Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associ

Re: Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and As

Postby admin » Fri Jul 07, 2017 9:07 am

TAB 11. MEMORANDUM FOR DCI FROM DD(P) TRANSMITTING MR. BARNES' 19 JANUARY MEMORANDUM; 27 JANUARY 1962

27 January 1962

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Mr. Barnes' Memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a major part of the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.

2. I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.

3. I will be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire.

/s/ Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachments
1. Barnes' Memo
2. IG Memo to Mr. Barnes
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Re: Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and As

Postby admin » Fri Jul 07, 2017 9:07 am

TAB 12. MEMORANDUM TO MR. KIRKPATRICK FROM MESSRS. _____, AND _____ (IG STAFF OFFICERS), SUBJECT: THE IG'S SURVEY AND THE DD/P'S ANALYSIS OF THE CUBAN OPERATION; 26 JANUARY 1962

COPY

26 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick

SUBJECT: The IG's Cuban Survey and the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation

1. The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated in the Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identify and describe weaknesses within the Agency which contributed to the final result and to make recommendations for their future avoidance. The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for making decisions and policy at other levels of government. This field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase of the operation.

2. Much of the DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however, to a discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the operation's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses described by the Survey. The few which it admits were, it contends, not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops on the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states that small boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way. And it states that other weaknesses were not important because they were not the decisive reason for failure.

4. There is a fundamental difference of approach between the two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepartmental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any further significant light on this fundamental issue.

5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles. This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and misleading. Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala. The PM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November 1960, rather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it deals with events on the working level of the project.

6. The IG investigators centered their inquiry on certain phases which are significant to the success or failure of any operation and of the Agency's over-all mission itself. They cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions made outside the Agency.

______
/s/
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/s/
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/s/
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Re: Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and As

Postby admin » Fri Jul 07, 2017 9:08 am

TAB 13. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN McCONE, DCI, FROM ALLEN W. DULLES, SUBJECT: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CUBAN OPERATION; 15 FEBRUARY 1962

15 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence, I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line with the practice I had consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the Inspect General: namely, the Office which is the subject of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the I.G. report before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans), dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was submitted to you following my resignation.

2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell.

3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may wish me to submit on any phases of this letter relating to C.I.A. responsibilities. Hence I will not submit detailed written comment on the Inspector General's report.

4. At this time, however, I wish to make certain general comments:

a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. While I do not now have a copy of these documents, I made only one or two reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations of these reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular operation.

b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A. Opinions based on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor Committee, of actions of all of the participating elements in the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

d. At no time during the preparation of his report did the Inspector General request any information from me and he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility was clearly involves.

5. Two major areas of criticism in the I.G. report cover (1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their political organization. As to these points, I submit the following:

a. First, while certain organizational matters, in the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelligence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

b. Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was realized.

These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A. responsibility.

6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for the day-by-day management of the operation, and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important developments. During the concluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961, relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A to Chapter IV of DDP report).

7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. These Reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions in support of the operation.

/s/ Allen W. Dulles

Allen W. Dulles
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Re: Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and As

Postby admin » Fri Jul 07, 2017 9:08 am

TAB 14. DCI'S LETTER OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF MR. DULLES' 15 FEBRUARY MEMORANDUM; 19 FEBRUARY 1962

19 February 1962

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

Washington, D.C.

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of 15 February 1962 containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together with the DD/P analysis of the survey, the comments made by General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report -- and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion to read it.

Sincerely,

signed

John A. McCone
Director
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