Part 4 of 5
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2-II26. The 20 cities were Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati (the June disorder), Dayton (the June and September disorders), Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson.
The three university settings were Houston, Texas (Texas Southern University). Jackson, Mississippi (Jackson State College) and Nashville, Tennessee (Fisk University and Tennessee A. & I. State College).
See Statement on Methodology. Appendix, for a description of our survey procedures.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2-IIReservoir of Grievances in the Negro Community
27. See Part IV, THE BACKGROUND OF DISORDER, infra; and Part III, THE RIOT PARTICIPANT, infra.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2-II -- PRECIPITATING INCIDENTS28. A final incident was identifiable preceding all 24 surveyed disorders except Rockford. See Section II, "The Development of Violence," infra, for the time and place of each final incident and the outbreak of violence.
29. In our surveys at least 88 prior incidents were identified by Negro interviewees as having been widely known and remembered at the time of the outbreak of violence, as having been a source or exemplification of grievances, and as having contributed to the disorders. The number of such prior precipitating incidents in a given city cannot be stated with certainty. Different sources recalled different events or stressed different aspects of a single event. However, we have been able to identify multiple incidents in moat of the cities surveyed. Such incidents were reported in all except two cities (Elizabeth and Tucson; both minor).
At least 10 prior incidents were identified in Houston (serious); seven in Bridgeton (minor); six in Atlanta. Milwaukee and Nashville (one major, two serious); five in Cincinnati, Newark and Plainfield (all major); four in Cambridge and the June and September Dayton disorders (two serious, one minor); three in Detroit, Jersey City New Haven and Phoenix (one major, two serious and one minor); two in Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, New Brunswick, Paterson, Rockford and Tampa (one major, three serious and three minor). Twenty-eight prior incidents occurred within a week preceding violence, nine occurred one month to one week prior, 36 occurred six months to one month prior, eleven occurred one year to six months prior to the violence. One year was used as an arbitrary time limit for counting incidents, except when the incident was identified as particularly significant to the disorder in that city. Four such incidents were identified: In Newark (the 1965 shooting of a Negro by police), in Jersey City (a disturbance in 1964), in Englewood (a 1962 disturbance), and in Cambridge (racial tensions necessitating the presence of National Guardsmen from 1963 to 1965).
30. See the section on "Grievances" in Part IV infra.
31. Such actions were identified as prior incidents in 35 cases preceding 18 disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Detroit, Englewood, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford and Tampa; six major, six serious and six minor).
The percentages used for the frequency of the occurrence of type of incidents total more than 100 percent since a few incidents fell into more than one category.
32. Thirty-two incidents preceding all 18 disorders fit this pattern. Responses to a larger group constituted four incidents, all involving groups of demonstrators (Cincinnati, Nashville, and twice in Houston; one major and two serious).
33. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Detroit. Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark, Phoenix, Tampa and Tucson (four major, six serious and two minor).
34. Cambridge and Houston (both serious). The incident in Cambridge occurred when police fired at a group of Negroes leaving a protest meeting, and in Houston when they arrested a Negro trying to address a group of demonstrators.
35. This was the case in 15 instances preceding nine disorders (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark and Phoenix; two major and six serious).
36. This occurred in five cases preceding four disorders (Cambridge, the June Dayton disturbance, Houston and Nashville; all serious).
37. Atlanta and the June Dayton disturbance (both serious) featured nationally-known militants. Cincinnati, the September Dayton disturbance and Plainfield (two major and one minor) involved only local leaders.
38. Atlanta, Cincinnati and the September Dayton disturbance (one major, one serious and one minor).
39. The June Dayton and Plainfield disturbances (both serious).
40. This occurred in 15 cases preceding nine disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, the June Dayton disorder, Detroit, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville and Tampa; three major, five serious, one minor).
41. Atlanta the June and September Dayton disturbance, Detroit, Englewood, Jersey City and Paterson (one major, three serious and three minor). The previous disorder counted in Detroit was the "Kercheval incident" in August of 1966 mentioned in the text of this section, and not the 1943 Detroit riot. In Dayton, the June 1967 disorder was counted as a prior incident in relation to the September disorder; four major, six serious and three minor).
42. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee and Plainfield (three major, three serious and one minor).
43. Four such cases preceded four disorders (Bridgeton, Grand Rapids, Phoenix and Plainfield; one major, two serious and one minor).
44. Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick and Paterson (one serious, four minor).
See Part I of this Chapter for a discussion of the patterns of the disorders in terms of timing and geographic distribution. The impact of communications media on the propagation of disorders is discussed in Chapter 15.
45. This was the case in nine or more instances preceding six disturbances (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark and Plainfield; four major, one serious and one minor). The initial refusal to fund or the cancellation of funding by officials responsible for federally-financed antipoverty programs was included in this category. There were three cases preceding three disturbances (the June Dayton disorder, New Haven and Phoenix; all serious).
46. This was the case in eight instances preceding eight disorders (Cambridge, Cincinnati, the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, and Paterson; three major, three serious and two minor).
47. This incident was not included in the category of racist activities, since the shooting apparently was not motivated entirely by the victim's ethnic origin.
48. Bridgeton, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark and Tampa (four major, two serious and one minor).
49. Atlanta, Cincinnati and the September Dayton disturbance (one major and two serious).
Meetings to protest actions involved in prior incidents on the part of city officials other than the police were identified as the final incident preceding two disorders (the June Dayton disturbance and Plainfield; one major and one serious).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2-II
Development of Violence50. This is readily apparent from the charts annexed to this Report, which portray graphically the varying levels of violence during the period of each of the 24 disorders.
51. All except Bridgeton, Cambridge, Elizabeth, Jersey City, New Brunswick and New Haven (two serious and four minor disturbances). In eight of the 18 cases the estimated size of the groups ranged from 50 to 100 (the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Paterson, Phoenix and Plainfield; two major, five serious and one minor); in six cases from 100 to 200 (Cincinnati, the June Dayton disorder, Englewood, Nashville, Rockford and Tucson; one major, two serious and three minor): and in six cases from 200 to 1,000 (Atlanta, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark and Tampa; three major and three serious).
52. Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson (four major, three serious and three minor). Seven disorders began on Monday (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City and New Brunswick; one major, three serious and three minor). Three began on Tuesday (the September Dayton disturbance, Houston and Phoenix: two serious and one minor), three on Wednesday (the June Dayton disturbance, Jackson and Newark; one major and two serious) and one Thursday (Bridgeton; minor).
53. Eighteen disorders for which temperature information was available occurred at the end of a day in which the temperature had reached a high of at least 79 degrees. In nine cases the temperature had reached 90 degrees or more during the day (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, the June Dayton disturbance, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tampa and Tucson; three major, five serious and one minor) in eight cases the temperature had been in the 80's (Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven and Rockford: one major, two serious and five minor), and in one city the high temperature was 79 degrees (Milwaukee; a major disturbance).
54. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.
55. Ibid. Of New Haven's six cycles of violence, one occurred during early daylight hours and one began and reached its peak during the afternoon. In Plainfield (major) substantial violence began during one afternoon and continued, through a midnight peak, into the following day and evening. In Grand Rapids (serious) two cycles of violence occurred within one 24- hour period, one continuing into daylight hours and the other beginning in the afternoon.
56. In three disorders this was the pattern (Atlanta, Cambridge and Englewood; two serious and one minor). 1n a few cases these cycles were separated by one or more 24-hour periods in which little or no violence occurred, even during the first days of the disorder. Also see the charts annexed to this chapter.
57. Violence erupted within less than 30 minutes after the occurrence of the final incident in 11 disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; four major, five serious and two minor).
In seven other disorders the violence erupted less than two hours after the occurrence of a final incident (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Detroit, Nashville, New Haven, Newark and Phoenix; two major, four serious and one minor). The time span between the final incident and the beginning of violence is not easily established for the disturbances in the five New Jersey cities in which the final incidents were reports of disorders in neighboring cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, New Brunswick, Jersey City and Paterson: one serious and four minor).
58. Violence in 11 disorders reached a peak for the first night, and in some cases an overall peak, in less than one hour after the initial outbreak (Atlanta, Bridgeton, the June and September Dayton disorders, Englewood, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark" Plainfield and Rockford; three major, five serious and three minor). In tour other disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than two hours (Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson and Tampa; one major, one serious and two minor), and in eight disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than five hours (Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Phoenix and Tucson; one major, five serious and two minor). In one disturbance (Detroit: major), violence continued to escalate over a period of 12 to 15 hours after the initial outbreak.
59. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.
60. Ibid. All except the June and September Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Houston and New Brunswick (two serious and three minor).
61. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, Tampa and Tucson (two major, five serious and three minor).
62. Atlanta, Detroit, Jackson, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield and Rockford (three major, five serious and one minor). See the section on "The Control Effort," infra, for a further discussion of violence levels.
63. Of 34 reported occasions of rock and bottle-throwing, 26 occurred in the first two cycles of violence. Of 31 reported occasions of window-breaking, 24 occurred in the first two cycles.
64. Of 30 reported occasions of looting, 20 occurred in the first two cycles and 28 in the first three cycles.
65. Of 24 reported occasions of fire bombs and Molotov cocktails, 12 occurred in the first two cycles and 12 in the second two.
66. Of 26 reported occasion of fires, 18 occurred in the second and third cycles, and eight in the first and last.
67. Of 18 reported occasions, 13 occurred in the second and third cycles.
68. In only four instances did local police request and receive assistance in the initial response from an outside force (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Englewood and New Brunswick; one serious and three minor). In the case of Cambridge, the outside forces consisted of National Guardsmen, State police, and the county sheriff and constable. In the other three cases, they consisted of the police of neighboring towns or county or both.
69. In ten of the 24 disorders, this was the case (Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Jersey City, Nashville, Paterson, Phoenix and Tucson; six serious and four minor).
70. In a majority of cases for which we have such information, in 12 out of 22, the initial control force was either larger than the crowd on the street or no fewer than a ratio of one policeman to every five persons on the street (Bridgeton, Cambridge, both Dayton disorde18, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, Phoenix and Rockford; five serious and seven minor).
In one of these instances almost the entire police force of 900 men was moved in before a single rioter appeared on the streets (Jersey City: minor). In the remaining ten cases the ratio varied: from one policeman to every six persons on the street (New Haven; serious), to one policeman to 300 people on the street (Tampa; major). The median ratio In these ten cases was one policeman to 25 parsons on the street (Cincinnati Detroit, Houston, Jackson, Nashville, Newark, Plainfield, and Tucson; four major, three serious and one minor).
71. In at least one case, the police rushed at the crowd with nightsticks (Newark; major). In only one case was a shot fired by the police during the initial response, and in that case it was a single shot (Cambridge; serious).
72. Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford and Tucson (two major, three serious and five minor).
In at least five of these cases, arrests were made (Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tucson; one serious and four minor).
73. Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Houston, Phoenix and Tampa (three major, three serious and two minor).
74. Detroit, Houston, Phoenix and Tampa; two major and two serious.
75. Cambridge, both Dayton disturbances, Jackson, Nashville and Plainfield (one major, four serious and one minor).
76. See annexed charts of levels of violence. In at least 13 instances the initial control response appeared to fail, in this sense. The three control approaches, dispersal, reconnaissance containment were almost equally represented in this group: six of these were cases of dispersal (Englewood, Grand Rapids Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark and Tucson; two major; two serious and two minor); four cases of containment (Cambridge, both Dayton disorders and Jackson; three serious and one minor); and three were cases of reconnaissance (Detroit, Houston and Tampa: two major and one serious).
77. If violence continued, or resumed after a pause, the second control response by local police (and, in the instances we have noted, by the outside forces which by then had arrived) again was one of the three categories of dispersal, reconnaissance and containment. However, at this stage, dispersal was used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the stage of the initial response: twelve cases, two more than in the initial response (Atlanta, Bridgeton Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson and Rockford: four major, four serious and four minor). Containment was also now used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the earlier stage: nine cases, one more than before (both Dayton disturbances, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Nashville, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson: two major, five serious and two minor). Reconnaissance, the most passive tactic and therefore understandably less tenable in the face of continued violence, was abandoned by half the forces which had used it initially but surprisingly was still employed by half: three forces (Cincinnati and Detroit, which turned to dispersal, and Tampa, which turned to containment; three major) abandoned reconnaissance for one of the other tactics, but reconnaissance was still used by three (Cambridge, Elizabeth, and Houston; two serious end one minor).
78. See footnote 22 to the section on "Levels of Violence and Damage" in Part I of this chapter. See also the Profiles on Newark and Detroit in Chapter 1.
79. This combination occurred in at least seven cases, two during the initial response (Englewood and Plainfield; one major and one minor) and five during a subsequent response (Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Nashville and New Haven; two major and three serious).
80. Atlanta, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Phoenix and Plainfield (four major, five serious and two minor).
81. Cambridge, Nashville, Newark and New Haven (one major and three serious).
82. One major and one serious.
83. Cincinnati, Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Phoenix, Rockford and Tampa (five major, three minor and one serious). In four of these nine disturbances (Detroit, Jackson, and, arguably, Phoenix and Rockford; one major, two serious and one minor) the entry of extra forces occurred after the first outbreak of violence. In four cities (Cincinnati, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; all major) extra forces were brought in after two outbreaks of violence. In one city (New Haven; serious) extra forces were brought in after three outbreaks of violence. See the annexed charts of levels of violence, and type and duration of law enforcement mobilization.
84. In all but two of these cities (Plainfield and, arguably, Rockford; one major and one minor) violence recurred thereafter on two occasions. In three cases, (Cincinnati, Tampa and Phoenix; two major and one serious) the subsequent violence was at lower levels than before the extra forces' arrival But in the majority of cases (Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield and Rockford; three major, two serious and one minor) the intensity of violence recurring after the arrival of extra forces was equal to or greater than that of the earlier violence.
85. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Englewood and New Brunswick (one serious and three minor).
86. In one city (Englewood; minor) four outbreaks followed; in four cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Grand Rapids, and Jersey City; two serious and two minor) two outbreaks followed; and in one city (New Brunswick; minor) a single outbreak followed.
87. In three of the six cities (Bridgeton, Englewood and Grand Rapids; one serious and two minor) the level of violence in one or more successive outbreaks was the same as or higher than that in the first outbreak of disorder. In three of these cities (Cambridge, Jersey City and New Brunswick; one serious and two minor) the later outbreak or outbreaks was of lower intensity than the first or there was no further outbreak of violence.
88. Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Nashville, Paterson and Tucson; five serious and three minor.
89. Two of these cities (Paterson and Tucson; one serious and one minor), had four outbreak.; one (Atlanta; serious) had three outbreaks; two (Elizabeth and Nashville; one serious and one minor), had two outbreaks; and three (both Dayton disorders and Houston; two serious and one minor), had one outbreak. Of the four cities which had multiple outbreak., three (Atlanta, Paterson and Tucson; two serious and one minor), had subsequent outbreaks of violence at the same or a higher level of violence than the first outbreak.
90. There is evidence of a total of at least 68 such meetings in 21 of the 24 disturbances studied: only in three disorders (Cambridge, Milwaukee and Rockford; one major, one serious and one minor) is there no evidence of such meetings. The annexed charts include, on a horizontal line near the top, a depiction of such meetings through the period of disorder in the 21 cases.
91. In 17 of the 21 disturbances (excepting only Atlanta, Jackson, Jersey City and Paterson; three serious and one minor) the first meetings occurred either immediately before the disorder erupted or during the first or second day of disorders.
In only three of the 17 cases (Cincinnati, the Dayton September disturbance and New Brunswick; one major and two minor) did such meetings occur before the outbreak of violence.
92. Of the 16 disorders which had a duration of more than two days, the meetings also continued beyond that point in nine cases (Cincinnati the Dayton June disturbance, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield and Tampa; five major, three serious and one minor). In five of these nine cases (the Dayton June disturbance, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids and Tampa; two major, two serious and one minor), the meetings also continued through the final two days of the disorders.
93. Of the 21 disturbances in which such meetings occurred established Negro leaders participated in meetings in 18 (all except Englewood, Jackson, and Phoenix; two serious and one minor).
94. Eight out of 21. In three cases (Englewood, Jackson and Phoenix; two serious and one minor), youths were the sole Negro participants in meetings with government officials.
96. Cincinnati, Nashville, New Brunswick, Plainfield and Tampa (three major, one serious and one minor). Of these five cases, the two elements of the Negro Community attended meetings together in two disorders (Cincinnati and Plainfield; one major, one serious) and in the remaining three disorders they attended such meeting separately.
96. This was the case in five disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Houston, Plainfield and Phoenix; two major and three serious). In one of the five disorders (Phoenix; serious) the only meeting which established Negro leadership participated was one with Negro youths. In the remaining four cases, established Negro leadership also met with government officials. In three of the five disorders, Negro youths also met with government officials (all except Atlanta and Houston; both serious).
97. This occurred in nine of the 21 disturbances in which such meetings took place (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, the Dayton June disturbance, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Newark, New Brunswick and New Haven; one major, five serious and three minor). Also involved were representatives of local human relations commissions (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, both Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; four major, three serious and four minor); state community relations agencies (Jersey City, Newark, Plainfield and Tampa; three major and one minor) and federal agencies. In four cities (Cincinnati, Detroit, Jersey City and Newark; three major and one minor) officials of the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice were participants in meetings.
98. Meetings during 19 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all accept Houston and Tucson; one serious and one minor). In 13 cases the grievance related to the handling of the precipitating incident by the Police (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield and Phoenix; three major, six serious and four minor).
99. Meetings during 12 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all except Atlanta Bridgeton, the Dayton September disturbance, Detroit, Eliza Nashville, Newark, New Haven and Paterson; two major, four serious three minor).
In seven cases the pre-existing grievances related to unemployment and underemployment (Cincinnati, the Dayton June disturbance, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Phoenix and Tucson; one major, two serious and four minor). In six cases they related to inadequate recreation facilities (the Dayton June disturbance, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; two major, one serious and three minor).
100. This was the case in 10 of the 21 disorders in which meetings were held. In most of these cases (8 of 10), the earlier meetings or early stages of meetings focussed on disorder-related grievances and the later meetings, or stages of meetings, focussed on pre-existing grievances (Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Phoenix and Tampa; two major, four serious and two minor). In only two cases (New Brunswick and Plainfield; one major and one minor), was the order of subjects reversed.
101. The only disorders in which counter-rioters were not active were Bridgeton, Cambridge, the Dayton September disorder, Englewood, Milwaukee and Rockford (one major, one serious and four minor).
102. For a discussion of this study and the characteristics of those who so identified themselves, as compared with rioters, see Part III, THE RIOT PARTICIPANT infra.
103. Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Phoenix, Tampa and Tucson (five major, seven serious and three minor).
104. For example, in Cincinnati the police opposed official recognition of counterrioters, whereas in Detroit and Dayton there was close cooperation between police and counter-rioters.
105. Nine of 15 (Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Newark, Phoenix and Tampa; four major, three serious and two minor).
106. Houston, Nashville, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield and Tucson (one major, four serious and one minor).
107. In Elizabeth and Newark the counter-rioters wore arm bands (one major and one minor).
108. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Jackson, Jersey City and Newark (three major, three serious and one minor).
109. Examples are: employees of city agencies (Detroit and Cincinnati; two major); ministers (Atlanta, Phoenix and Tampa; one major and two serious); college students (Grand Rapids, Newark, Jackson and Nashville; one major and three serious; civil rights leaders (Atlanta and Cincinnati; one major and one serious; young Negro militants (Phoenix, Jersey City and New Haven; two serious and one minor); poverty workers (Atlanta, Phoenix and Cincinnati; one major and two serious) and admitted former riot participants (Tampa; major).
110. Newark (major). In Paterson (serious) they held a block dance: in Phoenix (serious), they promised to make attempts to find jobs for rioters; in Jackson (serious) they kept nonstudents out of college dormitories; and in Atlanta (serious), they attempted to organize a Youth Corps Patrol, similar to Dayton's "White Hats." Counter-rioters used physical force to restrain rioters in two cities (Tampa and Nashville; one major and one serious). In neither case was the use of force officially authorized.
111. All four sources are subject to limitations, and we have therefore used each as a reliability check on the others. Eyewitness accounts are subject to retrospective distortion. Data on arrestees also involve built-in biases. The fact of arrest alone, without subsequent trial and conviction does not constitute evidence or the crime charged, and there has not been sufficient time for many of the 1967 riot arrestees to be brought to trial. Many of the most active rioters may have escaped arrest, while many of the uninvolved, or even counter-rioters, may have been arrested in the confusion. Finally, questions about riot activity in interview surveys may elicit overstatements of participation by some interviewees and under-statements by others.
We are conducting a continuing study of arrest records in a number of cities which experienced disorders in 1967 and in some earlier years as well. So far we have studied the records of 13,788 persons arrested during disturbances in 22 cities in 1967. The unpublished study of arrestees in Detroit, which was sponsored by the Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, involved interviews with 496 arrestees.
The Detroit and Newark surveys furnish the moat comprehensive information on mass participation.
The Detroit survey data represent a reanalysis by Dr. Nathan S. Caplan and Jeffery M. Paige, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, of data collected during the two weeks following the disorder, in a study sponsored by the Detroit Urban League. The Newark study was conducted for the Commission by Dr. Caplan and Mr. Paige, approximately six months after the disorder.
The Detroit analysis is baaed on 393 interviews with Negroes aged 15 and over. The Newark data are based on 233 interviews with Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35. In both surveys, the sampling area was determined by identifying the 1960 census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. Newspaper accounts were used to identify the location of riot damage, fires and looting. In Detroit, the sample was drawn from two riot areas, the West Side and the East side, including the following census tracts: nine through 22, 26-28, 36-43, 115-123 and 152-188 (West Side); 759-778 and 789-793 (East Side). The Newark sample was drawn from an inner-city area consisting of census tracts 12, 29-33, 38-40, 58-67 and 81-82.
A probability sample was drawn for both cities so that the probability of inclusion for any household in Detroit was approximately 1/5Oth and Newark 1/44th. Blocks were selected at random from within the specified census tracts and constituted the primary sampling unit for each study. In Detroit, lists of all dwellings in the selected blocks were prepared from a city directory. Every fifteenth address was identified and assigned to an interviewer. In Newark, segments of approximately 10 dwelling units were constructed by field enumeration of blocks selected at random and assigned to interviewers. Both studies used techniques described by Leslie Kish in Survey Sampling, New York, Wiley, 1965, Chapter 9.
Each interviewer in Detroit was instructed to conduct interviews only at those dwelling unite on his assignment sheet. Within households only Negroes were to be interviewed, and the interviewer was instructed to list all members of the household and then select every other one for interviewing. The interviewer was required to return twice if there was no answer to the initial call or if the respondent to be interviewed was not at home. This procedure yielded 437 interviews for 50 blocks, or 8.7 interviews per block.
In order to enlarge the sample of those who were likely to identify themselves as rioters, interviewers in Newark were told to interview only Negro males between the ages 15 and 35. They were instructed to interview all eligible respondents in each household. They were also required to return three times if there was no answer or if an eligible respondent was not at home. A total of 233 interviews were completed in 24 blocks, or 9.7 interviews per block.
In Detroit, 67.0 percent of all eligible respondents were interviewed; in Newark, 66.0 percent. While these response rates do not compare favorably with the usual 80-85 percent response rate in white, middle-class samples, they are comparable to the rates in other ghetto area studies. A Negro response rate of 71.0 percent was reported in another study in approximately the same area of Newark. See Chernik, J., Indik, B., and Sternlieb, G., "Newark-New Jersey: Population and Labor Force," Spring 1967, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers -- The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
In both surveys, questions were designed to permit comparisons of the characteristics and attitudes of those who (a) admitted active participation in rioting, referred to as "self-reported rioters:" (b) those who said they had sought to stop the rioting, the "counter-rioters:" and (c) those who claimed not to have been involved, the "noninvolved." These classifications were based on the answers to two questions, one direct and one indirect. The indirect question asked how active the respondent had been during the riot, without specifying in particular what he bad been doing. The second question, which appeared later in the questionnaire, asked whether the respondent had participated in various activities, such as trying to stop the riot, calling the fire department, or picking up goods and taking them home. Respondents were classified as "rioters" if they answered either that they were "active" or admitted one or more specific anti-social activities. They were classified as "counter-rioters" if they said that they were engaged in some pro-social activity whether or not they said they were "active." If they said that they had stayed home and also claimed not to have been "active," they were classified as "noninvolved." In the Detroit survey the analysis is based only on the answers of those 393 respondents who were willing to answer at least one of these classificatory questions. In the Newark survey the entire sample of 233 was used, and those who refused to answer either of the classificatory questions were included in the "noninvolved."
112. In Detroit, 11.2 percent (44) of the 393 respondents identified themselves as rioters, 15.8 percent (62) as counter-rioters, and the majority, 73 percent (287), as noninvolved. Bystanders included approximately 5 percent who admitted to having gone into the riot area but claimed not to have participated; and another 15 to 20 percent who claimed to have watched from the front steps or sidewalk in front of their homes. For purposes of analysis all of the 393 respondents other than the self-reported rioters and counterrioters were treated as the "noninvolved." In the Newark survey, where the sample was restricted to Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35, 45.4 percent identified themselves as rioters, and 54.6 percent as noninvolved. About 5 percent of the respondents identified themselves as counter-rioters, but were included as noninvolved because the number of persons was so small. The proportion of respondents who admitted active participation does not necessarily indicate the levels of support for rioting among inner-city Negroes. In Detroit, 23.3 percent of those interviewed felt that more was to be gained than lost through rioting. In Newark 47.0 percent agreed that more was to be gained and 77.1 percent said that they were generally sympathetic to the rioters.
113. In the more detailed discussion which follows, only those characteristics of the counter-rioter which differed from those of the noninvolved are highlighted.
114. Of 13,012 arrestees in 22 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit. Elizabeth Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix:, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; six major, nine serious and seven minor) 10,792 (82.9 percent) were Negroes, 1967 (15.1 percent) were whites, 78 (.6 percent) were Puerto Ricans and 37 (.3 percent) were of other races. The ethnic origin of 138 arrestees (1.1 percent) was unknown.
A study of 348 arrestees in Grand Rapids (serious) divided the disorder in that city into two time segments of 4 hours and 36 hours. During the first 4 hours of the disorder, 95 percent were Negroes. The proportion of Negro arrestees declined to 66 percent during the remaining 48 hours of the disorder. See "Anatomy of a Riot," United Community Services, Research Department, Grand Rapids and Kent County, Michigan, 1967.
115. Age Distribution
The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorder 82 percent of the arrestees were under 25 years of age. During the remaining 48 hours, the proportion of arrestees under 25 years of ace declined to 58 percent. See "Anatomy of a Riot," op cit.
*Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Jackson, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson (five major five serious and six minor)
** R -Rioters
NI -Noninvolved
A -Arrestees
*** The symbol "p" represents the probability that a difference this great is a product of chance. The symbol ">" means greater than. The symbol "<" means less than.
116. Sex Distribution
The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorders, 45 of the 46 persons arrested (98 percent) were males. During the remaining 48 hours of the disorder female arrestees increased, comprising 10 percent of a total of 274 adults.
* Atlanta Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson (five major, nine serious, and seven minor)
117. Marital Status
118. Family Structure in Newark Survey
119. Region of Upbringing
120. Of 266 arrestees in five cities (Atlanta, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; two major, one serious and two minor), 106 (40 percent) were born in the state in which the disorder occurred, 98 (37 percent) were born in the South (but not in the state in which the disorder occurred in the cases of Atlanta and Tampa; one major and one serious) and 23 (8 percent) went born elsewhere. The state of birth of 39 persons (15 percent) was undetermined. For purposes of the sample, the South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Caroline, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.
121. The discrepancy between the percentages of the non-involved brought up in the North in Newark and Detroit (two major) is not significant since the Detroit sample includes more older people than the Newark sample. This di1ference does not affect the validity of the figures for youthful rioters.
122. Place of Birth
123. Of 3,395 arrestees in 15 cities (Atlanta Bridgeton Dayton, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson: three major, seven serious and five minor) 3,054 (90 percent) resided in the city in which the disorder occurred, 228 (7 percent) resided in the state in which the disorder occurred, and 48 (1 percent) resided elsewhere. The residence of 65 persons (2 percent) was undetermined.
124. Income Level
125. See the section on "The Pattern of Disadvantage" in Part IV of this chapter.
126. Educational Level
127. Employment Status
128. Underemployment in Newark Survey
129. Occupation Level in Newark Survey
130. Job Aspiration in Newark Survey
131. Perceived Job Opportunity in Newark Survey
132. Perceived Obstacles to Employment in Newark Survey
133. Ability and Success in Detroit Survey
134. Racial Consciousness
135. Black Conscious in Newark Survey
136. Anti-White Attitudes
137. Hostility Toward Middle-Class Negroes in Newark Survey
138. Half the arrestees were charged with one or more of three offenses: breaking and entering, trespassing, or curfew violation.
Of 13,112 offenses charged against 12,457 persons in 19 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; six major, six major, six serious and seven minor), 4,108 (31 percent) were charges of breaking and entering or trespassing and 2,506 (19 percent) were charges of curfew violation. The breakdown of charges by categories was:
139. Political Information in Newark Survey
140. Political Involvement in Newark Survey
141. Trust of the Government in Newark Survey
142. Political Grievances in Detroit Survey
143. Perception of Country as Not Worth Fighting For
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2 IV
The Pattern of Disadvantage144. For purposes of this section the three university-related riots, in Houston, Jackson and Nashville, have not been included.
145. See the discussion of Grievances in relation to the riot process in Part II of this chapter.
146. Our discussion relies heavily upon 1960 census data, which are always the most complete and usually the most recent data available. Nevertheless, 1960 statistics are outdated for describing American urban life in 1967 and consequently, we used more recent data wherever possible.
We have examined, for most purposes in this section, 20 of the 23 surveyed riot cities. Three cities (Houston, Jackson and Nashville; three serious) were excluded because their disturbances were more directly campus- related than city-related.
In each of 17 cities, we have compared conditions in the riot area with conditions elsewhere in (1) the city as a whole, and (2) the metropolitan area of which the city is a part, including the suburban areas. In addition, we have sought to determine whether racial differences affect these comparisons. To do this, we have identified census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. This is limited to 17 cities because identification of the disturbance area for purposes of analysis was not possible for three cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge and New Brunswick; one serious and two minor). 1'bey are not divided into census tracts.
We recognize that participants in the disorders did not necessarily live in the area of disorder. However, we have attempted to learn whether the disturbance areas have characteristics which set them apart from the cities and metropolitan areas in which the disturbance areas are situated.
The disturbance areas were primarily commercial areas in a part of the city having a high concentration of Negro residents. These were usually characterized by a number of retail or wholesale shops, often with residences above the shops and with residential areas immediately adjacent to the commercial streets. In two cities (Atlanta and Tucson; one serious and one minor) the disturbance area was primarily residential.
147. After studying 20 cities, The Department of Labor reached the same conclusion: "Negroes living in non-poverty areas were not much better off than those in poverty areas; among whites, the differences were very sharp." (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Special Labor Force Report No. 75, "Poverty Areas of Our Major Cities," October, 1966, p. 1105.)
148. The Bureau of the Census categorizes citizens as white and nonwhite. Since 92 percent of the nonwhites in the United States are Negroes we have used the terms "Negro" and "nonwhites" interchangeably throughout this section. The numbers compared in the section are medians for the 17 cities.
149. In eight cities, white population also increased in that period, however, it did so at a much lower rate. Only Englewood (minor) showed no change in white population during that period.
150. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tucson, Rockford and Tampa; five major, five serious and three minor), including seven of the cities which experienced the most severe violence, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than twice the percentage of Negro population in the entire city; in nine of the cities, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than triple the citywide percentage.
151. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger in all 17 cities exceeded the percentage of whites in that age group. The percentage of Negro population 65 years of age or older in all 17 cities except two (Phoenix and Tucson; one serious and one minor) was less than one-half the percentage of whites in that age group.
Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger living in the disturbance area in approximately half the cities (Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield and Tucson; three major, two serious and three minor) exceeded the city-wide percentage. The percentages were equal only in Tampa (major).
The differences we have seen are even greater when the age distribution among Negroes in the disturbance areas 18 compared with the age distribution among whites in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's).
Median Age Distribution (%)152. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The number of median years of school completed by Negroes was less than the median number for whites in all 17 cities. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; four major, five serious and four minor) there was a difference of at least one year.
The percentage of Negro population over 25 years of age having eight years or less of education in all 17 cities was greater than the percentage of white population.
Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The median years of school completed by Negroes in the disturbance area in more than half of the 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford and Tucson; two major, three serious and four minor) was lower than the median rate of education for Negroes in the entire city. In three of the 17 cities (Jersey City, Milwaukee and Tampa;. two major and one minor) the median years completed by Negroes in the disturbance area and by Negroes in the city were equal. In the remaining five cities the median rate was slightly higher (less than a year's difference) for Negroes in the disturbance area. The difference between the median number of years completed was one-tenth of a year for the 17 cities. The percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area over 25 years of age having eight years or lees education was slightly greater than the city-wide percentage in 11 of the 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; four major, three serious and four minor). The differences we have seen are even greater when comparing the level of education of Negroes in the disturbance areas with that of whites in the SMSA's:
Median Education153. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the labor force in nine of 17 cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford and Tampa: three major, two serious and four minor) exceeded the percentage of white males. The proportion of Negro and white males employed or seeking employment was equal in Grand Rapids (serious).
The percentage of Negro females exceeded the percentage of white females in the labor force in all 17 cities.
Comparing Negroes in the disturbance area and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the disturbance area in the labor force. in all except seven cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Plainfield and Tucson: two major, two serious and three minor), exceeded the percentage of Negro males in the entire city in the labor force.
The percentage of Negro females in the labor force in the disturbance area, in all except ten cities (Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Paterson, Phoenix and Plainfield; two major, five serious and three minor) was larger than the percentage of Negro females in the entire city in the labor force.
The differences in the percentages of Negroes and whites in the labor force again can be seen to be small by comparing Negroes in the disturbance area with whites in the SMSA:
Median Labor Force Participation Rates (%)More recent and complete data indicate that unemployment and under- employment of Negroes are even more serious than the 1960 census revealed. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported ("Poverty Areas of Our Major Cities," op. cit.) in late 1966 that one out of every six Negro males was not reported in the 1960 census. B.L.S. surveyed ten slum areas of eight cities and obtained data for five other cities. Two of these cities, Detroit and Phoenix (one major and one serious) were among the cities we surveyed. The Bureau found, in the slum areas surveyed, that:
The unemployment rate was approximately three times the nationwide rate of 3.7 percent;
Six and nine-tenths percent of those listed as employed were working only part time although they were trying to find full-time work; the comparable figure for the nation as a whole was 2.3 percent;
Twenty-one percent of those working full time were earning less than $60 a week; the comparable figure for the nation as a whole was 15.4 percent;
In another study The Department of Labor found that 33.9 percent of the labor force were subemployed and 70 percent of the subemployed population was Negro. U.S.-Department of Labor, "A Sharper Look at Unemployment in U.S. Cities and Slums," p. 6.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics included in its definition of subemployment (i) those unemployed in the sense that they are actively looking for work and unable to find it; (ii) those working only part time when they are trying to get full-time work; (iii) those heads of households under 65 who earn less than $60 per week working full time and those individuals under 66 who are not heads of households and earn less than $56 per week in a fulltime job; (iv) half the number of "non-participants" (not in the labor force) in the male 20-64 age group; and (v) a conservative and carefully considered estimate of the male undercount group.
154. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unemployment in all 20 cities was higher than the unemployment rate for white males. In 13 of the 20 cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield and Rockford; four major, five serious and four minor) the rate of unemployment for Negroes was more than twice the rate for whites.
The unemployment rate for Negro females more than the rate for white females in all of the 20 cities except Plainfield (major).
Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The unemployment rate for Negro males in the disturbance area was slightly more than the Negro citywide rate in 11 of 17cities and slightly less in the remaining six (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, New Haven and Paterson; two major, three serious and one minor).
The disturbance area unemployment rate for Negro-females equalled or exceeded the citywide rate in seven of 17 cities (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; four major, two serious and one minor).
The differences are even greater when the unemployment rate among Negroes in the disturbance areas is compared with the unemployment rate among whites in the SMSA's:
Median Unemployment Rate (%)