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The state of environmental protection in the Russian Federation: a review of the post-Soviet era
by Joshua P. Newell [1] & Laura A. Henry[ 2]
1. School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;
2. Department of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, USA
Published online: 10 Feb 2017.
NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT
ABSTRACT
In the 25 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, sweeping political, economic, and social changes have profoundly influenced environmental protection in Russia, the world’s largest country and one of global importance with respect to natural resources, biodiversity conservation, wilderness preservation, and climate change mitigation. This paper reviews the state of the environment by assessing post-Soviet era changes to legislation, government regulatory institutions, and civil society. A gulf exists between Russia’s formal environmental laws and state agency capacity and interest in enforcing them. This stems, in part, from repeated bureaucratic reorganizations that have progressively eroded environmental institutions. The Russian environmental movement, which blossomed during Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s, struggled in the 1990s to mobilize the broader public due to economic hardship and political instability. Since then, the Putin administration has labeled many environmental groups “anti-Russian” and used aggressive tactics such as raiding NGO offices, intimidating journalists, and instituting severe legislative measures to quash advocacy and dissent. Post-Soviet environmental successes have been relatively few, with expansion of the protected area system and forest certification notable exceptions. These successes can partially be attributed to efforts by large environmental organizations, but expansion of certification and corporate social responsibility is also tied to Russian business interests dependent on natural resource export to global markets increasingly sensitive to environmental concerns. The paper concludes by illustrating how corruption, poor enforcement, and the muzzling of civil society render the state incapable of resolving arguably its most significant environmental challenge: illegal and unregulated resource use.
Introduction
In the pages of this journal, dating back to when it was Soviet Geography and then Post-Soviet Geography and continuing into its current form, researchers and scholars have written extensively on environmental degradation in the vast swath of territory that now constitutes the Russian Federation. Readers are now familiar with the country’s past and current environmental blights (oil and gas spills, radioactive waste, air and water pollution) and to a lesser degree the wanton waste of resources caused by inefficient extraction and manufacturing processes (Backman and Zausaev 1998; Barr and Braden 1988; Feshbach 1995; Feshbach and Friendly 1992; Petersen, Bielke, and Peterson 2002; Peterson 1995; Pryde 1972, 1991; ZumBrunnen and Osleeb 1986).
But scholars have largely been far less attentive to what may be Russia’s greatest legacy to the planet: wilderness. Within the borders of the Russian Federation are some of the most extensive (largely roadless) wilderness areas remaining on Earth. This is vividly illustrated by a nighttime view of Eurasia, with the dark vast swaths of Siberia and the Russian Far East in stark contrast to the brightly lit cities and infrastructure of Eastern China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (Figure 1). Lake Baikal alone holds one-fifth of the world’s fresh water. Russia’s forests comprise an astounding 20% of the world’s remaining “frontier forest” (Potapov et al. 2008). Siberian tigers roam the Ussuri taiga forests along the Sikhote-Alin’ Mountain Range, a region with the richest terrestrial biological diversity in Russia (Krever et al. 1994). While the forests of central Kamchatka Peninsula protect rivers containing some of the world’s largest salmon runs, the oceans surrounding Russia are some of the most biologically productive waters on the planet (Newell 2004). Russia’s wilderness plays a globally important role in mitigating climate change, protecting biodiversity, and generally ensuring ecosystem function, particularly of the polar Arctic.
Figure 1. Nighttime view of Eurasia. In addition to cities, fires, fishing boats, gas flares, oil drilling, and mining operations can show up as points of light. Source: NASA Earth Observatory 2012.
It is also notable that, for centuries, Russia’s economy has been highly dependent on this rich natural resource base. In the era of the tsar Peter the Great (who ruled from 1682 to 1725), Siberia and the Russian Far East became a military outpost and supplier of raw materials for the rest of Russia (Newell and Wilson 1996). Soviet industry, like that which came before, exploited the region’s precious metals, minerals, fisheries, and timber supplies and exported these raw materials to the rest of the Soviet Union (Bradshaw 1997; Bradshaw and Lynn 1998). Today, natural resources continue to form the basis of the Russian economy, with much of the oil and gas, precious metals, fish, and timber exported abroad (Bradshaw and Connolly 2016). One of the ironies associated with the sheer inefficiency of the Soviet command economy, which caused horrendous pollution and environmental degradation in accessible areas, is that large areas of wilderness remain intact. During both the Soviet era and the present day, the state has simply lacked the technology and capital to build the infrastructure necessary to extract natural resources in many of these areas (Barr and Braden 1988; Bradshaw and Lynn 1998).
Thus, environmental protection and the trajectory of the Russian economy and political system are deeply intertwined. Waves of economic and political restructuring in the 25 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have brought a series of challenges that will have to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of these globally important ecosystems. Russia’s most intractable environment challenge may indeed be illegal resource harvest (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008; Newell 2004). But identifying underlying causes and strategies to address this problem quickly leads to evaluation of the sweeping political, social, and economic changes since the perestroika reforms of the Gorbachev era and, later, the integration of Russia into the global economy.
With this context in mind, the purpose of this essay is to take stock of and assess key changes associated with environmental protection in the Russian Federation since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. First, we provide an overview of notable reforms to Russian legislation and relevant government oversight agencies, followed by a brief assessment of Russia’s protected area system given these changes. Then, we evaluate the level of participation of the Russian Government in international environmental treaties (in particular, climate change agreements), as well as the Russian private sector in environmental certification systems and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This is followed by an assessment of civil society and the environment, with a particular focus on how these groups are increasingly targeted as adversaries of the state. In the final section, we return to the question of illegal and unregulated resource harvest (some of which occurs in wilderness and protected areas) by reflecting on interconnections with these changes to Russian environmental regulation to the restriction of civil society, as well as broad economic shifts spawned by privatization, trade liberalization, and the rise of export markets, especially in Asia.
State environmental protection in Russia
Two consistent themes characterize Russia’s approach to environmental protection in the post-Soviet period. First, the law tends to be prescriptive and complex, articulating relatively high standards, but it is often not effectively implemented and enforced. Second, there has been a high degree of instability with respect to which state agencies have the authority over the environment.
Russia possesses a comprehensive body of environmental legislation. The Russian Constitution proclaims, “Everyone shall have the right to a favorable environment, reliable information about its state and restitution for damage inflicted to health and property from ecological transgressions” (Chapter 2, Article 42). One of the first laws passed by the newly independent Russian Federation was the 1991 Federal Act on the Protection of the Natural Environment (Bond and Sagers 1992). Russia’s major environmental legislation mandates a high level of environmental protection and asserts the country’s commitment to sustainable development (Henry 2009; Oldfield and Shaw 2002).
But large gaps exist between Russia’s formal environmental laws on the books and state agencies’ capacity to and interest in carrying them out. Despite a solid legal foundation, critics charge that environmental law and regulations often are not sufficiently specific, lack mechanisms for their implementation, and are not enforced in practice (Kotov and Nikitina 2002; Potravnyi and Weissenburger 1997, 288). For example, many programs designed to achieve sustainable development have suffered from “inadequate finance and weak coordination” (Oldfield 2005, 75). In 2010, while president, Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that Russia’s strict environmental laws are often fragmented and contradictory, resulting in “unsolved problems, unfulfilled instructions and unaccomplished tasks” (President of Russia 2010). Russia has experimented with the recentralization of authority in environmental protection previously devolved to the regions, a trend that at least some regional leaders found objectionable due to “criss-crossing jurisdictions and emphasis on raising revenues” (Crotty and Rodgers 2012, 25). These problems continue to limit environmental protection in Russia.
In the 1990s, Russia introduced a variety of new mechanisms for environmental governance, including a new system of permitting and pollution charges and requirements for environmental impact assessment (Kochtcheeva 2010). Kotov and Nikitina (2002, 1) argue that these new instruments were “deformed by corruption, weakness of the government at all levels, shadow economy, impacts of the interest groups, and low public control over environmental decision-making.” Other analyses of Russia’s environmental policies have found a number of problems. A 2014 World Bank report on environmental regulation prior to Russia’s WTO entry concluded,
The report also found that charges for pollution are low compared to other states and that the system of fines for polluters is ineffective “because it targets too many pollutants, and consequently results in insufficient capacity for monitoring and enforcement” (22). Medvedev also cited the lack of environmental monitoring and data gathering as key problems (President of Russia 2010). The punishment for environmental crimes, such as poaching, illegal timber harvesting, and illegal waste disposal, tends to be so feeble that “perpetrators do not fear getting caught” (Stoecker and Shakirova 2014, 11; see also, Bellona 2013; Braden 2014).
Currently, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment is responsible for laws and regulations related to the use and conservation of natural resources, as well as environmental monitoring and pollution control. Other federal-level agencies charged with aspects of environmental protection include the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor), the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Rosgidromet), the Federal Supervisory Service for the Environment, Technology, and Nuclear Management (Rostekhnadzor), and smaller agencies focused on water, forests, and mineral resources. The current division of authority for the environment among state institutions is the result of repeated bureaucratic reorganizations in the post-Soviet period that progressively lowered the status of environmental protection.
In 1991, the Russian Government established a Ministry of Ecology, and Alexei Yablokov, one of Russia’s leading environmentalists, was invited to serve as an advisor to President Yeltsin. However, in 1996, Yeltsin demoted the ministry to a less powerful State Committee on Ecology (Figure 2). Then, in May 2000, President Putin signed a decree to dissolve the state committee as well as the Federal Forestry Service, transferring their responsibilities to the Ministry of Natural Resources (Figure 2). Environmentalists challenged what they saw as the continued downgrading of environmental protection. Igor Chestin of WWF-Russia argued that putting the Ministry tasked with utilizing natural resources for economic growth in charge of the environment “is like putting a goat in charge of the cabbage patch” (Cockburn 2000).
The funds allocated by the government for environmental protection have declined as well. The portion of the federal budget dedicated to the environment decreased from 0.4% in 2001 to 0.1% in 2007, even as the overall size of the budget grew (Yablokov 2010, 3). A Ministry of Natural Resources report contends that the Russian Government allocates roughly 0.5% of the federal budget for environmental protection, still relatively low compared to other states (Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology, Russian Federation 2012, 5).
Figure 2. The devolution of environmental protection and regulation in the post-Soviet era. Since 1996 through bureaucratic reorganization, the Russian government has progressively weakened the primary institution responsible for environmental management and protection.
During his relatively brief tenure in office from 2008 to 2012, President Medvedev introduced new environmental priorities related to his broader agenda of modernizing the Russian economy. These priorities included a 2009 law on energy efficiency and other energy savings measures. In a 2010 speech at a State Council Presidium meeting, Medvedev asserted, “Our society has finally come to understand that if we take no account of the current state of environment, if we fail to strictly abide by environmental standards, we simply have no future” (President of Russia 2010). In 2012, as the outgoing president, Medvedev approved the “Basic Principles of State Environmental Policy to 2030” (President of Russia 2012). This guiding document sets out the following objectives:
Environmentalists praised these goals, but criticized the strategic plan for lacking specific measures to achieve these objectives (Oliphant 2012). Since his return to the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has made only token remarks about the importance of environmental protection.
Overall, the erosion of institutions of environmental protection and weak law enforcement throughout the post-Soviet period -– despite recent initiatives -– have led to the charge that Russia is in a period of “de-ecologization” (Yanitsky 2000). Mol (2009, 231) labels this phenomenon the “de-institutionalization” of environmental policy, arguing that throughout the early 2000s, “the institutional structure showed all signs of erosion, degradation and delegitimation, developing into but a shadow of its powerful predecessor in the early 1990s.” Yablokov (2010, 3), who until his death in January 2017 played an important role in the environmental movement, explained, “The logic of de-environmentalism … is that Russia will start dealing with environmental problems once it is rich.” This attitude in part stems from the state’s reliance on oil and gas revenue, in addition to lesser income from mining, forestry, and other natural resource industries, all of which could be threatened by strict environmental protection.
The protected area system in the post-Soviet era
The erosion of environmental protection and decrease in law enforcement, combined with budget shortfalls, has proven to be a formidable threat to the health of Russia’s nature reserve system and to the ecosystems and wildlife that it protects. This protected area system can be traced back to prerevolutionary nobility, whose members set aside land for hunting reserves. These reserves set temporary restrictions on land use or hunting during breeding seasons in order to protect important game populations. After the revolution, beginning in 1917, nature reserves (zapovedniki) were established, and in 1921, Vladimir Lenin established a formal statute for them (Shtilmark 2003). The zapovedniki grew rapidly, particularly in European Russia, so by 1951 more than 128 of these reserves protected over 12 million hectares (ha) of land. In 1952, citing economic need, Stalin’s government dissolved more than 70% of the reserves, shrinking their total land area to 1.5 million ha (Newell 2004). Over time, many reserves were reestablished, but not before many were logged, mined, or otherwise degraded. Only in the mid-1980s did the figure again reach 12 million ha, as in 1951. Today, Russia has a range of protected area types at the national, regional, and local levels (Table 1). Federal-level protected areas total roughly 3.2% of the total land area of the country, with regional- and local-level protected areas covering 7.3 and 1.6%, respectively.
There are numerous forms of protected areas, each with a different purpose (Pryde 1997). Federal- and regional-level zakazniki (wildlife refuges) protect more area in Russia than zapovedniki but suffer the reputation of being “paper parks” because of inadequate protection (Newell 2004). Due to the inability to patrol reserve boundaries, illegal logging, mining, and poaching are far too common.
National parks, first established in 1983, have become an important tool in protecting Russia’s wilderness and biodiversity (Fiorino and Ostergen 2012; Ostergren and Shvarts 1998). Other forms of protected areas include natural monuments, regional natural parks, and territories of traditional nature use (TTPs). Zapovedniki were primarily created to protect samples of a particular ecosystem or landscape (steppe, central taiga) and, less frequently, to protect a particular species’ breeding or wintering grounds (Shtilmark 2003). The most important type of protected area in Russia, zapovedniki, falls under World Conservation Union (IUCN) Category 1a, the strictest designation possible under this system. Economic activity is forbidden, but due to declining budgets, some zapovedniki have opened up to tourism. Reports of logging, grazing, and other industrial activity on protected lands have increased in the post-Soviet era. This system is perpetually understaffed and ill-equipped to provide a comprehensive management program for the zapovedniki. Directors of individual zapovedniki, therefore, have incurred increased managerial responsibility, and many actively seek international contacts, organize eco-tours, and pursue other avenues to secure funding to pay staff and continue research. The total area of protected land under the zapovedniik system is 1.6% of the Russian Federation (Table 1). These zapovedniki are a potent legacy, as they comprise more than 40% of the world’s strict scientific nature reserves (Newell 2004).
Budget cuts for all forms of protected areas arguably pose the greatest threat to Russia’s reserve system (Newell 2004; Ostergen 1998; Wells and Williams 1998). Many zakazniki have no full-time staff and lack basic infrastructure. Zapovedniki generally have full-time staff, but some have crumbling facilities, no funds for scientific research, and inadequate equipment and fuel to patrol the reserve (Ostergen 1998). Lack of law enforcement, coupled with poverty and disregard for laws and regulations in Russia, has led to an escalation of illegal logging, poaching, and mining within reserve boundaries (Newell 2004). Lack of funds has led to squabbling between Moscow and regional governments: the latter complain that money earmarked for the region never arrives, while Moscow complains that money delivered to the regions is not spent properly. A secondary problem facing the reserve system is the conflicting priorities of the government bodies involved in their management; this problem hinders the development of a coherent management structure and conservation plan.
The protected area system remains poorly understood by the public. In Soviet times, zapovedniki were for scientific research, not tourism (Wells and Williams 1998). Many citizens still consider them reserves for the scientific elite and resent the loss of land for commercial use. There was no form of protected area allowing recreational use until the Soviet government created the national park system (Ostergren and Hollenhorst 1999). The public, however, generally resists the concept of a designated area for activities such as relaxing, picking mushrooms, and fishing: many Russians see the taiga as a common resource (Newell 2004).
Despite inadequate funding and structural flaws, the Russian reserve system has expanded significantly in the post-Soviet period. New forms of protected areas have been developed, particularly on the regional level, giving both governments and NGOs the flexibility necessary to further expand the system. A recent analysis of the country’s system noted this success in terms of expansion and correspondingly better protection of Russia’s ecological and cultural assets (Krever, Stishny, and Onufrenya 2009). But it also identified key gaps in the system by identifying ecosystems, landscapes, and species that need better protection. In general, the Arctic regions (where population and resource extraction pressures are relatively low) are fairly well-protected, while deciduous forests and steppes are not. With respect to biodiversity, there are significant gaps as well. The study found that 51% of rare and threatened mammal species (excluding whales and dolphins), 41% of rare and endangered birds, and 36% of endangered reptiles are protected (2009). This necessitates continued expansion of the nature reserve system despite persistent challenges discussed earlier.
Russian Federation and international treaties
Internationally, Russia participates in a number of global conventions on environmental issues (Hønnelund and Jørgenson 2003). In the 1990s alone, Russia signed on to more than 30 bilateral and 25 multilateral environmental protection agreements (Funke 2005, 261). Korppoo and co-authors suggest that Russia’s participation in global environmental governance and vision of itself as a global “environmental donor” are part of the country’s efforts to project its “soft power” internationally (Korppoo, Tynkkynen, and Hønneland 2015, 19). International agreements do not always lead to domestic action, however, and Russia’s participation can be limited. For example, in 2011, the Public Chamber, a group of representatives from civil society that advises the government, advocated without success Russia’s ratification of the Aarhus Convention, a global agreement that commits signatories to ensuring the rights of citizens to have access to information on the environment and to participate in environmental policy-making (Tumanov, Shapovalov, and Davydova 2014). Russia continues to participate in other environmental initiatives in a modest way, including providing $15 million to the Global Environmental Facility in 2014 (RIA Novosti 2014).
Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol allowed the climate agreement to come into force in 2005. Yet, after ratification, domestic climate policy developed at a glacial pace (Henry and Sundstrom 2012, 2014). In part, this inaction was because Kyoto’s generous emissions targets for Russia did not require the country to curb greenhouse gasses further. In addition, many Russian policy-makers and scientists remained skeptical about the causes of climate change and the ability of governments to slow the process. Early in the debate, some officials argued that a general trend toward warmer temperatures could benefit Russia. In 2003, at the World Conference on Climate Change in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that climate change is an important issue, but then joked, “an increase of two or three degrees wouldn’t be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up” (Pearce 2003). After only lukewarm participation in Kyoto’s joint implementation mechanism and the decision not to take part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia renewed its engagement in global climate negotiations at the Paris Climate Summit in 2015. At the talks, President Putin pledged that Russia would reduce it greenhouse gas levels by 70% from 1990s levels by 2030; critics argued that, given the post-Soviet industrial collapse of the 1990s when emissions dropped dramatically, this pledge allows Russia to actually increase current emissions by as much as 40%.
Instead, the Russian Government has focused on other benefits from participation in environmental regimes, such as achieving great power status, among other foreign policy goals, and obtaining economic advantages. Reflecting on Russia’s participation in the Paris agreement, Sergei Donskoi, the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, emphasized associated benefits that Russia expected to receive:
Russia also has attempted to shape emerging aspects of global governance in its favor, such as in determining the role of forests as carbon sinks in climate negotiations (Wilson Rowe 2013). Considering other international agreements, such as regional efforts to protect the Baltic Sea through the Helsinki Commission, Korppoo, Tynkkynen, and Hønneland (2015, 80) argue that “environmental protection may at times be seen as a relatively easy field of interstate cooperation, and can therefore be used as a way of projecting an image of cooperativeness and eliciting cooperation in non-environmental areas of greater interest.”
As Russian companies seek international investors and become players in the global market, they increasingly need to abide by global rules and norms in sourcing and manufacturing their products. A number of Russian forestry and fishing companies have been active participants in the product certification systems of the Forest Stewardship and Marine Stewardship Council (Tysiachniouk 2012). Environmentalists often promote these global standards inside Russia. For example, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has been the primary promoter of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification; Russia is now the country with the second highest acreage of forested territory certified as sustainably managed under FSC, following Canada. The global initiatives may have ancillary effects in the political sphere more broadly. FSC, for example, has introduced new ideas of equity into Russian discourse (Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2016) and has promoted new models of citizen participation (Henry and Tsyiachniouk 2015).
Russian companies also have developed internal corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and participate in global standards organizations such as the Global Reporting Initiative, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification, and the UN Global Compact. Russia may engage with the concept of CSR selectively, neglecting factors such as corruption and stakeholder consultation, for example (Preuss and Barkemeyer 2011). Crotty (2016) explores what CSR means in an economic context characterized by the legacy of state planning and high levels of corruption. She finds that CSR is often conflated with philanthropy and does not indicate robust connections to civil society, but may serve to demonstrate compliance with the law (2016, 846). A number of Russian NGOs promote CSR as a means of going beyond state regulations of companies. Recently, WWF initiated another effort to promote higher standards in the oil and gas sector through the creation of a rating system for the environmental responsibility of oil and gas companies in Russia (Shvarts, Pakhalov, and Knizhnikov 2016).
Certain regions of Russia are disproportionately affected by natural resource extraction, notably the Arctic region. Currently, the Arctic region is slated for significant development, including expansion of the oil and gas industry, mineral smelting, military installations, and shipping; by early 2014, “about 25% of the Russian Arctic shelf had been licensed to permit exploration and production” (Josephson 2016). Much of this activity is undertaken by companies that are least partially state-owned and that often evade environmental regulation (2016). Indigenous people in the Arctic suffer the greatest impact from this activity and often find it challenging to utilize domestic laws and global standards that are designed to protect their traditional practices, including fishing, hunting, and reindeer herding. In interviews, reindeer herders in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug recounted challenges with air pollution, trash, and pipelines blocking traditional herding routes and their difficulties negotiating with companies for compensation (Henry et al. 2016). Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud (2014) find that Russia is more willing to engage multilaterally in the Arctic than in other regions and issues, noting that the region has been “successfully ‘branded’ as a zone of peace and cooperation in the diplomatic framing.” Thus far, however, this framing has not had significant impacts on environmental or indigenous policy.
The state of environmental protection in the Russian Federation: a review of the post-Soviet era
by Joshua P. Newell [1] & Laura A. Henry[ 2]
1. School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;
2. Department of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, USA
Published online: 10 Feb 2017.
NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT
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Once again, there is serious purpose. The rulers of the world want Ukraine not only as a missile base; they want its economy. Kiev’s new Finance Minister, Natalie Jaresko, is a former senior U.S. State Department official who was hurriedly given Ukrainian citizenship.
They want Ukraine for its abundant gas; Vice President Joe Biden’s son is on the board of Ukraine’s biggest oil, gas and fracking company. The manufacturers of GM seeds, companies such as the infamous Monsanto, want Ukraine’s rich farming soil.
Above all, they want Ukraine’s mighty neighbor, Russia. They want to Balkanize or dismember Russia and exploit the greatest source of natural gas on earth. As the Arctic ice melts, they want control of the Arctic Ocean and its energy riches, and Russia’s long Arctic land border.
Their man in Moscow used to be Boris Yeltsin, a drunk, who handed his country’s economy to the West. His successor, Putin, has re-established Russia as a sovereign nation; that is his crime.
-- The Rise of a "Democratic" Fascism, by John Pilger
ABSTRACT
In the 25 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, sweeping political, economic, and social changes have profoundly influenced environmental protection in Russia, the world’s largest country and one of global importance with respect to natural resources, biodiversity conservation, wilderness preservation, and climate change mitigation. This paper reviews the state of the environment by assessing post-Soviet era changes to legislation, government regulatory institutions, and civil society. A gulf exists between Russia’s formal environmental laws and state agency capacity and interest in enforcing them. This stems, in part, from repeated bureaucratic reorganizations that have progressively eroded environmental institutions. The Russian environmental movement, which blossomed during Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s, struggled in the 1990s to mobilize the broader public due to economic hardship and political instability. Since then, the Putin administration has labeled many environmental groups “anti-Russian” and used aggressive tactics such as raiding NGO offices, intimidating journalists, and instituting severe legislative measures to quash advocacy and dissent. Post-Soviet environmental successes have been relatively few, with expansion of the protected area system and forest certification notable exceptions. These successes can partially be attributed to efforts by large environmental organizations, but expansion of certification and corporate social responsibility is also tied to Russian business interests dependent on natural resource export to global markets increasingly sensitive to environmental concerns. The paper concludes by illustrating how corruption, poor enforcement, and the muzzling of civil society render the state incapable of resolving arguably its most significant environmental challenge: illegal and unregulated resource use.
Introduction
In the pages of this journal, dating back to when it was Soviet Geography and then Post-Soviet Geography and continuing into its current form, researchers and scholars have written extensively on environmental degradation in the vast swath of territory that now constitutes the Russian Federation. Readers are now familiar with the country’s past and current environmental blights (oil and gas spills, radioactive waste, air and water pollution) and to a lesser degree the wanton waste of resources caused by inefficient extraction and manufacturing processes (Backman and Zausaev 1998; Barr and Braden 1988; Feshbach 1995; Feshbach and Friendly 1992; Petersen, Bielke, and Peterson 2002; Peterson 1995; Pryde 1972, 1991; ZumBrunnen and Osleeb 1986).
But scholars have largely been far less attentive to what may be Russia’s greatest legacy to the planet: wilderness. Within the borders of the Russian Federation are some of the most extensive (largely roadless) wilderness areas remaining on Earth. This is vividly illustrated by a nighttime view of Eurasia, with the dark vast swaths of Siberia and the Russian Far East in stark contrast to the brightly lit cities and infrastructure of Eastern China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (Figure 1). Lake Baikal alone holds one-fifth of the world’s fresh water. Russia’s forests comprise an astounding 20% of the world’s remaining “frontier forest” (Potapov et al. 2008). Siberian tigers roam the Ussuri taiga forests along the Sikhote-Alin’ Mountain Range, a region with the richest terrestrial biological diversity in Russia (Krever et al. 1994). While the forests of central Kamchatka Peninsula protect rivers containing some of the world’s largest salmon runs, the oceans surrounding Russia are some of the most biologically productive waters on the planet (Newell 2004). Russia’s wilderness plays a globally important role in mitigating climate change, protecting biodiversity, and generally ensuring ecosystem function, particularly of the polar Arctic.
Figure 1. Nighttime view of Eurasia. In addition to cities, fires, fishing boats, gas flares, oil drilling, and mining operations can show up as points of light. Source: NASA Earth Observatory 2012.
It is also notable that, for centuries, Russia’s economy has been highly dependent on this rich natural resource base. In the era of the tsar Peter the Great (who ruled from 1682 to 1725), Siberia and the Russian Far East became a military outpost and supplier of raw materials for the rest of Russia (Newell and Wilson 1996). Soviet industry, like that which came before, exploited the region’s precious metals, minerals, fisheries, and timber supplies and exported these raw materials to the rest of the Soviet Union (Bradshaw 1997; Bradshaw and Lynn 1998). Today, natural resources continue to form the basis of the Russian economy, with much of the oil and gas, precious metals, fish, and timber exported abroad (Bradshaw and Connolly 2016). One of the ironies associated with the sheer inefficiency of the Soviet command economy, which caused horrendous pollution and environmental degradation in accessible areas, is that large areas of wilderness remain intact. During both the Soviet era and the present day, the state has simply lacked the technology and capital to build the infrastructure necessary to extract natural resources in many of these areas (Barr and Braden 1988; Bradshaw and Lynn 1998).
Thus, environmental protection and the trajectory of the Russian economy and political system are deeply intertwined. Waves of economic and political restructuring in the 25 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have brought a series of challenges that will have to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of these globally important ecosystems. Russia’s most intractable environment challenge may indeed be illegal resource harvest (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008; Newell 2004). But identifying underlying causes and strategies to address this problem quickly leads to evaluation of the sweeping political, social, and economic changes since the perestroika reforms of the Gorbachev era and, later, the integration of Russia into the global economy.
With this context in mind, the purpose of this essay is to take stock of and assess key changes associated with environmental protection in the Russian Federation since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. First, we provide an overview of notable reforms to Russian legislation and relevant government oversight agencies, followed by a brief assessment of Russia’s protected area system given these changes. Then, we evaluate the level of participation of the Russian Government in international environmental treaties (in particular, climate change agreements), as well as the Russian private sector in environmental certification systems and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This is followed by an assessment of civil society and the environment, with a particular focus on how these groups are increasingly targeted as adversaries of the state. In the final section, we return to the question of illegal and unregulated resource harvest (some of which occurs in wilderness and protected areas) by reflecting on interconnections with these changes to Russian environmental regulation to the restriction of civil society, as well as broad economic shifts spawned by privatization, trade liberalization, and the rise of export markets, especially in Asia.
State environmental protection in Russia
Two consistent themes characterize Russia’s approach to environmental protection in the post-Soviet period. First, the law tends to be prescriptive and complex, articulating relatively high standards, but it is often not effectively implemented and enforced. Second, there has been a high degree of instability with respect to which state agencies have the authority over the environment.
Russia possesses a comprehensive body of environmental legislation. The Russian Constitution proclaims, “Everyone shall have the right to a favorable environment, reliable information about its state and restitution for damage inflicted to health and property from ecological transgressions” (Chapter 2, Article 42). One of the first laws passed by the newly independent Russian Federation was the 1991 Federal Act on the Protection of the Natural Environment (Bond and Sagers 1992). Russia’s major environmental legislation mandates a high level of environmental protection and asserts the country’s commitment to sustainable development (Henry 2009; Oldfield and Shaw 2002).
But large gaps exist between Russia’s formal environmental laws on the books and state agencies’ capacity to and interest in carrying them out. Despite a solid legal foundation, critics charge that environmental law and regulations often are not sufficiently specific, lack mechanisms for their implementation, and are not enforced in practice (Kotov and Nikitina 2002; Potravnyi and Weissenburger 1997, 288). For example, many programs designed to achieve sustainable development have suffered from “inadequate finance and weak coordination” (Oldfield 2005, 75). In 2010, while president, Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that Russia’s strict environmental laws are often fragmented and contradictory, resulting in “unsolved problems, unfulfilled instructions and unaccomplished tasks” (President of Russia 2010). Russia has experimented with the recentralization of authority in environmental protection previously devolved to the regions, a trend that at least some regional leaders found objectionable due to “criss-crossing jurisdictions and emphasis on raising revenues” (Crotty and Rodgers 2012, 25). These problems continue to limit environmental protection in Russia.
In the 1990s, Russia introduced a variety of new mechanisms for environmental governance, including a new system of permitting and pollution charges and requirements for environmental impact assessment (Kochtcheeva 2010). Kotov and Nikitina (2002, 1) argue that these new instruments were “deformed by corruption, weakness of the government at all levels, shadow economy, impacts of the interest groups, and low public control over environmental decision-making.” Other analyses of Russia’s environmental policies have found a number of problems. A 2014 World Bank report on environmental regulation prior to Russia’s WTO entry concluded,
The legislative system includes over 4000 federal-level regulatory legal documents, and is thus difficult to follow as quite a few of them contravene one another. So even if industrial compliance were genuine, the rules of the game are too difficult to follow. (World Bank 2014, 20)
The report also found that charges for pollution are low compared to other states and that the system of fines for polluters is ineffective “because it targets too many pollutants, and consequently results in insufficient capacity for monitoring and enforcement” (22). Medvedev also cited the lack of environmental monitoring and data gathering as key problems (President of Russia 2010). The punishment for environmental crimes, such as poaching, illegal timber harvesting, and illegal waste disposal, tends to be so feeble that “perpetrators do not fear getting caught” (Stoecker and Shakirova 2014, 11; see also, Bellona 2013; Braden 2014).
Currently, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment is responsible for laws and regulations related to the use and conservation of natural resources, as well as environmental monitoring and pollution control. Other federal-level agencies charged with aspects of environmental protection include the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor), the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Rosgidromet), the Federal Supervisory Service for the Environment, Technology, and Nuclear Management (Rostekhnadzor), and smaller agencies focused on water, forests, and mineral resources. The current division of authority for the environment among state institutions is the result of repeated bureaucratic reorganizations in the post-Soviet period that progressively lowered the status of environmental protection.
In 1991, the Russian Government established a Ministry of Ecology, and Alexei Yablokov, one of Russia’s leading environmentalists, was invited to serve as an advisor to President Yeltsin. However, in 1996, Yeltsin demoted the ministry to a less powerful State Committee on Ecology (Figure 2). Then, in May 2000, President Putin signed a decree to dissolve the state committee as well as the Federal Forestry Service, transferring their responsibilities to the Ministry of Natural Resources (Figure 2). Environmentalists challenged what they saw as the continued downgrading of environmental protection. Igor Chestin of WWF-Russia argued that putting the Ministry tasked with utilizing natural resources for economic growth in charge of the environment “is like putting a goat in charge of the cabbage patch” (Cockburn 2000).
It's easier to penetrate the CIA than the WWF. -- Raymond Bonner, New York Times reporter
-- Panda Leaks: The Dark Side of the WWF, by Wilfried Huismann
The funds allocated by the government for environmental protection have declined as well. The portion of the federal budget dedicated to the environment decreased from 0.4% in 2001 to 0.1% in 2007, even as the overall size of the budget grew (Yablokov 2010, 3). A Ministry of Natural Resources report contends that the Russian Government allocates roughly 0.5% of the federal budget for environmental protection, still relatively low compared to other states (Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology, Russian Federation 2012, 5).
Figure 2. The devolution of environmental protection and regulation in the post-Soviet era. Since 1996 through bureaucratic reorganization, the Russian government has progressively weakened the primary institution responsible for environmental management and protection.
During his relatively brief tenure in office from 2008 to 2012, President Medvedev introduced new environmental priorities related to his broader agenda of modernizing the Russian economy. These priorities included a 2009 law on energy efficiency and other energy savings measures. In a 2010 speech at a State Council Presidium meeting, Medvedev asserted, “Our society has finally come to understand that if we take no account of the current state of environment, if we fail to strictly abide by environmental standards, we simply have no future” (President of Russia 2010). In 2012, as the outgoing president, Medvedev approved the “Basic Principles of State Environmental Policy to 2030” (President of Russia 2012). This guiding document sets out the following objectives:
environmentally oriented economic growth; the preservation of the environment, biodiversity and natural resources to meet the needs of present and future generations; the realization of the right of everyone to a favorable environment; and the strengthening of the rule of law in the areas of environmental protection and environmental safety (2012).
Environmentalists praised these goals, but criticized the strategic plan for lacking specific measures to achieve these objectives (Oliphant 2012). Since his return to the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has made only token remarks about the importance of environmental protection.
Overall, the erosion of institutions of environmental protection and weak law enforcement throughout the post-Soviet period -– despite recent initiatives -– have led to the charge that Russia is in a period of “de-ecologization” (Yanitsky 2000). Mol (2009, 231) labels this phenomenon the “de-institutionalization” of environmental policy, arguing that throughout the early 2000s, “the institutional structure showed all signs of erosion, degradation and delegitimation, developing into but a shadow of its powerful predecessor in the early 1990s.” Yablokov (2010, 3), who until his death in January 2017 played an important role in the environmental movement, explained, “The logic of de-environmentalism … is that Russia will start dealing with environmental problems once it is rich.” This attitude in part stems from the state’s reliance on oil and gas revenue, in addition to lesser income from mining, forestry, and other natural resource industries, all of which could be threatened by strict environmental protection.
The protected area system in the post-Soviet era
The erosion of environmental protection and decrease in law enforcement, combined with budget shortfalls, has proven to be a formidable threat to the health of Russia’s nature reserve system and to the ecosystems and wildlife that it protects. This protected area system can be traced back to prerevolutionary nobility, whose members set aside land for hunting reserves. These reserves set temporary restrictions on land use or hunting during breeding seasons in order to protect important game populations. After the revolution, beginning in 1917, nature reserves (zapovedniki) were established, and in 1921, Vladimir Lenin established a formal statute for them (Shtilmark 2003). The zapovedniki grew rapidly, particularly in European Russia, so by 1951 more than 128 of these reserves protected over 12 million hectares (ha) of land. In 1952, citing economic need, Stalin’s government dissolved more than 70% of the reserves, shrinking their total land area to 1.5 million ha (Newell 2004). Over time, many reserves were reestablished, but not before many were logged, mined, or otherwise degraded. Only in the mid-1980s did the figure again reach 12 million ha, as in 1951. Today, Russia has a range of protected area types at the national, regional, and local levels (Table 1). Federal-level protected areas total roughly 3.2% of the total land area of the country, with regional- and local-level protected areas covering 7.3 and 1.6%, respectively.
Table 1. Protected Areas of the Russian Federation, 2014, by type and area.
Type of protected area / Number / Total area / % of total area of Russian Federation
Federal level
Strict nature reserve (Zapovednik) / 103 / 33.8 million hectares (ha) / 1.6
National park / 46 / 12 million ha / 0.8
Wildlife refuge (Zakaznik) / 71 / 13 million ha / 0.8
Natural monument / 28 / .04 million ha / 0.002
Subtotal / 248 5/ 8.84 million ha / 3.2
Regional level
Wildlife refuge, natural park, territory of traditional nature use, natural monument / 11,148 / 125.8 million ha / 7.3
Local level
Wildlife refuge, natural park, territory of traditional nature use, natural monument / 1598 / 27 million ha / 1.6
Protected area systems with international status
Natural world heritage site / 10 / 11 strict nature reserves, 4 national parks, 3 wildlife refuges
UNESCO biosphere reserve / 38 / 33 strict nature reserves, 6 national parks
Ramsar wetland of international importance / 35 / 12 strict nature reserves, 11 wildlife refuges, 1 natural park
Transboundary protected area / 4 / 4 strict nature reserves
Source: WWF (2015).
There are numerous forms of protected areas, each with a different purpose (Pryde 1997). Federal- and regional-level zakazniki (wildlife refuges) protect more area in Russia than zapovedniki but suffer the reputation of being “paper parks” because of inadequate protection (Newell 2004). Due to the inability to patrol reserve boundaries, illegal logging, mining, and poaching are far too common.
National parks, first established in 1983, have become an important tool in protecting Russia’s wilderness and biodiversity (Fiorino and Ostergen 2012; Ostergren and Shvarts 1998). Other forms of protected areas include natural monuments, regional natural parks, and territories of traditional nature use (TTPs). Zapovedniki were primarily created to protect samples of a particular ecosystem or landscape (steppe, central taiga) and, less frequently, to protect a particular species’ breeding or wintering grounds (Shtilmark 2003). The most important type of protected area in Russia, zapovedniki, falls under World Conservation Union (IUCN) Category 1a, the strictest designation possible under this system. Economic activity is forbidden, but due to declining budgets, some zapovedniki have opened up to tourism. Reports of logging, grazing, and other industrial activity on protected lands have increased in the post-Soviet era. This system is perpetually understaffed and ill-equipped to provide a comprehensive management program for the zapovedniki. Directors of individual zapovedniki, therefore, have incurred increased managerial responsibility, and many actively seek international contacts, organize eco-tours, and pursue other avenues to secure funding to pay staff and continue research. The total area of protected land under the zapovedniik system is 1.6% of the Russian Federation (Table 1). These zapovedniki are a potent legacy, as they comprise more than 40% of the world’s strict scientific nature reserves (Newell 2004).
Budget cuts for all forms of protected areas arguably pose the greatest threat to Russia’s reserve system (Newell 2004; Ostergen 1998; Wells and Williams 1998). Many zakazniki have no full-time staff and lack basic infrastructure. Zapovedniki generally have full-time staff, but some have crumbling facilities, no funds for scientific research, and inadequate equipment and fuel to patrol the reserve (Ostergen 1998). Lack of law enforcement, coupled with poverty and disregard for laws and regulations in Russia, has led to an escalation of illegal logging, poaching, and mining within reserve boundaries (Newell 2004). Lack of funds has led to squabbling between Moscow and regional governments: the latter complain that money earmarked for the region never arrives, while Moscow complains that money delivered to the regions is not spent properly. A secondary problem facing the reserve system is the conflicting priorities of the government bodies involved in their management; this problem hinders the development of a coherent management structure and conservation plan.
The protected area system remains poorly understood by the public. In Soviet times, zapovedniki were for scientific research, not tourism (Wells and Williams 1998). Many citizens still consider them reserves for the scientific elite and resent the loss of land for commercial use. There was no form of protected area allowing recreational use until the Soviet government created the national park system (Ostergren and Hollenhorst 1999). The public, however, generally resists the concept of a designated area for activities such as relaxing, picking mushrooms, and fishing: many Russians see the taiga as a common resource (Newell 2004).
Despite inadequate funding and structural flaws, the Russian reserve system has expanded significantly in the post-Soviet period. New forms of protected areas have been developed, particularly on the regional level, giving both governments and NGOs the flexibility necessary to further expand the system. A recent analysis of the country’s system noted this success in terms of expansion and correspondingly better protection of Russia’s ecological and cultural assets (Krever, Stishny, and Onufrenya 2009). But it also identified key gaps in the system by identifying ecosystems, landscapes, and species that need better protection. In general, the Arctic regions (where population and resource extraction pressures are relatively low) are fairly well-protected, while deciduous forests and steppes are not. With respect to biodiversity, there are significant gaps as well. The study found that 51% of rare and threatened mammal species (excluding whales and dolphins), 41% of rare and endangered birds, and 36% of endangered reptiles are protected (2009). This necessitates continued expansion of the nature reserve system despite persistent challenges discussed earlier.
Russian Federation and international treaties
Internationally, Russia participates in a number of global conventions on environmental issues (Hønnelund and Jørgenson 2003). In the 1990s alone, Russia signed on to more than 30 bilateral and 25 multilateral environmental protection agreements (Funke 2005, 261). Korppoo and co-authors suggest that Russia’s participation in global environmental governance and vision of itself as a global “environmental donor” are part of the country’s efforts to project its “soft power” internationally (Korppoo, Tynkkynen, and Hønneland 2015, 19). International agreements do not always lead to domestic action, however, and Russia’s participation can be limited. For example, in 2011, the Public Chamber, a group of representatives from civil society that advises the government, advocated without success Russia’s ratification of the Aarhus Convention, a global agreement that commits signatories to ensuring the rights of citizens to have access to information on the environment and to participate in environmental policy-making (Tumanov, Shapovalov, and Davydova 2014). Russia continues to participate in other environmental initiatives in a modest way, including providing $15 million to the Global Environmental Facility in 2014 (RIA Novosti 2014).
Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol allowed the climate agreement to come into force in 2005. Yet, after ratification, domestic climate policy developed at a glacial pace (Henry and Sundstrom 2012, 2014). In part, this inaction was because Kyoto’s generous emissions targets for Russia did not require the country to curb greenhouse gasses further. In addition, many Russian policy-makers and scientists remained skeptical about the causes of climate change and the ability of governments to slow the process. Early in the debate, some officials argued that a general trend toward warmer temperatures could benefit Russia. In 2003, at the World Conference on Climate Change in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that climate change is an important issue, but then joked, “an increase of two or three degrees wouldn’t be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up” (Pearce 2003). After only lukewarm participation in Kyoto’s joint implementation mechanism and the decision not to take part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia renewed its engagement in global climate negotiations at the Paris Climate Summit in 2015. At the talks, President Putin pledged that Russia would reduce it greenhouse gas levels by 70% from 1990s levels by 2030; critics argued that, given the post-Soviet industrial collapse of the 1990s when emissions dropped dramatically, this pledge allows Russia to actually increase current emissions by as much as 40%.
Instead, the Russian Government has focused on other benefits from participation in environmental regimes, such as achieving great power status, among other foreign policy goals, and obtaining economic advantages. Reflecting on Russia’s participation in the Paris agreement, Sergei Donskoi, the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, emphasized associated benefits that Russia expected to receive:
[the agreement] is a very good way to stimulate production, modernize the economy and so on. … In the plan to implement this agreement, we will undertake preparations and changes to the law from the point of view of the best technologies that have fewer emissions. In my opinion, it also will have a positive effect in terms of the modernization of production. (TASS 2016)
Russia also has attempted to shape emerging aspects of global governance in its favor, such as in determining the role of forests as carbon sinks in climate negotiations (Wilson Rowe 2013). Considering other international agreements, such as regional efforts to protect the Baltic Sea through the Helsinki Commission, Korppoo, Tynkkynen, and Hønneland (2015, 80) argue that “environmental protection may at times be seen as a relatively easy field of interstate cooperation, and can therefore be used as a way of projecting an image of cooperativeness and eliciting cooperation in non-environmental areas of greater interest.”
As Russian companies seek international investors and become players in the global market, they increasingly need to abide by global rules and norms in sourcing and manufacturing their products. A number of Russian forestry and fishing companies have been active participants in the product certification systems of the Forest Stewardship and Marine Stewardship Council (Tysiachniouk 2012). Environmentalists often promote these global standards inside Russia. For example, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has been the primary promoter of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification; Russia is now the country with the second highest acreage of forested territory certified as sustainably managed under FSC, following Canada. The global initiatives may have ancillary effects in the political sphere more broadly. FSC, for example, has introduced new ideas of equity into Russian discourse (Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2016) and has promoted new models of citizen participation (Henry and Tsyiachniouk 2015).
Russian companies also have developed internal corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and participate in global standards organizations such as the Global Reporting Initiative, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification, and the UN Global Compact. Russia may engage with the concept of CSR selectively, neglecting factors such as corruption and stakeholder consultation, for example (Preuss and Barkemeyer 2011). Crotty (2016) explores what CSR means in an economic context characterized by the legacy of state planning and high levels of corruption. She finds that CSR is often conflated with philanthropy and does not indicate robust connections to civil society, but may serve to demonstrate compliance with the law (2016, 846). A number of Russian NGOs promote CSR as a means of going beyond state regulations of companies. Recently, WWF initiated another effort to promote higher standards in the oil and gas sector through the creation of a rating system for the environmental responsibility of oil and gas companies in Russia (Shvarts, Pakhalov, and Knizhnikov 2016).
Certain regions of Russia are disproportionately affected by natural resource extraction, notably the Arctic region. Currently, the Arctic region is slated for significant development, including expansion of the oil and gas industry, mineral smelting, military installations, and shipping; by early 2014, “about 25% of the Russian Arctic shelf had been licensed to permit exploration and production” (Josephson 2016). Much of this activity is undertaken by companies that are least partially state-owned and that often evade environmental regulation (2016). Indigenous people in the Arctic suffer the greatest impact from this activity and often find it challenging to utilize domestic laws and global standards that are designed to protect their traditional practices, including fishing, hunting, and reindeer herding. In interviews, reindeer herders in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug recounted challenges with air pollution, trash, and pipelines blocking traditional herding routes and their difficulties negotiating with companies for compensation (Henry et al. 2016). Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud (2014) find that Russia is more willing to engage multilaterally in the Arctic than in other regions and issues, noting that the region has been “successfully ‘branded’ as a zone of peace and cooperation in the diplomatic framing.” Thus far, however, this framing has not had significant impacts on environmental or indigenous policy.