This formula expresses not only the psychological self but also the dogmatic figure of Christ. As an historical personage Christ is unitemporal and unique; as God, universal and eternal. Likewise the self: as the essence of individuality it is unitemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God-image and therefore universal and eternal. [77] Now if theology describes Christ as simply "good" and "spiritual," something "evil" and "material" -- or "chthonic" -- is bound to arise on the other side, to represent the Antichrist. The resultant quaternion of opposites is united on the psychological plane by the fact that the self is not deemed exclusively "good" and "spiritual"; consequently its shadow turns out to be much less black. A further result is that the opposites of "good" and "spiritual" need no longer be separated from the whole:
This quaternio characterizes the psychological self. Being a totality, it must by definition include the light and dark aspects, in the same way that the self embraces both masculine and feminine and is therefore symbolized by the marriage quaternio. [78] This last is by no means a new discovery, since according to Hippolytus it was known to the Naassenes. [79] Hence individuation is a "mysterium coniunctionis," the self being experienced as a nuptial union of opposite halves [80] and depicted as a composite whole in mandalas that are drawn spontaneously by patients.
It was known, and stated, very early that the man Jesus, the son of Mary, was the principium individuationis. Thus Basilides [81] is reported by Hippolytus as saying: "Now Jesus became the first sacrifice in the discrimination of the natures [], and the Passion came to pass for no other reason than the discrimination of composite things. For in this manner, he says, the sonship that had been left behind in a formless state [] ... needed separating into its components [], in the same way that Jesus was separated." [82] According to the rather complicated teachings of Basilides, the "non-existent" God begot a threefold sonship (). The first "son," whose nature was the finest and most subtle, remained up above with the Father. The second son, having a grosser () nature, descended a bit lower, but received "some such wing as that with which Plato ... equips the soul in his Phaedrus." [83] The third son, as his nature needed purifying (), fell deepest into "formlessness." This third "sonship" is obviously the grossest and heaviest because of its impurity. In these three emanations or manifestations of the non-existent God it is not hard to see the trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body ( ). Spirit is the finest and highest; soul, as the ligamentum spiritus et corporis, is grosser than spirit, but has "the wings of an eagle," [84] so that it may lift its heaviness up to the higher regions. Both are of a "subtle" nature and dwell, like the ether and the eagle. in or near the region of light. whereas the body, being heavy, dark, and impure, is deprived of the light but nevertheless contains the divine seed of the third sonship, though still unconscious and formless. This seed is as it were awakened by Jesus, purified and made capable of ascension (), [85] by virtue of the fact that the opposites were separated in Jesus through the Passion (i.e., through his division into four). [86] Jesus is thus the prototype for the awakening of the third sonship slumbering in the darkness of humanity. He is the "spiritual inner man." [87] He is also a complete trichotomy in himself, for Jesus the son of Mary represents the incarnate man, but his immediate predecessor is the second Christ, the son of the highest archon of the hebdomad, and his first prefiguration is Christ the son of the highest archon of the ogdoad, the demiurge Yahweh. [88] This trichotomy of Anthropos figures corresponds exactly to the three sonships of the non-existing God and to the division of human nature into three parts. We have therefore three trichotomies:
I. First sonship Second sonship Third sonship
II. Christ of the Ogdoad Christ of the Hebdomad Jesus the Son of Mary
III. Spirit Soul Body
It is in the sphere of the dark, heavy body that we must look for the , the "formlessness" wherein the third sonship lies hidden. As suggested above, this formlessness seems to be practically the equivalent of "unconsciousness." G. Quispel has drawn attention to the concepts of in Epiphanius [89] and in Hippolytus, [90] which are best translated by "unconscious." , and all refer to the initial state of things, to the potentiality of unconscious contents, aptly formulated by Basilides as (the non-existent, many-formed, and all-empowering seed of the world). [91]
This picture of the third sonship has certain analogies with the medieval filius philosophorum and the filius macrocosmi, who also symbolize the world-soul slumbering in matter. [92] Even with Basilides the body acquires a special and unexpected significance, since in it and its materiality is lodged a third of the revealed Godhead. This means nothing less than that matter is predicated as having considerable numinosity in itself, and I see this as an anticipation of the "mystic" significance which matter subsequently assumed in alchemy and -- later on -- in natural science. From a psychological point of view it is particularly important that Jesus corresponds to the third sonship and is the prototype of the "awakener" because the opposites were separated in him through the Passion and so became conscious, whereas in the third sonship itself they remain unconscious so long as the latter is formless and undifferentiated. This amounts to saying that in unconscious humanity there is a latent seed that corresponds to the prototype Jesus. Just as the man Jesus became conscious only through the light that emanated from the higher Christ and separated the natures in him, so the seed in unconscious humanity is awakened by the light emanating from Jesus, and is thereby impelled to a similar discrimination of opposites. This view is entirely in accord with the psychological fact that the archetypal image of the self has been shown to occur in dreams even when no such conceptions exist in the conscious mind of the dreamer. [93]
***
I would not like to end this chapter without a few final remarks that are forced on me by the importance of the material we have been discussing. The standpoint of a psychology whose subject is the phenomenology of the psyche is evidently something that is not easy to grasp and is very often misunderstood. If, therefore, at the risk of repeating myself, I come back to fundamentals, I do so only in order to forestall certain wrong impressions which might be occasioned by what I have said, and to spare my reader unnecessary difficulties.
The parallel I have drawn here between Christ and the self is not to be taken as anything more than a psychological one, just as the parallel with the fish is mythological. There is no question of any intrusion into the sphere of metaphysics, i.e., of faith. The images of God and Christ which man's religious fantasy projects cannot avoid being anthropomorphic and are admitted to be so; hence they are capable of psychological elucidation like any other symbols. Just as the ancients believed that they had said something important about Christ with their fish symbol, so it seemed to the alchemists that their parallel with the stone served to illuminate and deepen the meaning of the Christ-image. In the course of time, the fish symbolism disappeared completely, and so likewise did the lapis philosophorum. Concerning this latter symbol, however, there are plenty of statements to be found which show it in a special light -- views and ideas which attach such importance to the stone that one begins to wonder whether, in the end, it was Christ who was taken as a symbol of the stone rather than the other way round. This marks a development which -- with the help of certain ideas in the epistles of John and Paul -- includes Christ in the realm of immediate inner experience and makes him appear as the figure of the total man. It also links up directly with the psychological evidence for the existence of an archetypal content possessing all those qualities which are characteristic of the Christ-image in its archaic and medieval forms. Modern psychology is therefore confronted with a question very like the one that faced the alchemists: Is the self a symbol of Christ, or is Christ a symbol of the self?
In the present study I have affirmed the latter alternative. I have tried to show how the traditional Christ-image concentrates upon itself the characteristics of an archetype -- the archetype of the self. My aim and method do not purport to be anything more in principle than, shall we say, the efforts of an art historian to trace the various influences which have contributed towards the formation of a particular Christ-image. Thus we find the concept of the archetype in the history of art as well as in philology and textual criticism. The psychological archetype differs from its parallels in other fields only in one respect: it refers to a living and ubiquitous psychic fact, and this naturally shows the whole situation in a rather different light. One is then tempted to attach greater importance to the immediate and living presence of the archetype than to the idea of the historical Christ. As I have said, there is among certain of the alchemists, too, a tendency to give the lapis priority over Christ. Since I am far from cherishing any missionary intentions, I must expressly emphasize that I am not concerned here with confessions of faith but with proven scientific facts. If one inclines to regard the archetype of the self as the real agent and hence takes Christ as a symbol of the self, one must bear in mind that there is a considerable difference between perfection and completeness. The Christ-image is as good as perfect (at least it is meant to be so), while the archetype (so far as known) denotes completeness but is far from being perfect. It is a paradox, a statement about something indescribable and transcendental. Accordingly the realization of the self, which would logically follow from a recognition of its supremacy, leads to a fundamental conflict, to a real suspension between opposites (reminiscent of the crucified Christ hanging between two thieves), and to an approximate state of wholeness that lacks perfection. To strive after teleiosis in the sense of perfection is not only legitimate but is inborn in man as a peculiarity which provides civilization with one of its strongest roots. This striving is so powerful, even, that it can turn into a passion that draws everything into its service. Natural as it is to seek perfection in one way or another, the archetype fulfils itself in completeness, and this is a of quite another kind. Where the archetype predominates, completeness is forced upon us against all our conscious strivings, in accordance with the archaic nature of the archetype. The individual may strive after perfection ("Be you therefore perfect -- -- as also your heavenly Father is perfect." [94]) but must suffer from the opposite of his intentions for the sake of his completeness. "I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me." [95]
The Christ-image fully corresponds to this situation: Christ is the perfect man who is crucified. One could hardly think of a truer picture of the goal of ethical endeavour. At any rate the transcendental idea of the self that serves psychology as a working hypothesis can never match that image because, although it is a symbol, it lacks the character of a revelatory historical event. Like the related ideas of atman and tao in the East, the idea of the self is at least in part a product of cognition, grounded neither on faith nor on metaphysical speculation but on the experience that under ceitain conditions the unconscious spontaneously brings forth an archetypal symbol of wholeness. From this we must conclude that some such archetype occurs universally and is endowed with a certain numinosity. And there is in fact any amount of historical evidence as well as modern case material to prove this. [96] These naive and completely uninfluenced pictorial representations of the symbol show that it is given central and supreme importance precisely because it stands for the conjunction of opposites. Naturally the conjunction can only be understood as a paradox, since a union of opposites can be thought of only as their annihilation. Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations because it alone gives adequate expression to their indescribable nature.
Whenever the archetype of the self predominates, the inevitable psychological consequence is a state of conflict vividly exemplified by the Christian symbol of crucifixion -- that acute state of unredeemedness which comes to an end only with the words "consummatum est." Recognition of the archetype, therefore, does not in any way circumvent the Christian mystery; rather, it forcibly creates the psychological preconditions without which "redemption" would appear meaningless. "Redemption" does not mean that a burden is taken from one's shoulders which one was never meant to bear. Only the "complete" person knows how unbearable man is to himself. So far as I can see, no relevant objection could be raised from the Christian point of view against anyone accepting the task of individuation imposed on us by nature, and the recognition of our wholeness or completeness, as a binding personal commitment. If he does this consciously and intentionally, he avoids all the unhappy consequences of repressed individuation. In other words, if he voluntarily takes the burden of completeness on himself, he need not find it "happening" to him against his will in a negative form. This is as much as to say that anyone who is destined to descend into a deep pit had better set about it with all the necessary precautions rather than risk falling into the hole backwards.
The irreconcilable nature of the opposites in Christian psychology is due to their moral accentuation. This accentuation seems natural to us, although, looked at historically, it is a legacy from the Old Testament with its emphasis on righteousness in the eyes of the law. Such an influence is notably lacking in the East, in the philosophical religions of India and China. Without stopping to discuss the question of whether this exacerbation of the opposites, much as it increases suffering, may not after all correspond to a higher degree of truth, I should like merely to express the hope that the present world situation may be looked upon in the light of the psychological rule alluded to above. Today humanity, as never before, is split into two apparently irreconcilable halves. The psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate. That is to say, when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must perforce act out the conflict and be torn into opposing halves.
_______________
Notes:
1. I John 2 : 22 (DV).
2. I John 4 : 3 (DV). The traditional view of the Church is based on II Thessalonians 2: 3ff., which speaks of the apostasy, of the (man of lawlessness) and the (son of perdition) who herald the coming of the Lord. This "lawless one" will set himself up in the place of God, but will finally be slain by the Lord Jesus "with the breath of his mouth." He will work wonders (according to the working of Satan). Above all, he will reveal himself by his lying and deceitfulness. Daniel 11 : 36ff. is regarded as a prototype.
3. For "city" cf. Psychology and Alchemy, pp. 104ff.
4. (The kingdom of God is within you [or "among you"]). "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say. Lo here! or, lo there'" for it is within and everywhere. (Luke 17: 20f.) "It is not of this [external] world:' (John 18: 36.) The likeness of the kingdom of God to man is explicitly stated in the parable of the sower (Matthew 13: 24. Cf. also Matthew 13: 45, 18: 23, 22: 2). The papyrus fragments from Oxyrhynchus say: ... . (The kingdom of heaven is within you, and whosoever knoweth himself shall find it. Know yourselves.) Cf. James, The Apocryphal New Testament, p. 26, and Grenfell and Hunt, New Sayings of Jesus, p. 15.
5. Cf. my observations on Christ as archetype in "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity," pars. 226ff.
6. "Et haec ergo imago censenda est Dei in homine, quod eosdem motus et sensus habeat humanus animus, quos et Deus, licet non tales quales Deus" (Adv. Marcion., n, xvi; in Migne, P.L., vol. 2, col. 304).
7. Contra Celsum, VIII, 49 (Migne, P.G., vol. 11, col. 1590): "In anima, non in corpore impressus sit imaginis conditoris character" (The character of the image of the Creator is imprinted on the soul, not on the body). (Cf. trans. by H. Chadwick, p. 488.)
8. In Lucam homilia, VIII (Migne, P.G., vol. 13, col. 1820): "Si considerem Domi- num Salvatorem imaginem esse invisibilis Dei, et videam animam meam factam ad imaginem conditoris, ut imago esset imaginis: neque enim anima mea specialiter imago est Dei, sed ad similitudinem imaginis prioris effecta est" (If I consider that the Lord and Saviour is the image of the invisible God, I see that my soul is made after the image of the Creator, so as to be an image of an image; for my soul is not directly the image of God, but is made after the likeness of the former image).
9. De principiis, I. ii, 8 (Migne, P.G., vol. 11, col. 156): "Salvator figura est substantiae vel subsistentiae Dei" (The Saviour is the figure of the substance or subsistence of God). In Genesim homilia, I, 13 (Migne, P.G., vol. 12. col. 156): "Quae est ergo alia imago Dei ad cuius imaginis similitudinem factus est homo, nisi Salvator noster, qui est primogenitus omnis creaturae?" (What else therefore is the image of God after the likeness of which image man was made, but our Saviour, who is the first born of every creature?) Selecta in Genesim, IX, 6 (Migne, P.G., vol. 12, col. 107): "Imago autem Dei invisibilis salvator" (But the image of the invisible God is the saviour).
10. In Gen. hom., I, 13 (Migne, P.G., vol. 12, col. 155): "Is autem qui ad imaginem Dei factus est et ad similitudinem, interior homo noster est, invisibilis et incorporalis, et incorruptus atque immortalis" (But that which is made after the image and similitude of God is our inner man, invisible, incorporeal, incorrupt, and immortal).
11. De princip., IV, 117 (Migne, P.G., vol. 11, col. 412).
12. Retractationes, I, xxvi (Migne, P.L., vol. 32, col. 626): "(Unigenitus) ... tantummodo imago est, non ad imaginem" (The Only-Begotten ... alone is the image, not after the image).
13. Enarrationes in Psalmos, XLVIII, Sermo II (Migne. P.L., vol. 36, col. 564): "Imago Dei intus est, non est in corpore ... ubi est intellectus, ubi est mens, ubi ratio investigandae veritatis etc. ibi habet Deus imaginem suam," Also ibid., Psalm XLII, 6 (Migne, P.L., vol. 36, col. 480): "Ergo intelligimus habere nos aliquid ubi imago Dei est. mentem scilicet atque rationem" (Therefore we understand that we have something in which the image of God is, namely mind and reason). Sermo XC, 10 (Migne, P.L., vol. 38, col. 566): "Veritas quaeritur in Dei imagine" (Truth is sought in the image of God), but against this the Liber de vera religione says: "in interiore homine habitat veritas" (truth dwells in the inner man). From this it is clear that the imago Dei coincides with the interior homo.
14. Enarr. in Ps., LIV, 3 (Migne, P.L., vol. 36, col. 629): " ... ubi autem homo ad imaginem Dei factum se novit, ibi aliquid in se agnoscit amplius esse quam datum est pecoribus."
15. I Cor. 15: 47.
16. In Joannis Evangelium, Tract. LXXVIII, 3 (Migne, P.L., vol. 35, col. 1836): "Christus est Deus, anima rationalis et caro" (Christ is God, a rational soul and a body).
17. Sermo CCXXXVII, 4 (Migne, P.L., vol. 38, col. 1124): "(Verbum) suscepit totum quasi plenum hominem, animam et corpus hominis. Et si aliquid scrupulosius vis audire; quia an imam et camem habet et pecus, cum dico animam humanam et carnem humanam, totam animam humanam accepit."
18. Enarr. in Ps., LIV, 1 (Migne, P.L., vol. 36, col. 628).
19. Contra Faustum, XXII, 38 (Migne, P.L., vol. 42, col. 424): "Est enim et sancta Ecclesia Domino Jesu Christo in occulto uxor. Occulte quippe atque intus in abscondito secreto spirituali anima humana inhaeret Verbo Dei, ut sint duo in carne una." Cf. St. Augustine's Reply to Faustus the Manichaean (trans. by Richard Stothert, p. 433): "The holy Church, too, is in secret the spouse of the Lord Jesus Christ. For it is secretly, and in the hidden depths of the spirit, that the soul of man is joined to the word of God, so that they are two in one flesh." St. Augustine is referring here to Eph. 5: 3If.: "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the Church."
20. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, 22 (Migne, P.L., vol. 42, col. 1053): "Reforma mini in novitate mentis vostrae, ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari, a quo formata est" (Be reformed in the newness of your mind; the beginning of the image's reforming must come from him who first formed it) (trans. by John Burnaby, p. 120).
21. Cf. "Concerning Mandala Symbolism," in Part I of vol. 9.
22. Psychology and Alchemy, pars. 323ff.
23. Irenaeus (Adversus haereses, II. 5, I) records the Gnostic teaching that when Christ, as the demiurgic Logos, created his mother's being, he "cast her out of the Pleroma -- that is, he cut her off from knowledge." For creation took place outside the pleroma, in the shadow and the void. According to Valentinus (Adv. haer., I. 11, 1). Christ did not spring from the Aeons of the pleroma. but from the mother who was outside It. She bore him. he says, "not without a kind of shadow." But he, "being masculine,' cast off the shadow from himself and returned to the Pleroma , while his mother, "being left behind in the shadow, and deprived of spiritual substance, ' there gave birth to the real "Demiurge and Pantokrator of the lower world.' But the shadow which lies over the world is, as we know from the Gospels, the princeps huius mundi, the devil. Cf. The Writings of Irenaeus, I, pp. 45f.
24. Cf. R. Scharf, "Die Gestalt des Satans im Alten Testament."
25. "The Spirit Mercurius," par. 271.
26. Jewish Christians who formed a Gnostic-syncretistic party.
27. A Gnostic sect mentioned in Epiphanius, Panarium adversus octoginta haereses, LXXX, 1-3, and in Michael Psellus, De daemonibus (in Marsilius Ficinus, Auctores Platonici [Iambichus de mysteriis Aegyptiorum), Venice, 1497).
28. "Oportuit autem ut alter illorum extremorum isque optimus appellaretur Dei filius propter suam excellentiam; alter vero ipsi ex diametro oppositus, mali daemonis, Satanae diabolique filius diceretur" (But it is fitting that one of these two extremes, and that the best, should be called the Son of God because of his excel- lence, and the other, diametrically opposed to him, the son of the evil demon, of Satan and the devil) (Origen, Contra Celsum, VI. 45; in Migne. P.G., vol. 11, col. 1367; cf. trans. by Chadwick. p. 562). The opposites even condition one another: "Ubi quid malum est ... ibi necessario bonum esse malo contrarium .... Alterum ex altero sequitur: proinde aut utrumque tollendum est negandumque bona et mala esse; aut admisso altero maximeque malo, bonum quoque admissum oportet." (Where there is evil ... there must needs be good contrary to the evil. ... The one follows from the other; hence we must either do away with both, and deny that good and evil exist, or if we admit the one, and particularly evil. we must also admit the good.) (Contra Celsum, II, 51; in Migne, P.G., vol. 11, col. 878; cf. trans. by Chadwick, p. 106.) In contrast to this clear, logical statement Origen cannot help asserting elsewhere that the "Powers, Thrones, and Principalities" down to the evil spirits and impure demons "do not have it -- the contrary virtue -- substantially" ("non substantialiter id habeant scl. virtus adversaria''), and that they were not created evil but chose the condition of wickedness ("malitiae grad us") of their own free will. (De principiis, I, VIII, 4; in Migne, P.G., vol. II, col. 179.) Origen is already committed, at least by implication, to the definition of God as the Summum Bonum, and hence betrays the inclination to deprive evil of substance. He comes very close to the Augustinian conception of the privatio boni when he says: "Certum namque est malum esse bono carere" (For it is certain that to be evil means to be deprived of good). But this sentence is immediately preceded by the following: "Recedere autem a bono, non aliud est quam effici in malo" (To turn aside from good is nothing other than to be perfected in evil) (De principiis, II, IX, 2; in Migne, P.G., vol. II, cols. 226-27). This shows clearly that an increase in the one means a diminution of the other, so that good and evil represent equivalent halves of an opposition.
29. Adv. haer., II, 4, 3.
30. Oratio ad Graecos (Migne, P.G., vol. 6, col. 829).
31. Migne, P.G., vol. 6, col. 1080.
32. Basil thought that the darkness of the world came from. the shadow cast by the body of heaven. Hexaemeron, II, 5 (Migne, P.G., vol. 29, col. 40).
33. Homilia: Quod Deus non est auctor malorum (Migne, P.G., vol. 31, cot 341).
34. De spiritu sancto (Migne, P.G., vol. 29, col. 37). Cf. Nine Homilies of the Hexaemeron, trans. by Blomfield Jackson, pp. 61f.
35. Migne, P.G., vol. 18, cols. 1132f.
36. Responsiones ad orthodoxas (Migne, P.G., vol. 6, cols. 1313-14).
37. Migne, P.G., vol. 11, cols. 716-18. Cf. the Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, trans. by John Parker, I, pp. 53ff.
38. "Nunc vero ideo sunt omnia bona, quia sunt aliis alia meliora, et bonitas inferiorum add it laudibus meliorum .... Ea vero quae dicuntur mala, aut vitia sunt rerum bonarum, quae omnino extra res bonas per se ipsa alicubi esse non possunt. ... Sed ipsa quoque vitia testimonium perhibent bonitati naturarum. Quod enim malum est per viti urn, profecto bonum est per naturam. Vitium quippe contra naturam est, quia naturae nocet; nec noceret, nisi bonum eius minueret. Non est ergo malum nisi privatio boni. Ac per hoc nusquam est nisi in re aliqua bona .... Ac per hoc bona sine mal is esse possunt, sicut ipse Deus, et quaeque superiora coelestia; mala vero sine bonis esse non possunt. Si enim nihil nocent, mala non sunt; si autem nocent, bonum minuunt; et si amplius nocent, habent adhuc bonum quod minuant; et si to turn consumunt, nihil naturae remanebit qui noceatur; ac per hoc nec malum erit a quo noceatur, quando natura defuerit, cuius bonum nocendo minuatur." (Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, I, 4f.; in Migne, P.L., vol. 42, cols. 606-7.) Although the Dialogus Quaestionum LXV is not an authentic writing of Augustine's, it reflects his standpoint very clearly. Quaest. XVI: "Cum Deus omnia bona creaverit, nihilque sit quod non ab ilIo conditum sit, unde malum? Resp. Malum natura non est; sed privatio boni hoc nomen accepit. Denique bonum potest esse sine malo, sed malum non potest esse sine bono, nec potest esse malum ubi non fuerit bonum .... Ideoque quando didmus bonum, naturam laudamus; quando didmus malum, non naturam sed vitium, quod est bonae naturae contrarium reprehendimus," (Question XVI: Since God created all things good and there is nothing which was not created by him, whence arises evil? Answer: Evil is not a natural thing, it is rather the name given to the privation of good. Thus there can be good without evil, but there cannot be evil without good, nor can there be evil where there is no good .... Therefore, when we call a thing good, we praise its inherent nature; when we call a thing evil, we blame not its nature, but some defect in it contrary to its nature, which is good.)
39. "Iniquity has no substance" (CCXXVIII). "There is a nature in which there is no evil -- in which, indeed, there can be no evil. But it is impossible for a nature to exist in which there is no good" (CLX).
40. Augustini Opera omnia, Maurist edn., X, Part 2, cols. 2561-2618.
41. Sermones supposititii, Sermo I, 3, Maurist edn., V, col. 2287.
42. Summa theologica, I, q. 48, ad 1 (trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, II, p. 264).
43. Ibid., I, q. 48, ad 3 (trans., p. 268).
44. "... Quod autem conveniens est alicui est illi bonum. Ergo omne agens agit propter bonum" (Summa contra Gentiles, III, ch. 3, trans. by the English Dominican Fathers, vol. III, p. 7).
45. Summa theologica, I, q. 48, ad 2 (trans., II, p. 266, citing Aristotle's Topics, iii, 4).
46. In the Decrees of the 4th Lateran Council we read: "For the devil and the other demons as created by God were naturally good, but became evil of their own motion." Denzinger and Bannwart. Enchiridion symbolorum, p. 189.
47. Harnack (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, p. 332) ascribes the Clementine Homilies to the beginning of the 4th cent. and is of the opinion that they contain "no source that could be attributed with any certainty to the 2nd century." He thinks that Islam is far superior to this theology. Yahweh and Allah are unreflected God-images, whereas in the Clementine Homilies there is a psychological and reflective spirit at work. It is not immediately evident why this should bring about a disintegration of the God-concept, as Harnack thinks. Fear of psychology should not be carried too far.
48. Der Dialog des Adamantius, III, 4 (ed. by van de Sande Bakhuyzen, p. 119).
49. The female or somatic triad consist of (desire), (anger), and (grief); the male, of (reflection), (knowledge), and (fear). Cf. the triad of functions in "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairy- tales," Part I of vol. 9. pars. 425ff.
50. P. de Lagarde (Clementina, p. 190) has here ... ... . The reading seems to me to make more sense.
51. Ch. .
52. The Clementine Homilies and the Apostolical Constitutions, trans. by Thomas Smith et al., pp. 312ff. (slightly modified).
53. Panarium, ed. by Oehler, I, p. 267.
54. Clement. Hom. XX, ch. VII. Since there is no trace in pseudo-Clement of the defensive attitude towards Manichaean dualism which is so characteristic of the later writers, it is possible that the Homilies date back to the beginning of the 3rd cent., if not earlier.
55. Hennecke. Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, pp. 309ff.
56. Cf. Matt. 19: 17 and Mark 10: 18.
57. A reference to the slaying of the first-born in Egypt.
58. Nezikin I, Baba Kamma 60 (in The Babylonian Talmud, trans. and ed. by Isidore Epstein, p. 348 [hereafter abbr. BT]; slightly modified).
59. Numbers 24: 16.
60. Zera'im I, Berakoth 7a (BT, p. 31).
61. Midrash Tanchuma Shemoth XVII.
62. Cf. Pentateuch with Targum Onkelos ... and Rashi's Commentary, trans. by M. Rosenbaum and A. M. Silbermann, II, p. 76.
63. Midrash on Song of Sol. 2 : 6.
64. Bereshith Rabba XII, 15 (Midrash Rabbah translated into English, ed. by H. Freedman and M. Simon, I, p. 99; slightly modified).
65. Ibid. XXXIX, 6 (p. 315).
66. Mo'ed IV, Pesahim 119 (BT, p. 613); Nezikin VI, Sanhedrin II, 103 (BT, pp. 698ff.).
67. Nezikin VI, Sanhedrin II, 97 (BT, p. 659; modified).
68. Zera'im I, Berakoth 16b (BT, p. 98: slightly modified).
69. Ibid. 7a (p. 30).
70. "Akathriel" is a made· up word composed of ktr = kether (throne) and el, the name of God.
71. A string of numinous God names, usually translated as "the Lord of Hosts."
72. Zera'im I, Berakoth 7 (BT, p. 30; slightly modified).
73. Aurora, trans. by John Sparrow, p. 423.
74. My learned friend Victor White, O.P., in his Dominican Studies (II, p. 399). thinks he can detect a Manichaean streak in me. I don't go in for metaphysics. but ecclesiastical philosophy undoubtedly does, and for this reason I must ask what are we to make of hell, damnation, and the devil, if these things are eternal? Theoretically they consist of nothing. and how does that square with the dogma of eternal damnation? But if they consist of something. that something can hardly be good. So where is the danger of dualism? In addition to this my critic should know how very much I stress the unity of the self, this central archetype which is a complexio oppositorum par excellence. and that my leanings are therefore towards the very reverse of dualism.
75. It has been objected that Christ cannot have been a valid symbol of the self, or was only an illusory substitute for it. I can agree with this view only if it refers strictly to the present time, when psychological criticism has become possible, but not if it pretends to judge the pre-psychological age. Christ did not merely symbolize wholeness, but, as a psychic phenomenon, he was wholeness. This is proved by the symbolism as well as by the phenomenology of the past, for which -- be it noted -- evil was a privatio boni. The idea of totality is, at any given time, as total as one is oneself. Who can guarantee that our conception of totality is not equally in need of completion? The mere concept of totality does not by any means posit it.
76. Just as the transcendent nature of light can only be expressed through the image of waves and particles.
77. Cf. Psychology and Alchemy, pars. 323ff., and "The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious," pars. 398ff.
78. Cf. "The Psychology of the Transference," pars. 425ff.
79. Elenchos, V, 8, 2 (trans. by F. Legge, I, p. 131). Cf. infra, pars. 358ff.
80. Psychology and Alchemy, par. 334, and "The Psychology of the Transference," pars. 457ff.
81. Basilides lived in the 2nd cent.
82. Elenchos, VII. 27, 12 (cf. Legge trans., II, p. 79).
83. Ibid., VII, 22, 10 (cf. II, pp. 69-70).
84. Ibid., VII, 22, 15 (II, p. 70). The eagle has the same significance in alchemy.
85. This word also occurs in the well-known passage about the krater in Zosimos. (Berthelot, Alch. grecs, III, li, 8: .
86. I must say a word here about the horos doctrine of the Valentinians in Irenaeus (Adv. haer, I, 2, 2ff.) Horos (boundary) is a "power" or numen identical with Christ, or at least proceeding from him. It has the following synonyms: (boundary-fixer), (he who leads across), (emancipator), (redeemer), (cross). In this capacity he is the regulator and mains~tay of the universe, like Jesus. When Sophia was "formless and shapeless as an embryo, Christ took pity on her, stretched her out through his Cross and gave her form through his power," so that at least she acquired substance (Adv. haer., I, 4). He also left behind for her an "intimation of immortality." The identity of the Cross with Horos, or with Christ, is dear from the text, an image that we find also in Paulin us of Nola:
" ... regnare deum super omnia Christum,
qui cruce dispensa per quattuor extima ligni
quattuor adtingit dimensum partibus orbem,
ut trahat ad uitam populos ex omnibus oris."
(Christ reigns over all things as God, who, on the outstretched cross, reaches out through the four extremities of the wood to the four parts of the wide world, that he may draw unto life the peoples from all lands.) (Carmina, ed. by Wilhelm Hartel, Carm. XIX, 639ff., p. 140.) For the Cross as God's "lightning" cf. "A Study in the Process of Individuation," pars. 535f.
87. Elenchos, VII, 27, 5 (Legge trans., II, p. 78).
88. Ibid., VII, 26, 5 (II, p. 75).
89. Panarium, XXXI, 5 (Oehler edn., I, p. 314).
90. Elenchos, VII, 22, 16 (Legge trans., II, p. 71). Cf. infra, pars. 298ff.
91. Ibid., 20, 5 (cf. II, p. 66). Quispel, "Note sur 'Basilide'."
92. With reference to the psychological nature of Gnostic sayings, see Quispel's "Philo und die altchristliche Haresie," p. 432, where he quotes Irenaeus (Adv. haer., II, 4, 2): "Id quod extra et quod intus dicere eos secundum agnitionem et ignorantiam, sed non secundum localem sententiam" (In speaking of what is outward and what is inward, they refer, not to place, but to what is known and what is not known). (Cf. Legge, I, p. 127.) The sentence that follows immediately after this -- "But in the Pleroma, or in that which is contained by the Father, everything that the demiurge or the angels have created is contained by the unspeakable greatness, as the centre in a circle" -- is therefore to be taken as a description of unconscious contents. Quispel's view of projection calls for the critical remark that projection does not do away with the reality of a psychic content. Nor can a fact be called "unreal" merely because it cannot be described as other than "psychic." Psyche is reality par excellence.
93. Cf. Psychology and Alchemy, pars. 52ff., 122ff., and "A Study in the Process of Individuation," pars. 542, 550, 581f.
94. Matt. 5: 48 (DV).
95. Rom. 7: 21 (AV).
96. Cf. the last two papers in Part I of vol. 9.