PART 1 OF 2
V. SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES LEADING TO EXCESSIVE AND UNNECESSARY STAFF USE OF FORCE AND HIGH LEVELS OF INMATE VIOLENCE
We have identified several deficiencies relating to the Department’s systems, staffing, operations, and management that contribute to the excessive and inappropriate staff use of force against adolescents and the high incidence of inmate-on-inmate violence. The Department must implement corrective measures to address these deficiencies to adequately protect the adolescent population from harm. See Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“evidence of systemic failures” in preventing improper use of force at New York City jails “supports a finding of a ‘policy of deliberate indifference’ as to staff-inmate violence on the part of defendants”).
A. Inadequate Reporting of Use of Force
Department staff fail to adequately document use of force incidents involving adolescents. The use of force reports we have examined are almost uniformly poor and contain many significant problems, including a general lack of detail, incomplete information, and internally inconsistent information. In addition, reports frequently do not provide an accurate account of the incident or the level of force employed, and fail to specify any resulting inmate injuries. Furthermore, despite DOC policies that require a use of force report from every officer involved in a use of force, as well as from every officer who witnesses a use of force by another officer, our investigation suggests that not all uses of force are documented and violence against inmates by staff is generally underreported.
Use of force reports are critically important as they form the basis for staff accountability. If a use of force is not reported, or reported inadequately or falsely, then there is no reasonable basis for review of that incident and no appropriate method to hold staff accountable for the improper use of force. Because of the poor reporting of use of force incidents at Rikers, unnecessary or excessive use of force goes undiscovered and unchallenged. This, in turn, has resulted in a culture in which staff feel empowered to use force inappropriately, in ways that go outside the bounds of written policies, because they know they are unlikely to face any meaningful consequences.
1. Failure to Report Use of Force
Pursuant to DOC’s Use of Force Directive, all “[s]taff who employ or witness force or have been alleged to employ or witness force . . . shall prepare a written report concerning the incident based on their own observations and written independently from other staff that were involved or alleged to have been involved in the incident.” Furthermore, staff are required to prepare these reports “prior to leaving the facility unless medically unable to do so.” Despite this clear policy requirement, this rule appears to be frequently and intentionally ignored, especially if the use of force does not result in a serious injury.
There is evidence that a powerful code of silence prevents staff who witness force from reporting. For example, staff will frequently report that they witnessed an inmate using force against an officer or resisting an officer, but then fail to note or describe the force the officer employed in response to the inmate—even when the officer himself has reported that he has used force. Similarly, officers frequently affirmatively state that they did not witness any use of force despite other evidence that suggests they were at the scene where force was used. Investigators and supervisors reviewing the use of force reports consistently fail to point out these and other obvious omissions and failures to conform the reports to DOC policy, reinforcing the perception of officers that it is not important to be forthcoming or complete in their reports. For example:
• In April 2013, an inmate sustained facial injuries and contusions to his left shoulder after an officer struck him multiple times in the intake area of RNDC. Video of the incident shows an officer standing idly by for several minutes just a few feet away. This officer did not submit a use of force witness report, and investigators noted that they would not have known he was even in the area had they not viewed the video.
• In February 2012, an inmate was beaten in the head by an officer in the RNDC school area. Three months after the incident, a different officer submitted a handwritten memo to the Warden, at the request of the Deputy Warden, describing the fact that he witnessed the first officer using “control holds” to gain control of the inmate, and that he was standing by to provide assistance if needed. The investigating Captain’s report found that the use of force was justified and included no mention of this officer witness’s failure to submit a use of force witness report at the time of the incident. The Tour Commander and the Warden, who concurred with the investigating Captain’s conclusion, also did not reference the officer’s failure to report the incident. The incident was never referred to the Department’s Investigation Division, and the officer witness was not disciplined for his failure to submit a timely use of force report.
We also have identified a pattern of correction officers failing to complete reports for comparatively “minor” uses of force. A correction officer assigned to EMTC described several incidents to us that she alleged were never written up as use of force incidents, including slapping and hitting adolescent inmates to get them to stop talking or stop playing around in school. We also reviewed an incident where an officer failed to submit a use of force report after she had hit an inmate with handcuffs to wake him up while he was sleeping in class. The incident only came to light because the same officer similarly assaulted another inmate, and that second assault led to a more serious altercation, which ultimately led to a full investigation by the Investigation Division. (This incident, referred to as involving Inmate H, is described in further detail in the Appendix.) This failure to document “minor” uses of force was also noted by the inmates themselves. During an interview with our consultant, an inmate observed that officers “slap, hit, and punch” adolescent inmates regularly, but only report a “use of force” when there is a serious beating.
Additionally, in some cases, officers and supervisors pressure inmates not to report, using a phrase that is widely used and universally known at Rikers: “hold it down.” This expression is code for, “don’t report what happened.” Inmates who refuse to “hold it down” risk retaliation from officers in the form of additional physical violence and disciplinary sanctions. A DOC Associate Commissioner acknowledged the underreporting of use of force by officers, noting that it would be “disingenuous” to claim that it doesn’t exist. The head of the Investigation Division also acknowledged the problem.
A senior DOHMH official told us that he also was very familiar with the phrase, “hold it down,” and conveyed his belief that adolescents were often instructed not to report incidents. He indicated that one of the reasons inmates might agree to “hold it down” was that if inmates do not report a use of force, they themselves were then less likely to be infracted and disciplined. The official expressed concerns that inmates might not receive needed medical treatment for injuries caused by staff uses of force if pressured not to report the incident.22 In addition, the official believed that some injuries reported to be the result of alleged slip and fall accidents in fact involved unreported use of force, based on the unusual frequency of slip and fall accidents and the serious nature of the injuries that allegedly resulted from them. For example, buried in the medical file of an inmate brought to the clinic for treatment of a one-centimeter laceration on his ear after a reported slip and fall is a note that the patient “claims he was hit in the left ear with cuffs,” although the incident was not reported as a use of force.
In interviews with dozens of adolescent inmates, our consultant found that violence ranging from casual and spontaneous to premeditated and severe is often accompanied by the officers warning inmates to “hold it down.” According to our consultant, this phrase was familiar to almost every inmate he interviewed, as well as inmates he spoke with informally as he toured the jails. The warning may come from officers immediately following a beating, or sometimes days or weeks after an incident. Officers may even delay taking inmates to clinics for medical attention as they try to convince them to “hold it down.” If the inmate indeed “holds it down” and declines to report a use of force, the staff also then do not report it.
The following are a few of the examples described by inmates to our consultant:
• An inmate reported that he was punched and stomped on by several officers in a school corridor after verbally insulting one of them during an argument. He asked to go to the medical clinic, but the officers refused to take him there, giving him tissues to clean himself up and telling him to “hold it down.” The inmate also described another incident in which officers beat him, injuring his arm. They refused to take him to the clinic for medical care until he agreed to tell the clinic that he hurt his arm playing basketball. He agreed to that story, and as far as he knows, the use of force was never reported.
• An inmate stated that he got into an altercation with an officer after fighting with another inmate. Although he got 70 days in punitive segregation for fighting with the other inmate, a Captain told him he would not get any additional days for fighting with the officer if he didn’t report that fight or discuss the situation.
• After a severe beating by multiple officers, an inmate was taken to a holding cell in intake and told by officers to “hold it down” while medical care was delayed for more than an hour. He eventually was taken to Elmhurst Hospital for medical treatment. He refused to “hold it down,” and in fact filed a civil lawsuit against the Department, which settled before trial. (Incident is referenced supra at 18 and described in further detail in the Appendix, referred to as involving Inmate D.)
• An inmate stated that when he asked staff for medical attention after being raped by an officer, he was told not to say anything about the incident. He reported it anyway, and told our consultant that after doing so, staff continually harassed him. In fact, the inmate reported to our consultant that he was warned by two officers not to say anything about the incident as he was being taken to speak with our consultant while our investigative team was at Rikers.23
During our site visit, we observed another example of staff exerting pressure on inmates to remain silent. As an officer was bringing an inmate to our consultant for an interview, our consultant heard the officer tell him that he didn’t have to tell our consultant “no damn story.”
Finally, there is evidence suggesting that non-DOC staff, such as medical staff and teachers, also fail to report witnessing use of force, due in part to fear of retaliation from DOC uniformed staff, who prefer they look away when staff are using force against inmates. According to a senior DOHMH official, medical staff have faced retaliation for reporting injuries that they suspected were the result of staff uses of force. We were advised of an incident where a medical staff member reported that the reason she had witnessed an inmate being beaten was that, because she was new, she did not know she was “supposed to go to the back” of the clinic during such incidents. In addition, while DOC policy requires that mental health staff attempt to obtain inmates’ cooperation to leave their cells in order to avoid forced cell extractions, mental health staff routinely leave the housing areas after doing so and before the cell extractions take place. While this is partly to avoid injuries to medical staff, a DOHMH official admitted that this practice also protects mental health staff from witnessing the actual extraction.
There are also indications that teachers at the schools on Rikers, where as discussed above a disproportionate amount of violence against adolescents takes place, are told to look the other way when inmates are being beaten so as not to be a witness. During an investigation of an incident in the RNDC school area, one teacher told an investigator that when a use of force incident occurs, Department of Education staff “knows [sic] they should turn their head away, so that they don’t witness anything.” In connection with the same incident, another teacher told an investigator that she tried not to watch officers beating the inmate for the same reason, despite the fact that she could hear the inmate screaming and crying for his mother. That teacher also tried to keep other inmates in the classroom away from the window so that they would not witness anything either. The admission by two teachers that they had been instructed or trained to witness nothing did not appear to surprise the investigator who made no particular note in the investigation file. (This incident, referred to as involving Inmate H, is described in further detail in the Appendix.) Indeed, we reviewed many incidents involving use of force in the RNDC school area, but very few of the investigative files included witness statements from a teacher. In the rare instances where the file included a statement, teachers most often reported that they did not see anything.
2. Inadequate and/or Falsified Use of Force Reports
Pursuant to DOC’s Use of Force Directive, a written report regarding a use of force incident must include a “complete account of the events leading to the use of force,” a “precise description of the incident,” “the specific reasons” force was necessary, “the type of force” used, and a “description of any injuries sustained by inmates or staff.”
Rikers staff routinely fail to meet the standards set forth in this policy when completing use of force reports. One of the many failures of the reports is a lack of detail sufficient to determine what actually happened, including why force was necessary and what injuries resulted. Reports frequently provide a generic description of the incident often using boilerplate terminology that appears designed to justify the use of force. For example, rather than providing a complete and detailed description of the events leading up to the use of force, and exactly how the encounter unfolded, staff will simply report that an inmate “failed to respond to a direct order and became aggressive,” that they “defended” themselves from the inmate, that they used “one two second burst of OC spray,”24 and that they “told the inmate several times to stop resisting.” Staff also rarely identify inmate injuries in their incident reports, and investigators and supervisors consistently fail to note this glaring and repeated omission.
Furthermore, our review of use of force reports has detected certain patterns that strongly suggest staff engage in false reporting. These patterns include:
1) Use of force reports in which staff allege that the inmate instigated the altercation by punching or hitting the officer, often allegedly in the face or head and for “no reason,” “out of nowhere,” “spontaneously,” or “without provocation.” But then the officer has no reported injuries—no lacerations or fractures or even minor bruises or swelling—that would be commensurate with such blows. While unprovoked assaults by inmates on staff certainly may occur, according to our consultant, they are rare in other jurisdictions. This pattern of an allegation by a correction officer of an unprovoked attack by an inmate, with no commensurate officer injury, suggests that staff are justifying their own use of force by falsely accusing inmates of hitting them first.25
2) Use of force reports in which staff report using only limited physical force, such as control holds to subdue the inmate or “guide” him to the floor, while the inmate’s injuries suggest a much greater level of force was used. For example, the inmate sustains injuries to the face and head that are consistent with blows to the head. This pattern suggests that officers are falsely reporting that the force they used was less severe than it actually was.
In an interview, a senior DOHMH official noted that jail medical clinic staff have observed inmate injuries that are inconsistent with the officers’ explanations of what occurred and how the inmate became injured, and our own review of medical records in conjunction with use of force reports bears this out.
3) Use of force reports in which staff report injuries to their own hands, but do not report punching or hitting inmates, again describing the force used as something more innocuous such as “control holds” or using OC spray. Again, this pattern suggests that officers are falsely reporting that the force they used was less severe than it actually was.
4) Use of force reports submitted by multiple officers regarding the same incident in which similar or even identical language is used to describe the incident. This similar or identical language could be a single unusual word, or an entire paragraph repeated virtually verbatim across reports. This pattern suggests collusion among officers to tell a particular story and/or to cover up the actual facts of a particular incident.
In an interview, an EMTC correction officer confirmed what the pattern of similarly worded reports suggests, namely that staff work together to cover-up the facts of incidents and to ensure that they provide consistent written accounts. The officer told us that in her experience, Captains often tell officers what to write in their reports, and that officers understand that their reports must match the report of the Captain. The officer referred to one instance when she was told that someone else would write a report for her regarding a use of force that she witnessed, although she never saw or signed any such report.
5) Use of force reports in which the description of an incident is inconsistent with the video recording, and officers later provide an addendum to their report or change their story when confronted with the video evidence. Again, this pattern suggests that officers are simply falsely reporting the force they used.
The following are just a selection of the many examples of these patterns that we identified:
• After an incident outside the dining hall in January 2013, the Captain who repeatedly had punched an inmate reported that the inmate had “continued to resist by flailing his arm and moving his body about in [an] attempt to avoid being cuffed.” However, this was contradicted by the video surveillance. In a supplemental report prepared almost two weeks after the incident, the Captain acknowledged that the inmate “placed his hands by his head” while on the ground and explained that he had not mentioned that in his initial report “[d]ue to the inmates [sic] odd behavior and the adrenaline flowing.” (This incident is also referenced supra at 16 and described in further detail in the Appendix, referred to as involving Inmate L.)
• After a December 2012 incident, an officer reported that during a pat-frisk an inmate “without provocation” punched him in the face, causing him to defend himself by punching the inmate in the face. The inmate told our consultant that he never hit the officer, but instead that the officer hit him after he made a snide remark. Although the officer went to the hospital for treatment, medical notes indicate that his face appeared normal with no swelling or bruising.
• After an incident in November 2012 in the RNDC school area, officers reported only guiding an inmate to the floor and using a “one two second burst of OC.” However, the inmate sustained facial bruising and swelling on the nasal bridge. Ten days later, the inmate was still complaining of pain, and medical staff recommended an x-ray to rule out a nasal bone fracture.
• After a cell extraction in September 2012, officers reported only that they had pinned an inmate to the wall and applied force to his upper torso and legs. However, medical reports show that the inmate had pain in his right and left jaw, swelling of his right jaw, as well as swelling and pain behind his left ear and redness of the left ear canal. Such injuries cannot be explained by the force the officers reported using. In this same incident, multiple officers used a nearly identical phrase in their use of force reports, describing the way the inmate “twisted and turned away from the bed.” Other officers used an identical sentence to explain why force was used, citing the use of force policy regarding the need to “defend oneself or another from a physical attack.”
• After a May 2012 incident in the EMTC school area, an officer reported that an inmate threw several punches to the officer’s face and neck area without warning. Although the officer claimed injuries to his hand and shoulder, he had no injuries to his facial area. (This incident, referred to as involving Inmate E, is described in detail in the Appendix.)
3. Failure to Use Video to Augment Use of Force Reporting: Loss of Video and Poor Video Recordings of Anticipated Use of Force
Video recordings are extremely useful tools for reviewing use of force incidents, evaluating staff and inmate statements, and determining whether the use of force was appropriate. Indeed, the Department relies heavily on video recordings in those instances where correction officers are actually charged and disciplined for excessive or inappropriate force. The head of the Investigation Division noted, for example, that video evidence is critical in cases of excessive or inappropriate force because that is the evidence that is most clear cut.
As discussed above, several areas in the jails where adolescents are housed have no camera coverage whatsoever. Additionally, critical videotapes frequently go missing. As noted above, we requested all relevant records, including video surveillance, for approximately 200 use of force incidents. Of the incidents in our sample that were captured by the video surveillance, the Department advised us that it had lost or was otherwise unable to locate over 35% of those video recordings. Many investigative reports also note that although video was recorded, the video evidence cannot be located.
The missing video surveillance is alarming, given that the Department has a specific policy requiring any video recording of a use of force or alleged use of force to be retained in the office of the Deputy Warden for Security for no less than four years, as well as detailed procedures for documenting the chain of custody for any such recordings. The frequency with which video evidence disappears either indicates an unacceptably blatant disregard for the Department’s policies regarding the safeguarding of video evidence, or even more disturbingly, possible tampering with important evidence.
Another concern is the poor quality of some of the video recordings that do exist. By policy, staff are required to film cell extractions, probe teams deployments, and other situations where use of force is anticipated. There is a detailed policy requiring the videotaping of all cell extractions, from start to finish, including a requirement that the videotape show the extraction team’s attempts to gain the inmate’s compliance before force is used. However, based on our review of incidents involving anticipated uses of force, the videotape is often shot poorly such that the use of force is not clearly visible and other important information is not captured. The failure to properly videotape these incidents is particularly concerning given the frequency with which probe teams and cell extraction teams are involved in incidents where excessive and unnecessary force is allegedly used.
B. Inadequate Investigations into Use of Force
The Department’s investigations into use of force by staff against adolescent inmates are inadequate at both the facility level and the Investigation Division (“ID”). Pursuant to Department policy, the facility (e.g., RNDC) is generally responsible for conducting an initial investigation into use of force incidents, and most incidents are not subject to any further review. Certain incidents, such as those involving serious injuries, may trigger a full investigation by the ID. As discussed below, the criteria for when the ID must investigate an incident appears unclear, and less than one-fifth of the adolescent use of force incidents and allegations in 2012 were subject to a full ID investigation. In addition to performing full investigations, the ID also conducts a limited review of a sample of facility-level investigations to assess their quality. Finally, use of force incidents of particular concern may be referred for an investigation by New York City’s Department of Investigation, a separate city agency.
Reviews and investigations of use of force incidents are critically important because they are the means by which the Department is able to determine whether its own use of force policies are being followed and to evaluate the adequacy of staff reporting of incidents. Rigorous investigations, conducted with integrity, are a key part of any system that intends to hold staff accountable for their actions, and thus prevent future abuses. Our investigation has found the systemic failure of the investigative process at Rikers to be one of the central reasons for the widespread use of excessive and unnecessary force against adolescent inmates. The Department’s failure to conduct thorough and comprehensive use of force investigations has resulted in a system where staff are frequently not held accountable for policy violations, and expect that their version of events will be accepted at face value with little scrutiny.
1. Inadequate Investigations at the Facility Level
Facility-level investigations are conducted initially by one of the Captains within the facility where the incident took place, then reviewed by a Tour Commander and an Assistant Deputy Warden and/or Deputy Warden for Security, and ultimately approved by the Warden. The assigned investigating Captain cannot be the Captain who was supervising the officers involved in the use of force at the time of the incident. Because the majority of use of force incidents will never be reviewed by the ID or the DOI, this investigation by the facility is the sole Departmental review for most use of force incidents. These investigations are grossly inadequate.
The facility rarely finds that force has been used inappropriately, and nearly always concludes that force was justified and in accordance with Departmental policy—often despite evidence to the contrary. Based on our review of facility investigation files, we found the investigations to be cursory and identified the following common and systemic deficiencies:
• A general bias toward accepting staff’s version of an event at face value, even where there is medical or other evidence to the contrary, and discrediting the inmate’s account.
• Failure to consistently follow up with staff regarding obvious deficiencies in their use of force reports. As discussed above, these deficiencies may include accounts that are inconsistent with reported injuries to the inmate or the involved officers, accounts that fail to explain why officers did not or could not have used a lesser level of force, and suspiciously similar statements and language in descriptions of incidents.
• Failure to identify and reconcile material discrepancies between statements from involved officers, staff witnesses, reported injuries, and video surveillance (when available).
• Failure to make sufficient efforts to obtain statements from inmates, including the inmates subject to the use of force and inmate witnesses. Although we realize that inmates may be reluctant to talk to uniformed officers due to fear of retaliation, we were struck by the frequency with which facility investigative packages state that inmates refused to provide statements, especially given how openly inmates have discussed incidents with our consultant, medical staff, and even ID investigators.
• Where video exists, failure to describe the events on the video. Often there is just a summary statement that the video was reviewed and consistent with officers’ use of force reports. Because video recordings so frequently go missing, as described above, without an accurate and detailed description of the video recording, there is no longer any objective record of the incident.
The Captains assigned to investigate incidents at the facility level do not receive specialized training in investigative techniques, and show little familiarity with basic investigative skills or procedures. In most investigations, Captains and Tour Commanders simply summarize the use of force reports provided by the officers involved, and the witness statements provided by other correction officers and inmates (if any). Finally, due in part to an antiquated system that relies on handwritten statements and the physical transfer of paper folders and files from one desk to another, there is often a backlog of use of force packages awaiting final approval, notwithstanding Departmental policy that use of force investigations be completed within 15 days of the incident. This almost inevitably contributes to pressure on a facility’s top management to give each use of force package little more than a cursory review, making it easier for correction officers to conceal misconduct.
2. Lack of Clarity Concerning What Triggers ID Investigation
It is unclear what criteria are used for referring an incident to the ID for a full investigation—both in terms of how a determination is made as to which cases merit further investigation and who makes those determinations. The criteria for involvement by the DOI in any particular incident are also ambiguous. The lack of transparent lines of responsibility for investigations undermines the effectiveness of the investigative process, and creates the risk that particularly troubling incidents may escape the rigorous and comprehensive review they merit.
The policies regarding when the ID investigates an incident, as well as key officials’ understanding of these policies, are inconsistent and contradictory. According to the Use of Force Directive, “the facility is responsible in the first instance for investigating all uses of force.” This suggests that the ID becomes involved only after the facility has completed its own investigation of a use of force. But other Departmental policies, as described in the ID Training Manual and in interviews with Department officials, specify that ID investigates in the first instance all Class A uses of force, and allegations of Class A uses of force.26 Written policies also specify other situations in which an ID investigation is mandatory, such as allegations that inmates were dissuaded from reporting force. The ID also appears to have the authority to open a full investigation whenever it deems it appropriate to do so. The facility officials we interviewed, including RNDC Deputy Wardens and the now former RNDC Warden, indicated they also have the discretion to refer any use of force to the ID, which may then “take over” an investigation. Responsibility for investigation of headshots illustrates some of the confusion in this area: although the head of the ID told us that her division handles investigations involving alleged headshots, it is clear that many such incidents are subject only to facility-level investigations.
Further complicating matters, the Department operates an Intelligence Unit (“IU”) that also conducts investigations into matters such as inmate-on-inmate fights and violence. Although these incidents often lead to use of force by staff, and thus could have overlapping witnesses and evidence, the extent to which IU investigations are coordinated with facility investigations or ID investigations is unclear.
Finally, some incidents are referred to the DOI, or the DOI may on its own “take over” an investigation. According to written policies, the DOI broadly investigates “corruption or other criminal activity . . . or other misconduct within the Department of Correction.” Although we believe it is important to have a watchdog agency outside the Department review use of force incidents that are of particular concern, there do not appear to be clearly established criteria concerning the types of investigations that require external review, nor is it clear how incidents are brought to the attention of the DOI.
The ambiguity surrounding when incidents are subject to investigations by the ID and/or the DOI is magnified by the Department’s failure to implement an effective case management tool to track all pending and completed use of force investigations. The Department does not appear to have a single centralized system for tracking information on all use of force investigations and findings, including whether the facility, the ID, or the DOI (or some combination of these entities) investigated an incident, the date the investigation was commenced and completed, whether the investigating entity ultimately determined that force was used appropriately, and any resulting discipline of the correction officers involved.
3. Inadequate Investigations by the ID
While we found ID investigations to be marginally more professional and sometimes of better quality than facility-level investigations, we nonetheless found that they suffer generally from the same bias in favor of correction officers and against inmates. The extraordinarily high number of use of force incidents appears to overwhelm the review and investigative capacities of the ID. The unit has an insufficient number of investigators to effectively review and investigate the use of force incidents at over a dozen DOC jails, especially given that these same individuals are also responsible for investigating other types of alleged staff misconduct and policy violations, including inmate disturbances, discovery of dangerous contraband, erroneous discharges, and serious injuries. During an interview, the head of ID acknowledged that her front line investigators have extremely high caseloads that impeded their ability to conduct expeditious investigations. Because the Department’s investigative functions are overwhelmed in this way, they have become largely ineffectual and staff accountability for excessive or inappropriate use of force is greatly diminished.27
a. Poor Quality of ID Investigations
The ID investigations suffer from numerous problems. We found several instances where the ID concluded that staff’s use of force was appropriate despite evidence suggesting otherwise or without conducting a comprehensive and rigorous investigation. Although ID investigations are conducted by trained investigators and are superficially more thorough than facility investigations, as noted above, they nonetheless are plagued by the same biases as the facility investigations, which affect the entire investigative process. Despite lengthy investigations, ID investigators frequently fail to reconcile contradictory statements or reports, usually defaulting to the staff version of events. While the ID has the ability to compel interviews of DOC staff, and usually does so, investigators often fail to ask obvious questions about deficiencies in staff reports or inconsistencies in their accounts. Additionally, investigators often fail to interview all the relevant witnesses, especially inmate witnesses. When they do interview inmates, ID investigators too frequently fail to credit their version of events, even when the inmate’s account is more consistent with the medical records or other evidence. Finally, the ID disregards or is selective about the policy violations that it chooses to note in its reports—from failure to safeguard video and failure to submit timely use of force reports, to false reporting and excessive use of force—sometimes recommending no charges at all despite substantial evidence of one or more policy violations.
The following are just a few examples of some of these common problems:
• The ID conducted a full investigation of an incident in April 2012 in which an inmate alleged that he was beaten in the head by multiple correction officers at the behest of a female Captain in the RNDC school area after a heated argument with the Captain earlier that day. The inmate provided a detailed account to the ID, describing two officers and the Captain by name. The Captain who the inmate alleged ordered the beating claimed she was not in the area during the incident. However, a preliminary ID report describes video showing a female Captain going up to the school area before the incident and then coming down from the school area with the probe team that removed the inmate from the area. The final ID report includes a much shortened description of this video and omits the fact that a female Captain went either into or out of the school area. The ID apparently made no attempt to find out where the Captain was at the time of the incident or who was with her. The ID also did not interview or otherwise obtain a statement from one of the officers named by the inmate as participating in the beating, nor did the ID interview the probe team members to ask whether the Captain was present when they arrived. Additionally, the one officer who admitted using force made inconsistent statements in his use of force report and to ID investigators, which he explained away by saying he had been “dazed” by the incident and thus forgot to include certain details, although he never submitted a supplemental report. The ID nonetheless credited that officer’s account that the inmate had punched him first, and concluded that the use of force was appropriate. No charges were recommended and the case was closed. (This incident, referred to as involving Inmate A, is described in further detail in the Appendix.)
• The ID conducted a full investigation of an incident in February 2012 in which it concluded that an officer had inappropriately sprayed an inmate with OC spray during an argument, when the inmate was clearly not a threat to the officer at the time. The officer had stated in both her written use of force report and during her interview that the inmate had threatened her with a weapon, but the video showed that the inmate was actually turned away from the officer and in the process of putting on a sweatshirt when he was sprayed. Another officer witness also submitted a use of force witness report containing information that the video showed was false, but the ID did not interview that officer. While the ID recommended that charges be brought for unnecessary use of force, the ID did not recommend that any charges be brought for submitting false use of force reports or making false statements to investigators.
• The ID conducted a full investigation into a May 2011 incident in which an inmate was beaten by officers in the RNDC school area and suffered two broken front teeth, a lip laceration that required sutures, and additional facial swelling, contusions and abrasions. Despite the fact that the officer previously had been involved in 45 separate use of force incidents, two of which resulted in charges, the ID investigators credited the officer’s report that the inmate had struck the officer in the face with a closed fist “without any warning,” requiring him to defend himself by striking the inmate in the face and upper torso. During an interview, the officer later added the fact that when he brought the inmate to the floor he brought him down face first and fell down on top of him, which the ID investigator believed was a possible cause of the broken teeth. The ID investigator also failed to obtain written statements from or interview any of the probe team members who responded to the incident, and did not interview the one other officer who submitted a use of force witness statement, whom the inmate had alleged joined the first officer in beating him and kicking him in the mouth. Although the incident took place in school during school hours, there is also nothing in the file that suggests that any inmates or teachers were interviewed about the incident. No charges were recommended and the case was closed.