by Carlos Osorio and Peter Kornbluh
Global Research
March 10, 2013
8 March 2012
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National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 416
Edited by Carlos Osorio
Former military officers from Argentina and Uruguay went on trial this week in Buenos Aires for their human rights abuses in Operation Condor, a cross-border conspiracy of dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s to “eradicate ‘subversion,’ a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and center left,” according to declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive ( http://www.nsarchive.org).
Today’s posting of documents and evidence provided by the Archive to Argentine prosecutors includes the first briefing report, from August 1976, to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the secret police collaboration in the Southern Cone to “find and kill” opponents of their military regimes.
“The documents are very useful in establishing a comprehensive analytical framework of what Operation Condor was,” said Pablo Enrique Ouvina, the lead prosecutor in the case.
Founded by the Pinochet regime in November 1975, Operation Condor was the codename for a formal Southern Cone collaboration that included transnational secret intelligence activities, kidnapping, torture, disappearance and assassination, according to the National Security Archive’s documentary evidence from U.S., Paraguayan, Argentine, and Chilean files.
Prominent victims of Condor include two former Uruguayan legislators and a former Bolivian president, Juan Torres, murdered in Buenos Aires, as well as former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Moffitt, assassinated by a car bomb in downtown Washington D.C.
The historic trial charges 25 high-ranking military officials, including former Argentine presidents Jorge Videla and Reynaldo Bignone, with conspiracy to “kidnap, disappear, torture and kill” 171 opponents of the military dictatorships that dominated the Southern Cone in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the victims are approximately 80 Uruguayans, 50 Argentines, 20 Chileans and a dozen from Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador who were targeted by Condor operatives. The kidnapping and disappearance of two Cuban Consulate officials in Buenos Aires on August 9, 1976, is also part of the prosecution.
“Condor was a latter day rendition, torture and assassination program,” noted Carlos Osorio, who directs the Archive’s Southern Cone Documentation project. “Holding these officials accountable for the multinational crimes of Condor,” he said, “cannot help but set a precedent for more recent abuses of a similar nature.”
Besides Generals Videla and Bignone, those indicted included 22 Argentine military intelligence officers and agents. In preparation for the trial, prosecutors sought the extradition of several foreign high ranking officers from Chile and Paraguay among other Condor countries. The only foreigner sitting at the courtroom, however, is Uruguayan Army Major Manuel Cordero, charged with participating in death squads and torture at the infamous Orletti Motors secret detention center in Buenos Aires. He was extradited by Brazil where he was living.
Of the 171 Condor victims cited in the indictments, approximately forty-two survived and a number of them are expected to testify in court. One hundred twenty others were killed and/or disappeared.
************************
THE DOCUMENTS
Document l: Department of State, Report to Kissinger, SECRET, “The Third World War and South America,” August 3, 1976.
This report, based on CIA intelligence, was written by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Harry Shlaudeman and presented to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in August 1976. The document summarizes the coordination of Southern Cone security forces:
“[T]hey are joining forces to eradicate ‘subversion,’ a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and center left. The security forces of the Southern Cone now coordinate intelligence activities closely; operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of ‘subversives’; have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists…in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations.”
UNCLASSIFIED
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
AUG 3, 1976
TO: The Secretary
FROM: ARA – Harry W. Shlaudeman
ARA Monthly Report (July)
The “Third World War” and South America
The military regimes of the southern cone of South America see themselves as embattled:
on one side by international Marxism and its terrorist exponents, and
on the other by the hostility of the uncomprehending industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda.
In response they are banding together in what may well become a political bloc of some cohesiveness. But, more significantly, they are joining forces to eradicate “subversion”, a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and center left. The security forces of the souther cone
now coordinate intelligence activities closely;
operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of “subversives”;
have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the “Revolutionary Coordinating Committee” in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations.
This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps the natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which the societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have been badly shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military leaders, despite near decimation of the Marxist left in Chile and Uruguay, along with accelerating progress toward that goal in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must go on. Some talk of the “Third World War”, with the countries of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civilization.
Somewhat more rationally,
they consider their counter-terrorism every bit as justified as Israeli actions against Palestinian terrorists; and
they believe that the criticism from democracies of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard.
The result of this mentality, internally, is to magnify the isolation of the military institutions from the civilian sector, thus narrowing the range of political and economic options.
The broader implications for us and for future trends in the hemisphere are disturbing. The use of bloody counter-terrorism by these regimes threatens their increasing isolation from the West and the opening of deep ideological divisions among the countries of the hemisphere. An outbreak of PLO-type terrorism on a worldwide scale in response is also a possibility. The industrial democracies would be the battlefield.
This month’s trends paper attempts for the first time to focus on long-term dangers of a right-wing bloc. Our initial policy recommendations are:
To emphasize the differences between the six countries at every opportunity.
To depoliticize human rights.
To oppose rhetorical exaggerations of the “Third-World-War” type.
To bring the potential bloc-members back into our cognitive universe through systematic exchanges.
Security Cooperation is a Fact
There is extensive cooperation between the security/intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan “Operation Condor.” It will include extensive FBI-type exchanges of information on shady characters. There are plans for a special communications network. These details are still secret, but broad security cooperation is not. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it necessary to cooperate with each other and their neighbors against internationally-funded terrorists and “subversives.”
The problem begins with the definition of “subversion” – never the most precise of terms. One reporter writes that subversion “has grown to include nearly anyone who opposes government policy.” In countries where everyone knows that subversives can wind up dead or tortured, educated people have an understandable concern about the boundaries of dissent. The concern doubles when there is a change of persecution by foreign police acting on indirect, unknown information. Numerous Uruguayan refugees have been murdered in Argentina, and there are widespread accusations that Argentine police are doing their Uruguayan colleagues a favor. These accusations are at least credible, whether or not they are exact.
The nature of the Left-Extreme Threat: A “Third World War”?
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco – one of the brighter and normally steadier members of the group – was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists as a “Third World War.” The description is interesting for two reasons:
It justifies harsh and sweeping “wartime” measures.
It emphasizes the international and institutional aspect, thereby justifying the exercise of power beyond national boarders.
The threat is not imaginary. It may be exaggerated. This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco, who believes – probably correctly – that he and his family are targeted. One must admire his personal courage.
Even by objective standards, the terrorists have had substantial accomplishments over the years:
At one time or other, urban and rural guerrillas have created severe problems for almost every South American government, including those where democracy is still surviving.
They have provoked repressive reactions, including torture and quasi-governmental death squads. (The guerrillas typically claimed to welcome repression, but we wonder if they really like what they got.)
They still pose a serious threat in Argentina and – arguably – a lesser problem in two or three other countries.
There is a terror-oriented “Revolutionary Coordinating Junta,” possibly headquartered in Paris, which is both a counterpart of and an incentive for cooperation between governments.
Nevertheless, it is also true that, broadly speaking, both terrorists and the peaceful left have failed. This is true even in the minds of studious revolutionaries. Che Guevara’s romantic fiasco crushed hopes for rural revolution. Allende’s fall is taken (perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the electoral route cannot work. Urban guerrillas collapsed in Brazil with Carlos Marighela and in Uruguay with the Tupamaros. The latter represented a high-water mark. Their solid, efficient structure posed a real wartime threat. Probably the military believe that torture was indispensable to crack this structure.
There is still a major campaign in Argentina. We expect the military to pull up their socks and win. They have precedents to guide them, and the terrorists have no handy refuge in neighboring countries.
What will remain is a chain of governments, started by Brazil in 1964, whose origin was in battle against the extreme left. It is important to their ego, their salaries, and their equipment-budgets to believe in a Third World War. At best, when Argentina stabilizes, we can hope to convince them that they have already won. The warriors will not like this. They already snicker at us for being worried about kid stuff like drug-smuggling when there is a real military campaign going on. They accuse us of applauding the defeat of terrorism in Entebbe but not in Montevideo. Our differing perceptions of the threat are raising suspicions about our “reliability.”
What the Right-Wing Regimes Have in Common
These governments are reactive: they derived their initial legitimacy from a reaction against terrorism, left-extremism, instability, and (as they see it) Marxism. Thus, “anti-Marxism” is a moral and political force.
There is also an ideology that is more positive in origin: that of national development.
The vision of nation has been as effective in South America as it was in Europe. (It may yet turn out to be as destructive; this paper looks only briefly at the potential for conflicts between Latin nations and blocs.) Military establishments, traditional protectors of boundaries and national integrity, are in a position to profit from the new nationalism.
Economic development is a pressing need and a public demand. Disciplined military establishments can work with technocrats to produce economic development. In the countries we are considering, the military is always the strongest national institution – sometimes almost the only one. It has, typically, saved the nations from civilian chaos.
National developmentalism is therefore real medicine, closer to most citizens than trendy left or right-wing causes. To this extent, military power can find a popular base.
National developmentalism has obvious and bothersome parallels to National Socialism. Opponents of the military regimes call them fascist. It is an effective pejorative, the more so because it can be said to be technically accurate. But it is a pejorative. These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily to describe his economic views.
In practice, the military regimes tend to be full of the same inconsistencies that characterize non-military, pragmatic, non-ideological regimes.
Local political institutions are (reasonably) considered to have been a failure, and it is suggested that “democracy doesn’t work for us.” Leaders want to build more efficient institutions, to organize their societies entirely differently. Yet there is, at some level of consciousness, an acceptance that democracy is the ideal eventually to be sought.
No other institution is allowed to challenge military power, yet political parties and courts often exist and perform some valid functions. Brazil’s toothless parliament, for example, does cautiously articulate public opinion and provide a dormant alternative to military rule.
Insecure, repressive governments nevertheless allow substantial “democratic” freedoms, including varying degrees of freedom of expression. The ambiente is more like Washington than Moscow. You can buy a good newspaper, a pair of decadently-flowered blue jeans, a girlie magazine, or a modern painting.
These military regimes do not expect to last forever. There is no thought of a Thousand-Year Reich, no pretense of having arrived at ultimate Marxist-style truth.
From the standpoint of our policy, the most important long-term characteristics of these regimes may be precisely that they are reversible, in both theory and practice. They know it. But they do not know what to do about it. Political and social development lag. Long after left-wing threats are squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them. Fighting the absent pinkos remains a central goal of national security. Threats and plots are discovered. Some “mistakes” are made by the torturers, who have difficulty finding logical victims. Murder squads kill harmless people and petty thieves. When elections are held, the perverse electorate shows a desire to put the military out of power. Officers see the trend ending with their own bodies on the rack.
No more elections for a while.
We do not suggest that there is a hopelessly vicious circle. Since some of these regimes are producing really solid economic successes. The officers may eventually trust civilians to succeed them and provide an honorable exit. So far, the military has found it easier to ride the tiger than to dismount. When an alternative government eventually has to be found, it might be that the only one available will be at the far left.
But There Are Also Leading Differences.
In discussing the general characteristics of the southern military regimes, we have made some indefensibly broad generalizations. The following is an attempt to correct the worst distortions, country-by-country. It is important to be clear about the differences because, for reasons we shall develop later, our policy should be to emphasize what the countries do not have in common rather than what they do.
The front-burner cases are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
Argentina is the most interesting, both because it is important and because the directions of the new regime are not clear. The Argentines are politically sophisticated like the Brazilians, but unlike the Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even military unity. To recover economically, they must break the power of traditional structures, and especially of the labor movement. There is also a genuine challenge from left-wing terrorists and right-wing counter-terror. The problem approaches civil-war dimensions. We believe that the Brazilian model will prevail. In the long run, thus, we think the military will win. Videla – or his successor – will have more trouble with hard-line military officers and right-wing terror than with the left. Forces probably connected to the regime have already been killing exiles and priests, among others.
Chile has been the subject of so much action lately that you probably do not need to hear any more. The Chileans have smashed the Left almost as thoroughly as the Brazilians, but the repressive apparatus is much more unrestrained. There is no one at the top like Geisel who even seems to wish to moderate human-rights abuses. The Santiago regime provides the archetype of the reasoning that criticism of torture can come only from international Marxist plotters. The military seem particularly insecure and isolated, even with respect to the Chilean public.
Uruguay is the third pressing case (with Argentina and Chile). Foreign Minister Blanco was the first to talk about the “Third World War,” and he still insists that the threat continues high in his country. Given this picture, Uruguay is, of course, eager to cooperate with its neighbors in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the Chileans, the Uruguayans have maintained some sense or proportion about human rights and international public opinion. Civilians are up front in the government, give the military substantial support, and interact relatively well.
Brazil: We can and should relate to Brazil as an emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot. Yet its 1964 “revolution” is the basic model for its neighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite remarkable successes, the Brazilian armed services still cannot find a way to relax their hold on power. On the other hand, they are not much worried about it. They have been able to tap civilian talent for economic purposes. The Left is smashed, but it is not clear whether the President can control the zeal of his security forces. Attempts at political distensao have largely flopped (The word carries both the English sense of “distending”, or enlarging authority from a narrow military base, and the French sense of “relaxing.” Better than détente?) Brazil, like the other large countries, does see itself as a world actor, and this inhibits extremism.
Bolivia is an interesting case but not a hot problem. This is the scene of one of the three genuine social revolutions in Latin America – which makes it all the more puzzling that Che Guevara thought he had a contribution to make. Despite his failure, he left lasting worries. The Bolivians still consider that Che’s death makes them a target of revenge for international terrorists. We cannot quite perceive the same menace. In Bolivian terms, the government is notably stable and economically successful. It has been moderate on human rights.
Paraguay is marching to the same tune as its neighbors but is a mile behind. This is the kind of nineteenth-century military regime that looks good on the cartoon page. Paraguay, however, has eminently sound reasons for being backward and is not in the least apologetic. The Paraguayans remember that, in the Chaco War, they fought off the massively superior armed forces of three neighbors for a ridiculously long time. Pride was saved, if nothing else. There is no democratic tradition whatever. The government has reacted to fear of the left rather than the kind of specific challenge posed in the other countries.
A Political Bloc In Formation?
If police-type cooperation evolves into formation of a political bloc, our interests will be involved in ways that are new for South America. Such a bloc is not here yet. The conditions for its formation are largely present:
The conviction that an international leftist threat amounts to a “World War” and hence requires an alliance.
Highly compatible philosophies and political objectives in other respects.
Improved transport and communication between neighboring countries, which previously had better links with the U.S. and Europe than with each other.
A suspicion that even the U.S. has “lost its will” to stand firm against communism because of Viet-Nam, détente, and social decay.
Resentment of human-rights criticism, which is often taken as just one more sign of the commie encirclement.
Exclusion by the military of the civilian, democratic interplay which helps to maintain a sense of proportion.
There are a few inhibitions on formation of a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one. Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense of nation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile tension, however, border disputes are no longer an overriding factor in the southern cone.
To predict a political bloc would still be speculative. Commonsense could assert itself. There is plenty of it available in these countries and even some in their armies. We do think that the trend toward bloc thinking is present, clear, and troublesome.
If a Bloc Does Form …
In the early stages, we will be a “casual beneficiary” (as one reporter puts it) for reasons that are too obvious to need elaboration here. On the main East-West stage, right-wing regimes can hardly tilt toward the Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we are an apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trouble, as had historically been the case in this hemisphere.
But we would expect a range of growing problems. Some are already with us. Internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys. We are especially identified with Chile. It cannot do us any good. Europeans, certainly, hate Pinochet & Co. with a passion that rubs off on us.
More problems are on the schedule:
Human rights abuses, as you know, are creating more and more problems of conscience, law, and diplomacy.
Chile’s black-sheep status has already made trouble for its economic recovery. The farther to the right the drift goes in other countries, the more difficulties we can expect in our economic links with them.
We would like to share with, say, the Brazilians a perception that we are natural allies. Brazilian participation in a right-wing bloc would make this unlikely.
Eventually, we could even see serious strains with the democracies farther north. Orfila has told us that he thinks a confrontation is possible. Uruguay and Venezuela have just broken relations over an incident involved political asylum. A precedent?
Over the horizon, there is a chance of serious world-scale trouble. This is speculative, but no longer ridiculous. The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta now seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus considerable activity in other European capitals. With terrorists being forced out of Argentina, their concentration in Europe (and possibly the U.S.) will increase.
The South American regimes know about this. They are planning their own counter-terror operations in Europe. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are in the lead; Brazil is wary but is providing some technical support.
The next step might be for the terrorists to undertake a worldwide attack on embassies and interests of the six hated regimes. The PLO has shown the way. We can picture South American activities on a comparable scale, again using the industrial democracies as a battlefield. The impossibility of peaceful change will radicalize exiles who might, in earlier days, have looked forward to returning home peacefully.
Our Response: How to end the Third World War.
Till now, though we have tried to exercise a moderating influence, we have not taken a long-term strategic view of the problems that a right-wing bloc would create. This paper has tried for a sharper focus. We shall have more recommendations in months to come, but the following are a fair start:
(1) Distinguish between countries with special care. If we treat them as a whole, we will be encouraging them to view themselves as an embattled bloc. In our dealings with each country and in Congressional testimony, we should, for example, reflect recognition that:
Argentina, with its virtual civil war, faces a problem much different from its neighbors.
Uruguay, with its substantial remnants of military/civilian interplay, is not comparable to Chile.
Brazil has the weight, sophistication, and world-perspective to share many of our concerns.
Our military-sales programs may also provide an opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer provides significant leverage. There is vast interest in overall economic relations – but not much freedom of movement.
2) Try to get the politics and ideology out of human rights. This objective will be hard to reconcile with the equally pressing need to multilateralize our concern. To avoid charges of “intervention,” we must increasingly work through the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The countries that support us there, however, will tend to be democracies (and perhaps one or two radical Caribbean governments). Right-wing regimes will feel besieged. Ideally, we should keep one or more of them with us. If that is impossible (as now seems likely), we should take special care to make clear that authoritarian regimes of the right have no monopoly on abuses. (Your Santiago speech had the right balance).
3) Oppose Rhetorical exaggerations – there and here.
Make clear in our South American dealings that the “Third World War” idea is overdrawn and leads to dangerous consequences.
In Congressional testimony here, stress that the threat is real for a country like Argentina.
4) Bring them back to our cognitive universe. But how? Our Embassy in La Paz has recommended that we exchange intelligence briefings with the Bolivians. This might provide a way to reach suspicious military officers and work on their “Third World War” syndrome. But there are hazards. We would fail to produce information sustaining their thesis, and they might conclude that we were badly informed or uncooperative. Instead, we think we should work on systematic mid-level exchanges – something more than exchanges of information on terrorists. We need to achieve a perception that neither détente nor distensao is a threat to the legitimacy of friendly regimes.
In time, perhaps we can convince them that a Third World War is undesirable.
ARA/PLC: DCProper/WHLuers
8/2/76 x-29192
Document 2: Defense Intelligence Agency, [Report on Operation Condor] “Special Operations Forces,” SECRET, October 1, 1976.
This comprehensive intelligence report, based on information gathered by the FBI legal attaché in Buenos Aires, provides details on the collaboration between Argentina, Uruguay, and other Southern Cone military dictatorships. The document provided critical information to prosecutors on a joint operation with Uruguayan intelligence agents in late September 1976, in which dozens of Uruguayan members of the militant leftist movement OPR-33 were rounded up, detained, tortured, and a number killed in Buenos Aires. “The entire OPR-33 infrastructure in Argentina has been eliminated,” the document states. The kidnapped Uruguayans are among the over one hundred disappeared victims included in the Operation Condor trial. The document goes on to describe the “formation of special teams” to “carry out operations to include assassinations” in countries as far away as Portugal and France. The report cited a “favorite remark” of Southern Cone military officers as saying that “one of their colleagues is out of country because he is flying like a condor.”
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified by DIA in accordance with EO 12958
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
1. COUNTRY: Argentina
2. SUBJECT: (U) Special Operations Forces (U)
3. ___ NUMBER: N/A
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1976, SEP 28
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACC: 1976, SEP 28
6. EVALUATION: Buenos Aires, SOURCE A, INFORMATION 1
7. SOURCE: Legal Attache, AMEMB
8. REPORT NUMBER 6: 804 0334 76
9. DATE OF REPORT: 1976, OCT 1
10. NO. OF ___: 2
11. REFERENCES: PG1200 PG 1100 ICR A-TAC-44396
PG2200 PG1300
PG2220 PG2240
12. ORIGINATOR: USDAO BUENOS AIRES
13. PREPARED BY: LTC JOHN L. BOHACH, JR. USA, AARMA
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL. PAUL A. COUGHLIN, USA, ARMA, DATT
15. SUMMARY: This IR provides information on joint counterinsurgency operations by several countries in South America. Information was provided by US Embassy Legal Attache who has excellent contacts within the State Secretariat for Information and Federal Police Force.
This IR partially fulfills requirement of ICR A-TAC-44396.
REC'D DS-4B 13 OCT '76
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
1. "Operation Condor" is the code name given for intelligence collection on "leftists," Communists and Marxists in the Southern Cone Area. It was recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in member countries with Chile reportedly being the center of operations. Other participating members include: Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. In addition, Brazil has apparently tentatively agreed to provide intelligence input for Operation Condor. Members showing the most enthusiasm to date have been Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. These three countries have engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina, against terrorists targets. During the week of 20 September 1976, the Director of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service traveled to Santiago to consult with his Chilean counterparts on Operation Condor (This travel is similar to trip reported in IR G 804 0309 76.)
2. During the period 24-27 September 1976, members of the Argentina State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), operating with officers of the Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service carried out operations against the Uruguayan Terrorist organization, the OPR-33 in Buenos Aires. As a result of this joint operation, SIDE officials claimed that the entire OPR-33 infrastructure in Argentina has been eliminated. A large volume of US currency was seized during the combined operation.
3. A third and reportedly very secret phase of "Operation Condor" involves the formation of special teams from member countries who are to carry out operations to include assassinations against terrorist or supporters of terrorist organizations. For example, should a terrorist or a supporter of a terrorist organization from a member country be identified, a special team would be dispatched to locate and surveil the target. When the location and surveillance operation has terminated, a second team would be dispatched to carry out an operation against the target. Special teams would be issued false documentation from member countries, could be composed either of individuals from one member nation or of persons from various member nations. Source stated that team members would not be commissioned or non-commissioned officers of the armed forces, but rather "special agents." Two European countries, specifically mentioned for possible operations under the third phase were France and Portugal.
4. A special team has apparently been organized in Argentina for use in "Operation Condor." They are members of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service and the State Secretariat for Information. They are reportedly structured much like a US Special Forces Team with a medic (doctor), demolition expert, etc. They are apparently being prepared for action in phase three.
COMMENT: More and more is being heard about "Operation Condor" in the southern cone. Military officers who, heretofore, had been mum on the subject have begun to talk openly about it. A favorite remark is that, "One of their colleagues is out of the country because he is flying like a condor."
Document 3: CIA, SECRET, A Brief Look at Operation Condor, August 22, 1978.
In the aftermath of the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, the CIA prepared this short briefing paper for Eugene Propper, the Justice Department’s lead prosecutor in the case. “Operation Condor is a cooperation effort by the intelligence/security services of several South American countries to combat terrorism and subversion. The original members included services from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia; Peru and Ecuador recently became members.”
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified and Approved for Release July 2000
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: Classified Reading Material re "CONDOR" for Ambassador Landau and Mr. Propper
FROM: C/LA/[DELETE]
DATE: 22 August 1978
COMMENTS: Two papers attached: "A Brief Look at Operation Condor," and [DELETE] the papers are for perusal Ambassador Landau and Mr. Propper.
[DELETE]
SUBJECT: A Brief Look at "Operation Condor"
1. "Operation Condor" is a cooperative effort by the intelligence/security services of several South American countries to combat terrorism and subversion. The original members included services from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia; Peru and Ecuador recently became members. The Agency's first knowledge of the organization's existence came in March 1976 when [DELETE] reported that Colonel Manuel CONTRERAS, then chief of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), had initiated a program of cooperation between the intelligence services of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia called "Plan Condor." Although cooperation between the respective intelligence/security services had existed for some time -- perhaps as early as February 1974 -- the cooperative effort was not formalized until late May 1976 when a Condor meeting was held in Santiago, Chile. The basic theme of the meeting was long-range cooperation among the services of the participating countries, but went well beyond information exchange. Condor members were given numerical designations; i.e., "Condor One," "Condor Two," etc.
2. By July 1976 the Agency was receiving reports that Condor planned to engaged in "executive action" outside the territory of member countries against leaders of indigenous terrorist groups residing abroad. The latter included members of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) which comprised the Chilean MIR, Argentine ERP, Uruguayan MLN-Tupamaros, and certain other less important groups.
3. [DELETE]
4. During the past two years Condor representatives have met periodically in one or another of the member countries to coordinate their activities, have established a special communications network, and have conducted training of various types including psychological warfare. [DELETE]
Document 4: Department of State, SECRET, “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source,” April 7, 1980.
In this revealing memorandum to Ambassador Castro, James J. Blystone, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, details his April 2 meeting with an Argentine intelligence source. The anonymous Argentine source describes how Horacio Campiglia and Susana Binstock, two militant Montoneros, were captured by Argentine officers of Battalion 601 (in coordination with Brazilian intelligence), taken to Argentina and held at the Campo de Mayo Army base. Campiglia and Binstock who were never seen again, are amongst the more than a hundred victims included in the Operation Condor trial.
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 7 April 1980
REPLY TO ATTN OF: RSO/James J. Blystone, American Embassy, Buenos Aires
SUBJECT: Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source
TO: The Ambassador
Through: DCM/Maxwell Chaplin
On April 2, 1980, the RSO had a meeting with a member of the Argentine intelligence services to discuss various topics. In the beginning the RSO jokingly asked what had happened to the two Montoneros that disappeared between Mexico and Rio. The source answered that he would tell me but only in the strictest of confidence as this information was top secret. Source stated that Force 601 had captured a Montonero and during the interrogation learned that this Montonero was to have a meeting with the two Montoneros from Mexico and the meeting was to take place in Rio de Janiero. The two Montoneros from Mexico are Horacio Campiglia (warname Peter) and Susana de Binstok. Horacio Campiglia (number 4 or 5 in the Montonero structure) has overall charge of the TEI operations and manages these forces from Mexico. Source advised that during the interrogation they told the Montonero that they had captured, that if he cooperated with the forces he would live. This Montonero knew he was in no position not to cooperate, provided the date and time for the meeting in Rio. The Argentine military intelligence (601) contacted their Brazilian military intelligence counterparts for permission to conduct an operation in Rio to capture two Montoneros arriving from Mexico. Brazilians granted their permission and a special team of Argentines were flown under the operational command of Lt. Col. Roman, to Rio aboard an Argentine airforce C130. Both of the Montoneros from Mexico were captured alive and returned to Argentina aboard the C130. The Argentines, not wanting to alert the Montoneros that they had conducted an operation in Rio, utilized an Argentine woman and man to register at a hotel using the false documents obtained from the two captured Montoneros, thereby leaving a trail that the two Montoneros from Mexico had arrived in Rio, registered at a hotel and then departed. These two Montoneros are presently being held at the army's secret jail, Camp de Mayo.
Regarding another subject, the source advised that within the last ten to 15 days security forces had captured alive 12 members of a TEI group which was reinfiltrating the country. Source stated that they had captured some time ago, the Montonero who was the TEI training instructor in Libya (previously reported by the RSO) and who is now working with the Argentine services. This Montonero who is cooperating with the Argentines, received information that 12 members of the TEI would be re-entering Argentina via bus routes from Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Argentine security services, with the cooperation of the police set up a trap to capture all 12 members. The police performed documentation and drug control procedures in the bus terminals in Buenos Aires and the intelligence services with the cooperation of this Montonero, were able to apprehend the TEI members arriving by bus. Once the Montonero member was identified, the police would ask to check their documents and advise the individual he would have to go to the police station for routine police matters. Once the Montonero was placed in a car for transportation to a police station, military intelligence took over and transported the Montonero to their secret jail in Campo de Mayo. All 12 members of the TEI group were captured with documentation which indicated that they would place under surveillance 10 targets of the Minister of Economy and of the 10 targets under surveillance, decide which three would be the easiest to attack. The Argentine intelligence service is upset as none of the 12 TEI members apprehended were armed. Logistically the Argentines are confused as to where and how the Montoneros are obtaining their weapons.
Regarding the TEI, the Argentines have further learned that a group of TEI members are to infiltrate the country to reorganize their political structure, which is a drastic change from previous operations. This for the Argentines signifies a change in the Montonero thinking in that they have decided to give up armed attacks and try to gain their objectives through political means.
On the last subject, the RSO inquired whether the source had any additional information regarding Jarara de Cabezas. Source stated that he hadn't any new information beyond the face that she is still alive and being held by the Navy. (Note, the RSO was not previously informed that this individual was being held by the Navy, just that she was being held.)
The RSO questioned the source regarding the disappeareds who are able to communicate and visit their families. Source advised that this is true. The forces sometimes capture Montoneros but during investigation and interrogation, learn that the individual is a sympathizer, not a full-fledged member or combatant. These individuals, after a period of time are allowed limited liberty by the forces to contact their families until their paperwork is ready. At that time they are sent out of the country. An agreement is made with them that they will not contact their families for a period of months. Source stated that it would be detrimental to the services if these individuals were granted limited liberty and then killed.
THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE USED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE RSO.
cc: DCM
POL
POL/R
DAO
The original source of this article is The National Security Archive
Copyright © Carlos Osorio and Peter Kornbluh, The National Security Archive, 2013