George Bush: The Company's Man, by Covert Action Information

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We Need Your Help
by CovertAction Information Bulletin
Winter 1990

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Book Review: Cults and Christian Warriors
by Fred Clarkson *
Winter 1990

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right by Sara Diamond, South End Press, 116 St. Botolph Street, Boston, MA 02115; Combatting Cult Mind Control by Steven Hassan. Park Street Press, One Park Street, Rochester, VT 05767.

It is rare when a book comes along that takes the wind out of the sails of the conventional wisdom. Rarer still when there are two. It could leave the conventional wisdom rudderless. This wisdom has told us that the Religious Right is dead or dying. We've also been told that "cults" are not a problem anymore, and that criticism of "new religions" is simply religious and/or racial intolerance. For anyone who has heard and not known how to respond, or believes these notions, Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right by Sara Diamond, and Combatting Cult Mind Control by Steven Hassan may help the convention-bound jump ship.

Much has been written about low-intensity conflict in recent years. But on the critical intersection between LIC and the activities of the Christian Right, reporting has been piecemeal and there has been little analysis. Spiritual Warfare establishes Sara Diamond as the foremost writer in this emerging field of investigative reporting and scholarship.

Much has also been written about "cults" and "mind control," as complex and controversial a subject as there is. Thus Steven Hassan's book is a guide for the perplexed, offering practical advice on how to view and what to do about unethical techniques of recruitment and indoctrination used by "cults." Hassan is an ex-Moonie leader, with a Master's Degree in counseling psychology, and ten years' experience as an "exit counselor" (as distinct from a "deprogrammer").

Hassan defines a cult as a group that practices "mind control;" he explains what it is, how it works, and suggests sensible, humane ways for friends and family to regain contact with a loved one, and perhaps help them find an "exit" from a group that seems to have them locked in.

The significant political implications of this are only touched on in the book itself. Many of the right -wing or fascist groups discussed in Spiritual Warfare are cults. The political utility of cult-controlled individuals to intelligence agencies and national security states is well documented in Spiritual Warfare. Tactics for community leaders, families and societies for dealing with cults are the subject of Combatting Cult Mind Control.

Spiritual Warfare

While the U.S. media were obsessed with the sexual peccadillos of Jimmy Swaggart, and the outrageous criminal frauds (and, of course, sexual escapades) of Jim Bakker, Sara Diamond was investigating the political activities of the Christian Right. She reveals, among other significant, and generally unreported, activities, Swaggart's assistance to dictators Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, and the white minority regime in South Africa.

Spiritual Warfare is a primer on the history, ideology, factions, and plans of the Christian Right, focusing on the 1970s and 1980s when it emerged as a political force. Though there is much noteworthy reporting on U.S. politics, some of the most original and remarkable reporting is on international operations. One may find many of the roots of contemporary Christian broadcasting in the international radio broadcasts of the Cold War. " ... [O]ne can point to a dramatic shift in the role of missionary radio when," writes Diamond, "after World War II, evangelicals decided to broadcast into countries that were closing its [sic] borders to U.S. missionaries." For example, after Mao's victory in China, the Far East Broadcasting Company was established, and according to Sig Mickelson, the former head of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) it was a "U.S. government operation with intelligence ties similar to RFE and RL."

The message articulated the Manichean Cold War vision of good Christian vs. evil atheistic communists who persecute Christians for their faith. These themes played domestically as well, and continue today. Diamond details how these themes were used during the Reagan administration's war on Nicaragua - and even exposes a phony persecutee, who was popular on evangelical Christian talk shows.

There are many such stories of the recent foreign adventures of the U.S.-based Christian Right. For example - the extensive support provided by evangelicals (especially Pat Robertson), to the genocidal Gen. Rios Montt of Guatemala, during 1982-83. This support for Montt (a member of a U.S. based Pentecostal sect) had the blessing, if not partnership, of the Reagan administration. For many evangelicals, it was also a political epiphany: "The Guatemalan experience, however vicarious, of a born again Christian shepherding an entire nation reinforced a mentality ... that they could seize the reigns of power and install - by force if necessary - a 'kingdom of God on earth.'''

Diamond persuasively argues that in order to understand the strategy of "total war" employed by the U.S. and other governments, it is necessary to study the role of religion. "It is doubtful," she insists, "that counterinsurgency could be effective without the use of religion. Because the conduct of 'psychological operations' relies on the successful interpretation and manipulation of a target population's deeply held beliefs and cultural practices, the functional use of religion simply must be addressed .... "

There are discussions of such operations in the Philippines, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Middle East, including an updated report on the Christian Right's collusion with South African government propaganda and political operations and its peculiar relationship to the government of Israel. The Christian Right's role in Oliver North's supply lines to the contras is further explored - as is the report that it is still intact, untouched by the Iran/contra scandal.

"Humanitarian aid, and psychological operations are the two areas of total war where the Christian Right serves U.S. foreign policy best," she continues. The Christian Right as "promoters of anti-communist ideology use religion to mask the aggressive, cynical use of 'humanitarian' projects. Cloaked as missionary evangelism, the 'spiritual warfare' component of counter-insurgency escapes serious attention by anti-intervention activists ... " and most everyone else. One brief example: The head of Pat Robertson's Operation Blessing relief arm, Robert Warren, is a retired U.S. Navy Captain and a veteran of counterinsurgency programs in the Philippines. In 1984, Warren and Harry "Heinie" Aderholt of the Air Commando Association established a medical clinic in Guatemala as part of "then president Gen. Mejia Victores's counter-insurgency 'model village program.' The model villages where civilians are 'protected' by the military, have frequently been declared by human rights observers as de facto concentration camps."

One of the critical discussions in Spiritual Warfare is the relationship between cults and the national security state. Diamond describes, for example, how fanatical cultic groups are being organized and armed into vigilante death squads in the Philippines. What's more, Diamond reveals the CIA's long term interest in cults: "At least as early as 1964, the CIA was aware of the political potency of such groups. In a 1964 'National Intelligence Survey,' the CIA analyzed a pseudo-Catholic Filipino cult called 'Iglesia Ni Kristo' (Church of Christ), which then represented an estimated one percent of the population and which, the CIA noted, was distinguished by its intense authoritarianism, its multi-tiered cell group structure, and the fact that members were required to vote for 'church designated political candidates.' In other words, the CIA analysts understood the political utility of the kind of 'shepherding' groups described in Chapter 4."

Indeed, in Chapter 4, Diamond documents the role of shepherding cults in American politics, and other countries. In shepherding cults, one "submits" to a "shepherd" influence, who may not control just religious, but all aspects of life; personal relationships, finances and politics. Many in Pat Robertson's "hidden army" of activists in the 1988 presidential campaign were members of shepherding cults, notably Maranatha Campus Ministries.

Of tremendous significance is the covert cooperation between Protestant and Catholic shepherding leaders, who have worked secretly together since 1968, orchestrating much of the "charismatic revival" in mainstream Protestant and Catholic churches. In fact, mainstream Christianity has been systematically infiltrated by charismatic shepherding cells which peel away members, or influence, even take over congregations. Mainstream Christianity has not fully come to grips with its cult problems. Nor has the secular Left, which not only faces off politically with such groups, but has cults of its own. Several cults of the Left wreak havoc in coalitions and in the broader progressive movement, notably the New Alliance Party led by Lenore Fulani, and (former Lyndon LaRouche associate) Fred Newman.

Combatting Cult Mind Control

The attack of cultic groups on communities can be profoundly disorienting, leaving people feeling helpless before strange, even fearsome entities. Hassan demystifies the cult phenomenon, providing clear definitions, and guidance for how to distinguish between what is a cult, and what is just an unconventional group. Hassan says that mind control, or "thought reform," is not to be confused with ''brainwashing,'' which best describes methods used on political prisoners, to extract false confessions, etc. Mind control is more subtle, not usually involving physical force. It does involve deceptions intended to place people in vulnerable positions for purposes of indoctrination, which Hassan says usually involves forms of hypnosis and sophisticated manipulations of group dynamics.

Hassan stresses that he believes in religious freedom, recalling the random abuses he suffered as a "Moonie." His is a case study in how to distinguish between fair criticism and bigotry. It is important to note that cults are not just religious, but may be political, commercial, or psychotherapy groups. Thus the use of "mind control" is what distinguishes a cult.

Ultimately, this book is about empowerment - how individuals and societies can defend themselves against these unethical applications of behavioral sciences. The reader is provided with resource lists, usable definitions, and simple communication and investigative strategies for when a loved one falls under cultic influences -- as well as strategies for intervention. Hassan teaches for example about how to use one's history and strengths of family, community, beliefs, and individual identity to reach and rescue people from false, cultic identities: " ... cult mind control never fully succeeds in erasing a person's core self. It does impose a dominating cult identity ... As a Unification Church member, I thought that the old Steve Hassan was dead. Yet the core 'me' woke back up during my deprogramming. He had been there all along."

"I have discovered," he writes, "that when someone in slavery is given a free choice, he or she does not choose to be enslaved." It is not unlike people in company towns who form unions to stand up to a domineering industry, or societies that rise up against unjust political or economic elites.

Spiritual Warfare makes clear that cults are being deployed by powerful interests to further their political agendas. But whether a cult is connected to power or not, Combatting Cult Mind Control warns: "People who know how mind control operates will have a distinct advantage over those who do not." Similarly, those who need to understand the Christian Right, and read Spiritual Warfare, will have a distinct advantage over those who do not.

_______________

Notes:

* Fred Clarkson is a Washington, D.C. based freelance journalist. He has written extensively about the Religious Right.

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El Salvador 1989: Elections Under State Terror
by Terry Allen and Edward S. Herman*
Winter 1990

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

On March 19, 1989, in an election in which two thirds of the eligible voters did not vote, the ARENA party won full control of the government of El Salvador. Chile's General Augusto Pinochet was the first to congratulate the President-elect, Alfredo Cristiani. It was a fitting conclusion to a U.S. investment of $4 billion, in the interest of "democracy," that power should fall into the hands of a party founded and still strongly influenced by the death squad organizer and "pathological killer" Roberto D' Aubuisson. [1] It was also predictable that the U.S. mass media and leading liberal Democrats would still find this election, as they had its predecessors, a legitimating exercise in democracy.

We will review here the background of the March 1989 election and the reasons why it was democratic in form but not in substance.

The 1982 and 1984 Elections

The 1982 and 1984 elections in El Salvador were classic examples of "demonstration elections" and effectively served their purpose: they induced the U.S. mass media and the Congress to find El Salvador a "democracy" worthy of material and moral support, and money flowed there to sustain administration policy. That policy was exclusively military, aiming at the defeat of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) by a counterinsurgency (CI) war of attrition; the elections were simply a public relations (PR) arm of this military effort.

The U.S. mass media helped make the 1982 and 1984 demonstration elections successful by failing to acknowledge and discuss the primacy of the CI war and the role of elections in clearing the ground for intensified warfare. Reporters at the 1982 election almost universally observed that "peace" was the first objective of the voters. The electoral slogan formulated in the United States to encourage voting by the war-weary people of El Salvador was "Ballots versus Bullets," suggesting that the election was a route to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But neither the Salvadoran army, the Reagan administration, nor any party represented in the elections favored a negotiated settlement of the war. When the 1984 elections approached, the media avoided discussing the anomaly of the public having desired peace above all in 1982, and the obvious failure of the earlier allegedly democratic election to bring about - or even to elicit attempts to negotiate - peace.

In order to perpetuate the myth that democracy was a goal of the Salvadoran elites, the army, and the U.S. government, it was also incumbent on the mass media covering the 1982 and 1984 elections to avert their eyes from history. The Salvadoran elite had been fighting furiously against political, social and economic democracy for decades before 1982. So had the army, which was its ally and instrument. The U.S. government showed no concern over the lack of democracy in El Salvador until rebellion threatened the status quo. Could these parties be taken seriously as sponsors of democracy? The question doesn't arise for a patriotic media. Client state leaders who have murdered thousands are assumed to have "changed course" and must be "given a chance." By contrast, spokespersons for states being destabilized "cannot be trusted," and their word is not accepted on their claimed beneficent plans.

Above all, the mass media do not discuss the fundamental conditions of a free election. Is there freedom of speech and assembly? Is there a free press? Are organizations like unions, peasant leagues, and student groups allowed to organize and operate openly? Can parties and candidates qualify and campaign without fear, irrespective of their political position? Is the public subject to any threats of violence? None of these conditions was met in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984. [2]

The 1982 election was held in the midst of an ongoing reign of terror in which 700-800 unarmed civilians were murdered per month during the preceding 30 months by official and officially sponsored paramilitary forces. Many of the victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated; their bodies often left on public display. More than two dozen journalists were murdered in El Salvador between 1979 and 1984 and the two independent newspapers were eliminated by violence in 1980 and 1981. A large number of organizations were destroyed and their leaders killed or driven underground.

The "main opposition," the guerrilla movement and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FOR), could not participate in any election for fear of assassination. Their five top leaders had been tortured and murdered in November 1980, and the remaining leadership was on army death lists. Furthermore, they were not intended to run. The U.S. plan was to clear the ground by systematic terror, then to pretend that the guerrillas wouldn't join in the election because they feared losing in a fair contest! The guerrillas were also portrayed as trying to disrupt the election, and voter turnout was used as a measure of support for the army - which was "protecting the election" - and by implication, U.S. policy and the CI war.

The mass media also failed to report in 1982 that voting was required by law, ID cards had to be stamped, and the head of the army had warned the public that a failure to vote was treasonous. In an environment of mass killing, these characteristics of the voting process were clearly relevant to explaining voter turnout.

In the 1984 election, the presence and victory of Jose Napoleon Duarte gave the election credibility as a genuine exercise in democracy. As an alleged reformer, running against D' Aubuisson, he provided an appearance of choice. Duarte was also a charismatic man, spoke excellent English, and was able to convince many members of Congress that he was really going to improve human rights and bring peace to El Salvador. The reality, however, is that Duarte joined the Salvadoran junta in March 1980, just as the real reformers resigned in recognition of their inability to stop an army reign of terror. Duarte then served as a fig leaf for the organized violence that followed, engaging in steady apologetics for the army's mass murder. [3]

Most important, in order to be able to take power, survive in office, and maintain the vital flow of U.S. aid, Duarte had to accept the army's and Reagan administration's pursuit of a war to the finish, and engage in no compromise with "the subversives" (a phrase used regularly by the army and by Duarte himself). At no time, therefore, did Duarte offer the peace option of a negotiated settlement, although he was vague and duplicitous enough to convince some that he was a peacemaker. [4] During his tenure in office no state or para-military murderer was prosecuted for killing or torturing Salvadorans, despite the huge civilian toll and the fact that in many cases eyewitnesses presented official depositions identifying the perpetrators and presenting ironclad evidence of their guilt. Duarte was the perfect front man for a regime of terror.

The Rise of ARENA

The decline of the Christian Democrats was inevitable. Their base of popular support gradually eroded as a result of regressive economic policies, failure to make progress toward ending the war, exposure of their massive corruption, increasing party divisions, and resentment at their subservience to U.S. interests. The Christian Democrats had split apart in 1980, when Duarte and his faction decided to align itself with the army against the guerrillas (who Duarte admitted at the time had the support of the general populace ). [5] It split apart again in 1988, partially over the choice of Duarte's successor, but also because of attempts by the faction led by Rey Prendes to distance itself from the increasingly obvious corruption, ineptitude and dwindling support of the ruling group.

ARENA, on the other hand, prospered under the conditions created by the U.S.-sponsored CI war, which fostered the growth of the army and anticommunist ideology, and concentrated on weakening and destroying the left and its popular support base. There was little "center" to begin with, and the luke-warm liberal-left support of Duarte and the Christian Democrats eroded as they revealed themselves to be corrupt, powerless, and agents of the army and a foreign government.

ARENA almost won the 1982 election. It lost in 1984 only because of a massive foreign (i.e., U.S.) intervention in support of Duarte and a last gasp of electoral hope by an important segment of the public that Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party might do something constructive. Following the 1984 election, ARENA embarked on a systematic organizational effort that positioned it well for future politicking. [6] By the end of 1988, ARENA had gained control of the legislature, the judiciary, and a good portion of the electoral apparatus. In 1989, with its new organizational structures in place, and backed by the wealth of the army and oligarchy, it presented itself as a unified party standing for peace, prosperity, and incorruptible patriotism.

Organized by Roberto D' Aubuisson, ARENA is the party of the oligarchy, the army officer corps, and the death squads. D' Aubuisson is the best known leader of the Salvadoran death squads? Trained in Taiwan and the United States, and a close ally of Guatemalan leader and death squad organizer Mario Sandoval Alarcon, D' Aubuisson was a participant in the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, and has close links to the fascist international. [8] In 1982, he told several Western European correspondents that Hitler had treated the Jews appropriately. [9]

D' Aubuisson and ARENA were always acceptable to the Reaganites - they were merely less desirable than Duarte and the Christian Democrats. The latter provided a better facade for the alleged democracy, and had the additional advantage of being more subservient to U.S. demands than ARENA. Historically, the Salvadoran oligarchy has been relatively independent and not eager to share its power and profits with foreign capital. As the party of the oligarchy, ARENA represents a rightwing nationalist movement that resents U.S. intervention, even while accepting it out of necessity. Its leaders do not kiss the American flag and do not accept orders as readily as the "reformers."

But ARENA is anticommunist and hostile to radical change in El Salvador, and it is therefore ''within the ballpark" for U.S. leaders and bureaucrats, just as Stroessner, Pinochet, and Somoza were quite acceptable for most of their lengthy tenures in power. When ARENA came close to full power in 1982, the U.S. Embassy quietly began to rationalize D'Aubuisson, [10] setting the stage for his becoming a Free World leader. The press did likewise, suppressing his statement on Hitler and the Jews and treating him in a tone quite different from that accorded enemy terrorists like Abu Nidal or Carlos. [11]

Table 1. Human Rights Violations Against Civilians in El Salvador in 1988*
Number of Incidents
Captures of Civilians by Uniformed Soldiers or "Heavily Armed Men in Civilian Clothes": 1,556
Assassinations: 412
Attempted Assassinations: 30
Reported Disappearances: 36
Members of Cooperatives Killed or Disappeared: 20
Civilians and Unidentified Persons Killed During Military Operations: 167
Incidents of Violence Against Internationals (Captures, Deportations, Injuries, Assassinations): 87
Violations Attributable to FMLN:
Kidnappings: 56
Executions: 21

* Source: El Rescate Human Rights Department, Chronology of Human Rights, Violations in El Salvador, January-December 1988, pp. vi-vii.

Despite these sanitation efforts, ARENA remains the party of terrorism. D'Aubuisson, its founder and continuing leader, is a "terrorist" by any western definition of the word. Voted ARENA's Honorary President for Life in 1988, he retains his power in the party and still gets the loudest applause at ARENA gatherings. Before the 1989 election it was widely known in El Salvador that D' Aubuisson dominated the party, set policy, and did most of the talking at planning meetings. Cristiani contributed little and nodded often, according to a source who was present. [12] D' Aubuisson also maintains his charismatic influence with a portion of the middle class, small business people and peasants who are fiercely nationalistic. These groups see ARENA as the only party capable of standing up to the United States. They are tired of war, but believe the rightwing line that the FMLN is part of an international communist conspiracy, and that it can be defeated by a burst of intensified warfare.

The ARENA support base overlaps with the membership of the earlier terrorist organization ORDEN, a paramilitary structure from which the death squads were partly drawn (along with the army and police). With D'Aubuisson a death squad organizer, many other death squads supported by oligarchs who joined ARENA, and the remnants of ORDEN supplying many death squad cadres, the death squads may be said to be institutional affiliates of the ARENA party.

ARENA has long had strong representation in the El Salvador judiciary, and its entrenched position has been a major factor rendering the law inoperative as regards state and rightwing terror. A steady stream of Supreme Court decisions in 1988 and 1989 exonerated the murderers of Archbishop Romero, the assassins of two American labor advisers, the mass killers at La Hoya and San Sebastian, and others. It is evident that ARENA's taking control of the executive, as well as the legislative and judicial apparatus of the state, will eliminate all internal legal protections against unrestrained state terrorism.13 This series of court decisions received little coverage in the U.S. media, and their implications for the meaning of the election have also been ignored.

The Brief Opening - And Then Escalated Terror

Following the 1984 election, a small amount of space opened up in El Salvador. [14] The press and TV stations were able to criticize, and unions and other groups could organize and engage in protest without assured violent retribution. The media were still under conservative ownership and control, and outright espousal of the guerrilla cause was not possible above ground. A newspaper with a level of dissent equal to that of La Prensa in Nicaragua would not have been able to operate, even in the "thaw" years. Leaders of the FDR, Reuben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo, returned to El Salvador and initiated a campaign, thus reintroducing a left presence into the electoral process.

From 1987 on, however, as the army made little progress in the CI war, and elections loomed on the horizon, the space opened up in 1984 began to shrink. Death squad activity increased, army violence against ordinary citizens escalated, and systematic attacks on dissident unions and other revived groups and their leaders rose sharply. Death squad killings increased 138 percent between 1987 and 1988, Tutela Legal, with four new groups coming into existence and threatening "subversives."

Table 1 shows the number and type of attacks on civilians for the year 1988, derived from the El Rescate Chronology and list of abuses for that year. The vast majority of these incidents were carried out by members of the army and security forces. It should be noted that the largest item, 1,556 "Captures of Civilians by Uniformed Soldiers or 'Heavily Armed Men in Civilian Clothes'," is almost entirely the result of operations of state agents, to whom we may also allocate virtually all of the large total for "Assassinations." The flavor of the reality that lies behind these numbers is hinted at in the tiny sample of El Rescate entries given in Box 1, taken from their Chronology which is 291 pages for 1988 alone.

One of the most notable features of the growing state terror in El Salvador has been the return to systematic attacks on popular organizations and the arrest, torture, disappearance and murder of their leaders. Americas Watch published two volumes which described in detail the recent onslaught against organized labor in El Salvador: Labor Rights in El Salvador (March 1988) and Petition Before the U.S. Trade Representative on Labor Rights in El Salvador (March 1989). In the former document, which notes 13 murders and disappearances of labor activists in a 12 month period, it is stressed that the security forces have been systematically attacking organized labor as an important part of their overall service; that "recurrent military involvement in detentions of, and attacks against, union and peasant cooperative activists suggests that such measures remain a component of government policy" (p. 14). The Petition submitted in 1989 summarizes case after case of police and army intervention in labor disputes, with frequent arrests, torture, sexual abuse, and sometimes murder. These two documents by Americas Watch were not reported on in the New York Times and mass media in general.

Box 2 shows a small sample of the record of increasing and systematic attacks on organizations, which encompassed virtually all the major trade union groups, peasant organizations, the University of San Salvador, refugee groups, and even day care centers. The murders and raids are not on the scale of 1980-1981, but they are numerous, destructive, and traumatizing.

Freedom of the Press and the Murder of Journalists

As in the earlier period, open media support for the guerrillas is impossible in El Salvador. Broadcast stations interviewing guerrilla leaders were sent a "quiet message" of warning by the army. [15] The two largest newspapers in El Salvador not only supported ARENA, they blacked out news of the activities and statements of moderate and left opposition groups and even refused to take their paid advertisements. [16]

Box 1. How Security Forces Treat Civilians in "Free" El Salvador, 1988*

January 6: Jose Victor Manuel Gomez de Leon, 25 years old, a member of ANT A (the National Association of Agricultural Workers), in Las Marias, Chinameca, San Miguel, is captured by soldiers from the ARCE Battalion on the Las Zelayas Farm, Plan Grande. Days later, his body is found with the feet and legs burned, and the head and left arm missing. (Tutela Legal)

January 11: Jose Angel Alas Gomez, 27 years old, is captured by the Treasury Police. The Police announce that Alas dies from a "cardiac arrest" in a Treasury Police vehicle. According to investigations by the CDHES (Non-Governmental), the body shows lacerations, swelling, burns on one shoulder and on the legs, and blows and pokes on the testicles. (CDHES)

January 25: Nelson Rivas, 16, is abducted from his house in Cuesta Blanca by men in civilian clothes at 9:00 p.m. According to neighbors from the area, there were many soldiers on the highway that day. The next day Rivas's body is found with his hands tied, his shirt in his mouth, his throat slashed, and with signs of torture. (IDHUCA and North American churchworkers)

January 29: Bodies of eight persons are found in La Libertad, six in Sacoyo and two in San Pablo Tacachico: all tortured including two young women found hanging from a tree, breasts cut off, faces painted red. (El Mundo, January 30, 1988)

January 31: Six uniformed soldiers abduct Juan Alberto Guevara Monge and his son Jose Adelmo Deras Guevara, 9 years old, who is mentally handicapped, from Platanillo, La Libertad. Guevara Monge's body is found in the Agua Caliente River, with the legs broken, the head mutilated, the shirt and pants burned, an ear split, and a bullet in one cheek. (Tutela Legal)

*Source: A tiny sample taken from the almost 5,000 incidents reported in the El Rescate, Human Rights Department, Chronology Of Human Rights Violations in El Salvador, January-December 1988.

In the pre-election period, also, the Salvadoran Attorney General officially warned the press against allowing any statements "inciting" the public not to vote. [17] This was not mentioned in the U.S. mass media, to our knowledge.

Box 2. Attacks on Organizations by the Armed Forces*

December 28, 1988: A bomb explodes in the Lutheran Church, causing extensive damage to the sanctuary and the pastor's office. A group of men entered the church at 3 a.m. and after throwing religious ornaments on the floor, placed an explosive. Bishop Medardo Gomez had received death threats in recent weeks. (El Mundo December 28, 1988)

December 29: ANTA offices in Santa Ana are searched and ransacked by soldiers of the Second Brigade; two workers are captured and almost $6,000 in equipment stolen. Later the two workers are released. (San Salvador Television, Channel 12, December 30, 1988)

June 1, 1989: The Bracamonte Battalion enters San Jose Las Flores, Chalatenango, destroys the day care center and holds people captive in the church for more than two hours; gunfire damages a home, the clinic and the convent, and soldiers threaten to rape the nuos. (El Mundo, June 19, 1989)

June 6: Soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion raid and rob the SOICES union offices in San Jose Las Fiores, Chalatenango. (El Mundo, June 17, 1989)

July 17: Twenty thousand rounds of ammunition fired by soldiers and security forces into the National University campus in San Salvador, injuring 11 people. Fourteen students and professors have been captured by authorities in the past two weeks; two from Santa Ana campus are thought to be "disappeared."

July 18: Treasury Police invade UNADES office (Office of Earthquake Victims) to search. They rip the office apart. According to Carmen Rivera, at midnight they took ten workers to the police headquarters. "There the interrogator pulled my hair and chased me around the cell .... More than anything else they asked me about my children. Then they asked me about my husband. This was the hardest thing for me. Every time I would answer he would say I was lying, and that the next interrogator would kill me. The entire time I was not allowed to use the bathroom, given no food or water. I was denied sleep and forced to stand for 72 hours. They kept touching my breasts; I feared they would rape me. I had been told that they would put me in the electric chair." [She was transferred to the women's prison on July 21].

*Sources: El Rescate, Human Rights Department, Chronology for 1988; updates for June and July 1989.

During the 1989 election the Salvadoran state continued its practice of murdering journalists, and the U.S. mass media continued their role of protecting a client state election by looking the other way. On election day, two reporters from Reuters were shot by Air Force personnel, one of whom died, the other severely wounded. A Dutch journalist was shot in a cross-fire, and died while his fellow reporters were unable to get him to a hospital because military helicopters kept firing at their trucks, plainly marked with press insignia. Another reporter, from the local San Salvador TV Channel 12, was shot dead by military personnel. The western reporters assembled in El Salvador were perturbed at these murders, and asked sharp questions of Defense Minister Vides Casanova at a press conference. He claimed these were regrettable accidents, that he would investigate, and that anyone guilty of misbehavior would surely be punished. [18]

But once again, the U.S. mass media down-played these murders. None of them featured this story, and few provided the background information that there had been several dozen prior journalist killings. None of them called attention to the fact that Channel 12 had angered the security establishment by its reporting on human rights abuses and that other staff from the station had been captured, tortured and released the previous year as a warning. They did not mention that the two Reuters reporters had been shot in the back after having been allowed to pass through a check point. None of the papers followed up the press conference with a report on whether or not guilty parties were found and punished.

The Democratic Convergence and Its Role

Among the factors differentiating the 1989 election from those held in 1982 and 1984, the most striking was the presence of the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of three left parties which was openly aligned with the FMLN.

According to its officials, the Convergence chose to participate in order to create political space, widen the frame of debate, obtain a seat on the Central Election Council (CCE), [19] and serve as a bridge between the FMLN and the government and United States in future negotiations. It remains to be seen whether this strategy was effective. What is certain, however, is that the participation of a leftist group gave the U.S. press another reason for declaring the 1989 election open (although the absence of such an electoral option in earlier years hadn't prevented the media from finding those also triumphs of democracy). The press failed, however, to provide the context that would explain why the Convergence was not able to mount a serious electoral bid.

In 1980, opposition parties had been forced underground by systematic murder. It was not until 1987 that Zamora and Ungo felt able to return from exile abroad. However, they had neither the necessary time nor the money to develop an organization that could span the country. With a budget of only $200,000 - compared with an estimated $6 million and $8 million for the Christian Democrats and ARENA, respectively. [20] The Convergence was not able to hire U.S. public relations firms, organize many rallies or pay for extensive advertising. [21]

These "legal" disadvantages were exacerbated by a pattern of illegal tactics used against the leftist party. In violation of the electoral code, a propaganda campaign was mounted against the Convergence by the army and others. In Santa Ana, army personnel passed out leaflets proclaiming that Zamora and Ungo were traitors. At one rally, the army distributed leaflets featuring Zamora enveloped in a hammer and sickle. Posters also appeared throughout the country with "enemies of the people" superimposed over photos of Zamora and his running mate Reni Roldan. So many violations were recorded that the president of the Central Election Committee (CCE) told a delegation from the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG) that he had "formally requested the armed forces to cease interfering with the Convergencia's campaign." [22] This request, and the numerous incidents of army partisanship in the election, were not reported in the mainstream U.S. press.

Because of the personal risks and lack of money, the Convergence's campaign was limited largely to San Salvador. Only once did Zamora travel outside the city to campaign. Even within the capital the danger was substantial. Their major rally, held in front of the National Cathedral on the last campaign day before the election, was broken up as it started to grow dark by the approaching sound of machine gun and heavy weapons fire. The candidates were rushed to cars and the crowd melted away. [23]

Another source of problems for the Convergence was the opposition of the FMLN to their participation in the electoral process. The FMLN claimed that "elections at the point of a gun" could not lead to a democratic outcome, and it called for a boycott. This split over tactics on the left cost the Convergence a great many votes.

As noted, the U.S. media cited the Convergence's participation as evidence of the openness of the election. In this connection, Lindsey Gruson observed in the New York Times that "In 1981... the armed forces put a bounty on the heads of 138 leftists by publishing a list of their names and describing them as wanted traitors." [24] This important fact, which tells us so much about the integrity of the 1982 election, was not reported by the New York Times in 1982. Now, with this fact mere "history," with the social democrats running in 1989, it can be mentioned! The suppressions now move to the factors that make the left appearance merely nominal and that worked in favor of ARENA, sometimes outside the law.

From Mandatory to Restricted Voting

Another major difference between the elections of the early 1980s and that of March 1989 was the government's policy on obligatory voting. In the elections of 1982 and 1984 voting was mandatory and citizens without a stamp on their national identity card (ID, cedula) certifying that they had voted risked fines, accusations of FMLN collaboration, harassment and even death. After their legislative victories in 1988, ARENA introduced a series of electoral "reforms." Among these, the legal requirement to vote was eliminated. Instead of having his/her voting record on the ID, which citizens are required to carry at all times, a new card (carnet) was issued specifically for voting.

At the same time, however, confusing and often arbitrary and costly restrictions were placed on obtaining these cards. The ID was required for obtaining a voting carnet, and this could only be gotten in one's home town or by paying more than $60 (approximately half the annual income of a rural worker) for alternative documentation. This discriminated heavily against refugees, migrant workers, and the poor. According to the IHRLG, "Fully 20 percent of those applying for a new carnet were rejected by the computer" because of technical "discrepancies," leading the IHRLG to conclude that the "procedure may eliminate more eligible voters than ineligible ones." [25] Local boards, often controlled by ARENA, also had discretionary authority to rule on the validity of documentation presented to obtain a carnet. In addition, the registration period was shortened.

Many Salvadorans did not even try to get the new cards. Publicity about the changes in the law was poor and travel in El Salvador is dangerous, especially without proper papers. As of 1985, over half the 285 municipalities in the country reported that their town halls (where birth certificates and records are kept) had been destroyed. The number is undoubtedly higher today.

Between 20 and 30 percent of the Salvadoran population is either internal or external refugees. The IHRLG estimated that there were 450,000-700,000 internal refugees and displaced persons, who had great difficulty voting under the new restrictions. A large fraction of these were effectively disqualified from voting. All of the estimated 600,000-1,000,000 external refugees were ineligible to vote by law. This adds up to between 1-1.7 million Salvadorans excluded from the vote (a million actually voted in the election). The excluded Salvadorans were mainly rural and urban peasants and workers, many of whom had been victimized by the army and paramilitary forces, and would tend to oppose ARENA.

Not all the exclusions were legal, even by Salvadoran standards. "[Jose Ricardo] Perdomo [president of the CCE] announced that the records of an estimated 290,000 voters in the election registry have been tampered with." [26] Charges of double and even triple voting were made in some districts. "It's like sneaking into a fair," joked one multiple voter to an international observer (who told this story to Terry Allen). The Convergence charged that fraud had robbed them of the third place standing which would have given them a place on the election review board.

By eliminating mandatory voting and instituting restrictive registration requirements and control over documentation, ARENA gained not only a public relations victory, but also a tactical advantage over both the Convergence and the Christian Democrats. With its large campaign fund and extensive organization, ARENA was able to ensure that its supporters registered and turned out. The Christian Democrats went into the election disorganized, dispirited, and outvoted on the electoral boards. The Convergence was unable to compete in organizational reach and communications effort.


Credit: Terry Allen
Figure 1: Clear plastic balloting boxes used in Salvadoran elections.

The extremely effective transportation strike called by the FMLN, which brought most traffic to a halt throughout the country on election day, undoubtedly helped ARENA. It had planned for an Operacion Rescale, and mobilized thousands of private vehicles that brought its supporters to voting stations. 27 The army also helped bring voters to the voting stations in trucks, bedecked with banners "In the service of the public." Ordinary citizens might not be keen on riding to vote in army trucks. For the Convergence, the strike emphasized the split with the FMLN over participation in the tainted electoral process, and like the Christian Democrats it was unable to provide private transportation to get its supporters to the polls.

Of 3.1 million eligible voters (i.e., excluding external refugees), only 2.2 million actually registered; and of these only 1.8 million eventually received cards allowing them to vote. Of those, 1 million actually voted. Another 56,000 ballots were unmarked or annulled [28] (a strategy supported by the FMLN for those who were afraid to stay away from the polls, but did not wish to support the electoral process). Thus while almost 54 percent of those who voted cast their ballots for ARENA, this represented only 16.5 percent of the number of eligible voters and under 14 percent of the potential electorate (including external refugees). Thus while ARENA may be said to have won by a "landslide," [29] it was of a shrunken and minority electorate. The number of eligible voters participating in the election fell from 68.5 percent in 1984 to 32.5 percent in March 1989.

Although the low turnout was partially the result of the elimination of compulsory voting, the transportation strike, and the exclusion of many potential voters by the new registration procedures, another important factor was the loss of credibility of elections as a means of achieving any useful ends. This attitude also biased the election in favor of the right. Its constituency could hope to achieve power and implement their preferred agenda. Those who had thought that elections might bring peace, human rights improvements, and progressive reform, had reason for disillusionment and justification for the search for other tactics.

The Non-Privacy of the Vote

If an election is held in an environment of potential coercion, it is important to examine possible abuses in the basic mechanics of voting. Despite the Salvadoran constitutional guarantee of voter privacy, the ballot boxes used in the 1982, 1984 and 1989 elections were made of clear plastic. Figure 1 is a photograph taken by one of the authors (Allen) at the March 19 election. The ballots, which are numbered, are printed on translucent paper and can easily be seen after they are deposited by the voter in the plastic bags. The brightly colored party logos and the voters mark (an official felt tip pen is provided) bleed through and are readable on the reverse side of the paper, even when the ballot is carefully folded.

Figure 2 shows numerous members of the armed forces standing near the polling stations. The government announced in early March that 75 per cent of its 56,000 man force would be deployed on election day to ensure "security." ARENA poll watchers were also present at every one of the 7,000 voting booths in the country, sometimes in numbers greater than the single watcher permissible by law (ARENA mobilized an army of 23,000 poll watchers, 30 who were provided with fancy box lunches, decorated with the party logo).

We cannot be certain what effect these violations of voter secrecy had on the election result. In the past, however, voting for the ''wrong'' faction was sometimes punished by such sanctions as harassment, loss of employment, beating, rape, imprisonment, and even murder. As these punishments were commonly meted out by death squads closely linked to both ARENA and the army, voters contemplating dissent were not likely to be put at ease when members of these two groups were present and able to observe their votes. Although the U.S. media are very alert to the intimidating threats of security forces in the case of enemy elections, friendly security forces only "protect elections," whatever their actual record. [31] In accord with this patriotic rule, the threats to the most basic requirements of privacy in El Salvador that we have just described were not reported by the mainstream media in 1989, just as they were not in the two prior elections.

After the 1988 elections, a Permanent Committee of the National Debate, a broad-based coalition of 59 social, political and religious institutions and organizations, was formed under the leadership of the centrist Archbishop of San Salvador, to assess electoral politics. Meeting in September 1988, a large majority of the participants agreed that elections under existing conditions, which excluded a large fraction of the population from participation, and were closely tied to the aims of the war party, were neither very helpful in solving the nation's problems nor an expression of democracy. [32]

Although the National Debate was organized under respectable auspices and included a wide range of Salvadoran groups, its activities and findings were blacked out in the U.S. mass media (which did the same to the powerful critique of the Guatemalan elections of 1984-1985 by its Catholic Bishops). [33] The press sticks to sources that will confirm the official view, such as the official observer delegations, which always find client state election turnouts impressive and public enthusiasm for the new army-sponsored "democracies" inspiring. [34]

The FMLN Proposal

On January 24, 1989, two months before the election, the FMLN put forward a proposal "To Convert the Election Into a Contribution Toward Peace," which offered FMLN acceptance of and participation in the electoral process in exchange for concessions by the government. The proposal called for postponement of the election from March 19 to September 15; guarantees by the government to end repression of the popular movement; confinement of the army to the barracks on election day (and the substitution of less threatening observers and "protectors"); participation of the Democratic Convergence in the Central Electoral Commission; a revised electoral code; arrangements to allow the huge external refugee population to vote; and U.S. withdrawal from the election process.


Credit: Terry Allen
Figure 2: Soldiers watch over Salvadoran voters.

This proposal shocked the Salvadoran establishment and U.S. government, and they spent a month hemming and hawing and working out the best way of rejecting the proposal. There were some elements of the establishment who were interested, and the Church and popular groups urged serious consideration. They pointed out that the FMLN proposals added up to the conditions for making the election democratic. The United States, however, was still committed to winning the war, and the dominant elements of the army and ARENA were adamantly opposed to doing business with "delinquent terrorists." Thus an important peace option was rejected, and a public still claiming peace as a foremost objective was allowed an election that would consolidate the power of the extreme war party. This irony escaped the western media.

Conclusions

The March 19, 1989 election in El Salvador was neither free, fair, nor democratic. The level of state-sponsored terror was too high to allow the basic conditions of a free election to be met. Among other limitations, journalists continued to be murdered, unions, peasant groups, and other popular organizations and their leaders were under steady threat and attack by the army and paramilitary groups, and transparent voting boxes that compromised the secrecy of the vote remained in use. We believe that if these electoral characteristics existed in Nicaragua, the U.S. media would find that election a farce. As it is, they remained discreetly silent on the negatives and, as in the past, saw to it that an election sponsored by their government was a triumph of democracy.

The victory of the ARENA party was an ironic but logical consequence of U.S. intervention and policy. The United States supported the systematic attack on and decimation of popular organizations, while trying to shore up Duarte and a largely mythical center. But U.S. policy assured that Duarte could not fulfill any reformist or peace-making campaign promises, and his support base disintegrated. With the collapse of the Christian Democrats, only the nationalist right remained as a viable force in electoral politics. The Convergence Party and other progressive forces could make only a nominal showing in the face of the earlier destruction of its leaders and organizational support base, and the continuing attacks from the army and right. Only the party of D'Aubuisson, the death squads, the army and the oligarchy had the enthusiasm, money, organization and military force to win an election under the conditions of economic crisis and in the midst of an ongoing counterinsurgency war.


Credit: Terry Allen
This banner, displayed in front of bombed-out labor union office, reads "ARENA ASSASSINS."

As we stressed earlier, an important feature of the electoral environment of El Salvador has been the shift from mandatory to restricted voting. This reflects the growing legislative muscle of ARENA. In 1982 and 1984, when the United States viewed "turnout" as crucial to the success of the election (reflecting its PR role), voting was legally required in El Salvador. For ARENA, a distinctly minority party, restricted voting was desirable because it would tend to keep off the voting rolls the support base of the left. ARENA would do best with a small but "select" voter turnout. Its legislators used their legislative power to eliminate mandatory voting and put in its place laws which made registration more difficult. A million or more potentially eligible voters therefore did not register. Many more didn't bother to vote, and ARENA won with the vote of only 16.5 percent of the eligible electorate and under 14 percent of potentially eligible voters. But just as the U.S. press failed to report and discuss the significance of mandatory voting in 1982 and 1984, the next phase of undemocratic and manipulative adjustment of the vote - by the deliberate shrinkage of the electorate - also escaped their notice in 1989.

Following the March 1989 election, and helped by the fact that the U.S. mass media simply refused to publish information on the escalating state terror in El Salvador, the Senate Democrats joined forces with the Bush administration and voted $90 million in unconditional military aid to the Salvadoran government on September 20, 1989, to show that "we appreciate and support what he [Cristiani] is doing and we stand behind him" (Christopher Dodd). There are two fallacies in this position. One is that, even on the assumption that Crisitiani is a moderate who means well, and is not merely a powerless front man for D' Aubuisson and the security forces, unconditional aid would weaken his ability to restrain the hardliners. It would signal them that any barriers to kill imposed by the United States are down. Second, apart from the matter of incentives, there is a question of what Cristiani is actually doing? Under considerable pressure, he was talking to the rebels, although no agreement has been reached, and in our view, no useful compromise is likely to come out of negotiations reluctantly engaged in by the Salvadoran extreme right. We believe these talks are necessary to ARENA for political and PR purposes, but that they will only clear the ground for an intensified war, just as demonstration elections did earlier.

On the other hand, Cristiani has escalated state terror against popular groups in El Salvador since he took office. The National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) reports that in the first three months after ARENA took over executive power, there were 317 civilians assassinated, 62 disappeared, over 400 captured by the security forces, and more than 100 women sexually assaulted while in detention. According to this same group, over 140 of its members were seized by the military and police in the period during and immediately after the September 13-15 peace talks in Mexico City. Eight of the 11 members of the executive board of the National Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS) have been arrested under ARENA rule, and their protests and demonstrations have been broken up violently. In a press conference in late September, members of FENASTRAS claimed that of 64 people detained by the National Police during their protest march on September 18, eight were raped while in custody. The National University has been periodically attacked by gunfire which has wounded significant numbers, and over a dozen faculty and students have been arrested, with several murdered or disappeared. The office of the Union of Earthquake Victims (UNADES) has been ransacked and its officials arrested and abused. [35]

These are a sample of Cristiani's material actions, but as the mainstream press is not featuring - or even mentioning them, for the Democrats these events do not occur. Just as the election of Duarte - a front man for the army and the Reagan administration - neutralized the Democrats in 1984; five years later they have embraced Cristiani - a front man for Roberto D' Aubuisson, the death squads, and the oligarchy.

El Salvador 1989: Epilogue on the Collapse of the Democratic Facade

Shortly after the completion of our article, on October 31, the San Salvador office of FENASTRAS was bombed, killing nine senior labor leaders and wounding 40 other people. On the same day the office of COMADRES (Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners) was bombed, wounding six. These events were given low-key coverage in the U.S. media, just as the escalating state terrorism of the preceding year (summarized in our text above) was hardly noticed.

Thus, when the FMLN began a major offensive on November 11-12, this was portrayed by the political establishment and in the media as perverse behavior coming out of the blue, not as an almost inevitable result of a growing state violence which showed that the Cristiani/ARENA participation in peace talks was a meaningless gesture. Another fact that would have put the FMLN offensive in meaningful context was the Salvadoran (and U.S.) government's refusal to take seriously the FMLN pre-election proposed accord that would have ended the war, eliminated state terrorism, and provided the basis for genuinely free elections. That refusal, the escalating attacks on popular groups, and the increased and unconditional military aid by the U.S. government, suggested that it was the Salvadoran establishment and U.S. government, not the rebels, who understand only the language of force.

It was the cold-blooded murder and mutilation - following torture - of six distinguished Jesuit clerics and their two housekeepers, on November 16, 1989, that weakened the liberal establishment's post-election complaisance regarding the "new" ARENA. The Salvadoran army and police had been torturing and killing ordinary citizens week after week without being called to task, and were even given accolades for their moderation. Killing and torturing notables, however, resulted in publicity and focused attention, and although nothing changed, suddenly there was the "perception" of a human rights problem! The line that resurfaced in the establishment was that Cristiani might be "unable to control" the army and death squads, just as the junta of 1980-84 and Duarte allegedly couldn't control them. The fact that not one soldier or officer has yet to be punished for murdering any Salvadoran in nine years, and that the party of death squad killer D'Aubuisson now runs the government and judiciary, is still not seen as making the "inability to control" argument a foolish apologetic.

The nature of the Salvadoran regime revealed itself once again during the renewed warfare of November 11 and after. During the stepped up fighting the Air Force used rockets, 500 pound bombs and gatling guns capable of firing 8,000 rounds per minute on heavily populated areas. The army and death squads moved more aggressively against members and leaders of the popular movements, the murder of the six clerics and two women providing only the most dramatic and "newsworthy" episode of a wide-ranging assault. Despite offers from the FMLN, ARENA also refused to negotiate a truce or to respect the neutrality of the Red Cross and the press corps. Civil liberties such as the rights of due process, assembly, and the press were totally suspended. A draconian "anti-terrorism" package is in its last stages of movement through the ARENA-controlled legislature, a bill which even the New York Times describes as involving "sweeping new restrictions on individual freedoms, including virtually unhindered government power to ban dissent and peaceful protest" (November 25). Leaders of the Christian Democratic Party describe this legislation as a "fascist project." This is entirely compatible with the long-standing agenda and aims of the leaders of the ARENA party.


Credit: Terry Allen
Firebombed office of Jesuit priests murdered by Salvadoran Army.

In light of the main focus of the present article, on the March 1989 Salvadoran election, it is notable that President Bush himself, questioned on U.S. support of the Salvadoran government, relied heavily on the legitimation by election. And on CNN's "Crossfire" on November 21, Michael Kinsley of the New Republic, relying entirely on the cliches of state propaganda, sharply criticized an FMLN representative for the military offensive against a government duly accredited by an election. As we have described in the main text, however, this was an election held after an extended period of extreme state terror which dismantled the left opposition and its organized base, and under conditions of ongoing state terror. Like its predecessors, the March 1989 election failed to meet the basic conditions of a fair and free election.

It is interesting to note that the United States gave unconditional support to the terror regime of January 1980-March 1982, which was unelected. The elections of 1982 and 1984 then consolidated the power of an army and political establishment that had previously run the killing machine without elections. Nevertheless, these elections legitimized the government according to U.S. official observers and the mass media. Official observers, however, always find U.S.-sponsored elections meritorious, and no matter how biased they may be and how superficial their observations, they are always cited as credible sources by the mainstream media. We believe that the establishment press will find any election carried out under their government's imprimatur to be legitimizing, no matter how distant it may be from fairness and freedom. The legitimized government may also kill its citizens freely, if it avoids murdering and mutilating notables, in which case the press may raise questions about whether the "elected government" real-

[PIECE MISSING?!]

_______________

Notes:

* Terry Allen, a journalist and writer, was in El Salvador during the March 1989 election. Edward Herman is the author of the forthcoming book, with Gerry O'Sullivan, The "Terrorism" Industry, to be published by Pantheon in January.

1. The quoted phrase was applied to D'Aubuisson by former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White.

2. For a full discussion, see Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S. Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. 119-26.

3. Dennis Hans, "Duarte: Man and Myth," CovertAction Information Bulletin, No. 26, Summer 1986.

4. See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 101-102.

5. See Edward Schumacher, New York Times, February 21, 1981.

6. On this organizational program, see Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "The Rise of the Reebok Right," NACLA Report on the Americas, July 1989.

7. Michael McClintock, The American Connection Volume One: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (London: Zed, 1985), pp. 260- 74; Craig Pyes, "Dirty War in the Name of Freedom," Albuquerque Journal, December 18, 1983.

8. Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), pp. 136-7, 147-48, 191-213.

9. Op. cit., n. 4, p. 58.

10. Op. cit., n. 2, pp. 140-142.

11. Op. cit., n.4, p.58.

12. This information was given to Terry Allen by an official of the ARENA Party.

13. The constitution and laws of El Salvador do provide the trappings of democratic process and legal guarantees of civil rights. Although these are selectively enforced at best, they provide a basis for public protest and are often cited at demonstrations and in paid public advertisements in El Mundo, the one daily newspaper which occasionally prints them, as evidence of the hypocrisy and lawlessness of the Duarte and ARENA regimes. Rather than bring actual policy in line with the law, ARENA has proposed a draconian "anti-terrorism law" which eliminates most civil rights and would bring the law into line with policy.

14. This was partly a result of the fact that after 30,000 killings and organizational disruption of the popular forces, mass killing was no longer needed. It was also a result of pressures and demands from Duarte's voting constituency, which could be met within limits and for a period without excessive cost to the war project. The U.S. antiwar movement had also been pressuring Congress to cut off funds, so that unrestrained killing threatened the flow of dollars. Until such time as a new wave of mass terror might become politically necessary. assassination and imprisonment could be more selective and the body count kept at a level that could be easily ignored by the U.S. press and Congress and more acceptable to pressure groups.

15. International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), Report on the 1989 Salvadoran Electoral Process (Washington, D.C.: March 1989), p. 131.

16. Ibid., p. 125.

17. "Attorney General Restricts Media Activities," U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), March 17, 1989.

18. Michael Massing, "When More Means Less," Columbia Journalism Review, July-August 1989, p. 44.

19. The Democratic Convergence failed to attain this objective, as it came in fourth in the vote, losing third place by a very tiny margin. Only the first three parties in voter popularity obtained a seat on the CEC.

20. Linda Garrett, "Salvadoran Election: A Victory For the Right or For Peace?" El Rescate: E1 Salvador, March 22, 1989, p. 8.

21. Both the Christian Democrats and ARENA hired U.S. PR firms to handle their campaigns. ARENA worked with political consultant Roger Ailes, who was George Bush's media advisor. "With Ailes's help, the party has succeeded in conveying a populist image through television advertisements employing to a great effect humor and upbeat jingles (one of which is strikingly similar to the song used in the 'No' campaign in Chile's plebiscite)," Op. cit., n. 15, p. 85.

22. Op. cit., n. 15, p. 122.

23. This scene was observed by one of the authors, Terry Allen.

24. "A Fingerhold for Dissent in Salvador," March 17, 1989. This statement is in error: many of those on the list were centrists, not leftists.

25. Op. cit., n. 15, p. 52.

26. Washington Center for Central American Studies, El Salvador On Line, July-August 1989.

27. Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Marching Orders," NACLA Report on the Americas, July 1989, p. 25.

28. Arnon Hadar, ed., Central American Bulletin, May 1989, p. 3.

29. Michael Massing was one of many reporters who called the ARENA victory "a landslide." Michael Massing, "Sad New El Salvador," New York Review of Books, May 18, 1989, pp. 53-6).

30. Op. cit., n. 27, p. 25.

31. Op. cit., n. 2, pp. 157, 173-80.

32. Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador, Final Document, National Debate, San Salvador, September 1988, p. 11.

33. Op. cit., n. 4, pp. 113, 116.

34. For a humorous case, see Appendix 1, "The U.S. Official Observers in Guatemala, July 1-2, 1984," op. cit., n. 4. Senator Mitch McConnell, head of the U.S. delegation to El Salvador in March 1989, commented that "Our turnouts aren't this good in the United States." Newly-elected President Cristiani concurred shortly after on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, "The turnout equaled or surpassed the voter participation rate in the 1988 [U.S.] presidential election."

These remarks are inaccurate, as the U.S. voter participation rate in the 1988 election substantially exceeded 325 percent. Furthermore, as we noted the Salvadoran turnout declined precipitously from that in 1984. It was also drastically below the turnout for the Nicaraguan election of 1984. None of these points was featured, or even mentioned, in the mainstream media.

35. See El Rescate's Human Rights Chronology for June through September; Washington Center on Central American Studies, On Line, October 2, 1989; Kate Thompson, "Repression Targets Popular Movement," Alert', Oct. 1989.

[admin]

News Notes
by CovertAction Information Bulletin
Winter 1990

Washington's War on Nicaragua, written by Holly Sklar and published by South End Press, is without question one of the most important books on U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. She has presented this material with singular, easy-to-follow scholarship and with straight-forward prose.

A brief introduction places the subject within a historical context and then digs into current U.S. policy. She traces the roots of the Reagan-Bush Nicaraguan intervention to Jimmy Carter's presidency. Sklar demonstrates that Washington's current policy towards Nicaragua began in the months before the July 19, 1979 Sandinista triumph.

Holly Sklar provides a gold mine of information, documentation, analysis, and dozens of revealing quotes by key actors in the war. Examples include:

• Reagan's roving ambassador, Richard Stone, told Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto in June 1983, "You should do as we say. You will see how almost by magic the problem [of the contras] will disappear."

• John Hull, contra supporter and alleged drug smuggler, said, "If it were within my power people like [liberal Senators] Kennedy and Kerry would be lined up against a wall and shot tomorrow at sunrise."

• An anonymous U.S. government official proclaimed, ''We were going to knock off these little brown people on the cheap."

• Finally, a U.S. Ambassador in Central America acknowledged, "If they do it, it's terrorism, if we do it, it's fighting for freedom."

We highly recommend Washington's War on Nicaragua to everyone interested, not only in Central America, but in how U.S. policy is conceived and implemented throughout the world.

***

Political Research Associates recently released a topical report called "The Coors Connection: How Coors Family Philanthropy Undermines Democratic Pluralism." The Coors family made its fortune brewing beer in Colorado and, particularly with the rise of Ronald Reagan, became important funders of the extreme rightwing movement in the U.S.

The Coors report was written by Russ Bellant who also authored "Old Nazis, The New Right, and the Reagan Administration." The preface of "The Coors Connection" states that "Those who have benefited, directly and indirectly, from Coors family generosity include persons whose views reflect not only traditional conservatism, but also nativism, xenophobia, theories of racial superiority, sexism, homophobia, authoritarianism, militarism, reaction and in some cases outright neo-fascism."

We strongly recommend this report to anyone interested in learning about how the extreme Right uses its profits to promote the rightwing agenda in this country. It is available for $5 from Political Research Associates, 678 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 205, Cambridge, MA 02139.

***

In CAIB issue number 31, we wrote about the "Resistance Conspiracy" case in which seven anti-imperialist activists were charged by the U.S. government with conspiracy and with a number of bombings of military and government buildings.

On the eve of their trial, supporters of the "Resistance Conspiracy" defendants have written an open letter to the progressive community asking for support in their efforts to combat this political persecution. Their letter states that "The defendants in this case, like the other political prisoners in this country, need to be returned to our communities and not disappear into the prison system. We must lend our voices and support to ensure their rights - and our own."

We would encourage all our readers to support the "Resistancy Conspiracy" defendants in their struggle for justice and to contribute to the defense of these political prisoners. For more information or to make a contribution, write: Emergency Committee for Political Prisoners, P.O. Box 28191, Washington, DC 20038-8191.

***

Also in issue 31 we announced "Campus Watch," a newsletter writing about CIA campus recruiting, officer-in-residence programs, and special CIA campus operations.

We want to report that "Campus Watch" is alive and well and still available. A must for anyone who wants to keep informed about CIA activities on university campuses. It is also a great resource for student activists organizing to end CIA operations at their universities. Published four times during the academic year; $10 individual; $20 institutions; $3 for current issue. Order your subscription from: Campus Watch, P.O. Box 9623, Warwick, RI 02889.

***

We also want to bring your attention to a speaker's bureau which features lecturers who are experts on intelligence issues. Becker Lectures can arrange for your group to host David MacMichael (former CIA analyst), William Schaap (co-editor of CAIB), Edgar Chamorro (former contra leader turned outspoken critic), Daniel Ellsberg, Jack Ryan (former FBI agent turned critic), and many others.

Contact Becker Lectures at:

P.O. Box 1094, Northampton, MA 01061; (413) 585-0708.

***

Finally, we would like to call your attention to a new publication entitled "CIA Off Campus: An Organizing Handbook for Student Activities." This edition combines the accumulated knowledge of more than a dozen anti-CIA organizers and activists from campuses across the country.

Chapter topics include: CIA-sponsored student and faculty recruiting; CIA-sponsored research funding; how to organize using university and community resources; taking action - how to expose CIA campus activity.

Available from: Bill of Rights Foundation, 220 S. State St., Suite 1430, Chicago, IL 60604, (312) 939-0675; $5.00/copy plus $1.00 for postage and handling.

[admin]

FEMA and the NSC: The Rise of the National Security State
by Diana Reynolds*
Winter 1990

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

Since the advent of changes which took place during the Reagan regime, America has been a presidential directive away from a civil security state of emergency which, if ever enacted, could create a constitutional crisis equal in severity to the American Civil War.

A national state of emergency can be declared by a concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress or by the President in the case of natural disasters, nuclear war, a massive mobilization in anticipation of an enemy attack on U.S. territory, or domestic civil unrest.

A disturbing shift in policy occurred during the Reagan years which could have profound consequences with respect to civil liberties. Whereas civil defense planning in the past had focused on disaster relief, the national security focus of the Reagan administration meant implementing new ways to expand police powers in times of nuclear war, domestic unrest, or civil disorder. [1] Bending under pressure brought by the Reagan Administration, Congress gave the president and his executive agencies sweeping emergency powers. This article will examine how those powers came to be, and will explore a possible scenario-the U.S. government's war on drugs-in which these powers might be used.

Civil Security Planning

Since WWII, the U.S. government has had contingency plans in preparation for a large scale disaster or attack. However, during the last twenty-five years - beginning with civil unrest at the height of the Vietnam War-the government's plans have increasingly on focused ways of controlling political dissent.

On October 30, 1969, President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11490, "Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to Federal Departments and Agencies," which consolidated some 21 operative Executive Orders and two Defense Mobilization Orders issued between 1951 and 1966 on a variety of emergency preparedness matters.

In 1976 President Gerald Ford ordered the Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency (FEPA) to develop plans to establish government control of the mechanisms of productions and distribution, of energy sources, wages and salaries, credit and the flow of money in American financial institutions in any (heretofore undefined) "national emergency." This Executive Order (EO 11921) also indicated that, when a state of emergency is declared by the President, Congress could not review the matter for a period of six months. [2]

Even arch-conservative activist Howard J. Ruff was quick to point out that, since the enactment of EO 11490, "The only thing standing between us and a dictatorship is the good character of the President and the lack of a crisis severe enough that the public would stand still for it. ... " [3]

While Ruff thought a national emergency might be used to destroy the free markets in the U.S. and take away the C.B. radios and guns of Americans, The Washington Afro-American was alarmed for more rational and obvious reasons. In an editorial, the paper repeated Ruffs warning:

Executive Order No. 11490 is real, and only the lack of a crisis big enough, a president willing enough, and a public aroused enough to permit it to be invoked, separates us from a possible dictatorship, brought about under current law, waiting to be implemented in the event of circumstances which can be construed as a "national emergency." [4]

President Carter evidently did not share this concern and, in 1977, he signed Executive Order 12148 which created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to replace the Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency. This Presidential Directive mandated an interface between the Department of Defense (DOD) and FEMA for civil defense planning and funding. [5]

When Ronald Reagan came to power he gave FEMA vast- 1y expanded executive emergency powers and appointed retired National Guard General Louis O. Giuffrida as his "emergency czar." Giuffrida's creation of contingency emergency plans to round up "militant negroes" while he was at the Naval War College caught the attention of then-Governor of California Reagan and his executive secretary Edwin Meese III.

As Governor, Reagan called on Giuffrida to design Operation Cable Splicer. Cable Splicer I, II and III were martial law plans to legitimize the arrest and detention of anti-Vietnam war activists and other political dissidents. [6] In 1971, Governor Reagan, with a $425,000 grant from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, established a counterterrorism training center - the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) - and made Giuffrida its commandant. [7]


Credit: White House Photo
Louis Giuffrida and George Bush discuss disasters.

Shortly after he assumed the directorship of FEMA in 1981, Giuffrida had flooded high-level FEMA posts with friends from CSTI and the military police, [8] had created a Civil Security Division of FEMA, and had established a Civil Defense Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland - based on the CSTI model. By 1984, the Center had trained one thousand civil defense personnel in survival techniques, counterterrorism and military police methods. [9]

From February to July of 1982, President Reagan signed a series of National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) -- presidential decisions on national security objectives - on civil defense policy and emergency mobilization preparedness. While Reagan's real U.S. civil defense policy is contained in the classified NSDD 26, some of the law enforcement and public safety provisions of the policy are made public in NSDD 47. This National Security Decision Directive provides for an intensified counterintelligence effort at home and the maintenance of law and order in a variety of emergencies, particularly terrorist incidents, civil disturbances, and nuclear emergencies. [10]

Reagan gave the National Security Council (NSC) authority over the planning for civil defense policy with its expanded civil security powers. He mandated the creation of a senior-level interdepartmental board, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) and charged it with responsibilities for policy and planning guidance, coordination of planning, resolution of issues, and monitoring progress. [11]

The members of the EMPB were the Assistant for National Security Affairs (as its Chair), the DOD's Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and representatives from 10 other federal agencies. FEMA provided the staff, support secretariat and operational supervision for the EMPB and their working group on civil defense. According to then Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, by February 1983, the EMPB had prepared - and the President had approved - a national policy statement on emergency mobilization preparedness. [12]

Oliver North served on the EMPB, having been assigned there from 1982 to 1984 by former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane. General Giuffrida was there too, providing operational supervision. By forming the EMPB, Ronald Reagan made it possible for a small group of people under the authority of the NSC, to wield enormous power. [13] They, in turn, used this executive authority to change civil defense planning into a military/police version of civil security.

Military Rule

In January of 1982, FEMA and the Department of Defense issued a joint paper entitled, "The Civil/Military Alliance in Emergency Management" which specified many of the provisions of Reagan's policy on emergency mobilization preparedness. This document indicates that FEMA had been given cane blanche emergency powers to acquire resources from federal and state agencies (including National Guard personnel) and the private sector (banking, communications, transportation, etc.) "for use in civil disturbance operations." [14]

Apparently General Frank S. Salcedo, Chief of FEMA's Civil Security Division and Giuffrida's former colleague at CSTI, wanted more. In 1983, in a workshop at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Salcedo recommended expanding FEMA's power further in the areas of survivability training, research on imposing martial law, and the potential threat posed by foreign and domestic adversaries. As he saw it at least 100,000 U.S. citizens, from survivalists to tax protesters, were serious threats to civil security.

Salcedo saw FEMA's new frontier in the protection of industrial and government leaders from assassination, and of civil and military installations from sabotage and/or attack, as well as the prevention of dissident groups from gaining access to U.S. opinion or a global audience in times of crisis. [15]

"This Is Only A Test, Repeat ... "

It came to light that while FEMA has been expending the lion's share of its energy and funding on building a civil security infrastructure, it had neglected its authorized civil defense role.

While improving capabilities to respond to civil security emergencies was for the most part a planning activity with the Reagan Administration, FEMA was also active in exercises to test these plans. In 1981, FEMA and DOD began a continuing tradition of biannual joint exercises to test civilian mobilization, civil security emergency and counterterrorism plans using such names as "Proud Saber/Rex-82," "Pre-Nest," and "Rex-84/Night Train." [16]

The Rex-84 Alpha Explan (Readiness Exercise 1984, Exercise Plan), indicates that FEMA in association with 34 other federal civil departments and agencies conducted a civil readiness exercise during April 5-13, 1984. It was conducted in coordination and simultaneously with a Joint Chiefs exercise, Night Train 84, a worldwide military command post exercise (including Continental U.S. Forces or CONUS) based on multi-emergency scenarios operating both abroad and at home. In the combined exercise, Rex-84 Bravo, FEMA and DOD led the other federal agencies and departments, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Veterans Administration through a gaming exercise to test military assistance in civil defense. [17]

The exercise anticipated civil disturbances, major demonstrations and strikes that would affect continuity of government and/or resource mobilization. To fight subversive activities, there was authorization for the military to implement government ordered movements of civilian populations at state and regional levels, the arrest of certain unidentified segments of the population, and the imposition of martial rule. [18]

Attorney General William French Smith finally became aware of the abuses of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board operating under the NSC. He admonished McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who theoretically chaired the planning group. In a letter dated August 2, 1984, Smith responded to a request by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review, for form and legality, a draft Executive Order revising the powerful EO 11490, assigning emergency preparedness functions to federal departments and agencies. The Attorney General said that apart from the legal review by the Office of Legal Counsel,

... I believe that the draft Executive Order raises serious substantive and public policy issues that should be further addressed before this proposal is submitted to the President. In short I believe that the role assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the revised Executive Order exceeds its proper function as a coordinating agency for emergency preparedness.

This Department and others have repeatedly raised serious policy and legal objections to the creation of an 'emergency czar' role for FEMA. Specific policy concerns regarding recent FEMA initiatives include the abandonment of the principle of 'several' agency responsibility and the expansion of the definition of severe emergencies to encompass 'routine' domestic law enforcement emergencies. Legal objections relate to the absence of Presidential or Congressional authorization for unilateral FEMA directives which seek to establish new Federal Government management structures or otherwise task Cabinet departments and other federal agencies. [19]

The Fall of FEMA

Smith's letter signaled what seemed to be the beginning of the end for FEMA and Reagan's Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William Webster had previously complained when FEMA's Director of Civil Security, General Salcedo, had intruded into the FBI's domestic intelligence jurisdiction under the rubric of counter terrorism. Salcedo was forced to turn over to Webster some 12,000 names he had been compiling on a list of potential threats to civil security. [20]

Furthermore, it came to light that while FEMA had been expending the lion's share of its energy and funding on building a civil security infrastructure, it had neglected its authorized civil defense role. On June 15, 1984, barely a month after Giuffrida filed his glowing accomplishment report with Meese, Robert Guffus, Inspector General of FEMA, wrote a draft report on FEMA's Comprehensive Cooperative Agreements (CCA) (with states) in civil defense preparedness.

He concluded that management actions were needed to improve the effectiveness of programs with state and local governments. In his review of the CCAs he found inadequate FEMA management control, imprecise program guidelines and a lack of personnel resources. Programmatic and financial weaknesses were a result of fiscal mis-management, unclear assignment of responsibilities, overlapping job descriptions, inflated training figures, and lack of written procedures. [21]

McFarlane removed North from the EMPB and assigned him to help with conducting unconventional warfare in Nicaragua. Giuffrida resigned in 1985 after a House subcommittee charged that FEMA was being mismanaged, and it was publicized that Giuffrida had staffed FEMA with his military/police cronies and had allowed $170,000 of agency funds to be used to outfit a deluxe bachelor pad at the Civil Defense Training Academy at Emmitsburg. [22] He now operates a security consulting firm in Washington, D.C. General Salcedo has moved on to be Presidential Liaison to Veterans Organizations at the Veterans Administration.

There is some debate about what happened to the plans for a civil security emergency.· There was a rumored joint investigation conducted by the Defense Department and the CIA into the unconstitutionality of planning for a civil security emergency by several government agencies. Supposedly, the two investigators, Special Forces Lt. Colonel Kvererdas and the CIA's William Buckley, prior to his fatal Beirut assignment, destroyed the plans and the exercise data.

Some believe that much of the planning was incorporated into Vice President Bush's Report from his Task Force on Combatting Terrorism which has inspired civil security contingency planning at the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service by an Alien Border Control (ABC) Committee. The working group within the INS was designing plans and programs regarding the control and removal of alien terrorists, potential terrorist aliens and those ''who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the U.S." [23]

The most obvious resting place for the material is the National Security Council. In 1987, Reagan signed another NSDD, number 259, which superseded both NSDD 26, the secret civil defense plan of February 25, 1982 and the unclassified version dated March 16, 1982. Even though the 1987 version is shorter and more vague than its predecessors, no significant changes are evident in civil defense planning and programs from the 1984 EMPB scenarios.

Just before he left office, Reagan signed Executive Order 12656 which assigned new emergency preparedness responsibilities. Reagan's final national security legacy to civil defense planning puts the NSC clearly in charge. In Section 104, EO 12656 states that the NSC is the principal forum for consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy and will arrange for Executive branch liaison with, and assistance to, the Congress and the Federal judiciary on national security emergency preparedness matters.

The Director of FEMA has now been promoted to advisor to the NSC on mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological disasters, "and other issues, as appropriate." The Director of FEMA is also authorized to assist in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating federal departments and agencies; as well as state and local governments. The exercise program is to continue and plans and procedures ''will be designed and developed to provide maximum flexibility to the President for his implementation of emergency actions." [25]

On the same day that Reagan signed EO 12656 he also signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which provided yet another in a series of get-tough-but-do-nothing drug policies produced by the Reagan Administration. If and when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act fails-a victim of underfunding and bureaucratic in-fighting-then Executive Order 12656 could become an historic document in the war on drugs.

The National Security State and the Drug War

The U.S. government's proposed ''war on drugs" is one such case in which the U.S. government will have the authority to use the national security apparatus to suppress civil liberties. It may be the first opportunity to call into action the years of planning and expense used to develop the emergency preparedness network.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed in the final hours of the 100th Congress, when incumbents were anxious to return to their districts in order to campaign and when public opinion was calling for drastic action in the war on drugs. The Act was quickly drafted by ad hoc congressional committees and private consultants, then passed by Congress without the usual legislative hearings and debate.

The Act broadly defines the programs, goals, guidelines and appropriations for all the 58 federal departments plus the thousands of state and local agencies involved in the national war on drugs. Some provisions were made for drug education, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, but much of the text focuses on the punitive measures to be taken by the government.

The Act increases state powers in the areas of government surveillance, intelligence gathering and seizure of private property.

The anti-drug policy authorizes the use of the U.S. military to assist in the drug war at home. If you live in federal housing or if you reside in large urban areas such as New York, Boston, Washington DC, or Los Angeles - where crime and addiction have turned neighborhoods into combat zones -- this Act will authorize the military to fence off your streets, keep track of who comes from and goes to your home, stop and frisk you, your friends and family, and regularly inspect your home and belongings. IT you or anyone who visits you is suspected by the authorities of using, selling or trafficking in any kind of illicit narcotic substance, you can be evicted from your home whether your landlord is the government or a private party. [27]

The Act increases state powers in the areas of government surveillance, intelligence gathering, and seizure of private property. It authorizes regional intelligence sharing centers, which not only compile statistics but provide contracts to states, local criminal justice agencies, and non-profit organizations for purposes of identifying, targeting and removing criminal conspiracies and activities spanning jurisdictional boundaries. [28]

The Justice Department is given the power to confiscate private property and deny state and federal entitlement by decree. Once caught, even casual marijuana users could be subject to the confiscation of their homes, cars, and bank accounts. [29] The government seizure takes place through civil proceedings where the burden is on the defendant to prove his or her innocence, unlike the "innocent until proven guilty" due process guarantee of criminal proceedings. [30]

A National Drug Czar

William Bennett, as the Director of the Office of National Drug Policy, is an adviser to and voting member of the National Security Council. [31] It is here in the NSC that the ultimate drug war could be fought. All it would take is a President determined enough, a Congress pliant enough, and people desperate enough for the drug war in America to be declared a national security emergency. IT and when that happens, the NSC -- as part of civil emergency preparedness - would be in charge of its implementation under the guidance of the President.

A national security emergency would without a doubt decrease drug use in America. The government would be authorized to increase domestic intelligence and surveillance of U.S. citizens. State security measures would be enhanced by restricting the freedom of movement within the U.S. and granting the government authority to relocate large groups of civilians at will. The U.S. Continental Forces and a federalized National Guard could seal off borders and take control of U.S. airspace, all ports of entry, and interstate highways. [32] It was James Madison's worst nightmare that a righteous faction would some day be strong enough to sweep away the constitutional restraints, designed by the framers to prevent the tyranny of centralized power, executive privilege and arbitrary government authority over the individual. [33] These restraints, the balancing and checking of powers among branches and layers of government and the civil guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights would be the first casualties in a drug-induced national security state with Reagan's civil emergency preparedness unleashed.

Nevertheless, there will be those who will welcome the National Security Council into the drug fray, believing that increasing state police powers to emergency levels is the only way left to fight America's enemy within. In the short run, a national security state would probably be a relief to those whose personal security and quality of life has been diminished by drugs or drug related crime. And as the general public watches the progression of institutional chaos and social decay, they too may be willing to pay the ultimate price: one drug-free America for 200 years of democracy.

_______________

Notes:

* Diana Reynolds is a Research Associate and Program Director at the Edward R Murrow Center, The Fletcher School, Tufts University. She is also an Assistant Professor of Politics, Bradford College and a Lecturer at Northeastern University. Research assistance for this article was provided by Charles Haber.

1. Alfonso Chardy, "Reagan Aides and the 'Secret' Government: ' The Miami Herald, July 5, 1987.

2. Executive Order 11921, "Emergency Preparedness Functions," June 11, 1976: The Federal Register, vol. 41, no. 116 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), June 15, 1976), pp. 24294-300.

3. Howard Ruff, How to Prosper During the Coming Bad Years (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1979), p. 150.

4. Editorial, "The Implications of Miami!," The Washington Afro-American, May 31, 1980.

5. Executive Order 12148, June 13, 1977, as cited in, '''!be Civil/Military Alliance In Emergency Management," FEMA and DOD (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982); for a comprehensive review of FEMA's activities from 1979 to 1985 see: Keenen Peck, "'!be Take Charge Gang," The Progressive, May 1985, pp. 17-24.

6. Edwin Meese III, Executive Secretary to Governor Reagan, Speech transcript, Law Enforcement and Administration Association meeting, San Francisco, CA, March 5, 1970.

7. Ken Lawrence, "The New State Repression," CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 24 (Summer 1985), pp. 6-9.

8. Howard Kurtz, "Retired Military Policemen Troop Into Highly Paid Agency Jobs," The Washington Post, February 3, 1985.

9. Louis O. Giuffrida, "Memorandum For Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President," (Washington, DC: FEMA, May 16, 1984), p. 5.

10. National Security Decision Directive 47, "Emergency Mobilization Preparedness," July 22, 1982, p. 10.

11. Ibid., p. 12. From 1982-1988, a new secret Defense Mobilization Planning Systems Agency under the authority of then Vice President George Bush spent more than $3 billion upgrading command, control, and communications links in FEMA's continuity of government infrastructure. For a more comprehensive discussion of this agency see: Steve Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," U.S. News and World Report, August 7, 1989, pp. 26- 30.

12. Op. cit., n. 10.; also see Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report To The Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), p. 261.

13. Ben Bradlee, Jr., Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York, NY: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1988), pp. 132-135; also see Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua 1981- 1987(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Hedrick Smith, The Power Game (New York, NY: Random House, 1988).

14. FEMA/DOD, '''The Civil Military Alliance in Emergency Management." A background paper to support the Civil/Military Action Officer Planners Conferences on Military Support of Civil Defense and Land Defense of CONUS, San Francisco, CA, January 26-29, 1982; New York, NY February 9-12, 1982.

15. Frank S. Salcedo and Richard Fierman, "The Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse: Civil Security During and After the Unthinkable," Speech transcript, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual Meeting, March 5, 1983.

16. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report To The Congress, FY 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1, 1983); also see FEMA, Exercise PRENEST84 (Washington, DC: FEMA, September 1983).

17. FEMA, REX-84 ALPHA: Exercise Plan (Washington, DC: FEMA, February 28, 1984), pp. 24.

18. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Exercise Division, Operations Directorate, in Coordination with Plans and Policy Directorate, Military Support of Civil Defense System Description (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 1983), pp. 14.

19. William French Smith, U.S. Attorney General, to The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, August 2, 1984.

20. Deposition of Daniel Sheehan, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey v. John Hull, et. al., 1984.

21. Robert Guffus, Inspector General, FEMA, "Draft Report # H-7-84 - Management Actions are Needed to Improve the Effectiveness of Programs with State and Local Governments," (Washington, DC: FEMA, June 15, 1984). According to FEMA's "Budget in Brief for FY 1990," the net of total agency obligations for 1990 are $1.45 billion. (This is nearly equal to the total budget authority of $15 billion for the Justice Department for 1989). Of this only 1% ($9 million) is allocated for earthquake and other hazards and $280 million for disaster relief.

22. Op. at., n. 8; Pete Earley, "Smith Accuses FEMA of Grab for Power," Washington Post, September 3, 1984.

23. Robert J. Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Investigations Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Alien Border Control Committee," (Washington, DC: Immigration and Naturalization Service, October 1, 1986).

24. Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988," Federal Register, vol. 53, no. 266 (Washington, DC: GPO, November 23, 1988).

25. Ibid., p. 47492.

26. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Commitment to Drug Treatment is the Law," New York Times, September 17, 1989.

27. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, November 18, 1988, Public Law 100- 690: 100th Congress, Title I, Section 1005, paragraph (c), p.4186; also see Bernard Weintraub, "Bush Considers Calling Guard To Fight Drug Violence in Capitol [sic]," New York Times, March 21, 1989; Michael Isikoff, "Bennett Plans War On Drugs in D.C. Area," Washington Post, March 19, 1989.

28. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Ibid., Title I, Section 6101, paragraph (a), p. 4340.

29. Ibid., Title V, "User accountability."

30. For all of its draconian prescriptions, however, the U.S. anti-drug policy is, in effect, a paper tiger. On September 5, 1989, George Bush announced his strategy for carrying out the policies outlined by Reagan's Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Although the Bush strategy implements only a portion of Reagan's policy for a drug-free America by 1995, professionals in law enforcement, the judiciary, the military, health, and education know that even Bush's piecemeal strategy cannot be funded nor administrated. Low estimates indicate that $50 billion dollars will be required over the next four years to implement Bush's present battle plan. The money is unlikely to come from federal taxes. Overburdened and underfunded state and local governments are expected to come up with the majority of the revenues and personnel needed to implement the federal anti-drug policy. In the long run, according to state and local officials, the policy will be very costly to state and local agencies because of further proposed Congressional cuts in social services and education in order to fund the federal government's drug war.

31. Op. cit., n. 27, Section 1003, paragraph (t), p. 4182; also see Diane Alters, "Bennett's 2 Battles: Drugs and Politics," Boston Globe, January 15, 1989.

32. The Posse Comitatus Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1879, prohibited the use of federal troops in civilian law enforcement. Legislation passed by Congress from 1981 to 1988 has substantially undermined the Posse Comitatus Act permitting U.S. Continental Forces and active reserves which constitute a portion of each state's National Guard to participate in domestic law enforcement. See: 1982 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act's amendments to title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 371-378 entitled, "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials"; DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 which amends title 10 Code by changing the meaning of "active duty" as it relates to Air Guard Reserve personnel; and National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1989 which amends title 10, section 371-378 and adds Sections 379 and 380 for drug interdiction and law enforcement (public Law 100-456, Section 1105). Also see, Maj. Aleksandra M. Rohde, "Pushing the Limits of Posse Comitatus," National Guard Magazine, August 1989, p. 22.

33. James Madison, "Checks and Balances", The Federalist Papers, No. 51.

[admin]

U.S. Disinformation: Dealing With Drugs In Cuba
by Debra Evenson *
Winter 1990

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

"That's a Cuban cigar. You see where it come from? Havana." Reinaldo Ruiz, an imposing man six feet four inches in height and weighing 270 pounds, sat in the Miami office of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant in mid- 1987 and bragged about transporting cocaine shipments from Colombia through Cuba with the help of "top" Cuban officials. [1] The DEA informant, Hu Chang, was well aware of Ruiz's contacts in Cuba since he himself had flown the first successful transshipment for Ruiz from Colombia to Cuba on May 9, 1987. [2] Nor was Chang new to the drug trade. A former Nationalist Chinese air force pilot who had worked as a contract pilot for the CIA in Southeast Asia, Chang had been arrested on drug smuggling charges shortly after immigrating to the U.S. in 1979. [3] The collaboration between these two men initiated the first proven involvement of Cuban officials in international drug trafficking.

For years the U.S. accused Cuba of trafficking in drugs but never had credible evidence to back its accusations. [4] Reinaldo Ruiz provided that opportunity. When Ruiz persuaded a young relative working for the Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) to arrange use of Cuba as a transit point in 1987, U.S. law enforcement officials tracked the operation from its inception, taping the conversations among the participants.

The information DEA obtained was never shared with the Cuban government, which did not uncover the drug-dealing operations on its own until the spring of 1989. Then the Cuban government moved quickly to expose the scandal and to prosecute the officials involved. But rather than praise the Cubans for taking decisive steps to stop drug trafficking, the Bush administration harshened its public repudiation of Cuba and rejected Cuba's offers to cooperate in drug interdiction.

What Did the U.S. Know?

The facts raise many questions about the involvement of U.S. agencies in the Cuba drug operation. They also call into question whether the Bush administration is more concerned with anti-communism than it is with interdicting drug traffic.

Reinaldo Ruiz left Cuba in 1962 at about age 25. By 1986, he was living comfortably in Los Angeles where he owned two homes worth more than $800,000. One apparent source of income was a business he operated out of Panama called Colombian Tours, SA., which arranged travel to and from Cuba. To carry out some of his business arrangements with Cuba, Ruiz contracted for the legal services of Interconsult, a Cuban office in Panama. Coincidentally, Miguel Ruiz Poo, the 34-yearold son of Ruiz's cousin, happened to be a captain in the Cuban Ministry of Interior functioning as manager of the Interconsult office in Panama. In the fall of 1986 Ruiz went to the Interconsult offices to look up his young relative.

After establishing a relationship with Ruiz Poo, Reinaldo began to suggest business deals in which he would acquire various blockaded equipment for the Cubans, proposals which Ruiz Poo passed on to his superior, Amado Padron, who was in charge of Cuban intelligence activities in Panama. As these discussions progressed, Reinaldo introduced the idea of drug shipments through Cuba. He told Ruiz Poo that his girl friend, Ligia Cruz, a Colombian, could obtain cocaine through her connections to Gustavo Gaviria, a cousin of Medellin cartel boss Pablo Escobar Gaviria, and through contacts in Miami, Ruiz could arrange for the drugs to be picked up by speedboats and taken to Florida. Thus, if Miguel Ruiz Poo could arrange a transshipment base in Cuba, Reinaldo Ruiz could take care of getting the drugs to and from Cuba. Ruiz Poo took the proposal to Padron, and the three met in Panama in late 1986 to discuss the scheme.

A few weeks later, Ruiz flew to Cuba to meet with Padron and Tony de la Guardia, the chief of the special MC department set up by the Cuban Ministry of Interior in 1986 to break the U.S. trade blockade by obtaining U.S. goods in Miami and elsewhere and getting them into Cuba. [5] These operations frequently involved receiving clandestine Shipments by plane or by speed boats coming from Miami. On de la Guardia's order alone, the coast and landing strips were cleared for receipt of these shipments which were unloaded only by members of the MC department. So the mechanism by which Cuba could be used as a transit base for drugs without the knowledge of officials outside the MC department was already in place when Ruiz proposed his deal.


Credit: Wide World Photos
Reinaldo Ruiz, convicted drug smuggler.

Arrangements were made for a first operation to take place in January 1987. Ruiz purportedly sent his plane to Colombia for the drugs, the speedboats arrived from Miami, but the plane never came. Perhaps Ruiz was just testing his Cuban counterparts; he told them problems with the airplane caused the operation to be aborted.

A second operation was planned for April 10, 1987. As early as October 1986, Ruiz had established a relationship with Hugo Ceballos, a Colombian living in Miami who was looking for ways to transship cocaine from Colombia to Florida. Ceballos worked with a group of Miami-based speedboat operators. According to U.S. legal documents, Reinaldo's son Ruben Ruiz and an American co-pilot named Richard Zzie flew Ruiz's plane from Florida to Panama on March 28. On April 10, they flew from Panama to Colombia, picked up about 400 kilograms of cocaine and landed the shipment at Cuba's Varadero airport concealed in boxes of Marlboro cigarettes.6 The boxes were then loaded onto speedboats which had arrived from Florida. The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted the boats as they entered U.S. waters.

Later, in a "secretly" recorded videotape, Ruben Ruiz bragged about how the Cubans "tricked" U.S. customs officials in Fort Lauderdale by calling ahead and reporting that Ruiz's plane had had engine difficulty forcing it to land in Varadero. [7] Thus, according to Ruben, U.S. Customs did not give them any trouble for coming in from Cuba. However, given the constant accusations of Cuban complicity with drug trafficking, it is inconceivable that U.S. Customs would not closely scrutinize an unscheduled plane coming from Cuba no matter what the reason given. The most plausible explanation is not that the Cubans were able to give Ruiz cover, but that U.S. officials knew full well where the plane had been and were not going to interfere with the activities of Ruiz.

Only on the third try, in May 1987, did the operation succeed. This time DEA agent Chang co-piloted the plane with Ruben Ruiz. The drugs arrived in Cuba packed in Epson computer boxes, were repacked into cigar boxes and loaded onto waiting speedboats which took the shipment to Florida. The plane flew from Cuba to Merida, Mexico, before returning to Miami. After this operation, the MININT officials involved decided to stop the operation for the rest of the year; Ruiz ceased his dealings with Cuba and moved his operations to Haiti. The four Cuban officials involved had received a total of approximately $400,000 from their deal with Ruiz.

The DEA, and probably the CIA, were both involved in and knowledgeable of these operations as early as the summer of 1986, when a DEA undercover agent infiltrated Ceballos's organization. Coincidentally, in late July Ruben Ruiz purchased a Cessna 401 aircraft which was used to transport the drug shipments. It is not clear from the court documents in the case how Ceballos was put in contact with Ruiz, but according to the documents, U.S. law enforcement officials were aware that Ceballos and Ruiz met at least as early as October 1986, which is about the same time that Ruiz approached his Cuban relative Ruiz Poo. Meetings among the U.S.-based participants were held at Chang's offices in Miami which were recorded on videotape.

In February 1988 Ruiz and his co-conspirators including his son Ruben Ruiz were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Miami. [8] At the same time, Hugo Ceballos and 10 others were arrested under a separate indictment. [9] In July 1988, Ceballos and his cohort involved in smuggling the drugs into Florida were convicted. [10] Eight months later, in early March 1989, Ruiz and his son pleaded guilty, but were not sentenced until late August, more than a month after the Cuban government had convicted and sentenced the officials involved.

Although the February 1988 indictments in the Ruiz/Ceballos cases alleged use of Cuba as a transshipment point, the Cuban government denied the allegations of official involvement as just so much more U.S. propaganda. There was nothing to distinguish such allegations from the barrage of previous accusations which the Cubans claimed were patent- 1y false. Among the evidence proffered to show the Cuban connection was one of the "secretly" recorded videotapes made at Chang's office.

In the portion of the tape which was played at Reinaldo Ruiz's bond hearing in March 1988, Ruiz says "the drug money went into Fidel's drawer." Though Ruiz admitted afterwards that he had no actual knowledge of Fidel Castro's involvement, the taped statement made headlines in the U.S. press. [11] To the Cuban government, however, the allegation was specious and provided convincing evidence that the charges were unfounded.

Cuban Suspicions Arise

It was not until the trial of Hugo Ceballos in July 1988 that Cuban intelligence began to take interest in the allegations. Ceballos did not have direct contacts with Cuban officials, but evidence presented at his trial suggested use of Cuban territorial waters for drug shipments. Although the testimony regarding Cuban connections was not specific, Cuban diplomats nevertheless approached officials of the DEA to request an exchange of information. DEA officials in Miami were interested in exploring such an exchange and took the proposal to the State Department where it was tacitly rejected. [12] The rejection may have further convinced the Cubans that the U.S. had no concrete evidence to share. In any event, left with nothing more than unsubstantiated general statements in the context of a virulently hostile propaganda campaign, Cuba undertook no further investigation of its own at that time.

According to Granma, the newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, Cuba began its investigation when it received reliable information from friendly diplomats in March 1989. [13] State Department representatives in Havana have claimed that they had attempted to provide information to the Cuban government in 1988, but that their warnings were ignored. [14] However, in briefing a House Narcotics Subcommittee delegation bound for Cuba to discuss drug-related issues with Fidel Castro, State Department officials in Washington advised in December 1988 that the U.S. was not cooperating with the Cubans on narcotics matters either officially or unofficially. [15] Obviously, if the Bush administration was interested in furthering its purported effort to inform the Cubans, it would have solicited the aid of the House delegation, and at a minimum advised them of the situation.

It is evident that the U.S. did not want to hasten the Cuban probe into drug dealing, and some U.S. law enforcement officials have expressly stated that the Miami investigation did not provide the informational basis for the Cuban investigation. Indeed, only after Cuba completed its own investigation did the DEA admit that although it had the names of the Cuban officials working with Ruiz, these names were never released in public documents nor given to Cuba. DEA's claims that it had uncovered these names by October 1988 are disingenuous. Since its own agents were involved even before Ruiz made contact with the Cubans and a DEA agent participated in landing drugs in Cuba, DEA knew the names of these contacts from the very beginning.

The Arrests in Cuba

In June 1989, the Cuban government arrested 14 military officials including 11 Ministry of Interior officers on charges of corruption and drug trafficking. Among those arrested were the three officers who dealt with Reinaldo Ruiz in 1987. [16] Despite the substantial amount of information compiled by DEA from July 1986 to the present on the Ruiz/Cuba connection, Johnny Phelps, assistant special agent in charge of the DEA office in Miami, told the press after the announcement of the Cuban arrests that "there's nothing at this point to say that there is [a connection between the two operations]." [17] The U.S. continued to conceal the facts it had in its possession.


Credit: Prensa Latina
General Arnaldo Ochoa testifying at the military trial.

An explanation for the Reagan/Bush administrations' refusal to share information with the Cubans surfaced on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal on September 25. According to an Op-Ed piece by David Asman, the CIA sent operatives into Cuba on several occasions after the arrest of Reinaldo Ruiz in attempts to get Tony de la Guardia and Miguel Ruiz Poo out before they were arrested by the Cuban government. Rescuing drug traffickers from trial in their native country is an odd tactic in the "war on drugs," but it is consistent with the objective of preventing Cuba from learning the full facts about the drug operations.

When Cuba arrested 14 officials, the Bush administration had the audacity to insist it had a right to interview the defendants.


Credit: CANF
Then-DEA Director Frances Mullen speaking at the extreme rightwing Cuban American National Foundation.

Not only did Cuba uncover the facts despite the U.S. concealment, the Cuban investigation went much further than the DEA's and uncovered operations involving other Cuban-Americans based in Miami who had engaged the cooperation of the Cuban officials convicted. There are no reports that these Miami dealers have been arrested or indicted in the U.S.

The Trials in Cuba and Miami

In the more than eight days of televised court proceedings, the Cuban population learned in detail how the special MININT division secretly set up to break the U.S. trade blockade became involved in drug smuggling. At the same time evidence described how three members of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR) assigned to Angola, including popular military hero Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, unsuccessfully tried to arrange a drug deal with Medellin drug cartel boss Pablo Escobar in an escapade which seriously threatened Cuban national security.

Although all the defendants confessed to the charges, under Cuban law, like many other civil law systems, a guilty plea does not obviate a trial. The state must still demonstrate independent evidence of guilt and present argument for sentencing. In this case, the corroborating evidence consisted of the testimony of other defendants and witnesses, stashes of cash, drugs and documentary evidence.

At the end of the trial, the prosecutor requested the death penalty for seven defendants. The three-judge military court sentenced to death the four highest ranking officials who had directed the operations, and with one exception sentenced the others to 25-30 years imprisonment. [18]

In Miami, both Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz were given reduced sentences for their "cooperation" with the prosecution. For his part, Reinaldo Ruiz, who initiated the operation was sentenced on August 21st to 17 years imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 1993. Under the new sentencing guidelines which went into effect on November 1, 1987, Ruiz should have received life in prison, but government lawyers moved that the guidelines not apply to Ruiz, conceding that his criminal activity ended prior to that date. Interestingly, the indictment alleges criminal activity through mid-February 1988. Ruben Ruiz was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Although Reinaldo Ruiz received leniency on the basis of post-arrest cooperation, the record suggests that the information yielded by Ruiz was available to the DEA throughout the criminal conspiracy in 1986 and 1987. No significant new information emerged after arrest. Could it be that Ruiz's "cooperation" began in 1986 before he contacted his Cuban cousin?

The Disinformation Campaign Continues

In the tradition of spurious allegations and exaggerations which has characterized the U.S. propaganda campaign against Cuba since 1960, some U.S. officials, anti-Castro exile groups, and members of the establishment press launched an attack marked as much by inconsistency as by preposterous lies and speculation. Among the baseless allegations most popularized by the U.S. media were charges that 1) the prosecutions were merely a "show" trial to cover up a political purge; 2) the trafficking was directed or at least condoned by Fidel Castro himself; 3) the Cubans knew of the Cuban involvement in 1988 when the U.S.-based connections were indicted in Miami and did nothing to stop the operations; and 4) Cuba continues to cooperate with drug smuggling operations.

Among the more specious invectives was the charge that the Cuban prosecutions were merely a "show" trial to cover up a political purge. Although the evidence manifestly contradicts such speculation and U.S. intelligence officials were reported by Newsweek International to have rejected such assertions as unfounded, 19 U.S.-funded Radio Marti broadcast daily bulletins to Cuba alleging that the drug charges were groundless and that Ochoa and the others were being pilloried for plotting against Castro. That Radio Marti would broadcast such an obvious lie to the very audience with which it tries to establish credibility is astonishing. But, then, the U.S. national press put forth similar allegations as news reporting. [20]

The proponents of the "purge" theory apparently want it both ways: They chastise Cuba for refusing to acknowledge drug trafficking by its officers, but when Cuba prosecutes drug traffickers, they accuse Cuba of masking a political plot against the government. If Fidel Castro wanted to purge officers, he did not need to risk his credibility by exposing Cuban involvement in drug trafficking which he had long denied. Moreover, much of the evidence in the case against the MININT officers closely paralleled evidence in the Ruiz/Ceballos cases, and prosecution was limited to the MININT officers working for the special MC department and three FAR officers. The evidence of drug trafficking was both detailed and compelling.

A prominent component of the propaganda campaign is the assertion that the trafficking was directed or at least condoned by Fidel Castro himself. According to this theory, the prosecution of high ranking officials was, therefore, just a maneuver to dissociate Castro from the drug activities. No evidence has been offered to substantiate such a claim. Indeed, the facts make such a charge highly implausible and it has been rejected by prominent Castro biographers Gianni Mina and Tad Szulc. [21]

First, the quantity of drug transshipments by way of Cuba even at the height of the operations was relatively insignificant, hardly worth the effort, given the likelihood of detection by the U.S. If Fidel Castro was really engaged in drug trafficking, why wouldn't he make the most of it? Cuba lies directly in the path of Latin American cocaine producers and the primary port of entry into the United States, Florida. Why be involved in penny-ante isolated efforts which could not in the least give the Cuban economy the support the U.S. claimed it was seeking through such illegal activity? The evidence at the recent trial in Cuba suggests that from 1987 to April 1989, Cubans received only $3 million for all their efforts and much of this was taken for the private use of the officials prosecuted. Castro would never have risked his prestige and the prestige of the revolution for so little.

Moreover, it is no secret that where there is drug trafficking the CIA is often close at hand. The CIA was undoubtedly aware of the MC operations to break the blockade. In late 1986 and 1987, contacts in Panama and Miami suggested to the MC officials that the MC initiative could be aided financially by allowing Cuba to be used as a transshipment base for drugs. To permit Cuban territory to be used as a transshipment base invites CIA involvement and infiltration. And indeed, a CIA operative flew one of the first cocaine-laden planes which landed at the military airport at Varadero Beach in 1987.

Further, it appears that Ruiz, if not an agent himself, cooperated with the CIA to send an operative to Cuba to attempt to get Tony de la Guardia and Miguel Ruiz Poo to defect before they were arrested. [22] It is not inconceivable that some of the drug operations were initiated by CIA connections, but it is inconceivable that Castro would willingly compromise Cuban security to such an extent.


Credit: Prensa Latina
Audience listens to testimony at the trial of Cuban military officials.

Second, those involved had a convincing cover which hid their drug activities from higher officials. As director of the special MC department - the mission of which was to bring blockaded goods into Cuba-Tony de la Guardia and other members of the department established operations in Panama to purchase U.S. goods. Since sale of such goods to Cuba violated U.S. Treasury Department regulations, the goods had to be obtained through secret channels. Some of the goods came into Cuba by speedboat from Miami and by air from Panama and Colombia. In order to achieve their objectives in secret, de la Guardia and company had to have authority to permit such boats and planes to enter Cuban territory without interference by the Coast Guard. To further the cover, drugs arrived in boxes marked "Epson Computers" or other blockaded goods. After reviewing the evidence, even U.S. diplomats in Havana gave credence to Cuba's claim that Castro did not know about the operations. [23]

Third, such involvement is contrary to Cuban interests in maintaining international prestige and in improving relations with the United States. Since Cuba is hopeful of loosening the trade embargo to help its economy, it would be irrational to play into U.S. propaganda used to justify the continuation of the blockade.

The latest version of the "Castro connection" asserts that Fidel Castro's brother and Cuban Defense Minister, Raul Castro, took part in the operation. The support for this accusation came from confessed smuggler Reinaldo Ruiz as he was about to be sentenced this past summer. [24] Ruiz, who initiated the first drug operation with the Cubans, was purportedly facing a life sentence for his involvement but after his "cooperation" with prosecutors he received only 17 years with eligibility for parole in 1993 (only four years' time) and a promise from the judge that his sentence could be further reduced if he continued his "cooperation." How coincidental that as he is about to be sentenced months after he pleaded guilty he suddenly remembered that he saw Raul Castro at the airport when one of Ruiz's cocaine shipments was unloaded at a military airfield in 1987. [25]

With Cuba now taking firm measures to prevent any reoccurrences of Cuban nationals cooperating with drug traffickers, the Bush administration will probably stretch spurious charges as far as it can. And with nothing to lose but time in jail, Ruiz will probably come forth with additional revelations which cannot be corroborated.

Is Cuba Now Engaged in Drug Trafficking?

Although there appears to be some evidence that drugs have been transported near or through Cuban territorial waters and over Cuban airspace since June, such facts alone do not implicate Cuban involvement any more than they would implicate the governments of all countries lying along known drug shipment routes. There is no evidence of any Cuban cooperation with these shipments. The harm done to Cuba by the recent scandal was substantial. To risk additional harm to national security and prestige by continuing such operations simply does not make sense. The harsh sentences handed down by the Cuban military court were a clear warning to any others who might engage in such ventures.

Elliott Abrams suggests that if the Cubans are really serious about stopping drug trafficking, they should shoot down planes flying over their territory without authorization. It is not difficult to predict the U.S. reaction here if Cuba shot down an innocent plane.

Cuba persists in its effort to enter into cooperative agreements on drug interdiction with the U.S. The Bush administration has responded by tightening the economic embargo and seeking further restrictions on travel between the two countries. In criticizing the Bush administration for rejecting Cuba's offers, Representative Charles B. Rangel (Dem.-New York), chair of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control put the issue bluntly: "It's time for the State Department to stop playing anti-Communist politics. It's drugs, not Communists, that are killing our kids."

_______________

Notes:

* Debra Evenson is an Associate Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law and the President of the National Lawyers Guild; copyright © 1989 by Debra Evenson and Covert Action Publications, Inc.

1. The statement was made in a videotape played at Reinaldo Ruiz's pretrial detention hearing in Federal District Court, Southern District of Florida on March 9, 1988; Washington Past, March 10, 1988, p. A18.

2. Chang's involvement is reported both in the indictment of Reinaldo Ruiz and in the Miami Herald, July 9,1989, p. 1A.

3. lbid.

4. U.S. law enforcement officials acknowledged this in a Washington Post story following the trial of drug smugglers with alleged connections to Cuba. Washington Past, July 26, 1988, p. A4. See also, CovertAction Information Bulletin, No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 9-11.

5. The United States imposed a partial trade blockade on Cuba in 1960 which was extended in 1961 to include almost all U.S. goods with the exception of some foodstuffs and medicines. By 1964, the U.S. had pressured the OAS to join the blockade. Most Latin American allies of the U.S. joined with the notable exception of Mexico. Today, most Latin American countries have lifted the blockade and have re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba. The U.S., however, has extended its economic embargo under the Reagan and Bush administrations, including the restriction of travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.

In order to get needed parts and goods, the Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) set up the MC Department within MININT to find ways to obtain blockaded goods.

6. Marlboro cigarettes are one of the primary brands of U.S. cigarettes brought into Cuba to be sold in tourist and diplomat stores.

7. Ruben Ruiz also liked to boast of his terrorist skills. According to the transcript of Reinaldo Ruiz's pre-detention hearing, he had been taped as saying that he was expert in blowing up cars.

8. Indictment No. 88·127, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

9. Indictment No. 88-126, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

10. Ceballos was sentenced to 30 years on each of 5 counts of importing and distributing cocaine, the sentences to run concurrently.

11. Washington Post, March 10, 1988, p. A18; Miami Herald, March 10, 1988, p. 4C.

12. The account of this thwarted attempt at cooperation was reported in the Miami Herald, July 9, 1989, p. 1A. DEA's request was simply shelved by the State Department.

13. The recent trial of former Minister of Interior Jose Abrantes Fernandez revealed that Abrantes had received a report from one of his officers in late February 1989 suggesting that some MININT officials might be involved in drug trafficking. When Abrantes failed to act on the information, it went no further. Since prosecutors could not prove that Abrantes deliberately furthered the drug scheme, he was not charged with involvement in the drug operations and thus not subject to the death sentence. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for abuse of office, negligence in service and unauthorized use of financial resources belonging to the ministry.

14. Washington Post, July 25,1989, p. A17.

15. Jeff Leen, Miami Herald, July 9, 1989, p. 1A.

16. Even after the Cubans arrested the officials and publicized their names, U.S. Attorney Dexter Lehtinen in charge of the Miami cases would not reveal the names of the Cuban officers identified in the U.S. investigations.

17. Miami Herald, July 9, 1989, p. 1A

18. Under Cuban law, a death sentence must be reviewed by the Supreme Court and the Council of State before it can be executed. Both institutions reaffirmed the sentences in this case. Because of the critical significance of the trial and its consequences both domestically and internationally, the 29 members of the Council of State publicly explained their individual reasons for affirming the death sentences.

19. Newsweek International, July 10, 1989.

20. Julia Preston, "Cuba Sentences Officers to Death for Corruption; General's Dealings Circumvented Castro," Washington Post, July 8, 1989, p. A1.

21. "Juicio a Fidel, entrevistas con sus biografos," Proceso, September 18, 1989.

22. Wall Street Journal, September 25, 1989.

23. Washington Post, July 24, 1989, p. A17.

24. Ruiz was Originally scheduled to be sentenced in May. Sentencing was delayed until July. Although the reason for the delay has not been made public, it is probable that it was related to the trial in Cuba. Sentencing was again postponed in early August, purportedly due to Ruiz's health problems. After the sentencing which took place on August 21, enforcement officials disclosed Ruiz's allegation that he saw Raul Castro at the military base where he landed one of the planes. Miami Herald, August 22, 1989, p. 1B.

25. Since Ruiz's account of Raul Castro's possible involvement, another Cuban American indicted in a separate drug trafficking operation has stated that Raul Castro approved the operations. No doubt many more drug smugglers will make such revelations since the payoff in reduced sentences is such an attractive incentive.

[admin]

Cuba's Policy Against Drug Trafficking
by CovertAction Information Bulletin
Winter 1990

Soon after the triumph of the revolution in 1959, Cuba completely eliminated the U.S.-based Mafia which had made the island a major drug center. Even before taking power, the revolutionary forces issued a proclamation in 1958 stating its objective "to completely eliminate hard drugs and illicit gambling." [1] Making note of the ways in which drug trafficking corrupts social institutions, the revolutionary Cuban government took a very puritanical stance with respect to narcotics. Drug dealing in Cuba today is a rare occurrence and involves almost exclusively small amounts of home grown marijuana. The Cuban criminal justice system has achieved what U.S. law enforcement has not - swift prosecution even for small dealers.

In the area of international drug trafficking, Cuba has played a role in interdicting shipments. Since Cuba lies directly in the path of drug producers and the Florida coast, smugglers frequently use routes through neighboring waters and the country's airspace. According to Cuban reports, its Coast Guard arrested 328 drug smugglers in 83 violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters between 1970 and March 1986. [2] Most of those captured strayed accidentally onto the Cuban coast, broke down or landed because they were out of fuel.

In 1978 and 1979 the Cuban and U.S. Coast Guard services held two rounds of talks during which they agreed upon cooperative measures in the attempt to interdict drug trafficking. Although no official document was signed, DEA officials have publicly acknowledged the collaboration. Cuba renounced the agreement in 1982 in response to the U.S. federal indictments of four Cuban officials on drug trafficking charges which the Cuban government labelled false. [3] Even so, Cuba continued to arrest drug traffickers caught within its territorial waters or whose planes landed on the island. DEA officials concede that as many as 18 U.S. citizens arrested on drug charges are now in Cuban jails.

The U.S. Propaganda Campaign Against Cuba

More aggressively hostile in its policy toward Cuba than the previous administration, the lies of the Reagan administration were unabashed. Shortly after Reagan's inauguration, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick told a Washington audience that Soviet submarines were operating out of Cuba. [4] According to Wayne Smith, who was chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana at that time, no Soviet nuclear or missile submarines had docked in a Cuban port since 1974. [5] Similarly, Smith denounced as false Reagan administration accusations that Cuba was arming the Salvadoran rebel forces in 1982. [6] In fact, Smith had informed Washington that Cuba had stopped such shipments in hopes of engaging the U.S. in negotiating an end to the armed conflict. [7]

Accusations of Cuban drug dealing have been part of the U.S. government's claims of Cuban wrongdoing since the 1960s. In 1966, a Senate report charged Castro with smuggling "Red" Chinese heroin into the United States to finance its guerrilla activities. [8] The Reagan administration intensified the accusations of Cuban drug trafficking. In 1982, based on testimony of convicted drug smugglers, four Cuban officials were indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami. The indictment accused the Cubans of making a deal in 1980 with reputed Colombian drug smuggler Jaime Guillot to give safe passage to Guillot's shipments to the U.S. in exchange for the transport of arms to the M-19 guerrillas operating in Colombia. The Cuban government vehemently denied the charges.

Based on the alleged brief arrangement between the then Cuban ambassador to Colombia and Guillot, the Reagan administration along with the extremist anti-Castro Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) began coupling Cuba with both drugs and terrorism. The primary premise of the allegations was that Cuba was engaged in drug trafficking to earn hard currency to support terrorist forces operating in any number of Latin American countries. An even more repugnant allegation repeated ad nauseum in CANF literature was that Cuban officials were given specific orders by Fidel Castro to "penetrate and addict U.S. youths with drugs." [9]

U.S. efforts to prevent drug trafficking through Caribbean air and water routes have failed, in some measure because of its own cooperation with known dealers. When revelations of CIA and contra involvement in drug trafficking surfaced, both Congress and the administration looked the other way and actively removed evidence from public view. Since a substantial portion of V .S.-based drug traffickers and money launderers have been Cuban Americans operating out of Miami, it is advantageous for the CANF and State Department to continue to point the finger at Cuba particularly during election years.

"Is there anything more? I mean ... are we all just running around here shooting ourselves in the foot in terms of having one isolated incident ... "

Further, to avoid some of the embarrassment of the significant involvement of Cuban Americans in illicit drug related activities, rumors were spread in the early 1980s that Castro had infiltrated over 400 agents among the Mariel emigres in order to start U.S.-based drug operations. In response to a Senate subcommittee question regarding such rumors, acting DEA director Francis M. Mullen, Jr. testified in 1983 that no evidence had been uncovered to substantiate such charges. [10] Asked again in 1984, he gave the same reply. [11]

In fact, until 1987 few drug shipments, if any, were reportedly making their way to the United States with the cooperation of Cuban nationals. In hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1984, DEA director Mullen reported two isolated instances of possible drug smuggling allegedly made with Cuban cooperation since 1982. In both instances the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Cuba was in fact involved.

In his testimony, Mullen described two incidents allegedly involving Cuban cooperation. In March 1983, a diary found on a sailboat carrying marijuana showed an itinerary of Florida, the Bahamas, Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Cuba, the Bahamas, and finally Florida. The second incident took place six months later in September 1983. According to the DEA, the wreckage of an aircraft which crashed in the Florida Keys indicated that the flight was involved in drug activity. One of the items found was a letdown chart for Varadero, Cuba, and fuel from the wreckage showed it to have a different octane and lead content than aircraft fuels commercially available in the United States and Jamaica. [12]

Searching for more damning evidence, Representative Lawrence Smith (Dem.-Florida) asked "Is there anything more? I mean ... are we all just running around here shooting ourselves in the foot in terms of having one isolated incident here, one isolated incident here, but not enough to really put together something which might be ... some kind of operation to break down?" Mullen replied, 'We are looking for that pattern .... We have not reached that point yet." [13]

Although the harangue of accusations of Cuban drug trafficking continued unabated, drug enforcement officials had no substantial evidence of Cuban involvement until 1987. Investigations leading to the February 1988 indictments of Cuban exile Reinaldo Ruiz and Colombian Hugo Ceballos on charges of smuggling drugs into Florida by way of Cuba, provided the first real evidence that Cuban officials were actually cooperating with drug smugglers. Jack Hook, a spokesperson for the DEA in Miami, was quoted as saying, "This is the first time we've had evidence that Cuba -like other Caribbean countries - is being used as a transshipment base .... Before this, it's only been rumors." [14]

Moreover, statements made by law enforcement officials at the time of the Ceballos trial in Miami in July 1988, suggest that they believed Cuba had not previously been used as a shipment base. Some U.S. officials considered the evidence in the Ceballos case significant because it signalled that cocaine traffickers were turning to Cuba as a transit point as other routes through the Bahamas were choked off. [15]

United States repudiation of Cuban offers of cooperation have hurt efforts to stem the flow of drugs into this country. According to Mullen, only a very small portion of the cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone coming through the Caribbean was believed to pass through Cuba: "If Cuba were completely neutralized as a transit point, the effect on drug availability would be minimal. On the other hand, if Cuba were to cooperate fully in international drug interdiction efforts, ... a more significant impact could be made on the drug traffic through the Caribbean." [16] The amount of cocaine trafficking in which Cuban MININT officials participated between April 1987 and 1989 was indeed minimal. Now it has been stopped altogether.

_______________

Notes:

1. Provision No. 6 for the Civil Administration of the Free Territory in the Sierra Maestra reads: "It is the responsibility and aim of the Revolutionary Movement and this Administration to completely eliminate hard drugs and illicit gambling, which at present make the real physical, mental and economic development of the Cuban people impossible."

2. These statistics were published by the Cuban government in a document entitled Drug Consumption and Traffic 1986.

3. See CAIB No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 9-11.

4. Introduction by Wayne Smith to Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. xiii.

5. Ibid.

6. Wayne Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York:. W.W. Norton, 1987), pp. 258-60.

7. Ibid.

8. See Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1983), p. 3.

9. The Cuban Monitor. News from the Cuban American National Foundation, Vol. 2, No.3 (August 1989), p. 5 (quoting former Cuban official Manuel de Beunza); see also "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic," Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 30, 1983, p. 389 (testimony of convicted drug smuggler Mario Estevez-Gonzalez in Federal District Court, Southern District of F1orida, February 7, 1983).

10. "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic," Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 30, 1983, p. 76.

11. "United States Response to Cuban Government Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 21 and 23, 1984, p. 39.

12. These examples which offered only circumstantial evidence, even though the persons involved were taken into custody, were the most concrete the DEA could offer. Ibid., p. 28.

13. Op. cit., p. 40.

14. Washington Past, July 26, 1988, p. A4.

15. Ibid.

16. Op. cit., n. 11, p. 29.

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Chronology
by CovertAction Information Bulletin
Winter 1990

July 1986: Ceballos group infiltrated by DEA undercover agent. Ruben Ruiz buys Cessna aircraft later used in drug operations.

October 1986: Ceballos makes contact with Reinaldo Ruiz re arranging drug shipments from Colombia.

October or November 1986: Reinaldo Ruiz contacts Miguel Ruiz Poo, captain in Cuban Ministry of Interior, to discuss drug trafficking.

December 1986: Ruiz meets with Ruiz Poo and Amado Padron in Panama to discuss arrangements for drug transshipments through Cuba. Ruiz travels to Cuba to firm up deal on arrangements for transshipping drugs through Cuba. Meets with Tony de la Guardia and Amado Padron.

January 1987: Arrangements made for first shipment, but Ruiz never arrives in Cuba with drugs.

April 10, 1987: Ruben Ruiz, with co-pilot Richard Zzie, lands drugs at Varadero. Drugs loaded onto speedboats which are intercepted.

May 8, 1987: Ruben Ruiz, with co-pilot Hu Chang, who is a DEA agent, lands drugs at Varadero packed in computer boxes. Drugs transferred to speedboats.

February 1988: Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz and two others indicted in Federal District Court in Miami. Ceballos and ten other co-participants are charged in separate indictment in Miami. All are arrested.

March 1988: Tape played at Ruiz pretrial detention hearing in which he and son Ruben Ruiz boast about having a Cuban connection but without naming specific Cuban officials.

July 1988: Hugo Ceballos and ten other defendants convicted on drug smuggling charges. Ceballos sentenced to 30 years. Cuban officials seek information from DEA on Ceballos and Ruiz cases. State Department turns down request to share information.

March 8, 1989: Reinaldo Ruiz and other co-defendants plead guilty.

March 1989: Cuba begins investigation to uncover drug operations in Cuba.

June 12-13, 1989: Fourteen Cuban officials arrested on charges of corruption and drug trafficking.

July 8, 1989: Cuban defendants found guilty and sentenced. Four sentenced to death.

July 13, 1989: Four Cuban officials who directed drug trafficking operations are executed in Havana.

August 1989: Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz sentenced in Miami.

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5 for 10
by CovertAction Information Bulletin
Winter 1990

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We think it is important for readers to have CAIB in their hands. We want you to read our back issues and discover the valuable, enlightening, and shocking expos6s contained in all the issues of CovertAction Information Bulletin. Included in this set is issue number 26 - a special edition which contains an index to CAIBs 13-25.

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U.S. Policy: Chile and the National Security Doctrine
by Carla Stea*
Winter 1990

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

United States Ambassador Harry Barnes had been in Santiago since October 1985, officially and stridently espousing the U.S. government's concern for human rights in Chile. Under these circumstances (and considering the enormity of U.S. involvement with, and influence upon Chile's government), how was it possible, ten months later, in July 1986, for an atrocity such as the murder of Rodrigo Rojas to occur publicly and with such impunity? Who signaled the armed forces to proceed? In which ultimate power source did the authorization for such an act originate?

The escalation of repression, torture, and murder committed by Chilean government forces since Ambassador Barnes's arrival presents a disturbing contradiction with avowed U.S. policy. Atrocities committed by the Chilean military culminated during the days of mass protest in early July 1986, with a most shocking crime: the death of Rodrigo Rojas and near-death of Carmen Gloria Quintana. Chilean soldiers forced two innocent and (according to the original testimony of 14 witnesses) unarmed teenagers to lie on the ground, beat them mercilessly, then drenched their bodies with gasoline and set them on fire.

U.S. citizens must confront the odious truth that their tax dollars are being used directly and indirectly to support, in Chile, a government which routinely utilizes the most brutal torture. [1]

Hector Salazar, the lawyer representing the families of Rojas and Quintana in the trial of the soldiers responsible for the atrocity, discussed the impact which news of that crime had upon the conscience and sensibilities of people worldwide. He noted that the event had been shocking to people outside Chile. "But for us in Chile, this was nothing new. For many years, the poorest people, those who have suffered most under this dictatorship, have protested their situation during days of nationwide mobilization, often by placing burning tires at entrances to their neighborhoods to keep police and military traffic out. The army, in punishment, has often used the people themselves to extinguish the flames. The burning alive of Rodrigo Rojas and Carmen Gloria Quintana was just the culmination of this process. The Army always acted with impunity."

Salazar has received countless death threats to himself, his family, and his children. "That is part of the job," he said, and he perseveres, while fully conscious that the possibility of "winning" the case under the Pinochet dictatorship is virtually nonexistent. Witnesses to the murder have also received death threats. One, imprisoned for several months, and kept in an isolated cell, was granted release after stating, contradicting his original testimony, that Rojas carried a Molotov cocktail.

The government, which had originally denied responsibility for the murder, was forced to admit that the crime had been perpetrated by its own soldiers after a western European journalist, in Santiago the day of the murder, had overheard on his walkie-talkie a conversation between the soldiers detaining Rojas and Quintana, and their superiors. The soldiers stated that they were holding two teenagers and asked military headquarters for orders. They were told, "silence them."

The journalist brought a recording of this conversation to his embassy; it was sent by diplomatic pouch to Europe, the details published in a Spanish newspaper, and the Pinochet government, confronted with the proof of its own military's involvement, was obliged to admit the crime. What has not yet, and will most likely never be revealed, is from how high a level, and by whom, the authorization for such a murder was given. Salazar suggests this is where the ultimate responsibility lies. (See sidebar.)

The Pattern of U.S. Support

"In Chile the Americans made a mistake .... They killed the revolution, but, as we can see from recent developments there, they didn't kill the dream. In Nicaragua they're trying to kill the dream." [2]

There is an ugly pattern to official U.S. "interest" in the rights of majorities in its National Security States. There is a consistency in history, motive, and tragic consequences for these majorities when the U.S. government expresses its concern for their "rights." (See sidebar.) The bitter lesson for the dispossessed majorities is evident: Any ostensible gestures of official U.S. or client state concern and support for the welfare of groups outside domestic or U.S. elites must be considered potential Trojan Horses, ploys whose objective is, perhaps inevitably, the detection, repression, and eradication of incipient popular movements.

It is against this background that it is urgent to examine the Reagan and Bush administrations' official concern for human rights in Chile, the more as Washington's ostentatious display of interest in human rights in Chile coincided with the emergence of a formidable popular mobilization against Pinochet, a mobilization which is expanding, encompasses a broad spectrum of socio-economic groups, and whose confidence and militancy is growing. [3]

The murder of Rojas, undoubtedly intended to intimidate the opposition, backfired and became a potent moral bomb in the arsenal of a Chilean opposition predominantly committed to non-violence, and difficult to label "terrorist." Rojas's death sent shock waves throughout the world, became an immense embarrassment for Pinochet, and a rallying cry for the opposition. It therefore became necessary for the regime to attempt to discredit Rojas posthumously. Senator Jesse Helms arrived in Santiago and denounced Rojas as a terrorist. The embarrassed U.S. Embassy officially disclaimed Helms as a "private citizen." Then death threats were made against the witnesses to Rojas's murder, [4] against the Commission lawyers investigating the murder, [5] and inevitably, three months after the murder, it was "discovered" that he had been carrying a firebomb. [6] An apparent assassination attempt, from which Pinochet emerged unscathed, was cynically utilized: The opposition was labelled terrorist and wholesale repression was instituted. [7]

Ambassador Barnes may be sincere in his concern for human rights, but the record of serious contradictions between his official pronouncements and the regular appearance of "private citizens," United States Senators and Generals espousing antithetical policies, is disturbing.8 Considering that the very survival of a National Security State depends on massive and sustained violations of human rights, official U.S. concern must be based on the Prosterman model (See sidebar).

The National Civil Assembly

The various opposition parties had not generally worked together during the first 13 years of Pinochet's dictatorship, and had posed no serious threat to his control. However, during the months immediately preceding the Rojas murder, a new popular organization had emerged, the National Civil Assembly, a broad coalition of large sectors of the population opposed to the regime, a federation of professional groups-doctors, lawyers, teachers, labor organizations, women's groups, student organizations, and artists.

The Civil Assembly began to create what the political parties had failed to: a coherent, unified organization of formidable mobilized resistance to the dictatorship, and organization devoted to non-violence, but encompassing so great a number of Chileans that for the first time the possibility of a major popular uprising existed. A huge and serious popular alternative and threat to Pinochet's control was rapidly developing. And it was under the auspices of the National Civil Assembly that mass protests occurred in early June 1986, pressuring for a prompt transition to democracy and restoration of civil, economic, and social rights.

The Assassination Attempt

The burnings of Rojas and Quintana added international outrage and pressure for change to mounting and effective internal resistance to the dictatorship. Indeed, by late August, many observers agreed that the killing of Rojas, a permanent resident of the U.S., actually threatened the viability of the regime, and that equal and opposing force was essential to restore any legitimacy to the Pinochet government. Perhaps, then, it was not a coincidence that an assassination attempt against Pinochet occurred on September 7, one week later. Pinochet imposed a state of siege which crushed the exposed and conspicuous opposition. The movement toward democracy was paralyzed. [9]

Several core members of the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez, a small, armed-resistance movement, claimed responsibility for the attempt, and were imprisoned, undergoing unimaginable torture. Other participants escaped arrest, and there are suggestions that members of the CNI, Pinochet's secret police (and an outgrowth of DINA), were also involved. In view of the total failure of the attempt and the devastating effect it had on the opposition, there is a serious question whether the FPMR was infiltrated and used to bolster the regime. [10]

Conclusion

Prospects for an early return of democracy to Chile remain dim. The visit of the Pope in April 1987 strengthened rightwing elements in the church, resulting in pressure to close the Vicariate of Solidarity which, for more than a decade, provided refuge and support for victims of government persecution. After the Pope's visit, a fierce campaign of harassment against foreign journalists occurred, as government supporters claimed that the foreign press exaggerated human rights violations and popular resistance in Chile. [11] Moreover, the United States continued to refrain from serious criticism of Chile. In December 1986 it voted against a United Nations resolution expressing "grave concern over human rights violations in Chile." In December 1988, it abstained from a similar resolution.

Pinochet lost his plebiscite on October 5, 1988, and elections for the presidency were scheduled for December 1989. Because of the continued repression and the many attacks the opposition has sustained, it is no surprise that Pinochet was simply replaced by a center-right candidate who will not affect the status quo. The armed forces (Pinochet will remain Chief of the Army for the next eight years) continue to be central to the stability of any new government and the fundamental structure of a National Security State remains intact.

_______________

Notes:

* Carla Stea is a free-lance writer whose articles have appeared in the major international press.

1. In November 1986, for example, the U.S. government abstained on both World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans to the Pinochet government totaling half a billion dollars, thereby virtually guaranteeing that these human rights violations would continue. Had the U.S. opposed the loans, as the Harkin Amendment (Sec. 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act) would seem to have necessitated (requiring opposition of loans to countries which engage in gross violations of human rights), they could not have been made.

2. Statement by a Jesuit priest who had worked in Chile and then in Nicaragua; quoted by John Saul, Monthly Review, March 1985.

3. Moderate leader Gabriel Valdez was quoted in the New York Times (April 4, 1986): "He argued that the Communist Party and the Marxist-Leninist groups had a right to take part in civic life. 'We don't accept the exclusion of ideas.' "

4. New York Times, August 26, 1986.

5. Ibid., September 11, 1986.

6. Ibid., October 21, 1986.

7. "Chile's Democratic Transition is in Question: Attempt to Kill Pinochet May Signal Stronger Left," was the New York Times headline September 14. On September 19, the Times ran a story of the discovery of an enormous "Soviet and Cuban supplied" arms cache. And on November 11, an Op-Ed article in the Times noted that "The U.S. State Department appropriately condemned the attempt to assassinate General Pinochet that provoked the State of Siege. But for several weeks Washington has had nothing to say about the murders, torture, death threats, and mass arrests that General Pinochet is using to punish the non-violent democratic movement." Op-Ed article by Americas Watch.

8. In November 1985, U.S. General Schweitzer arrived in Santiago offering unconditional support to the Chilean armed forces. The U.S. Embassy disclaimed him as another "private citizen."

9. Major opposition leaders agreed that, had the assassination attempt succeeded, it would have resulted not in a restoration of democracy, but in a seizure of power by the military, a slaughter of the entire opposition leadership, and a bloodbath which they termed "another Jakarta." Sergio Bitar, editor of Fortin Mapocho and former Minister of Mines under Allende, said at least 60 leaders would have been immediately murdered in reprisal, "and a large part of the Chilean people thereafter."

10. Jorge Lavandero, publisher of Fortin Mapocho, noted, ''There are seven secret police organizations in Chile. It is virtually impossible that an organization such as FPMR was not infiltrated by agents provocateurs. "

11. The home of a top UPI official, Anthony E. Boadle, was broken into and his files and papers searched and destroyed. Rumors were fabricated that two European journalists were drug addicts.