by Robert Parry
March 25, 2017
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Special Report: The mainstream U.S. media obsesses over Russian “propaganda” yet the U.S. government created a “psyops” bureaucracy three decades ago to flood the world with dubious information, reports Robert Parry.
Newly declassified documents from the Reagan presidential library help explain how the U.S. government developed its sophisticated psychological operations capabilities that -– over the past three decades –- have created an alternative reality both for people in targeted countries and for American citizens, a structure that expanded U.S. influence abroad and quieted dissent at home.
Walter Raymond Jr., a CIA propaganda and disinformation specialist who oversaw President Reagan’s “perception management” and psyops projects at the National Security Council. Raymond is partially obscured by President Reagan and is sitting next to National Security Adviser John Poindexter. (Photo credit: Reagan presidential library)
The documents reveal the formation of a psyops bureaucracy under the direction of Walter Raymond Jr., a senior CIA covert operations specialist who was assigned to President Reagan’s National Security Council staff to enhance the importance of propaganda and psyops in undermining U.S. adversaries around the world and ensuring sufficient public support for foreign policies inside the United States.
Raymond, who has been compared to a character from a John LeCarré novel slipping easily into the woodwork, spent his years inside Reagan’s White House as a shadowy puppet master who tried his best to avoid public attention or -– it seems -– even having his picture taken. From the tens of thousands of photographs from meetings at Reagan’s White House, I found only a couple showing Raymond -– and he is seated in groups, partially concealed by other officials.
But Raymond appears to have grasped his true importance. In his NSC files, I found a doodle of an organizational chart that had Raymond at the top holding what looks like the crossed handles used by puppeteers to control the puppets below them. Although it’s impossible to know exactly what the doodler had in mind, the drawing fits the reality of Raymond as the behind-the-curtains operative who was controlling the various inter-agency task forces that were responsible for implementing various propaganda and psyops strategies.
Until the 1980s, psyops were normally regarded as a military technique for undermining the will of an enemy force by spreading lies, confusion and terror. A classic case was Gen. Edward Lansdale — considered the father of modern psyops — draining the blood from a dead Filipino rebel in such a way so the dead rebel’s superstitious comrades would think that a vampire-like creature was on the prowl. In Vietnam, Lansdale’s psyops team supplied fake and dire astrological predictions for the fate of North Vietnamese and Vietcong leaders.
In his autobiography, In the Midst of Wars, Lansdale gives an example of the counterterror tactics he employed in the Philippines. He tells how one psychological warfare operation "played upon the popular dread of an asuang, or vampire, to solve a difficult problem." The problem was that Lansdale wanted government troops to move out of a village and hunt Communist guerrillas in the hills, but the local politicians were afraid that if they did, the guerrillas would "swoop down on the village and the bigwigs would be victims." So, writes Lansdale:A combat psywar [psychological warfare] team was brought in. It planted stories among town residents of a vampire living on the hill where the Huks were based. Two nights later, after giving the stories time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks. When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the vampire had got him and that one of them would be next if they remained on the hill. When daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity.
Lansdale defines the incident as "low humor" and "an appropriate response ... to the glum and deadly practices of communists and other authoritarians."
-- The Phoenix Program, by Douglas Valentine
Essentially, the psyops idea was to play on the cultural weaknesses of a target population so they could be more easily manipulated and controlled. But the challenges facing the Reagan administration in the 1980s led to its determination that peacetime psyops were also needed and that the target populations had to include the American public.
The Reagan administration was obsessed with the problems left behind by the 1970s’ disclosures of government lying about the Vietnam War and revelations about CIA abuses both in overthrowing democratically elected governments and spying on American dissidents. This so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” produced profound skepticism from regular American citizens as well as journalists and politicians when President Reagan tried to sell his plans for intervention in the civil wars then underway in Central America, Africa and elsewhere.
While Reagan saw Central America as a “Soviet beachhead,” many Americans saw brutal Central American oligarchs and their bloody security forces slaughtering priests, nuns, labor activists, students, peasants and indigenous populations. Reagan and his advisers realized that they had to turn those perceptions around if they hoped to get sustained funding for the militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras as well as for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, the CIA-organized paramilitary force marauding around leftist-ruled Nicaragua.
So, it became a high priority to reshape public perceptions to gain support for Reagan’s Central American military operations both inside those targeted countries and among Americans.
A ‘Psyops Totality’
As Col. Alfred R. Paddock Jr. wrote in an influential November 1983 paper, entitled “Military Psychological Operations and US Strategy,” “the planned use of communications to influence attitudes or behavior should, if properly used, precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. Put another way, psychological operations is the one weapons system which has an important role to play in peacetime, throughout the spectrum of conflict, and during the aftermath of conflict.”
President Ronald Reagan leading a meeting on terrorism on Jan. 26, 1981, with National Security Advisor Richard Allen, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and White House counselor Edwin Meese. (photo credit: Reagan library)
Paddock continued, “Military psychological operations are an important part of the ‘PSYOP Totality,’ both in peace and war. … We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs. … The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operations strategy is badly needed.”
Some of Raymond’s recently available handwritten notes show a focus on El Salvador with the implementation of “Nation wide multi-media psyops” spread through rallies and electronic media. “Radio + TV also carried Psyops messages,” Raymond wrote. (Emphasis in original.) Though Raymond’s crimped handwriting is often hard to decipher, the notes make clear that psyops programs also were directed at Honduras, Guatemala and Peru.
One declassified “top secret” document in Raymond’s file -– dated Feb. 4, 1985, from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger -– urged the fuller implementation of President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 130, which was signed on March 6, 1984, and which authorized peacetime psyops by expanding psyops beyond its traditional boundaries of active military operations into peacetime situations in which the U.S. government could claim some threat to national interests.
Memorandum for the Chairman, Special Planning Group, Public Diplomacy
by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
February 4, 1985
4601
TOP SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
February 4, 1985
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL PLANNING GROUP, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
SUBJECT: NSDD 130 Tasking
In your 4 April 1984 memorandum supplementing Presidential tasking in National Security Decision Directive 130, you requested from the Department of Defense recommendations for a national structure and policy guidelines for the conduct of psychological operations. On 20 July 1984, pursuant to your tasking, I recommended, in considerable specificity, the establishment of a National Psychological Operations Committee and the approval of national guidelines for the conduct of military psychological operations. Subsequently, in order to meet the intent of NSDD 130, this department issued a directive that requires the armed forces to conduct overt, strategic psychological operations in peacetime and I ordered the development of a departmental master plan that will serve as a blueprint for the revitalization of our military psychological operations.
Actions within the Defense Department to satisfy the requirements laid down in NSDD 130 are well in train. It is now necessary that the remaining provisions of NSDD 130 with respect to psychological operations be implemented fully. A national organizational framework and national policy guidelines, as provided for in NSDD 130, within which military psychological operations can be conducted most effectively in support of U.S. objectives, are required. Therefore, I urge the speedy approval of my recommendations of last July. This approval can provide the impetus to the rebuilding of a necessary strategic capability, focus attention on psychological operations as a national -- not solely military -- instrument, and ensure that psychological operations are fully coordinated with public diplomacy and other international information activities.
CLASSIFIED BY: SecDef
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 4/18/13
“This approval can provide the impetus to the rebuilding of a necessary strategic capability, focus attention on psychological operations as a national –- not solely military -– instrument, and ensure that psychological operations are fully coordinated with public diplomacy and other international information activities,” Weinberger’s document said.
This broader commitment to psyops led to the creation of a Psychological Operations Committee (POC) that was to be chaired by a representative of Reagan’s National Security Council with a vice chairman from the Pentagon and with representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.
“This group will be responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing psychological operations activities in support of United States policies and interests relative to national security,” according to a “secret” addendum to a memo, dated March 25, 1986, from Col. Paddock, the psyops advocate who had become the U.S. Army’s Director for Psychological Operations.
Memorandum for Dr. Stearman, National Security Council
by Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., Colonel, U.S Army, Director for Psychological Operations
March 25, 1986
SECRET
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000
25 Mar 1986
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. STEARMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: PSYOP Committee
As per our last discussion, attached is a draft charter for an additional committee which would report to the SPG in the NSDD-77 mechanism. This would constitute one track of the dual track approach suggested by Dr. Ikle. The other track would be a PSYOP committee reporting to the PCG. Dual membership on both committees by a few individuals should assist in the coordination of PSYOP programs.
I believe that the draft charter affords a degree of generalization similar to the charters of the existing NSDD-77 committees, thus hopefully will allow us to move past the line-by-line haggling over more comprehensive terms of reference during previous meetings. At the same time, the charter clearly places the responsibility for defining peacetime PSYOP activities on the committee, as well as for providing appropriate interagency coordination and policy guidance for the participation of DoD in such activities -- as specified in NSDD-130.
Since both Gerry Helman and Phil Arnold have asked for more illustrative examples of DoD's participation in peacetime PSYOP, I proposed that DoD present a briefing on PSYOP programs supporting our foreign policy objectives in Central America. From our perspective, the best time to present such a briefing would be the period 14-25 April. This briefing, plus discussion of the draft PSYOP committee charter, would constitute the agenda for our next meeting.
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.
Colonel, U.S Army
Director for Psychological Operations
Attachment
a/s
cc. Mr. Alderman - DUSD
Mr. [DELETE] - ODUSD
Mr. [DELETE] - ODUSD
Col. [DELETE] -- 33 POD
CLASSIFIED BY DIR, PSYOP
DECLASSIFY ON OADR
DECLASSIFIED IN PART BY RW 4/18/13
***
Psychological Operations Committee: This committee will be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A senior representative of the Department of Defense will serve as vice chairman of the Committee. This group will be responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing psychological operations activities in support of United States policies and interests relative to national security. The committee will provide the focal point for interagency coordination of detailed contingency planning for the management of national information assets during war, and for the transition from peace to war. It will coordinate interagency information assets and develop national policy guidance to respond to the operational needs of military commanders during crises. It will formulate and define the nature of overt psychological operations activities in peacetime, and provide appropriate interagency coordination and policy guidance for the participation of the Department of Defense in these programs, as directed by NSDD-130. The committee shall be empowered to make recommendations and, as appropriate, to direct the concerned departments and agencies to implement psychological operations strategies in support of key policy objectives, and to insure that these strategies complement US public diplomacy and international information activities.
To implement NSDD 130, a Psychological Operations Committee (POC) will be created consisting of representatives from Defense, State, CIA, USIA, and other agencies when required. This Committee will be chaired by designated representatives of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
NSDD 130 stressed the importance of psychological factors in maintaining the confidence of allied governments and in deterring military action against U.S. national interests. In order to employ psychological operations (PSYOP) effectively and economically, the POC shall establish national PSYOP guidelines, and define the roles and relationships of the agencies involved in PSYOP. NSDD 130 further stated that in order to be prepared for the immediate and effective use of PSYOP in crisis and wartime, it is vital that the Armed Forces maintain a strong and active international information capability; therefore, the POC shall ensure that the Department of Defense gives high priority to the revitalization and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning, and to promoting a funded PSYOP program.
Crisis and wartime conditions impose special requirements on U.S. international information activities. The POC shall seek to ensure that in wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of America citizens or the imminence of war between the U.S. and other nations), U.S. international information elements are ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience. The agencies represented on the POC should review and, as necessary, develop procedures for their operations during crises.
NSDD 130 also directs the Department of Defense, with appropriate interagency cooperation and in accordance with national law and policy, to participate in PSYOP programs in peacetime. Department of Defense participation in other international information activities shall continue to be under the SPG which should take the lead in developing coordinated interagency plans, including the utilization of DOD capabilities, for such activities in support of national security objectives. When appropriate and required, the POC shall work with the SPG in coordinating PSYOP with other international information activities.
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 2/2/17
“The committee will provide the focal point for interagency coordination of detailed contingency planning for the management of national information assets during war, and for the transition from peace to war,” the addendum added. “The POC shall seek to ensure that in wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens or the imminence of war between the U.S. and other nations), U.S. international information elements are ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience.”
Taking Shape
The Psychological Operations Committee took formal shape with a “secret” memo from Reagan’s National Security Advisor John Poindexter on July 31, 1986.
Establishing of a Psychological Operations Committee
by John M. Poindexgter
July 31, 1986
4601
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
SUBJECT: Establishing of a Psychological Operations Committee
To implement NSDD 130, a Psychological Operations Committee (POC) will be created consisting of representatives from Defense, State, CIA, USIA, and other agencies when required. This Committee will be chaired by designated representatives of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
NSDD 130 stressed the importance of psychological factors in maintaining the confidence of allied governments and in deterring military action against U.S. national interests. In order to employ psychological operations (PSYOP) effectively and economically, the POC shall establish national PSYOP guidelines, and define the roles and relationships of the agencies involved in PSYOP. NSDD 130 further stated that in order to be prepared for the immediate and effective use of PSYOP in crisis and wartime, it is vital that the Armed Forces maintain a strong and active international information capability; therefore, the POC shall ensure that the Department of Defense gives high priority to the revitalization and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning, and to promoting a funded PSYOP program.
Crisis and wartime conditions impose special requirements on U.S. international information activities. The POC shall seek to ensure that in wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens or the imminence of war between the U.S. and other nations), U.S. international information elements are ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience. The agencies represented on the POC should review and, as necessary, develop procedures for their operations during crises.
NSDD 130 also directs the Department of Defense, with appropriate interagency cooperation and in accordance with national law and policy, to participate in PSYOP programs in peacetime. Department of Defense participation in other international information activities shall continue to be under the SPG which should take the lead in developing coordinated interagency plans, including the utilization of DOD capabilities, for such activities in support of national security objectives. When appropriate and required, the POC shall work with the SPG in coordinating PSYOP with other international information activities.
John M. Poindexter
DECLASSIFIED
BY RW 2/2/17
Its first meeting was called on Sept. 2, 1986, with an agenda that focused on Central America and “How can other POC agencies support and complement DOD programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama.” The POC was also tasked with “Developing National PSYOPS Guidelines” for “formulating and implementing a national PSYOPS program.” (Underlining in original)
First Meeting of the Psychological Operations Committee (POC)
by Rodney B. McDanhiel, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
September 2, 1986
6269
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 2, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT, Executive Secretary, Department of State
JAMES F. LEMON, Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
JOHN H. RIXSE, Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
JOHN BITOFF, Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
RICHARD MEYER, Executive Secretary, Agency for International Development
LARRY R. TAYLOR, Chief of the Executive Secretariat, U.S. Information Agency
BRUCE PORTER, Executive Director, Board for International Broadcasting
SUBJECT: First Meeting of the Psychological Operations Committee (POC)
The first meeting of the Psychological Operations Committee (POC) will be on September 10, 1986, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. As this will be an organizational meeting, we have allotted two hours for the session. Two representatives from each participating agency are invited to attend. Please give the office of Walter Raymond (395-6900) the names of those who will be attending from your agency no later than COB, Friday, September 5.
The following will be the meeting's agenda:
Central America
• DOD Presentation on Programs in Support of SOUTHCOM
• Discussion of the Above Presentation
o How can other POC agencies support and complement DOD programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama.
Developing National PSYOPS Guidelines
• A briefing on DOD's response to NSDD 130
• Establishing a Subcommittee to prepare recommendations on:
o roles, missions, and relationship of agencies in formulating and implementing a national PSYOPS PROGRAM
o Organization of national PSYOPS ASSETS:
Bureaucratic structure for PSYOPS in crises and wars.
Inventory of personnel and technical assets.
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 2/2/17
Then-Vice President George H.W. Bush with CIA Director William Casey at the White House on Feb. 11, 1981. (Photo credit: Reagan Library)
Raymond was named a co-chair of the POC along with CIA officer Vincent Cannistraro, who was then Deputy Director for Intelligence Programs on the NSC staff, according to a “secret” memo from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Craig Alderman Jr. The memo also noted that future POC meetings would be briefed on psyops projects for the Philippines and Nicaragua, with the latter project codenamed “Niagara Falls.” The memo also references a “Project Touchstone,” but it is unclear where that psyops program was targeted.
Establishment of a Psychological Operations Committee
by Craig Alderman, Jr., Deputy, Department of Defense
September 2, 1986
SECRET
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
SUBJECT: Establishment of a Psychological Operations Committee
On 31 July 1986, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs established an interagency Psychological Operations Committee to implement NSDD-130, U.S. International Information Policy. The Committee will be co-chaired by the Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, Vince Canestraro, of the NSC staff. We anticipate that regular participants in the Committee will be Assistant Secretary-level representatives from Defense, State, CIA, and USIA. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) will be the OSD representative.
The purpose of this memorandum is to request that the JCS provide an appropriate representative for this Committee and to ask that the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group prepare a series of information briefings for meetings of the Committee. These briefings normally should be no longer than 30 minutes in duration. They are intended to both inform the Committee and to focus its deliberations on key agenda items.
The first briefing requested is on the overt peacetime U.S. military PSYOP program in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The briefing, which will be presented during the initial meeting of the Psychological Operations Committee on 10 September 1986, should focus on the objectives and organization of the program, progress to date, and future plans. Some illustrative examples of the utilization of PSYOP by friendly regular military forces, particularly in El Salvador, would be useful.
Subsequent briefings requested, in approximate order of sequence, will focus on the Republic of Phlippines, Project TOUCHSTONE, contingency planning for war, crisis response, psychological exploitation of military exercises, and Project NIAGARA FALLS. Details on these briefings will be coordinated with your staff. The OSD point of contact is Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., Director of Psychological Operations (x55692).
Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy
DECLASSIFIED BY RS 8/6/13
Another “secret” memo dated Oct. 1, 1986, co-authored by Raymond, reported on the POC’s first meeting on Sept. 10, 1986, and noted that “The POC will, at each meeting, focus on an area of operations (e.g., Central America, Afghanistan, Philippines).”
The Psychological Operations Committee Gets Under Way
by Walter Raymond, Jr., Vincent M. Cannistraro, William L. Stearman
October 1, 1986
7131
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
[National Security Advisor has seen]
October 1, 1986
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: The Psychological Operations Committee Gets Under Way
The Psychological Operations Committee (POC), which you recently authorized, had its first meeting on September 10. The report on the meeting at Tab I provides a description of how the POC will function.
The POC will be operating on two levels. A Planning Sub-Committee (PSC) will plan POC agendas and will also be responsible for developing PSYOPS guidelines and for inventorying and assessing USG technical and human PSYOPS assets (except for those of CIA). The POC will, at each meeting, focus on an area of operations (e.g., Central America, Afghanistan, Philippines) and will review and approve PSC recommendations and reports.
We are confident that the POC will at last provide the mechanism we have needed to focus and to coordinate interagency PSYOPS efforts and are satisfied that it has gotten off to a good start.
cc. Peter Rodman
Ron St. Martin
Ken Kissell
Attachment
Tab I PSYOPS Report
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 2/2/17
The POC’s second meeting on Oct. 24, 1986, concentrated on the Philippines, according to a Nov. 4, 1986 memo also co-authored by Raymond. “The next step will be a tightly drafted outline for a PSYOPS Plan which we will send to that Embassy for its comment,” the memo said. The plan “largely focused on a range of civic actions supportive of the overall effort to overcome the insurgency,” an addendum noted. “There is considerable concern about the sensitivities of any type of a PSYOPS program given the political situation in the Philippines today.”
PSYOPS Operations Committee
by Walter Raymond, Jr., Vincent M. Cannistraro, William L. Stearman
November 4, 1986
7996
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
INFORMATION
November 4, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: PSYOPS Operations Committee
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum summarizing the second PSYOPS Committee meeting. We focussed this meeting on the Philippines in an effort to get the Department of Defense more engaged in the nation-building/civic action program in that country. The next step will be a tightly drafted outline of a PSYOPS Plan which we will send to that Embassy for its comment. The POC was alerted both by Dick Childress and State over the extreme sensitivities of a PSYOPS plan at a time when there is serious tension within the Government of the Philippines. We will be seeking Steve Bosworth's counsel regarding how to raise the plan for approval with the Government of the Philippines after we have an agreed program.
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the Record
cc: Dick Childress
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 2/2/17
***
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
INFORMATION
October 31, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL
FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: Psychological Operations Support for the Philippines
The second meeting of the PSYOPS Committee took place on October 24. DOD provided a detailed presentation of the kinds of things that they could undertake if a PSYOPS plan were approved. This largely focussed on a range of civic actions supportive of the overall effort to overcome the insurgency. There is considerable concern about the sensitivities of any type of a PSYOPS program given the political situation in the Philippines today. Nevertheless, it was the unanimous agreement of the Committee that a plan should be developed and sent to the field for their input. The tasker at Tab I is designed to set that process in motion.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the tasker at Tab I.
Approve
Dick Childress concurs.
Attachment
Tab I Tasker
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 2/2/17
Earlier in 1986, the Philippines had undergone the so-called “People Power Revolution,” which drove longtime dictator Ferdinand Marcos into exile, and the Reagan administration, which belatedly pulled its support from Marcos, was trying to stabilize the political situation to prevent more populist elements from gaining the upper hand.
But the Reagan administration’s primary attention continued to go back to Central America, including “Project Niagara Falls,” the psyops program aimed at Nicaragua. A “secret” Pentagon memo from Deputy Under Secretary Alderman on Nov. 20, 1986, outlined the work of the 4th Psychological Operations Group on this psyops plan “to help bring about democratization of Nicaragua,” by which the Reagan administration meant a “regime change.” The precise details of “Project Niagara Falls” were not disclosed in the declassified documents but the choice of codename suggested a cascade of psyops.
Interim Executive Summary: Project NIAGARA FALLS
by Craig Alderman, Jr., Deputy
November 20, 1986
RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
TO: Mr. Walter Raymond
National Security Council (NSC)
Old Executive Office Bldg, Wash DC
Number: D162871
Description of Material being Transferred (Do Not Enter Classified Info): MEMORANDUM ON PROJECT NIAGARA FALLS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
2/15/12
***
SECRET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
20 November, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Interim Executive Summary: Project NIAGARA FALLS
As you requested during the In-Progress-Review briefing by the 4th Psychological Operations Group on the psychological operations plan to help bring about democratization of Nicaragua, I am forwarding the executive summary of the plan as completed so far (TAB A).
Progress toward completion continues to be on track, and planning will be finished in early December. A briefing and executive summary on the complete plan will be available at that time.
Craig Alderman, Jr.,
Deputy
Attachment
a/s
cc:
NSC: Walter Raymond
Vincent Cannestraro
CIA: DDO/CATF
DDO/PPS
CLASSIFIED BY: USD (P)
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 4/18/13
***
SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-5000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DJSM 2008-86
19 November 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Subject: Follow-on Actions for Project NIAGARA FALLS
1. In response to your memorandum* of 14 November 1986, enclosed is the Executive Summary for Project NIAGARA FALLS, forwarded through the Army from the 5th Psychological Operations Group.
2. I believe this summary provides the requisite information for presentation before the Inter-Agency Group on Nicaragua.
3. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to assist your staff, as necessary, to ensure completion of this important project.
P.F. CARTER, JR.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
Enclosure
a/s
Reference:
* DUSD (P) memorandum, 14 November 1986, "Follow-on Actions for Project NIAGARA FALLS"
Classified by Director, Joint Staff
Declassify on OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY RW 10/17/13
Other documents from Raymond’s NSC file shed light on who other key operatives in the psyops and propaganda programs were. For instance, in undated notes on efforts to influence the Socialist International, including securing support for U.S. foreign policies from Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Europe, Raymond cited the efforts of “Ledeen, Gershman,” a reference to neoconservative operative Michael Ledeen and Carl Gershman, another neocon who has served as president of the U.S.-government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), from 1983 to the present. (Underlining in original.)
SI MEETING
1. Objective = To secure the support of Socialist and Social Democratic Parties for US objectives and policy; or at least to prevent them from opposing US policy.
2. Means = What has been US strategy (brief summary), 2 tracs, but limited activity.
3. What has been gained?
4. What have been the costs?
-- resources
-- politically
5. What can be achieved in the future? Estimated timetable.
6. With what costs?
(a) resources
(b) politically
[ILLEGIBLE]
US efforts: Ledeen, Gershman
Although NED is technically independent of the U.S. government, it receives the bulk of its funding (now about $100 million a year) from Congress. Documents from the Reagan archives also make clear that NED was organized as a way to replace some of the CIA’s political and propaganda covert operations, which had fallen into disrepute in the 1970s. Earlier released documents from Raymond’s file show CIA Director William Casey pushing for NED’s creation and Raymond, Casey’s handpicked man on the NSC, giving frequent advice and direction to Gershman. [See Consortiumnews.com’s “CIA’s Hidden Hand in ‘Democracy’ Groups.”]
Another figure in Raymond’s constellation of propaganda assets was media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who was viewed as both a key political ally of President Reagan and a valuable source of funding for private groups that were coordinating with White House propaganda operations. [See Consortiumnews.com’s “Rupert Murdoch: Propaganda Recruit.”]
In a Nov. 1, 1985 letter to Raymond, Charles R. Tanguy of the “Committees for a Community of Democracies – USA” asked Raymond to intervene in efforts to secure Murdoch’s funding for the group. “We would be grateful … if you could find the time to telephone Mr. Murdoch and encourage him to give us a positive response,” the letter said.
CCD USA
COMMITTEES FOR A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES - USA
Suite 310, 1725 DeSales Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. (202) 955-5778
James R. Huntley, Founding Chairman
November 1, 1985
Mr. Walt Raymond, Jr.
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Room 351
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Walt:
Thanks again for being the guest speaker at CCD-DC's luncheon yesterday. I particularly appreciated your forthrightness in responding to questions. I believe that you agree with us that ways need to be found to make an effective connection between the Administration's policy of support for CCD's program and objectives, and its ability to raise funds from private sources, especially corporations. I have suggested to Sam and my other colleagues in our working group that we come back to you with some ideas on how you might be helpful to us in this regard.
Meanwhile I am enclosing a copy of Sam's September 17 letter to Rupert Murdoch together with two more recent letters enclosing copies of letters of support and endorsement from Bud McFarlane and Charles Wick. We have had no reply to this correspondence other than informal word from his office that we would be receiving a reply in the near future. We would be grateful therefore if you could find the time to telephone Mr. Murdoch and encourage him to give us a positive response. Please assure him that Sam would be happy to meet with him here or in New York if he would like additional information or a chance to discuss our program before reaching a decision.
Best wishes as always and tot ziens.
Sincerely,
Charles R. Tanguy
P.S. Since dictating the above I was informed by Greg Winn of USIA that Mr. Wick has decided that he does not wish to meet with Sam De Palma or write a letter on behalf of CCD-USA to Rupert Murdoch. It would be all the more timely, therefore, Walt, if you could give us a personal boost with Mr. Murdoch. CRT
Another document, entitled “Project Truth Enhancement,” described how $24 million would be spent on upgrading the telecommunications infrastructure to arm “Project Truth, with the technical capability to provide the most efficient and productive media support for major USG policy initiatives like Political Democracy.” Project Truth was the overarching name of the Reagan administration’s propaganda operation. For the outside world, the program was billed as “public diplomacy,” but administration insiders privately called it “perception management.” [See Consortiumnews.com’s “The Victory of Perception Management.”]
The Early Years
The original priority of “Project Truth” was to clean up the images of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran security forces and the Nicaraguan Contras, who were led by ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza’s ex-National Guard officers. To ensure steady military funding for these notorious forces, Reagan’s team knew it had to defuse the negative publicity and somehow rally the American people’s support.
President Ronald Reagan meeting with Guatemalan dictator Efrain Rios Montt, who was later charged with genocide against indigenous populations in Guatemala’s highlands.
At first, the effort focused on weeding out American reporters who uncovered facts that undercut the desired public images. As part of that effort, the administration denounced New York Times correspondent Raymond Bonner for disclosing the Salvadoran regime’s massacre of about 800 men, women and children in the village of El Mozote in northeast El Salvador in December 1981. Accuracy in Media and conservative news organizations, such as The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page, joined in pummeling Bonner, who was soon ousted from his job. But such efforts were largely ad hoc and disorganized.
CIA Director Casey, from his years crisscrossing the interlocking worlds of business and intelligence, had important contacts for creating a more systematic propaganda network. He recognized the value of using established groups known for advocating “human rights,” such as Freedom House.
One document from the Reagan library showed senior Freedom House official Leo Cherne running a draft manuscript on political conditions in El Salvador past Casey and promising that Freedom House would make requested editorial “corrections and changes” -– and even send over the editor for consultation with whomever Casey assigned to review the paper.
In a “Dear Bill” letter dated June 24, 1981, Cherne, who was chairman of the Freedom House’s executive committee, wrote: “I am enclosing a copy of the draft manuscript by Bruce McColm, Freedom House’s resident specialist on Central America and the Caribbean. This manuscript on El Salvador was the one I had urged be prepared and in the haste to do so as rapidly as possible, it is quite rough. You had mentioned that the facts could be checked for meticulous accuracy within the government and this would be very helpful. …
“If there are any questions about the McColm manuscript, I suggest that whomever is working on it contact Richard Salzmann at the Research Institute [an organization where Cherne was executive director]. He is Editor-in-Chief at the Institute and the Chairman of the Freedom House’s Salvador Committee. He will make sure that the corrections and changes get to Rita Freedman who will also be working with him. If there is any benefit to be gained from Salzmann’s coming down at any point to talk to that person, he is available to do so.”
By 1982, Casey also was lining up some powerful right-wing ideologues to help fund the “perception management” project both with money and their own media outlets. Richard Mellon Scaife was the scion of the Mellon banking, oil and aluminum fortune who financed a variety of right-wing family foundations -– such as Sarah Scaife and Carthage -– that were financial benefactors to right-wing journalists and think tanks. Scaife also published the Tribune Review in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
A more comprehensive “public diplomacy” operation began to take shape in 1982 when Raymond, a 30-year veteran of CIA clandestine services, was transferred to the NSC. Raymond became the sparkplug for this high-powered propaganda network, according to an unpublished draft chapter of the congressional Iran-Contra investigation that was suppressed as part of the deal to get three moderate Republican senators to sign on to the final report and give the inquiry a patina of bipartisanship.
Though the draft chapter didn’t use Raymond’s name in its opening pages, apparently because some of the information came from classified depositions, Raymond’s name was used later in the chapter and the earlier citations matched Raymond’s known role. According to the draft report, the CIA officer who was recruited for the NSC job had served as Director of the Covert Action Staff at the CIA from 1978 to 1982 and was a “specialist in propaganda and disinformation.”
“The CIA official [Raymond] discussed the transfer with [CIA Director] Casey and NSC Advisor William Clark that he be assigned to the NSC as [Donald] Gregg’s successor [as coordinator of intelligence operations in June 1982] and received approval for his involvement in setting up the public diplomacy program along with his intelligence responsibilities,” the chapter said. Gregg was another senior CIA official who was assigned to the NSC before becoming Vice President George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser.
“In the early part of 1983, documents obtained by the Select [Iran-Contra] Committees indicate that the Director of the Intelligence Staff of the NSC [Raymond] successfully recommended the establishment of an inter-governmental network to promote and manage a public diplomacy plan designed to create support for Reagan Administration policies at home and abroad.”
War of Ideas
During his Iran-Contra deposition, Raymond explained the need for this propaganda structure, saying: “We were not configured effectively to deal with the war of ideas.”
President Reagan meets with publisher Rupert Murdoch, U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Wick, lawyers Roy Cohn and Thomas Bolan in the Oval Office on Jan. 18, 1983. (Photo credit: Reagan presidential library)
One reason for this shortcoming was that federal law forbade taxpayers’ money from being spent on domestic propaganda or grassroots lobbying to pressure congressional representatives. Of course, every president and his team had vast resources to make their case in public, but by tradition and law, they were restricted to speeches, testimony and one-on-one persuasion of lawmakers. But President Reagan saw the American public’s “Vietnam Syndrome” as an obstacle to his more aggressive policies.
Along with Raymond’s government-based organization, there were outside groups eager to cooperate and cash in. Back at Freedom House, Cherne and his associates were angling for financial support.
In an Aug. 9, 1982 letter to Raymond, Freedom House executive director Leonard R. Sussman wrote that “Leo Cherne has asked me to send these copies of Freedom Appeals. He has probably told you we have had to cut back this project to meet financial realities. … We would, of course, want to expand the project once again when, as and if the funds become available. Offshoots of that project appear in newspapers, magazines, books and on broadcast services here and abroad. It’s a significant, unique channel of communication” –- precisely the focus of Raymond’s work.
On Nov. 4, 1982, Raymond, after his transfer from the CIA to the NSC staff but while still a CIA officer, wrote to NSC Advisor Clark about the “Democracy Initiative and Information Programs,” stating that “Bill Casey asked me to pass on the following thought concerning your meeting with [right-wing billionaire] Dick Scaife, Dave Abshire [then a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board], and Co. Casey had lunch with them today and discussed the need to get moving in the general area of supporting our friends around the world.
“By this definition he is including both ‘building democracy’ … and helping invigorate international media programs. The DCI [Casey] is also concerned about strengthening public information organizations in the United States such as Freedom House. … A critical piece of the puzzle is a serious effort to raise private funds to generate momentum. Casey’s talk with Scaife and Co. suggests they would be very willing to cooperate. … Suggest that you note White House interest in private support for the Democracy initiative.”
The importance of the CIA and White House secretly arranging private funds was that these supposedly independent voices would then reinforce and validate the administration’s foreign policy arguments with a public that would assume the endorsements were based on the merits of the White House positions, not influenced by money changing hands. Like snake-oil salesmen who plant a few cohorts in the crowd to whip up excitement for the cure-all elixir, Reagan administration propagandists salted some well-paid “private” individuals around Washington to echo White House propaganda “themes.”
The role of the CIA in these initiatives was concealed but never far from the surface. A Dec. 2, 1982 note addressed to “Bud,” a reference to senior NSC official Robert “Bud” McFarlane, described a request from Raymond for a brief meeting. “When he [Raymond] returned from Langley [CIA headquarters], he had a proposed draft letter … re $100 M democ[racy] proj[ect],” the note said.
While Casey pulled the strings on this project, the CIA director instructed White House officials to hide the CIA’s hand. “Obviously we here [at CIA] should not get out front in the development of such an organization, nor should we appear to be a sponsor or advocate,” Casey said in one undated letter to then-White House counselor Edwin Meese III as Casey urged creation of a “National Endowment.”
But the formation of the National Endowment for Democracy, with its hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. government money, was still months down the road. In the meantime, the Reagan administration would have to line up private donors to advance the propaganda cause.
“We will develop a scenario for obtaining private funding,” NSC Advisor Clark wrote to Reagan in a Jan. 13, 1983 memo, adding that U.S. Information Agency Director “Charlie Wick has offered to take the lead. We may have to call on you to meet with a group of potential donors.”
Despite Casey’s and Raymond’s success in bringing onboard wealthy conservatives to provide private funding for the propaganda operations, Raymond worried about whether a scandal could erupt over the CIA’s involvement. Raymond formally resigned from the CIA in April 1983, so, he said, “there would be no question whatsoever of any contamination of this.” But Raymond continued to act toward the U.S. public much like a CIA officer would in directing a propaganda operation in a hostile foreign country.
Raymond fretted, too, about the legality of Casey’s ongoing role. Raymond confided in one memo that it was important “to get [Casey] out of the loop,” but Casey never backed off and Raymond continued to send progress reports to his old boss well into 1986.
It was “the kind of thing which [Casey] had a broad catholic interest in,” Raymond shrugged during his Iran-Contra deposition. He then offered the excuse that Casey undertook this apparently illegal interference in domestic politics “not so much in his CIA hat, but in his adviser to the president hat.”
Peacetime Propaganda
Meanwhile, Reagan began laying out the formal authority for this unprecedented peacetime propaganda bureaucracy. On Jan. 14, 1983, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 77, entitled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security.” In NSDD-77, Reagan deemed it “necessary to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government.”
President Reagan meeting with Charles Wick on March 7, 1986, in the Oval Office. Also present: Stephen Rhinesmith, Don Regan, John Poindexter, George Bush, Jack Matlock and Walter Raymond (seated next to Regan on the left side of the photo). (Photo credit: Reagan library)
Reagan ordered the creation of a special planning group within the National Security Council to direct these “public diplomacy” campaigns. The planning group would be headed by Walter Raymond and one of its principal outposts would be a new Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America, housed at the State Department but under the control of the NSC. (One of the directors of the Latin American public diplomacy office was neoconservative Robert Kagan, who would later co-found the Project for the New American Century in 1998 and become a chief promoter of President George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.)
On May 20, 1983, Raymond recounted in a memo that $400,000 had been raised from private donors brought to the White House Situation Room by U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Wick. According to that memo, the money was divided among several organizations, including Freedom House and Accuracy in Media, a right-wing media attack organization.
When I wrote about that memo in my 1992 book, Fooling America, Freedom House denied receiving any White House money or collaborating with any CIA/NSC propaganda campaign. In a letter, Freedom House’s Sussman called Raymond “a second-hand source” and insisted that “this organization did not need any special funding to take positions … on any foreign-policy issues.”
But it made little sense that Raymond would have lied to a superior in an internal memo. And clearly, Freedom House remained central to the Reagan administration’s schemes for aiding groups supportive of its Central American policies, particularly the CIA-organized Contra war against the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Plus, White House documents released later revealed that Freedom House kept its hand out for funding.
On Sept. 15, 1984, Bruce McColm –- writing from Freedom House’s Center for Caribbean and Central American Studies –- sent Raymond “a short proposal for the Center’s Nicaragua project 1984-85. The project combines elements of the oral history proposal with the publication of The Nicaraguan Papers,” a book that would disparage Sandinista ideology and practices.
“Maintaining the oral history part of the project adds to the overall costs; but preliminary discussions with film makers have given me the idea that an Improper Conduct-type of documentary could be made based on these materials,” McColm wrote, referring to a 1984 film that offered a scathing critique of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. “Such a film would have to be the work of a respected Latin American filmmaker or a European. American-made films on Central America are simply too abrasive ideologically and artistically poor.”
McColm’s three-page letter reads much like a book or movie pitch, trying to interest Raymond in financing the project: “The Nicaraguan Papers will also be readily accessible to the general reader, the journalist, opinion-maker, the academic and the like. The book would be distributed fairly broadly to these sectors and I am sure will be extremely useful. They already constitute a form of Freedom House samizdat, since I’ve been distributing them to journalists for the past two years as I’ve received them from disaffected Nicaraguans.”
McColm proposed a face-to-face meeting with Raymond in Washington and attached a six-page grant proposal seeking $134,100. According to the grant proposal, the project would include “free distribution to members of Congress and key public officials; distribution of galleys in advance of publication for maximum publicity and timely reviews in newspapers and current affairs magazines; press conferences at Freedom House in New York and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.; op-ed circulation to more than 100 newspapers …; distribution of a Spanish-language edition through Hispanic organizations in the United States and in Latin America; arrangement of European distribution through Freedom House contacts.”
The documents that I found at the Reagan library did not indicate what subsequently happened to this specific proposal. McColm did not respond to an email request for comment about the Nicaraguan Papers plan or the earlier letter from Cherne (who died in 1999) to Casey about editing McComb’s manuscript. Freedom House did emerge as a leading critic of Nicaragua’s Sandinista government and also became a major recipient of money from the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, which was founded in 1983 under the umbrella of the Casey-Raymond project.
The more recently released documents -– declassified between 2013 and 2017 -– show how these earlier Casey-Raymond efforts merged with the creation of a formal psyop bureaucracy in 1986 also under the control of Raymond’s NSC operation. The combination of the propaganda and psyop programs underscored the powerful capability that the U.S. government developed more than three decades ago for planting slanted, distorted or fake news. (Casey died in 1987; Raymond died in 2003.)
Over those several decades, even as the White House changed hands from Republicans to Democrats to Republicans to Democrats, the momentum created by William Casey and Walter Raymond continued to push these “perception management/psyops” strategies forward. In more recent years, the wording has changed, giving way to more pleasing euphemisms, like “smart power” and “strategic communications.” But the idea is still the same: how you can use propaganda to sell U.S. government policies abroad and at home.
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s. You can buy his latest book, America’s Stolen Narrative, either in print here or as an e-book (from Amazon and barnesandnoble.com).