Part 1 of 3
PART IV: SUPPLEMENT AND APPENDICES
Supplement on Control of Disorder
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 12 on Control of Disorder focused on the problems of civil and police omc1als seeking to prevent disorder, dealing with incidents leading to disorders, and responding to political, social and legal issues that arise at all stages of a disorder. In this Supplement we focus principally on controlling disorders that have escalated beyond immediate police capabilities and require a total community response to halt the violence. We also consider the rarer cases where state or federal forces are necessary to achieve control.
Within this context, we assess the present capabilities and preparedness of public safety forces, military units, civil government and the community at large to cope with disorders of large magnitude and make recommendations to help assure adequate responses at all levels.
I. THE POLICE AND CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS
The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. These rely in turn upon the quantity and quality of police manpower, the training of patrolmen and police commanders, and the effectiveness of their equipment. This portion of the Supplement will review the adequacy of police planning, training and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the Commission's recommendations for improvement.
When underlying tensions are present -- and they exist in every American city with a large minority population -- a small incident can turn a crowd into a mob. Last summer an appreciable number of incidents were triggered by police actions -- some serious, such as shooting a suspect, but usually by routine activities, such as a simple arrest.
The way policemen approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators consulted by the Commission repeatedly stressed the need for good judgment and common sense among police officers called to the scene of an incident in a neighborhood where tensions exist. They warned against using sirens and flasher lights that attract crowds. They cautioned against over-responding to a small 1nc1dent with too much visible force -- riot guns and helmets may only aggravate a tense situation. Yet control has sometimes been lost because an insufficient number of police were on hand to control a disorder in its initial stages. It takes a seasoned senior officer to make the all-important initial assessments and decisions that will contain an incident.
If an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and ensure the public safety.
Planning
Effective preparation for disorder requires careful plans. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed, and directed by senior officers. They must have adequate logistical support, particularly if extended operations are necessary.
Mobilization Planning -- To find and mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million, an area of 140 square miles, and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. The difficulties in mobilizing additional men were described by the police commissioner:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 1-1/2 to 2 hours.
By the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department.
Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance -- large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified colDDl8Dd control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual to deal with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different organization with new operational procedures.
To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department must have So specific mobilization plan that can mobilize and deploy needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures, and with m1n1mumcurtaIlment of essential police services.
A study conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that all had some form of written mobilization plan. The quality of the plans varied greatly. Principal defects were: inadequate attention to implementing the plan; inadequate relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; inadequate accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder; inadequate predesignated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; inadequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; inadequate flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations.
Because of these deficiencies in the mobilization plans of the leading police departments, the Commission has prepared a model plan, which can be adapted to local requirements. Currently used as training material in the Conference on the Prevention and Control of Civil Disorders conducted by the Department of Justice in response to Commission recommendations, the plan will be revised as additional information is developed by these conferences. The Commission recommends that the Department of Justice disseminate the revised plan to police departments across the country and ensure that it is used in federally-sponsored training on riot control methods.
Operational Planning -- Operational planning, a necessary complement to mobilization planning, tells the police command and the men what to do to control the disorder. It includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence, means to combat inflammatory rumors, and tactics.
(1) Command and Control and Communications -- Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends upon the success with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places where they are needed. In most police departments the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher are within the capabilities of the man and his equipment.
Many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders have had serious problems in commanding and controlling the large numbers of men required to work together as an effective, coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and staff at certain periods of the day. It is one thing to assemble a large force; it is quite another to provide appropriate direction and leadership.
Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends upon communications, and communications is a function both of planning and of equipment. Relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. Forty-two percent of all police departments studied by the Commission had no special radio frequency for emergencies.
The lack of emergency frequencies overloads normal frequencies. This may not only preclude effective command and control of police in the area of a civil disorder but may also undermine the ability of the police to provide vital services to the remainder of the city.
The absence of adequate communication facilities is particularly acute with respect to outside police assistance. Approximately 50 percent of all police agencies surveyed had inadequate means to coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions. Incompatible radio frequencies in one instance prevented effective use of men and equipment from a neighboring police department. When local and state police must cooperate with National Guard units. the need for communications coordination is urgent.
We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use. [1]
Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders particularly if the riot commanders are to exercise effective command and control over police units in control operations. At the present time police officers can generally communicate only to headquarters and only from a police vehicle. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the federal government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police. [2]
(2) Intelligence -- The absence of accurate information both before and during a disorder has created special control problems for police. Police departments must develop means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes, as well as on-the-scene information for use in police operations during a disorder.
An intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel should be established to gather, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders. It should provide police administrators and commanders with reliable information essential for assessment and decision-making. It should use undercover police personnel and informants but it should also draw on community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto.
Planning is also necessary to cope with the ever present problem of rumors. A rumor collection center will enable police and other officials to counter false and inflammatory reports by giving accurate information rapidly to community leaders and others in troubled areas. Evaluation of rumors can also provide important information about potential disorders.
In Chicago, for example, a "Rumor Central" unit established in the Commission on Human Relations averted trouble. When a Negro, after an argument, was shot to death by a white store owner who was placed in custody by the police, a rumor spread through the neighborhood that the white man would not be arrested. This false information was picked up by a radio station and broadcast. But Rumor Central, which received some 500 telephone calls about the incident, obtained the facts from the police and gave those facts to community leaders and news media. This appreciably assisted the police in alleviating tension.
How police intelligence units can be organized and can operate is set forth in a Model Operations Plan discussed below.
(3) Tactics -- In dealing with disorders, police have traditionally relied principally on the use of various squad formations and tactics to disperse crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in some recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting and fire-bombing.
Studies made for the Commission indicate that the police are aware of the deficiency. Many police departments admitted that traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffective or only partially useful in the disorders. But no new and practical response to the recent types of disorders has emerged. Few departments have evolved new tactics against rioters. Even fewer have sent trained personnel to consult with officials in cities that have experienced civil disorders.
The tactics effective in dealing with the type of disorders experienced last summer, as well as those that may develop in the future, are also presented in the Model Operations Plan discussed below.
(4) Recommendations for Operational Planning -- The Commission believes that model operations plans are needed now. They must provide guidelines tor police departments and assist them in coping with civil disorders.
The Commission also believes that more thought is needed about types of disorders that may develop in the future, together with the police responses that will be relevant and effective.
Acting on these convictions, the Commission has developed a model operations plan after consultation with leading police officials. Like the mobilization plan, this plan is also being used in the Department of Justice training conferences and will be revised from time to time. The Commission recommends that this plan be distributed to local and state police departments in the same manner as the proposed model mobilization plan.
Obtaining Outside Assistance -- When should a mayor or local police chief call for state assistance? The answer is difficult partly because of the problem of determining when outside assistance is actually necessary, and partly because local officials may be understandably reluctant to admit that they cannot control the disorder.
No amount of planning will provide an automatic solution to this problem. Sound judgment on the part of mayors and police chiefs remains the only answer. Yet once the decision has been made, proper advance planning will help speed assistance.
Outside forces will need a relatively long lead time before response. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that an average of four to six hours is required from the time of notification to the time of arrival of an effective complement of men.
Local authorities must not wait until the critical moment to alert a neighboring jurisdiction, the state police, or the National Guard. Outside control forces will then be unable to mobilize and respond on time. All agencies that may be asked to help control a civil disturbance must be alerted at an early stage and kept informed.
These problems will be further discussed in the section on the National Guard and state local planning.
Logistical Planning -- Commission studies disclosed serious deficiencies in police plans for logistical support. Many police departments simply assume that supplies and equipment are on hand and in the amounts required. The moment of need is too late to find out whether they are.
Regular police vehicles are usually inadequate for transporting and supplying large numbers of police, particularly since the men should be moved in units. Furthermore, a disorder extending over a long period of time will require the resupply of expended items and probably food and shelter for police personnel. In one city. when the failure to plan for these contingencies kept an entire police force on 24-hour duty, physical exhaustion seriously impaired police effectiveness.
Commission studies indicate that few police departments are prepared for these exigencies.
A major problem of the 1967 disorders arose from the large number of persons arrested. Facilities to transport, detain, process, feed, and house them overwhelmed the existing structure. Discussed in the chapter on the Administration of Justice under Emergency Conditions, the task of caring for large numbers of prisoners is also a matter of logistics.
Training
The Commission survey on the capabilities and preparedness of selected police departments showed that the most critical deficiency of all is inadequate training. Practically no riot control training is provided for supervisory police officers. Recruits receive an average of 18 hours in departments offering anywhere from 62 hours to only 2. Moreover, although riot control tactics require the work of highly disciplined and coordinated teams, almost all departments train policemen as individuals.
Eleven of the 30 police departments surveyed reported no special or additional riot control training beyond the recruit level. Of the 19 departments reporting some post-recruit training, five limit training to the use of firearms and chemicals. In many cases, the training program is built around traditional military formations that have little applicability to the kinds of civil disorders experienced by our cities. Yet 50 percent of all the departments, surveyed said they were generally satisfied with their training programs and planned no significant changes.
Basic riot control should be taught in recruit school, and intensive unit training should be conducted subsequently on a regular or semi-annual basis. Without this kind of training police officers cannot be expected to perform effectively in controlling civil disturbances. Training supervisory and command personnel in the control of civil disorders must also be a continuing process.
Emergency plans and emergency operations must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. Yet few departments test their mobilization and operational plans. As a result, where carefully planned variations from the normal chain-of-command communications systems and unit assignments go into effect at a time of riot emergency, policemen are often unfamiliar with them. The most thoroughly developed emergency plan is useless unless all personnel fully understand it before it is put into operation.
Of the 30 police departments surveyed, not a single one reported coordinated training with fire units. Yet recent experience shows a clear need for police-fire teamwork in riots. Even more revealing, only 2 of the departments surveyed have undertaken coordinated training with other community agencies required in a riot emergency. Only 2 departments reported coordinating their riot control training with the National Guard and state police.
In order to strengthen police training, the Commission recommends:
1. Departments should immediately allocate whatever time is necessary to reach an effective level of riot control capability. The need for training in civil disorder prevention and control is urgent.
2. Training must include all levels of personnel within the police agency, especially commanders. Post-recruit riot training must be a continuing process for all personnel and build upon recruit training rather than duplicate it.
3. Riot control training must be provided to groups expected to function as teams during actual riot conditions. Required levels of teamwork can be achieved only through team training. All special riot control units must receive additional and intensive training in tactics and procedures, as well as in special equipment and weapons.
4. Mobilization plans and emergency procedures must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. All members of the department must be familiar with riot plans at all times.
5. Mayors and other civil officials must recognize the need and accept the responsibility for initiating regional training and coordination with military and state police personnel, as well as with other agencies of local governments.
6. Police agencies must review and become familiar with recent riot experience so that training programs can be realistically adjusted in the light of anticipated problems.
7. In order to help law enforcement agencies improve their knowledge and strengthen their capabilities to prevent and control civil disorders, a national center and clearinghouse should be established to develop, evaluate, and disseminate riot prevention and control data and information. This center should be part of the proposed National Institute for Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended by the President and awaiting action by Congress.
A suggestion has been made that national observer teams be established and assigned to the scene of incipient or developing disorders. These teams would study the effectiveness of control techniques and organization, recommend improvements, and make this information available to public officials. The Commission endorses the recommendation and suggests further that the disorder observer teams be made an integral part of the proposed national center.
Police Control Equipment
Personal Equipment -- A serious hazard faced by police officers during disorders is injury from bottles, rocks, and other missiles thrown by rioters. Yet few police departments can furnish every man assigned to civil disturbance duty with the proper equipment to protect head, face, and eyes. The Commission has found that protective clothing, boots, and gloves are generally not available for the police, although most police administrators recommend their procurement and use. Police officers must have the proper personal equipment and clothing to safeguard them against the threat of bodily harm.
Police Weapons -- On the basis of the surveys made of 30 major police departments, the Commission found that many police forces are inadequately equipped or trained for use of even conventional riot control weapons and materiel. For example, although the police baton has proven to be a very effective weapon in situations where a low level of physical force will control a disorder, many police departments fail to instruct their men in the proper use of this control weapon. The value of the police baton should not be overlooked and police administrators should assure that proper training in its correct and most effective use is given to all police officers.
The most serious deficiencies, however, are in advanced nonlethal weapons. Riot control authorities regard nonlethal chemical agents, such as tear gas, as the single most valuable and effective type of middle-range weapons in controlling civil disorders. In listing the priority of force to be applied in a disorder, the FBI manual on riot control, as well as Army and National Guard doctrine, prescribe the use of tear gas (CS and CN) before resorting to firearms. According to the FBI riot control manual: "They are the most e1fective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury."
While most of the police departments surveyed possessed some chemical weapons with varying degrees of supplies on hand, they lacked sufficient gas masks to equip even 30% of their personnel properly. The lack of gas masks restricts use of gas by many police forces.
Police and other civil officials have also been inhibited by the unfavorable psychological reaction to the use of any gas or chemical weapon. An additional restraint is created by the presence of large numbers of innocent people in the disorder area who would be affected by the traditional, massive use of tear gas.
The recent development of new containers and projectile devices by the U.S. Army now makes it possible to use CS discriminatingly against small groups and even individuals. Police departments could use them to deal effectively and appropriately with looters and snipers.
Some police departments have recently been equipping police officers with a liquid tear gas device. Initial reports indicate that, though less effective than CS, it provides a useful method of dealing with unruly and dangerous individuals. Used properly, it renders offenders harmless for 10 to 15 minutes. Projectors now in production promise to give police a means of acting against lawless small groups or individuals up to a distance of 30 feet.
The use of distinctive colors and odors either added to the liquid tear gas or projected from a separate device may be an additional way to help police not only identify those engaged in vandalism and other illegal acts but also deter others.
The exaggerated reports of sniping in many cities experiencing disorders created unwarranted apprehension among some police administrators. This concern has led to a belief in some communities that police officers should be armed with highly destructive implements of war.
The Commission believes that equipping civil police with automatic rifles, machine guns, and other weapons of massive and indiscriminate lethality is not warranted by the evidence. Chemical agents provide police forces with an effective and more appropriate weapon. If violence by rioters goes beyond the capability of the police to control, trained military forces should be called in. We should not attempt to convert our police into combat troops equipped for urban warfare.
The true source of police strength in maintaining order lies in the respect and good will of the public they serve. Great harm is likely to result from the use of military weapons of mass destruction by police forces which lack the command and control and firearms discipline of military units. Improper action could destroy the concept of civilian police as a public service agency dependent for effective operations on community cooperation and support.
Ot1erall Recommendations -- The development of modem, nonlethal control equipment has languished because police departments lack the resources for tests and evaluation. The decentralized nature of law enforcement and the absence of standard criteria have also limited market opportunities. As a result, private industry has been reluctant to invest in research and development of new police equipment.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends:
• The federal government should undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate nonlethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces.
• Federal support should be provided to establish criteria and standard specifications which would stimulate and facilitate the production of such items at a reasonably low cost.
• Federal funds should be used to develop appropriate tools and materiel for local and state law enforcement agencies.
If these recommendations are adopted, the result will better maintenance of law and order and better control of disorders with fewer risks to police and the public. Use should be made of technology and resources of the Department of Defense and other appropriate federal agencies.
II. FIRE DEPARTMENTS AND CIVIL DISORDERS
Of the 23 cities studied by the Commission, most reported arson and fires accompanying the disorders, ranging from burning of police barricades in Jackson, Mississippi, to the 682 riot-connected building fires listed by the Detroit Fire Department. Fire departments face problems equal in difficulty to control problems of law enforcement agencies.
Major Fire Department Problems in Civil Disorders
Abnormal Number of Fires -- The basic problem for fire departments during a civil disorder is lack of resources to cope with an abnormal number of fires in one area while maintaining some coverage of other areas. Detroit had as many fires in the five days of disorder as it usually has in a month. No other city approached this number of fires during a disorder, but fire problems were still critical. For example, during the four days of disorder in Newark, the fire department responded to 250 fire calls, plus 64 false alarms, and 50 emergencies where no fire existed. Of these 364 calls, 166 took place on the first day of the disorder.
Fire departments are not organized or equipped to cope with an abnormal number of fires on a sustained basis. There are more than 23,500 public fire departments in the United States, and only 285 have 100 or more employees .Only 19 cities have more than 1,000 paid employees, ranging from 13,917 in New York City to 1,061 in New Orleans. But total strength is far from the number of men available to fight a fire. Regular hours of duty mean that only 20 to 35 percent of personnel are on duty at any one time. The situation is even more critical in the suburban communities surrounding the core city of a metropolitan area, for many of these departments depend to a very large extent on volunteer firemen even for routine fires, and few have as many as 25 men normally on duty.
Shortages of equipment, particularly reserve equipment necessary for a full utilization of all available manpower, also inhibit efforts to combat widespread fires. During the Detroit disorder, 41 suburban communities furnished men and about 49 pieces of equipment to augment the 97 pieces of equipment in the city department. The danger in relying on mutual aid agreements comes from the possibility that adjoining communities may be simultaneously involved in a disorder and unable to release men or equipment.
Malicious or Nuisance False Alarms -- False alarms have often plagued fire departments during disorders. These alarms overload incoming communications systems and deplete manpower and equipment needed for actual fires.
Attacks and Harassment of Firemen -- In many of the cities experiencing civil disorders, firemen have been harassed, and even attacked, primarily by thrown objects. These, plus fear of attack, have seriously interfered with the work of firemen. Firemen can no longer depend upon community assistance, but must be ready for open hostility.
Overtaxed Communication Facilities -- Fire department communication capabilities have been severely taxed during disorders. At headquarters, increased number of alarms overload incoming telephone lines, and impose heavy burdens on dispatchers. In the field, frequencies have been overloaded, while the use of different frequencies by fire units, law enforcement agencies and National Guard forces has prompted confusion. The Commission has requested that the Federal Communications Commission provide sufficient frequencies to permit communication during disorders among all agencies of government involved in control.
Identification of a Civil Disorder Fire Problem -- The fire problem in a civil disorder has usually developed after the initial disturbance. The time interval may be a matter of hours as in Detroit, or a matter of days as in Los Angeles in 1965. In order to insure efficient response, fire chiefs must identify the start of a problem as early as possible both to activate emergency plans and to avoid an initial over-commitment of resources.
Water Supply Problems -- Numerous fires reduce water pressure, and malicious openings of hydrants deplete water supplies.
Logistical Support -- Extended fire-fighting operations by large numbers of personnel and equipment have created serious logistical problems. Sufficient manpower and equipment must be on hand not only to combat the fires but also to avert long hours of duty leading to exhaustion. Special feeding and rest facilities near the center of operations should be provided.
The availability and state of repair of reserve equipment creates additional difficulties when this equipment is pressed into service during an emergency.
Large scale glass breakage during disorders has damaged tires of fire trucks. Hose problems have been acute. Most fire departments lack the heavy stream equipment that is most efficient in handling riot-caused fires. Forced withdrawals because of attacks on firemen and rapid reassignment to new threatened areas have prevented recovery of hose. Damage from large scale operations, as well as from sabotage, has further reduced hose inventories.
Recommendations for Improving Fire Department Response
The Commission recommends that fire departments evaluate all existing resources, develop and test plans of response, and make every effort to strengthen the fire-fighting force within the limits of the community's financial base. Beyond this, detailed plans must be prepared to:
• identify areas where disorders and fires are likely to occur.
• compute the units needed to service critical areas, while maintaining minimum protection for the remainder of the community.
• evaluate jointly total needs with cooperating agencies and schedule required assignments in advance.
• select command post sites, providing for a command room, adequate parking of apparatus, sufficient access and maneuver, communication facilities, and space for personnel for extended periods of time.
• provide for coded signals to implement responses, to activate command posts, and to recall off-duty personnel.
• choose special teams of men and equipment for commitment, including, normally, one or two pumpers, a ladder truck, a chief officer, necessary heavy equipment, and communication facilities.
• review the adequacy of the water supply and solve foreseeable problems in advance.
• develop plans for actual operations at the scene of fires.
• provide a way to screen incoming alarms to avoid duplication of response and depletion of resources.
Coordination and Liaison with Other Units -- Fire departments must be an integral part of the planning to coordinate all government agencies and private groups involved in control operations, in particular with law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. Effective liaison must be established well in advance of emergencies, and lines of communication to the police will provide both information for the prompt recognition of special fire problems and police protection. Tests of all agreements are a necessity.
Protection of Firemen -- A fireman is neither trained nor equipped to control rioters. To be effective, he must be able to devote his entire attention to fire control activities. Since firemen have a professional responsibility and duty to respond to all fires, protection furnished by outside sources may be necessary for the personal well-being of firemen, and for effective fire-fighting operations.
Thus, if firemen are attacked or severely harassed or interfered with in their operations, either police or National Guardsmen should be assigned to fire units, to furnish effective protection. In order to ensure that proper protection will be immediately available if needed, advance commitments and assignments are necessary. Firemen must establish and maintain liaison with top police officials and National Guard officers.
Personal protective equipment for firemen and apparatus may also be necessary -- covered cabs, eye shields and crash helmets, as well as covering material for fire engines.
Adequate Communication Equipment -- Adequate communications between headquarters and field operations are essential -- additional telephones to receive alarms; direct-line telephones to command posts and key officials; portable two-way radios; radio links to other agencies and cooperating fire departments; equipment for reserve units; and reliable means to direct firefighters to fire scenes. Periodic exercises and tests are necessary.
Logistical Support -- To ensure an adequate logistical support, fire departments must make an inventory of all equipment and supplies, repair or replace inoperative or defective equipment, and ensure adequate repair and maintenance facilities. Sufficient quantities of hose, particularly heavy stream and large diameter hose, are required.
Training -- Because operations during civil disorders differ substantially from normal operating procedures, training must be carried out at operational and command levels. Command level training is of special importance, for many fire department officials lack experience in wide-scale operations. Tactical exercises will help train senior staff officers and test communications and command capabilities.
Training and Planning Conferences -- The Commission recommends training conferences for the nation's fire departments. Nationwide or area-wide conferences among top fire department officials will promote exchanges of information relating to basic plans for responding to disorders and the preparation of training programs and materials for both operational and command levels. The Federal Government should assume the responsibility for instituting, and funding such conferences.
Improved Community Relations -- Fire departments, like police departments, must improve their relations with the communities they serve in order to gain the community cooperation and assistance that are essential for effective fire-fighting. This requires getting out of the fire house and becoming acquainted with the people in the neighborhood. Fire department officials have an obligation to develop programs to achieve these goals.
III. STATE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDERS
A major civil disorder may require control forces beyond the personnel and equipment of a single city. When this occurs in an American city, the response will necessarily be far different than it would be in many foreign countries. Most Asian and European countries have national police forces under centralized control, and in the event of a disorder, thousands of additional, specially trained and equipped control personnel can be rapidly deployed to the scene.
Because a national police force is anathema to American tradition, and because the use of federal forces in domestic violence is limited by the Constitution, governing statutes, and precedent, state forces alone will be available in the great majority of civil disorders in this country. The state forces presently available to assist local law enforcement agencies are the state police and the National Guard.