The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commission

Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:34 am

Chapter Twenty-Three: THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The Commission found that corruption within the Department was so pervasive that honest rookies joining the police force were subject to strong pressures to conform to patterns of behavior which tended to make cynics of them and ultimately led many of them into the most serious kinds of corruption. This situation was the result of an extremely tolerant attitude toward corruption which had existed in the Department for the better part of a century and had flourished despite the efforts -- sometimes vigorous and sometimes not -- of police commissioners and various law enforcement agencies.

Two important factors which perpetuated this attitude were: (1) a stubborn belief held by officials of the Department and of other law enforcement agencies that the existence and extent of police corruption should not be publicly acknowledged, because it might damage the image of the Department, thus reducing its effectiveness; and (2) a code of silence, honored by those in the Department who were honest as well as by those who were corrupt, which discouraged officers from reporting the corrupt activities of their fellows and which sometimes seemed to mark the reporting of corruption as an offense more heinous than the practice of corruption.

The effect of these attitudes was compounded by the fact that law enforcement agencies concerned with police corruption traditionally were commanded by persons who substantially agreed that it was contrary to the public interest to acknowledge the full extent of police corruption, and relied for their investigative efforts upon police officers who themselves were sympathetic to the code of silence.

We believe a beginning has been made towards a fundamental correction of these conditions. Our Commission, with the support of the Mayor and of Commissioner Murphy, has made full public disclosure of those patterns of corruption we found to exist. Commissioner Murphy and his administration, aided by the change in public opinion generated by our revelations, has instituted important and imaginative reforms. There has been official recognition that the appearance of honesty is no longer to be deemed more important than its actuality. The code of silence seems, for the time being at least, to have been weakened. Whereas two years ago it was thought inconceivable that rank and file police officers would testify publicly against the corrupt activities of their fellows, a number of officers have since followed the ground broken in this regard by Detective Leuci and by Patrolmen Phillips, Droge and Logan. Moreover, as already noted, Commissioner Murphy has been successful in instituting a program wherein officers volunteer on a regular basis to do undercover work in conjunction with the Departmental anti-corruption efforts.

The question is, will these new trends continue after this Commission has disbanded and public attention has ceased to be focused on police reform ~ It is the Commission's conclusion that there is a reasonable chance for an affirmative answer to that question if the momentum for reform can be continued until new attitudes can be institutionalized. It must become routine for the upper echelon of the Department to feel that integrity is more important than the appearance of integrity and for at least the honest members of the rank and file to consider that the exposure of corruption is both honorable and necessary to the proper functioning of a responsible police force. Once these attitudes become securely established, the Commission feels, the momentum toward integrity will have a chance to become self-generating and the Department's internal anti-corruption machinery, assisted by the district attorneys and other regular law enforcement agencies, should be adequate to cope with corruption. Until such time, we feel that some ongoing independent anti-corruption effort is essential.

It was to meet this need that the Commission made its first -- and what turned out to be its most controversial -- recommendation. The Commission envisaged a Special Deputy Attorney General who would have his own staff of investigators with no ties to the Police Department and who would supplement the efforts of the district attorneys and other law enforcement agencies. The Commission suggested that the job of this new official should be to continue this Commission's role of spotting patterns of corruption and providing impetus for reform as well as to prosecute corruption-related crimes. Because police corruption is only one -- and not necessarily the most important -- aspect of a much broader problem, the Commission recommended that this Special Deputy Attorney General have jurisdiction over all corruption in the criminal process. For the same reason, the Commission urged that the Special Deputy emphasize the prosecution of members of the public who offer bribes as well as those who receive them.

On September 19, 1972, Governor Rockefeller responded to our recommendation by taking two actions: He announced the appointment of Maurice Nadjari as a Special Deputy Attorney General to supersede the district attorneys in the five counties of New York City with respect to corruption in the criminal justice system; he established a special unit of the State Commission of Investigation, under the direction of Commission Chairman Paul Curran, to perform ongoing monitoring work in the same field.

These innovations represent an important addition to the anticorruption forces in the City. The Special Deputy Attorney General's office will provide an independent prosecuting arm with the capabilities of being wholly independent of other law enforcement agencies and of devoting its full attention to the problems of corruption in the criminal justice system on a citywide basis. Equally important is the continuing focus which the new unit of the State Commission of Investigation can maintain on existing anti-corruption machinery through the ongoing examination of patterns of corruption and the means of combating them.

Any long-range hope of meaningful reform, however, depends upon the Department itself. If, as the Commission suggested, the Department's Inspectional Services Bureau is reorganized along the lines of the Inspections Office of the Department of Internal Revenue, with officers spending their entire careers in anti-corruption work, the Department's anti-corruption machinery will be strengthened and provided with a measure of continuity which will afford some hope of its surviving intact the tenure of commissioners less effective than Commissioner Murphy.

In addition, if the momentum already generated is to be maintained and the needed reforms implemented, Commissioner Murphy and whoever succeeds him must have the clear support of the public in taking the difficult measures necessary. New Yorkers must stop going along with demands for graft payments and must stop offering them. The business community, in particular, was most uncooperative with this Commission, apparently preferring to retain its ability to buy its way out of tangles with the law, while placing full blame for corruption squarely on the heads of the police. New Yorkers must realize that seemingly harmless small bribes made to policemen often lead to acceptance of larger and more serious bribes from gamblers and narcotics pushers. In addition, the prevalence of bribes from businessmen who are apparent leaders in the community, such as contractors and hotel executives, lends an aura of respectability to the practice, making it much easier for an officer to justify to himself the acceptance of payoffs from organized crime.

New York City policemen, whatever their other problems, are traditionally men of extraordinary courage. To protect our lives and property, they face armed men on darkened rooftops and a host of less dramatic dangers. New Yorkers must now find the courage to sacrifice narrow self-interest in helping these men to do their extremely difficult jobs with integrity. The goals of all of us should parallel those expressed by Captain Daniel McGowan during the Commission's public hearings:

"[I would like to] contribute in some small measure to rooting out the weaknesses in the system that permits fine young men with high ideals to come into the Department and within a few years be involved in corruptive practices. The tragedy of these men and their families [is] so demonstrably shown here with Patrolman Droge.

" ... I've spent over half of my life in the Police Department. I'm the son of a man who spent thirty-nine years in the Police Department. I want both of us to look back on that service with honor.

"And, last, I'm a resident and a citizen of this City. I have a vested interest that the quality of life in this City should become somewhat better, and that my wife and my children and my grandchild, together with all citizens, can point to the Police Department and truly say, 'It's the finest.'"
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:39 am

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 1


THE CITY OF NEW YORK
LAW DEPARTMENT
Municipal Building
New York, N. Y. 10007

J. LEE RANKIN, Corporation Counsel

May 14, 1970

The Honorable John V. Lindsay
Mayor of the City of New York
City Hall
New York, N.Y. 10007

My dear Mr. Mayor:

As a result of allegations of corruption in the New York City Police Department you appointed this Committee and charged it with a three-fold responsibility: (1) to evaluate the procedures presently employed by the Police Department to investigate charges of corruption in order to ascertain whether these procedures provide the public with adequate assurance that charges of police corruption are dealt with vigorously, promptly and fairly; (2) to recommend improvements in these procedures; and (3) to investigate the charges of corruption and other allegations growing out of the announcement of the Committee's formation.

This assignment involves the integrity of the principal law enforcement agency of this City and is therefore of major importance to the community. In our brief period of existence the Committee has met four times and taken the following initial steps in what must now be regarded as an undertaking of far greater magnitude than that originally envisioned when this Committee was created:

1. At the Committee's request, Police Commissioner Howard Leary has furnished a report of the existing procedures employed by the Police Department for the investigation of charges of corruption.

2. The public has been requested to supply the Committee with any information it has concerning acts of police corruption. As of this date, 375 complaints have been received. The Commissioner of Investigation is evaluating and investigating these charges, in some instances in conjunction with the appropriate District Attorney.

3. The Committee has requested the five District Attorneys in New York City to provide summaries of prosecutions of police officers for acts of corruption over the past five years in order that we might ascertain the extent to which existing law enforcement agencies have delved into this problem.

4. Under present law a City employee is required to give 30 days notice before his retirement becomes effective. The Police Department has found that in many instances this time period does not permit a proper investigation and disposition of charges of corruption against members of the police force, particularly if criminal charges are also under investigation. Other City departments have encountered similar problems with regard to allegedly dishonest employees seeking to retire and obtain their pension benefits. The Committee recognizes that it would be unfair to require all City employees to be subjected to a longer period of notice. However, where charges have been filed against an employee, he should not be permitted to retire prior to 60 days from the date of these charges in order to permit the City, after fair hearing, either to dismiss or otherwise discipline the employee or to absolve him of the allegations. Consideration should also be given to changes in the law which would permit the divesting of pension rights in those instances where employees, after their retirement, have been convicted of crimes which relate to the performance of their City jobs. An employee should not be permitted to acquire pension rights under circumstances which, if they were known at the time, would have caused his dismissal from City service.

These steps represent only the beginning of the work which must be done in order for the people of this City to feel confident that its Police Department is free of corruption. A thorough evaluation of police procedures must go forward. Most importantly, however, a thorough investigation of specific charges of corruption must be undertaken backed by whatever resources of men and money is necessary in order to do the job. To facilitate this investigation members of the police force must be urged by the Mayor and by the Police Commissioner to advise the District Attorneys of any known acts of corruption. Commissioner Leary has stated unequivocally that no reprisals of any kind will be permitted against a member of his department who comes forward with such information. Any member of the department who feels that reprisals have been instituted against him should be assured that he can report this fact directly to the Mayor's office with full confidence that the Mayor himself will undertake to protect him against reprisals by the Department.

To state the magnitude of the task, however, is to indicate why this Committee would find it most difficult to perform it. An investigation only of the charges thus far received requires a full-time investigative body with a skilled full-time staff. The members of your Committee all have demanding responsibilities in connection with their respective offices. It is unfair to the public and to the positions they hold for the members of this Committee to attempt to perform the investigation which the job requires and which the public has a right to demand.

It has also been suggested that because of our several official positions there could be conflict between our responsibilities in our offices and as Committee members. While we do not accept the validity of this suggestion, we all agree that those undertaking so important a responsibility for the community should not only be free from any conflicts but also should be free from any appearance thereof. We, therefore, recommend to you that your Committee be disbanded and that it be replaced with an independent investigative body, appointed by you from the private sector, with full authority to carry forward this investigation. It must have the cooperation of the District Attorneys and all City agencies, most particularly the Department of Investigation and the Police Department, and should refer to the District Attorneys all cases which warrant criminal prosecution. Such an investigative agency should have an adequate staff and should be able to draw upon appropriate City agencies for assistance.

The Members of this Committee pledge their full cooperation to you and to the new investigative agency which we urge you to appoint.

Sincerely,

FRANK S. HOGAN
HOWARD R. LEARY
J. LEE RANKIN
BURTON B. ROBERTS
ROBERT K. RUSKIN
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:42 am

EXHIBIT 2

CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
New York, N.Y. 10007

Office of the Mayor
Executive Order No. 11
May 21, 1970

Appointing a Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures

Section 1. Pursuant to the Authority vested in the Mayor, I hereby appoint a Commission to (1) investigate the extent of alleged police corruption in the City and any relationship of such alleged corruption to crime and law enforcement; (2) inquire into and evaluate the existing procedures for investigating specific allegations of corruption and present practices designed to prevent corruption and ascertain whether these procedures provide the public with adequate assurance that charges of police corruption are dealt with vigorously, promptly and fairly; (3) recommend improvements in these procedures, additional steps to provide stronger safeguards against corruption, and any improvements in methods of law enforcement which will tend to eliminate police corruption; (4) take evidence and hold whatever hearings, public and private, the Commission may deem appropriate to ascertain the necessary facts.

§2. The Commission shall consist of the following persons who are hereby appointed as members thereof:

Whitman Knapp, Chairman
Arnold Bauman
Joseph Monserrat
Franklin A. Thomas
Cyrus R. Vance

§3. The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedures and to employ such assistants as it deems necessary, within the amounts appropriated therefor.

§4. All departments and agencies of the City are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time.

§5. This order shall take effect immediately.

JOHN V. LINDSAY
Mayor
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:47 am

EXHIBIT 3

LOCAL LAWS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1970


No. 13

Introduced by Mr. Cohen (by request of the Mayor) --

A LOCAL LAW

To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the powers of the commission appointed by the mayor to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures.

Be it enacted by the Council as follows:

Section 1. Article one of title F of chapter fifty-one of the administrative code of the city of New York is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to be section F51-9.0, to follow section F51-8.0, to read as follows:

§F51-9.0 Commission appointed by the mayor to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures; additional powers. -- The commission established by the executive order of the mayor number eleven, dated May twenty-first nineteen hundred seventy, to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures, or any member of it designated in writing by the chairman, shall have the powers and duties set forth in such executive order and, in addition thereto, for the purpose of carrying out such powers and duties, such commission, or a subcommittee thereof, shall have power to administer oaths or affirmations, to hold hearings either public or private, require and enforce by subpoena the attendance and take testimony under oath of such persons as it deems necessary, and require and enforce by subpoena duces tecum the production of books, accounts, papers and other evidence relevant to the subject or subjects of its investigation or inquiry.

§2. This local law shall take effect immediately and shall cease to be of any force or effect on December thirty-first, nineteen hundred seventy.

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, S.S.:

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of a local law of The City of New York, passed by the Council on May, 1970 and approved by the Mayor on June 25, 1970.

HERMAN KATZ, City Clerk, Clerk of the Council.

***

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW SECTION 27

Pursuant to the provisions of Municipal Home Rule Law Section 27, I hereby certify that the enclosed local law (Local Law 13 of 1970, Council Int. No. 276) contains the correct text and:

Received the following vote at the meeting of the New York City Council on May 27, 1970: 29 for; 8 against.

Was approved by the Mayor on June 25, 1970.

Was returned to the City Clerk on June 26, 1970.

J. LEE RANKIN, Corporation Counsel.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:50 am

EXHIBIT 4

July 1, 1971

Interim Report of Investigative Phase

The work of the Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, as stated in the report to LEAA of February 16, 1971, has been divided into two phases: investigation and analysis. The investigative aspect of the Commission's work was related to the subpoena power created by the City Council, which expired yesterday. Analysis of the investigative data and the formulation of recommendations will be continued throughout the summer. Detailed findings and recommendations will be presented at a later date. This is an interim report dealing in summary form with the investigative phase of the Commission's work.

It may be noted at the outset that the Commission's investigation has not aimed at ascertaining individual acts of corruption or establishing the guilt of individual police officers. Indeed, as District Attorney Frank Hogan has correctly observed, the Commission is not equipped to develop cases against individual police officers. In an interview with the New York Post, Mr. Hogan observed, among other things:

"They [the Commission] don't have the power to use the grand jury. They do not have the power of contempt nor do they have the power to prosecute."


The Commission has focused its efforts on identifying patterns of police corruption and on defining the problem areas in sufficient detail to lay the groundwork for the remedial recommendations.

A fundamental conclusion at which the Commission has arrived is that the problem of police corruption cannot -- as is usually asserted -- be met by seeking out the few "rotten apples" whose supposedly atypical conduct is claimed to sully the reputation of an otherwise innocent Department. The Commission is persuaded that the underlying problem is that the climate of the Department is inhospitable to attempts to uncover acts of corruption, and protective of those who are corrupt. The consequence is that the rookie who comes into the Department is faced with the situation where it is easier for him to become corrupt than to remain honest. The Commission's ultimate recommendations' will concern themselves with methods of reversing this pressure toward corruption.

In broad outline, the Commission's method of investigation has been: first, to postulate the patterns of corruption by interrogating a wide variety of sources, including aggrieved citizens, community organizations, trade associations, present and former police officers, and members of the underworld; and second, to verify the patterns thus postulated by ordinary investigative techniques, such as analysis of Police Department records, surveillance of police officers, examination of the financial books and records of persons believed to have made corrupt payments, and monitoring conversations with suspected police officers. As required by applicable law, the use of monitored conversations was confined to situations involving the cooperation of someone in a suspected officer's confidence who was willing to equip himself with a recording or transmitting device.

Among the areas of police activity that the Commission investigated were narcotics, gambling, prostitution, bars and restaurants, hotels, construction, tow trucks and bodegas (Spanish grocery stores). The reports concerning these investigations will be forthcoming when the evidence has been fully analyzed. However, certain preliminary observations seem now appropriate.

Narcotics: The Commission concurs with the statement by the State Commission of Investigation that police officers in the Narcotics Division engage in "various types and techniques of corruption ranging from extortion, bribery, contradictory court testimony designed to affect the release of a narcotics criminal, improper associations with persons engaged in drug traffic, and, finally * * * involvement by police officers in the actual sale of narcotics."

Gambling: The Commission's investigation has substantiated allegations frequently made in the press with respect to the prevalence and extent of payoffs by gamblers to the police. Payments are made on a regular basis to plainclothesmen who are primarily responsible for gambling enforcement, and these payments are divided on the basis of shares -- i.e., a full share or a fraction or multiple, depending upon the position of the police officer receiving payment. "Show" arrests of predetermined low-level employees of gambling establishments are periodically made.

Prostitution: The open way in which certain houses of prostitution are operated suggests that they are tolerated because of payments to the police. This has been corroborated by evidence developed by the Commission establishing the making of such payments.

Liquor: Payoffs are made by bars, restaurants and night clubs for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from the desire to avoid prosecution for outright violations of law to the mere assurance of cooperative attitudes by the local police.

Hotels: In addition to Christmas gratuities to practically all ranks in the Department, leading hotels were found to provide free food and accommodations to the local police in surprisingly substantial amounts.

Construction: The construction industry, in order to avoid compliance with a variety of regulations, was found generally to make regular payments which are usually earmarked for various police officers with jurisdiction in the area.

Tow Trucking: Despite wide publicity that had been given to scandals concerning collusion between police and tow truck operators, payments by such operators to police for favorable treatment at the scene of an accident are still prevalent.

Bodegas (small Spanish groceries): The Commission initially found a ritualized system of weekly police demands for payment from the bodegas which violated Sabbath laws. Police Commissioner Murphy subsequently ordered that Sabbath laws be enforced only on complaint, and the demands have apparently been greatly diminished.

Other areas which will be discussed in our final report include parking lots, garages, police property clerk's office, pistol permits, street vendors, gypsy confidence swindles, trucking companies. sale of police information, car rentals, and community taxis (gypsy cabs).

During the coming months, staff reports analyzing the evidence underlying the foregoing conclusions will be prepared, and the Commission will formulate its recommendations for dealing with the patterns of corruption which have been discussed.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:54 am

EXHIBIT 5

Opening Statement by Whitman Knapp

First Public Hearings, October 18, 1971


I should like briefly to state the general purpose of these public hearings. As many of you know, the Commission was long undecided as to whether or not to hold public hearings. We were concerned lest the testimony at such hearings would -- by its necessary relation to individual situations -- detract from the basic findings of our inquiry.

The main thrust of our findings -- and the point we wish to bring home to the public -- is that the problem of police corruption cannot be solved merely by focusing on individual acts of wrongdoing. It arises out of an endemic condition which must be attacked on all fronts. The difficulty with any testimony is that it must necessarily relate to individual situations.

However, we believe that our counsel has succeeded in structuring these hearings in such a way as to focus on basic conditions and on the public's responsibility for giving support to steps taken to remedy such conditions.

It is of the utmost importance that the public be made aware of the critical problems facing the Department and its individual members. The police officer's job is perhaps more important than any other in our society. The average citizen's most frequent contact with government is through the police officer, and the manner in which the police officer performs his or her duties is what makes most people decide how government is functioning. Moreover, the police officer must at all times live with a realization of physical danger. This latter fact is obvious in the case of men and women assigned to high-crime areas. But no member of the force is immune from being called -- at a moment's notice -- into a situation where his or her life is at risk.

In addition to the physical danger of which a police officer must continually be aware, he or she is subjected to moral pressures the like of which we impose on no other person. Unlike almost all others subject to moral pressure, the police officer must frequently face these pressures alone and unobserved. He or she is constantly called upon to act in situations where the usual processes of audit and review cannot be used.

In such circumstances, it is as irresponsible for society to fail to provide the police officer with every possible support in resisting pressures toward corruption as it would be to let an officer respond to an armed robbery alarm without having provided training in self-defense.

What do we mean by support? The methods of accomplishing it may be -- and indeed are -- difficult. But the objectives are clear. A police officer who -- totally alone and unobserved -- is placed in a position where the mere acceptance of a proffered bribe may produce more wealth than an entire year's salary, or in the more usual position where the pressures are more subtle, is entitled to at least three elements of support to fall back upon:


(1) The officer in such situations should be entitled to feel confident that society is so organized that if a bribe be refused and the matter reported to superior officers, there is a reasonable chance that the corruptor will land in jail; on the other hand,

(2) such officer should feel that if he or she yields to temptation there is a reasonable chance that he or she -- and any other officer similarly situated -- will be apprehended, separated from the force and subjected to criminal prosecution; and, finally and perhaps most importantly,

(3) such officer should be confident that a refusal of the bribe and a report of the corruptor would produce commendation -- and not hostility -- from his superiors and fellows.


The need for focusing public attention on this problem of support has been dramatized by the nature of the opposition that has arisen to steps recently taken by the Police Commissioner to deal with the twin problems of corruption and discipline.

For example, some people have attacked the Commissioner's judgment on priorities. Instead of concerning himself with corruption and discipline, those people say, he should worry exclusively about "crime in the street." In our view such an approach would be futile and totally irresponsible. The Department's ability to take effective action in any direction depends on its discipline and integrity. Unless such discipline and integrity be maintained, it is ridiculous to expect the Department to be effective in dealing with "crime in the streets."

A word about what these hearings will not seek to accomplish. Being expositive in nature, those hearings will not deal with recommendations for reform or with attempts to fix responsibility for such conditions as have been found to exist. Those matters will be dealt with in our report, which is now in process of preparation and which will be published as soon as it is ready.

In brief, then, it is the purpose of these hearings to inform the public about -- and to focus attention upon -- the corruption-related problems faced by the Department and its individual officers.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 1:57 am

EXHIBIT 6

Opening Statement by Whitman Knapp

Second Public Hearings, December 14, 1971


As a preliminary, I would like to give a word about the purpose of these hearings, which is different from the purpose of the previous ones.

The reason for having the first hearings in public, rather than behind closed doors, was to enable the public to share with us and understand the conditions our investigation had uncovered. As I then observed, we believed -- and still believe -- it to be of the utmost importance that public attention be focused on the conditions and causes of corruption, to the end that the public may give its constant support to official action taken to remedy such conditions and causes -- and may, indeed, insist that such action be taken. The previous round of hearings, then, dealt with present conditions as to which action was -- and is -- imperative.

In line with our desire and purpose of producing action by focusing on present conditions, it had been our original intention to confine to private hearings our inquiries as to the past events, and to deal in our final report with the meaning of such events and their significance to the future.

However, it soon became apparent that there was intense public interest in one phase of past history -- namely what official action or inaction had resulted from revelations made by Sergeant David Durk and Patrolman (now Detective) Frank Serpico concerning events in 1966 and 1967. Such interest appeared to be so intense that we became persuaded that to refrain from public hearings on the subject would not serve our purpose of focusing attention on the future, but would, on the contrary, simply divert such attention to the futile business of wondering about the past. It is to avoid such a result that these hearings have been scheduled.

It is obvious that these hearings, having a different purpose, will have a different format. The Commission itself has come to no conclusions as to any of the matters to be disclosed. Nor will it come to any conclusions in the course of these hearings. Any conclusions the Commission may make will appear in its final report.

In these hearings we shall simply endeavor to let each participant in the events under discussion lay before the public in an organized fashion his recollection and understanding of the events as they occurred.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 2:04 am

EXHIBIT 7

Sources of Funds Received by the Commission


Image

Grantor/Amount

City of New York: $325,000.00
U.S. Department of Justice-Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: 215,037.00
State of New York-Office of Planning Services-Division of Criminal Justice: 75,083.00
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation: 50,000.00
Field Foundation: 20,000.00
Fund for the City of New York: 18,500.00
New World Foundation: 10,000.00
The Rosenblat Charitable Trust: 10,000.00
The New York Foundation: 7,500.00
The J. M. Kaplan Fund Inc.: 5,000.00
Joint Foundation Support, Inc. on behalf of the Joyce and John Gutfreund Foundation: 2,500.00
Joint Foundation Support, Inc. on behalf of the Bernhardt Foundation: 2,500.00
The Stern Fund: 3,000.00
New York Community Trust: 2,500.00
Howard Z. Leffel Fund in Community Funds, Inc.: 2,500.00

Total: $749,120.00
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Wed Jul 23, 2014 2:09 am

EXHIBIT 8

POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF NEW YORK
DIVISIONS & PATROL PRECINCTS


Image

Small numbers indicate precincts. which are gathered into divisions (indicated by large numbers). Divisions are in turn grouped into seven borough commands: Manhattan South includes Divisions 1 and 3; Manhattan North, 4, 5 and 6; Bronx, 7, 8 and 9; Brooklyn South, 10, 11 and 12; Brooklyn North, 13 and 14; Queens, 15, 16 and 17; and Richmond includes three precincts, but no divisions. This map shows boundaries which existed as of January, 1972.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Mar 29, 2016 7:50 am

Part 1 of 2

Throughout its investigation the Commission staff sought to find police officers actually engaged in corrupt activities who could be induced to describe openly and for the record their activities and their knowledge of the patterns of corruption observed during their careers. We were informed by people experienced in police work that no police officer had ever given such information and that none ever would, even if he himself were caught in a corrupt act and were offered immunity in exchange for his testimony. The tradition of the policeman's code of silence was so strong, we were advised, that it was futile to expect such testimony from any police officer. The most that could be expected was anonymous information or, if we were extremely lucky, testimony given under oath on an anonymous basis. All of the experienced people with whom we spoke agreed that if even one police officer could be induced to give inside information based upon personal experience, the testimony would be of inestimably greater value than any other evidence the Commission might uncover.

The search for a corrupt officer who would speak frankly and openly uncovered not one but five. However, the first and potentially most productive of these proved to be too valuable to keep to ourselves. Robert Leuci was a detective who had spent eleven years on the force and who had been assigned to the elite Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of the Narcotics Division. He had met police officers Durk and Serpico in 1970 and led them to believe that he would back up their charges that SIU had not adequately pursued certain narcotics cases. In the fall of 1970 Durk arranged for meetings between Leuci and various assistant district attorneys, the State Commission of Investigation, and the staff of this Commission. In these meetings Leuci's statements were inconclusive and not susceptible to investigation. He subsequently indicated that his purpose in submitting to questioning had been to discover how much information the Commission and other agencies possessed.

In February, 1971, Leuci was again interviewed by the Commission staff, and this time he was convinced to tell all he knew about corruption in SIU and to help the Commission expose it.

Leuci told of a Narcotics Division infested with corruption. Drawing on personal experiences as well as those he observed and discussed with fellow officers, he described enormous payoffs by narcotics violators, illegal wiretaps used to facilitate shakedowns, involvement of supervisory personnel in narcotics graft, and arrangements between police officers and organized crime members which gave the latter protection from arrest and advance knowledge of legitimate investigations involving them.

Leuci worked with Commission agents for about one month and obtained a number of incriminating tape-recorded conversations with police officers. It quickly became apparent that he had incalculable value as an undercover agent. His work, if allowed to continue for as long as it was productive, could result in criminal prosecutions which might well expose a network of narcotics related corruption involving many police officers and stretching outside the Department.

However, an investigation calculated to accomplish this end would, if successful, last for many months, even years, and would require concentrating on obtaining evidence in specific cases rather than on gathering information for the purpose of identifying patterns of corruption. Because the Commission's investigation was due to end in a few months, we decided that Leuci should be turned over to law enforcement authorities with the time and manpower necessary for such an investigation.

In March, 1971, Assistant United States Attorney General Wilson and Whitney North Seymour, Jr., United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, were apprised of Leuci's activities to date and advised that the Commission was willing to forego any use of Leuci or the information he had provided in favor of an investigation directed at criminal prosecutions. The Commission also offered to refrain from revealing or further pursuing certain investigations into narcotics and related corruption which might draw attention to Leuci, and to allow the attorney and the two agents who had been working with Leuci to devote their full time to the proposed investigation. The Commission's offer was accepted.

The following month Commissioner Murphy and First Deputy Commissioner William H. T. Smith were informed of the investigation and arrangements were made to transfer Leuci back into SIU where he could work most effectively. The Commissioner agreed to keep his knowledge of the investigation entirely confidential and to give his full assistance whenever requested to do so.

The investigation was pursued with great success by the original investigative team aided by personnel from Mr. Seymour's office and, as the scope of the investigation broadened, by agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and a few carefully selected police officers. By the spring of 1972 federal authorities were confident that the investigation would result in far-ranging indictments involving organized crime members, police officers, and others in the criminal justice system including even judges.

However, Detective Leuci's participation in the investigation came to an end in June, 1972, when a story printed in The New York Times precipitated a general disclosure of his activities. Six indictments have so far been returned alleging corruption on the part of four police officers, an assistant district attorney, three lawyers, a bail bondsman and a private investigator. Other indictments are anticipated, but some of the most important cases have undoubtedly been aborted by the premature disclosure of the investigation.

The Commission could not, of course, call Leuci as a witness in its public hearings since at that time he was still working as a federal undercover agent. Moreover, findings in other Commissions investigations were withheld during the hearings so as to avoid areas where the focusing of attention might threaten his undercover activities. [xii] With his exposure some of the information disclosed by Leuci and certain of the results of his undercover work can now be discussed and have been included, where relevant, in this report.

***

Corruption in narcotics law enforcement has grown in recent years to the point where high-ranking police officials acknowledge it to be the most serious problem facing the Department. In the course of its investigation, the Commission became familiar with each of the practices detailed by Chief Cawley, as well as many other corrupt patterns, including:

• Keeping money and/or narcotics confiscated at the time of an arrest or raid.
• Selling narcotics to addict-informants in exchange for stolen goods.
• Passing on confiscated drugs to police informants for sale to addicts.
• "Flaking," or planting narcotics on an arrested person in order to have evidence of a law violation.
• "Padding," or adding to the quantity of narcotics found on an arrested person in order to upgrade an arrest.
• Storing narcotics, needles and other drug paraphernalia in police lockers.
• Illegally tapping suspects' telephones to obtain incriminating evidence to be used either in making cases against the suspects, or to blackmail them.
• Purporting to guarantee freedom from police wiretaps for a monthly service charge.
• Accepting money or narcotics from suspected narcotics law violators as payment for the disclosure of official information.
• Accepting money for registering as police informants persons who were in fact giving no information and falsely attributing leads and arrests to them, so that their "cooperation" with the police may win them amnesty for prior misconduct.
• Financing heroin transactions.

In addition to these typical patterns, the Commission learned of numerous individual instances of narcotics-related corrupt conduct on the part of police officers, such as:

• Determining the purity and strength of unfamiliar drugs they had seized by giving small quantities to addict-informants to test on themselves.
• Introducing potential customers to narcotics pushers.
• Revealing the identity of a government informant to narcotics criminals.
• Kidnapping critical witnesses at the time of trial to prevent them from testifying.
• Providing armed protection for narcotics dealers.
• Offering to obtain "hit men" to kill potential witnesses.

***

In 1968, allegations of irregularities in the Narcotics Division led to an investigation by the Department's Internal Affairs Division. As a result of this investigation, many members of the division, including almost the entire staff of SIU, were gradually transferred out of the Division. However, three years later, this Commission's study of narcotics-related corruption revealed that both sectors of the Narcotics Division were still pervaded by corruption. Within the past year, there has been a nearly one hundred percent turnover in Narcotics Division personnel, but as the present commander of the Division recently told the Commission, the problem of corruption remains....

In June, 1972, a dismissed plainclothesman who had been assigned to the Narcotics Division was convicted in New York County and sentenced to up to four years in prison for his part in an extortion scheme which involved six members of the Narcotics Division. According to testimony at the trial, he and two other police officers contacted a restaurant owner and demanded $6,000, threatening to arrest his daughter-in-law on a narcotics charge unless he paid them. They further threatened to send the woman's two children to a foundling home in the event of her arrest. The restaurant owner paid them what they asked.

Within a few months, the same policeman, along with some other members of the unit, again approached the man and demanded an additional $12,000. The man told them to return in a few days, and in the interim he arranged for police surveillance of the next transaction. The plainclothesman was arrested when he accepted a down payment in marked money....

They told of participation in police shakedowns of narcotics "cribs" and said that it was standard practice for an informant to find a location where drugs were being sold in large quantities, and by attempting to make a buy with a large denomination bill, to induce the seller to reveal the hiding place of his cash supply....On leaving, the informant would arrange to return later to make another buy. On his next visit, as the seller opened the door, the police would crash in behind the informant. If the police felt they could score without risk, they would take whatever money and narcotics were available and let the seller go. If the amount of money was small, they would usually arrest the seller but still keep most of the narcotics, turning in only the amount necessary to charge a felony or misdemeanor as the case might be....

The Commission learned that it was not uncommon for defense attorneys in narcotics cases to pay policemen for such favors as lying under oath and procuring confidential police and judicial records concerning their clients' cases....

Evidence uncovered by the United States Attorney's Office in Manhattan in a current investigation of bribery by heroin dealers confirms the fact that corruption in narcotics law enforcement goes beyond the Police Department and involves prosecutors, attorneys, bondsmen, and allegedly even certain judges....

one Tactical Patrol Force officer who was apparently so confident of the acceptability of bribery that he attempted to arrange for a significant narcotics violator to bribe an assistant district attorney. He later pleaded guilty to bribery and resigned from the force after having served in the Department for eighteen years....

Theoretically, police may not secretly tap a suspect's telephone without a warrant. However, since strict constitutional safeguards and a certain amount of red tape surround the procedure for obtaining a warrant, it was not uncommon for Narcotics Division detectives to monitor and record the conversations of suspects without the required court order.

Since the Police Department has no official record of a wiretap installed without a warrant, no arrest is officially expected. Thus, information obtained by means of illegal taps can be used as easily to extort money and drugs from suspects who have been overheard as to make cases against them. Two Narcotics Division detectives were recently observed by a federal undercover agent as they engineered just such a score. The detectives illegally tapped the telephone conversations of a suspect in order to determine the extent of his dealings in narcotics. They then confronted the suspect with the evidence they had against him and threatened to arrest him unless he paid them $50,000. The suspect acceded to their demand and was given his freedom. The undercover agent, a former member of the Narcotics Division, told the Commission that in his experience the case is not unique....

Most often a police officer seeking to score simply keeps for himself all or part of the money and drugs confiscated during a raid or arrest. One former member of the Narcotics Division recently assigned to other duties told the Commission that in his experience eighty to ninety percent of the members of the Narcotics Division participated in at least this type of score....

The sergeant took a black fur coat from the trunk of the car and hid it in his own, while the patrolman walked away with a stereo tape device and several tape cassettes. Other situations described by Logan indicate that theft by police of furnishings and other personal property from premises where a narcotics raid had taken place were not uncommon.

Logan testified that his PEP Squad sergeant taught him the various techniques of scoring, and that such scoring was standard police procedure among his fellow officers....

"[T]he general feeling was that the man was going to jail, was going to get what was coming to him, so why should you give him back his money and let him bail himself out. In a way we felt that he was a narcotics pusher, we knew he was a narcotics pusher, we kind of felt he didn't deserve no rights since he was selling narcotics."... "[t]he feeling is that it is his word against theirs."...

Logan testified that he began to let suspects go after he had taken their money, so that they would be less likely to complain. This practice was in keeping with the philosophy of scoring taught to Logan by his sergeant: "[W]hen you are scoring a guy, try to leave him happy. If you leave a guy happy, he won't beef, won't make a complaint against you." Logan explained in his testimony that this could be accomplished even after a large amount of money was taken from a suspect by releasing him with enough of his narcotics to get him back into business....

Another detective, assigned to a squad in Queens, had been a full partner in a narcotics wholesale enterprise, and testified at the same hearings that when he decided to join the partnership, he discussed with fellow officers the fact that at least part of his heroin supply would come from holding back large quantities of heroin from important narcotics arrests....

Narcotics retained from prior arrests are also used for "padding," that is, for adding to the quantity of narcotics found on a subsequently arrested person, thus enabling the arresting officer to upgrade the charge to a felony. It is also common to use illegally retained narcotics to "flake" a narcotics suspect, that is, to plant evidence on a person in order to make a narcotics arrest....

Waverly Logan, in his testimony before the Commission, told of an occasion when he flaked a suspect. He had arrested a suspected narcotics seller and planted four bags of narcotics on him. At the precinct house the prisoner told two narcotics detectives how the arrest had been made. One of the detectives then took Logan aside and carefully instructed him on how to write up the complaint in order to make the case stick....

one patrolman testified that padding can also be accomplished by mixing the seized narcotics with adulterants such as quinine and mannitol....

The Commission found that police officers were involved in possession and sale of narcotics in a variety of ways, including financing transactions, recruiting informants and addicts as pushers, and share-selling, where the pusher is given drugs on consignment and retains part of the proceeds as payment. In addition, the Commission found it common for police officers to use narcotics as a medium of exchange for goods and services....

The Commission was able to verify the allegations that merchandise-for-drugs transactions between police officers and addicts were commonplace....

One plainclothesman, in the middle of a narcotics-for-cigarettes transaction ordered a gasoline powered mini-bike. The informant explained that it was still daylight and that he could not conveniently and easily steal a mini-bike in Central Park until sundown. The officer indicated he didn't care about the informant's troubles in obtaining a mini-bike, he just wanted it and, emphatically, that night....

In one of these a narcotics plainclothesman gave the two Commission informants a written list specifying thirty-one quart bottles by brand name. He told them to make sure to "come through because I need them for my daughter's wedding shower." The patrolman paid for the liquor with a quantity of white powder containing heroin, starch, quinine, and mannitol....

Another similar case which resulted in the conviction of a police officer involved a young woman, the addict mother of several children, who had been arrested on information supplied by her mother and her boyfriend, who hoped she would be treated. The arresting officer, a member of the Narcotics Division, persuaded her to become an informant and continued to supply her with large quantities of narcotics. The arresting officer later introduced her to a "gangster" -- actually another member of the Narcotics Division -- and together, by threatening to harm her children, they forced her into becoming a share-seller pusher.

Eventually her boyfriend complained to the Internal Affairs Division and an arrest was made. At one point during the investigation, the patrolman kidnapped the victim and held her in captivity while trying to frighten her into refraining from testifying against him....

In the case of one police officer who was convicted for selling narcotics, it was clear from the evidence that during the period covered by the charges, from the summer of 1970 to December, 1970, he had been a wholesaler of substantial amounts of cocaine. The conviction was obtained largely through the cooperation of another arrested former policeman, who on several occasions had acted as a distributor for him. The evidence included a secretly-recorded conversation in which the defendant discussed the possible effects of his distributor's arrest on his cocaine operation, the possibility of fixing the colleague's case, and the desirability of killing the informant who was responsible for the arrest....

A former Narcotics Division detective, while a member of the force, financed a narcotics wholesale business that dealt in one-eighth kilo quantities of heroin. He obtained some of the heroin he used for resale from an underworld connection, a wholesaler in narcotics....

a narcotics wholesale ring that was responsible for the monthly distribution of 1.5 million dollars' worth of heroin, revealed that a New York City patrolman provided armed protection as the ring made its deliveries....

Members of the Narcotics Division have helped known narcotic violators win amnesty or leniency from district attorneys' offices by fraudulently registering them as police informants and attributing arrests and leads from other sources to these "informants" on official Department records....

Captain McGowan testified, "that a member of our Narcotics Bureau learned the identity of an East Harlem character who was an informant for the Federal Narcotics Bureau and the allegation was that he passed this information on to the organized crime people in that area, that the informant was subsequently taken upstate and murdered, and the detective was paid $5,000."...

it is unfair of some City residents to assume that the existence anywhere of conspicuous narcotics trading proves that policemen are either directly involved or are being paid to close their eyes to the illegal activity. Very often, it is not police corruption, but the overcrowding of the courts and the penal system, and the difficult standard of proof required to convict an arrested suspect that are to blame for the apparent non-enforcement of narcotics laws....

When a police officer keeps for himself a portion of confiscated narcotics he is not always acting from corrupt motives. The Department's practice in the past of not providing money to pay informants, who usually are addicts themselves, created great pressure on police officers to use seized narcotics to pay for information.

***

The Commission found that payments to the police by contractors and subcontractors were the rule rather than exceptions and constituted a major source of graft to the uniformed police. It must be noted that policemen were not alone in receiving payoffs from contractors. Much larger payoffs were made to inspectors and permit-granting personnel from other agencies....

Corruption is a fact of life in the construction industry. In addition to extensive payoffs contractors make to police and others in regulatory agencies, there is evidence of considerable corruption within the industry itself. Contractors have been known to pay owners' agents to get an inside track on upcoming jobs; subcontractors pay contractors' purchasing agents to receive projects or to get information helpful in competitive bidding; sub-subcontractors pay subcontractors; dump-truck drivers exact a per-load payment for taking out extra loads they don't report to their bosses; and hoist engineers get money from various subcontractors to insure that materials are lifted to high floors without loss or damage. In this climate, it is only natural that contractors also pay the police....

the responsibility for inspecting certain permits and enforcing the ordinances outlined above lies with the police. The police officers charged with this responsibility have always been faced with a particularly tempting opportunity for corruption....

In a small job like the renovation of a brownstone, the general contractor was likely to pay the police between $50 and $150 a month, and the fee ascended sharply for larger jobs. An excavator on a small job paid $50 to $100 a week for the duration of excavation to avoid summonses for dirt spillage, flying dust, double-parked dump trucks, or for running vehicles over the sidewalk without a permit. A concrete company pouring a foundation paid another $50 to $100 a week to avoid summonses for double-parking its trucks or for running them across a sidewalk without a curb cut. (Concrete contractors are especially vulnerable, as it is essential that foundation-pouring be carried on continuously. This means that one or more trucks must be kept standing by while one is actually pouring.) Steel erectors paid a weekly fee to keep steel delivery trucks standing by; masons paid; the crane company paid. In addition, all construction sites were approached by police for contributions at Christmas, and a significant number paid extra for additional police patrols in the hope of obtaining protection from vandalism of building materials and equipment....

A promising method of curtailing construction graft which the Department has yet to use on a broad scale, would be a campaign to arrest contractors who offer bribes to policemen. The recent use in the Bronx of police undercover agents posing as regular policemen has led to the arrests of such would-be bribers.

***

payoffs from bars licensed by the state to sell liquor, along with those from construction firms, were the most common source of illegal outside income to uniformed policemen, and that unlicensed premises, operating completely outside the law, were paying substantial amounts to plainclothesmen and detectives. Like the construction industry, the business of selling liquor by the drink is governed by a complex system of state and local laws, infractions of which can lead to criminal penalties, as well as suspension or loss of license. Thus licensees are highly vulnerable to police shakedowns.....

virtually all bars were found to provide free food and drinks to policemen and also made Christmas and vacation payments to police. In addition, investigators found that many bars doing a substantial volume of business customarily made regular biweekly or monthly payments to the police. During the Commission's investigation such payments were usually initiated by the sector patrol sergeant who, bar owners said, would pay a visit to the premises and point out various violations or suggest that he could always flush the soap down the toilet and write out a summons for "no soap in the men's room."...

In one bar, Commission investigators were mistaken for detectives, and the owner told them, in a tape-recorded conversation, that he had recently paid the precinct captain. As a result of that incident the precinct captain, now a deputy inspector, has been brought up on departmental charges of unlawfully accepting $300 and then attempting to persuade the bar owner not to testify against him....

Behavior of supervising patrol sergeants in the Nineteenth, who were responsible for licensed premises inspections, was consistent with a pattern of biweekly and monthly payoffs to them by bar owners. Duty schedules in the precinct were arranged so that the three sergeants who were alleged to act as bagmen were always assigned to different shifts. They turned out to be a bar-hopping lot. The sheer volume of their visits to bars was out of all proportion to law-enforcement problems posed by licensed premises.

The most glaring example was one sergeant who invariably showed up in one bar or another ten minutes after going on duty and ordered a V.O. on the rocks, then proceeded to go from bar to bar for the rest of his tour....

In some cases, uniformed police officers shook down afterhours clubs. One owner of such an establishment told the Commission the following story, which was later corroborated by another source. Shortly after his bar opened, the local precinct captain paid a visit and asked the owner if he was running an after-hours bar. The owner admitted he was, whereupon the captain produced a neatly typed list of payments the owner was to make to the police for the privilege of operating. Listed were captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and sector car patrolmen, with the amount to be paid to each....

The Commission concluded during its investigation that the interests of both the police and the public would best be served by divesting the Police Department of responsibility for enforcing these laws except in response to specific complaints....Any corruption which may exist in such agencies is a lesser evil than corruption among policemen.

-- THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION: COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES
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