Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:22 am

PART 2 OF 2

Findings and recommendations

Finding 31

OIS investigations generally lack consistency.


Given the PPD’s current structure and process for OIS investigations, the only source of consistency and standardization comes from the IAD shooting team, which responds to all OISs and applies a standard protocol. Our evaluation of investigative quality also showed that shooting team investigators conducted the highest-quality interviews in our sample.

However, much of an OIS investigation is conducted by one of two units, which are vastly inconsistent in their approach. The homicide unit investigates fatal incidents and fields a team of six detectives to do so. The detective division investigates nonfatal incidents and fields a team of two detectives to do so. Notably, neither of these units has specialized training or experience in investigating OISs or any protocols in place for doing so. This distribution of investigative responsibilities can inhibit standardization across OIS investigations. Across all OIS investigations, we found a general lack of consistency in quality. Some investigations were very good and some were very poor. Crime scene photography and canvassing were among the most inconsistent aspects of the investigation.

Recommendation 31.1

The PPD should establish a single investigative unit devoted to criminal investigations of all deadly force incidents.


Deadly force incidents have unique characteristics that make the investigation of such incidents different from other criminal investigative work, even homicide cases. [150] Interview questions and techniques, crime scene analysis, and approaches to canvassing all need to account for the fact that the investigators are dealing with a police use of deadly force, as opposed to other homicides.

All deadly force investigations need to be conducted with the same thoroughness. Establishing a single unit devoted to these investigations will help ensure that a consistent standard is applied. For the purpose of this report, we will refer to this specialized investigative unit that conducts the criminal investigation as a deadly force investigation team (D-FIT). Whether the incident is fatal, injurious, or noninjurious, the decision by the involved officer(s) to use deadly force remains the same. The various outcomes (death, injury, or a miss) are determined by a number of factors such as shooting accuracy, distance, reaction time, and readily available medical care. Note that none of these outcomes is a result of the intent of the officer.

In response to a high number of OISs and calls for organizational reforms, other agencies have established specialized units. Examples are the Baltimore Police Department, [151] Seattle Police Department, [152] Portland (Oregon) Police Department, [153] and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. [154] The PPD’s newly established unit should investigate all deadly force incidents, excluding noninjurious accidental discharges and animal shootings. The PPD should staff the unit sufficiently to handle at least 50 OIS incidents annually. The unit should investigate not only OISs, but all deadly force cases and in-custody deaths.

The D-FIT will be the lead unit in the interviews of all civilians and officers, in collaboration with the shooting team. The one exception for interview officers will be any involved officers that must be compelled to give interviews under Garrity. Compelled officers should continue to be interviewed by shooting team investigators. D-FIT will compile the entire criminal investigation, gathering all pertinent facts, statements, and evidence.

Recommendation 31.2

PPD D-FIT members should have the experience and training necessary to conduct thorough and objective OIS investigations.


Members of the newly established unit should have prior major case investigation experience with a strong preference for homicide investigations. Furthermore, all members of the unit should receive specialized training in OIS investigations. The training may be obtained from a variety of vendors or can be developed in-house by instructors who have been certified through specialized courses. The department may also consider consulting with other agencies on their training requirements and programs for OIS investigations.

Recommendation 31.3

The PPD should develop a manual for conducting OIS investigations from a criminal standpoint.


The manual should describe a detailed, step-by-step protocol for investigators to follow and have as a reference point when conducting OIS investigations. The manual will serve as another mechanism for ensuring that all OIS investigations are conducted with a consistent, standard quality. This manual should be developed by staff members who have attended training in the investigation of OISs. The department may also review manuals and operating procedures developed by other large agencies.

The manual should include, at a minimum, the following standardized practices:


• Canvassing. Neighborhood canvassing efforts should be thoroughly documented. The investigators should publish a media release with email and phone contact information requesting that witnesses come forward, follow up with all addresses not contacted, and keep a complete list of addresses with the names of those contacted who were part of the canvass. The goal of a canvass is for investigators to be able to identify and interview any potential eye and ear witnesses. The effort should be conducted and documented in a way that makes it replicable.
• Crime scene management. All crime scenes should be managed to a quality standard, including consistent documentation in a crime scene log, assignment of a log officer, and setting of a perimeter. The management of the crime scene should be documented in detail in the final investigative report.
• Interviews and interrogations. The manual should clearly describe the appropriate practices for interviewing or interrogating all witnesses and involved persons, including interviews of civilian witnesses, witness officers, and discharging officers (if applicable); supervisor roles and responsibilities; taking of a public safety statement; and documentation of interviews and interrogation.
• Crime scene documentation. The manual should describe the appropriate steps for a thorough documentation of the crime scene, including video-recorded crime scene walk-throughs, photography, distance measurements, development of crime scene diagrams, and identification of physical and forensic evidence. Photographs should always be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and items of importance. All suspects, involved officers, casings, and projectiles should be photographed and labeled.
• Report writing. All reports should thoroughly document the investigation, including complete statements, all photos (in a readable format), crime scene diagrams, and complete forensic and analytic reports. In addition, there should be a single source narrative document that provides a chronological summary of the incident, to include all precursor events, enforcement, and investigative actions taken.

Finding 32

PPD officers involved in a shooting provide a “public safety statement” to the transporting supervisor regarding the crime scene, evidence, suspects, and witnesses. In practice, the statement lacks structure and consistency.


The purpose of the “public safety statement” is to address any emergency circumstances that may exist, such as the need to capture a fleeing felon or search for additional victims, possible witnesses, the extent of the crime scene, and the direction of all rounds fired. However, the utility of these statements varies widely, depending upon the questions asked by the transporting supervisor.155 There is no established set of questions or information to be gathered by the transporting supervisor. A poor public safety statement can impact the ability of the investigators to reconstruct the crime scene and locate evidence and potential witnesses. Many of the public safety statements reviewed for this assessment were believed to be too informal. In many cases, reviewers did not believe that the statement collected from the transported supervisor constituted a “public safety statement.”

Recommendation 32.1

The PPD should develop a standard checklist of items constituting a public safety statement that transporting supervisors must obtain from an officer involved in a shooting.


The PPD should create a policy that specifies all pieces of information a transporting supervisor is expected to gather in the event of an OIS. All supervisors should be made aware of the policy and be issued a standard checklist to use when performing this duty.

The check list could include the following items: [156]

• Type of force used
• Direction of shots fired
• Knowledge of any injured persons and their location
• Knowledge of any suspects at large
• Time lapse of the event
• Any knowledge of witnesses, including names, descriptions, and locations
• Any knowledge of evidence at the crime scene
• The scope of the crime scene

Recommendation 32.2

The transporting supervisor should conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s).


It is currently not standard PPD practice for the transporting supervisor to conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s). This is a limiting factor, because the supervisor cannot visualize the scene while the officer is describing what occurred. By conducting a walk-through with the discharging officer(s), transporting supervisors will be better able to assist investigators in the crime scene investigation and incident reconstruction.

Finding 33

The PPD’s current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and discharging officers is through typed notes.


In all major case investigations, including OISs, PPD investigators take what they refer to as “verbatim statements” via typed transcriptions. This means that an investigator is sitting at a computer, typing in questions and answers as they occur in real time. These statements are often not signed by the officer. [157] The compelling concern with this practice is that the statements are not a verbatim recording of the information. Ultimately, responses will be summarized or rephrased when individuals without the skills and training or an actual stenographer are typing the transcriptions. This can lead to a number of issues, such as incompleteness, inaccuracies, or unintentional bias. This also poses difficulty in determining the appropriateness and thoroughness of interviewing techniques used by investigators.

Recommendation 33

The PPD should establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in the course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.


Video recording interviews will increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in the PPD’s investigative procedures. From an investigative standpoint, video recordings can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos and audio recording cannot provide. [158] A video-recorded interview will allow for an unadulterated, objective view of the interview and allow viewers to observe the behavior of both the interviewers and interviewees.

The policy should specify that interviews with all critical civilian witnesses, officer witnesses, suspects, and discharging officers should be video recorded. At a minimum, critical witnesses should include any officer or civilian who witnessed the shooting, any officer who discharged his or her firearm, and any supervisors who were involved in managing the incident before or during the use of force either by radio or on the scene.

Segments of the video-recorded interviews should be incorporated into the UFRB presentation and hearing. In addition, all video-recorded interviews, with the exception of the discharging officer (unless voluntary), should be included as part of the OIS case file sent to the SIU for review.

Finding 34

Control of the initial crime scene is assigned to the criminal investigators on an informal basis. As a result, there is a general lack of consistency in the quality of crime scene control and integrity.


Based on our review of PPD investigations, crime scene logs were frequently messy and incomplete. Sometimes, people signed in but did not sign out. Other times, there were multiple crime scene logs that did not match. In general, crime scene management was poorly documented in the PPD case files we reviewed.

Recommendation 34

The PPD should establish a policy that control of an OIS crime scene must be assigned to the criminal investigative unit.


D-FIT should work collaboratively with the IAD shooting team to sufficiently document the scene before the scene is released. The time of the release of the crime scene should be documented in each OIS investigation. In addition, the person(s) in charge of the crime scene and who authorized its release should be documented in each OIS investigation. All incidents should document the perimeter of the crime scene, the assignment of a log officer, and a complete crime scene log to maintain the integrity of the crime scene and its documentation. [159]

Finding 35

Crime scene photos of OIS incidents are inconsistent and often lack the appropriate perspectives and details.


We found that crime scene photos for OIS incidents were exceptional at times and inadequate at other times. This lack of consistency is evidenced in investigatory reviewers’ ratings on the overall quality of crime scene photos and the account of perspectives and items of importance in crime scene photos. Although most investigations included adequate crime scene photos and labeling, a sizable proportion did not, indicating an overall lack of consistency.

Recommendation 35.1

The PPD should establish a standard for OIS crime scene photography to be incorporated into its OIS investigations manual.


The PPD’s OIS investigation manual should outline or reference the proper techniques and documentation of crime scene photos from the lead investigator’s standpoint. All crime scene photos should be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and any significant items that appear in the photos should be labeled. All officers and suspects (when possible) should be photographed in the attire they were wearing at the time of the incident. [160] All photos should be included in the investigative file and sent to the DAO and all PPD personnel involved in the administrative review of the incident.

Recommendation 35.2

The crime scene should be video recorded.


Preservation of the crime scene is essential to the integrity of the investigation. Although a photo log has sufficed throughout much of police history, an emerging practice in crime scene documentation is the use of video. In addition to photos, the PPD should video record the crime scene. Doing so will provide supervisors and investigators with an additional perspective on the incident and the spatial relationships between different parts of the crime scene. [161] In addition, still photos render light differently from video. For example, at night, photos show either a very brightly lighted scene or a very dark scene. Video shows a truer visual representation of the scene as it occurred. Investigators should conduct a video walk-through of the scene and capture relevant views and angles as they relate to the OIS.

Finding 36

The IAD shooting team waits for the DAO to decline charges against an officer before it interviews discharging officers and closes its investigation. As a result, most officers involved in shootings are not interviewed until three or more months after the incident occurred.


Presently, the IAD is the primary point of contact with the SIU, which reviews the criminal investigation of OISs and makes a decision on whether to pursue criminal charges. This puts the IAD in the peculiar position of serving as liaison for a potential criminal investigation of an officer and compelling statements from discharging officers that are protected from use in the criminal investigation. The PPD addresses the potential conflict of interest in part by not conducting the compelled interview with the discharging officer until after the DAO has declined charges. [162] As a result, the interview is often not conducted until months after the incident. In other words, a detailed interview with the most critical witness (the involved officer) doesn’t occur until many months after the incident. Yet research has shown that critical incidents can have a profound impact on officer memory. [163] The PPD’s approach calls into question the reliability of the officer’s recall and memory.

Recommendation 36.1

The PPD should revise its policy and practice so that the criminal investigative unit assigned to each OIS is the primary point of contact with the DAO. The IAD should be extricated from this role.


The criminal investigation of the incident should be led by a single investigative unit in the PPD. That unit should be the sole liaison with SIU and DAO’s criminal prosecutors. By doing this, the department will ensure that compelled statements and information derived from those statements are completely walled off from the criminal case. It will also enable the IAD to interview discharging officers sooner without concern of contamination between the administrative investigation and the criminal investigation.

The IAD will still have access to the entire criminal investigation file. Shooting team investigators will still be able to participate in any and all interviews that are part of the criminal investigation. However, the IAD will not have any responsibility or authority related to the criminal investigation. The IAD must conduct its own parallel administrative investigation.

Recommendation 36.2

The shooting team should conduct interviews with the discharging officer(s) as soon as practical, but not later than 72 hours of the incident.


There is no consensus on the timeframe in which discharging officers should be interviewed in the wake of an OIS. There is little research specific to the effect of time on officer recall of an OIS. One noteworthy pilot study found that officers in simulated critical incidents had better recall immediately after the event than they had three days later. However, the authors urge caution and call for more research on the topic, concluding that police departments should consider the timing of officer interviews on a case-by-case basis. [164]

Some agencies have a policy to interview the officer immediately, as has been recommended by the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC). [165] The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Psychological Services Section insists that officers be given some time to recover after an incident while noting that this can range from a few hours to several days. Many departments afford officers anywhere from one to three sleep cycles, which is consistent with guidelines set forth by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE). [166] In the PPD, administrative investigations should no longer wait for the completion of a criminal investigation or the declination of charges by the DAO. PPD shooting team investigators should interview officers as soon as all other interviews have been completed but not longer than 72 hours after of an OIS, which would bring the department within current guidelines and common practices for OIS investigations. [167]

Recommendation 36.3

The IAD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination.


From 2007 to 2013, it took the IAD an average of 100 days to complete an administrative case after the DAO declined to pursue charges. With adoption of the new practice of discharging officers being interviewed soon after the OIS, this lag in the completion of the investigation should be significantly reduced. The PPD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination. This will, in turn, move up the timeframe in which the UFRB can take place and therefore improve the timeliness with which the department rectifies any issues identified in the administrative investigation.

Recommendation 36.4

All interviews of discharging officers should be video recorded.


Current PPD policy states that IAD investigators will take the officers’ statements and ask them to sign each page as it transcribed by the investigators. This sort of documentation is subject to error through miscommunication or unintentional bias in the investigator’s interpretation of what was said. Our review of investigative files noted that these interviews did not appear to be transcribed verbatim. Video recording interviews with officers can increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in PPD’s investigation of officers involved in shootings. From an investigatory perspective, video can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos or audio recordings cannot provide. Video recorded interviews should be part of the UFRB presentation and hearing. If the interview is compelled, the transcript and video should not be sent to the DAO as part of the investigative file, as they are protected by Garrity. All video interviews should be protected from public disclosure through policy and protocols set forth by the PPD.

Finding 37

The PPD lacks official training requirements for IAD shooting team members.


The IAD shooting team has significant experience in conducting internal affairs and OIS investigations. However, there are no official requirements for shooting team investigators in terms of experience or training.

Recommendation 37

Current and future members of the shooting team should be required to receive specialized training in OIS investigations.


All shooting team investigators should be required to complete specialized training on OISs. The training can be obtained from a variety of vendors or developed in-house by instructors who have been certified in one of these specialized courses.

Finding 38

The shooting team does not have a formal process for consulting with subject matter experts to inform their investigation and findings.


The shooting team occasionally consults with other members of the department, but this process has not been formalized. These sorts of discussions and insights were frequently missing from investigative files reviewed by our investigation review panel.

Recommendation 38

The shooting team should establish a policy to review its investigation and findings with other departmental experts.


Investigators should consult with training staff, tacticians, and other experts to address officer decision making and tactics during the OIS. Experts in specialized topics such as defensive tactics, officer safety, firearms training, crime scene management, or crisis intervention can illuminate conflicts in the officers’ actions and departmental procedure and training.

Finding 39

The scope of shooting team investigations focuses solely on policy while largely neglecting officer tactics and decision making.


Our review of OIS investigative files found that there was rarely any discussion of tactics and decision making by the IAD. The incident analysis was found to be minimal. Tactical reviews are an emerging best practice. They aid the department in identifying performance issues that do not reach the threshold of policy violation, but require remediation through training and possibly department-wide reforms. [168]

Recommendation 39.1

The shooting team should significantly enhance its investigative scope to include officer tactics and decision making.


In addition to their policy investigation, the shooting team should investigate the tactics and decision making of all officers, dispatchers, and supervisors, including but not limited to communications, assessment of backdrop, officer safety, officer coordination, cover and concealment, less-lethal options, exhaustion of other alternatives, supervision, incident command, and de-escalation. This enhanced scope should be reflected in interview questions, consultations with other department experts, and investigative reports.

Recommendation 39.2

Shooting team investigative reports should highlight findings and any inconsistencies in policy, procedure, and training for the UFRB to evaluate in its decision.


Shooting team reports, by design, describe the incident, crime scene evidence, and witness accounts of the incident. Given the shooting team investigator’s knowledge and experience investigating the case, they should clearly delineate officer actions and relevant departmental policy, procedure, and training. This will foster better deliberation during UFRB hearings and ultimately more informed decisions.

Recommendation 39.3

The shooting team should develop an operations manual delineating all of its investigative activities, reporting, and role in the review process.


The manual should describe a step-by-step process for conducting an administrative investigation of OISs. It should be written in a way that each investigation will be standardized and replicable from start to finish. The shooting team manual should be separate from the criminal investigation manual for OISs.
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:23 am

Chapter 8. Use of Deadly Force Review and Officer Accountability

Overview


In this chapter, we assess the process by which Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) reviews officer-involved shootings (OIS) internally, holds officers accountable, and learns and self-corrects from those incidents. We assess the department’s case review program, which the department uses to monitor all officer behavior, including complaints, off-duty actions, uses of force, and deadly force. We also assess the PPD’s Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) and Police Board of Inquiry (PBI), which are distinct but related decision-making boards for deadly force incidents. Last, we examine the rate at which the PPD disciplines officers as the result of an OIS and the nature of that discipline.

We reviewed all of the Office of Professional Responsibility’s (OPR) policies, directives 10 and 22 on use of force, and a sample of memoranda regarding UFRB decisions. We interviewed members of the UFRB, the PPD’s charging unit, and various members of internal affairs. We also observed the UFRB in hearing and reviewing 20 OISs. Finally, we examined outcome and disciplinary data from all completed PBI cases arising from OISs that occurred between 2007 and 2013.

The following sections describe the case review program, UFRB, and PBI. We then present five key findings and 12 recommendations to reform the PPD’s OIS review and accountability process.

Case review program

Although over two decades old, police early intervention systems (EIS) remain largely untested and unverified. The PPD has operated an early intervention system, which it calls the case review program, since 1995. It is designed to identify officer behavior that indicates the potential for misconduct and address the behavior through counseling before it becomes a problem for the officer or department. On a 12-month rolling basis, the system collects various officer data and sets occurrence thresholds for each type of incident that trigger a review. Table 25 illustrates the PPD’s current data and thresholds. [169]

Table 25. Case review program thresholds

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The case review program operates out of the Internal Affairs Division (IAD). When an officer reaches a threshold on any of the data points listed above, it triggers a series of reviews and recommendations based on the officer’s record. Figure 28 illustrates the review process.

Figure 28. Case review program process

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If it is agreed by all parties that an officer requires counseling, a review session is held at IAD headquarters involving the subject officer, the subject officer’s commanding officer, the subject officer’s immediate supervisor, and members of the IAD. [170]

PPD internal review of OISs

Current PPD practice is for any sustained allegation of any policy violation to be forwarded to the PBI for a hearing. [171] Typically, a complaint is investigated by the IAD and forwarded to the PBI if investigators find any policy violations. However, deadly force incidents are first reviewed by the UFRB, which makes the decision on any misconduct and forwards cases as appropriate to the PBI to charge the officer administratively.

Use of force review board

The UFRB hears all officer-involved shootings, including accidental discharges and animal shootings. The board comprises the following members: [172]

• Deputy Commissioner of Organizational Services
• Deputy Commissioner of Office of Professional Responsibility
• Deputy Commissioner of Major Investigations
• Deputy Commissioner of Field Operations

The purpose of the board is to “review the totality of circumstances and issue a final determination of whether the force deployed was appropriate or the officer had probable cause to use deadly force.” [173]

The board meets quarterly to review multiple OIS cases. Prior to the hearing, the IAD shooting team sends the entire case file to the chairperson of the board, who then distributes the file to members of the board. At the board hearing, shooting team investigators give an informal briefing for each incident. [174] Board members may ask questions about the facts of the incident and investigation. However, the shooting team does not draw conclusions about the appropriateness of the officer’s actions. The board deliberates openly on the facts and circumstances of the case and whether the officer’s actions were appropriate. A formal vote concludes each hearing. A majority vote is required for the case to be sent to the PBI for a formal disciplinary hearing.

This past year, the board updated its selection of findings to be more comprehensive. The board can now make any of the following findings regarding an OIS: [175]

• Administrative approval. If the review indicated that the officer’s actions were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, the review will be terminated and the case will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy.”
• Improve tactics or decision making. If the review indicated that the actions of the officer were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, but the officer’s tactics or decision making could be improved where the force became necessary, the review will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Tactical/Decision Training Recommended.”
• No use of force violations, but other departmental violation discovered. If the review indicated that the actions of the officers were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, but other departmental violations not related to the use of force are discovered, the review will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Other Violations Discovered.”
• Policy or departmental training issues. If the review indicates that an undesirable outcome occurred regarding the use of force and the force appears reasonable, but no actual policy or training currently exists regarding the subject matter, the case will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Review of Departmental Policy or Training Recommended.”
• Administrative disapproval. If the review indicated that the officer’s actions were not in accordance with departmental policy or deemed unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive, even under extraordinary circumstances, the case will be marked “Not within Departmental Policy.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing and forward the case to the charging unit for the appropriate disciplinary charges to be filed against the officer.

Police board of inquiry

If the UFRB finds that an officer violated PPD policy, a memorandum stating the policy violation is sent to the charging unit of the PPD. The charging unit then reviews the UFRB memorandum and makes the following decisions:

• Can the officer be charged with a policy violation?
• If so, what is the applicable disciplinary action given the PPD’s disciplinary matrix?

In cases where the charging unit agrees with the UFRB, a police advocate is responsible for presenting the case for discipline at the PBI. The police advocate makes the department’s case while the officer and a representative make his or her case in an adversarial, due process hearing. A panel of three sworn officers, consisting of one captain, one lieutenant, and one peer officer, serve as a jury and decide if the officer is not guilty or guilty of the policy violation. Alternatively, officers can plead “guilty” and avoid the PBI hearing.

In contrast to the UFRB, PBI hearings have representation for the discharging officer(s) and the department. Witnesses for both sides of the case are called to testify, including the shooting team investigators who investigated the case.

Officers found guilty at PBI hearings may avail themselves of the arbitration process if they seek to overturn or reduce disciplinary action.

PPD OIS case processing

We analyzed all OIS incidents that fit our criteria, were reviewed by the UFRB, and were forwarded to the PBI for remedial action between 2007 and 2013. This accounted for a total of 88 PBI cases, each of which represents an involved officer. Table 26 shows the distribution of penalties in these cases. The most common outcome of a PBI hearing is “training and counseling,” which the PPD does not consider disciplinary action. Notably, the UFRB may issue training and counseling without further review by the PBI. Cases forwarded from the UFRB to the PBI are explicitly in response to an identified policy violation. The next most frequent outcome is an “official reprimand” followed by a finding of “not guilty.” Officers were suspended 20 percent of the time, with suspensions ranging from 1 to 30 days. Five officers were recommended for termination. One officer retired.

Taken as a whole, these 88 cases represent incidents in which the UFRB found that an officer violated a policy in the course of an OIS incident. Based on our review of PBI outcomes, the UFRB’s findings were essentially invalidated nearly half of the time. This accounted for all incidents in which the PBI found officers not guilty (18 percent) or only in need of training and counseling (30 percent).

Table 26. Distribution of penalties issued by PBI resulting from OIS cases

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We requested arbitration outcomes from the PPD for all OIS-related arbitration cases. We found that disciplinary action for a total of four OIS incidents occurring between 2007 and 2013 have been challenged thus far. Of those four, the department has settled three times. In one case, the department agreed to pay an officer in lost overtime wages. In another case, the department agreed to expunge a counseling memo that resulted from an OIS. And in the third case, the department agreed to transfer an officer to one district rather than another. In the one case that has gone to arbitration, the arbiter reduced the officer’s discipline from a 30-day suspension to a seven-day suspension and awarded the officer compensation for lost wages. The OIS involved shooting at a motor vehicle.

Findings and recommendations

Finding 40

The UFRB and PBI are duplicative processes that at times have conflicting outcomes. This sends a mixed message to members of the department and causes unnecessary internal strife.


The PPD has two separate but connected review processes in place for OISs; at times they result in different outcomes. The UFRB comprises solely high-ranking command staff, whereas the PBI has a more diverse set of ranks and fewer voting members. In addition, the PBI process allows for the calling and questioning of witnesses, whereas the UFRB does not. Some interview participants believed that the PBI undermines the findings of the UFRB and has meted out too little discipline. [176] Our examination of PBI disciplinary data showed that half of the cases UFRB forwards to the PBI are resolved without formal discipline. We attribute this to the different process and voting membership of each of the processes.

Recommendation 40.1

The PPD should dismantle the two-board system for OISs and combine the functions of the UFRB and PBI into one integrated board.


The integrated board would eliminate the inherent conflict in the current two-board system, and allow the department to speak with one voice in terms of officer misconduct and accountability. Findings of the board should be forwarded directly to the police commissioner. The integrated board should be held only for intentional discharges involving persons, injurious accidental discharges, or other uses of force that result in death or serious bodily injury. The goal of the board should be to determine whether any policy violations occurred and whether there are any lessons to be learned regarding tactics and decision making of all officers and supervisors involved. The board should also ensure that when officers are present and being questioned, they have representation, affording them the due process afforded to all employees.

Recommendation 40.2

The newly established board should conduct a comprehensive review of each incident.


The board’s scope should not be limited to the moment of deadly force itself. The review process should enhance scrutiny of these incidents from all angles, including department-wide policy and training deficiencies, tactical decision making of all officers and supervisors, from the beginning of the incident, up to the moment of force itself. This can help the PPD continually learn and improve as an organization, while also holding the officers accountable when needed. [177]

At a minimum, the board should review the following incident factors, as presented by shooting team investigators: [178]

• Communications
• Tactical decision making
• Officer coordination
• Tactical and verbal de-escalation
• Verbal commands
• User of cover and concealment
• Number of shots fired
• Use of force continuum
• Less-lethal options
• Legal justification for deadly force
• Exhaustion of other options
• Incident management
• Supervision
• Crime scene investigation
• Global PPD policy and training review
• Historical review of involved officers training, disciplinary record, and prior uses of force, including OISs

Recommendation 40.3

Voting board members should include command staff, a sworn officer one rank higher than the involved officer, a peer officer, and at least one citizen representative.


The board should always include the following command staff as voting members:

• Deputy Commissioner, Organizational Services
• Deputy Commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility
• Deputy Commissioner, Major Investigations
• Deputy Commissioner, Patrol

In addition, the board should adopt the PBI policy of having a one peer member and an officer of one rank higher as voting members. Neither of these members should be from the same command as the involved officer.

Finally, the community should be included in the review process that rules on the most critical conflicts between the police and the public. [179] The board should have at least one citizen with voting power. The PPD and the Police Advisory Commission (PAC) should work together to develop a pool of citizen board members. The citizens will have to be trained and familiarized in the PPD’s policies, procedures, and use of force training. The citizen representative should not be in law enforcement, have law enforcement experience, or have any close family members in law enforcement. In addition, citizen members should not have pending lawsuits against the department. Citizen members should sign a nondisclosure agreement related to the details of the case and hearing in which they participated.

Recommendation 40.4

Shooting team investigators should make a formal presentation of the facts to the board, highlighting any potential conflicts and key points for deliberation among the board.


At a minimum, the presentation should include the following components:

• Case summary
• Identification of all officers and supervisors involved
• Satellite view of the scene
• Timeline of incident
• Critical decision points
• Annotated crime scene photographs
• Photographs of involved officers and subject, if available, as they appeared at the time of the incident
• Any injuries or fatalities associated with the incident
• Impact and recovery of all rounds
• Officers’ training records pertinent to the incident
• Review of all training pertinent to the incident
• Review of relevant policies and officers’ actions as they pertain to the policy
• Review of relevant training and officers’ actions as they pertain to the training

Recommendation 40.5

Board members should have the opportunity to call witnesses and ask questions related to the incident.


Witnesses could include, but not be limited to, shooting team investigators, officer witnesses, civilian witnesses, departmental experts, outside experts, and discharging officers. Discharging officers should be required to participate on the board and answer questions. [180] If an officer’s participation is not voluntary, the department should issue a Garrity warning and compel the officer to participate. Discharging officers may also have representation with them if desired. Questions may only be asked by voting board members. The questions should be nonadversarial and fact-finding in nature. Shooting team investigators should not be asked their opinion regarding whether a policy violation has occurred. They are present as fact finders and investigators only.

Recommendation 40.6

After board proceedings are complete, voting members should deliberate the case and issue a finding by majority vote.


All nonvoting members should exit the meeting space for the deliberations and return when a decision has rendered. The PPD’s revised findings structure for UFRB hearings positions the department better to take remedial action as the result of an OIS. Recent experience with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, for example, showed the agency increased its ability to issue discipline and training with a similar change. [181] PPD’s board could further refine its findings to include the following:

• Administrative approval. The officer’s actions were within PPD policy. The officer exhibited good to excellent judgment and tactics. PPD policy and training adequately addressed the situations. Commendations may be recommended if deemed appropriate.
• Remedial training and counseling. The officer did not violate any PPD policies, but better judgment and tactics were available. This finding should be accompanied by references to the exact circumstances in which the officer needs additional training or counseling.
• Policy violation. The officer violated PPD policy. This finding should be accompanied by references to specific policies and officer actions that violated said policies. Upon rendering this finding, the charging unit will determine the administrative action to be taken, as outlined in the PPD disciplinary code, and forward the charges to the commissioner for review.
• Department-wide policy failure. Current PPD policy failed to adequately address the circumstances and provide proper guidance to the officer. The finding should be accompanied by references to the exact circumstances and identified gap in policy.
• Department-wide training failure. Current PPD training failed to adequately address the circumstances and provide proper skills and guidance to the officer. The finding should be accompanied by references to the exact circumstances and identified gap in training.

These findings should not be considered mutually exclusive. All findings should be forwarded to the commissioner’s office for review and appropriate action.

Finding 41

The PPD’s disciplinary code section on firearm discharges is too encompassing. As a result, the penalty for violating this code ranges widely from reprimand to dismissal for first, second, and third offenses.


The PPD’s disciplinary code lists section 6-§008-10 as “Discharging, using, displaying or improper handling of a firearm while not in accordance to Departmental Policy.” [182] This sweeping charge covers all firearms-related violations, ranging from accidental discharges to excessive force. As a result, the disciplinary action for violating this code ranges widely from a simple reprimand to outright dismissal. No other section in the disciplinary code is structured in such an open-ended way. As written, the current code would allow for a reprimand for a third-time offender of the department’s deadly force policy.

Recommendation 41

The PPD should delineate the various firearms-related violations in its disciplinary code and the penalties for first, second and third time offenders.


Discharging a firearm is one of the most important and consequential decisions an officer can make. Charges and penalties should reflect the various circumstances under which discharging a firearm may violate policy. For instance, accidentally discharging a firearm into a locker door should not fall under the same code as putting oneself in a position of peril and forcing a deadly confrontation with a moving vehicle.

Finding 42

The process for reviewing OISs in the PPD is separated from the department’s commendatory process. As a result, officers may be issued commendations for actions that were less than commendable.


A supervisor or officer may compose a version of the incident that justifies a commendation but does not reflect the facts of the case or the opinion and findings of the board. Some interview participants commented on this issue during our conversations, citing that commendations occasionally did not resemble the incident they had reviewed. One problem with this practice is that it can result in an expectation that any officer involved in a shooting will receive a medal. There are many occasions on which officers display great heroism and deserve special recognition. Excessive commendation of officers for simply discharging their firearm does a disservice to the work of others.

Recommendation 42.1

The UFRB should review and, if appropriate, approve all recommendations for commendations related to deadly force incidents.


The board should be empowered to modify the narrative of the citation to ensure it is an accurate reflection of the event.

Recommendation 42.2

The department should develop a commendation that recognizes when an officer uses exceptional tactical or verbal skills to avoid a deadly force situation
.

There is little official, department-endorsed incentive for officers to utilize good tactics and de-escalation skills in a potentially deadly confrontation. The department should recognize the good, life-saving work of officers who de-escalate incidents and resolve otherwise dangerous situations safely. The award could be called the Superior Tactics and Response (STAR) Award. These incidents may also serve as case studies for training purposes throughout the department.

Finding 43

The PPD’s case review program has disciplinary overtones.


We reviewed 11 memoranda of counseling sessions conducted in 2014 and found the language to be “boilerplate” and lacking any description of the unique context in which the officers’ counseling sessions were situated. Furthermore, it appears that counseling sessions mostly make officers aware of the impact of their behavior on career advancement and neglect any intrinsic motivators. This, coupled with the fact that officers are called out to IAD headquarters for an IAD-administered program, gives the system an overt disciplinary tone.

Recommendation 43

The PPD should refine its case review program and review its metrics, thresholds, procedures, and organizational structure to ensure that it is best serving the interests of the department, the officers, and the community.


Like many other aspects of police administration, there is no one-size-fits-all approach for EIS. [183] Ultimately, the department will need to work iteratively to identify what works best for its workforce, and continually assess and adjust as it deems appropriate. The department’s review should be guided by the following principles:

• The program should be proactive, not disciplinary in either perception or reality. [184]
• The program should be procedurally just to the officers, meaning officers should understand the program, process, and its outcomes and be involved in its development.
• Data points and thresholds should be grounded in a combination of normative and empirically driven concepts about errant officers and indicators of officer misconduct while recognizing that there is no panacea. Ultimately, the system will identify officers who are not at real risk of misconduct and will fail to identify errant officers. In this sense, the system is a tool, not a solution.
• Interventions should include informed and substantive conversations.
• Interventions should result in action plans with measurable goals. Supervisors should follow up with subject officers to ensure that courses are corrected and that goals are being achieved. [185]

Finding 44

The PPD does not have an established process for organizational learning related to OISs or, more broadly, use of force.


Issues tend to be identified anecdotally and on an ad-hoc basis. No unit within the department is charged with conducting analyses on OISs, use of force or, more broadly, officer safety from a trend or pattern perspective. Yet the department regularly collects data related to these issues. The department manages a database containing all use of force reports, another database on all OISs, and yet another on officer injuries. Valuable trends and patterns can be identified from these data sources and used to inform the development and improvement of policy and training. [186]

Recommendation 44.1

The department should establish a permanent office for organizational learning and improvement related to officer safety, tactics, and use of force.


The office should be responsible for conducting analysis and producing analytic products on a routine basis, accepting special study requests from command staff, and actively improving the department’s record keeping related to officer safety, tactics, and use of force, including policy, training, and real-life incidents.

Recommendation 44.2

The newly established office should convene a working group at least bi-annually.


At least twice per year, the department should convene a workshop committed to identifying ways the department can improve officer safety and tactics, and reduce use of force. The working group should review department-wide trends on these topics, review current policy, training, and practice, and identify best and emerging practices from across the law enforcement.
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:25 am

Chapter 9. External Oversight and Transparency

Overview


In this chapter, we describe the state of oversight and transparency of Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) operations related to deadly force. We focus on two key areas of interest: the relationship between the department and the Police Advisory Commission (PAC); and the release of information to the public regarding deadly force incidents and outcomes.

Our review included the department’s investigative and review procedures and the participation of outside parties and policies and practices of the PPD, including reforms initiated in 2014, regarding the release of information regarding officer-involved shooting (OIS) incidents and outcomes to the public. We interviewed PPD personnel from the office of communications and command staff. We also discussed the issue of transparency and oversight with community members over the course of our assessment.

We conclude with four key findings and 11 recommendations to reform the PPD into a more transparent organization.

External oversight

The Philadelphia PAC is the official civilian oversight agency of the PPD. The commission was formed in 1994 as the successor of the police advisory board. [187] There are a total of 19 commissioners, one executive director, and two investigators. Each commissioner is appointed by the mayor for a term of four years.

The commission’s mandate is to investigate complaints against the PPD, provide general advice on PPD policy and practice, and broadly study the concerns of the community. Most of the complaints investigated by the PAC involve physical and verbal abuse or abuse of authority. [188] PAC investigators have the authority to interview complainants, witnesses, and officers as part of their investigation. As an investigation and review body, in 2013, the commission investigated 56 complaints and audited 23 Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigations. [189] The PAC also holds public meetings, conducts community outreach, issues position papers, makes recommendations to the PPD, and disseminates data on public complaints.

Regarding OISs, there has been a point of significant contention between the PAC and the PPD regarding access to data and files. The PAC has sought access to investigative files and statistical data regarding OISs, which the PPD has refused. [190] In February 2013, the PAC made a formal request to the department, which was refused by the department (see appendix C on page 135).

Transparency

The PPD’s media policy states that members of the office of media relations may not release information related to an OIS with first conferring and obtaining approval from the appropriate deputy commissioner.191 The department, however, does not have a policy that describes the roles and responsibilities of departmental personnel for engaging with the public and media when an OIS occurs—e.g., what information is released, by whom, when, and how?

However, in 2014, the PPD began taking significant steps to enhance transparency and communications with the public about the circumstances and outcomes of OISs. The department has established a permanent web page that describes the department’s policy and investigative processes. [192] The site also provides a summary of annual statistics on OISs and a geographic overlay of crime and OISs throughout the city. OIS cases are listed in a table, which includes the date, the location, any injuries or fatalities, the district attorney’s office (DAO) decision, and the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) determination. Each case also includes a hyperlink that has a basic incident summary.

The department has also become one of many that are now launching pilot programs to equip officers with body-worn cameras (BWC). The department is equipping officers in several districts throughout the city with the equipment, and plans to test their implementation and effectiveness.

Findings and recommendations

Finding 45

The PPD has begun posting a significant amount of data and case information on its website. Still, more transparency is needed to properly keep the community informed.


The department’s efforts to publicize more OIS data are laudable. Although it is becoming an increasingly popular practice, many police agencies still do not have such a practice in place. However, the PPD should release information in a more timely fashion. More information and context should be included in case summaries. In addition, the department does not publish its use of force directives on its website.

Recommendation 45.1

The PPD should, at a minimum, publish directives 10 and 22 and the yet-to-be-written directive on the UFRB on its OIS web page.


In addition, any updates and significant revisions of these policies should be published on the website, as needed. This transparency helps inform community members about the parameters of officer decision making related to use of force and the process for reviewing these incidents in the PPD.

Recommendation 45.2

The PPD should update its website as case files are closed and available for public dissemination.


The PPD currently updates its OIS web page on a quarterly basis. This is too seldom. The community should not have to wait three months to learn the facts and circumstances of a deadly conflict involving a member of the department. Incident summaries should be posted on the website within 72 hours of an OIS.

Recommendation 45.3

The PPD website should be updated to include more detailed accounts of the OIS and DAO review of the incident.


When the investigation has been completed, the PPD should publish a redacted version of the DAO’s declination letter. All subsequent internal review files and outcomes (i.e., administrative investigation, UFRB, police board of inquiry [PBI], and arbitration hearing) should also be posted to the website. Personally identifiable information regarding civilian witnesses and victims should be redacted from the reports. This enhanced transparency will demonstrate to the public what internal accountability mechanisms are in place in the PPD and the outcomes of those processes.The criminal investigation summary should be posted within seven days after the district attorney issues a declination letter.

Recommendation 45.4

The PPD should publish a detailed report on use of force, including deadly force, on an annual basis. The report should be released to the public.


The report should present statistical trends and analyses of incident characteristics of all uses of force, including deadly force incidents, for that year. The report should also highlight any major revisions in department policies and procedures related to use of force and, more broadly, public interactions.

Finding 46

The PPD does not fully accommodate the PAC in its role of providing independent civilian oversight of police operations in Philadelphia.


The department has not cooperated with the PAC’s request for access to OIS investigative files and statistical data. Yet Executive Order No. 8-93 empowers the PAC to access such data related to any internal investigation into police misconduct. The order states that the commission will have “full access to relevant police department personnel for interview and to relevant documents, including, but not limited to, . . . all general summaries, statistical compilations, and other internal reports on shootings, injuries, complaints of abuse, training, and any other issues related to the work of the commission.” [193]

Recommendation 46

The PPD should work with the PAC and accommodate requests for important documentation, investigative files, and data related to all uses of force, including OISs.


The PPD should submit these files to the PAC to allow for the civilian oversight intended in Executive Order 8-93. These files should be sent in a timely fashion at their completion. If the PAC requests files related to completed investigations, the PPD should accommodate that request in a timely fashion. This recommendation applies to all files and databases maintained by the PPD related to administrative investigations, criminal investigations, UFRB findings, memoranda to the commissioner regarding UFRB findings and recommendations, PBI proceedings, and arbitration hearings.

Finding 47

Distrust in the ability of the PPD to investigate itself pervades segments of the community. Past and present scandals, high-profile OIS incidents, and a lack of transparency in investigative outcomes help cement this distrust.


From 2007 to 2013, approximately 15 percent of subjects in OISs were unarmed. These incidents included threat perception failures (TPF), toy guns, physical altercations, and accidental discharges that led to deadly force. There are no reliable national estimates on the prevalence and nature of OISs. [194] Therefore, we cannot say whether this number is high or low. However, we believe any police leader would agree that the law enforcement profession should take all efforts to reduce, in whole, the number shootings of unarmed persons. These incidents are undoubtedly the most controversial. Anecdotally, single incidents involving unarmed persons have led to significant upheaval and civil unrest in the past. Single incidents have also been the catalyst for significant reform in some police agencies.

Segments of the Philadelphia community do not trust the agency or any local partners to conduct a fair and objective investigation of OISs. This distrust stems from incidents in which members of the department have engaged in corruption and excessive uses of force and from the department’s lack of transparency on these matters. We make no claim that the department is an untrustworthy agent when it comes to investigating OISs. However, we believe that the department can take significant steps to build trust with disaffected communities in Philadelphia.

Recommendation 47.1

The PPD should establish a policy stating that the police commissioner or designee will hold a press conference on an OIS incident within 72 hours of the incident.


All OISs, fatal and nonfatal, should be addressed in a press conference within 72 hours of the incident by the police commissioner or a designee. At the press conference, the commissioner or their designee should share basic facts and circumstances of the incident known at the time as collected and confirmed by investigators.

Recommendation 47.2

The PPD should enter into an agreement with the PAC allowing a PAC observer access to all pertinent documentation related to an OIS investigation.


PAC observers should be called out to the scene and receive a briefing from the lead investigator prior to the release of the crime scene. In addition, PAC observers should have the names of all involved persons and witnesses so they can conduct their own interviews if deemed appropriate. PAC observers should be required to sign nondisclosure agreements, prohibiting them from sharing any information about any open investigations. However, PAC observers should be required to report any allegations of misconduct or violation of investigative protocols to the PAC executive director, the PPD IAD, and the police commissioner.

Recommendation 47.3

The police commissioner should enter into a memorandum of understanding with an external, independent investigative agency, through which the investigation of all OISs involving an unarmed person will be submitted for review.


Based on past years, this would result in the PPD submitting an average of approximately five cases to the agency per year for review. The PPD should make its request and the agency’s response transparent. The PPD should notify the public when a case is submitted, whether the agency accepts or declines to recommend charges, and ultimately the agency’s findings or recommendations for further action to be taken.

This does not mean that the PPD will not investigate the case or that the district attorney (DA) will not have the ability to prosecute if appropriate. Local law enforcement will always play a role in deadly force investigations. However, oversight by an independent law enforcement authority will provide the community with an outside, independent review of the investigation. The PPD should formalize this recommendation into policy. The department may set a sunset clause and revisit the policy two years from its implementation. The PPD should consider the Philadelphia field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Pennsylvania office of the U.S. Attorney General to serve in this role. In addition to OISs involving unarmed persons, the department may also consider other controversial, challenged, or complex OIS incidents for external review at the discretion of the commissioner.

Finding 48

The PPD has taken the initiative to launch a pilot program for BWCs in several districts in the city.


BWCs have drawn much media attention and interest from law enforcement agencies and oversight agencies. Proponents argue that they will have a “civilizing effect” on police-public encounters and therefore reduce the amount of police misconduct and public complaints, as evidenced by one study involving the Rialto (California) Police Department. [195] However, research on the effectiveness of BWCs is still growing and privacy concerns remain.

Recommendation 48.1

The PPD should collaborate with the multiple stakeholders in the development of policies and protocols for use of BWCs.


The department should engage with community members, particularly privacy advocates, to ensure the department deploys BWCs in a way that is in line with community values and expectations of privacy. In addition, the department should engage in a dialogue with the Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Police to ensure that officers’ due process and privacy are considered and addressed in the policies, training, and protocols of BWCs.

Recommendation 48.2

The PPD should actively monitor the implementation of BWCs and study its effects on the department’s objectives.


The department should pay particular attention to all uses of force and complaints. The PPD should consider conducting public satisfaction surveys to study the impact of BWCs on police-public encounters, paying particular attention to the impact that BWCs may have on public engagement in foot patrol districts and other high-crime areas.

Recommendation 48.3

The PPD should address major training and policy concerns prior to the deployment of BWCs.


Before deploying BWCs, the department should immediately address the following key policy issues:

• Training requirements
• Data storage location
• Data retention time
• Impact of Pennsylvania’s two-party consent law on BWC use by the PPD
• Impact of Pennsylvania’s public disclosure law on BWC use by the PPD
• Encounters in which BWCs should and should not be activated

The department will also want to address the following policy issues, if BWCs become a fixture in the department:

• Voluntariness of PPD officers
• Voluntariness of persons being recorded
• Auditing of BWC activations
• Auditing of BWC footage
• Sustainment costs of equipment and software
• Distribution of BWCs by police district
• Readdressing all policy issues listed above and uncovered during the pilot
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:26 am

Chapter 10. Conclusion

The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) is a large, complex organization with a deeply rooted history and culture. The department’s complexity reflects, in part, the growing complexity of the role of police in society, which has evolved from reactive to proactive in its fight against crime. We are recommending that the department take the same evolutionary steps in its approach to all interactions with the public, use of force, and use of deadly force. The first step was already completed when the commissioner requested this assessment from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). The department has been fully cooperative with our assessment and has both literally and figuratively opened its books to our team. For that, the department is deserving of praise.

Our overarching goal is to make the PPD a “best practice” police department for deadly force policy, training, investigations, and oversight. The department has much work to do in the months and years ahead. Our assessment uncovered policy, training, and operational deficiencies in addition to an undercurrent of significant strife between the community and department. It yielded 48 findings and 91 recommendations for the department to consider in reforming its deadly force practices.

We found the PPD’s policies to be in need of significant refinement. Officers need more less-lethal options. In addition, the department’s use of force policies need to be more explicit and officers need more training on them. Regarding training, it is essential that the PPD establish a field training officer (FTO) program. We also found that much of the PPD’s training on use of force concepts and tactics is too infrequent, lacks the appropriate concepts, and, at times, lacks standards, which leaves officers inadequately prepared to make decisions in an increasingly complex environment. The PPD’s investigations of deadly force incidents need to be completed in a more timely fashion. In particular, discharging officers should be interviewed within 72 hours of an incident. Furthermore, the scope of the investigation and reporting on the administrative side needs to be expanded to reflect the goals of the use of force review board. The PPD’s review process needs to enable the department to hold officers accountable, learn from deadly force incidents, self- critique, and change as a result. Last, in an effort to maximize transparency, the PPD should request the independent investigation of unarmed officer-involved shooting (OIS) incidents from another capable and legitimate authority. The department also needs to improve its relations with the police advisory commission and be more forthcoming with deadly force investigative files and data.

Over the next 12 months, the assessment team will work with the PPD and the COPS Office to monitor and assist in the implementation of the reforms. The department’s progress will be published in two monitoring reports. The reforms are intended to create a safer environment for the public and officers. By implementing the reforms recommended in this report, the department will be addressing a host of critical issues facing not only the PPD, but the entire police profession.
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:32 am

Appendix A. Table of Findings and Recommendations

Use of force policies


Findings & Recommendations

Finding 1: PPD officers do not receive regular, consistent training on the department’s deadly force policy.

Recommendation 1.1: The PPD should develop a standard training module on directives 10 and 22 and require all sworn personnel to complete the training on an annual basis.

Recommendation 1.2: The PPD should engage with officers and supervisors at the patrol level to seek their input on the clarity and comprehensibility of the department’s use of force directives.

Finding 2: The PPD’s use of force policies are fragmented, as are revisions of these policies. As a result, the PPD currently has two use of force models, which can be a source of confusion for officers.

Recommendation 2.1: The PPD should revise directives 10 and 22 at the same time to ensure the policies provide clear and consistent direction and guidance.

Recommendation 2.2: For each district unit, the PPD should designate or assign an individual who is responsible for policy and training bulletin dissemination and auditing.

Recommendation 2.3: The PPD should incorporate officers’ acknowledgment of receipt of training bulletins and policy updates into the PPD’s training record-keeping system.

Finding 3: Directive 10 is too vague in its description of use of force decision making, relying too heavily on the use of force decision chart.

Recommendation 3: The PPD should update directive 10 to include additional narrative context describing the appropriate level of force to be applied under various circumstances.

Finding 4: Directive 10 uses the term "probable cause" in the context of deadly force, which is an unnecessary and confusing departure from the traditional legal definition of the term.

Recommendation 4: The PPD should remove the term "probable cause" from directive 10 and expound upon the principles of Graham v. Connor to guide officers in deadly force decision making.

Finding 5: The definition of "objectively reasonable" in PPD directive 10 includes the terms "imminent" and "immediate," which can be a source of confusion for officers in the field. Notably, the term "imminent" does not appear in the Graham v. Connor decision.

Recommendation 5: The PPD should remove the term "imminent" from directive 10.

Finding 6: The PPD’s "duty to intervene" clause in directive 22 creates a limited requirement—specifically, that officers are required to stop another officer from using force when it is no longer required. The policy is silent on whether officers are required to stop initial use of force when inappropriate and on whether any such abuses should be reported.

Recommendation 6.1: The PPD’s "duty to intervene" should be revised to account for any officers witnessing the inappropriate initiation of force.

Recommendation 6.2: The PPD’s "duty to intervene" should be expanded to include a "duty to report."

Finding 7: Directive 22 does not require officers to carry oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray.

Recommendation 7: Directive 22 should state that officers are required to carry OC spray on their duty belt at all times while on duty.

Finding 8: The PPD requires officers to complete crisis intervention training (CIT) in order to obtain an electronic control weapon (ECW). This requirement conflates the two tactical approaches and limits the distribution of less-lethal tools throughout the department.

Recommendation 8.1: The PPD should decouple ECWs and CIT both conceptually and operationally.

Recommendation 8.2: ECWs should be standard issue weapons for all PPD officers assigned to uniformed enforcement units.

Recommendation 8.3: All PPD officers in uniformed enforcement units should be required to carry ECWs on their duty belt at all times.

Recommendation 8.4: The PPD should continue to dispatch CIT officers to calls for service involving persons in a probable state of mental crisis.

Finding 9: The PPD’s electronic control weapons (ECW) policy is not detailed enough on the circumstances in which use of the tool should be limited.

Recommendation 9.1: The PPD’s ECW policy should limit the number of cycles used per subject to three.

Recommendation 9.2: The PPD’s use of force decision chart policy should clearly illustrate where using ECWs are appropriate and inappropriate.

Recommendation 9.3: ECW discharges used against handcuffed persons should be permissible only in cases where the officer or another is danger of serious bodily injury.

Recommendation 9.4: Officers who accidentally discharge an ECW and strike a suspect or nonsuspect should be required to complete a use of force report.

Finding 10: Between 2007 and 2013, PPD officers were involved in 30 OISs involving vehicles. The department’s policy does not provide enough limitations on this practice.

Recommendation 10: The PPD should amend its policy and include a stronger prohibition on shooting at moving vehicles.

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Basic recruit training

Findings & Recommendations

Finding 11: PPD recruit training is not conducted in a systematic and modular fashion. As a result, some recruit classes receive firearms training close to the end of the academy while others receive it early on.

Rrecommendation 11.1: The PPD should revise the sequencing of its academy curriculum so that recruits are continually building on previously learned skills.

Recommendation 11.2: Skills that require continual training and refinement, such as firearms, defensive tactics, communications, and driving, should be staggered throughout the length of the academy.

Finding 12: PPD training staff members are required to complete instructor training just one time during their careers, in accordance with minimum MPOETC standards.

Recommendation 12: The PPD should establish a minimum continuing education requirement for all training staff to remain certified by the PPD.

Finding 13: On occasion, PPD training staff provides inconsistent or contradictory instruction to recruits.

Recommendation 13: The PPD should create formal, ongoing collaboration between the FTU and the academy.

Finding 14: PPD officers are dissatisfied with academy defensive tactics training.

Recommendation 14.1: The PPD should review and update its defensive tactics manual at least once every two years, taking into account PPD officer experiences and emerging best practices from the field.

Recommendation 14.2: Ground fighting should be a part of the PPD’s defensive tactics training.

Recommendation 14.3: The PPD should discontinue training on the use of neck restraints and eliminate its use from the field except in exigent circumstances when life or grave bodily harm are at risk.

Finding 15: For some PPD recruits, de-escalation training has amounted to little more than lecture and observations.

Recommendation 15.1: The PPD should revamp its academy de-escalation training, ensuring that recruits receive more hours of scenario training, which allows each recruit to exercise and be evaluated on verbal de-escalation skills.

Recommendation 15.2: PPD de-escalation training should be expanded to include a discussion of tactical de-escalation.

Finding 16: Academy recruits are not trained to use electronic control weapons (ECW).

Recommendation 16: ECW certification should be incorporated into the PPD’s basic recruit academy.

Finding 17: Incidents involving discourtesy, use of force, and allegations of bias by PPD officers leave segments of the community feeling disenfranchised and distrustful of the police department.

Recommendation 17.1: The PPD’s academy should significantly increase the scope and duration of its training on core and advanced community oriented policing concepts.

Recommendation 17.2: The PPD should develop and implement an action plan in response to the organizational assessment on community oriented policing policies and practices throughout the department.

Finding 18: Academy instruction materials on the use of force policy and use of force continuum are inconsistent.

Recommendation 18: The PPD should conduct a complete audit of its use of force policy and legal instruction conducted throughout the academy and ensure that messaging is clear, consistent, and understandable.

Finding 19: The majority of academy instruction and scenario-based training sessions related to use of force end with the officer having to use force.

Recommendation 19: The PPD should review all of its use of force course material, including lesson plans, case studies, and scenarios, and ensure that they demonstrate the opportunity for a peaceful resolution.

Finding 20: There is a strong desire for more reality-based training throughout the department.

Recommendation 20: The PPD should increase the amount of reality-based training offered to academy recruits.

Finding 21: PPD training scenarios are not developed with a consistent method or evaluation process.

Recommendation 21: PPD scenarios should be developed in a formal fashion and include learning objectives and evaluation criteria.

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In service training

Findings & Recommendations

Finding 22: The PPD lacks a field training program to help transition academy graduates into full-time work as officers.

Recommendation 22: The PPD should develop a field training program.

Finding 23: The PPD’s annual in-service training requirements tend to be limited to MPOETC standards. As a result, officers do not regularly receive in-service training on threat perception, decision making, and de-escalation.

Recommendation 23.1: The PPD should add at least one additional day of RBT to its annual requirements.

Recommendation 23.2: The PPD should include training in procedural justice during the next offering of mandatory in-service program courses.

Recommendation 23.3: The PPD should include training in unconscious bias and law enforcement during the next offering of mandatory in-service program courses.

Finding 24: The PPD training staff lacks opportunities for exposure to day-to-day officer experiences.

Recommendation 24: The PPD should require training staff members to work a patrol shift in a two-officer car at least twice annually.

Finding 25: The PPD lacks a comprehensive scenario playbook that includes a diverse set of scenarios that are relevant to policing in Philadelphia.

Recommendation 25.1: The PPD should develop a catalog of scenarios based on real-world incidents experienced by PPD officers and other officers across the country.

Recommendation 25.2: Officer performance in training should be recorded as a way to track officer progress department-wide and flag any tactical issues that may require additional targeted training.

Recommendation 25.3: The PPD should review its training on animal shootings to ensure they are consistent with the community expectations while considering factors affecting officer safety.

Finding 26: The PPD does not have a recertification program for CIT.

Recommendation 26: The PPD should create a periodic recertification training program for CIT officers.

Finding 27: The PPD does not have a recertification program for electronic control weapons (ECW).

Recommendation 27: The PPD should create a periodic recertification training program for ECWs.

Finding 28: Unique opportunities for scenario-based and simulated training have been eliminated from the department.

Recommendation 28.1: The PPD should reinstitute the rotating simulation use of force training program.

Recommendation 28.2: The PPD should investigate and obtain a sufficient facility or facilities to house reality-based training.

Finding 29: The PPD requires that officers qualify with their firearms just once per calendar year.

Recommendation 29: The PPD should require that officers qualify with their weapons at least twice per year.

Finding 30: PPD officers do not receive in-service defensive tactics training.

Recommendation 30: The PPD should provide periodic defensive tactics training.

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Investigations

Findings & Recommendations


Finding 31: OIS investigations generally lack consistency.

Recommendation 31.1: The PPD should establish a single investigative unit devoted to criminal investigations of all deadly force incidents.

Recommendation 31.2: PPD D-FIT members should have the experience and training necessary to conduct thorough and objective OIS investigations.

Recommendation 31.3: The PPD should develop a manual for conducting OIS investigations from a criminal standpoint.

Finding 32: PPD officers involved in a shooting provide a "public safety statement" to the transporting supervisor regarding the crime scene, evidence, suspects, and witnesses. In practice, the statement lacks structure and consistency.

Recommendation 32.1: The PPD should develop a standard checklist of items constituting a public safety statement that transporting supervisors must obtain from an officer involved in a shooting.

Recommendation 32.2: The transporting supervisor should conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s).

Finding 33: The PPD’s current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and discharging officers is through typed notes.

Recommendation 33: The PPD should establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in the course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.

Finding 34: Control of the initial crime scene is assigned to the criminal investigators on an informal basis. As a result, there is a general lack of consistency in the quality of crime scene control and integrity.

Recommendation 34: The PPD should establish a policy that control of an OIS crime scene must be assigned to the criminal investigative unit.

Finding 35: Crime scene photos of OIS incidents are inconsistent and often lack the appropriate perspectives and details.

Recommendation 35.1: The PPD should establish a standard for OIS crime scene photography to be incorporated into their OIS investigations manual.

Recommendation 35.2: The crime scene should be video recorded.

Finding 36: The IAD shooting team waits for the DAO to decline charges against an officer before it interviews discharging officers and closes its investigation. As a result, most officers involved in shootings are not interviewed until three or more months after the incident occurred.

Recommendation 36.1: The PPD should revise its policy and practice so that the criminal investigative unit assigned to each OIS is the primary point of contact with the DAO. The IAD should be extricated from this role.

Recommendation 36.2 The shooting team should conduct interviews with the all discharging officer(s) as soon as practical, but not later than 72 hours after the incident.

Recommendation 36.3: The IAD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination.

Recommendation 36.4: All interviews of discharging officers should be video recorded.

Finding 37: The PPD lacks official training requirements for IAD shooting team members.

Recommendation 37.Current and future members of the shooting team should be required to receive specialized training in OIS investigations.

Finding 38: The shooting team does not have a formal process for consulting with subject matter experts to inform their investigation and findings.

Recommendation 38: The shooting team should establish a policy to review their investigation and findings with other departmental experts.

Finding 39: The scope of shooting team investigations focuses solely on policy while largely neglecting officer tactics and decision making.

Recommendation 39.1: The shooting team should significantly enhance their investigative scope to include officer tactics and decision making.

Recommendation 39.2: Shooting team investigative reports should highlight findings and any inconsistencies in policy, procedure, and training for the UFRB to evaluate in their decision.

Recommendation 39.3: The shooting team should develop an operations manual delineating all of their investigative activities, reporting, and role in the review process.

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Use of deadly force and officer accountability

Findings & Recommendations


Finding 40: The UFRB and PBI are duplicative processes that at times have conflicting outcomes. This sends a mixed message to members of the department and causes unnecessary internal strife.

Recommendation 40.1: The PPD should dismantle the two-board system for OISs and combine the functions of the UFRB and PBI into one integrated board.

Recommendation 40.2: The newly established board should conduct a comprehensive review of each incident.

Recommendation 40.3: Voting board members should include command staff, a sworn officer one rank higher than the involved officer, a peer officer, and at least one citizen representative.

Recommendation 40.4: Shooting team investigators should make a formal presentation of the facts to the board, highlighting any potential conflicts and key points for deliberation among the board.

Recommendation 40.5: Board members should have the opportunity to call witnesses and ask questions related to the incident.

Recommendation 40.6: After board proceedings are complete, voting members should deliberate the case and issue a finding by majority vote.

Finding 41: The PPD’s disciplinary code section on firearm discharges is too encompassing. As a result, the penalty for violating this code ranges widely from reprimand to dismissal for first, second, and third offenses.

Recommendation 41: The PPD should delineate the various firearms-related violations in its disciplinary code and the penalties for first, second and third time offenders.

Finding 42: The process for reviewing OISs in the PPD is separated from the department’s commendatory process. As a result, officers may be issued commendations for actions that were less than commendable.

Recommendation 42.1: The UFRB should review and, if appropriate, approve all recommendations for commendations related to deadly force incidents.

Recommendation 42.2: The department should develop a commendation that recognizes when an officer uses exceptional tactical or verbal skills to avoid a deadly force situation.

Finding 43: The PPD’s case review program has disciplinary overtones.

Recommendation 43: The PPD should refine its case review program and review its metrics, thresholds, procedures, and organizational structure to ensure that it is best serving the interests of the department, the officers, and the community.

Finding 44: The PPD does not have an established process for organizational learning related to OISs or, more broadly, use of force.

Recommendation 44.1: The department should establish a permanent office for organizational learning and improvement related to officer safety, tactics, and use of force.

Recommendation 44.2: The newly established office should convene a working group at least bi-annually.

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External oversight and transparency

Findings & Recommendations

Finding 45: The PPD has begun posting a significant amount of data and case information on its website. Still, more transparency is needed to properly keep the community informed.

Recommendation 45.1: The PPD should, at a minimum, publish directives 10 and 22 and the yet-to-be-written directive on the UFRB on its OIS web page.

Recommendation 45.2: The PPD should update its website as case files are closed and available for public dissemination.

Recommendation 45.3: The PPD website should be updated to include more detailed accounts of the OIS and DAO review of the incident.

Recommendation 45.4: The PPD should publish a detailed report on use of force, including deadly force, on an annual basis. The report should be released to the public.

Finding 46: The PPD does not fully accommodate the PAC in its role of providing independent civilian oversight of police operations in Philadelphia.

Recommendation 46: The PPD should work with the PAC and accommodate requests for important documentation, investigative files, and data related to all uses of force, including OISs.

Finding 47: Distrust in the ability of the PPD to investigate itself pervades segments of the community. Past and present scandals, high-profile OIS incidents, and a lack of transparency in investigative outcomes help cement this distrust.

Recommendation 47.1: The PPD should establish a policy stating that the police commissioner or designee will hold a press conference on OIS incident within 72 hours of incident.

Recommendation 47.2: The PPD should enter into an agreement with the PAC allowing a PAC observer access to all pertinent documentation related to an OIS investigation.

Recommendation 47.3: The police commissioner should enter into a memorandum of understanding with an external, independent investigative agency, through which the investigation of all OISs involving an unarmed person will be submitted for review.

Finding 48: The PPD has taken the initiative to launch a pilot program for body-worn cameras (BWC) in several districts in the city.

Recommendation 48.1: The PPD should collaborate with the multiple stakeholders in the development of policies and protocols for use of BWCs.

Recommendation 48.2: The PPD should actively monitor the implementation of BWCs and study its effects on the department’s objectives.

Recommendation 48.3: The PPD should address major training and policy concerns prior to the deployment of BWCs.

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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:33 am

Appendix B. PPD Investigation Flow Chart

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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:33 am

Appendix C. Police Advisory Commissioner Letter Re: Officer-Involved Shootings

Commissioner Charles Ramsey

Philadelphia Police Department
Police Administration Building
8th & Race Street, Room 313
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Wednesday February 6, 2013

Commissioner Ramsey:

I write to formally request that the police department provide the Commission with copies of all completed shooting and discharge reports from 2007 to the present. Going forward, I would like to meet with police department officials to discuss a procedure for our office to receive these reports automatically upon completion, as was once done with shooting/discharge reports provided to the previous Integrity & Accountability Office.

It has come to my attention that Internal Affairs personnel have refused written requests (see attached 1/3/2013 letter) to provide this information to Commission investigators, under the mistaken assumption that these records are exempt from disclosure to our agency. This refusal has severely undermined the Commission’s ability to bring closure in a number of formal complaints filed with our agency, as well as our larger mission of providing oversight of matters of importance to the board and the public.

Executive Order 8-93, Section 4 (Powers & Duties) grants the Commission access to a broad range of police department records, and specifically subsection 0(5) includes “all general summaries, statistical compilations and other internal reports on shootings, injuries . . . etc. (emphasis mine).

Our concerns regarding these incidents runs considerably deeper than the question of the Commission’s access to records. When a Philadelphia Police officer takes an action that injures or takes the life of another, we have a responsibility to provide independent investigation, review and public analysis of those incidents. While we have no desire to reveal any confidential or statutorily exempt information, the conclusions reached in these inquiries are valid matters of public concern that the police department cannot keep hidden from scrutiny by the Commission.

In a related matter, I note that the department’s latest crime maps no longer display basic information about justifiable homicides, which were the public’s (and the Commission’s) only way of tracking these incidents outside of media reports.

We need to collectively work to end the silence that lingers around fatal incidents in our city, erodes confidence in law enforcement, and allows misinformation to replace the honest public reckoning that our officers and the public deserve.

Kelvyn Anderson
Executive Director
Police Advisory Commission
990 Spring Garden St, 7th floor
Philadelphia, PA 19123

CC: Deputy Commissioner Denise Turpin, Internal Affairs
Michael Resnick, Esq., Director of Public Safety
Richard Negrin, Esq., Managing Director
Michael Nutter, Mayor
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:34 am

Appendix D. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AELE Americans for Effective Law Enforcement

APM Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha

ATU Advanced Training Unit

BWC body-worn camera

CLETA Census of Law Enforcement Training Academies

CIT crisis intervention training

COPS Office Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

CP-SAT Community Policing Self-Assessment Tool

DAO district attorney’s office

D-FIT deadly force investigation team

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

DT defensive tactics

DTI defensive tactics instructor

ECW electronic control weapons

EIS early intervention system

FATS firearms training simulator

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FTO field training officer

FTU Firearms Training Unit

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IAD Internal Affairs Division

LEMAS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

MPOETC Municipal Police Officer Education and Training Commission

NAN National Action Network

NIJ National Institute of Justice

NRA National Rifle Association

PAC Police Advisory Commission

PARC Police Assessment Resource Center

PBI Police Board of Inquiry

PDAC police district advisory council

PPD Philadelphia Police Department

OC oleoresin capsicum

OIS officer-involved shooting

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility

PTSD post-traumatic stress disorder

RBT reality-based training

SIU special investigation unit

SWAT special weapons and tactics

TBI traumatic brain injury

TPF threat perception failure

UFRB Use of Force Review Board
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

Postby admin » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:37 am

Appendix E. PPD directive 10

Note: This appendix has been slightly modified to adhere to COPS Office publication standards.

Issued date: 05-23-14

Effective date: 05-23-14

Update date:

Subject: Use of force—involving the discharge of firearms (PLEAC – 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.5, 1.3.6, 1.3.7)

Index

SECTION TITLE PAGE NUMBER I Policy 1 II Definitions 1 III Use of Force 2 Use of Force Decision Chart 3 IV Specific Prohibitions 4 V Reporting Discharges of Firearms 4 VI Investigation of Police Discharges 8 VII Custody and Disposition of Firearms Discharged by Police Personnel 10 VIII Use of Force Review Board (U.F.R.B.) 12 IX Discharge Involving Animals 14 X Annual Review 16

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I. Policy

A. It is the policy of the Philadelphia Police Department that our officers hold the highest regard for the sanctity of human life, dignity, and liberty of all persons. The application of deadly force is a measure to be employed only in the most extreme circumstances and all lesser means of force have failed or could not be reasonably employed.

B. The most serious act in which a police officer can engage during the course of his official duties is the use of deadly force. The authority to carry and use firearms in the course of public service is an immense power, which comes with great responsibility.

C. Police officers shall not use deadly force against another person unless they have probable cause that they must protect themselves or another person from imminent death or serious bodily injury. Further, an officer is not justified in using deadly force at any point in time when there is no longer probable cause to believe the suspect is dangerous, even if deadly force would have been justified at an earlier point in time.*( PLEAC 1.3.2)

D. When feasible under the circumstances, police officers will give the suspect a verbal warning before using deadly force.

E. Police officers using their professional judgment should not discharge their weapon when doing so might unnecessarily endanger innocent people.

F. After using deadly force, officers shall immediately render the appropriate medical aid and request further medical assistance for the suspect and any other injured individuals when necessary and safe to do so and will not be delayed to await the arrival of medical assistance. *(PLEAC 1.3.5)

II. Definitions

A. Probable cause: Facts and circumstances which would support an objectively reasonable belief that the officers must protect themselves or others from imminent death or serious bodily injury

B. Objectively reasonable belief: A fourth amendment standard whereby an officer’s belief that they must protect themselves or others from imminent death or serious bodily injury is compared and weighed against what a reasonable or rational officer would have believed under similar circumstances. This determination is made by reviewing all relevant facts and circumstances of each particular case, including but not limited to (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspects poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

C. Imminent: Threatening, likely, and unavoidable.

D. Serious bodily injury: Bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or causes serious, permanent disfiguration or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

III. Use of force

A. GOAL: To always attempt to de-escalate any situation where force may become necessary. In the event force becomes unavoidable, to use only the minimal amount of force necessary to overcome an immediate threat or to effectuate an arrest.

B. The amount of force, the continued use of any force, and the type of police equipment utilized all depend upon the situation being faced by the officer. However, once the threat has been overcome or a subject is securely in custody, it is an officer’s responsibility to de-escalate and immediately address any injuries the suspect may have sustained.

C. USE OF FORCE DECISION CHART: The following diagram illustrates the amount of force an officer should use based on the offender’s behavior and threat. It is the offender’s behavior that places the officer and/or others in danger. The offender’s threat is the primary factor in choosing a force option. However, the officer should also consider the totality of the circumstances to include but not be limited to an offender’s altered state due to alcohol or drugs, mental impairment, medical conditions, or the proximity of weapons.

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IV. Specific prohibitions

A. Police officers shall not draw their firearms unless they reasonably believe a potential threat for serious bodily injury or imminent death to themselves or another person exists.

B. Police officers shall not discharge their firearms in defense of property.

C. Police officers shall not use a firearm as a club.

D. Police officers shall not fire warning shots under any circumstances. *(PLEAC 1.3.3)

E. Police officers shall ensure their actions do not precipitate the use of deadly force by placing themselves or others in jeopardy by taking unnecessary, overly aggressive, or improper actions. It is often a tactically superior police procedure to withdraw, take cover, or reposition rather than to immediately use force.

F. Police officers shall not discharge their firearms to subdue a fleeing individual who presents no threat of imminent death or serious physical injury to themselves or another person present

G. Police officers shall not discharge their firearms FROM a moving vehicle unless the officers are being fired upon.

H. Police officers shall not discharge their firearms AT a vehicle unless officers are being fired upon by the occupants of the vehicle. An officer should never place themselves or another person in jeopardy in an attempt to stop a vehicle.

NOTE: Barring exigent circumstances (e.g., the driver is unconscious and the motor is still running), an officer shall never reach into an occupied vehicle in an attempt to shut off the engine or to recover evidence, because this has been known to result in serious injury to officers.

I. Police officers with revolvers shall not under any circumstances cock a firearm. Firearms must be fired double-action at all times.

V. Reporting discharges of firearms

A. The discharge of any firearm, whether accidental or intentional, by sworn personnel on duty or off duty (except test or target fire at a bona fide pistol range or lawfully hunting game) will be reported as follows:

1. The officer who fired the weapon will

a. immediately notify police radio of the occurrence and provide pertinent information regarding the need for supervisory personnel and emergency equipment if required;

b. inform the first supervisor on the scene of the location(s) of the crime scene(s) and the general circumstances relative to the preservation and collection of physical evidence;

c. make no official statements to anyone except personnel from Internal Affairs. However, this provision shall not be construed to prohibit the officer from speaking to any counselor or union representatives regarding the incident while at Internal Affairs or at any time afterwards.

2. Each officer at the scene of a discharge of a firearm by any police officer will

a. notify police radio of the discharge unless the officer knows police radio has already received such a notification;

b. inform the first supervisor on the scene of the circumstances of the discharge and provide all relevant information concerning the incident;

c. ensure the provisions of directive 2 “Responsibilities at Crime Scenes” are followed.

3. Police radio will

a. ensure that a district supervisor is dispatched to the scene;

b. immediately make the following notifications:

(1.) Internal Affairs

(2.) Homicide division (only when death occurs or is likely to occur or an officer is struck by gun fire)

(3.) Detective division of occurrence

(4.) District of occurrence

(5.) District or unit to which officer is assigned

(6.) Command Inspection Bureau (CIB), if applicable

(7.) Crime Scene Unit (CSU)

(8.) RTCC to identify all city owned or privately owned cameras;

c. notify the commanding officer, Employee Assistance Program (EAP) of the police discharge. The commanding officer of EAP will have police radio notify the on-call peer counselor and he or she will contact police radio for details of the shooting.

4. The first supervisor on the scene will be responsible for the following:

a. Ensure that police radio has been notified of the incident.

b. Ensure that the provisions of directive 2 “Responsibilities at Crime Scenes” are carried out and protect and secure the crime scene.

c. Determine which officer(s) fired their weapon(s) by examining the magazine/cylinder of the weapon of each officer present during the discharge.

d. Any officer having left the scene prior to the supervisor’s arrival will be recalled in order to have their weapon inspected.

(1.) Glock (semi-automatic) weapon inspection: Instruct the officer(s) to remove the magazine for inspection and note the number of rounds. If the weapon has been fired, record the number of remaining rounds and take possession of the magazine. Supervisors who are not Glock-trained are prohibited from physically handling the weapon (excluding the magazine) during the inspection.

(2.) Revolver inspection: Pay special attention to the cylinder position before ordering the officer to open their weapon’s cylinder. Note the condition of each round in all chambers and what chamber was located under the firing pin when the cylinder was opened. If the weapon has been fired, take note of the number of spent cartridges and take possession of all six rounds of ammunition, live or spent.

e. Allow involved officer(s) to retain custody of the firearm absent any exigent circumstances and reload their weapon with six new rounds or a new magazine. This will be done to ensure officers have a fully loaded weapon while being transported to Internal Affairs.

f. Ensure that information concerning the location(s) of the crime scene(s) and the general circumstances relative to the preservation and collection of physical evidence is provided by the involved officer(s) and disseminated to the assigned investigator by remaining at the scene until the arrival of divisional detective personnel.

g. Escort the involved officer, if not incapacitated, directly to Internal Affairs. When reasonable, discharging officers should be transported separately. If additional vehicles are needed, additional supervisors will be summoned to provide transportation.

NOTE: The first supervisor on the scene (corporal, sergeant, or lieutenant) will not delegate the responsibility of transporting officers to any other supervisor regardless of the district/unit assignment of the officer(s) involved. However, command-level personnel (captain or above) may assign a subordinate supervisor to transport involved officers in the event a commander is the first superior officer on the scene.

5. The operations room supervisor (ORS) of the district of occurrence will make notification via a computer terminal to Internal Affairs by accessing the Use of Force Notification Screen on the PPD intranet homepage.*(PLEAC 1.3.6)

B. Reporting discharges of firearms OUTSIDE jurisdiction

1. The officer who fired the weapon will

a. call the local Emergency 9-1-1 to notify the jurisdiction of occurrence;

b. comply with the directions given by the local investigating law enforcement officials;

c. call the Philadelphia Police Radio Room at 215-686-1295 so the proper notifications can be made.

2. Police radio will

a. notify Command Inspection Bureau (CIB) or district/unit commanding officer depending on the time of occurrence;

b. notify Internal Affairs and provide pertinent information regarding the discharge.

3. Internal Affairs will

a. be immediately notified of any incident involving the discharge of a firearm by police. The Internal Affairs shooting team will be notified of any incident involving the discharge of a firearm by Philadelphia Police personnel. In addition, the shooting team will be notified whenever a city issued or privately owned weapon of a Philadelphia Police Officer is discharged, intentionally or accidentally, by someone other than the respective officer;

b. notify the local investigative agency, speak to the assigned investigator, and request if Internal Affairs can respond to the scene or meet with the investigator;

c. respond to any discharge within reasonable driving distance (2–3 hours);

d. if permissible, obtain any documents and/or interviews pertaining to the discharge.

VI. Investigation of police discharges

A. The homicide unit will

1. investigate all cases involving the discharge of firearms by police personnel resulting in or likely to result in death of a human being. They will be responsible for the preparation of the Investigation Report (75-49) which will be forwarded to Internal Affairs within seven (7) calendar days; *(PLEAC 1.3.6)

2. ensure that all pertinent death notifications have been made.

B. The detective division of occurrence will investigate all other cases involving the discharge of firearms by police personnel. They will be responsible for the preparation of the investigation report (75-49), which will be forwarded to Internal Affairs within seven (7) calendar days. *(PLEAC 1.3.6)

NOTE: Other investigative units involved will coordinate their efforts with the assigned detective division.

C. Crime Scene Unit personnel will process the scene after conferring with the assigned investigator.

D. The officer’s commanding officer will

1. ensure the commanding officer of Internal Affairs is notified;

2. contact the police department’s Employee Assistance Unit (EAP) within five (5) business days in order to arrange confidential counseling whenever an officer has discharged their firearm except at an animal;

NOTE: Commanding officers may use their discretion regarding required EAP counseling when the discharge is at an animal.

3. be responsible for having the officer retrained at the Firearms Training Unit (FTU) before returning to duty (exception: discharges at deer);

4. whether or not the discharge results in death or injury to any person, the officer shall be temporarily assigned to non-street duties inside their command within their squad. *(PLEAC 1.3.7).

EXCEPTION: Officers who discharge at deer will be returned to duty immediately after arrival of an Internal Affairs investigator. Internal Affairs will not come out to the scene when SWAT has killed a deer or other wild animal, except canines.

5. An officer will return to active street duty as soon as possible after the officer has attended his scheduled visit with Employee Assistance Program (EAP), completed the required training at the Range and based on the recommendation of Internal Affairs.

E. Commanding officer, Employee Assistance Program (EAP) will

1. have the assigned peer counselor respond to Internal Affairs to meet the discharging officer for an initial assessment. During the initial assessment, the peer counselor will explain the emotions that the officer might be experiencing and explain the procedures that will occur following his/her discharge (i.e. reporting to the range and EAP, etc.);

NOTE: EAP peer counselors will only respond to police discharges where the suspect was fatally wounded or injured as a result of the discharge. The exception is when there is a request from the investigating shooting team, the officer’s commanding officer, CIB, or the commanding officer, EAP.

2. have the peer counselor conduct a confidential follow-up assessment and provide referral information to the officer. The officer will be encouraged to contact Penn Behavioral Health (PBH);

3. have the peer counselor, at the completion of the session with EAP or the Penn Behavioral Health provided counselor, fax a memorandum to the commanding officer, Internal Affairs shooting team, stating the officer has attended their appointment with EAP. All other information is prohibited from being released. All EAP sessions are STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and information pertaining to the session can not be released without the officer’s permission.

NOTE: EAP is a support service and is not involved in the investigation of the police shooting. COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE

F. Internal Affairs will

1. assist in all investigations of discharges of firearms by police personnel;

2. ensure a member of the Internal Affairs shooting team interviews the officer(s) that fired the weapon separately;

3. prepare a supplemental report (75-52) detailing the results of the Internal Affairs investigation; *(PLEAC 1.3.6)

NOTE: Upon completion of the supplemental report, the chief inspector, Office of Professional Responsibility will forward a complete report to the deputy commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility who will forward it to the police commissioner.

4. notify the commanding officer of the discharging officer’s status.

VII. Custody and disposition of firearms discharged by police personnel

A. Internal Affairs will prepare a property receipt (75-3) at Internal Affairs containing the following information: the firearm’s make, model, caliber, and serial number. A second 75-3 will be prepared for the fired cartridge(s) and unfired ammunition. The Internal Affairs police shooting case number will be indicated on both property receipts.

B. In discharges of firearms not resulting in injury and in any discharge (accidental or intentional) resulting in the shooting of an animal, the discharged firearm will be given to the transporting supervisor in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. When the firearm is to be returned, the assigned Internal Affairs investigator will designate, in the description section of the property receipt containing the firearm information, “FIREARM IS TO BE TEST FIRED AND RETURNED.” The assigned Internal Affairs investigator’s signature and date will follow. Internal Affairs will retain the white (control) copy of the property receipt for their records.

2. The transporting supervisor will transport the firearm, fired cartridge(s), and unfired ammunition and both property receipts directly to the Firearms Identification Unit (FIU).

a. When the Firearms Identification Unit (FIU) (843 North 8th Street, Room 022) is open, FIU will test fire and make every effort to expedite the examination and return the weapon to the involved officer. The test shots and firearm related materials (bullets, specimens, and/or fired cartridge cases) will be retained at FIU.

NOTE: Evidence intake unit is open 24 hours a day, weekends and holidays.

b. When FIU is closed, the evidence receiving clerk, Laboratory Division will aid the officer in securing their firearm in the mobile firearm’s storage box. A replacement firearm of the same caliber will immediately be issued to that officer. Subsequently, the FIU will contact the officer for return of their original firearm.

c. The firearm will be unloaded and made safe but not cleaned prior to examination.

d. Upon completion of the FIU examination, a copy of the findings will be forwarded to Internal Affairs and the pertinent detective division.

C. In all deliberate shootings (not involving animals) where an injury or death occurs and all accidental discharges of firearms resulting in injury or death, Internal Affairs will do the following:

1. The assigned Internal Affairs investigator will interview the involved officer and determine if the firearm can be returned to the officer.

2. If the firearm is to be returned to the officer, follow the procedure in Section V-B-1 and 2 in this directive except the actual transportation of the weapon to FIU will be done by Internal Affairs.

3. If the firearm is not to be returned, the assigned Internal Affairs investigator will designate in the description section of the property receipt containing the firearm information one of the following:

a. FIREARM IS TO BE TEST FIRED AND RETAINED—ISSUE A REPLACEMENT WEAPON.

b. FIREARM IS TO BE TEST FIRED AND RETAINED—DO NOT ISSUE REPLACEMENT WEAPON.

4. The assigned Internal Affairs investigator’s signature and date will follow. Internal Affairs will retain the white (control) copy of any property receipt.

5. The assigned Internal Affairs investigator will transport the firearm, fired cartridge(s), and unfired ammunition, and both property receipts directly to the Firearms Identification Unit (FIU).

a. When the Firearms Identification Unit (FIU) is open, the FIU clerk will take possession of the weapon and other material.

b. When FIU is closed, the evidence receiving clerk, Laboratory Division will aid the Internal Affairs investigator in properly securing the weapon and related material in the mobile firearm’s storage box.

c. If a replacement firearm is to be issued, the involved officer, upon leaving Internal Affairs, will proceed to FIU or evidence receiving clerk, Laboratory Division.

6. FIU will test fire the firearm in question and forward a copy of the findings to Internal Affairs and the pertinent Detective Division.

D. City-owned or privately owned firearms

1. Internal Affairs will determine the disposition of the City-owned firearm and notify FIU to transport the discharged firearm to the Firearms Training Unit. All other evidence, including fired cartridge(s) and unfired ammunition will be stored at FIU until released by Internal Affairs.

2. During the second week of January, a status review of City-owned firearms being retained under the above conditions will be conducted by the commanding officer, Firearms Training Unit. Internal Affairs will determine which weapons may be returned to inventory. The commanding officer, Firearms Training Unit will submit a final report to the deputy commissioner, Organizational Services by February 28th of each year detailing the status of all firearms being retained.

VIII. Use of force review board (UFRB)

A. Strict standards in the application of force by police personnel are necessary to provide guidance and to safeguard the public from unnecessary or unreasonable force. However, police personnel may be confronted with circumstances that were unknown or unanticipated when departmental standards were developed. Such circumstances may require extraordinary and unanticipated actions to be taken to protect police personnel or others, including suspects, from imminent serious bodily injury or death. In these extraordinary situations, written policies alone are often insufficient to properly evaluate the appropriateness or reasonableness of police personnel’s actions. To fairly review these cases, maintain departmental integrity, and ensure the public is properly protected, the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) will function as both an investigative and an administrative tool to objectively review the appropriateness or reasonableness of force.

B. Cases subject to review by the UFRB

1. All police involved shootings shall be reviewed.

C. The UFRB will be composed of

1. the deputy commissioner, Organizational Services, who will act as chairperson;

2. the deputy commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility;

3. the deputy commissioner, Major Investigations;

4. the deputy commissioner, Field Operations.

NOTE: If a member of the UFRB cannot attend, a designee will be identified and approved by the chairperson (chief inspector or higher).

D. Procedure

1. All completed police shooting investigations will be referred to the UFRB. No final determination regarding the appropriateness of the force used will be made by Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs shall present the facts of the shooting incident to the UFRB. The UFRB shall review the totality of the circumstances and issue a final determination of whether the force deployed was appropriate or the officer had probable cause to use deadly force.

2. The chairperson of the UFRB will receive and distribute copies to all members of all Internal Affairs use of force investigations and investigative reports relating to cases referred to the UFRB. The UFRB shall have access to the entire investigative file, attachments, and assigned investigators to complete a thorough review.

3. The chairperson will convene the UFRB at least quarterly for the purpose of reviewing the investigative reports on each case. The chairperson may convene the UFRB as often as necessary.

4. The decision regarding each incident shall be made by a majority vote of the UFRB.

a. Administrative approval: If the review indicated that the officer’s actions were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, the review will be terminated and the case will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy.”

b. Improve tactics and/or decision making: If the review indicated that the actions of the officer were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, but the officer’s tactics and/or decision making could be improved where the force became necessary, the review will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Tactical/Decision Training Recommended.”

c. No use of force violations, but other departmental violation discovered: If the review indicated that the actions of the officer were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, but other departmental violations not related to the use of force are discovered, the review will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Other Violations Discovered.”

d. Policy or departmental training issues: If the review indicates that an undesirable outcome occurred regarding the use of force and the force appears reasonable, but no actual policy or training currently exists regarding the subject matter, the case will be marked “Justified Use of Force within Departmental Policy—Review of Departmental Policy or Training Recommended.” The chairperson shall forward the case the deputy commissioner, Organizational Services, Strategy and Innovations. The deputy commissioner, Organizational Services, Strategy and Innovations shall, no later than thirty (30) days from the receipt of the case from the UFRB, be responsible to present to the police commissioner, through the chain of command, a proposed department-wide policy and/or training curriculum to remedy the issue.

e. Administrative disapproval: If the review indicated that the officer’s actions were not in accordance with departmental policy or deemed unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive, even under extraordinary circumstances, the case will be marked “Not within Departmental Policy.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing and forward the case to the charging unit for the appropriate disciplinary charges to be filed against the officer.

5. Any departmental violations uncovered during the course of the Internal Affairs investigation will be forwarded to the Police Board of Inquiry (PBI) for their review and action. 6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abridge, restrict, or otherwise limit the police commissioner’s final authority relating to discipline in these matters, including the right to override the decision of the UFRB.

IX. Discharges involving animals

A. Destroying injured deer

1. Firearms should not be used to destroy injured deer when they are not presenting an immediate threat to the officer or another person. Attempt to contact the Pennsylvania Game Commission at (610) 926-3136 or (610) 926-1966.

2. If the above agency is unavailable, and the severities of the injuries are such that the animal should be destroyed for humane reasons, officers will first request the assistance of the SWAT unit, who will be responsible for its destruction.

3. SWAT personnel will do the following:

a. Upon destroying an animal, be responsible for completing the preformatted memorandum and a 75-48.

b. The memorandum and 75-48 will be submitted to the Internal Affairs shooting team within 24 hours of the incident.

c. If the SWAT unit is unavailable, the officer may destroy the deer, but only in the presence and on the orders of a supervisor.

NOTE: Usually one shot between the eyes or behind the ear of the animal should be sufficient to complete the task. However, in the event it becomes necessary for police personnel to destroy any animal suspected of being rabid by use of a firearm, it is preferred that the animal be shot in the body rather than the head. The head needs to be examined by the Philadelphia Department of Public Health.

4. Police radio will notify the Internal Affairs shooting team. The discharging officer and the onscene supervisor will remain on the scene until their arrival. (Exception: when SWAT personnel have performed the task.)

5. Consideration should be given before discharging a weapon to destroy any animal (e.g., the close proximity of people and buildings, type of back stop or ground).

6. The Streets Department will be notified, via police radio, to remove the carcass of deer or other animals found or destroyed by police personnel. Suspected rabid animals that are shot by police will be transported by Animal Care and Control Team (ACCT). Dogs that are shot by police will be transported by ACCT or to ACCT by police personnel. They will not be transferred to any veterinary hospital or private veterinarian even if the animal is still alive.

B. Discharges involving other animals

1. Police officers shall not discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal except to protect themselves or another person from physical injury when there is no other reasonable means to eliminate the threat or when acting consistently with existing department guidelines authorizing the humane destruction of deer. When on location with an injured animal that is not presenting an immediate threat to the officer or another person, every attempt should be made to confine or contain the animal and notify police radio to have them contact the Animal Care and Control Team (ACCT).

2. In all cases where a dog is shot and injured by the police, the animal will be transported directly to ACCT for examination by a veterinarian.

NOTE: Police personnel will not transport an injured dog shot by police to a veterinary hospital unless exigent circumstances exist and upon approval of a supervisor (e.g., ACCT or SPCA is unavailable).

X. Annual review

Research and Planning, in conjunction with Internal Affairs and the Training Division, shall review this directive annually and recommend any updates and changes through the appropriate chain of command to the police commissioner.

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BY COMMAND OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER

*Meets the standards of the Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Accreditation Commission (PLEAC).
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Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly

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Appendix F. PPD directive 22

Note: This appendix has been slightly modified to adhere to COPS Office publication standards.

12-20-10

Subject: Use of force

I. Purpose

A. This directive outlines the proper use of force, particularly in situations involving the use of the baton/ASP, oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray, electronic control weapons (ECW), and other force which may be used by police, as well as the required reporting of incidents in which officers are called upon to use less than deadly force. The use of deadly force is fully covered in directive 10.

II. Policy

A. The primary duty of all police officers is to preserve human life. Only the minimal amount of force necessary to protect life or to effect an arrest should be used by an officer. Excessive force and/or gratuitous use of any force will not be tolerated. Officers should exercise all safe and reasonable means of control and containment, using only the amount of force necessary to overcome resistance. The application of force by a police officer should be guided by principles found in the “force continuum,” which are

• officer presence;
• verbal commands;
• physical control;
• less than lethal force;
• deadly force.

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B. *3 RENDERING MEDICAL AID – After employing any force including lethal or less than lethal weapons, officers shall render appropriate medical aid and request further medical assistance, when necessary, for the suspect and any other injured individuals as soon as it is safe to do so. Any aid provided shall be documented in the appropriate report.

C. Additionally, personnel will not unnecessarily or unreasonably endanger themselves and others in applying these guidelines to actual situations.

D. Though many officers may be at the scene of a police incident where force is being used, some officers may not be directly involved in taking police action. As officers, we have an obligation to protect the public and other officers. Therefore, it shall be the duty of every officer present at any scene where force is being applied to either stop or attempt to stop another officer when force is no longer required. Your actions will protect both the officer from civil or criminal liability and the civilian from serious injury.

E. As outlined in section VI, Use of force notification procedure, the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) must be informed when

1. a person is treated at a hospital (whether or not admitted) or dies while in police custody as the result of actions taken by police;

2. any time a person in police custody is treated at a hospital (e.g., prisoner complaining of chest pains or a prisoner assaulted by another prisoner);

3. any incident involving the use of force where an injury or a complaint of an injury results;

4. whenever a baton/ASP has been used to strike a subject, OC spray has been used by police, or the ECW has been used;

NOTE: Whenever the trigger on the ECW is pulled, it is recorded in the weapon and must be reported to the IAD. Accidental discharges will be reported to the IAD through the notification screen on the police intranet homepage. The use of force report will not be necessary.

5. whenever a subject is delivered a blow or strike with a hand, fist, foot, or other body appendage or other object.

F. The department’s use of force form described within will not be used when officers discharge their firearm. It will be completed, however, when the baton/ASP has been used to strike an individual, OC spray was used on an individual, another object was used to strike (e.g., police vehicle), a canine dog has bitten or been used to physically apprehend an individual, or an ECW has been used.

G. Guidelines set forth in this directive will also pertain to police correctional officers at the Police Detention Unit when appropriate.

III. Utilizing force (general)

A. When responding to any incident which may require the use of force, officers WILL

1. evaluate the situation;

2. immediately establish control of their firearm;

3. when feasible and safe, provide some warning to the individual;

4. illuminate the subject, when possible;

5. if force is necessary, coordinate appropriate tactics with a sufficient number of personnel to safely overcome any resistance;

6. use the minimum force necessary;

7. except when using an ECW, target the preferred or intermediate striking areas identified in section V-B-6.

8. handcuff the individual behind the back, palms out, ensure handcuffs are double-locked, and do so at the earliest possible time to reduce potential resistance;

9. notify a supervisor immediately;

10. ensure that the individual is checked for injuries;

11. take any individual who has been struck on the head or any individual complaining of an injury to the nearest hospital or appropriate trauma center immediately (prepare a complaint or incident Report [75-48] for the hospital case and have the individual sign the 75-48 if treatment is refused; also, note if the individual refuses to sign]. In all cases where the ECW or OC pepper spray is used, the individual will be taken to the hospital;

12. prepare all necessary paperwork as required by department policy;

13. ensure that the investigator assigned is made aware that force had to be used to control or take the individual into custody.

NOTE: A description of the actions of the individual which caused the use of force as well as the officer’s actions should be included by the assigned investigator within the investigation report (75-49). Should injuries occur, they should also be described within the investigation report to include treatment received.

B. When responding to any incident which may require the use of force, officers WILL NOT

1. whenever possible, sit, kneel, or stand on a subject’s back or chest;

2. stand on a subject’s head, face, and/or neck area;

3. offensively kick and/or stomp on a subject;

4. transport an individual in a face down position, especially when handcuffed. This will serve to prevent positional asphyxia that occurs when the position of the subject’s body interferes with his/her ability to breathe. If an individual is having trouble breathing or is demonstrating lifethreatening symptoms, medical assistance will be sought immediately.

IV. Use of OC pepper spray

A. Oleoresin capsicum spray is an inflammatory agent that causes an intense burning sensation of the skin and mucous membranes. It has a near immediate effect on an individual sprayed, though the effects subside after about 30 minutes.

B. If sprayed in the face, the individual’s eyes will close, tear, and swell as a result. The subject may become disoriented and lose their balance. When pepper spray is inhaled, the respiratory tract will become inflamed and temporarily restrict breathing to short, shallow breaths. The subject may experience choking, gagging, or gasping for breath. A burning sensation of the skin may also occur.

C. The use of OC spray is for defense or to assist in effecting an arrest. It may be used to

1. control an aggressively resisting subject such as an involuntary commitment or prevent an escape from arrest;

2. overcome resistance to an arrest;

3. protect an officer or another person from bodily injury;

4. prevent an individual from injuring themselves;

5. prevent a suicide.

D. It is not to be used

1. for the dispersal of non-violent persons;

2. for disorderly crowds;

3. in situations where people are exercising their Constitutional rights of free speech or assembly;

4. at random;

5. as a threat to gain compliance or information.

E. Once an individual has been placed under control, there is no further justification for the continued use of the OC spray.

F. When carrying or utilizing OC spray, officers WILL

1. carry only the departmentally approved OC spray;

2. ensure care is taken to protect infants, children, and the elderly from the spray;

3. deliver the spray directly into the face (eyes, nose, mouth) and, where practical, in two one-half second bursts;

4. be aware of cross-contamination, wind direction, and the presence of fellow officers before utilizing spray;

5. remember that the effective range of the spray is 10–12 feet;

6. safely secure the individual in handcuffs once under control;

7. calm the individual and reassure them that the effects are temporary;

8. expose the subject to fresh air and, if water is available, flush the contaminated areas (to decontaminate a premises indoors, ventilate by opening windows and doors);

9. transport the subject to the nearest hospital and take the spray canister along;

10. continue to monitor the subject during transportation for respiratory distress;

11. if the subject is or becomes unconscious, transport as an emergency hospital case;

12. have subject wash any contaminated areas of the skin with soap and water once arriving at the hospital;

13. when applicable, have subject remove contact lenses and wash same;

NOTE: Serious eye damage can occur if contacts are not removed within 4–6 hours of exposure.

14. prepare a 75-48 for the hospital case and have the individual sign the 75-48 if treatment is refused. Also note if the individual refuses to sign;

15. prepare a use of force report;

16. prepare other necessary paperwork relating to the incident where necessary (i.e., 75-48, 75-49);

17. treat OC spray as a weapon and store in a secure place when not on duty.

G. When carrying or utilizing OC spray, officers WILL NOT

1. spray directly into the eyes at a distance of less than three feet, when possible;

2. spray into the wind or in a confined area;

3. keep spray projectors in vehicles;

4. store where temperatures exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit.

H. Miscellaneous OC spray information

1. All OC spray will be issued by the Firearms Training Unit (FTU).

2. Officers should check the expiration date on each canister. If expired or there is a leak or damage or the canister is empty, report to the FTU for a replacement. A memorandum will be prepared and distributed as outlined in section 4 below.

3. Lost or stolen spray canisters shall be immediately reported on memorandum in triplicate to the pertinent district/unit commanding officer fully explaining the circumstances. A 75-48 and 75-49 will be submitted to the pertinent detective division.

4. The memorandum will be distributed as follows:

a. commanding officer, Firearms Training Unit

b. district/unit file

c. finance unit

5. When the commanding officer determines negligence has occurred, the officer will be subject to disciplinary action and/or required to pay for its replacement.

6. Commanding officers will review and approve the memorandum and permit the officer to obtain a replacement.

7. Upon one’s retirement, OC spray canisters will be turned in to the officer’s commanding officer and sent to the FTU.

V. Use of the police baton/ASP

A. The use of the baton/ASP is for defense and to assist in effecting an arrest. It should not be used as an offensive weapon. It may be needed to

1. block or deflect an attack;

2. counterstrike in self-defense;

3. control an aggressively resisting subject;

4. overcome resistance to an arrest;

5. protect an officer or another person from bodily injury;

6. prevent an individual from injuring themselves;

7. prevent a suicide.

B. When carrying or utilizing the baton/ASP, officers WILL

1. carry the departmentally issued baton, which shall have an overall length of 22–24 inches and a diameter of one and one-quarter inches (1 1/4”) and shall be made of wood or fiberglass or a departmentally issued ASP;

2. carry the baton/ASP whenever leaving the vehicle (uniformed officers and supervisors);

3. carry the baton/ASP in their belt loop on the opposite side of the gun holster;

4. carry the baton/ASP in a non-aggressive (e.g., under arm) manner during vehicle or pedestrian stops, disturbances, crowds, or other potentially dangerous situations;

5. attempt to use alternate forms of control;

6. strike only the following locations of the body when necessary:

Preferred striking areas:

muscle in the legs (thigh and calf ) and arms (forearms and biceps). These areas are most vulnerable to an effective strike;

Intermediate striking areas:

If striking the preferred areas is not possible, or unsafe to the officer, or other officers, the officer should attempt to strike the intermediate areas, which include the elbows, knees, and ankles. These are secondary strike zones, which may cause pain or injury but are not intended to cause permanent damage;

7. immediately notify a supervisor of the use of the baton/ASP;

8. take an injured individual or one complaining of an injury to the nearest hospital or appropriate trauma center immediately (prepare a 75-48 for the hospital case and have the individual sign 75-48 if treatment is refused. Also, note if the individual refuses to sign);

9. prepare a use of force report in all cases where the baton/ASP was used to strike an individual;

10. prepare other necessary paperwork relating to the incident, where necessary (i.e., 75-48, 75-49).

C. When carrying or utilizing the baton/ASP, officers WILL NOT

1. make modifications of, substitutions for, or additions to the issued baton/ASP;

2. intentionally strike the head, face, throat, chest, abdomen, groin, and collarbone of an individual;

3. use more force than is necessary to overcome the resistance;

4. use another object in place of the baton/ASP, unless unusual circumstances preclude the officer from reaching or using the baton/ASP or OC spray. If another object is used, the involved officer will follow the same reporting procedures outlined in this directive and explain why the object was utilized. The use of other objects may be reasonable and necessary.

D. Miscellaneous baton/ASP information

1. Damaged, lost, or stolen baton/ASPs shall be immediately reported on memorandum in triplicate to the pertinent district/unit commanding officer fully explaining the circumstances.

2. When the commanding officer determines negligence has occurred, the officer will be subject to disciplinary action and/or required to pay for its replacement.

3. The memorandum will be distributed as follows:

a. pertinent chief inspector

b. finance unit

c. retain in district/unit file

VI. Assault on police investigations procedures

A. In order to ensure the integrity of assault on police arrests and to protect all police personnel, the guidelines below will be followed. Listed below are investigation guidelines and command oversight for ALL assault on police investigations. They will be in place whether the assault on police is the primary or secondary charge.

B. Supervisor’s responsibilities: a supervisor WILL immediately respond to all assault on police/use of force crime scenes (whether it is the primary or secondary charge).

1. As stated in previous investigation guidelines, the responding supervisor will hold or release the crime scene after conferring with a supervisor from the detective division of occurrence.

2. The supervisor will document all police involved in the assault and/or arrest and supply the names, badge numbers, and patrol car numbers to the detective division. The supervisor will also ensure that all personnel are interviewed by the detective division of occurrence.

3. The supervisor will ensure that all civilian witnesses are documented on the complaint or incident report (75-48) (include all contact information, cell phone numbers, etc.) and will be supplied to the detective division. Transportation to the detective division (for interviews) will also be arranged as needed.

4. The supervisor will observe and document (and supply the information to the detective division) all injuries to police and/or defendants (and ensure that they receive hospital treatment).

5. The supervisor will ensure that all use of force paperwork is prepared and submitted in accordance with this directive.

C. Detective unit responsibilities: a detective unit supervisor WILL be notified immediately whenever an assault on police (use of force) arrest or investigation is received (whether it is the primary or secondary charge). The supervisor WILL

1. confer with the responding supervisor on the street and determine if the crime scene will be held for processing;

2. monitor the investigation, ensuring that all parties (police and civilian) are interviewed by detectives; review the interviews and ensure that any follow-up questions are addressed;

3. ensure that all injuries (police and civilian) are documented and photographed;

4. ensure that all interviews and evidence (photographs, property receipts, etc.) are entered in the PIIN system (as stated in previous guidelines, ALL preliminary discovery is required to be entered in PIIN on any arrest before charges are approved by DACU).

D. BEFORE the arrest is entered in PARS, the detective supervisor WILL notify the detective division commanding officer (during business hours) so that they can review all paperwork involving the arrest. The detective division commanding officer will also review all paperwork on an investigation of an assault on police (no arrest) PRIOR to the detective submitting an affidavit for an arrest warrant.

1. If the arrest occurred during non-business hours, the detective supervisor WILL notify police radio for a Command Inspections Bureau commander to respond and review the arrest paperwork (PRIOR to entry in PARS).

2. If during business hours and the detective division commanding officer is unavailable (vacation, etc.), then the detective division supervisor will notify the following in the listed order:

a. The divisional inspector

b. The available patrol commanding officer located in the divisional headquarters (in the same building as the detective division)

c. A district commanding officer in the division of occurrence (NOT located in the divisional headquarters).

3. The detective supervisor WILL confer with the responding commander on the aspects of the case. DACU will be contacted by phone if guidance is needed in the charging procedure.

4. The detective supervisor will then ensure that the PARS report is submitted (and approved by the supervisor) with the proper charges lodged. The supervisor will ensure that any requested follow-up by DACU is completed immediately and resubmitted for the approval of the PARS.

E. The assigned detective WILL

1. ensure that their supervisor has been notified of the assault on police arrest or investigation (primary or secondary charge);

2. ensure all investigative steps have been taken, including (but not limited to) crime scene processing, retrieval of available video, CCI information and/or radio tapes, etc.;

3. document and photograph all injuries (police and defendants);

4. ensure all persons (police and civilian) involved are interviewed; make interviews available to supervisory and command personnel for their review;

5. attempt to interview the defendant(s) (after advising their Miranda warnings);

6. ensure the complete investigative package is available for review by the supervisor and command personnel and entered into PIIN;

7. ensure PARS is submitted ONLY AFTER the case has been approved by the unit supervisor AND the reviewing commander.

F. Responding commanding officer responsibilities: upon notification of an assault on police arrest, the assigned commander (detective captain, divisional inspector, district captain, or CIB commander) WILL

1. review all arrest and case file paperwork (including interviews);

2. confer with detective supervisor (and DACU if needed) for proper charges; if NO charges are warranted, ensure the suspect(s) are released and the investigative paperwork is updated;

3. the responding commander WILL ensure that an entry is made on the Detective Division Daily Complaint Summary (75-67) and that they list the rank, name, badge number, and unit assigned and review the assault on police arrest (list location of assault, DC# and Detective Control #);

4. ensure that the required use of force forms are completed and submitted and the Internal Affairs Division is notified when required.

VII. Use of force notification procedure

A. Whenever less than lethal force is used by uniform or plainclothes sworn personnel, the following notification process will be implemented:

1. A supervisor will be notified immediately.

2. The supervisor will ensure that only one (1) 75-48 will be prepared describing circumstances of the incident as well as information on the use of force required during that incident. If more than one officer has utilized force during that single incident, only one (1) 75-48 is required, though the names of all involved officers must be included.

3. The supervisor will assign one of the involved officers the responsibility for preparing a complete use of force form (75-632). If more than one officer has used force, he/she will only complete sections of an additional use of force form that pertain to their involvement in the incident, the top line of the report, and the signature block.

NOTE: All reports must be completed before the officer(s) completes his/her tour of duty.

4. Both the assigned lieutenant and the sergeant will be responsible for reviewing and ensuring completeness and accuracy of the use of force form. They will also sign the form.

5. When the use of force results in death or serious life threatening injury, a supervisor will immediately notify his/her commanding officer or Command Inspections Bureau (CIB) commander. That commander will then immediately notify Internal Affairs by phone. Police radio will be notified on the 12-8 tour or on weekends.

6. The operations room supervisor (ORS) will also ensure that the IAB incident notification screen is filled in completely and accurately. (Access the screen through the police intranet home page.)

NOTE: If more than one officer is injured or if more that one defendant has had force used against them as a result of a single incident, separate messages must be sent via the IAB notification screen.

7. When the use of force results in only minor injury or no injury at all, only the IAB notification screen need be completed. No phone call to Internal Affairs from a commander is necessary.

8. In all cases, the ORS will ensure pertinent information is entered on the district/unit daily complaint summary (75-67).

VIII. Distribution of the use of force form

A. When the use of force form(s) (75-623) is completed, copies will be made and distributed as follows:

Original: Internal Affairs Division within five (5) days of incident, where it will be kept for three (3) years.

First copy: District/unit commanding officer’s file, where it will be kept for three (3) years.

Second copy: Commanding officer, Firearms Training Unit (OC pepper spray/ECW use only).

Related procedures

Directive 10, “Discharge of Firearms by Police Personnel”

Directive 111, “Barricaded Persons/Hostage Situations”

Directive 136, “Emotionally Disturbed Persons”

Memorandum 98-01, “Off-Duty Police Actions”

BY COMMAND OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER

FOOTNOTE #

GENERAL #

DATE SENT

REVISIONS

*1 -- 8209 -- 3-18-11 -- ADD SECTION VI

*2 -- 3736 -- 10-27-11 -- ADD APPDX “B”

*3 -- 7102 -- 01-24-12 -- ADDITION

PPD directive 22 appendix A

SUBJECT: USE OF THE ELECTRONIC CONTROL WEAPON (ECW)

I. Purpose

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance and direction on the use of the electronic control weapon (ECW) in the context of the use of force continuum.

II. Policy

It is the policy of the Philadelphia Police Department to use only reasonable and necessary force to overcome the resistance put forth by individuals who are violent, exhibiting threatening behavior, or physically resisting arrest. All ECW training will conform to this policy.

III. Definitions

Arcing: Pulling the trigger to activate an ECW that does not have an air cartridge installed. This may be done while the ECW in contact with a subject (i.e., drive stun mode) or in a non-contact situation such as to test the ECW (i.e., spark test).

Activation or activating: The act of pulling the trigger of an ECW, either intentionally or accidentally, causing it to arc or to discharge probes.

Active aggression: A threat or overt act of an assault (through physical or verbal means), coupled with the present ability to carry out the threat or assault, which reasonably indicates that an assault or injury to any person is imminent.

Active resistance: A subject’s physical actions to defeat an officer’s attempt at control and to avoid being taken into custody. Verbal statements alone do not constitute active resistance.

Air cartridge: Replaceable cartridge for the ECW, which uses compressed nitrogen to fire two barbed probes with thin connecting wires sending a current signal into the subject.

Confetti tags: Small identifying cards expelled from an ECW air cartridge when probes are discharged. Each confetti tag contains a serial number unique to the specific air cartridge used. Confetti tags are also referred to as “anti-felon identification“ (AFID) tags.

Cycle: The time during which electrical impulses are emitted from the ECW following activation. In most ECWs, a standard cycle is five (5) seconds for each trigger pull. The duration of a cycle may be shortened by turning the ECW off. The duration of the cycle may be extended in certain models by continuing to pull the trigger.

Display: Drawing or exhibiting the ECW as part of a warning tactic, typically accompanied by appropriate verbalization.

Drive stun: A secondary function of an ECW. Drive stun is possible when the ECW air cartridge has been expended or removed from the ECW or when the probes are deployed at close range with minimal spread. This action requires pulling the trigger and placing the ECW in direct contact with a subject, causing the electrical energy to directly enter the subject or firing the probes at close range. Drive stun is frequently used as a non-incapacitating compliance technique. It may also be used to incapacitate a subject where at least one probe is attached to he subject’s body and the ECW contact will complete the circuit.

Duration: The aggregate time that the ECW is activated. The duration of activation may differ from the duration of time that a subject is exposed to electrical impulses from an ECW.

Electronic control weapon (ECW): A weapon primarily designed to discharge a chain of small electrical charges into the subject sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle contractions and override the subject’s voluntary motor responses.

Laser painting: The act of unholstering and pointing an ECW at a subject and turning on the ECWs laser aiming dot to show the device is aimed at the subject.

Passive resistance: Physical actions that do not prevent the officer’s attempt to control (e.g., a person who remains in a limp, prone position, passive demonstrators).

Probes: Small projectiles with wires contained in an ECW air cartridge. When the ECW is activated, probes are expelled from the ECW and penetrate the subject’s clothing and/or skin, allowing for the application of the electrical impulse.

Probe mode: The primary setting on an ECW that allows the system’s propulsion system to deploy two small probes that are attached to the ECW by insulated wires at distance up to 25 feet.

Serious bodily injury: Bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

Use of force continuum: A training model or philosophy that supports the progression and reasonable escalation and de-escalation of officer-applied force in proportional response to the action and level of resistance offered by a subject. The level of response is based upon the situation encountered at the scene and the actions of the subject in response to the officer’s commands. Such response may progress from the officer’s physical presence at the scene to the application of deadly force.

IV. Procedure

A. Authorized users, training, and equipment

1. Only those officers/supervisors who have successfully completed the approved, basic ECW training shall be authorized to carry an ECW.

2. To continue carrying an ECW, all personnel initially authorized to carry an ECW must undergo recertification training annually. Any personnel who fail to undergo recertification training and/or qualification shall be prohibited from carrying ECW until such time that recertification training and/or qualification is made.

NOTE: Officers that have successfully completed the crisis intervention training (CIT) will be issued an ECW. These officers are responsible for the safe handling and storage of this equipment while off duty. The protocols of this appendix shall apply equally to any off-duty actions.

3. Other personnel authorized to carry an ECW will be permitted to sign out an ECW at the beginning of the tour and the information will be recorded on the daily complaint summary (75-67).

4. Only departmentally issued ECWs shall be carried by authorized personnel. The use of privately owned ECWs, holsters, or other related equipment is strictly prohibited.

B. Device readiness

1. The ECW shall be carried in an approved holster on the side of the body opposite the service handgun.

2. The ECW shall be carried fully armed with the safety on in preparation for immediate use.

3. The ECW shall be set in “probe mode” as the primary setting option with “drive stun mode” used as a secondary option.

4. Officers/supervisors shall be issued one spare air cartridge as a backup. The spare air cartridge shall be stored and carried in a manner consistent with training and will be replaced consistent with the manufacturer’s expiration requirements.

5. The ECWs energy level shall be checked and a spark test done prior to taking the ECW out on patrol. This is accomplished by first removing the air cartridge, then turning the power switch on, pulling the trigger, then turning the unit off as soon as a spark is seen. A visible spark between the electrodes at the front of the ECW will show the unit is functioning properly. Point the ECW in a safe direction prior to spark test.

***************CAUTION***************

BE SURE TO REMOVE TASER AIR CARTRIDGE PRIOR TO BEGINNING SPARK TEST

6. The battery indicator on the Taser model M26 Taser® may blink or be a steady red, depending on the age of the unit. This indicator in and of itself does not ensure that the components of the ECW are performing properly; it only indicates the unit has power. If there is no red LED visible then return the unit to Firearms Training Unit for evaluation and replacement of batteries if required.

7. The battery indicator on the Taser model X26 Taser® is visible on the central information display. This indicator in and of itself does not guarantee that the components of the Taser are performing properly. When the display indicates less than twenty (20) firings remaining, return the unit to the Firearms Training Unit.

C. Activating the ECW

1. The ECW shall only be activated against persons who are exhibiting active aggression or active resistance in a manner that, in the officer’s judgment, is likely to result in injuries to themselves or others.

2. A warning shall be given to a person prior to activating the ECW unless to do so would place any other person at risk.

3. Personnel should not intentionally simultaneously activate more than one (1) ECW against a person.

4. Personnel may activate an ECW against an aggressive animal, but only if doing will not unnecessarily jeopardize the safety of the officer or civilians present.

5. Whenever an ECW is about to be used, it is the responsibility of the activating officer to make sure other officers on the scene understand that the ECW is being activated by announcing “TASER” several times before being discharging.

6. Personnel should not intentionally target sensitive areas (e.g., head, neck, genitalia).

7. When activating an ECW, personnel should use it for one (1) standard cycle (a standard cycle is five [5] seconds) and should evaluate the situation to determine if subsequent cycles are necessary. Personnel should consider that exposure to multiple activations and continuous cycling and exposure to the ECW longer than fifteen (15) seconds may increase the risk of death or serious injury. Any subsequent activation should be independently justifiable and should be weighed against other force options.

8. To minimize the number of cycles needed to overcome resistance and bring the subject under control, once it is announced that an ECW in being activated, all officers on scene should attempt to secure the subject while incapacitated by ECW power or immediately thereafter. All officers on scene must also be prepared for an ECW to be ineffective and immediately transition to other force options if necessary.

NOTE: In determining the need for additional energy cycles, officers must be aware that an energized subject may not be able to respond to commands during or immediately following exposure.

9. Drive stun is a secondary function of an ECW. Personnel must be aware that using an ECW in drive stun is OFTEN INEFFECTIVE in INCAPACITATING a subject. However, it may be used to effectively incapacitate a subject where at least one probe is attached to the subject’s body and the ECW contact will complete the circuit (i.e., provide the second electrical contact to a subject) by creating uncontrolled muscle contractions and overriding the subject’s voluntary motor responses.

10. The ECW SHALL NOT be used in the following manner:

a. Against a suspect exhibiting passive resistance

b. Against an unarmed suspect attempting to elude capture by fleeing that is wanted for a nonviolent misdemeanor, summary, or traffic offense

c. For the dispersal of nonviolent persons or disorderly crowds or in situations where people are exercising their Constitutional rights of free speech or assembly

d. At random or as a threat to gain compliance or information

e. In any environment where an officer reasonably believes that a flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present, including but not limited to gasoline, natural gas, propane, or alcohol-based oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray

f. Against any elderly/frail persons, young children, or any women who appear pregnant or where officers receive information that the women are or may be pregnant

g. Against a subject when in an elevated position where a fall may cause substantial injury or death

h. Against subjects in physical control of a vehicle in motion to include automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, ATVs, bicycles, and scooters

i. On handcuffed persons unless necessary to prevent the individual from harming themselves or others from serious bodily injury

j. Against a subject where officers receive information that the subject has any heart ailments or conditions or has a pacemaker

D. Post-deployment

1. Following an ECW activation, officers should use a restraint that does not impair respiration.

2. All individuals who are exposed to an ECW activation shall be transported to a medical facility for treatment. If the prongs are attached to the skin of the individual, cut off the wires between the cartridge and the prongs, leaving a twelve (12)-inch lead, prior to transportation. The ECW prongs should be treated as a biohazard risk.

3. If not incapacitated, the officer/supervisor firing the device will accompany the victim to the hospital. Prepare a separate 75-48 for the hospital case. Retrieve two (2) prongs from the hospital and place them inside cartridge holes and tape over and note: “Prongs are included.” The cartridge and prongs will be placed on a property receipt and submitted as evidence.

4. If possible, the confetti tags will be recovered and also placed on the property receipt.

5. Detectives will ensure that the area affected by the ECW is photographed. The use of the ECW will be noted on the investigation report (75-49).

E. Reporting/notifications

1. Any officer/supervisor that activates an ECW either intentionally or accidentally shall notify police radio and complete a use of force report (75-632). Police radio will dispatch a supervisor of the next highest rank to the scene.

2. The responding supervisor shall conduct an initial review of the ECW activation and ensure a use of force report is completed for both intentional and accidental activations.

3. After medical treatment, if the suspect is being arrested, the activating officer/supervisor shall ensure that the ORS is notified that the suspect was exposed to an ECW activation. This information will be inserted into the detainee medical checklist. In the event the activating officer/supervisor is incapacitated, the responding supervisor shall ensure the proper notification is made to the ORS and on the detainee medical checklist. The ORS shall monitor suspects who have been exposed to an ECW activation every fifteen (15) minutes for any possible medical emergencies.

4. After medical treatment, if an individual is exposed to an ECW activation and transported to a crisis response center (CRC), the activating officer/supervisor shall notify a CRC supervisor that the individual was exposed to an ECW activation. The name of the supervisor and the time of notification will be inserted on the use of force report. In the event the activating officer/ supervisor is incapacitated, the responding supervisor shall ensure the proper notification is made and the information is inserted into the use of force report.

5. Any officer/supervisor that activates an ECW either intentionally or accidentally shall report to the range no more than five (5) days after the incident for a replacement air cartridge and for range personnel to download the ECW’s data.

F. Investigations

1. All use of force reports involving the activation of an ECW shall be reviewed by Internal Affairs.

2. Internal Affairs shall initiate an internal investigation when any of the following factors are involved:

a. A person experiences death or serious bodily injury.

b. A person experiences prolonged ECW activation (longer than fifteen seconds).

c. The ECW appears to have been used in a punitive or abusive manner.

d. There appears to be a substantial deviation from training.

e. A person in an at-risk category has been exposed to an ECW activation (i.e., elderly/frail persons, young children, or any women who appear pregnant or where officers receive information that the women are or may be pregnant).

3. Every ECW-related force investigation initiated under section F-2 above should include

a. date, time and location of incident;

b. whether the use of display, laser painting and/or arcing where attempted to gain compliance of the subject;

c. identifying and descriptive information and investigative statements of the subject (including whether the subject was a an elderly/frail person, young child, or a woman who appeared pregnant or where officers received in/information that she was or may have been pregnant the time of the activation), all personnel firing ECWs, all witnesses, including the location of where all interviews (police and civilian) were taken;

d. the type and brand of ECW used;

e. the number of ECW activations, the duration of each cycle, the duration between activations, and (as best as can be determined) the duration that the subject received applications;

f. level of aggression encountered;

g. any weapons possessed by the subject;

h. the type of crime/incident the subject was involved in;

i. determination of whether deadly force would have been justified;

j. the type of clothing worn by the subject;

k. the range at which the ECW was used;

l. the type of mode used (probe or drive stun);

m. the point of impact on the subject in probe mode;

n. the point of impact in drive stun mode;

o. location of missed probes;

p. collection of ECW cartridges, probes, data downloads, any available video, and confetti tags;

q. the type of cartridge used;

r. photographs of cartridge/probes;

s. terrain and weather conditions during ECW use;

t. lighting conditions;

u. suspicion that subject was under the influence or drugs or alcohol;

v. medical care provided to the subject;

w. any injuries incurred by personnel or the subject;

x. forensic quality photographs (including a ruler to show distances) of subject and officer injuries.

4. When reviewing downloaded ECW data, supervisors and investigators should be aware that the total time of discharge registered on the ECW may not reflect the actual duration of ECW activation on a subject.

G. Auditing

1. All department ECWs will be subjected to periodic and random data downloading by Internal Affairs. The data obtained will be reconciled with existing use of force reports to ensure accountability between the cycles recorded and those documented in such reports and occurring in pre-shift testing.

2. Periodic and random audits shall be conducted to ensure all officers/supervisors who carry ECWs have attended initial and recertification training.

H. Lost or stolen ECWs

1. Lost or stolen ECWs and/or air cartridges shall be immediately reported on a memorandum to the pertinent district/unit commanding officer fully explaining the circumstance. The memorandum, 75-48, and 75-49 will be submitted to the commanding officer, Firearms Training Unit and to police finance.

2. After the commanding officer reviews and signs the memorandum, the officer/supervisor will report to the Police Academy, Firearms Training Unit, with a copy of the memorandum and the investigation report (75-49) to obtain a replacement device for a lost/stolen ECW. Between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., report to the Police Academy, Canine Unit, for issuance of a replacement device.

3. The Canine Unit will notify the Firearms Training Unit of all such transactions on the next business day.

4. When the commanding officer determines negligence has occurred, the officer/supervisor will be subject to disciplinary action and/or required to pay for its replacement.

I. Revocation of certification/privilege to carry an ECW: the issuance and authority to carry an ECW is a privilege granted to specially trained officers/supervisors and is not to be construed as standard issued equipment. As such, the department reserves the right to revoke this privilege. Any such revocation shall not be construed to prevent or limit the department from invoking any disciplinary charges, penalties or other remedies available.

BY COMMAND OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER

PPD directive 22 appendix B

SUBJECT: USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD

I. Policy

A. Strict standards in the normal application of force by police personnel are necessary to provide guidance and to safeguard the public from unnecessary or unreasonable force. However, police personnel may be confronted with circumstances that were unknown or unanticipated when departmental standards were developed. Such circumstances may require extraordinary and unanticipated actions to be taken to protect police personnel or others, including suspects, from imminent serious bodily injury or death. In these extraordinary situations, written policies alone are often insufficient to properly evaluate the appropriateness or reasonableness of police personnel’s actions.

B. To fairly review these cases, maintain departmental integrity, and ensure the public is properly protected, the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) will function as both an investigative and an administrative tool to objectively review the appropriateness or reasonableness of force used in those extraordinary cases that could not have been reasonably foreseen when creating a written policy.

C. Only those cases where it appears extraordinary and unanticipated actions were required to protect police personnel or others including suspects, from imminent serious bodily injury or death will be referred to the UFRB. These cases will be referred by the deputy commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility; however, the police commissioner or any deputy commissioner may also refer cases to the UFRB for review.

D. The UFRB will be composed of

1. designated deputy commissioner, who will act as chairperson;

2. deputy commissioner, Major Investigations;

3. deputy commissioner, Office of Professional Responsibility;

4. chief inspector, Training and Education Services Bureau.

II. Procedure

A. In those nondeadly use of force cases referred to the UFRB, no final determination regarding the appropriateness or reasonableness of the force used will be made by Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs shall attach its recommendations, but the UFRB shall review the totality of the circumstances and issue a determination of whether the force deployed was appropriate or objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

B. The chairperson of the UFRB will receive and distribute to all members copies of all Internal Affairs use of force investigations and investigative reports relating to cases referred to the UFRB.

C. The chairperson will convene the UFRB for the purpose of reviewing the investigative reports on each case. The UFRB shall have access to the entire investigative file, attachments, assigned investigators, and any witnesses necessary to complete a thorough review.

D. The decision regarding each incident shall be made by a majority vote of the UFRB.

1. If the review indicates that the officer’s actions were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, the review will be terminated and the case will be marked “Exonerated—Use of Force within Departmental Policy or Objectively Reasonable under Extraordinary Circumstances.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing.

2. If the review indicates that the officer’s actions were not in accordance with departmental policy or deemed unreasonable, unnecessary or excessive even under extraordinary circumstances, the case will be marked as “Sustained—Not within Departmental Policy or Objectively Reasonable under Extraordinary Circumstances.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing and recommend a full hearing before the Police Board of Inquiry.

3. If the review indicates that further information is required, the chairperson will schedule a hearing and summons the involved officer(s) and any witnesses necessary to enable the board to complete its review.

a. If the board determines as a result of the hearing that the officer’s actions were in accordance with departmental policy or objectively reasonable under extraordinary circumstances, the review will be terminated and the case will be marked “Exonerated— Use of Force within Departmental Policy or Objectively Reasonable under Extraordinary Circumstances.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing.

b. If the board determines as a result of the hearing that the officer’s actions were not in accordance with departmental policy or deemed unreasonable, unnecessary or excessive even under extraordinary circumstances, the case will be marked as “Sustained—Not within Departmental Policy or Objectively Reasonable under Extraordinary Circumstances.” The chairperson will notify the police commissioner in writing and recommend a full hearing before the Police Board of Inquiry.

4. The UFRB shall have the authority to make final determinations on any other departmental violations cited by Internal Affairs in cases reviewed by the UFRB. The findings of the board will in no way be determinative of the final disposition of any hearing before the Police Board of Inquiry.

5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abridge, restrict, or otherwise limit the police commissioner’s final authority relating to discipline in these matters, including the right to override the decision of the Use of Force Review Board.

BY COMMAND OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER
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