Policy Planning Staff Memo No. 23, by George Kennan

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A Fateful Error
by George F. Kennan
New York Times
February 5, 1997

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PRINCETON, N.J. -- In late 1996, the impression was allowed, or caused, to become prevalent that it had been somehow and somewhere decided to expand NATO up to Russia's borders. This despite the fact that no formal decision can be made before the alliance's next summit meeting, in June.

The timing of this revelation -- coinciding with the Presidential election and the pursuant changes in responsible personalities in Washington -- did not make it easy for the outsider to know how or where to insert a modest word of comment. Nor did the assurance given to the public that the decision, however preliminary, was irrevocable encourage outside opinion.

But something of the highest importance is at stake here.

And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.

It is, of course, unfortunate that Russia should be confronted with such a challenge at a time when its executive power is in a state of high uncertainty and near-paralysis.

And it is doubly unfortunate considering the total lack of any necessity for this move.

Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?

I am aware, of course, that NATO is conducting talks with the Russian authorities in hopes of making the idea of expansion tolerable and palatable to Russia. One can, in the existing circumstances, only wish these efforts success.

But anyone who gives serious attention to the Russian press cannot fail to note that neither the public nor the Government is waiting for the proposed expansion to occur before reacting to it.

Russians are little impressed with American assurances that it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected.

They would, of course, have no choice but to accept expansion as a military fait accompli. But they would continue to regard it as a rebuff by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.

It will obviously not be easy to change a decision already made or tacitly accepted by the alliance's 16 member countries.

But there are a few intervening months before the decision is to be made final; perhaps this period can be used to alter the proposed expansion in ways that would mitigate the unhappy effects it is already having on Russian opinion and policy.

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Russia's Concerns Aside, NATO Must Expand
by Kurt W. Bassuener
February 5, 1997/February 10, 1997

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To the Editor:

George F. Kennan (Op-Ed, Feb. 5) says that ''expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.''

Yet most responsible Russian politicians are well aware that the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in NATO would in no appreciable way threaten Russia's security and will publicly state this. Save a bit of northeastern Poland that borders Russia's Kaliningrad district, which is essentially a huge military reservation, none of the proposed new members even border Russia.

Unfortunately, Russia's propaganda campaign to counter expansion has effectively sidelined three potential members that would be easily integrated -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia -- simply because they were under Soviet domination for half a century. The United States never officially recognized the legitimacy of this occupation and should not now allow Moscow to dictate to any extent the foreign and security policy of these nations, which have clearly and unequivocally voiced their desire to enter NATO as full members.

The clear conceit of Russia's leadership is readily apparent: we will create a groundswell of opposition to NATO expansion, even though polls illustrate that such opposition does not presently exist among Russia's electorate. Russia not only wants to be able to intimidate its neighbors in the former Soviet Union but also wants to keep its former satellites out of any binding security arrangements to guarantee their security.

Instead, it proposes to join NATO or calls for its dissolution, both of which amount to a negation of the alliance. If the matter is not resolved, it could lead to a ''Russia increasingly swayed by ultranationalists,'' according to Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, the Russian Prime Minister.

It is clear why the new democracies in Central Europe want the security that would be guaranteed by admitting them into NATO. It is also clear that NATO should welcome them, not merely in spite of, but also because of Russia's opposition and the form it has taken.

KURT W. BASSUENER

Washington, Feb. 5, 1997

The writer is a former researcher on Central European security policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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NATO Expansion Would Be an Epic 'Fateful Error': Enlargement could weaken unity within the alliance. Denials of the potential threat to Russia are delusory.
by Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.
July 7, 1997

[Eugene J. Carroll Jr., a retired Navy rear admiral, is deputy director of the Center for Defense Information, a defense watchdog group based in Washington]

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Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first NATO supreme allied commander. Shortly after assuming that post, he wrote these words in February 1951:

"If in 10 years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project [NATO] will have failed."

One can only wonder at his reaction today if he learned that 46 years later, the United States was the dominant force in a plan not just to continue our powerful military presence there but to enlarge NATO's responsibilities and increase U.S. costs and risks in Europe. If his granddaughter, Susan Eisenhower, is any guide to his reaction, he would not be pleased. She gathered an impressive group of 49 military, political and academic leaders who joined her in signing an open letter to President Clinton on June 26 that terms the plan to expand NATO "a policy error of historic proportions."

Why have so many knowledgeable and responsible authorities, in addition to the letter's signatories, raised powerful objections to NATO expansion? Diplomat-historian George F. Kennan perhaps said it most clearly when he wrote earlier this year in a newspaper commentary: "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected . . . to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking."

Aye, there's the rub. The long-term interests of the United States in Europe can best be served by actions that promote enduring peace in Europe through security arrangements that include Russia as a cooperative participant. The expansion of NATO, however, excludes Russia at the same time it moves NATO borders 300 miles eastward -- the recent pact providing for regular NATO-Russia consultation notwithstanding.

President Clinton and his counselors deny that expansion threatens Russia. He told the graduating class at West Point in May that the objective was "to build and secure a New Europe, peaceful, democratic and undivided at last."

It is delusory, deliberately so, to argue that expanding NATO is a way to unite Europe. Certainly Henry Kissinger, a strong proponent of NATO expansion, was more candid and accurate when he wrote in The Times recently that "the new members are seeking to participate in NATO . . . not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries 300 miles to the east." In stating that the real purpose of expansion is to create new dividing lines, he also provided a clear picture of Moscow's perception of a new NATO threat moved closer to its borders.

This picture also reveals that, at its heart, NATO expansion is aimed at Russia. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirmed this in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23: "On the off-chance that in fact Russia doesn't work out the way that we are hoping it will . . . NATO is there."

NATO expansion is an attempt to extend Cold War divisions and strengthen the alliance against the chimera of a resurgent Russia bent upon imposing its hegemony in Eastern Europe. It may be safe to treat Russia as a prospective enemy today when it is helpless to prevent NATO expansion but there is the longer-term danger. A hard-line, anti-Western coalition will be strengthened in Moscow and give priority to anti-NATO measures in the future.

Even in the short-term there may well be nuclear dangers. The greatest U.S. security concern today is "loose nukes" in Russia. Our arbitrary and threatening actions may convince the hard-liners that nuclear weapons remain the only vestige of Russian military and political leverage. Efforts to reduce numbers, lower the alert status of long-range missiles and improve internal security for both weapons and missile material could easily be thwarted by the Russian Duma. This prospect represents a far greater threat to U.S. security than the improbable emergence of a Russian conventional threat at a distant date.

Overbearing U.S. insistence on expanding NATO strictly on our terms also could weaken unity within the alliance. Serious complaints are being leveled by some members concerning the autocratic tactics we have employed to control the expansion program. It will be ironic if our attempts to strengthen U.S. military leadership in Europe result in weakening U.S. political influence there.

Fortunately, it is not too late to halt the precipitous commitment to NATO expansion at the Madrid summit this week and consider alternatives that could produce a much more stable, peaceful Europe. Rushing into an unwise decision now to expand NATO in the face of real risks and great costs would be an action that fully merits the thoughtful warnings that it would be a "fateful error" of "historic proportions."