must provide a word of caution. The Commission's investigations and analysis were not primarily aimed at disclosing individual acts of wrongdoing or proving the guilt of individual police officers. In fact, one of our fundamental findings is that the problem of police corruption will not be solved solely by focusing exclusively on individual acts of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, particularly during the first segment, you will hear about crimes and acts of corruption committed by police officers. Though this evidence may arouse your concern, as it should, it by no means reflects the state of the Department as a whole. Quite the contrary. Our inquiries have shown that the New York City Police Department is one of the most honest and effective police forces in the world. The public and the media must not lose sight of that fact as the testimony unfolds. These hearings are not meant to be an indictment of the Department as a whole, but an exposition of the nature and causes of a Department problem that is a necessary step toward laying the groundwork for successful remedies to overcome the kind of problem we face.

When these hearings conclude, the Commission's work will continue. The evidence you will hear over the next several days will be presented in greater detail in the Commission's final report which is now in preparation and will be released as soon as it is ready.

But for now, as you listen to the evidence presented at these hearings, I ask you to keep in mind a fundamental point. Police corruption is a problem that cannot be solved exclusively by investigations and prosecutions that temporarily attract the public's attention through newspaper headlines. It is a condition that must be addressed on all fronts and in the daily operations of the Police Department: through appropriate recruiting, effective training, supervision, strict internal audits and procedures, effective corruption detection techniques, management accountability, public accountability, and most important, an unflagging commitment within the Department to deal with the problem of corruption candidly and effectively. That is the challenge that confronts the Police Department and the public -- to devise a system of corruption control that will operate with vigilance, commitment, and public accountability, not only when public attention has focused on the problem of police corruption as it has during the past year, but with constant vigor, well after ephemeral pressure for reform has faded away.

This Commission's best hope is that the result of its work will give a final answer to the questions asked by the Knapp Commission twenty years ago, so that twenty years from now a new police corruption commission will not be asked to ponder the same questions.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:15 am

EXHIBIT THREE

THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION

17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10004 (212) 487-7350 FAX 487-7361

MILTON MOLLEN, CHAIR
HAROLD BAER, JR.
HERBERT EVANS
RODERICK C. LANKLER
HAROLD TYLER

JOSEPH P. ARMAO, CHIEF COUNSEL

Opening Statement by Judge Milton Mollen, Chair at Public Hearings

Monday, October 4, 1993

For four days, the Commission has presented its evidence of the nature and causes of police corruption through the testimony of police officers who committed corrupt acts and honest police investigators who were frustrated in their attempts to root it out. We have learned from the evidence that the type of police corruption we face today has changed from the type of corruption that existed in the days of the Knapp Commission. We can take heart from the fact that the Commission has found no evidence that the systemic and highly organized bribery "pads" of the 1970s and earlier years persist today. Nonetheless, it is distressing when we hear that the form police corruption takes today exhibits a truly invidious character: police officers associating with and profiting from drug traffickers, committing robberies, larceny, perjury, conducting warrantless searches and seizures, and assaulting citizens. Moreover, the evidence shows that these officers committed their crimes repeatedly and, most distressingly with impunity. It is clear that the consequences of police corruption reach beyond the individual act of wrongdoing to undermine the confidence of the public in its police force and the safety and reputation of the overwhelming majority of police officers who are honest.

Police corruption undoubtedly plays a role in encouraging the process of juror nullification, whereby juries refuse to convict defendants, who in many instances are truly guilty, because the jurors doubt the credibility of police officers. Public confidence and faith in the integrity of police officers is imperative if community policing is to be effective in deterring crime and in aiding in the apprehension of criminals.

Thus the evidence set forth in the first part of these hearings inevitably leads to the central question of this next segment of our hearings: why did the Department's corruption controls fail to prevent and apprehend police officers who broke the law?

We have heard the answer to this important question suggested by some of the witnesses we have already heard. Over a long period of time the Department's commitment and capacity to prevent, detect, and prosecute police corruption has seriously eroded. In arriving at this unhappy conclusion, the Commission has spent considerable time and effort in analyzing the systems and procedures the Department has used since the time of the Knapp Commission to foster integrity and investigate corruption, and in assessing the Department's commitment to insure that its system of corruption control functioned effectively. These sessions will be devoted to presenting these findings to the public.

I ask the Commission's Chief Counsel to call the next witness.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:53 am

EXHIBIT FOUR

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'86-0449 -- Officer Dowd and partner steal money from drug dealers, prisoners, and deceased persons
'86-0039 -- Officer Dowd and other officers used excessive force against a prisoner
'87 -2608 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers frequent a drug location
'87-2712 -- Officer Dowd and partner accept $8,000 per week from drug dealers
'87-2525 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers drink and use drugs in "Auto Sound City"
'88-0094 -- Officer Dowd deals drugs
'88-1396 - Armed robbery of R&T grocery store
'88-966 -- F.I.A.U. self-generated case into precinct-wide corruption within the 75th precinct
'88-1554 -- Officer Dowd's P.B.A. card recovered from known criminal
'88-2352 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers purchase and sell drugs
'88-2060 -- Dowd's former partner sells drugs
'89-2385 -- Former police officer alleges that several 75th Precinct Police Officers engage in drug use and other forms of corruption
'89-2617 -- D.E.T.F. Informant alleges that he observed Officer Dowd use drugs
'91-2456 -- Federal informants allege that Officer Dowd worked for a drug ring
'91-2126 -- Officer Dowd and partner accepted liquor from bar owner
'92-0522 -- Suffolk County drug ring

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NYPD EVALUATION OF MICHAEL DOWD, 1987 (75TH PRECINCT)
RATER COMMENTS: This officer has excellent street knowledge: relates well with his peers and is empathetic to the community. This officer could excel within the New York City Police Department and easily become a role model for others to emulate if he maximized his inner drive to fulfill job responsibilities to the fullest. Must improve attendance and arrest activity. Good career potential.

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9TH PRECINCT POLICE CORRUPTION NETWORK INVESTIGATION
MARCH 25: Mr. X contacts MS/FIAU about police corruption network and barbecue MARCH 28: High level meeting at IAD with MS/FIAU
APRIL 3: IAD closes 9th precinct case as unsubstantiated
MAY 13: Buy #1: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown
JUNE 4: Buy #2: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown
JUNE 14: Buy #3/Arrest: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown and P.O. Brown arrested
22 DAYS LATER
JULY 6: Barbecue Scheduled Cancelled After Arrest

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9TH PRECINCT CORRUPTION NETWORK CASE

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IAD INVESTIGATOR SURVEY
QUESTION : Do you believe the NYPD is committed to aggressively identifying and rooting out corruption?
54% responded "NO" or "unclear"
COMMENTS: "Politically sensitive cases were not always as aggressively pursued."
QUESTION: Are you so overloaded with work that you do not have sufficient time to devote to serious corruption cases?
61% responded "NO"
COMMENTS: "You must be kidding with me!!"
"I should have taken a typing course."
"In fact, I hardly work. You must understand, a detective here is not used as a detective should be used."
QUESTION: What portion of your time is spent doing:
• Investigation related activity in the field: 16%
• Investigation related activity in the building: 37%
• Non-investigation related activity: 46%
• Did not respond to the question: 1%
QUESTION: Have you ever felt that you were discouraged from fully investigating allegations of corruption?
73% responded "OFTEN" or "SOMETIMES"
COMMENTS: "Depending on the supervisor and if he would rather settle for 'white socks' or if he wants to go all the way to the serious part of the allegation."
"I've been told, 'Let's get what we came for, nothing else.'"

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TICKLER FILE CASE
DANIEL F. SULLIVAN, Chief of Inspectional Services
Chief Beatty: Bob -- Don't enter this one in any records until later. Assign to whoever you think is best fit to handle it. -- D.S.

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IAD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

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LIFE OF A CORRUPTION ALLEGATION ("C CASE)

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Of approximately 2,700 police corruption allegations filed with the N.Y.P.D. on average each year:
ASSIGNED TO FIAU: 95%
RETAINED BY IAD: 5%
Of the 5% retained by IAD from 1988-1991 approximately 30% are minor misconduct /abuse of department regulations including:
• Free pizza
• Off-post
• Personal use of department vehicle
• Misusing police parking
permit to avoid paying tolls
• Off -duty employment as security guard
• Working out while on duty
• Drinking on duty
• Sleeping on duty
• Spends time in restaurant on duty

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IAD & FIAU TOTAL CORRUPTION CASES/INVESTIGATORS 1988-1992 AVERAGE

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IAD & FIAU TOTAL OPEN CORRUPTION CASES/INVESTIGATORS UNDERLOAD vs. OVERLOAD

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IAD CASE DISPOSITIONS, 5 YEAR AVERAGE 1988-1992

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IAD AND FIAU TOTAL OPEN CORRUPTION CASES/BACKLOG

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FIAU CASE DISPOSITIONS, 4 YEAR AVERAGE 1988-1991

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% OF "ABUSE OF DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS" CASES RETAINED BY IAD
Oversight Commission established (mid 1992), 40% decline in abuse of Department Regulation cases from 4 year average (1988-1991)

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POLICE CORRUPTION & FORCE ALLEGATIONS
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