Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 4:53 am

Edward T. Ned Caton -- Obituary
by The Virginian Pilot
November 23, 2014

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Virginia Beach - Edward T. (Ned) Caton, 86, was born April 7, 1928 at Leigh Memorial Hospital in Norfolk and died there on November 18, 2014 He was the son of the late Minnie Frances Murphy Caton and Edward T. Caton, Jr. He is survived by his wife of 58 years, Patricia (Patsy) Ackiss Caton of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and his three children, Christopher Edward Caton of Virginia Beach, Virginia, Leigh Anne Caton Vincent and her husband Branch (Chip) W. Vincent, III of Southern Shores, North Carolina and John Murphy Caton of Cape Charles, Virginia. He is further survived by five grandchildren, Patricia Karoline (Karly) Caton of Virginia Beach, Virginia, Caton Elizabeth Vincent, Benjamin Branch Edward Vincent, Anna Leigh Downs Vincent and David Ackiss Vincent of Southern Shores, North Carolina.

Ned attended Larchmont Elementary School and was graduated from Maury High School in Norfolk, Virginia, Class of 1946. He spent a brief time in Miami Beach, Florida working as a lifeguard. After returning to Norfolk, he worked for Norfolk newspapers until June 1947. Ned lifeguarded at the Cavalier Beach Club for the summer of 1947 and for the next 2-3 years and also waited tables at Trafton Chalfonte, a small resort hotel on the oceanfront in Virginia Beach.

Ned attended and was graduated from the University of Virginia, Class of 1951, with a B.S. in Commerce. After graduating from UVA, he attended the United States Coast Guard Officers' Candidate School (OCS) in New London, Connecticut and was commissioned as an Ensign. Thereafter he was stationed in Portsmouth, Virginia on the buoy tender "Jonquil" and later on the buoy tender "Mistletoe". He remained active in the Coast Guard Reserves for many years.

In 1953, Ned enrolled in law school at the University of Virginia where he joined the distinguished law fraternity Phi Delta Phi and was graduated in February 1956. He was admitted to the Virginia State Bar in February 1956 and began practicing law in Virginia Beach immediately thereafter.

Ned married Patsy Ackiss on April 7, 1956 and were married for 58 years.

Ned was very active in the Virginia Beach community. He was a member of the American Legion Post in Ocean View, a representative to Boy's State, received a Beautification Award for the renovation of an old beach cottage which became his law office on Pacific Avenue for over 50 years. He was a member of the Exchange Club, a member of the JayCees and the Ruritan Club. In 1967, The JayCees awarded him Young Man of the Year in Virginia Beach. Ned was a member of Virginia Beach United Methodist Church. He served on the Virginia Beach City Council of the small City of Virginia Beach from 1958 to 1965. Ned was involved in and prepared the preliminary charter to merge the City of Virginia Beach with the larger Princess Anne County which became the City of Virginia Beach as we know it today. As a result of this merger, Virginia Beach became a city on January 1, 1963. Ned was also a member of the Princess Anne Country Club where he enjoyed the men's group and tennis.

Ned also served in the Virginia House of Delegates from 1966 to 1968 and in the Virginia Senate from 1968 to 1972. After leaving the legislature, he was appointed to the Virginia Beach School Board and served until the early 1980's. He also was appointed as a Commissioner in Chancery for the Virginia Beach Court System.

The family will receive friends on Sunday, November 23, 2014 at H. D. Oliver Funeral Apts., Laskin Road Chapel from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. A funeral service will be celebrated on Monday, November 24, 2014 at the Virginia Beach United Methodist Church at 19th and Pacific Street in Virginia Beach at 11:00 AM.

In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to Virginia Beach United Methodist Church, the Virginia Beach Rescue Squad, 740 Virginia Beach Blvd. Virginia Beach, Virginia 23451 or the Noblemen, 2681 Production Road, Suite 105, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23454. Online condolences may be made at hdoliver.com.
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 5:05 am

Retired Virginia Beach Police Chief loses battle with cancer
by Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police & Foundation (VACP)
May 19, 2009

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The VACP is saddened to report that Retired Virginia Beach Chief Charles R. Wall passed away Monday night, May 18, 2009, after a courageous battle with cancer. Chief Wall served as President of the VACP from August, 1996 – August, 1997.

Funeral services will be held Friday, May 22 in Virginia Beach.

Chief Wall retired from the Virginia Beach Police Department in August of 1999, after 18 years of dedicated service, and, along with his wife, Marion, lived in Virginia Beach. During his long law enforcement career, beginning in 1958, Chief Wall served as the Chief of Police for Morgantown, WV, Rockville, MD, and Washington Township, NJ. Chief Wall also served as a staff consultant for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP.) Under his leadership the Virginia Beach Police Department received its first national accreditation in 1987, at that time being one of only 25 cities nationwide to achieve this distinction. During his tenure, the Police Department was one of the first City departments to implement a microcomputer local area network, E-911 emergency telephone reporting that displays a caller’s telephone number and address, and became the first municipality to use both mobile and portable KDT technology in a public safety operation. Chief Wall continued the expansion of the 800MHz radio system, the Department’s Automated Fingerprint Identification System was recognized as one of the best in the Commonwealth, established the Fourth Precinct in the Kempsville area and a police substation in Creeds, established the Selective Enforcement Team to apprehend drunk drivers, and implemented the Family Trauma Unit to investigate sexual and physical assault cases involving children and family members. During his tenure as Virginia Beach’s Police Chief, Chief Wall was responsible for establishing Crime Solvers and the Mounted Patrol. He was a proponent of community policing, school resource officers, and increasing training standards for all officers. In 1981, when he became Police Chief, the Virginia Beach Police Department’s sworn complement was 397. By the time he retired in 1999, Chief Wall commanded 777 sworn officers. During that time, the Department was aggressive in pursuing federal funding for sworn personnel, and was one of the first departments in the nation to be awarded grant funds through the U. S. Department of Justice COPS Office in 1993 for 28 officers. Grants totaling more than $8 million for about 120 officers were awarded for additional sworn personnel under his tenure as chief. Under his watch, Part I crimes dropped from 56.3 crimes per 1,000 population to 38.5 crimes per 1,000 population. From 1986 – 1997 Chief Wall served on the Board of Directors of Crime Stoppers International, Inc. Following his retirement, he remained an active Board Member of Virginia Beach Crime Solvers. In memory of Chief Wall, Virginia Beach police officers will have their badges draped through the day of his memorial service. There will be two viewing sessions on Thursday, May 21, from 1:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., at Smith and Williams Funeral Home, 4889 Princess Anne Road, Virginia Beach. A Memorial Service will be held on Friday, May 22, at 2:00 p.m. at the Church of the Ascension located at 4853 Princess Anne Road, Virginia Beach. A graveside service will follow at Colonial Grove Memorial Park, Princess Anne and Dam Neck Roads. The family has asked that, in lieu of flowers, donations be made to Virginia Beach Crime Solvers, Inc.

Virginia Beach Crime Solvers, Inc. Dan Edwards, Treasurer 1513 Beachview Drive, Virginia Beach 23464

Cards of sympathy may be sent to:

Mrs. Marion Wall C/O The Virginia Beach Police Department 2509 Princess Anne Road, Building #11 Virginia Beach, VA 23456
Please keep Chief Wall and his family in your thoughts and prayers.
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 5:19 am

Deputy Chief William T. Dean - Operations Division
by vbgov.com [Virginia Beach]
Accessed: 12/18/17

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Deputy Chief William (Bill) T. Dean commands the Operations Division. He began his career with the Virginia Beach Police Department in February 1986. He is from Ocala, Florida later moving to Athens, Georgia and then Poolesville, Maryland as his family followed the policing career of his father. He is married, with an adult son.

Deputy Chief Dean has served our community as a police officer in several capacities including Precinct Uniformed Patrol and as a Special Investigations Detective assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Unit, participating in joint investigations with the Drug Enforcement Agency, the United States Customs Service, and as a Task Force Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In a supervisory capacity, he has served in the Operations Division as a Patrol Sergeant, a Patrol Lieutenant, and as Command Duty Captain. In the Investigative Division, he has served as a Detective Sergeant in the Domestic Violence and Missing Persons Unit, and most recently as the Captain, and Commanding Officer of the Detective Bureau. Deputy Chief Dean has also served the Department in the Professional Standards Division as an Internal Affairs Lieutenant, Freedom of Information Act Coordinator, Accreditation Manager, and Training Director. He has also held ancillary duties as the Crisis Intervention Team Coordinator, and the Police Liaison to the Virginia Beach Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative.​​

Deputy Chief Dean earned his Associates Degree in General Studies from Montgomery Community College, Germantown Maryland, Bachelors of Science Degree in Criminal Justice and his Master of Public Administration Degree from Old Dominion University, earning several academic distinctions. He is also a graduate and class president of the University of Virginia and Virginia State Police National Criminal Justice Command College, a graduate of the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Police, and the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police West Point Leadership Program. Deputy Chief Dean was instrumental in the development of the Virginia Beach Police West Point Leadership Course, serving at various times as a class coordinator and instructor. He is an Assessor for the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and a past president of the Virginia Association of CALEA Accreditation Professionals.
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 6:29 am

John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 12/18/17

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The Right Honourable
The Earl of Dunmore
PC
Sir Joshua Reynolds - John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore - Google Art Project.jpg
Governor of the Province of New York
In office
1770–1771
Monarch George III
Preceded by Sir Henry Moore
Succeeded by William Tryon
Governor of the Province of Virginia
In office
1771–1775
Monarch George III
Preceded by Lord Botetourt
Succeeded by Patrick Henry (as Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia)
20th Royal Governor of the Bahamas
In office
1787–1796
Monarch George III
Preceded by James Edward Powell
Succeeded by John Forbes
Personal details
Born 1730
Taymouth, Scotland
Died 25 February 1809 (aged 78–79)
Ramsgate, Kent, England
Nationality British

Lord John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore and 4th Viscount of Fincastle, PC (1730 – 25 February 1809), generally known as Lord Dunmore, was a Scottish peer and colonial governor in the American colonies and The Bahamas. He was the last British Governor of Virginia.[1]

Lord Dunmore was named governor of the Province of New York in 1770. He succeeded to the same position in the Colony of Virginia the following year, after the death of Norborne Berkeley, 4th Baron Botetourt. As Virginia's governor, Dunmore directed a series of campaigns against the trans-Appalachian Indians, known as Lord Dunmore's War. He is noted for issuing a 1775 document (Dunmore's Proclamation) offering freedom to any slave who fought for the Crown against the Patriots in Virginia. Dunmore fled to New York after the Burning of Norfolk in 1776, and later returned to Britain. He was Governor of the Bahama Islands from 1787 to 1796. Dunmore was the last royal governor of Virginia.

Family and early life

Murray was born in Tymouth, Scotland, the eldest son of William Murray, 3rd Earl of Dunmore, by his marriage to Catherine Nairne; he was a nephew of John Murray, 2nd Earl of Dunmore. In 1745 both Murray, then only 15, and his father joined the ill-fated Rising of "Bonnie Prince Charlie" (Charles Edward Stuart), and the young Murray was appointed as a page to Prince Charles. The second Earl, his uncle, remained loyal to the Hanoverians .

After the Jacobite army was defeated at the Battle of Culloden in 1746, William Murray was imprisoned in Tower of London and his family was put under house arrest. By 1750, William Murray had received a conditional pardon. John Murray was now aged twenty and joined the British Army. In 1756, after the deaths of his uncle and father, he became the fourth Earl of Dunmore.

In 1759 Dunmore married Lady Charlotte, a daughter of Alexander Stewart, 6th Earl of Galloway. Their daughter Lady Augusta Murray later became an unwanted daughter-in-law of King George III, when she married his son Prince Augustus Frederick without the consent of the King. The Dunmores had another daughter close to her age, Lady Catherine Murray, and soon after they landed in Virginia they had another child, Lady Virginia Murray. Their daughter Lady Susan Murray (1768–1826) had three husbands and children by each: first Joseph Tharp, heir to a Jamaica sugar fortune; second John Drew, son of the Chichester banker John Drew; and finally a clergyman in Ireland, the Reverend Archibald Edward Douglas.

Colonial governor of New York

Dunmore was named the British governor of the Province of New York from 1770 to 1771. Soon after his appointment, in 1770, Virginia's governor, Norborne Berkeley, 4th Baron Botetourt (Lord Botetourt) died, and Dunmore was eventually named to replace him.[2]

Colonial governor of Virginia

Dunmore's War

Dunmore became royal governor of the Colony of Virginia on 25 September 1771 . Despite growing issues with Great Britain, his predecessor, Lord Botetourt, had been a popular governor in Virginia, even though he served only two years before his death. As Virginia's colonial governor, Dunmore directed a series of campaigns against the Indians known as Lord Dunmore's War. The Shawnee were the main target of these attacks, and his avowed purpose was to strengthen Virginia's claims in the west, particularly in the Ohio Country, but as a byproduct it was known he would increase his own power base. Some even accused Dunmore of colluding with the Shawnees and arranging the war to deplete the Virginia militia and help safeguard the Loyalist cause, should there be a colonial rebellion. Dunmore, in his history of the Indian Wars, denied these accusations.[3]

Battle for control

Lacking in diplomatic skills, Dunmore tried to govern without consulting the House of Burgesses of the Colonial Assembly for more than a year, which exacerbated an already tense situation.[4]

When Dunmore finally convened the Colonial Assembly in March 1773, which was the only way he could deal with fiscal issues to financially support his war through additional taxation, the burgesses instead first resolved to form a committee of correspondence to communicate their continued concerns about the Townshend Acts and Gaspee Affair to Great Britain. Dunmore immediately postponed the Assembly. Many of burgesses gathered a short distance away at the Raleigh Tavern and continued discussing their problems with the new taxes, perceived corruption and lack of representation in England. When Dunmore reconvened the Assembly in 1774, the burgesses passed a resolution declaring 1 June 1774 a day of fasting and prayer in Virginia. In response, Dunmore dissolved the House.

The burgesses again reconvened as the Second Virginia Convention and elected delegates to the Continental Congress. Dunmore issued a proclamation against electing delegates to the Congress, but failed to take serious action.[5] In March 1775, Patrick Henry's "Give me Liberty, or give me Death!" speech delivered at St. John's Episcopal Church in Richmond helped convince delegates to approve a resolution calling for armed resistance.[6]

In the face of rising unrest in the colony, Dunmore sought to deprive Virginia's militia of military supplies. Dunmore gave the key to the Williamsburg magazine to Lieutenant Henry Colins, commander of HMS Magdalen, and ordered him to remove the powder, provoking what became known as the Gunpowder Incident. On the night of 20 April 1775, royal marines loaded fifteen half-barrels of powder into the governor's wagon, intent on transporting it down the Quarterpath Road to the James River and the British warship. Local militia rallied, and word of the incident spread across the colony.

Confrontation with the Hanover militia

The Hanover militia, led by Patrick Henry, arrived outside of Williamsburg on 3 May. That same day, Dunmore evacuated his family from the Governor's Palace to his hunting lodge, Porto Bello in nearby York County.[7] On 6 May, Dunmore issued a proclamation against "a certain Patrick Henry... and a Number of deluded Followers" who had organised "an Independent Company... and put themselves in a Posture of War."[6]

Dunmore threatened to impose martial law, and eventually retreated to Porto Bello to join his family. Dislodged by the Virginia rebels and wounded in the leg,[8] on 8 June, Dunmore took refuge on the British warship HMS Fowey in the York River. Over the next months, Dunmore sent many raiding parties to plunder plantations along the James, York and Potomac rivers, particularly those owned by rebels. The raiders exacerbated tensions, since they not only stole supplies, they also encouraged slaves to rebel. In December, Washington commented "I do not think that forcing his lordship on shipboard is sufficient. Nothing less than depriving him of life or liberty will secure peace to Virginia, as motives of resentment actuate his conduct to a degree equal to the total destruction of that colony."[8]

Dunmore's Proclamation

Dunmore is noted for Dunmore's Proclamation, also known as Lord Dunmore's Offer of Emancipation. Dated 7 November 1775, but proclaimed a week later, Dunmore thereby formally offered freedom to slaves who abandoned their Patriot masters to join the British. Dunmore had previously withheld his signature from a bill against the slave trade.[4] The proclamation appeared to respond to the legislature's proclamation that Dunmore had resigned his position by boarding a warship off Yorktown nearly six months earlier. However, by the end of the war, an estimated 800 to 2000 escaped slaves sought refuge with the British; some served in the army, though the majority served in noncombatant roles.[9][10]

Dunmore organized these Black Loyalists into his Ethiopian Regiment. However, despite winning the Battle of Kemp's Landing on 17 November 1775, Dunmore lost decisively at the Battle of Great Bridge on 9 December 1775. Following that defeat, Dunmore loaded his troops, and many Virginia Loyalists, onto British ships. Smallpox spread in the confined quarters, and some 500 of the 800 members of the Ethiopian Regiment died.[11]

Final skirmishes and return to Britain

On New Year's Day in 1776, Dunmore gave orders to burn waterfront buildings in Norfolk from which patriot troops were firing on his ships. However, the fire spread. The city burned, and with it any hope that Dunmore's loyalists could return to Virginia.[12] Dunmore retreated to New York. Some ships of his refugee fleet were sent south, mostly to Florida.[13] When he realized he could not regain control in Virginia, Dunmore returned to Britain in July 1776. Dunmore continued to draw his pay as the colony's governor until 1783, when Britain recognized American independence.

From 1787 to 1796, Dunmore served as governor of the Bahamas. is tenure as governor, the British issued land grants to American Loyalists who went into exile. The sparse population of the Bahamas tripled within a few years. The Loyalists developed cotton as a commodity crop, but it dwindled from insect damage and soil exhaustion. In addition to slaves they brought with them, the loyalist planters' descendants imported more African slaves for labour.

Peerage

Dunmore sat as a Scottish representative peer in the House of Lords from 1761 to 1774 and from 1776 to 1790.

Death

Dunmore died on 25 February 1809 in Ramsgate in Kent.[14] He was succeeded in the earldom by his eldest son, George.[15] The Countess of Dunmore died in 1819.

Legacy

Dunmore County, Virginia, formed in 1772, was named in his honour. However, as the American Revolution got underway, the citizens changed its name to Shenandoah County in 1778.
Lake Dunmore in Salisbury, Vermont, was named after him in 1773, since he had claimed ownership of the area while he was Governor of New York.[16]
Porto Bello, the hunting lodge of Lord Dunmore, still stands on the grounds of Camp Peary in York County, Virginia. It is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Access to the base is highly restricted, so the structure is not available for public viewing.
The Dunmore Pineapple was built in 1761 before he left Scotland. The building is now owned by the National Trust for Scotland and is leased to the Landmark Trust who use it to provide holiday accommodation. The gardens are open to the public year-round.
Dunmore Street in Norfolk, Virginia, was named for him. It is said that the naming of Dunmore Street was not to honour the ex-governor, but to celebrate the place in Norfolk where he had last set foot.
The borough of Dunmore in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, is named after Dunmore Park in Scotland, location of the Dunmore Pineapple.
Lord Dunmore Drive in Virginia Beach, Virginia.
Dunmore Town, Harbour Island, North Eleuthera, Bahamas.

References

1. http://www.thepeerage.com/p10852.htm
2. Dunmore Biography.
3. Roosevelt, Theodore (1889). [1], Chapters VIII "Lord Dunmore's War" and XI "The Battle of the Great Kanawha", passim.
4. b PBS org
5. "Proclamation".
6. Red Hill Archived 26 November 2012 at the Wayback Machine..
7. Kibler, J. Luther (April 1931). "Numerous Errors in Wilstach's 'Tidewater Virginia' Challenge Criticism". William and Mary Quarterly. 2nd Ser. 11 (2): 152–156. doi:10.2307/1921010. JSTOR 1921010.
8. Wilson, James Grant; Fiske, John, eds. (1900). "Dunmore, John Murray". Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography. New York: D. Appleton.
9. Lanning, Michael Lee (2005). African Americans in the Revolutionary War. Citadel Press. p. 59. ISBN 0-8065-2716-1.
10. Raphael, Ray (2002). A People's History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence. Harper Collins. p. 324. ISBN 0-06-000440-1.
11. Stephanie True Peters (2005). Smallpox in the New World. Marshall Cavendish. p. 43.
12. Guy, Louis L. jr. bad link as of 12/16/12 --no independent access to Norfolk Historical SocietyCourier (Spring 2001)
13. Pybus, Cassandra Jefferson's Faulty Math: The Question of Slave Defections in the American Revolution Archived 10 August 2007 at the Wayback Machine. William and Mary Quarterly vol. 62 no. 2 (2005)- subscription or bad link as of 12/16/12
14. BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX OF FORMER FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH 1783 – 2002 (PDF). The Royal Society of Edinburgh. July 2006. ISBN 0 902 198 84 X.
15. Lowe, William C. "John Murray, fourth earl of Dunmore (ca. 1730–1809)". Encyclopedia Virginia/Dictionary of Virginia Biography. Retrieved 11 March 2015.
16. Zaremba, Robert E. and Danielle R. Jeanloz, Around Middlebury (Arcadia Publishing, 2000), p. 95.
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 8:56 pm

Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Kelso Leaves Legacy of Service, Integrity
by navy.mil
America's Navy
From Naval History and Heritage Command
6/24/2013

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WASHINGTON (Sept. 21, 1991) An official U.S. Navy portrait of the 24th Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Frank B. Kelso II. The photo is dated Sept. 21, 1991. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 3rd Class Jon Blosser/Released)

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Adm. Frank Kelso II, 79, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), died Sunday, June 23, 2013, following injuries sustained from a fall earlier in the week.

Kelso, a native of Fayetteville, Tenn., served as Chief of Naval Operations from June 29, 1990 until April 23, 1994.

As the Chief of Naval Operations and throughout his career as a naval officer, Kelso was renowned for his intelligence, integrity and upstanding character.

"Adm. Kelso was a submariner, an accomplished commander, and an unmatched leader known for his intelligence and integrity. The thoughts of the 900,000 Sailors, Marines and civilians who make up the Department of the Navy go out to our fallen shipmate and his family. Semper Fortis," said Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Ray Mabus.

"Adm. Frank Kelso's bold leadership and innovative thinking guided the Navy through times of war and significant draw-down at the end of the Cold War. The ability to cut against the grain and find new and creative solutions for the Navy are what set Admiral Kelso apart from his peers. It was his strength of character and sure-fire integrity that ensured his success as a former CNO and to a higher degree solidified the formidable legacy of a great life that Admiral Frank Kelso leaves behind. It was an honor to have served with him and we are a better Navy due to his leadership and faithful commitment to our Sailors, civilians and their families," said U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert.

Kelso eventually returned to live in Fayetteville, Tenn., in 2003, a decade after retiring from the Navy.

He was the third of three submariners in a row who served as CNO in in the 1980s and '90s. As CNO he led the Navy in a period of significant drawdown of U.S. naval forces in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the ballyhooed "peace dividend." Concurrently, he oversaw the introduction of new platforms and systems that improved capabilities, including precision strike operations. The nation persistently called on the naval capabilities throughout his tour, starting with Operation Desert Storm.

As CNO, he also oversaw revolutionary changes within the OPNAV staff and profoundly changed the means by which the Navy processed and made decisions. In keeping with joint staff practices, he changed "OP" codes to "N" codes, and the staff was reorganized to align with a "Napoleonic" arrangement used by both the Army and the Joint Staff. In a period of dramatic change, he helped to transform not merely the organization, but also the processes by which information could be shared and considered. He is credited with dramatically changing the means by which more informed decisions could be made by the Navy.

Kelso was a strong advocate for the integration of women, particularly in the wake of the 1991 Tailhook Convention during which numerous incidents of sexual assault and harassment were found to have occurred.

During his tour as Commander of the Navy's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro and had killed a disabled passenger. When their demands were not met, they negotiated safe refuge and were flown towards Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner. The plane was intercepted by U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats and forced to land in Sigonella, Sicily, where the hijackers were arrested and later tried for murder.

In March of 1986 the U.S. initiated a series of 'Freedom of Navigation' exercises in the Gulf of Sidra that challenged Libyan leader's Col. Muammar al-Qadhafi "line of death" that spanned the Gulf of Sidra. Then Vice Adm. Kelso deployed elements of Task Force 60 including America (CV 66), Coral Sea (CV 43), and Saratoga (CV 60) with upward of 250 aircraft and 26 ships and submarines across the line and triggered Libyan action. Ultimately naval aircraft completed 1,546 sorties in support of the successful operation.

Then in April of that year, following additional terrorist attacks sponsored by al-Qadhafi, the U.S. launched Operation El Dorado Canyon-attacks against Libyan military targets. Under Kelso, U.S. aircraft attacked three target areas near Tripoli. Jets also bombed the al-Jamahiriyyah barracks and Benina Airfield, both near Benghazi.

Kelso got his start in public school and the University of the South in Sewanee, Tenn., prior to entering the U.S. Naval Academy in 1952. Following graduation in 1956, he served in the cargo ship USS Oglethorpe (AKA 100) before attending Submarine School in 1958. On completion of training, he was assigned to the submarine USS Sabalo (SS 302) before returning to Submarine School for nuclear power training in January 1960. He then served one year in the Nuclear Power Department at the school. Subsequent tours included the pre-commissioning crew of the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Pollack (SSN 603), Engineering Officer aboard USS Daniel Webster (SSBN 626) and Executive Officer of USS Sculpin (SSN 590).

From January 1969 to August 1971, Kelso served as Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School in Bainbridge, Md. Following tours included Commanding Officer, USS Finback (SSN 670); Staff of Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and Commanding Officer, USS Bluefish (SSN 675). Adm. Kelso was then assigned as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic from September 1975 to July 1977.

He served as Commander, Submarine Squadron SEVEN until reporting as Division Director, Submarine Distribution Division in the Naval Military Personnel Command, and Section Head of the Submarine Programs Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) in September 1978.

He was selected for promotion to the rank of rear admiral in February 1980.

Upon selection for flag rank, Admiral Kelso served as Director, Strategic Submarine Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and then was assigned as Director, Office of Program Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. On February 8, 1985, Adm. Kelso became Commander 6th Fleet and NATO Commander Naval Striking Force and Support Forces Southern Europe. On June 30, 1986, Adm. Kelso was promoted to admiral and assumed the duties of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Kelso became Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command on November 22, 1988. He became the Navy's 24th Chief of Naval Operations on June 29, 1990.

Adm. Kelso has been awarded the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), Legion of Merit (four awards), Meritorious Service, Navy Commendation and Navy Achievement Medals.

He is survived by his second wife, Georgeanna, his four children and numerous grandchildren. Landess McCown, his first wife of 56 years, passed away in 2012.

Kelso, who would have been 80 on July 11, 2013, will be buried in Fayetteville in the historic Rose Hill Cemetery on Saturday.

Complete text of statements from Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert on the passing of Adm. Kelso is available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75026
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Dec 19, 2017 9:06 pm

NATO Defense College
by ndc.nato.int
Last updated: 27 Feb. 2017 17:00
Accessed: 12/19/17

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NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE MISSION

In response to Strategic Guidance issued to the NATO Defense College (NDC) by the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee (MC123/9), The Mission of the NATO Defense College is to:

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NDC Logo

* The mission of the NDC is to contribute to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance by developing its role as a major centre of education, outreach and research on transatlantic security issues.

To foster forward and creative strategic thinking on the key issues facing the Alliance, the NDC:

a. Provides senior-level education and brings together senior-level military and civilian officials to interact on NATO issues in a unique, diverse and multicultural setting while cultivating multi-national consensus-building and providing opportunities for multinational networking;

b. Engages in comprehensive outreach in support of Alliance strategic objectives;

c. Conducts strategic security studies and research in support of the Alliance's wider goals.

The scope of activities is to include:

a. The Alliance's shared values and interests, current and prospective missions, politico-military concepts, policies, organization and working methods;

b. The potential risks to the security of the Alliance and its members;

c. NATO's transformation, including defence planning and resource management;

d. The political, security, defence and socio-economic systems and interests of the Allies and their co-operation partners; their capabilities, limitations and prospects in international relations, particularly in the fields of defence and security; and their cultural diversity;

e. The role of, and interaction with, other key security-related international organizations;

f. Cooperation and regional security efforts of the Alliance;

g. Academic research, policy support and discussions on security issues;

h. Practice in the English and French languages;

i. The involvement of Partnership for Peace (PfP), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries, as well as those partners across the Globe (PatG)1 with a partnership programme with NATO;

j. Cooperation with other similar NATO and NATO nations' national military and civilian education and research institutions and think-tanks, as well as with institutions from partners, Non-NATO entities (NNEs)2, private companies, universities, think-tanks and other academic bodies.

_______________

Notes:

1 Within this document, “partners” refers to Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries, as well as those partners across the globe (PatG) with a partnership programme with NATO, unless otherwise stated.

2 In accordance with MC 0458/3, NNEs include International Organizations (IO), Governmental Organizations (GO) of non-NATO nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Non-NATO Multinational forces, Host Nations (when the host nation is not a NATO nation), Contractors on operations, exercises and transformational activities, and Non-NATO countries that do not meet the “partners” criteria as defined in footnote 1.

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WHO'S WHO
Last updated: 12 Dec. 2017 13:57

The Commandant

The Commandant ensures that NDC fulfills its mission to contribute to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance by developing its role as a major centre of education, study and research on transatlantic issues. The Commandant is responsible to the Military Committee, but her responsibilities and powers authorize her to communicate with NATO agencies, NATO members’ national authorities, academic institutions, such as the PfP Consortium, and individuals as appropriate. The Commandant may also liaise with non-NATO national bodies for the purpose of programs approved by the North Atlantic Council, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Lieutenant General Chris Whitecross

The Commandant


Last updated: 07 Nov. 2017 16:38

Welcome to the NATO Defense College! This is indeed a unique institution. For 60 years the College has been training and educating leaders, both military and civilian, who have gone on to work at NATO Headquarters and its Commands, as well as in the related diplomatic and military fields in their respective nations. Our strategic-level courses ensure that our graduates have a firm grasp of the new challenges that may affect our future security. Furthermore, our method of instruction helps graduates develop the human interoperability skills that are necessary to function successfully in a multinational environment.

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Lieutenant General Chris T. Whitecross

Outreach is one of our key specialities and the College is now part of a recognized defence network that extends to over 50 nations. Nations participating in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) programs have benefited from having representatives attend our extended Senior Course and shorter Modular Short Courses and Integrated Partnership Orientation Courses. In the spring of 2005 we had our first representative from Iraq attend NDC and in the fall of 2005 we welcomed our first Course Members from the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative nations to the College.

Furthermore the Secretary General characterized NDC as "...an indispensable part of the new NATO". He concluded his remarks by saying, "More than ever, we need military men and women with keen political instincts and considerable diplomatic skills. More than ever, we require military and civilians gifted with the talent of improvisation, able to communicate in several languages, able to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. And more than ever, we need people who are geared to cooperation with colleagues from other countries, whether they are from Allied or Partner countries. We also need what has been referred to as human interoperability - officers who think alike, officers who share the same fundamental ideas and who are not just able, but actually pre-disposed, to finding new approaches to new problems".

Lieutenant General Chris Whitecross, Royal Canadian Air Force, NDC Commandant


The DEAN

The Dean is responsible for the quality of the academic program, oversight of the curriculum and advice on academic policies. In this role he oversees the Academic Planning and Policy Division, the Academic Operations Division, the Research Division and the Middle East Faculty. He assists the Commandant on a variety of issues and initiatives and represents the Commandant during her absences. The Dean cultivates and maintains close relationships with Allied Command Transformation and NATO HQ to insure that guidance on academic, policy and strategic issues will be coordinated and reflected in curriculum planning and development.

BrigGen (ret.) František Mičánek

The DEAN

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 10:56

Ladies and gentlemen,

Welcome to the world of academic operations and research. This world has been built step by step by many previous Deans, Heads of Academic Divisions, Faculty Advisors and researchers who, for more than 60 years, have carefully and gradually created the current NDC curriculum.

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BrigGen (ret.) František Mičánek

Our College is a truly exceptional educational institution, delivering high-level lifelong education opportunities for both military and civilian personnel to be prepared for NATO and other international organizations appointments. What makes the NDC unique, compared to national defence universities and colleges, is a commitment to the original 1951 vision of General Eisenhower, combined with a number of modern features:

* Continuous re-identification of up-to-date and relevant topics from all domains of the field of international security studies – political, military, technological, legal, social, economy and environmental. Many of these reflect recommendations given by MC, IMS and ACT. They are regularly reviewed, thanks to a very complex system of evaluation and feedback from Course Members, NDC Anciens and the NDC Academic Advisory Board;

* Wide implementation of modern and highly efficient methods and modes of learning enabling Course Members to share personal experience, discuss their reflective observation from lectures delivered by world class scholars, reach abstract conceptualization, learn how to build consensus and validate acquired theoretical knowledge through active experimentation and exercises.

* High percentage of active engagement of Course Members. They work in committees in a purely international, socially rich environment, taken out of their national professional and cultural comfort zones and repeatedly intellectually challenged by the NDC academic staff and keynote speakers. The quality to which greatest importance is attached is not military rank or seniority, but level of holistic strategic thinking, dedication to teamwork, depth and strength of arguments used in discussion, as well as informal leadership, and last but not least cultural and ethical awareness;

* Significant investment of financial and human resources to ensure that teaching (and, above all, learning) is optimized by cutting edge technology. Our NDC academic portal not only provides all necessary information and data for staff, Anciens and Course Members, but also supports ADL and sharing of research publications, as well as other electronic sources prepared either by our Research Division or by our superb NDC Knowledge and Learning Centre;

* Permanent identification of new avenues for cooperation with other academic institutions, enhancing the pooling and sharing of resources dedicated to lifelong education.

The conditions and characteristics of the international security arena change and evolve continuously. So do we. Through its courses and related activities, the NDC is – and will continue to be – an excellent platform for promoting greater dialogue across cultures, religions and ideologies. We will continue to uphold and develop the academic heritage of our predecessors, in order to build and further reinforce trust among nations, helping overcome mental barriers and ensuring that any misunderstandings or misperceptions based on insufficient cultural awareness can be placed in an appropriate perspective. In other words, our academic programmes will seek to capitalize on the transformative power of education.

But be aware these gigantic tasks cannot be completed by faculty of the NDC alone. We need the continuing support of all NATO member states and partner nations; we need to be able to count on your trust, and your full understanding of the sheer complexity of our challenge.

Let me express my own personal belief, that we may have common understanding. All of this work is done in conviction that education is the only force capable to shape our destiny. Science and historically-obtained knowledge recognize no boundaries, and must be shared for the sake of peaceful future coexistence of all humankind.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you – and see you in Rome!

The Dean

~ UNITATEM ALENTES ~ FOR UNITY WE STRIVE ~


The Director of Management

The Director of Management (DoM) is the principal advisor to the Commandant on management issues. He is responsible for general operations, maintenance and coordination with the Host Nation regarding College facilities. The spectrum of activity of the DoM is comprised of general management, personnel, administration, information technology, security, logistics and support issues. He may act on behalf of the Commandant within this sphere of activity upon the direction of the Commandant or during his absence.

Brigadier General Mario Ramponi

The Director of Management

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 10:56

The Director of Management (DoM) is the principal advisor to the Commandant on management issues.

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Brigadier General Mario RAMPONI

He is responsible for general operations, maintenance and coordination with the Host Nation regarding College facilities. The spectrum of activity of the DoM is comprised of general management, personnel, administration, information technology, security, logistics and support issues.

He may act on behalf of the Commandant within this sphere of activity upon the direction of the Commandant or during his absence.

Brigadier General Mario Ramponi, Italian Army,
NDC Director of Management


The Head of the Academic Operations Division

The Head of the Academic Operations Division (DAO) is responsible to the Dean and Commandant for the delivery of the Senior Course and associated short courses (Modular Short Course (MSC), Integrated Partners’ Orientation Course (IPOC), and NATO Executive Development Programme (NEDP)). The DAO has direct responsibility for the Faculty Advisors Group, the Academic Programmes Branch, the Academic Field Studies Branch and the Linguistic Services Section.

Brigadier General David Pincet

The Head of the Academic Operations Division

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 11:32

The Head of the Academic Operations Division (DAO) is responsible to the Dean and Commandant for the delivery of the Senior Course and associated short courses (Modular Short Course (MSC), Integrated Partners’ Orientation Course (IPOC), and NATO Executive Development Programme (NEDP)). The DAO has direct responsibility for the Faculty Advisors Group, the Academic Programmes Branch, the Academic Field Studies Branch and the Linguistic Services Section.

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Major General Pascal VALENTIN

Brigadier General David Pincet, French Air Force, Head of the Academic Operations Division


The Head of the Academic Planning and Policy Division

The Division Head Academic Planning and Policy reports to (and, when necessary, deputizes for) the Dean. He directs and coordinates the activities of the Curriculum Planning Branch, the Academic Policy Branch and the Library and Knowledge Centre.
Supported by the Academic Planning and Policy Division, he is responsible for the preparation of the long-term programme for all academic courses and activities, as well as for the development, evaluation and revision of the academic objectives and curricula for all courses, including the academic material, educational methods and Faculty training. Among these courses are the six-month Senior Course, several short Modular Short Courses and the Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors’ Course.

Brigadier General Heinz Josef Feldmann

The Head of the Academic Planning and Policy Division

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 11:32

The Division Head Academic Planning and Policy reports to (and, when necessary, deputizes for) the Dean. He directs and coordinates the activities of the Curriculum Planning Branch, the Academic Policy Branch and the Library and Knowledge Centre.

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Brigadier General Heinz Josef Feldmann

Supported by the Academic Planning and Policy Division, he is responsible for the preparation of the long-term programme for all academic courses and activities, as well as for the development, evaluation and revision of the academic objectives and curricula for all courses, including the academic material, educational methods and Faculty training. Among these courses are the six-month Senior Course, several short Modular Short Courses and the Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors’ Course.

He oversees and coordinates preparations for the Conference of Commandants of National Defence Colleges and Institutes, the International Week in Kyiv (a one-week on-site course) and the Academic Advisory Board, as well as implementing follow-on actions stemming from them.

Finally, he acts as the Executive Secretary to the NATO Defense College’s Academic Advisory Board.

Brigadier General Heinz Josef Feldmann, German Army, Head of the Academic Planning and Policy Division


The Head of the Research Division

The Research Division Head is responsible for the planning, organization and execution of the NDC’s research and outreach programme.

He develops the annual research plan, budget, and policies for the Research Division, oversees ongoing projects, and supervises and coordinates the activities of the Division personnel, including managing the various fellowship programmes.

Dr Jeffrey A. LARSEN

The Head of the Research Division

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 11:33

The Research Division Head is responsible for the planning, organization and execution of the NDC’s research and outreach programme.

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Jeffrey A. LARSEN Research Division Director

He develops the annual research plan, budget, and policies for the Research Division, oversees ongoing projects, and supervises and coordinates the activities of the Division personnel, including managing the various fellowship programmes.

He is a member of the NDC Academic Council, Command Group, Civil Staff Association, and multiple other College committees.

He represents the NDC in international fora, creates and maintains a network of connections with international institutions and the think tank world, and develops close relations with NATO Headquarters, NATO agencies and military commands.

Jeffrey A. Larsen, PhD, Division Head Research


The Director of the Middle East Faculty

The Director, who is responsible for the activities carried out by the Middle East Faculty, provides guidance for the academic courses it organizes: the NATO Regional Cooperation Course and the Senior Executive Regional Conference. He leads the MEF in a broad spectrum of related activities, making an important contribution to the College mission.

Colonel Filippo Bonsignore

The Director of the Middle East Faculty

Last updated: 07 Nov. 2017 10:42

The Director, who is responsible for the activities carried out by the Middle East Faculty, provides guidance for the academic courses it organizes: the NATO Regional Cooperation Course and the Senior Executive Regional Conference. He leads the MEF in a broad spectrum of related activities, making an important contribution to the College mission.

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Colonel Filippo BONSIGNORE

He cultivates and maintains close relations with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries, as well as with Partners from the broader region of the Middle East.

Reporting to the Director, the MEF staff contributes to the growing popularity of the Faculty’s courses and other activities.

Colonel Filippo Bonsignore, Italian Army, Director of the Middle East Faculty


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THE HISTORY

Last updated: 10 Oct. 2017 11:30

NDC History (Excerpt from NDC Chronicle Book)

Main Dates

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NDC Building in NDC Building in Paris

The idea of a NATO Defense College originated from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who identified very early on the need for a new international institution with a unique educational mission.

On 19 November 1951, the NATO Defense College opened its doors to Course 1 in Paris.

In 1966, France withdrew from the Alliance's integrated military structure and the College moved to Rome where it continues to fulfil its mission.

On 10 September 1999, the new College building, twice the size of the old one, was inaugurated in the Military City of Cecchignola, 2 km. from the former site.

On 25 September 2001, the NATO Defense College celebrated its 50th Anniversary and hosted the 48th Annual Conference and Seminar of the Association of Anciens.

In 2009, the NATO Defense College celebrated the 60th Anniversary of NATO and the College's 10th year in Cecchignola.

In 2011, the NATO Defense College celebrated its 60th Anniversary: "60 Years Educating Leaders".

In 2016, the NATO Defense College celebrated its 65th Anniversary and the College's 50th year in Rome: "50 Year in Rome, 65 Years Serving NATO".
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Wed Dec 20, 2017 12:37 am

Louis H. Buehl III, Lieutenant General, United States Marine Corps
by arlingtoncemetery.net
Accessed: 12/19/17

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.


Louis H. Buehl III died at Bethesda Naval Medical Center on October 5, 1988 after having suffered a stroke. He was 56 and held the number-three job in the Marine Corps since October 1987. He was outranked only by the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant.

He was a combat veteran of the Vietnam War and had served as Commanding General of the Marine Base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs and as Senior Military Assistant to William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was a native of Pittsburgh, was a graduate of Miami University. He won the first of his three stars in April 1982 when he assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.

He is buried in Section 7-A of Arlington National Cemetery, near the Memorial Amphitheater and the Tomb of the Unknowns.

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BUEHL, LOUIS H III
United States Marine Corps
DATE OF BIRTH: 09/18/1932
DATE OF DEATH: 10/05/1988
BURIED AT: SECTION 7A SITE 107
ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Thu Dec 21, 2017 8:43 pm

Billie Sol Estes Investigation Reports Released
by CQ Almanac
1964

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

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Criticism of Governmental inefficiency in handling the grain-cotton-fertilizer manipulations of Texas promoter Billie Sol Estes, whose complicated activities were first unearthed in 1962, came from House and Senate committees in 1964. The Agriculture Department and other agencies were criticized for failing to act affirmatively to halt Estes' maneuvers.

The House report, by the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, charged that the Agriculture Department and other agencies almost totally failed to coordinate their separate investigations into Estes' “fraudulent activities.” However, the Subcommittee said it found “no credible evidence” that Estes had offered bribes to any elected or appointed Government official, or that any elected official had attempted to exert influence to assist Estes in his operations. The Subcommittee had held hearings in 1962 on transactions other than Estes' pooled cotton allotments.

The Senate Government Operations Committee held hearings in 1962–63 on the Agriculture Department's handling of Estes' pooled cotton allotments and reported in 1964 on its findings. The report criticized the Department for an environment of “disinterest and stagnation” which tended to “obstruct rather than foster communication between elements of the Department.” It was this environment, the report said, that Estes “undertook to benefit from” in building a financial empire. Two Republican members said Estes “received favoritism” from local, state and federal officials.

Additional attacks were leveled during the 1964 election campaign, as Sen. Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.), the GOP Presidential candidate, cited the Estes affair as an example of dishonesty in the Democratic Administration. Goldwater Sept. 17 charged that the Administration was using “delay, postponement, concealment and whitewash” to prevent public debate about the Estes case.

Meanwhile, although Estes had been sentenced to eight years for swindling and 15 years for mail fraud, he remained out of jail, pending Supreme Court rulings on his appeals of the convictions.

Background

REFERENCE–Committees Air Billie Sol Estes Dealings (1962 Almanac p. 988).

On March 29, 1962, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested the 37-year-old Pecos, Texas, promoter on charges of fraud involving forged mortgages.

The charge grew out of a complicated system initiated in 1958, whereby Estes sold liquid fertilizer at low rates to West Texas farmers in an effort to corner the fertilizer market in that area. Estes used the money from fertilizer sales to build and purchase grain storage facilities which were leased to the Government. To keep his long-range money-making plan in operation, Estes persuaded farmers to sign chattel mortgages to “purchase” non-existent fertilizer storage tanks. Estes then sold the mortgages to finance companies for cash which he used to carry on his transactions.

In 1960, Estes turned to cotton allotment dealings. He arranged for installment sales of land in Texas to out-of-state farmers who had cotton allotments eligible for transfer to new land. The sales agreements specified that Estes would regain title to the land if the farmers defaulted on their first installment payment to Estes. When the farmers did default, Estes regained his land–with the allotments. In this way, Estes increased his cotton acreage from approximately 2,000 to 5,000 acres. Charges of Agriculture Department favoritism resulted from the revelation of Estes' dealings.

Estes' financial downfall began when a Pecos newspaper exposed his fertilizer tank dealings in February 1962. By the end of 1964, Estes awaited Supreme Court rulings on his indictment and conviction in federal courts on counts of swindling (carrying an eight-year sentence) and mail fraud (carrying a 15-year sentence). In addition, a state court in 1964 convicted him for violation of Texas antitrust laws, and he faced trial in Dallas on a federal indictment charging he misrepresented his financial position to the Commodity Credit Corp. in connection with his Government grain storage deals.

Senate Report

The Senate Government Operations Permanent Investigations Subcommittee June 27, 1962–Nov. 12, 1963, held hearings on the Agriculture Department's handling of Estes' pooled cotton allotments. On Sept. 30, 1964, it issued a report (S Rept 1607) based on the hearings. Minority views were submitted by two Republican members. According to press reports, the delay between conclusion of the hearings and the release of the report had been caused by disagreement between Democratic and Republican members of the Subcommittee over the conclusions to be stated in the report.

Conclusions. The report said that despite the “dedication and integrity” of most Agriculture Department employees, the organizational structure which had evolved “over a period of many decades” left gaps in communication. It said that “an obvious and an apparent lack of organization” was displayed in instances during the Estes affair when the Department had been “unable to secure compliance with its directives even by its own employees.” The report also criticized the “diffusion of responsibility and a reluctance on the part of some employees to assume the obligations of their offices.”

Recommendations. The report said that “affirmative and corrective action” had been taken only when the facts concerning the Estes affair had been brought to the attention of Agriculture Secretary Orville L. Freeman. It urged that “arrangement be made” so that future problems which threatened to reach the magnitude of the “Estes dealings” would be brought to the attention of the Secretary earlier.

The report also recommended that:

* Responsibility for approving or disapproving allotment transfers be established in order to allow the Government, as well as producers, the right to appeal decisions.

* Future irregularities at the state level be brought to the attention of the Department in Washington “at an earlier date.”

* Responsibility for decisions by Department personnel be fixed “and blame assessed when necessary,” and credit be given “and accomplishment rewarded when appropriate.”

Individual Views. Sen. John L. McClellan (D Ark.), chairman of the Government Operations Committee, said that procedures followed by the Agriculture Department in the Estes affair in many respects had been “faulty, inefficient and ineffective,” and that “unfavorable conditions” had developed as a result of “timidity, vacillation and indecision, and the neglect or unwillingness on the part of high officials in the Department to act” However, McClellan said that “the prevailing system had been established and the procedures developed during previous administrations and over a period of many years.” He also said that Freeman took “immediate affirmative and effective corrective action” as soon as he had learned of the Estes affair, and was to be “commended for the prompt action he took” as well as for “many administrative and procedural reforms that he had inaugurated in the Department since this investigation began.”

Supplemental Views. Sens. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D N.C.) and Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine) said that “all evidence submitted” during the hearings “amply proves that the Department exhibited no favoritism” toward Estes. They said there had been “no evil design, and there were no improper motives.”

Additional Views. While saying that they “associate” themselves with the report, Sens. Karl E. Mundt (R S.D.) and Carl T. Curtis (R Neb.), in additional views, said that Estes' attempt to acquire cotton allotments had been “fraudulent from its inception,” and that the Agriculture Department had not only been “inept in its efforts to cope with same” but had, in many instances, been “a companion to this fraud through the actions, or failure to act, of its officials in high office.” This, they said, “brings us to the inevitable conclusion that the freewheeling, gift-giving Billie Sol Estes received favoritism on the county level, state level and in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C….” They added that “the obvious influence of Mr. Estes was a definite factor in the favoritism that was bestowed upon him by USDA in these actions, and omissions to act.”

House Report

The House Government Operations Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of L. H. Fountain (D N.C.), held 21 days of hearings in 1962 that focused on transactions other than Estes' cotton allotments. On Oct. 12, 1964, it released a report, which it said was unanimously approved by all members.

Conclusions. The report said that Estes had engaged in several major types of business operations in an “intermingled and often confusing” fashion, and that his arrest and the resultant collapse of his agricultural and financial empire “terminated a fantastic multimillion-dollar swindling operation.” However, the report concluded that “Estes never was worth a million dollars or anything close to it. In all probability, he was insolvent from the day he arrived in Pecos in 1951 until the day he was arrested in 1962.” In sum, the report said, Estes used “many unethical or fraudulent devices (to obtain) money or credit for more than 10 years.”

The report said that an “almost unbelievable number of inquiries and investigations” into Estes' dealings had been conducted since 1953, and that had even a few of them “been properly coordinated,” it was “almost inconceivable” that Estes' “fraudulent activities could have been continued for such a long period.”

Recommendations. The report said its investigation had disclosed “a serious lack of effective coordination and communication” among federal agencies. It recommended that the President authorize a comprehensive review aimed at devising actions to promote interagency coordination of auditing and investigative activities.

The report also recommended that:

* The Government initiate “appropriate legal action” to recover profits made by Estes from his grain storage operations. The report said the Government had been “induced by fraud” to grant contracts to Estes for storage of Government grain.

* Congress consider passing legislation to close “a possible loophole” in federal law by making it illegal to knowingly sell fraudulent commercial paper to national banks.

* The Department of Justice examine the report and information previously supplied by the Subcommittee “with a view to taking appropriate action.”

Supplemental Views. Rep. Florence P. Dwyer (R N.J.) said she wished “to emphasize certain elements” which had been brought out by the hearings, including “Government inefficiency, lack of communication and coordination between and within Government agencies, especially the Department of Agriculture, inadequate procedures, inept personnel….” She also said she regretted that the report had been released before the full Government Operations Committee had time to review and act on it “in accordance with its customary procedure.”

Committee Statement. In a statement released separately from the report, the Government Operations Committee said the investigation had found “no evidence” that the then-Vice President Johnson or members of his staff “participated in any way in the relationships between Billie Sol Estes and the Federal Government or its agencies,” other than “routinely referring to the Department of Agriculture correspondence including complaints about activities in which Estes was involved.”

Election Charges Against Senator

The Justice Department Aug. 31 said it found no evidence to substantiate allegations that Estes had given $50,000 in cash to Sen. Ralph Yarborough (D Texas) on Nov. 6, 1960. One week before the May 2, 1964, Texas Democratic primary, in which Yarborough was opposed by Dallas radio station owner Gordon McClendon, McClendon produced two alleged witnesses on statewide television who accused Yarborough of receiving the money. Yarborough April 28, also on statewide television, produced two other witnesses who denied he had taken any money from Estes on the alleged date.

Responding to a request by Yarborough for an investigation of the charge, the FBI May 1 issued a report which said one of McClendon's witnessed had admitted he was lying. The Dallas Morning News April 12 had printed an interview with Estes which quoted him as saying he had given Yarborough $50,000 on the date mentioned, but the FBI report said Estes had refused to talk with FBI investigators about the matter. The developments were believed to have narrowed Yarborough's early lead in the race, but Yarborough nonetheless won the primary with 57.3 percent of the vote and later was re-elected.

Document Citation

"Billie Sol Estes Investigation Reports Released." In CQ Almanac 1964, 20th ed., 998-99. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1965. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal64-1302889.

Document ID: cqal64-1302889
Document URL: http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal64-1302889
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United States invasion of Panama (Operation Just Cause)
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Image
U.S. soldiers prepare to take La Comandancia in the El Chorrillo neighborhood of Panama City, in December 1989.

Date 20 December 1989 – 31 January 1990[1]
(1 month, 1 week and 4 days)
Location Panama
Result US victory[2]
• Military leader Manuel Noriega deposed
Belligerents
Panama
• Panama Defense Force
United States
Panamanian opposition
Commanders and leaders
Manuel Noriega (POW) / George H. W. Bush; Maxwell R. Thurman; Guillermo Endara
Strength
20,000 / 27,000
Casualties and losses
234–314 killed / 26 killed
1,908 captured / 325 wounded
Panamanian civilians killed according to[3]
U.S. military: 202
Americas Watch: 300
United Nations: 500
CODEHUCA: 2,500–3,000
1 Spanish journalist killed[4][5]

The United States Invasion of Panama, code named Operation Just Cause, was an invasion of Panama by the United States between mid-December 1989 and late January 1990. It occurred during the administration of President George H. W. Bush and ten years after the Torrijos–Carter Treaties were ratified to transfer control of the Panama Canal from the U.S. to Panama by 1 January 2000.

During the invasion, de facto Panamanian leader, general, and dictator Manuel Noriega was deposed, president-elect Guillermo Endara sworn into office, and the Panamanian Defense Force dissolved.

Background

The United States had maintained numerous military bases and a substantial garrison throughout the Canal Zoneto protect the American-owned Panama Canal and to maintain American control of this strategically important area. On 7 September 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the de facto leader of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, signed Torrijos–Carter Treaties, which set in motion the process of handing over the Panama Canal to Panamanian control by the year 2000. Although the canal was destined for Panamanian administration, the military bases remained and one condition of the transfer was that the canal would remain open for American shipping. The U.S. had long-standing relations with General Noriega, who served as a U.S. intelligence asset and paid informant of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1967, including the period when Bush was head of the CIA (1976–77).[6]

Noriega had sided with the U.S. rather than the USSR in Central America, notably in sabotaging the forces of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and the revolutionaries of the FMLN group in El Salvador. Noriega received upwards of $100,000 per year from the 1960s until the 1980s, when his salary was increased to $200,000 per year.[7]Although he worked with the Drug Enforcement Administration to restrict illegal drug shipments, he was known to simultaneously accept significant financial support from drug dealers,[6] because he facilitated the laundering of drug money, and through Noriega, they received protection from DEA investigations due to his special relationship with the CIA.[8]

In the mid-1980s, relations between Noriega and the United States began to deteriorate. In 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan opened negotiations with General Noriega, requesting that the Panamanian leader step down after he was publicly exposed in The New York Times by Seymour Hersh, and later exposed in the Iran-Contra Scandal.[9] Reagan pressured him with several drug-related indictments in U.S. courts; however, since extradition laws between Panama and the U.S. were weak, Noriega deemed this threat not credible and did not submit to Reagan's demands.[10] In 1988, Elliot Abrams and others in the Pentagon began pushing for a U.S. invasion, but Reagan refused, due to Bush's ties to Noriega through his previous positions in the CIA and the Task Force on Drugs, and their potentially negative impact on Bush's presidential campaign.[11] Later negotiations involved dropping the drug-trafficking indictments. In March 1988, Noriega's forces resisted an attempted coup against the government of Panama. As relations continued to deteriorate, Noriega appeared to shift his Cold War allegiance towards the Soviet bloc, soliciting and receiving military aid from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya.[12] American military planners began preparing contingency plans to invade Panama.

Image
A U.S. Marine Corps LAV-25 in Panama

In May 1989, during the Panamanian national elections, an alliance of parties opposed to the Noriega dictatorship counted results from the country's election precincts, before they were sent to the district centers. Their tally showed their candidate, Guillermo Endara, defeating Carlos Duque, candidate of a pro-Noriega coalition, by nearly 3–1. Endara was beaten up by Noriega supporters the next day in his motorcade.[6] Noriega declared the election null and maintained power by force, making him unpopular among Panamanians. Noriega's government insisted that it had won the presidential election and that irregularities had been on the part of U.S.-backed candidates from opposition parties.[13]Bush called on Noriega to honor the will of the Panamanian people.[6] The United States reinforced its Canal Zone garrison, and increased the tempo of training and other activities intended to put pressure on Noriega.[14]

In October 1989, Noriega foiled a second coup attempt by members of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), led by Major Moisés Giroldi.[15] Pressure mounted on Bush.[6] Bush declared that the U.S. would not negotiate with a drug trafficker and denied knowledge of Noriega's involvement with the drug trade prior to his February 1988 indictment, although Bush had met with Noriega while Director of the CIA and had been the Chair of the Task Force on Drugs while Vice President.[16] On 15 December, the Panamanian general assembly passed a resolution declaring that the actions of the United States had caused a state of war to exist between Panama and the United States.[17][18]

The next day, four U.S. military personnel were stopped at a roadblock around 9:00 PM outside PDF headquarters in the El Chorrillo neighborhood of Panama City. Marine Captain Richard E. Hadded, Navy Lieutenant Michael J. Wilson, Army Captain Barry L. Rainwater, and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz had left the Fort Clayton military base and were on their way to have dinner at the Marriott Hotel in downtown Panama City. The U.S. Department of Defense reported that the servicemen had been unarmed, in a private vehicle and that they attempted to flee only after their vehicle was surrounded by an angry crowd of civilians and PDF troops. The PDF asserted later that the Americans were armed and on a reconnaissance mission. The PDF opened fire and Lieutenant Paz was fatally wounded by a round that entered the rear of the vehicle and struck him in the back. Captain Hadded, the driver of the vehicle, was also wounded in the foot. Paz was rushed to Gorgas Army Hospital but died of his wounds. He received the Purple Heart posthumously.[19]According to U.S. military sources, a U.S. Naval officer and his wife witnessed the incident and were detained by Panamanian Defense Force soldiers. While in police custody, they were assaulted by the PDF. The U.S. Naval officer spent two weeks in hospital recovering from the beating. PDF soldiers sexually threatened his wife.[17] The next day, President Bush ordered the execution of the Panama invasion plan; the military set H-Hour as 0100 on 20 December.[20]

United States's justification for the invasion

The official U.S. justification for the invasion was articulated by President George H. W. Bush on the morning of 20 December 1989, a few hours after the start of the operation. Bush listed four reasons for the invasion:[21]

• Safeguarding the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama. In his statement, Bush stated that Noriega had declared that a state of war existed between the U.S. and Panama and that he threatened the lives of the approximately 35,000 U.S. citizens living there. There had been numerous clashes between U.S. and Panamanian forces; one U.S. Marine had been killed a few days earlier.

• Defending democracy and human rights in Panama.

• Combating drug trafficking. Panama had become a center for drug money laundering and a transit point for drug trafficking to the U.S. and Europe.

• Protecting the integrity of the Torrijos–Carter Treaties. Members of Congress and others in the U.S. political establishment claimed that Noriega threatened the neutrality of the Panama Canal and that the U.S. had the right under the treaties to intervene militarily to protect the canal.

U.S. military forces were instructed to begin maneuvers and activities within the restrictions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, such as ignoring PDF roadblocks and conducting short-notice "Category Three" military exercises on security-sensitive targets, with the express goal of provoking PDF soldiers. U.S. SOUTHCOM kept a list of abuses against U.S. servicemen and civilians by the PDF while the orders to incite PDF soldiers were in place.[11] As for the Panamanian legislature's declaration of a state of war between the U.S. and Panama, Noriega insists[22] that this statement referred to a state of war directed by the U.S. against Panama, in the form of what he claimed were harsh economic sanctions and constant, provocative military maneuvers (Operations Purple Storm and Sand Flea)[23] that were prohibited by the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. The U.S. had turned a blind eye to Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking since the 1970s. Noriega was then singled out for direct involvement in these drug trafficking operations due to the widespread public knowledge of his involvement in money laundering, drug activities, political murder, and human rights abuses.[9]

Bush's four reasons for the invasion provided sufficient justification to establish bipartisan Congressional approval and support for the invasion. However, the secrecy before initiation, the speed and success of the invasion itself, and U.S. public support for it (80% public approval[citation needed]) did not allow Democrats to object to Bush's decision to use military force.[24] One contemporary study suggests that Bush decided to invade for domestic political reasons, citing scarce strategic reasoning for the U.S. to invade and immediately withdraw without establishing the structure to enforce the interests that Bush used to justify the invasion.[24]

Invasion

Image
Tactical map of Operation Just Cause showing major points of attack.

Image
Elements of 1st Bn, 508th Infantry parachuting into a drop zone, during training, outside of Panama City.

The U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines participated in Operation Just Cause. Ground forces consisted of :

• combat elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps,
• the 82nd Airborne Division,
• the 7th Infantry Division (Light),
• the 7th Special Forces Group,
• the 75th Ranger Regiment,
• a Joint Special Operations Task Force,
• elements of the 5th Infantry Division
• 1st Battalion, 61st U.S. Infantry and
• 4th Battalion, 6th United States Infantry (replacing 1/61st in September 1989),
• 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Ft Bragg NC
• 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), Ft Bragg NC
• 21st Military Police Company (Airborne), Ft Bragg NC
• 65th Military Police Company, Ft Bragg NC
• 108th Military Police Company (Air Assault), Ft Bragg NC
• 519th Military Police Battalion
• 1138th Military Police Company, Missouri Army National Guard
• 988th Military Police Company, Ft Benning, GA
• 193rd Infantry Brigade,
• 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry
• 1st Battalion, 508th
• Marine Security Forces Battalion Panama,
• Kilo company of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment,
• Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams,
• 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,
• 2nd Marine Logistics Group 39th Combat Engineer Btn. Charlie Co.

Air logistic support was provided by the 22nd Air Force with air assets from the 60th, 62nd, and 63rd military airlift wings.
The military incursion into Panama began on 20 December 1989, at 1:00 a.m. local time. The operation involved 27,684 U.S. troops and over 300 aircraft, including C-130 Hercules tactical transports flown by the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing (which was equipped with the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System or AWADS) and 314th Tactical Airlift Wing, AC-130 Spectre gunship, OA-37B Dragonfly observation and attack aircraft, C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy strategic transports, F-117A Nighthawk stealth aircraft flown by the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The invasion of Panama was the first combat deployment for the AH-64, the HMMWV, and the F-117A. Panamanian radar units were jammed by two EF-111As of the 390th ECS, 366th TFW.[25] These aircraft were deployed against the 16,000 members of the PDF.[26]

The operation began with an assault of strategic installations, such as the civilian Punta Paitilla Airport in Panama City and a PDF garrison and airfield at Rio Hato, where Noriega also maintained a residence. U.S. Navy SEALs destroyed Noriega's private jet and a Panamanian gunboat. A Panamanian ambush killed four SEALs and wounded nine. Other military command centers throughout the country were also attacked. The attack on the central headquarters of the PDF (referred to as La Comandancia) touched off several fires, one of which destroyed most of the adjoining and heavily populated El Chorrillo neighborhood in downtown Panama City. During the firefight at the Comandancia, the PDF downed two special operations helicopters and forced one MH-6 Little Bird to crash-land in the Panama Canal.[27] The opening round of attacks in Panama City also included a special operations raid on the Carcel Modelo prison (known as Operation Acid Gambit) to free Kurt Muse, a US citizen convicted of espionage by Noriega.

Fort Amador was secured by elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and 59th Engineer Company (sappers) in a nighttime air assault which secured the fort in the early hours of 20 December. Fort Amador was a key position because of its relationship to the large oil farms adjacent to the canal, the Bridge of the Americas over the canal, and the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. Key command and control elements of the PDF were stationed there. C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne) 508th PIR was assigned the task of securing La Comandancia. Furthermore, Fort Amador had a large U.S. housing district that needed to be secured to prevent the PDF from taking U.S. citizens as hostages. This position also protected the left flank of the attack on La Comandancia and the securing of the El Chorrillos neighbourhood, guarded by Dignity Battalions, Noriega supporters that the U.S. forces sometimes referred to as "Dingbats". Military police units from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina deployed via strategic airlift into Howard Air Force Base the next morning, and secured key government buildings in the downtown area of Panama City. MPs seized PDF weapons, vehicles and supplies during house-to-house searches in the following days, and conducted urban combat operations against snipers and Dignity Battalion holdouts for the following week.

A few hours after the invasion began, Guillermo Endara was sworn in at Fort Clayton.[28] According to The Los Angeles Times, Endara was the "presumed winner" in the presidential election which had been scheduled earlier that year.[29]

A platoon from the 1138th Military Police Company, Missouri Army National Guard, which was on a routine two-week rotation to Panama was called upon to set up a detainee camp on Empire Range to handle the mass of civilian and military detainees. This unit was the first National Guard unit called into active service since the Vietnam War.[30]

Noriega's capture

Operation Nifty Package was an operation launched by Navy SEALs to prevent Noriega's escape. They sank Noriega's boat and destroyed his jet, at a cost of four killed and nine wounded. Military operations continued for several weeks, mainly against military units of the Panamanian army. Noriega remained at large for several days, but realizing he had few options in the face of a massive manhunt and a $1 million reward for his capture, he obtained refuge in the Vatican diplomatic mission in Panama City. The U.S. military's psychological pressure on him and diplomatic pressure on the Vatican mission, however, was relentless, as was the playing of loud rock-and-roll music day and night in a densely populated area.[31] The report of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintains that the music was used principally to prevent parabolic microphones from being used to eavesdrop on negotiations, and not as a psychological weapon based around Noriega's supposed loathing of rock music.[27] Noriega finally surrendered to the U.S. military on 3 January 1990. He was immediately put on an MC-130E Combat Talon I aircraft and flown to the U.S.

Casualties

Image
A U.S. Army M113 in Panama

According to official Pentagon figures, 516 Panamanians were killed during the invasion; however, an internal U.S. Army memo estimated the number at 1,000.[32]

The UN estimated 500 deaths[33] whereas Americas Watch found that around 300 civilians died. President Guillermo Endara said that "less than 600 Panamanians" died during the entire invasion. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark estimated 3,000 civilian deaths. Figures estimating thousands of civilian casualties were widely rejected in Panama. The Roman Catholic Church estimated that 673 Panamanians were killed in total. Physicians for Human Rights, said it had received "reliable reports of more than 100 civilian deaths" that were not included in the US military estimate but also that there was no evidence of several thousand civilian deaths.[34]

Twenty-three U.S. servicemembers were killed[35] and 325 were wounded. But in June 1990, the U.S. military announced that of the casualties, 2 dead and 19 wounded were victims of friendly fire.[36] The U.S. Southern Command, then based on Quarry Heights in Panama, estimated the number of Panamanian military dead at 205, lower than its original estimate of 314.

Civilian fatalities included two American school teachers working in Panama for the Department of Defense Schools. They were Kandi Helin and Ray Dragseth. Rick Paul, the adult son of another teacher, was also killed by friendly fire as he ran an American road block. Also killed was a Spanish freelance press photographer on assignment for El Pais, Juan Antonio Rodriguez Moreno. Rodriguez was killed outside of the Marriott Hotel in Panama City early on December 21. In June 1990, his family filed a claim for wrongful death against the United States Government.[37] When the Rodriguez claim was rejected by the US government, in 1992 the Spanish government sent a Note Verbale extending diplomatic protection to Rodriguez and demanding compensation on behalf of his family.[38][39] However, the US government again rejected the claim, disputing both its liability for warzone deaths in general and whether Rodriguez had been killed by US rather than Panamanian gunfire.[38]

Human Rights Watch's 1991 report on Panama in the post-invasion aftermath stated that even with some uncertainties about the scale of civilian casualties, the figures are "still troublesome" because

[Panama's civilian deaths] reveal that the "surgical operation" by American forces inflicted a toll in civilian lives that was at least four-and-a-half times higher than military casualties in the enemy, and twelve or thirteen times higher than the casualties suffered by U.S. troops. By themselves, these ratios suggest that the rule of proportionality and the duty to minimize harm to civilians, where doing so would not compromise a legitimate military objective, were not faithfully observed by the invading U.S. forces. For us, the controversy over the number of civilian casualties should not obscure the important debate on the manner in which those people died.[40]


Origin of the name "Operation Just Cause"

Operation plans directed against Panama evolved from plans designed to defend the Panama Canal. They became more aggressive as the situation between the two nations deteriorated. The Prayer Book series of plans included rehearsals for a possible clash (Operation Purple Storm) and missions to secure U.S. sites (Operation Bushmaster).

Eventually, these plans became Operation Blue Spoon which was then, in order to sustain the perceived legitimacy of the invasion throughout the operation, renamed by The Pentagon to Operation Just Cause.[41] General Colin Powell said that he liked the name because "even our severest critics would have to utter 'Just Cause' while denouncing us."[42]

The post-invasion civil-military operation designed to stabilize the situation, support the U.S.-installed government, and restore basic services was originally planned as "Operation Blind Logic", but was renamed "Operation Promote Liberty" by the Pentagon on the eve of the invasion.[43]

The original operation, in which U.S. troops were deployed to Panama in early 1989, was called "Operation Nimrod Dancer".[44]

Local and international reactions

The invasion of Panama provoked international outrage. Some countries charged that the U.S. had committed an act of aggression by invading Panama and was trying to conceal a new manifestation of its interventionist policy of force in Latin America. On 29 December, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted 75–20, with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as a flagrant violation of international law.[45]

On 22 December, the Organization of American States passed a resolution deploring the invasion and calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops, as well as a resolution condemning the violation of the diplomatic status of the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama by U.S. Special Forces who had entered the building.[46] At the UN Security Council, after discussing the issue over several days, a draft resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Panama[47] was vetoed on 23 December by three of the permanent members of the Security Council,[48] France, United Kingdom, and the United States, who cited its right of self-defense of 35,000 Americans present on the Panama Canal.[49]

Peru recalled its ambassador from the U.S. in protest of the invasion.

Some claim that the Panamanian people overwhelmingly supported the invasion.[50] According to a CBS poll, 92% of Panamanian adults supported the U.S. incursion, and 76% wished that U.S. forces had invaded in October during the coup.[50] However, others dispute this finding, asserting that the Panamanian surveys were conducted in wealthy, English-speaking neighborhoods in Panama City, among Panamanians most likely to support U.S. actions.[51] Human Rights Watch described the reaction of the civilian population to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".[52] According to Robert Pastor, a former U.S. national security advisor, 74% of Americans polled approved of the action.[50]

In 2006, one author opined that "President Bush had not defended the hemisphere against European aggression under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine, or used the threat of Communist proliferation to take action, but instead he had used the US military to remove a hostile and problematic Latin American dictator from power because it was in the best interests of the United States to do so."[53]

Eighteen years after the invasion, Panama's National Assembly unanimously declared 20 December 2007 to be a day of national mourning. The resolution was vetoed by President Martin Torrijos.[54][55]

The Washington Post disclosed several rulings of the Office of Legal Counsel, issued shortly before the invasion, in regards to the U.S. armed forces being charged with making an arrest abroad. One ruling interpreted an executive order which prohibits the assassination of foreign leaders as suggesting that accidental killings would be acceptable foreign policy. Another ruling concluded that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prohibits the armed forces from making arrests without Congressional authorization, is effective only within the boundaries of the U.S., such that the military could be used as a police force abroad—for example, in Panama, to enforce a federal court warrant against Noriega.[56]

Aftermath

Image
20,000 were displaced from their homes. Disorder continued for nearly two weeks.

Guillermo Endara, in hiding, was sworn in as president by a judge on the night preceding the invasion. In later years, he staged a hunger strike, calling attention to the poverty and homelessness left in the wake of both the Noriega years and the destruction caused by the U.S. invasion.

On 19 July 1990, a group of 60 companies based in Panama filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government in Federal District Court in New York City alleging that the U.S. action against Panama was "done in a tortuous, careless and negligent manner with disregard for the property of innocent Panamanian residents". Most of the businesses had insurance, but the insurers either went bankrupt or refused to pay, claiming that acts of war were not covered.[57]

About 20,000 people lost their homes and became refugees as a result of urban warfare. About 2,700 families that were displaced by the Chorrillo fire were each given $6,500 by the U.S. to build a new house or apartment in selected areas in or near the city. However, numerous problems were reported with the new constructions just two years after the invasion.[58]

The government of Guillermo Endara designated the first anniversary of the U.S. invasion a "national day of reflection". On that day hundreds of Panamanians marked the day with a "black march" through the streets of Panama City to denounce the U.S. invasion and Endara's economic policies. Protesters echoed claims that 3,000 people were killed as a result of U.S. military action. Since Noriega's ousting, Panama has had four presidential elections, with candidates from opposing parties succeeding each other in the Palacio de las Garzas. Panama's press, however, is still subject to numerous restrictions.[59] On 10 February 1990, the Endara government abolished Panama's military and reformed the security apparatus by creating the Panamanian Public Forces. In 1994, a constitutional amendment permanently abolished the military of Panama. Concurrent with a severe recession in Latin America throughout the 1990s, Panama's GDP recovered by 1993, but very high unemployment remained a serious problem.

Noriega was brought to the U.S. to stand trial. He was subsequently convicted on eight counts of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering and sentenced to 40 years in prison. His sentence was later reduced to 30 years.[60]

On December 20, 2015, Vice President Isabel De Saint Malo de Alvarado announced Panama's intention to form a special independent commission with the aim to publish a so-called "truth report" to mark the 26th anniversary of the US attack on Panama. The commission's goal would be to identify victims so that reparations could be paid to their families, as well as to establish public monuments and school curriculums to honor history and reclaim Panama's collective memory. Victims' families have claimed that theretofore investigations into the invasion had been funded by Washington and therefore were biased.[61][62]

Timeline

Information in this section

September 1987

• U.S. Senate passes resolution urging Panama to re-establish a civilian government. Panama protests alleged U.S. violations of the Torrijos–Carter Treaties.

November 1987

• U.S. Senate resolution cuts military and economic aid to Panama. Panamanians adopt resolution restricting U.S. military presence.

February 1988

• Noriega indicted on drug-related charges. U.S. forces begin planning contingency operations in Panama (OPLAN Blue Spoon).

March 1988

• 15 March: First of four deployments of U.S. forces begins providing additional security to U.S. installations.
• 16 March: PDF officers attempt a coup against Noriega.

April 1988

• 5 April: Additional U.S. forces deployed to provide security.
• 9 April: Joint Task Force Panama activated.

May 1989

• 7 May: Civilian elections are held in Panama; opposition alliance tally shows their candidate, Guillermo Endara, beating Noriega's candidate, Carlos Duque, by a 3 to 1 margin. The election is declared invalid two days later by Noriega.
• 11 May: President Bush orders 1,900 additional combat troops to Panama (Operation Nimrod Dancer).[44]
• 22 May: Convoys conducted to assert U.S. freedom of movement. Additional transport units travel from bases in the territorial U.S. to bases in Panama, and back, for this express purpose.

June–September 1989 (Operation Nimrod Dancer)
• U.S. begins conducting joint training and freedom of movement exercises (Operation Sand Flea[44] and Operation Purple Storm[44]). Additional transport units continue repeatedly traveling from bases in the territorial U.S. to bases in Panama, and back, for this express purpose.

October 1989 (Operation Nimrod Dancer)

• 3 October: PDF, loyal to Noriega, defeat second coup attempt.

December 1989

• 15 December: Noriega refers to himself as leader of Panama and declares that the U.S. is in a state of war with Panama.
• 16 December: U.S. Marine lieutenant shot and killed by PDF. Navy lieutenant and wife detained and assaulted by PDF.
• 17 December: NCA directs execution of Operation Just Cause.
• 18 December: Army lieutenant shoots PDF sergeant. Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) advance party deploys. JCS designates D-
Day/H-Hour as 20 December/1:00 a.m.
• 19 December: U.S. forces alerted, marshalled, and launched.

D-Day, 20 December 1989

• U.S. invasion of Panama begins. The operation was conducted as a campaign with limited military objectives. JTFSO objectives in PLAN 90-2 were to: protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities, capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority, neutralize PDF forces, neutralize PDF command and control, support establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama, and restructure the PDF. Major operations detailed elsewhere continued through 24 December.
• JCS directs execution of Operation Promote Liberty.

3 January 1990 (D-Day + 14)

• Noriega surrenders to U.S. forces.

31 January 1990 (D-Day + 42)
• Operation Just Cause ends.
• Operation Promote Liberty begins.

September 1994 (D-Day + approximately 4.5 years)

• Operation Promote Liberty ends.[43]

Major operations and U.S. units involved

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Operations

All 27 objectives related to the Panamanian Defense Force were completed on D-Day, 20 December 1989. As initial forces moved to new objectives, follow-on forces from the 7th Infantry Division (L) moved into the western areas of Panama and into Panama City.

19 December 1989 (D-Day − 1)

• Company A, 1st Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)-already deployed into Panama, along with 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)-then permanently headquartered at Fort Davis, Panama, moved to predetermined positions.
• 3d Bde, 7th Infantry Division (L) (4/17th Inf), already deployed as part of peacekeeping forces in the region, was deployed to predetermined positions.
• 2nd Bde, 7th Inf Div (L), was alerted for deployment. DRF 1 (3/27th Inf) and DRF 2 (2/27th INF) were deployed.
• Tow Platoon, HHC, 5/87th Inf (L), conducts pre-invasion recon of all objectives for Task Force Wildcat.

20 December 1989 (D-Day)
• 3d Bde, 7th Infantry Division (L) (4/17th Inf) began operations in Colon City, the Canal Zone, and Panama City.
• The remainder of the 2d Bde was deployed and closed in Panama.
• Elements of 1st and 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conducted air assault and secured Pacora River Bridge preventing PDF reinforcements from reaching Omar Torrijos Airport and Panama City.
• The entire 75th Ranger Regiment, split into two elements (Team Black and Team Gold), conducted simultaneous parachute drops at Rio Hato Airfield, along with half the command and control of the HQ 75th RGR, the entire 2nd Battalion 75th RGR, and two companies from 3rd Battalion 75th, to neutralize PDF and Macho de Montes units present, seize the runway, and secure Manuel Noriega's beachside facility.
• The other half of HQ 75th RGR C&C, along with 1st Battalion 75th RGR and the remaining elements of 3rd Battalion 75th RGR, dropped into Omar Torrijos Airport to seize the runway and tower for follow-on operations by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, deployed by C141 airdrop/airland elements of the 317th Combat Control Squadron, 507th Tactical Air Control Squadron.
• 193d Infantry Brigade (Light) assaulted PDF headquarters at La Commandancia, PDF Engineer Battalion, PDF 5th Company at Fort Amador, PDF units at Balboa and Ancon.
• 45 minutes after the 75th RGR RGT conducted their parachute drop onto Omar Torrijos Airport the 1st BDE 82 ABN DIV begins parachuting onto the airfield, and then assembles for movement to assigned follow on objectives.

21 December 1989 (D-Day + 1)
• JCS directed execution of Operation Promote Liberty (renamed from Plan Blind Logic).
• The Panama Canal reopened for daylight operations.
• Refugee situation became critical.
• C Company, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment (193d Infantry Brigade) repelled a PDF counterattack at the PDF DNTT headquarters and rescued Panamanian Vice President Ford, whose convoy was also attacked.
• TF Bayonet began CMO in Panama City.
• Marriott Hotel was secured and hostages evacuated.

22 December 1989 (D-Day + 2)
• FPP established.
• CMO and stability operations became primary focus.
• 2d Bde, 7th Inf Div (L), deployed to Rio Hato.
• 1st Bde (9th Regiment), 7th Inf Div (L), was alerted for deployment.

23 December 1989 (D-Day + 3)
• International airport reopened.
• 2d Bde, 7th Inf Div (L) and SF elements began operations in west.
• 96th CA Bn assumed responsibility for DC Camp from USARSO.
• 1st Bde (9th Regiment) 7th Inf Div (L) closed in Panama.

24 December 1989 (D-Day + 4)
• Noriega entered Papal Nunciatura.
• Money for Weapons program initiated.
• Combined U.S./FPP patrols began.

25 December 1989 (D-Day + 5)
• Rangers secured Davíd.
• Operations in western Panama continued successfully.

3 January 1990 (D-Day + 14)
• Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces.
• Combat and stability ops continue.

31 January 1990 (D-Day + 42)
• Operation Just Cause ends.[63]
• Operation Promote Liberty begins.

September 1994 (D-Day + approximately 4.5 years)
• Operation Promote Liberty ends.[43]
Above information in this section[23]
United States military forces involved in Operation Just Cause[edit]

[x]
U.S. soldiers holding a U.S. flag at La Comandancia

United States Southern Command[64][65]

• United States Army South (USARSO)
• XVIII Airborne Corps – Joint Task Force South
• 525th Military Intelligence Brigade (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) (Airborne)(FT Bragg)
• 319th Military Intelligence Battalion (Operations) (Airborne) (FT Bragg)
• A Co. 319th MI BN (Corps Tactical Operations Support Element)
• B Co. 319th MI BN (Signal)
• 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) (Airborne) (FT Bragg)
• A Co 519th MI BN (Interrogation)
• B Co. 519th MI BN (Counterintelligence)
• C Co. 519th MI BN (SIGINT and Voice Intercept)
• 16th MP Brigade Fort Bragg
• 92nd MP Battalion Fort Clayton

• 549th MP Company Fort Davis
• 1138th MP Company, Det. 1, Missouri Army National Guard, Doniphan, Missouri
• 1109th Signal Brigade
• 35th Signal Brigade (25th Signal Battalion/426th Signal Battalion) Fort Bragg North Carolina
• 142nd Medical Battalion
• 324th Support Group
• 470th Military Intelligence Brigade
• 747th MI BN, Galeta Island
• 29th MI BN, Fort Davis
• '193rd Infantry Brigade, Task Forces Bayonet
• 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (United States)
• 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry
• 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry. Detach from 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
• C Company, 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor Regiment (Airborne), Detach from 82nd ABN Div
• D Company, 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion (USMC)
• D Battery, 320th Field Artillery Regiment
• 59th Engineer Company (Sapper)
• 519th Military Police Battalion, Fort Meade, MD
• 209th Military Police Company, Fort Meade, MD
• 555th Military Police Company, Fort Lee, VA
• 988th Military Police Company, Fort Benning Georgia
• 401st Military Police Company, Fort Hood
• 7th Infantry Division (Light), Task Force Atlantic[23]
• A Troop, 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry
• 2nd Brigade
• 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (DRF 2)
• 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment
• 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (DRF 1)
• 6th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment
• A Battery, 2-62d ADA
• B Company, 27th Engineer Battalion
• B Company, 7th Medical Battalion
• B Company, 707th Maintenance Battalion
• B Company, 7th Supply and Transportation Battalion
• 3rd Brigade
• 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment
• 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment
• C Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment
• 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Detach from 82nd ABN Div
• B Battery, 7th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment
• B Battery, 2d Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment
• C Company, 27th Engineer Battalion
• C Company, 7th Medical Battalion
• C Company, 707th Maintenance Battalion
• C Company, 7th Supply & Transportation Battalion
• 3d Platoon, Company B, 127th Signal Battalion
• 127th Signal Battalion (-)
• 27th Engineer Battalion (-)
• 7th Military Police Company (-)
• 107th Military Intelligence Battalion (-)
• 5th Public Affairs Detachment
• 82nd Airborne Division, Task Force Pacific
• 1st Brigade
• 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (-)
• A Company, 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• A Battery, 3d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment
• A Battery, 3d Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment
• C Company, 3d Battalion, 73d Armored Regiment (-)
• A Company, 307th Engineer Battalion
• A Company, 782d Maintenance Battalion
• B Company, 307th Medical Battalion
• A Company, 407th Supply & Services Battalion
• A Company, 313th Military Intelligence Battalion
• 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division
• 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment
• 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment
• 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment
• A Company, 13th Engineer Battalion
• A Company, 707th Maintenance Battalion
• A Company, 7th Medical Battalion
• A Company, 7th Supply and Transportation Battalion
• 1st Platoon, B Company, 127th Signal Battalion
• Company B, 82d Signal Battalion (-)
• 82d Military Police Company (-)
• 511th Military Police Company, Fort Drum
• Aviation Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, Task Force Aviation
• 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment
• 195th Air Traffic Control Platoon
• 214th Medical Detachment
• 3rd Battalion, 123d Aviation, Task Force Hawk (Fort Ord)
• E Company, 123d Aviation Regiment (-)
• 1st Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment, Task Force Wolf (Fort Bragg)
• 1st Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment (-)
• Troop D, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment
• 1st Battalion, 123d Aviation Regiment (-)
• Company D, 82d Aviation Regiment (-)

United States Marine Corps

• 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Task Force Semper Fi (MARFOR)
• I Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment
• K Company, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines
• Company D, 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-)
• G and H Detachment, Brigade Service Support Group 6
• 1st Platoon, Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams
• Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment (U.S. Embassy)
• Marine Corps Security Force Company Panama
• 534th Military Police Company (U.S. Army), Fort Clayton
• 536th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army)

United States Special Operations Command

• 7th Special Forces Group
• 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
• SEAL Team 4
• SEAL Team 6
• 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-DELTA
• 75th Ranger Regiment
• 96th Civil Affairs Battalion
• 4th Psychological Operations Group
• 8th Special Operations Squadron
• 16th Special Operations Squadron
• 20th Special Operations Squadron
• 919th Special Operations Wing
• Special Forces 1 (delta force)

United States Air Force

• 24th Composite Wing, Howard AFB
• 317th Tactical Airlift Wing
• 39th Tactical Airlift Squadron
• 40th Tactical Airlift Squadron
• 41st Tactical Airlift Squadron
• 314th Tactical Airlift Wing
• 50th Tactical Airlift Squadron
• 146th Tactical Airlift Wing, California Air National Guard
• 815th Tactical Airlift Squadron
• Twenty-Second Air Force
• 60th Military Airlift Wing
• 62d Military Airlift Wing
• 63d Military Airlift Wing
• 437th Military Airlift Wing
• 433d Military Airlift Wing
• 32d Aeromedical Evacuation Group
• 34th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron
• 512th Military Airlift Wing
• 172d Military Airlift Wing
• 363d Security Police Squadron
• 3d Mobile Aerial Port Squadron (3d MAPS)
• 366th Tactical Fighter Wing
• 37th Tactical Fighter Wing
• 836th Security Police Squadron
• 63d Security Police Squadron
• 552d Airborne Warning And Control Wing
• 3d Combat Communications Group
• Aerospace Audiovisual Service (AAVS)
• 1352d Combat Camera Squadron, Norton AFB, Calif.
• 1361st Combat Camera Squadron, Charleston AFB, South Carolina
• 1369th Combat Camera Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

United States Navy

• United States Navy SEALs
• Naval Special Warfare Unit EIGHT
• Special Boat Unit TWENTY-SIX
• United States Naval Small Craft and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS)
• USS Vreeland (FF-1068)

Related operations

• Operation Nifty Package: operation undertaken by SEALs to capture Manuel Noriega or destroy his two escape routes, destroying his private jet at Paitilla Airfield and his gunboat, which was docked in a canal. Noriega surrendered to U.S. troops on 3 January 1990.
• Operation Nimrod Dancer: reinforcing the forward-deployed U.S. forces with a brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion task force from the 7th Inf Div (L), a mechanized infantry battalion from the 5th Inf Div (M), and a U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Company. Augmentation continued with units rotating from both divisions under Operation Nimrod Sustain.[66]
• Operation Prayer Book
• Operation Promote Liberty: operation to rebuild the Panamanian military and civilian infrastructure.
• Operation Purple Storm: operation to assert, display, and exercise U.S. freedom-of-movement rights, with convoys traveling in and out of Panama for that express purpose.
• Operation Sand Flea: operation to exercise, display, and assert U.S. freedom-of-movement rights, with convoys traveling in and out of Panama for that express purpose.
• Raid at Renacer Prison: a military operation which involved rescuing 64 prisoners and taking over the prison.
See also[edit]
• 1980s portal
• 1990s portal
• The Panama Deception Academy Award winning documentary.
• Invasion, a 2014 Panamanian documentary.

References

Footnotes


1. The National Archives at St. Louis: Veterans Preference and "Wartime" Service
2. "Operation Just Cause: The Invasion of Panama, December 1989". United States Army.
3. "Panama and U.S. Strive To Settle on Death Toll". The New York Times.[full citation needed]
4. "U.S. Sued in Death of a Journalist in Panama". The New York Times. 24 June 1990.[full citation needed]
5. "'It's Been Worth It': Bush—U.S. Troops Take Control of Panama". Los Angeles Times. 21 December 1989.
6. Jones, Howard (2001). Crucible of Power: A History of US Foreign Relations Since 1897. p. 494.[full citation needed]
7. Kempe, Frederick (1990). Divorcing the Dictator. New York: Putnam. pp. 26–30, 162.
8. Cockburn, Alexander & St. Clair, Jeffrey (1998). Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs, and the Press. London: Verso.[page needed]
9. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing. p. 2.[full citation needed]
10. Buckley, Kevin (1991). Panama: The Whole Story. New York: Simon & Schuster.[page needed]
11. Oakley, Robert B.; Dziedzic, Michael J. & Goldberg, Eliot M. (1998). Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.[page needed]
12. Cole, Ronald H. (1995). Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990. Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 6.[full citation needed]
13. A report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that numerous human rights violations occurred in Panama during Noriega's government: "Report on the situation of human rights in Panama". 9 November 1989.[full citation needed]
14. Cole, Ronald H. (1995). Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990. Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 11.[full citation needed]
15. Yates, Lawrence A. (2008). The US Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning and Crises Management, June 1987 – December 1989. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army.[page needed]
16. "The Noriega Challenge to George Bush's Credibility and the 1989 Invasion of Panama". 2000.[full citation needed]
17. Cole, Ronald H. (1995). Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990. Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 27.[page needed]
18. "On December 15, 1989, Noriega publicly declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States." - http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-11th-circ ... JFMG0.dpuf
19. "Operation Just Cause". 870-5a Organizational History Files (Corps Historian's Notes). XVIII Airborne Corps. 1989–90. Notebook #1. Permanent. Corps Historian's Personal Notes Recorded During the Operation
20. Cole, Ronald H (1995). Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990. Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 30.[page needed]
21. "A Transcript of President Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force". The New York Times. 21 December 1989.[page needed]
22. Noriega, Manuel & Eisner, Peter (1997). America's Prisoner: The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega. Random House.[page needed]
23. "Operation Just Cause Historical Summary". GS.Org.
24. Cramer, J. K. (2006). "'Just Cause' or Just Politics?: U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War". Armed Forces & Society. 32(2): 178–201. doi:10.1177/0095327x05277899.
25. "366th Fighter Wing History". United States Air Force. Archived from the original on 15 June 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2010.
26. Pizzurno, Patricia & Andrés Araúz, Celestino. "Estados Unidos invade Panamá Crónica de una invasión anunciada" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 21 April 2006.[full citation needed] According to this piece, the PDF had 16,000 troops, but only 3,000 of them were trained for combat: "Para entonces las Fuerzas de Defensa poseían 16.000 efectivos, de los cuales apenas 3.000 estaban entrenados para el combate."
27. Cole, Ronald H. "Operation Just Cause: Panama" (PDF). Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
28. Fishel, John T. (1997). Civil Military Operations in the New World. Greenwood Publishing Group.[full citation needed]
29. "Combat in Panama, Operation Just Cause}". Los Angeles Times. 21 December 1989. p. A4.
30. http://www.nationalguard.mil/news/today ... ember.aspx[full citation needed]
31. Baker, Russell (3 January 1990). "Observer: Is This Justice Necessary?". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 November 2007.[page needed]
32. Lindsay-Poland, John (2003). Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama. Duke University Press. p. 118. ISBN 0-8223-3098-9.[full citation needed]
33. Pike, John. "Operation Just Cause". Global Security.
34. "Panama and U.S. Strive to Settle on Death Toll". The New York Times.[full citation needed]
35. "US Invasion of Panama 1989". Wars of the World.
36. "'Friendly Fire' Killed 2 GIs in Panama, Invasion: The Pentagon sharply increases its estimate of U.S. casualties inflicted by own forces". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 12 December 2014.[full citation needed]
37. Riding, Alan (1990-06-24). "U.S. Sued in Death of a Journalist in Panama". New York Times. Retrieved 2015-05-29.
38. Spanish Yearbook of International Law: 1992. 1992. pp. 158–161.
39. "España ha asumido ante el Departamento de Estado de EE UU la defensa de Juantxu". El Pais. 1992-03-27. Retrieved 2015-05-29.
40. "Human Rights in Post-Invasion Panama: Justice Delayed is Justice Denied". 7 April 1991.[full citation needed]
41. Conley, William J., Jr. "Operations 'Just Cause' and 'Promote Liberty': The implications of Military Operations Other than War" (PDF). Small Wars Journal.[full citation needed]
42. Powell, Colin & Persico, Joseph E. (1995). My American Journey. New York: Random House.[page needed]
43. Yates, Lawrence (May–June 2005). "Panama, 1988–1990: The Discontent between Combat and Stability Operations" (PDF). Military Review.[full citation needed]
44. "Operation Nimrod Dancer". Military. Global Security.[full citation needed]
45. "The Responsibility to Protect". International Development Research Centre. December 2001. Archived from the original on 13 December 2007.[full citation needed]
46. Brooke, James (21 December 1989). "U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy About Intervention". The New York Times.[page needed]
47. United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution S/21048 22 December 1989. Retrieved 13 September 2007.
48. United Nations Security Council Verbatim Report 2902. S/PV/2902 page 15. 23 December 1989. Retrieved 13 September 2007.
49. United Nations Security Council Verbatim Report 2902. S/PV/2902 page 10. 22 December 1989. Retrieved 13 September 2007.
50. Pastor, Robert A. (2001). Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean. p. 96.
51. Trent, Barbara (Director) (31 July 1992). The Panama Deception (Documentary film). Empowerment Project.
52. "Panama". Human Rights Watch World Report 1989. Human Rights Watch. 1989.[full citation needed]
53. Brewer, Stewart. Borders and Bridges: A History of U.S.–Latin American Relations. p. 147.[full citation needed]
54. "Panama's President Vetoes Law Declaring Anniversary of US Invasion a 'Day of Mourning'". Archived from the original on 13 March 2008. [full citation needed]
55. "Panama Marks '89 Invasion as Day of 'National Mourning'". CNN. Archived from the original on 19 December 2008.
56. Henkin, Louis (1991). Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force. pp. 161–2.[full citation needed]
57. "Panama Companies Sue U.S. for Damages". The New York Times. 21 July 1990.[full citation needed]
58. "El Chorrillo Two Years after the U.S. Invaded Panama, Those Displaced by the War Have New Homes". Christian Science Monitor. 20 December 1991.[full citation needed]
59. "Attacks on the Press 2001: Panama". Committee to Protect Journalists.
60. "BOP: FCI Miami". Archived from the original on 16 July 2010. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
61. "Panama to Launch 'Truth Report' on 1989 US Invasion". TeleSUR English. 20 December 2015. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
62. "Truth Report Investigating 1989 US Invasion of Panama Warms Up". TeleSUR English. 26 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
63. The National Archives at St. Louis: Veterans Preference and "Wartime" Service
64. "Operation Just Cause: Panama 1989".[full citation needed]
65. http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0 ... ed/AppB(US).pdf[full citation needed]
66. "Operation Just Cause Historical Summary: Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned Volume I".[full citation needed]

Bibliography

• Eisenmann, Roberto (21 December 1989). "For a Panamanian, Hope and Tragedy". The New York Times.
Further reading[edit]
• Donnelly, Thomas (1991). Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama. Lexington Books. ISBN 0669249750.
• Harding, Robert C. (2001). Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7658-0075-6.
• ——— (2006). The History of Panama. Greenwood Publishing. ISBN 978-0-313-33322-4.
• Phillips, R. Cody (2004). "Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama".
• Yates, Lawrence A. (2008). The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning and Crisis Management, June 1987 – December 1989 (1st ed.). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 55–1–1.
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Re: Mrs. Kay Griggs on How the Government Works

Postby admin » Tue Jan 02, 2018 11:41 pm

U.S. Marine colonel wounded in Beirut attack
by Paula Butturini
March, 5, 1984

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.


BEIRUT, Lebanon -- Unidentified gunmen shot a U.S. Marine colonel in the arm and chest Monday near the heavily guarded U.S. Embassy, the first attack against a Marine in Beirut since U.S. peace-keeping troops left last week.

Col. Dale Dorman was ambushed and shot in the arm and chest while he walked along the waterfront about 50 yards south of the embassy compound, said U.S. Embassy spokesman Jon Stewart.


Dorman was immediately taken by helicopter to the USS Guam, where he was reported in stable condition, Stewart said.

Stewart declined to release any additional details of the shooting, including Dorman's age, home town or his function at the embassy.

Moslem Druze militiamen who witnessed the attack said Dorman was shot by three men waiting in a pale-colored Mercedes automobile. The Druze militiamen occupy the neighborhood in which the embassy is located and are on friendly terms with Marines in the compound.

Marines on duty at the time of the attack said Dorman, dressed in civilian clothes, walked about 50 yards out of the embassy compound toward the Riviera Hotel before he was shot.

They said they did not hear the shots because the noise of the gunfire was drowned out by waves lapping the shore.

An embassy car was driven out to pick up Dorman, who was sitting upright in the car holding his arm as he returned to the compound, the Marines said.

The attack was the first against a U.S. Marine since the U.S. peace-keeping contingent pulled out of Beirut Feb. 26 and redeployed aboard U.S. 6th Fleet ships patrolling off the Lebanese coast.

After the last of the peacekeepers withdrew, the Marines left behind at the U.S. Embassy told reporters they felt safer than their colleagues had been at the vulnerable base at Beirut airport.

'This is the best protected embassy in the world,' said Lance Cpl. Ron Menard, 21, of Nashua, N.H.

The U.S. peace-keeping contingent lost 264 men during their 17-month stay in Lebanon, 241 in the suicide truck bomb blast at their headquarters compound Oct. 23, 1983. A 265th Marine lost his life from a self-inflicted gun shot.
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