The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commission

There are a million excuses for police corruption -- that they're underpaid, that they suffer stress, that their wives hate them, that they eat too many donuts, that their kids hate them, and that liberals use them as whipping boys. Read the official reports to hear the dreary recitation of why those who administer the laws never seem to obey them.

Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:31 am

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 1


THE CITY OF NEW YORK
LAW DEPARTMENT
Municipal Building
New York, N. Y. 10007

J. LEE RANKIN, Corporation Counsel

May 14, 1970

The Honorable John V. Lindsay
Mayor of the City of New York
City Hall
New York, N.Y. 10007

My dear Mr. Mayor:

As a result of allegations of corruption in the New York City Police Department you appointed this Committee and charged it with a three-fold responsibility: (1) to evaluate the procedures presently employed by the Police Department to investigate charges of corruption in order to ascertain whether these procedures provide the public with adequate assurance that charges of police corruption are dealt with vigorously, promptly and fairly; (2) to recommend improvements in these procedures; and (3) to investigate the charges of corruption and other allegations growing out of the announcement of the Committee's formation.

This assignment involves the integrity of the principal law enforcement agency of this City and is therefore of major importance to the community. In our brief period of existence the Committee has met four times and taken the following initial steps in what must now be regarded as an undertaking of far greater magnitude than that originally envisioned when this Committee was created:

1. At the Committee's request, Police Commissioner Howard Leary has furnished a report of the existing procedures employed by the Police Department for the investigation of charges of corruption.

2. The public has been requested to supply the Committee with any information it has concerning acts of police corruption. As of this date, 375 complaints have been received. The Commissioner of Investigation is evaluating and investigating these charges, in some instances in conjunction with the appropriate District Attorney.

3. The Committee has requested the five District Attorneys in New York City to provide summaries of prosecutions of police officers for acts of corruption over the past five years in order that we might ascertain the extent to which existing law enforcement agencies have delved into this problem.

4. Under present law a City employee is required to give 30 days notice before his retirement becomes effective. The Police Department has found that in many instances this time period does not permit a proper investigation and disposition of charges of corruption against members of the police force, particularly if criminal charges are also under investigation. Other City departments have encountered similar problems with regard to allegedly dishonest employees seeking to retire and obtain their pension benefits. The Committee recognizes that it would be unfair to require all City employees to be subjected to a longer period of notice. However, where charges have been filed against an employee, he should not be permitted to retire prior to 60 days from the date of these charges in order to permit the City, after fair hearing, either to dismiss or otherwise discipline the employee or to absolve him of the allegations. Consideration should also be given to changes in the law which would permit the divesting of pension rights in those instances where employees, after their retirement, have been convicted of crimes which relate to the performance of their City jobs. An employee should not be permitted to acquire pension rights under circumstances which, if they were known at the time, would have caused his dismissal from City service.

These steps represent only the beginning of the work which must be done in order for the people of this City to feel confident that its Police Department is free of corruption. A thorough evaluation of police procedures must go forward. Most importantly, however, a thorough investigation of specific charges of corruption must be undertaken backed by whatever resources of men and money is necessary in order to do the job. To facilitate this investigation members of the police force must be urged by the Mayor and by the Police Commissioner to advise the District Attorneys of any known acts of corruption. Commissioner Leary has stated unequivocally that no reprisals of any kind will be permitted against a member of his department who comes forward with such information. Any member of the department who feels that reprisals have been instituted against him should be assured that he can report this fact directly to the Mayor's office with full confidence that the Mayor himself will undertake to protect him against reprisals by the Department.

To state the magnitude of the task, however, is to indicate why this Committee would find it most difficult to perform it. An investigation only of the charges thus far received requires a full-time investigative body with a skilled full-time staff. The members of your Committee all have demanding responsibilities in connection with their respective offices. It is unfair to the public and to the positions they hold for the members of this Committee to attempt to perform the investigation which the job requires and which the public has a right to demand.

It has also been suggested that because of our several official positions there could be conflict between our responsibilities in our offices and as Committee members. While we do not accept the validity of this suggestion, we all agree that those undertaking so important a responsibility for the community should not only be free from any conflicts but also should be free from any appearance thereof. We, therefore, recommend to you that your Committee be disbanded and that it be replaced with an independent investigative body, appointed by you from the private sector, with full authority to carry forward this investigation. It must have the cooperation of the District Attorneys and all City agencies, most particularly the Department of Investigation and the Police Department, and should refer to the District Attorneys all cases which warrant criminal prosecution. Such an investigative agency should have an adequate staff and should be able to draw upon appropriate City agencies for assistance.

The Members of this Committee pledge their full cooperation to you and to the new investigative agency which we urge you to appoint.

Sincerely,

FRANK S. HOGAN
HOWARD R. LEARY
J. LEE RANKIN
BURTON B. ROBERTS
ROBERT K. RUSKIN
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:31 am

EXHIBIT 2

CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
New York, N.Y. 10007

Office of the Mayor
Executive Order No. 11
May 21, 1970

Appointing a Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures

Section 1. Pursuant to the Authority vested in the Mayor, I hereby appoint a Commission to (1) investigate the extent of alleged police corruption in the City and any relationship of such alleged corruption to crime and law enforcement; (2) inquire into and evaluate the existing procedures for investigating specific allegations of corruption and present practices designed to prevent corruption and ascertain whether these procedures provide the public with adequate assurance that charges of police corruption are dealt with vigorously, promptly and fairly; (3) recommend improvements in these procedures, additional steps to provide stronger safeguards against corruption, and any improvements in methods of law enforcement which will tend to eliminate police corruption; (4) take evidence and hold whatever hearings, public and private, the Commission may deem appropriate to ascertain the necessary facts.

§2. The Commission shall consist of the following persons who are hereby appointed as members thereof:

Whitman Knapp, Chairman
Arnold Bauman
Joseph Monserrat
Franklin A. Thomas
Cyrus R. Vance

§3. The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedures and to employ such assistants as it deems necessary, within the amounts appropriated therefor.

§4. All departments and agencies of the City are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time.

§5. This order shall take effect immediately.

JOHN V. LINDSAY
Mayor
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:31 am

EXHIBIT 3

LOCAL LAWS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1970


No. 13

Introduced by Mr. Cohen (by request of the Mayor) --

A LOCAL LAW

To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the powers of the commission appointed by the mayor to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures.

Be it enacted by the Council as follows:

Section 1. Article one of title F of chapter fifty-one of the administrative code of the city of New York is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to be section F51-9.0, to follow section F51-8.0, to read as follows:

§F51-9.0 Commission appointed by the mayor to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures; additional powers. -- The commission established by the executive order of the mayor number eleven, dated May twenty-first nineteen hundred seventy, to investigate allegations of police corruption and the city's anti-corruption procedures, or any member of it designated in writing by the chairman, shall have the powers and duties set forth in such executive order and, in addition thereto, for the purpose of carrying out such powers and duties, such commission, or a subcommittee thereof, shall have power to administer oaths or affirmations, to hold hearings either public or private, require and enforce by subpoena the attendance and take testimony under oath of such persons as it deems necessary, and require and enforce by subpoena duces tecum the production of books, accounts, papers and other evidence relevant to the subject or subjects of its investigation or inquiry.

§2. This local law shall take effect immediately and shall cease to be of any force or effect on December thirty-first, nineteen hundred seventy.

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, S.S.:

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of a local law of The City of New York, passed by the Council on May, 1970 and approved by the Mayor on June 25, 1970.

HERMAN KATZ, City Clerk, Clerk of the Council.

***

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW SECTION 27

Pursuant to the provisions of Municipal Home Rule Law Section 27, I hereby certify that the enclosed local law (Local Law 13 of 1970, Council Int. No. 276) contains the correct text and:

Received the following vote at the meeting of the New York City Council on May 27, 1970: 29 for; 8 against.

Was approved by the Mayor on June 25, 1970.

Was returned to the City Clerk on June 26, 1970.

J. LEE RANKIN, Corporation Counsel.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:31 am

EXHIBIT 4

July 1, 1971

Interim Report of Investigative Phase

The work of the Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, as stated in the report to LEAA of February 16, 1971, has been divided into two phases: investigation and analysis. The investigative aspect of the Commission's work was related to the subpoena power created by the City Council, which expired yesterday. Analysis of the investigative data and the formulation of recommendations will be continued throughout the summer. Detailed findings and recommendations will be presented at a later date. This is an interim report dealing in summary form with the investigative phase of the Commission's work.

It may be noted at the outset that the Commission's investigation has not aimed at ascertaining individual acts of corruption or establishing the guilt of individual police officers. Indeed, as District Attorney Frank Hogan has correctly observed, the Commission is not equipped to develop cases against individual police officers. In an interview with the New York Post, Mr. Hogan observed, among other things:

"They [the Commission] don't have the power to use the grand jury. They do not have the power of contempt nor do they have the power to prosecute."


The Commission has focused its efforts on identifying patterns of police corruption and on defining the problem areas in sufficient detail to lay the groundwork for the remedial recommendations.

A fundamental conclusion at which the Commission has arrived is that the problem of police corruption cannot -- as is usually asserted -- be met by seeking out the few "rotten apples" whose supposedly atypical conduct is claimed to sully the reputation of an otherwise innocent Department. The Commission is persuaded that the underlying problem is that the climate of the Department is inhospitable to attempts to uncover acts of corruption, and protective of those who are corrupt. The consequence is that the rookie who comes into the Department is faced with the situation where it is easier for him to become corrupt than to remain honest. The Commission's ultimate recommendations' will concern themselves with methods of reversing this pressure toward corruption.

In broad outline, the Commission's method of investigation has been: first, to postulate the patterns of corruption by interrogating a wide variety of sources, including aggrieved citizens, community organizations, trade associations, present and former police officers, and members of the underworld; and second, to verify the patterns thus postulated by ordinary investigative techniques, such as analysis of Police Department records, surveillance of police officers, examination of the financial books and records of persons believed to have made corrupt payments, and monitoring conversations with suspected police officers. As required by applicable law, the use of monitored conversations was confined to situations involving the cooperation of someone in a suspected officer's confidence who was willing to equip himself with a recording or transmitting device.

Among the areas of police activity that the Commission investigated were narcotics, gambling, prostitution, bars and restaurants, hotels, construction, tow trucks and bodegas (Spanish grocery stores). The reports concerning these investigations will be forthcoming when the evidence has been fully analyzed. However, certain preliminary observations seem now appropriate.

Narcotics: The Commission concurs with the statement by the State Commission of Investigation that police officers in the Narcotics Division engage in "various types and techniques of corruption ranging from extortion, bribery, contradictory court testimony designed to affect the release of a narcotics criminal, improper associations with persons engaged in drug traffic, and, finally * * * involvement by police officers in the actual sale of narcotics."

Gambling: The Commission's investigation has substantiated allegations frequently made in the press with respect to the prevalence and extent of payoffs by gamblers to the police. Payments are made on a regular basis to plainclothesmen who are primarily responsible for gambling enforcement, and these payments are divided on the basis of shares -- i.e., a full share or a fraction or multiple, depending upon the position of the police officer receiving payment. "Show" arrests of predetermined low-level employees of gambling establishments are periodically made.

Prostitution: The open way in which certain houses of prostitution are operated suggests that they are tolerated because of payments to the police. This has been corroborated by evidence developed by the Commission establishing the making of such payments.

Liquor: Payoffs are made by bars, restaurants and night clubs for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from the desire to avoid prosecution for outright violations of law to the mere assurance of cooperative attitudes by the local police.

Hotels: In addition to Christmas gratuities to practically all ranks in the Department, leading hotels were found to provide free food and accommodations to the local police in surprisingly substantial amounts.

Construction: The construction industry, in order to avoid compliance with a variety of regulations, was found generally to make regular payments which are usually earmarked for various police officers with jurisdiction in the area.

Tow Trucking: Despite wide publicity that had been given to scandals concerning collusion between police and tow truck operators, payments by such operators to police for favorable treatment at the scene of an accident are still prevalent.

Bodegas (small Spanish groceries): The Commission initially found a ritualized system of weekly police demands for payment from the bodegas which violated Sabbath laws. Police Commissioner Murphy subsequently ordered that Sabbath laws be enforced only on complaint, and the demands have apparently been greatly diminished.

Other areas which will be discussed in our final report include parking lots, garages, police property clerk's office, pistol permits, street vendors, gypsy confidence swindles, trucking companies. sale of police information, car rentals, and community taxis (gypsy cabs).

During the coming months, staff reports analyzing the evidence underlying the foregoing conclusions will be prepared, and the Commission will formulate its recommendations for dealing with the patterns of corruption which have been discussed.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:31 am

EXHIBIT 5

Opening Statement by Whitman Knapp

First Public Hearings, October 18, 1971


I should like briefly to state the general purpose of these public hearings. As many of you know, the Commission was long undecided as to whether or not to hold public hearings. We were concerned lest the testimony at such hearings would -- by its necessary relation to individual situations -- detract from the basic findings of our inquiry.

The main thrust of our findings -- and the point we wish to bring home to the public -- is that the problem of police corruption cannot be solved merely by focusing on individual acts of wrongdoing. It arises out of an endemic condition which must be attacked on all fronts. The difficulty with any testimony is that it must necessarily relate to individual situations.

However, we believe that our counsel has succeeded in structuring these hearings in such a way as to focus on basic conditions and on the public's responsibility for giving support to steps taken to remedy such conditions.

It is of the utmost importance that the public be made aware of the critical problems facing the Department and its individual members. The police officer's job is perhaps more important than any other in our society. The average citizen's most frequent contact with government is through the police officer, and the manner in which the police officer performs his or her duties is what makes most people decide how government is functioning. Moreover, the police officer must at all times live with a realization of physical danger. This latter fact is obvious in the case of men and women assigned to high-crime areas. But no member of the force is immune from being called -- at a moment's notice -- into a situation where his or her life is at risk.

In addition to the physical danger of which a police officer must continually be aware, he or she is subjected to moral pressures the like of which we impose on no other person. Unlike almost all others subject to moral pressure, the police officer must frequently face these pressures alone and unobserved. He or she is constantly called upon to act in situations where the usual processes of audit and review cannot be used.

In such circumstances, it is as irresponsible for society to fail to provide the police officer with every possible support in resisting pressures toward corruption as it would be to let an officer respond to an armed robbery alarm without having provided training in self-defense.

What do we mean by support? The methods of accomplishing it may be -- and indeed are -- difficult. But the objectives are clear. A police officer who -- totally alone and unobserved -- is placed in a position where the mere acceptance of a proffered bribe may produce more wealth than an entire year's salary, or in the more usual position where the pressures are more subtle, is entitled to at least three elements of support to fall back upon:


(1) The officer in such situations should be entitled to feel confident that society is so organized that if a bribe be refused and the matter reported to superior officers, there is a reasonable chance that the corruptor will land in jail; on the other hand,

(2) such officer should feel that if he or she yields to temptation there is a reasonable chance that he or she -- and any other officer similarly situated -- will be apprehended, separated from the force and subjected to criminal prosecution; and, finally and perhaps most importantly,

(3) such officer should be confident that a refusal of the bribe and a report of the corruptor would produce commendation -- and not hostility -- from his superiors and fellows.


The need for focusing public attention on this problem of support has been dramatized by the nature of the opposition that has arisen to steps recently taken by the Police Commissioner to deal with the twin problems of corruption and discipline.

For example, some people have attacked the Commissioner's judgment on priorities. Instead of concerning himself with corruption and discipline, those people say, he should worry exclusively about "crime in the street." In our view such an approach would be futile and totally irresponsible. The Department's ability to take effective action in any direction depends on its discipline and integrity. Unless such discipline and integrity be maintained, it is ridiculous to expect the Department to be effective in dealing with "crime in the streets."

A word about what these hearings will not seek to accomplish. Being expositive in nature, those hearings will not deal with recommendations for reform or with attempts to fix responsibility for such conditions as have been found to exist. Those matters will be dealt with in our report, which is now in process of preparation and which will be published as soon as it is ready.

In brief, then, it is the purpose of these hearings to inform the public about -- and to focus attention upon -- the corruption-related problems faced by the Department and its individual officers.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:32 am

EXHIBIT 6

Opening Statement by Whitman Knapp

Second Public Hearings, December 14, 1971


As a preliminary, I would like to give a word about the purpose of these hearings, which is different from the purpose of the previous ones.

The reason for having the first hearings in public, rather than behind closed doors, was to enable the public to share with us and understand the conditions our investigation had uncovered. As I then observed, we believed -- and still believe -- it to be of the utmost importance that public attention be focused on the conditions and causes of corruption, to the end that the public may give its constant support to official action taken to remedy such conditions and causes -- and may, indeed, insist that such action be taken. The previous round of hearings, then, dealt with present conditions as to which action was -- and is -- imperative.

In line with our desire and purpose of producing action by focusing on present conditions, it had been our original intention to confine to private hearings our inquiries as to the past events, and to deal in our final report with the meaning of such events and their significance to the future.

However, it soon became apparent that there was intense public interest in one phase of past history -- namely what official action or inaction had resulted from revelations made by Sergeant David Durk and Patrolman (now Detective) Frank Serpico concerning events in 1966 and 1967. Such interest appeared to be so intense that we became persuaded that to refrain from public hearings on the subject would not serve our purpose of focusing attention on the future, but would, on the contrary, simply divert such attention to the futile business of wondering about the past. It is to avoid such a result that these hearings have been scheduled.

It is obvious that these hearings, having a different purpose, will have a different format. The Commission itself has come to no conclusions as to any of the matters to be disclosed. Nor will it come to any conclusions in the course of these hearings. Any conclusions the Commission may make will appear in its final report.

In these hearings we shall simply endeavor to let each participant in the events under discussion lay before the public in an organized fashion his recollection and understanding of the events as they occurred.
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:32 am

EXHIBIT 7

Sources of Funds Received by the Commission


Image

Grantor/Amount

City of New York: $325,000.00
U.S. Department of Justice-Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: 215,037.00
State of New York-Office of Planning Services-Division of Criminal Justice: 75,083.00
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation: 50,000.00
Field Foundation: 20,000.00
Fund for the City of New York: 18,500.00
New World Foundation: 10,000.00
The Rosenblat Charitable Trust: 10,000.00
The New York Foundation: 7,500.00
The J. M. Kaplan Fund Inc.: 5,000.00
Joint Foundation Support, Inc. on behalf of the Joyce and John Gutfreund Foundation: 2,500.00
Joint Foundation Support, Inc. on behalf of the Bernhardt Foundation: 2,500.00
The Stern Fund: 3,000.00
New York Community Trust: 2,500.00
Howard Z. Leffel Fund in Community Funds, Inc.: 2,500.00

Total: $749,120.00
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Re: The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption: Commis

Postby admin » Tue Jun 23, 2015 7:32 am

EXHIBIT 8

POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF NEW YORK
DIVISIONS & PATROL PRECINCTS


Image

Small numbers indicate precincts. which are gathered into divisions (indicated by large numbers). Divisions are in turn grouped into seven borough commands: Manhattan South includes Divisions 1 and 3; Manhattan North, 4, 5 and 6; Bronx, 7, 8 and 9; Brooklyn South, 10, 11 and 12; Brooklyn North, 13 and 14; Queens, 15, 16 and 17; and Richmond includes three precincts, but no divisions. This map shows boundaries which existed as of January, 1972.
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