Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication Agenc

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Military Psychological Operations and U.S. Strategy
by Col. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.
US Army War College
November, 1983



Some of you may be wondering about the relevance of a paper on military psychological operations for a conference devoted to psychological strategies at the level of national and international behavior. The papers presented by Paul Smith, John Lenczowski, and others should have made you well aware of the Soviet threat in this regard. Steve Possony laid out very well for us the all-pervasive nature of the psychological dimension in his paper entitled "The PSYOP Totality." No matter which descriptive term we use for this dimension, the planned use of communication to influence attitudes or behavior should, if properly used, precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. [1] Put another way, psychological operations is the one weapons system which has an important role to play in peacetime, throughout the spectrum of conflict, and during the aftermath of conflict.

Military psychological operations are an important part of the "PSYOP Totality," both in peace and war. This paper, therefore, addresses the state of US military psychological operations capabilities and the role that these capabilities play -- or should play -- in national strategy. [2] Let me state my thesis at the outset: while some progress has been made in recent years to enhance these capabilities, major changes are required, both within the Department of Defense and at the interagency level, to insure that the psychological operations resources available throughout the government are effective organized and melded to support U.S. strategy.

Beginning at the top, there is no U.S. national level organization for PSYOP. We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs. [3] Psychological planning should be conducted on an integrated, worldwide basis, in response to national policy. Ad hoc committees created in reaction to regional crises are not the answer. The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operations strategy is badly needed. In addition, a knowledgeable psychological operations specialist should be added to the National Security Council staff, and play a key role in the interdepartmental committee created.

This coordinating mechanism should also provide to the Department of Defense the national policy upon which unified command PSYOP plans are based. Since strategic level PSYOP plans frequently require the assets of, or coordination with, other agencies, the lack of an interagency coordinating mechanism results in inefficient, time-consuming and incomplete coordination of theater PSYOP requirements and plans.

The present Administration appears to be cognizant of this perennial weakness in our PSYOP apparatus. The U.S. Information Agency, which has the principal responsibility for peacetime international communication, launched in 1981 an aggressive program named "Project Truth" to portray a more favorable image of the U.S. abroad, and to actively counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation. This new approach has not been without its detractors, however, to include some members of Congress; their concern in that "Project Truth" could take on too apparent a propaganda edge and end up destroying the credibility of the Voice of America and its parent agency, USIA. [4] Under the leadership of Director Charles Z. Wick, USIA has also been more receptive to interagency cooperation, a welcome change to those who remember a much a more reticent attitude on this subject under previous administrations.

Another major development was the Reagan Administration's announcement in the summer of 1982 that the President's national security strategy would have four basic components: diplomatic, economic, military and informational [emphasis added.] [5] In his address to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, President Reagan announced the intention of the United States to make a major effort to help "foster the infrastructure of democracy ... which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." A second and related theme of the President's address was a call to engage more vigorously in a peaceful "competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union and its Allies. [6] A $65 million program entitled "Project Democracy" was announced in early 1983 to promote democratic institutions abroad. The program was intended to focus on leadership training; education; strengthening institutions such as labor unions, churches, political parties and the media; conveying ideas and information through radio stations like the Voice of America; and development of personal and institutional ties. [7]

To strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of communication activities, in early 1983 the President signed National Decision Document 77, on public diplomacy. The decision established an interagency Special Planning Group (SPG) under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Membership consists of Secretary of State Schultz; Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Peter McPherson; and Charles Wick, Director of the US Information Agency. Four interagency standing committees have been established and will report regularly to the SPG: The International Information Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the USIA; the International Political Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the Department of State; the International Broadcasting Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Public Affairs Committee, co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for Communications and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. [8]

The President's initiatives have not been received with open arms by Congress and the media. Secretary of State Schultz encountered considerable skepticism when he outlined "Project Democracy" to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations in February 1983. Doubts were expressed by several subcommittee members about the feasibility and propriety of the U.S. trying to train young leaders and foster the growth of such democratic institutions as labor unions, political parties, news outlets, businesses and universities in countries where democracy is not permitted. "The more we look at this thing, the more nervous I become over it," said Representative Joel Pritchard, Republican of Washington. "I don't see how this program can possibly do anything but get us into trouble," said Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who labelled Project Democracy as "basically a multimillion dollar American propaganda effort." [9]

In early March, Director of USIA Charles Wick encountered similar tough questioning at the hands of several skeptical members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Former Senator J.W. Fullbright made an eloquent plea to committee members that they not mingle the Administration's short-term propaganda efforts with long-term overseas programs such as student exchanges, which have a non-political tradition. Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, asked that Wick return to the Committee with proposed legislative guidelines for Project Democracy. "If you wish this program to survive, you had better establish some parameters for behavior. I can see what's going to happen before it starts -- this is just going to be perceived as a propaganda tool," Dodd said. [10] Indeed, most of the proposed 65 million dollar program for "Project Democracy" has bee cut by Congress. [11]

This Congressional skepticism is vivid evidence of the obstacles which must be overcome for a Western democracy to wage effective psychological operations. Sensitive to this, the White House is concerned that its programs will be construed as a propaganda effort similar to campaigns waged by the Soviet Union; the President, for instance, has said it is "not propaganda -- it's public relations."
[12] thus the jury is still out on the Reagan Administration's peacetime "public relations" program, and there is little evidence of centralized policy direction to the Defense Department that would enable it to more effectively plan for wartime strategic level PSYOP. One would also hope that overt and covert propaganda efforts are being carefully coordinated, despite the fact that there is no CIA representation on the Special Planning Group or its four interagency subcommittees. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the current Administration are hopeful signs of improved national level guidance and coordination of U.S. psychological efforts.

Within the Department of Defense, the picture of our PSYOP capability is not very encouraging. At the "supporting superstructure" level, our PSYOP expertise is minimal. There are few personnel within the office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint State (OJCS) with extensive PSYOP experience; those with the requisite experience are often burdened with other duties and thus unable to devote their full energies to PSYOP matters. The same is true among the Service staffs in the Pentagon. The Army, with by far the bulk of forces and responsibilities dedicated to PSYOP, has at the present time only one fully qualified officer working full-time in this specialized area. Even this is an improvement -- two years ago there were no PSYOP qualified officers on the Army Staff. The situation is no better at the unified and major commands. With the exception of the RDJTF (CENTCOM), few of these commands -- which will direct the employment of military forces in their theaters during conflict -- have trained full-time PSYOP staff personnel. Significantly, there are no general or flag officers with PSYOP experience in positions where this experience can be brought to bear most effectively. In sum, psychological operations efforts are fragmented and too frequently ineffectual largely because PSYOP expertise is isolated from those who require it and from the mechanisms required to effectively apply it to every level of command.

Among the military services, again our PSYOP capability is limited. The Navy has a radio and television production capability in its reserves which is very good, plus a few mobile radio transmitters. The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of specially fitted C-130 aircraft for support of psychological operations, as well as other duties; it also has a handful of officers with PSYOP expertise, primarily as a result of having been instructors at the one-week familiarization course on PSYOP given at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida, and having served in PSYOP staff positions in unified commands or in the Pentagon. Only the Army has active duty forces dedicated solely to psychological operations.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is what remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability after PSYOP units in Okinawa, Panama and Germany were disbanded following the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Today its missions and responsibilities are many and worldwide in nature. The Group provides support to all levels, from the unified command through the division. It provides support to both conventional forces and unconventional warfare forces. In addition, it is often called upon to provide support directly to national level agencies and organizations, to include the Department of Army Staff and the OJCS.

Essentially, military psychological operations consists of two broad activities: research and analysis and operations. The first activity consists of continuous monitoring and assessing of the psychological environment in specific foreign nations and how this environment affects the formulation and execution of US policies and actions. This research and analysis results in the publication of studies and assessments that are unique within the interagency area. These studies and assessments provide the foundation for the establishment of psychological objectives to support U.S. goals relative to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is therefore essential to accomplishment of the second broad activity, operations. This activity includes planning and executing of specific psychological operations campaigns which employ communications media and other techniques with the goal of causing selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in ways which support U.S. national and military objectives.

The lion's share of peacetime activities for a PSYOP unit, therefore, is spent on research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences, developing PSYOP plans to support conventional and unconventional warfare units, and participating in field exercises which employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise at unified commands, the 4th Group also provides staff assistance and advice to these headquarters, as well as to other major commands.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing that one active duty PSYOP organization consisting of a Group headquarters, a radio section and three battalions is wholly insufficient to support all unified command requirements in mid or high-intensity conflict. The reserves, therefore, are a vital component of the "PSYOP community"; fully 80 percent of the Army's PSYOP mobilization capability lies in its Reserve component Units. The Reserve Component also provides some assistance in peacetime research and analysis support. Serving as the Army's Forces Command's (FORSCOM) planning agent under the CAPSTONE program (which links RC units with the units they would support mobilization), the 4th PSYOP Group coordinates the wartime planning efforts of RC units and provides training assistance.

Generally speaking, then, the active component 4th PSYOP Group acts as a "strategic nucleus" for the PSYOP community; it provides the bulk of peacetime research and analysis support, responds to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements, provides direction and guidance to the PSYOP community for wartime planning and peacetime exercise participation and provides the active component command and control nucleus for general or partial mobilization of reserve component forces. The Reserve Component assists in peacetime research and analysis efforts, performs its planning and training responsibilities under the CAPSTONE program, and prepares for general or partial mobilization in support of the unified commands.

One of the real success stories in the improvement of our PSYOP capability has been the unification of the Army "PSYOP community" under the aegis of the CAPSTONE Program. PSYOP supporting plans for unified commands have been developed, and subordinate level supporting plans are being completed. Every unit in the PSYOP community has a specific wartime mission, has established liaison with the units they will support upon mobilization, and in many instances have conducted field exercises with these supported units. These missions allow PSYOP units to focus on specific geographic regions, particularly essential for the Reserve Component because of their relatively limited time for developing campaign plans and conducting training; it also gives them a basis upon which to recruit linguists. Working closely together in this mission-oriented planning and training activities, this "PSYOP community" has achieve a sense of cohesion and camaraderie that could well serve as a model for the "Total Army" concept.

Paradoxically, the success achieved under the CAPSTONE Program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses: its capability to respond to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. As has been stated, for mid- and high-intensity conflict requirements, either partial or general mobilization of the Reserve Component is required. Conversely, the Active Component must be relied upon for almost all peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements -- which are increasing in scope, and which many observers feel will be the more likely threats to international stability during the 1980's. The most probable demands on PSYOP resources in this environment will be support to DOD and non-DOD agencies, staff assistance to unified commands, an increase in unscheduled studies and assessments oriented on crises-areas, and advisory Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) to Third-World nations. These demands, on top of the vital task of continuing to plan and train for mid- and high-intensity contingencies, will strain to the utmost the 4th PSYOP Group, which is already, in the words of a former Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, "the most over-committed and under-resourced colonel-level command in the Army." Recognizing this dilemma, the Army in 1981 approved a program for a modest enhancement of both personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group, in addition to addressing some critical equipment requirements of the Reserve Component. Implementation of this program, unfortunately, has become bogged down and little real improvement in overall capability has resulted to date.

While personnel resourcing and modernization of equipment are the most visible requirements to enhance the Army's PSYOP capability, these problems are only symptomatic of a larger issue, the lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP within the Army, and, indeed, throughout the military services. Some improvement has been seen in this critical area as a result of frequent briefings of senior commanders and staff officers by PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in contingency planning and support of conventional units on field exercises, and the steady improvement in quality of PSYOP studies and assessments (the latter aided considerably by the increased hiring of high-quality civilian intelligence analysts). The enthusiastic acceptance of PSYOP planning and support by the high-priority RDJTF has had a positive influence throughout the Defense establishment; it has also served as a model for interagency coordination in a politically sensitive area that demands such cooperation. Within the Army, the change in staff proponency for PSYOP from the G5 (Civil-Military Operations) to the G3 (Operations) should encourage commanders and staff officers to integrate PSYOP as a weapons systems in their planning rather than being considered only as an afterthought, as has been the case so often in the past. Within the Air Force, a few dedicated officers are working on the formulation of PSYOP operational doctrine for their service.

The momentum of these improvements will not be sustained, however, unless steps are taken to institutionalize PSYOP in the appropriate field manuals and to teach this doctrine in our service school system. The Army's 10-week PSYOP Staff Officer's Course taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, reaches a very small audience, mostly foreign officers and U.S. personnel scheduled for assignment to the 4th PSYOP Group. Similarly, the Air Force's one-week course, although a valuable overview, reaches only a limited audience. As was the case before our Vietnam involvement, PSYOP instruction in our service school system -- where our future commanders and staff officers are trained -- is limited or nonexistent. Its absence not only makes the PSYOP community's job more difficult in educating supported units on the capabilities and limitations of this unique weapons system, it also quite naturally has a negative effect when priorities concerning equipment modernization and personnel resourcing are being set. Most conventional force officers are not consciously anti-PSYOP; they simply have never been exposed to its value and therefore tend to put more emphasis on those areas with which they are more familiar. For the same reasons, many quality officers shun assignments to key PSYOP staff positions in active duty units or on high-level staffs. This out-of-the-mainstream image can only be reversed if PSYOP is institutionalized as a permanent and valued member of our family of weapons systems, rather than one that is resurrected only when a crisis occurs.

Contributing to this lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP is its continued association with, and subordination to, the special operations command and staff structure. Inclusion of the 4th PSYOP Group in the Army's recently formed 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) perpetuates and exacerbates this problem for the PSYOP community. The 1st SOCOM, using as its nucleus the former Headquarters, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, NC, has assigned to it all Special Forces units (to include those stationed overseas), the two Ranger battalions, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 4th PSYOP Group. Assignment of the 4th PSYOP Group to the 1st SOCOM will only further confuse those who previously believed PSYOP units to be part of special Forces. The uninformed will perceive the 4th Group to be focused primarily in support of other special operations forces, when in fact the Group's missions and responsibilities are much broader. [13]

This confusion over PSYOP and other special operations roles and missions is not a new problem. Indeed, the "spiritual father" of special operations forces, William J. Donovan, initially envisages the psychological dimension of warfare as his overarching organizational theme when he formed the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941:

Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing. The first stage would be 'intelligence penetration,' with the results processed by R&A [Research and Analysis], available for strategic planning and propaganda. Donovan called propaganda the 'arrow of initial penetration' and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. All of this represented the softening-up process, prior to invasion by friendly armed forces. Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional operations, thereby forging 'a new instrument of war.' [14]

Less than a year after COI's creation, it was dissolved but provided the nucleus for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); Donovan and OSS lost control of the overt propaganda function, however, which went to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI). The Army psychological warfare units that were formed during World War II primarily supported conventional ground forces, as was also the case during the Korean conflict.

There is a certain irony to this issue of PSYOP association with special operations when one considers the origins of the Army's Special Forces. With the impetus of the Korean War, the heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization in the Pentagon -- the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). The first head of this organization was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, who was General Eisenhower's Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) and thus emerged from World War II as the Army's foremost expert in this new field.

With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare; the inclusion of a Special Operations division in OCPW and McClure's selection of the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and the creation of Special Forces. Despite a "hot war" in Korea, the primary influence behind the Army's interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a guerrilla capability in Europe to held "retard" a Soviet invasion, should it occur. After some initial experimentation with the organizational machinery to conduct this "new concept" of warfare, the unit that emerged was clearly designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities, and it was based primarily on Donovan's OSS Operational Group Concepts -- not those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide the necessary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both Special Forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OPCW" would be located. The Psychological Warfare Center, created in 1952 at Fort Bragg, NC, was that center -- and it was there in the same year that the Army created its first formal unconventional warfare unit, the 10th Special Forces Group.

Roughly the same cold war tensions fueled interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial difference in the receptivity to each by the Army. Despite some of the "characters" associated with "sykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained increased respectability in the Army during World War II and Korea. On the other hand, the Army continued to view unconventional warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept Special Forces resulted from the legacy of OSS-military rivalry during World War II, a lack of appreciation for unconventional warfare by officers trained for conventional war, and a continuing suspicion of elite forces by the Army, as well as from the fact that there was no formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces units. Most important of all were the constraints of manpower and money in what was, despite the cold war, a peacetime Army.

In the face of resistance, both within the Army and from the Air Force and CIA, Special Forces nonetheless became a reality through the support of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonel Volckmann and Colonel Bank. But the bargaining positioning of unconventional warfare advocates weak in 1951-52; those in OCPW who wanted a separate existence for Special forces found it necessary to compromise. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and a tradition -- and unconventional warfare had neither -- it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the security restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Forces activities, explains the apparent ascendency of psychological warfare over unconventional warfare at that time.

General McClure's rationale for combining these two activities within OCPW in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially attributed to the heritage of General William Donovan's organizational philosophy, and to the fact that the other military services and the JCS had the same combination in their staffs. In allowing McClure his way, the Army may simply have found it convenient to lump these two relatively new out-of-the-mainstream (thus "unconventional") activities together while it attempted to sort out both ideas and weapons.

This marriage between psychological and unconventional warfare had its detractors, to be sure. Some psychological warfare officers believed that the kinds of background, education, training and experiences required for their field were inherently different from those necessary for the handling of special operations. Colonel Donald P. Hall, with psychological warfare experience in both World War II and Korea, expressed the view that there were few individuals who would have wide experience in both psychological and unconventional warfare. He feared that if the two fields were combined under one head, one of them "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the function in which the controlling personnel are especially interested and experienced." This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by Special Forces adherents in 1952; at that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare backgrounds. [15]

Colonel Hall's fears were prophetic, but the roles have been reversed since 1952. The tendency indeed has been to combine these functions in a single staff element at every headquarters level, to include the Department of the Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands. Over the years, these staff elements have usually been headed by Special Forces officers, strongly oriented toward their field of expertise. In such an organizational environment, it has been difficult for even the most conscientious PSYOP staff officer to give his full attention to the broader responsibilities of psychological operations, rather than those oriented toward special operations.

At Fort Bragg, the trend has been the same. The Psychological Warfare Center evolved into the Special Warfare Center in 1956, then the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance in 1969, and most recently, the 1st Special Operations Command. Through the years, key staff elements at the Center headquarters have invariably been headed by officers with Special Forces backgrounds.

An Air Force officer with long experience in PSYOP stated the problem for his service in 1977:

First the Air Force must put its own house in order by ... removing PSYOP from the enigma of being grouped only under Special Operations, specifying the all-encompassing nature of PSYOP regarding all Air Force actions, and delineating responsibilities as applying to all forces .... [16]

The problem, therefore, is not simply one of misperception by personnel outside the special operations community; rather, it is that under the 1st Special Operations Command concept, the 4th PSYOP Group may tend over time to more narrowly focus its limited resources on special operations at the expense of its broader missions and responsibilities. This tendency should be vigorously resisted. Increased acceptance of PSYOP by the military services lies not with special operations as its primary focus; it lies in the recognition by military and civilian leaders of its value as a weapons system that can be used throughout the conflict spectrum, to include support of conventional forces.

A closely related issue is that of wartime command and control relationships of PSYOP units under the 1st SOCOM concept. Consolidating the diverse capabilities represented by Special Forces, Ranger, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units under one headquarters for peacetime management is one thing. It is quite another matter to propose that this headquarters -- or a portion thereof -- will deploy to a theater, report directly to its commander, and direct the activities of all special operations units during wartime. If the latter course is being seriously considered, some perplexing questions emerge:

• Are current command and control provisions for special operations forces -- as outlined in unified command plans and supported by the Army's CAPSTONE program -- deficient?

• What common thread links Special Forces, PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Rangers to justify the requirement for a separate wartime headquarters to direct these diverse capabilities?

• Does the 1st SOCOM headquarters represent another "layer" between the theater commander and the individual special operations capabilities? Have the costs vs. benefits of this been thoroughly considered?

• What size headquarters will be required for the Commander, 1st SOCOM, to prepare for simultaneous deployment to multiple, geographically distinct theaters, provide the command and control nucleus for special operations forces and maintain an adequate training and sustaining base in the U.S.? How will this affect his span of control?

These questions should be thoroughly examined as planning for employment of the embryonic 1st SOCOM continues, because the answers arrived at could have significant implications for the use of PSYOP. Current doctrine envisages a Theater PSYOP Command or Task Force reporting directly to the Theater (Unified) Commander, exercising control over all PSYOP units and agencies whose resources can be directed toward support of PSYOP -- the goal being centralization of all PSYOP policy within one body to avoid duplication of effort, contradictory propaganda and propaganda contrary to national policy. PSYOP units, while considered "special operations forces," are combat support forces which must be prepared to simultaneously support both special operations and conventional missions. This distinction is important because over 90 percent of PSYOP units, both active and reserve, are assigned to support conventional forces; the remainder support special operations forces (primarily Special Forces units). Under current doctrine, Special Forces units operate under the control of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC) or task force (JUWTF). Thus, in the transition from peacetime to wartime, most of the PSYOP community aligns with a chain of command separate from other special operations forces. PSYOP units are employed at both strategic and tactical levels from theater to division, as a matter of routine; the other special operations forces are employed primarily as strategic assets on an exceptional basis.

While having the Ranger battalions under the command and control of the Commander, 1st SOCOM, might be rationalized (depending on how they are employed), it is difficult to envisage the conditions of employment for civil affairs units -- particularly in high or mid-intensity conflict -- that would justify placing them under the 1st SOCOM in wartime. PSYOP units may provide support to Civil Affairs during consolidation operations (those operations directed toward populations in either liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the liberating or occupying power), but the only time that Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP units might conceivably work together as a "package deal" is during some conditions of peacetime (MTTS) or low-intensity conflict.

Assuming that the 1st SOCOM is not designed solely for low intensity conflict threats, the insertion of this headquarters between the unified command and the disparate capabilities now embraced by the special operations label does not appear to offer many advantages. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to the close relationship that must exist between the senior PSYOP Commander and the Theater Commander in translating national policy to theater-level psychological operations objectives. Therefore, any such change in current doctrine and contingency plans needs to be carefully thought through and articulated, not only within the Army, but particularly to the Theater Commanders and their staffs.

All of this suggests that the time has come to consider a formal separation of PSYOP and special operations. As a prominent retired Army lieutenant general noted at the Special Operations Conference held at the National Defense University in March 1983, PSYOP is a phenomena in itself; it is so "all-pervasive" that marriage with Special Forces results in a case of mistaken identity which makes it so difficult for PSYOP units to carry out their doctrine and support other forces.

I believe that psychological operations are sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of this unique capability. This center should have both an operational component, and an educational, doctrinal and research and development component. The active duty operational component should initially consist of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group. Educational, doctrinal, and research and development responsibilities and resources for psychological operations should be transferred from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (formerly the Institute for Military Assistance) at Fort Bragg, NC.

Ideally, such a center should be joint in nature, with representation from the other military services. It could include, for example, the personnel currently assigned to teach psychological operations at the Air Force's Special Operations School at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida. Also included should be representatives from those governmental agencies with responsibility for information and communication, such as the USIA. A variety of courses could thus be offered, tailored to fit the needs of PSYOP units, both active and reserve, and to train PSYOP staff officers for the services, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands. The center should serve as the intellectual foundation and clearinghouse for PSYOP research -- both materiel and nonmateriel -- doctrine, education, and operational techniques that would benefit all services and interested agencies.

To be fully effective, this separation of PSYOP and special operations should also occur at every major headquarters and staff level among the services, in the OJCS, in OSD, and in the unified commands. This is particularly important at the unified command, because usually the only PSYOP officer in this headquarters is located in the special operations staff element, thus detracting from his broader responsibilities of planning PSYOP support for the theater commander's total contingency requirements. The unified command provides one of those vital nodes, or bridges, between military PSYOP and U.S. national level policy and strategy. It is here that much of the detailed planning must occur between the PSYOP staff officer and representatives from other governmental agencies whose resources would be made available to the theater commander to assist in carrying out his psychological operations campaigns during wartime. This aspect of detailed contingency planning for the transition from peace to war requires a great deal more attention. Separation of PSYOP from special operations at the unified command would facilitate this task.

In summary, despite the encouraging efforts of the current Administration to enhance the informational and public diplomacy component of its national security strategy, there is still no effective standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operation strategy. Serious deficiencies exist in our military PSYOP capability; the program initiated within the Army in 1981 to enhance both the personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group should be pursued vigorously, for the likelihood of increased peacetime and low-intensity conflict demands on the active component is high during the 1980s. The CAPSTONE Program accomplishments of the PSYOP community should provide the foundation for continued planning and training for mid- and high-intensity conflict in support of the unified commands, but strenuous efforts need to be exerted to equip the reserve component with modern equipment. While improvements in the understanding and appreciation of PSYOP have been seen within the Army, this momentum will not be sustained until PSYOP is institutionalized in our doctrine and taught in the service school system.

Inclusion of the 4th PSYOP Group in the 1st SOCOM must not result in its further isolation from the rest of the Army and the unified commands and possible dilution of its ability to accomplish its broader missions; in particular the wartime command and control relationship of PSYOP units under the SOCOM concept requires thorough examination. Indeed, serious consideration should be given to the formal dissociation of psychological operations and special operations at every level within the Department of Defense. Creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of military psychological operations is needed to enhance the understanding and appreciation of this unique capability and to improve its effectiveness in support of U.S. strategy.

Overall, the changes suggested here should significantly enhance both the organization and the effectiveness of the total psychological operations resources available to the U.S. To do less is to ignore an important and cost-effective dimension of strategy.



1. Stefan T. Possony, "The Invisible Hand of Strategy," Defense and Foreign Affairs (August 1975), p. 8. See also Samuel P. Huntington's discussion of "nonmilitary deterrence," pp. 14-21, in his chapter "The Renewal of Strategy," as part of Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982).

2. This paper is adapted from the author's "U.S. Psychological Operations Capabilities: An Assessment," presented at the Defend '83 Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 28 - 1 May, 1983.

3. Raymond J. Barrett, "PSYOP: What is It? and What Should We do About It?," Military Review (March, 1972), pp. 57-72. Although written over 10 years ago, Barrett's article is a lucid analysis of the use of PSYOP at the national level.

4. "The Great Propaganda War," U.S. News and World Report, 11 Jan 1982, p. 29; "Voice of America Finds its Words are Weighed," The New York Times, 5 October 1981; "U.S. Sharpening Information Policy Overseas," The Washington Post, 10 November 1981, pp. A1, A10.

5. William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Address on National Security Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May 1982; Thomas C. Reed, National Security Council, Address to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, 16 June 1982.

6. President Reagan, "Promoting Democracy and Peace," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 399, June 8, 1982.

7. "U.S. to Fund 'Democracy' Institutes," Washington Post, 21 January 1983; "Resist Urge to 'Go Public'," William Safire, New York Times, 24 January 1983, "U.S. Set to Promote Democracy Abroad," Washington Times, 8 February 1983; "Reagan; Let's Sell Freedom," UPI, 8 Feb 1983;
"Diplomacy Funds Separate from Arms Effort, State Says," Washington Post, 9 February 1983.

8. National Security Council Fact sheet, "Public Diplomacy," 8 February 1983.

9. "Skeptics Pelt Schultz with Queries on Reagan's 'Project Democracy'," Bernard Gwertzman, The New York times, 24 February 1983; "Lawmakers Voice Skepticism on U.S. 'Project Democracy'," Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post, 24 February 1983.

10. "USIA Chief Questioned on 'Project Democracy'," Patrick E. Tyler, The Washington Post, 13 March 1983; "Promoting the Infrastructure of Democracy', with Charts," Mary McGrory, The Washington Post, 3 March 1983.

11. "Reagan's Drive to Win World Opinion," Jeff Trimble, US News and World Report, 1 Aug 1983.

12. "U.S. to Fund 'Democracy' Institutes," Lou Cannon, The Washington Post, 21 January 1983.

13. As an example of the media reporting that contributes to misunderstanding of PSYOP, consider the headings on the following newspaper accounts about creation of the 1st SOCOM: "Warsaw Pact Harassment: Military is Directed to Revitalize Behind-the-Lines Forces," The Washington Post, June 20, 1982, "Elite Green Berets Hope to Recapture Their Glory Days," Washington Post, 17 September 1982, "Army Establishes Green Beret Headquarters," Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 September 1982. This article stated the following concerning the role of PSYOP: "The command is expected to cover a number of Army units with expertise in special operations, including psychological warfare [emphasis added] and civic action with the Green Berets acting as the core," sources said; "Comeback Eyed for Green Beret," AP, Harrisburg Patriot, 16 September 1982; "Better Days for Green Berets?," editorial, Harrisburg Patriot, 18 September; "General for a Special Force," New York Times, 4 October 1982; "Return of America's Secret Warriors," U.S. News and World Report, 15 November 1982. In only two of these articles is PSYOP mentioned, with no explanation as to the broad nature of its responsibilities. Similarly, the July issue of Defense 83, a publication of the Department of Defense, contains a cover story devoted to special operations (with photos of Special Forces soldiers) which explains very little concerning the broad range of PSYOP responsibility (pp. 8-13); the same is apparent in an article by the CG, 1st Special Operations Command, entitled "Special Forces: to Help Others Help Themselves," (complete with photos of "Green Berets" in action), in the widely read October 1983 "Green Book" issue of Army (pp. 246-252).

14. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 6. Original source -- Kermit Roosevelt, ed. War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker & Co., 1976), Volume 1, p. 16.

15. The documentation for this historical digression is provided in the author's U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press, 1982)

16. Fred W. Walker, "PSYOP is a Nasty Term -- Too Bad," in Ron D. McLaurin, ed., Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 264.
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 6:20 am

Project Truth Enhancement

Total: $24,000,000

The funding of the following projects would support the Political Democracy Initiative under the Project Truth umbrella:


It is imperative that this nation which spearheads the world-wide "second industrial revolution" -- telecommunications -- provide the USICA Inter-agency public affairs coordination structure, Project Truth, with the technical capability to provide the most efficient and productive media support for major USG policy initiatives like Political Democracy. Therefore, the following investment in infrastructure is indicated:

-- establish an inter-agency computerized system of follow-up on priority foreign policy issues to insure sustained and consistant public affairs treatment throughout the U.S. government. $515,000

-- Install "Washtax," a secure facsimile machine network linking the various agencies participating in the production of public affairs materials in support of priority foreign policy initiatives. $250,000

-- develop a fully comprehensive data base on all elements of public diplomacy (issues, publics, media, and countries) to be part of an interactive computer system for instantaneous "dial-up" data sharing between Washington and the field as well as among USG Agencies. $2,670,000

-- enhance the USICA research office to better serve as an integral part of the public policy process by introducing higher-level research "marketing strategy," audio-visual briefings and a new product, FOREIGN OPINION RESEARCH ADVISORY, (FORA), which would draw out policy implications of research data. $690,000

-- develop the capability to conduct studies that assist in the design of a coherent program for specific audiences through appropriate media, carrying tailored messages on Political Democracy themes as well as to conduct follow-up studies to evaluate program reach and impact. $550,000

-- improve USSR research monitoring activities: thematic analysis of propaganda, disinformation, and active measures; analysis of Soviet print/broadcast media with special attention to Soviet and block internal articles which contradict materials prepared for external use. $300,000

-- institute a propaganda library under the auspices of the Agency library to provide inter-agency public affairs programs with the reference resources on Communist ideology, methodology, vocabulary, and propaganda necessary to develop effective U.S. responses to Communist lines of conversation. $375,000
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 7:49 pm

Letter from R. Bruce McColm to Walter Raymond, Jr.
August 9, 1982

Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018

Freedom's Advocate the World Over

August 9, 1982

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
Office of National Security Adviser to the President
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Walter:

Leo Cherne has asked me to send these copies of Freedom Appeals. He has probably told you we have had to cut back this project to meet financial realities. The Independent journal is now combined with Freedom at Issue (as the latest issue of the latter reveals).

We would, of course, want to expand the project once again when, as and if the funds become available. Offshoots of that project appear in newspapers, magazines, books and on broadcast services here and abroad. It's a significant, unique channel of communication.

Best wishes,


Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director


[Handwritten notes: Answer - 1. Appreciate ref letter




20 West 40th Street
New York, N.Y. 10018
(212) 730-7744

September 15, 1984

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
National Security Council
The White House
Old Executive Office Building
Room 351
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Walter:

Enclosed please find a short proposal for the Center's Nicaragua project 1984-85. The project combines elements of the oral history proposal with the publication of The Nicaraguan Papers. The book itself will be a compilation of the key documents, speeches, interviews, given by the Sandinista comandantes from 1961 through the present and arranged according to subject matter. The interviews done with defectors or participants in the FSLN's internal discussions will serve to introduce the theme or document and place it in an historical context.

Maintaining the oral history part of the project adds to the overall costs; but preliminary discussions with film makers have given me the idea that an Improper Conduct-type of documentary could be made based on these materials. Such a film would have to be the work of a respected Latin American filmmaker or a European. American-made films on Central America are simply too abrasive ideologically and artistically poor. Of the three film projects currently under development for television, none fit the bill. The groundwork laid by the oral history part of the project will feed into a documentary at the same time furnish the introductions for each section of The Nicaraguan Papers.

David Nolan's book The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984) is a valuable addition to the massive bibliography on the Nicaraguan situation. It should but probably will not receive wide distribution. Its value lies in tracing the Sandinistas ideological roots from their beginning through the various tactical and strategic debates during the 1977-79 conflict. Using many of the movement's own works, Nolan does a good job in synthesizing the FSLN's ideological zigs-and-zags as they relate to guerrilla war strategy (something he should have made more explicit). The rather arcane subject matter of Marxist-Leninist factional fights limits the audience to academics and foreign policy specialists.

The Nicaraguan Papers attempts something quite different. The Grenada documents, at least the selection available to the public so far, allow the reader an insider's view of how ideological architects set about constructing a Marxist-Leninist state through factional fights, internal repression, diplomatic peace offensives, and covert military and security assistance from East Bloc countries. However, nothing must has been revealed about the seven years of planning and strategy that preceded the New Jewel Party's coup d'etat. Whatever The Nicaraguan Papers lack in terms of juicy accounts of training in the Soviet Union or the personality clashes is more than made up by its following a Marxist-Leninist movement from its creation, its initial failures, the war itself, to its attempts to create a revolutionary state. This would be the book's primary value, especially in light of the ongoing debate in the United States over Central America.

Behind internal ideological debates are objective realities. Nolan's book neglects to discuss some of the regional and global situations which FSLN tactics were addressing. The Nicaraguan Papers, for example, will discuss how much of the present Sandinista state was already formed and in place in 1979 as part of the FSLN's strategy for taking power. A dimension also lacking in the Grenada documents and crucial for understanding more overt power struggles later on. Also, key documents of the 1978-1980 period demonstrate in very nuts and bolts fashion how the FSLN planned to subvert or neutralize all existing free institutions. These documents discuss with some frankness the relationship between maintaining a pluralist front on the diplomatic side, while consolidating the revolution internally.

The Nicaraguan Papers will also be readily accessible to the general reader, the journalist, the opinion-maker, the academic and the like. The book would be distributed fairly broadly to these sectors and I am sure will be extremely useful. They already constitute a form of Freedom House samizdat, since I've been distributing them to journalists for the past two years as I've received them from disaffected Nicaraguans.

Starting September 24th, I'll be in Washington for two weeks for the OAS Inter-American Commission of Human Rights meetings and will be staying at the Anthony House for the duration. Let's see if we can get together to discuss the proposal.

Best Regards,

R. Bruce McColm




NEW YORK, N.Y. 10018
(212) 730-7744


During the joint American-Caribbean rescue operation in Grenada last October, a treasure trove of documents was discovered that provided the first inside glimpse of the strategy and tactics used by ideological architects to build a Marxist-Leninist state in the Caribbean. The materials documented everything from internal factional fights, the manipulation of American media, secret military agreements with Cuba, Soviet Union and the East block, and a strategy to infiltrate the island's churches and trade unions. The archive, currently being published by the United States Government in several volumes and selectively for a general audience by Prof. Paul Seabury at the University of California at Berkeley, will remain of historical significance for years to come.

A similar, slightly less spectacular set of documents concerning the Nicaraguan Revolution has slowly emerged over the past five years as former Sandinistas and their allies have become disillusioned with the direction of that Central American state. Unlike the Grenada documents, these minutes of party meetings, party platforms and briefings to select FSLN cadres are in the private possession of individuals dispersed over the United States and Latin America. Few of these revealing materials have been published, let alone written about. Others have been published by small radical left publishing houses in Mexico and are only available in Spanish.

While the Grenada documents revealed the most intimate inner-workings of a Marxist-Leninist regime and subsequently dispelled any doubts about the direction of that Revolution, there continues to be a divisive dispute in this country over the Sandinistas' true ideology and the direction of that regime. This debate over the nature of the Nicaraguan Revolution has polarized every significant institution in this country, particularly the church and labor. Consequently, the Nicaraguan government has mobilized in this country the most extensive and sophisticated network of support groups since the Vietnam War. Claiming a commitment to pluralism, economic reform and democracy, the Sandinistas, since their triumph, have been able to organize, along with the Salvadoran guerrillas, this nation-wide network keying each significant sector of the American society for the purpose of mobilizing American public opinion against Washington's policies.

Perhaps more significantly, this network has mobilized vast financial and material resources to disseminate the Sandinista line to the media, religious leaders, academics, local labor leaders as well as congressional staff and members. Material support -- food, medicine, cash donation, and even weaponry -- for the Sandinistas as well as the Salvadoran guerrillas, according to their own statements, amounts to approximately $25 million a year. Much of this support derives from average American citizens, who have been told of the young Revolution and its democratic aspirations.

The dreary tale of Western syncophants of revolutions has been well-documented, especially in Paul Hollander's book Political Pilgrims. In past revolutions, accurate information concerning the repression of free institutions, ethnic minorities, political dissidents and the totalitarian nature of the revolutionary elite was either not available or suppressed.

This is not the case in Nicaragua. Former officials and guerrillas have brought out of the country many of the documents detailing the FSLN's strategy to manipulate world opinion, while consolidating the revolution internally. The documents, already in the Center's possession, discuss the methods to be used for discrediting the Archbishop of Managua and the traditional Catholic Church, suppressing the free trade unions and eventually eliminating the private sector. One document even urges cadres to tolerate Christmas for the first few years of the Revolution because "Even the Soviet Union took a long time before it eliminated superstitution." Another discusses how elections will enable the "legitimization of a Marxist-Leninist state".

The Nicaraguan Papers covers a longer time-frame than the documents found in Grenada. The book itself would reprint internal documents from the FSLN from its founding through the 1977-79 war and its strategy for consolidating the revolution during the 1980s. While not as extensive as the Grenada archives, by any stretch of the imagination, The Nicaraguan Papers documents the rise of an insignificant Marxist-Leninist organization from guerrillas to the political elite in a state, which foments regional revolution. The key documents of the 1978-1980 period reveal how the Marxist-Leninists gained total control over the revolutionary organizations and actually put in place the organizational structure which would become post-revolutionary Nicaragua.

The book itself would be approximately 250-400 pages long. An introduction would written either by R. Bruce McColm or a well-known former Sandinista diplomat. To make it more accessible to the journalist, student and academic, it will be divided in sections according to key themes. These sections will be introduced by the commentary of a variety of former Sandinistas such as Alfonso Robelo, Eden Pastora, Arturo Cruz, Sr., and Donald Castillo who will place the documents into an historical context and elaborate on the discussions between the comandantes at that time.

Alfonso Robelo

Background. Alfonso Robelo was active in Nicaraguan politics for over 30 years. He was an original member of a five-person ruling junta of the Sandinista Government, a Southern Front Contra political leader and later Ambassador to Costa Rica during the presidency of Violetta Chamorro. Robelo's opposition to the Sandinistas crystallized in mid-1980 when he resigned his position on the Sandinista Council of State to protest the Council's expansion and addition of FSLN members. By early 1982, Robelo -- along with Eden Pastora and Brooklyn Rivera -- formed ARDE.

Allegations of Drug Trafficking. An October 1984 cable to Headquarters reported that a Sandinista newspaper, El Nuevo Diaro, had stated on October 10, 1984 that Robelo and ARDE had accepted help from an unidentified drug trafficker in Miami. The article also said that two FRS/ARDE helicopters had been painted with a black substance to make them invisible to radar.

In June 1987, CIA learned that Robelo had been contacted by two Bolivians -- Enrique Crespou and Fernando Perou -- who had offered to make a "significant" monetary contribution to the Contras. Robelo said that they offered $150 million to the Contras with "no strings attached." Robelo said that the Bolivians were evasive in their answers about the origins of the funds. Robelo was advised not to accept any money from the Bolivians until its origins could be determined.

CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. No information has been found to indicate that CIA took any actions to follow up on the 1984 Sandinista newspaper allegation that Robelo and ARDE were involved in dealings with a drug trafficker.

In October 1988, a cable reported to Headquarters that Perou and Crespou had been accused during a press conference by Roberto Suarez Levy, son of imprisoned cocaine "king" Roberto Suarez Gomez, of being CIA agents. Suarez Levy also alleged that CIA and DEA were operating a cocaine lab in "Huanchaca," Bolivia. A Headquarters response stated that the only relevant information it had regarding Perou and Crespo was that they had met with Robelo in June 1987 and offered him $150 million for the Contras.

Robelo says he does not recall the meeting with the Bolivians or their reported offer of $150 million. He does not deny that the meeting may have taken place, but states that he participated in approximately 10 situations when people offered to donate large sums of money to the Contras but did not do so.

Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. No information has been found to indicate that CIA informed U.S. law enforcement or other agencies or the Congress about the 1984 Sandinista newspaper allegation. CIA informed Congress about the alleged offer of $150 million from the Bolivians in 1997 in the context of another matter.


Eden Pastora

Background. Eden Pastora Gomez, whose "war name" was Commandante Zero, joined the Sandinistas in the early 1970s to seek the overthrow of Somoza. Especially popular after he stormed Somoza's National Palace in 1978, he was nonetheless excluded in 1979 from the Sandinista National Liberation Front's (FSLN's) nine-man Directorate and given relatively minor positions in the post-Somoza Sandinista Government. These setbacks displeased Pastora, and he also claimed to be dismayed by the leftward turn of the Sandinista regime. In 1981 Pastora broke with the Sandinistas, and he went into self-imposed exile in Costa Rica shortly thereafter.

Pastora formed the FRS in early 1982 and allied his group with several other Contra organizations to form the Costa Rican-based ARDE in September 1982. Pastora led ARDE's military struggle against the FSLN until July 1984, when the organization's leadership replaced him. An ARDE spokesman attributed Pastora's replacement to injuries received in the May 1984 bomb attack against him at La Penca, but Pastora's leadership had also been undermined by his refusal to join forces with leaders of the Northern Front. Pastora left ARDE in 1986 and withdrew from the military effort.

Between early 1982 and mid-1984, Pastora was the main recipient of the funds CIA channeled to Contras fighting on the Southern Front. However, the funding allocated by Congress for the Contras had been expended by August 1984, and CIA was forced to cease its material support. More comprehensive congressional restrictions on the Agency's ability to support the Contras took effect in October 1984 and remained in place until December 1985.

The cutoff of U.S. funding led associates of Pastora to begin looking for alternative sources of funds. In October 1984, CIA began receiving the reporting mentioned earlier that Southern Front leaders allied with Pastora had agreed to help Miami-based trafficker Jorge Morales bring drugs into the United States in exchange for his material and financial help to the Southern Front. A subsequent October Headquarters cable instructed those dealing with Pastora:

. . . not to take definitive action to declare the relationship with [Pastora] terminated. Rather, we want to back away from the man leaving him guessing as to the status of his relationship with [CIA]. We do not want to initiate contact with him under any circumstances, unless it is done for the purpose of manipulating him towards some objective clearly consistent with [U.S.] policy in the region.

The Agency's relationship with Pastora was one of its most significant with a Contra leader. While the drug trafficking allegations were a factor in the decision to terminate that relationship, the October 1984 Headquarters cable indicated that the Agency was responding to other factors as well. CIA also judged that the advantages of dealing with Pastora were outweighed by the poor performance of his Southern Front fighting forces, by counterintelligence issues arising from his contacts with the Sandinistas in Managua, and by operational restrictions imposed by Congress.

In November 1984, Headquarters instructed that "no direct action is to be taken with [Pastora]. Ideally, you will be able to avoid him altogether." A November reply stated that only four meetings with Pastora had occurred since July 1984 and that the last of these was on October 18. At the last meeting, it had reportedly been made clear that CIA could no longer provide any support, direct or indirect, to Pastora's organization.

Allegations of Drug Trafficking. An October 1982 cable to Headquarters reported that INS had received information indicating that a meeting of Contra members was to be held in Costa Rica to discuss an exchange in the U.S. of arms for narcotics. A November 1982 cable identified Pastora as one of those who would be attending.

CIA began receiving reporting in October 1984 indicating that associates of Pastora in ARDE had agreed to work with known narcotics trafficker Jorge Morales. That same month Harold Martinez Saenz -- a former deputy FRS commander -- said that he could no longer support ARDE due to Pastora's ineffective leadership. Martinez had also stated that he did not want to become involved in drug and arms smuggling activities and corrupt handling of money, thus inferring that Pastora and his staff were involved in those activities.

Regarding the arrangement allegedly worked out with Morales by Pastora's FRS associates in 1984, Adolfo Chamorro says that Pastora was not aware of Morales' drug trafficking activities until after the meetings in October 1984 and after Pastora himself had met with Morales in December 1984. Cables in 1985 indicate that Pastora "temporarily discontinued" the arrangement with Morales in early January 1985 when he realized the potential political fallout from dealing with narcotics traffickers. Pastora says that he ordered that the planes donated by Morales be returned when he learned that Morales was a drug trafficker.

In April 1985, according to a Headquarters cable, the text of a February Sandinista radio broadcast from Managua alleged that Pastora and his associates were completing construction of three landing strips in the Guanacaste area of Costa Rica for light aircraft to be used for drug trafficking. The drug trafficking was being undertaken, the radio broadcast said, to substitute for the financing that was no longer available in the wake of a Congressional cutoff of Contra funding.

An April 1985 cable to Headquarters reported that an employee of Alpa Airlines had said that the company was concealing cocaine in yucca shipments destined for the United States. The cable reported that two of the five persons reported to be owners of Alpa were Gerardo Duran and David Mayorga.(12) Duran had already been identified as a close associate of Pastora. In addition, one of the planes allegedly used by Alpa Airlines was reported to belong to Pastora and ARDE.

A December 1985 Headquarters cable stated that Adolfo Chamorro had told a Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) member that a Panamanian, Cesar Rodriguez, was gathering drug money for Pastora. Rodriguez was identified in this cable as a narcotics trafficker who had business ties to Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega.

A January 1986 cable reported to Headquarters that a Costa Rican associate of Pastora reportedly said that he had 200 kilograms of cocaine he wished to use in helping to finance Pastora's Contra activities.

In June 1986 and July-August 1987, CIA was told of a trip to Panama by Jose Davila, Carol Prado and Pastora. During the trip, Pastora reportedly had accepted $10,000 from Cesar Rodriguez, who was described as a narcotics trafficker from Colombia.

CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. CIA terminated its relationship with Pastora in October 1984, within two weeks of receiving the first reporting about ARDE's drug-related dealings with Morales. While other factors were involved, the drug trafficking allegations weighed in the decision.

A February 1986 cable requested an inter-Agency review of the information implicating David Mayorga in narcotics trafficking because he was one of Pastora's closest advisors. The same cable noted that this information "needs to be made available to those still bent on seeing that [Pastora] is given . . . funding." No information has been found to indicate that such a review took place.

On March 1986, a Station asked Headquarters for specific instructions regarding what role Pastora was to play in the Contra unification agreement. The Station outlined the drug allegations against Pastora's associates in the cable and stated that:

. . . .

in COS' view, a political or other kind of accommodation with [Pastora] in which [the Agency] plays a known mediating role places [the Agency] is an untenable and unjustifiable position for which, in COS' view, there can be no reasonable or acceptable explanation.

. . . .

We will work through one united command structure, built around the one which is currently in place. We [w]ill not work through the existing FRS structure because, simply put, it is too badly penetrated by Sandinistas and too many of the players have been associated with narcotics smuggling. We will be willing to incorporate members from the FRS structure into t[h]e unified structure, but only after they have been given a thorough security screening

. . . .

Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. As explained earlier, the reporting tying Pastora and senior members of his group to drug smuggling operations into the United States was disseminated by CIA to a broad range of senior USG intelligence and law enforcement officials.

OCA files indicate that the Agency forwarded to Steven Berry, Associate Counsel of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), on January 29, 1985, a response to a question regarding Pastora's possible consummation of a working arrangement with Colombian drug dealers. The Agency response noted that all relevant details had been reported in the program summaries to HPSCI. The response added that:

To summarize, intelligence reporting indicates that members of Pastora's organization (FRS) have agreed -- either with Pastora's direct knowledge or tacit approval -- to provide pilots and landing strips inside Costa Rica and Nicaragua to a Miami-based Colombian drug dealer in exchange for financial and material support. Information pertaining to Pastora's involvement in drug trafficking has been forwarded to the appropriate Enforcement Agencies. [sic]

On August 1, 1986, CATF legal officer Louis Dupart forwarded to CATF Chief Fiers, LA Division Chief and LA Division Deputy Chief a MFR for a meeting with HPSCI Staffer Mike O'Neil held on July 9, 1986 in CATF Chief's office at O'Neil's request to discuss another topic. The memorandum stated that, in response to other questions from O'Neil, Chief/CATF said that Pastora had voluntarily renounced his role as a resistance leader.

On April 25, 1986, Headquarters authorized the sharing with DEA of documents that described the October 1984 agreement between ARDE officials and Morales. DEA reportedly planned to use the documents as background information prior to debriefing Adolfo Chamorro in Miami.

In July 1987, a Station reported to Headquarters that, unless advised otherwise, the Station intended to provide the local DEA office with a message from Octaviano Cesar. The message indicated that Marcos Aguado wanted to contact the CIA to provide specific information that tied Eden Pastora to "past drug trafficking."

On July 31, 1987, CATF Chief Alan Fiers testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) concerning the allegations that Morales had made in testimony at the Kerry Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) regarding Contra involvement in narcotics trafficking. Fiers discussed what CIA knew about drug trafficking allegations concerning Pastora and a number of former FRS/ARDE members. Fiers stated that the Agency did not have knowledge that Pastora was directly involved in the Morales narcotics deal, but also said:

We have a significant body of evidence with regard to involvement of the former members of ARDE in the Southern Front--Pastora's people being directly involved in cocaine trafficking to the United States. . . .

In addition, according to SSCI transcripts, Fiers used one of his biweekly meetings with the SSCI to share information with that Committee regarding allegations that Southern Front personnel were involved in narcotics trafficking. On October 14, 1987, Fiers stated to the SSCI regarding Pastora's plans to return to Nicaragua:

We frankly don't very much care what [Pastora] does right now. We don't think it would be a terrible problem for us. You must always remember that the Sandinistas know what we know. This guy is a cocaine runner. Period. He ran cocaine. And they know that and we know that and they don't want him back. He's a hot potato for anybody.

A January 4, 1988 MFR drafted by Robert Buckman, OCA, indicated that CATF provided a summary briefing on the Nicaraguan program for SSCI on the same date. At that briefing, Senator Bill Bradley inquired about allegations of drug trafficking, and Fiers responded that "Pastora had been involved with a Colombian trafficker, but the FDN was clean."

-- Office of Inspector General Investigations Staff Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking in the United States

The project calls for a coordinator, who will interview former Sandinistas and locate those documents not currently in the Center's possession. Materials obtained from taped interviews will also form the basis of a documentary film on many of the subjects covered by the book. An editorial assistant would be in charge of publication and distribution. Since the book will be published in both English and Spanish, the project has substantial translation costs.

The project coordinator for The Nicaraguan Papers tentatively is Adriana Guillen, a former Sandinista and reporter for La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in the country. Ms. Guillen for many years was an insider to the deliberations of the FSLN before she left the Nicaragua. Since then, she was the American representative of Misura, the Nicaraguan Indian organization for the past three years.

At this date, the Center has not decided on whether to publish the book out of Freedom House or through a commercial publisher. Although a commercial publisher has advantages in the continental United States, Freedom House is more able to distribute the book in Latin America and Europe through two newly established programs created for this purpose.

The Nicaraguan Papers will be an important addition to the massive bibliography on Central America as well as a much needed antidote to the public's confusion over the true nature of the Sandinista revolution. It will be aggressively marketed and distributed, especially in the trade market. Marketing plans include:

* free distribution to members of Congress and key public officials;

* distribution of galleys in advance of publication for maximum publicity and timely reviews in newspapers and current affairs magazines.

* press conference at Freedom House in New York and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

* op-ed circulation to more than 100 newspapers (and translation into foreign languages for circulation abroad.)

* distribution of a Spanish-language edition through Hispanic organizations in the United States and in Latin America.

* arrangement of European distribution through Freedom House contacts.



Project Coordinator: $25,000
Editorial Assistant: 16,000
[Total]: $41,000
Translation: $7,000
Honoria and fee for introduction: 8,000
Typing of drafts and final manuscript: 3,000
Transcription of interview tapes (100 hours of taped interviews): 8,100
Research materials: 2,500
Overhead: (International phone calls, office space, copying, secretarial services, etc.): 8,000
Graphic Artist fee for cover: 1,500
Publishing Costs (2,000 hardcover and 10,000 trade paperback): 45,000
Distribution Costs: 10,000
Total Costs (Including printing): $134,100
Cost of Project (Commercial publisher assumes printing and distribution costs in the continental United States): $79,100
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 8:54 pm

Letter from Leo Cherne to William J. Casey [Bill]
June 24, 1981

Leo Cherne
The Research Institute of America, Inc.
589 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017
June 24, 1981

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a copy of the draft manuscript by Bruce McColm, Freedom House's resident specialist on Central America and the Caribbean. This manuscript on El Salvador was the one I had urged be prepared and in the haste to do so as rapidly as possible, it is quite rough. You had mentioned that the facts could be checked for meticulous accuracy within the government and this would be very helpful.

Please convey to whoever may undertake to do that, not to wrestle with grammatical, stylistic or other things which need improvement. I have just arranged with Rita Freedman to undertake that aspect of the task. Also, if I can secure the funding to assemble the very best of available materials for a book, I have come up with a tentative working title, "The Case for a Non-Communist El Salvador" and a detailed understanding with Rita Freedman on the gathering of the best pieces, factual and polemical.

If there are any questions about the McColm manuscript, I suggest that whomever is working on it contact Richard Salzmann at the Research Institute, 755-8900. He is Editor-in-Chief at the Institute and Chairman of the Freedom House's Salvador Committee. He will make sure that the corrections and changes get to Rita Freedman who will also be working with him. If there is any benefit to be gained from Salzmann's coming down at any point to talk to that person, he is available to do so.


Leo Cherne

Honorable William J. Casey
4100 Cathedral Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

[Handwritten note: Manuscript to Lopez AO/AB]
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 9:53 pm

Letter From James R. Huntley to Anne W. Coulter
25 June 1982

Seminars and Studies Program
4000 N.E. 41st Street
P.O. Box C-5395
Seattle, Washington 98105
Telephone (206) 525-3130

25 June 1982

Ms. Anne W. Coulter
Program Director
The American Political Foundation
PO Box 37034
Washington, DC 20013

Dear Anne:

What a very pleasant surprise to get your letter and all the enclosures! The materials fill in a number of gaps for me, and I thank you. I read the President's speech in the New York Times, but I had not seen all the editorial coverage you forwarded. I have also talked with various friends in Washington about this and I am sure, as the British say, "You are on a good wicket." I am glad that you are staying on with the APF, as I know they will need you.

I thought I might pass on some comments which you might like to share with George Agree. Indeed, I might have sent them to him, except that you wrote first and also I imagine he is head-over-heels with things to do at the moment. So, for either or both of you, here are my thoughts about the study on which you are embarking.

1. It is not entirely clear, from your proposals or from the President's speech, where the emphasis will be put with respect to various kinds of countries.
I'm sure there will be a lot of pressure on you to pay particular attention to the Soviet Bloc, but that is precisely the area where it is most difficult to see what can be done. I'm not a specialist on that part of the world, so I will have to leave that to others. (Ray Gastil will have some valuable ideas in this regard.) But I guess what I'm really trying to say is this: If the envisaged effort, which I shall call "Project Democracy" for the sake of an easy handle, concentrates mainly on dictatorships, whether authoritarian or totalitarian, and makes a sort of frontal attack on these most difficult cases, I think you are going to stir up an awful lot of hornets' nets and make less progress than people would like. The alternative would be to defer the hardest cases, or at least give them a more long-term timetable, and concentrate on countries which are (a) marginal cases, i.e., those in which some of the forces of democracy are already at work, but perhaps tenuously or fitfully; and (b) countries which have an extremely important place strategically in the future world scheme of things. I am sending with this letter a copy of a chart which I prepared for a Battelle study called "World Politics in the 1980s." It attempts to classify countries both geographically and according to "type." The type classification has to do with stages of development, political as well as economic. I have omitted from this chart countries whose future I do not consider to be of terribly great import, in a political or strategic sense. I do not suggest that you omit them from consideration, but I do suggest that a higher priority should be given to countries on the chart than to those which are not. I have circled a few countries which I think stand out as deserving of the highest priority. Egypt would be one example -- a place which certainly is not very democratic, but which is in a kind of transition stage; also a place which is of absolute strategic importance, for many reasons. I would give Egypt a lot higher priority than I would (for example) Saudi Arabia, because I think there is a better chance of doing something constructive in Egypt than in Saudi Arabia. That of course is a matter of judgment; maybe what I mean to say is that Saudi Arabia needs a long term approach, whereas I think one could do a lot in Egypt because the culture is more receptive at this stage to democratic ideas. Concentrate on the exchange students for Saudi Arabia, and also on training civil servants, but bring the Egyptians who are already in strategic positions to the United States and to other democratic countries for short tours to find out how democracies are run. And help them set up their own institutes for democracy, if they are so inclined, etc. By this same token, I would put more emphasis on Brazil than on Argentina.

2. I would pay special attention to countries outside the NATO-OECD group in which democracy already has something of a good start -- such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, Barbados, Papua-New Guinea, India, Colombia, Peru, etc.

3. Do not neglect the "nouveau democratique" nations within the Western Alliance, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece or Turkey. They would, I think, be of strategic value with respect to their former colonies and with respect (in the case of Turkey) to other Moslem countries.

4. Neither the President nor your proposals mention bringing the other Western countries (including Japan) into this effort; I think that it is of the utmost importance to work cooperatively with political parties and non-governmental forces in any or all of the NATO-OECD group, wherever a good deal stands to be gained from such cooperation. I know it is more cumbersome and difficult, but if this program turns out to be just an American one, it will turn out to be much more suspect and (I think) much less effective than if you have a number of participating groups from various countries in on the planning as well as the execution of whatever programs you're engaged in.
The case which you make so well for the German political foundations having paved the way is an eloquent argument for, at times, letting them and other similar groups in other countries do the job instead of involving the US directly.

5. Your proposal often mentions the word "bipartisan" and I heartily subscribe to that, but I think you ought also to use the adjective "non-partisan" at times, because there are many people (including myself) who are not strongly attached to either party, who nevertheless have strong convictions and a few ideas about how to do the job in which you are engaged. Many foundations are good examples of such institutions; they can help a lot but they would not consider themselves partisan in any sense.

6. I think in the study you are now undertaking you could get some good ideas from a careful examination of American experience in promoting democracy, after 1945, in Germany and Japan. I realize that the circumstances were vastly different than in party of the world today, and that many of the same carrots and sticks which we employed during a military occupation would not be at all appropriate. Nevertheless, having played a part in the American efforts to re-educate and reorient the Germans in 1952 to 1955, both at a national level (from Frankfurt) and out in small towns and provinces, I can testify that many of the things which we did were entirely persuasive in character, and that the Germans were eager to learn and to be partners with us in re-establishing the political base in that benighted country. I think the same thing can be said of many features of the occupation in Japan, and I think it would help you a lot to pull together a little advisory group of people who had experience in both countries, at the time.

7. There are three other countries where I think American experience would be especially relevant: Nigeria, Iran, and Egypt. I don't know much about any of the three cases, but I believe that foreign service officers and others who know about them could be readily found to identify what we failed to do, or did wrong. This could be an extremely productive enterprise in connection with "Project Democracy."

8. Following are a few suggestions for people and organizations who I think could be of special help to you:

J. Allan Hovey, now with the General Accounting Office and on the Board of the Atlantic Council of the US. Back in the 1950s he was the Secretary in Europe for the American Committee for a United Europe and has a great deal of knowledge about how these kinds of things can be done.

R.D. Gastil, Freedom House. You've met Ray and I think George Agree knows him well. I probably don't have to tell you that he [is] one of the world's experts on democracy and political modernization. He also is a member of The Committee for a Community of Democracies, DC. We would like to help you in any way that we can. Among the members of the Committee with a good deal of relevant experience to what you're doing, I suggest that Ray Gastil and the Committee Secretary Bob Foulon are the principal people to discuss this with. We are quite prepared to set up a working group to help you, if we can. (One example of our membership: Richard Van Wagenen, who held an important post in the occupation of Germany and the re-education efforts there, later with World Bank, wrote a seminal book on cooperation among the democracies, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area.)

Tim Greve, editor of the Oslo evening paper, Verdensgang, former Secretary of the Nobel Committee, and once private secretary to Halvard Lange. He could be a key person in getting all relevant groups in Norway into the program.

J.D. Livingston Booth, retired head of Charities Aid Foundation in the UK, founder and chairman of the International Standing Conference on Philanthropy. His knowledge of foundation law and activity in Europe and other parts of the world (including Latin America) is unparalleled. If you want to know about charitable instrumentalities, and about non-profit activity generally, this is the man. Address: Cedar House, Yalding, Kent, ME18 6JD, England.

The Liberal International in London. As you know, the "liberals" in most other parts of the world are actually pretty conservative, and generally favor free enterprise, but also civil liberties, etc. Urs Schoegttli is the international secretary general with offices at One Whitehall Place, London SW1. I know that he has a deep interest in the general aims of "Project Democracy". He is young and Swiss and very active.

I myself. I have no current plans for a trip back East, with one tentatively in the autumn. If you need me sooner, the APF or somebody else would have to pay my fare and expenses, but I would be willing to come for a few days if necessary. Would be glad to help you if I can in a minor way via the telephone or letters.

I don't have to tell you that what you're doing is extremely important. I am elated that the program is getting off the ground and want you to succeed if there is a human way to insure that!

Cordial good wishes.

James R. Huntley
Battelle Fellow

PS: We hope that you and George will both be members of CCD/DC. [CCD USA, COMMITTEES FOR A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES - USA, Suite 310, 1725 DeSales Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. (202) 955-5778, James R. Huntley, Founding Chairman] In these few months ahead we don't expect much of you, but it would be good to know that there was a kind of organic relationship. We are holding a "convention" or representatives from the various CCDs (now in Melbourne, Tokyo, Montreal, New York, Washington, London and possible Belgium and Germany) from 5-7 November, and it would be very good to have one of you or another representative of APF present. The concerns of CCD and your project overlap to an important extent; we, as you know, are also very much interested in "community" but we have an equal concern for democracy.

Enclosure: Basic Country Groups and the Key Countries

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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 9:59 pm

Chinese Request to NED
by Walter Raymond
January 2, 1985

January 2, 1985



SUBJ: Chinese Request to NED

Carl Gershman has called concerning a possible grant to the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD). I am concerned about the political dimension to this request. We should not find ourselves in a position where we have to respond to pressure, but this request poses a real problem to Carl. Senator Hatch, as you know, is a member of the board. Secondly NED has already given a major grant for a related Chinese program. Please let me know your views COB today (January 2).


[Handwritten note: No]
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 10:11 pm


Examples of institute funding:

1. Bolivia - 150 K - permit continuation of free TU

2. Peru - 50 K - direct counter to Soviet funding. Ex: The Soviets took over the Peruvian Bank Workers Union (due to lack of Western funding). The Union now provides $50 K monthly checkoff due to communist union leaders to support Peruvian Community Part activity.

3. Grenada - 50 K - To the only organized opposition to the Marxist government of Maurice Bishop (The Seaman and Waterfront workers Union). A supplemental 50 K to support free TV activity outside Grenada.

4. Nicaragua - $750 K to support an array of independent trade union activity, agricultural cooperatives.

5. Central America labor publishing house and distribution center for printed materials - TV materials, cooperatives, land reform, etc. - to counter Marxist literature ($500 K).

6. $100 K fund for relief to democratic trade unionists forced to flee their homeland.

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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Thu May 25, 2017 10:15 pm




System # IV

Package # 400559 ODDOR

I = Information

cc: Kagan/Kemp

FY 85

$2 M in AID for medical support to Afghanistan. Supplemental FY 84 McPherson

Walt go see Charlie Wilson (D-TX). Seek to bring him into [ILLEGIBLE] as discreet Hill connection. He can be very helpful in getting money. M

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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Fri May 26, 2017 12:27 am

We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy-the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities- which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

President Ronald Reagan
The Westminster Address
London, United Kingdom
June 8, 1982

The journey of which this visit forms a part is a long one. Already it has taken me to two great cities of the West -- Rome and Paris -- and to the economic summit at Versailles. There, once again, our sister democracies have proved that, even in a time of severe economic strain, free peoples can work together freely and voluntarily to address problems as serious as inflation, unemployment, trade, and economic development in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity. Other milestones lie ahead. Later this week in Germany, we and our NATO allies will discuss measures for our joint defense and America’s latest initiatives for a more peaceful, secure world through arms reductions.

Each stop of this trip is important, but, among them all, this moment occupies a special place in my heart and the hearts of my countrymen -- a moment of kinship and homecoming in these hallowed halls. Speaking for all Americans, I want to say how very much at home we feel in your house. Every American would, because this is -- as we have been so eloquently told -- one of democracy’s shrines. Here the rights of free people and the processes of representation have been debated and refined.

It has been said that an institution is the lengthening shadow of a man. This institution is the lengthening shadow of all the men and women who have sat here and all those who have voted to send representatives here.

This is my second visit to Great Britain as President of the United States. My first opportunity to stand on British soil occurred almost a year and a half ago when your Prime Minister graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at the British Embassy in Washington. Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped that I was not distressed to find staring down at me from the grand staircase a portrait of His Royal Majesty King George III. She suggested it was best to let bygones be bygones and -- in view of our two countries’ remarkable friendship in succeeding years -- she added that most Englishmen today would agree with Thomas Jefferson that “a little rebellion now and then is a very good thing.”

From here I will go on to Bonn and then Berlin, where there stands a grim symbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the city, is in its third decade. It is the fitting signature of the regime that built it. And a few hundred kilometers behind the Berlin Wall there is another symbol. In the center of Warsaw there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. In one direction it points toward Moscow. In the other it points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western Europe’s tangible unity. The marker says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland We have not inherited an easy is not East or West. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland’s struggle to be Poland, and to secure the basic rights we often take for granted, demonstrates why we dare not take those rights for granted. Gladstone, defending the Reform Bill of 1866, declared: “You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side.” It was easier to believe in the march of democracy in Gladstone’s day, in that high noon of Victorian optimism.

We are approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention -- totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today, not because democracy is less vigorous but because democracy’s enemies have refined their instruments of repression. Yet optimism is in order because, day by day, democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all fragile flower.

From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none -- not one regime -- has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

The strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrates the truth told in an underground joke in the Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union would remain a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted, because everyone would join the opposition party.

America’s time as a player on the stage of world history has been brief. I think understanding this fact has always made you patient with your younger cousins. Well, not always patient -- I do recall that on one occasion Sir Winston Churchill said in exasperation about one of our most distinguished diplomats: “He is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him.”


Witty as Sir Winston was, he also had that special attribute of great statesmen -- the gift of vision, the willingness to see the future based on the experience of the past. It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past, that I want to talk with you about today, for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two nations can make common cause for the future.

We have not inherited an easy world. If developments like the industrial revolution, which began here in England, and the gifts of science and technology have made life much easier for us, they have also made it more dangerous. There are threats now to our freedom, indeed, to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is, first, the threat of global war. No president, no congress, no prime minister, no parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don’t have to tell you that in today’s world, the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it.

That is why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks -- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks -- which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy, they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and unshakable and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides.

At the same time, there is a threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches: political control taking precedence over free economic growth, secret police, mindless bureaucracy -- all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom.

Now I am aware that among us here and throughout Europe, there is legitimate disagreement over the extent to which the public sector should play a role in a nation’s economy and life. But on one point all of us are united: our abhorrence of dictatorship in all its forms, but most particularly totalitarianism and the terrible inhumanities it has caused in our time: the great purge, Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag and Cambodia.

Historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the 1940s and early 1950s for territorial or imperial gain. Had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe -- indeed, the world -- would look very different today. And certainly they will note it was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed Polish solidarity or used chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

If history teaches anything, it teaches that self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly. We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma -- predictions of doomsday, antinuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must for its own protection be an unwilling participant. At the same time, we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit.

What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil? Sir Winston Churchill refused to accept the inevitability of war or even that it was imminent. He said:

I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today, while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.


This is precisely our mission today: to preserve freedom as well as peace. It may not be easy to see, but I believe we live now at a turning point. In an ironic sense, Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis -- a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate of growth in the national product has been steadily declining since the 1950s and is less than half of what it was then. The dimensions of this failure are astounding, a country which employs one-fifth of its population in agriculture is unable to feed its own people. Were it not for the tiny private sector tolerated in Soviet agriculture, the country might be on the brink of famine. These private plots occupy a bare 3% of the arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of Soviet farm output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables.

Overcentralized, with little or no incentives, year after year the Soviet system pours its best resources into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet people.

What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones. The decay of the Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies -- West Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam --it is the democratic countries that are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. And one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time is this: of all the millions of refugees we’ve seen in the modern world, their flight is always away from, not toward, the Communist world. Today on the NATO line, our military forces face East to prevent a possible invasion. On the other side of the line, the Soviet forces also face East -- to prevent their people from leaving.

The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will. Whether it is the growth of the new schools of economics in America or England or the appearance of the so-called “new philosophers” in France, there is one unifying thread running through the intellectual work of these groups: rejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses.


Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom: the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising in World War II. More recently we have seen evidence of this same human impulse in one of the developing nations in Central America. For months and months the world news media covered the fighting in El Salvador. Day after day we were treated to stories and film slanted toward the brave freedom fighters battling oppressive government forces in behalf of the silent, suffering people of that tortured country.

Then one day those silent, suffering people were offered a chance to vote, to choose the kind of government they wanted. Suddenly the freedom fighters in the hills were exposed for what they really are: Cuban-backed guerrillas who want power for themselves and their backers, not democracy for the people. They threatened death to any who voted and destroyed hundreds of busses and trucks to keep people from getting to the polling places. But on election day the people of El Salvador, an unprecedented 1.4 million of them, braved ambush and gunfire and trudged miles to vote for freedom.

They stood for hours in the hot sun waiting for their turn to vote. Members of our Congress who went there as observers told me of a woman who was wounded by rifle fire who refused to leave the line to have her wound treated until after she had voted. A grandmother, who had been told by the guerrillas she would be killed when she returned from the polls, told the guerrillas: “You can kill me, kill my family, kill my neighbors, but you can’t kill us all.” The real freedom fighters of El Salvador turned out to be the people of that country -- the young, the old, and the in-between. Strange, but in my own country there has been little if any news coverage of that war since the election.

Perhaps they'll say it’s because there are newer struggles now -- on distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifices for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren’t fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause, for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed and that people must participate in the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn’t have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.

In the Middle East the guns sound once more, this time in Lebanon, a country that for too long has had to endure the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and foreign intervention and occupation. The fighting in Lebanon on the part of all parties must stop, and Israel should bring its forces home. But this is not enough. We must all work to stamp out the scourge of terrorism that in the Middle East makes war an ever-present threat.

But beyond the troublespots lies a deeper, more positive pattern. Around the world today the democratic revolution is gathering new strength. In India, a critical test has been passed with the peaceful change of governing political parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving in remarkable and unmistakable ways to build and strengthen its democratic institutions. In the Caribbean and Central America, 16 of 24 countries have freely elected governments. And in the United Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations which have joined the body in the past 5 years are democracies.

In the Communist world as well, man’s instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again. To be sure, there are grim reminders of how brutally the police state attempts to snuff out this quest for self-rule: 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland. But the struggle continues in Poland, and we know that there are even those who strive and suffer for freedom within the confines of the Soviet Union itself. How we conduct ourselves here in the Western democracies will determine whether this trend continues.


No, democracy is not a fragile flower; still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy. Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in rightwing dictatorships but not in Communist regimes. To accept this preposterous notion -- as some well-meaning people have -- is to invite the argument that, once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course.

As for the Soviet view, President Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that the competition of ideas and systems must continue and that this is entirely consistent with relaxation of tensions and peace. We ask only that these systems begin by living up to their own constitutions, abiding by their own laws, and complying with the international obligations they have undertaken. We ask only for a process, a direction, a basic code of decency -- not for an instant transformation.

We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement, there have been and will continue to be repeated explosions against repression in dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimatize its leaders. In such crises, the very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it -- if necessary, by force.

While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. So states the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, among other things, guarantees free elections.

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy -- the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities -- which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

This is not cultural imperialism: it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity.
Democracy already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy. Who would voluntarily choose not to have the right to vote, decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspapers, prefer government to worker-controlled unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who till it, want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead of a free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance and diversity?

Since 1917 the Soviet Union has given covert political training and assistance to Marxist-Leninists in many countries. Of course, it also has promoted the use of violence and subversion by these same forces. Over the past several decades, West European and other social democrats, christian democrats and liberals have offered open assistance to fraternal political and social institutions to bring about peaceful and democratic progress. Appropriately for a vigorous new democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany’s political foundations have become a major force in this effort.


We in America now intend to take additional steps, as many of our allies have already done, toward realizing this same goal. The chairmen and other leaders of the national Republican and Democratic party organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American Political Foundation to determine how the United States can best contribute -- as a nation -- to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force. They will have the cooperation of congressional leaders of both parties along with representatives of business, labor, and other major institutions in our society.

I look forward to receiving their recommendations and to working with these institutions and the Congress in the common task of strengthening democracy throughout the world.
It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation -- in both the public and private sectors -- to assisting democratic development.

We plan to consult with leaders of other nations as well. There is a proposal before the Council of Europe to invite parliamentarians from democratic countries to a meeting next year in Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering would consider ways to help democratic political movements.

This November in Washington there will take place an international meeting on free elections and next spring there will be a conference of world authorities on constitutionalism and self-government hosted by the Chief Justice of the United States. Authorities from a number of developing and developed countries -- judges, philosophers, and politicians with practical experience -- have agreed to explore how to turn principle into practice and further the rule of law.

At the same time we invite the Soviet Union to consider with us how the competition of ideas and values -- which it is committed to support -- can be conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal basis.
For example, I am prepared to offer President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our if he will allow me the same opportunity with the Soviet people. We also suggest that panels of our newsmen periodically appear on each other’s television to discuss major events.

I do not wish to sound overly optimistic, yet the Soviet Union is not immune from the reality of what is going on in the world. It has happened in the past: a small ruling elite either mistakenly attempts to ease domestic unrest through greater repression and foreign adventure or it chooses a wiser course -- it begins to allow its people a voice in their own destiny.

Even if this latter process is not realized soon, I believe the renewed strength of the democratic movement, complemented by a global campaign for freedom, will strengthen the prospects for arms control and a world at peace.

I have discussed on other occasions including my address on May 9th, the elements of Western policies toward the Soviet Union to safeguard our interests and protect the peace. What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term -- the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.

That is why we must continue our efforts to strengthen NATO even as we move forward with our zero option initiative in the negotiations on intermediate-range forces and our proposal for a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads.


Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used. For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

The British people know that, given strong leadership, time, and a little bit of hope, the forces of good ultimately rally and triumph over evil. Here among you is the cradle of self-government, the mother of parliaments. Here is the enduring greatness of the British contribution to mankind, the great civilized ideas: individual liberty, representative government, and the rule of law under God.

I have often wondered about the shyness of some of us in the West about standing for these ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world. This reluctance to use those vast resources at our command reminds me of the elderly lady whose home was bombed in the blitz. As the rescuers moved about they found a bottle of brandy she’d stored behind the staircase, which was all that was left standing. Since she was barely conscious, one of the workers pulled the cork to give her a taste of it. She came around immediately and said. “Here now, put it back, that’s for emergencies.”

Well, the emergency is upon us. Let us be shy no longer -- let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not only possible but probable.

During the dark days of the Second World War when this island was incandescent with courage, Winston Churchill exclaimed about Britain’s adversaries: “What kind of a people do they think we are?” Britain’s adversaries found out what extraordinary people the British are. But all the democracies paid a terrible price for allowing the dictators to underestimate us. We dare not make that mistake again. So let us ask ourselves: What kind of people do we think we are? And let us answer: free people, worthy of freedom, and determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.

Sir Winston led his people to great victory in war and then lost an election just as the fruits of victory were about to be enjoyed. But he left office honorably -- and, as it turned out, temporarily -- knowing that the liberty of his people was more important than the fate of any single leader. History recalls his greatness in ways no dictator will ever know. And he left us a message of hope for the future, as timely now as when he first uttered it, as opposition leader in the Commons nearly 27 years ago. He said. “When we look back on all the perils through which we have passed and at the mighty foes we have laid low and all the dark and deadly designs we have frustrated, why should we fear for our future? We have,” he said, “come safely through the worst.”

The task I have set forth will long outlive our own generation. But together, we, too, have come through the worst. Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best -- a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.


Published by the United States Department of State – Bureau of Public Affairs/ Office of Public Communication – Editorial Division . Washington, D.C.
June 1982 Editor: Colleen Sussman
This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.
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Re: Project Truth, by Charles Z. Wick, Intl. Communication A

Postby admin » Fri May 26, 2017 12:51 am

Skeptics Pelt Schultz With Queries on Reagan's 'Project Democracy'
by Bernard Gwertzman, Special to the New York Times
February 24, 1983



WASHINGTON, Feb. 23— Secretary of State George P. Shultz ran into considerable skepticism today when he outlined the Administration's plans to spend $85 million in the next two years to promote President Reagan's Project Democracy around the world. Several members of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on International Organizations expressed doubts about the feasibility and the propriety of the United States trying to train young leaders and foster the growth of such democratic institutions as labor unions, political parties, news outlets, businesses and universities in countries where democracy is not permitted.

''The more we look at this thing, the more nervous I become over it,'' said Representative Joel Pritchard, Republican of Washington. He said he thought most Arab, African and Asian countries would view the project ''as a destabilizing factor'' and ''mischief-making.''

'Don't Be Nervous'

Mr. Shultz, who issued a long statement praising the project as ''critical to our national security,'' replied tersely to Mr. Pritchard's concerns. ''Don't be nervous about democracy, about holding that torch up there,'' he said.

Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida, chairman of the subcommittee, said the premise of the program was ''sound'' but he seemed unhappy that it would be administered by the United States Information Agency, not the State Department.

Project Democracy was announced by Mr. Reagan in London last June as a major program in an ideological competition with the Communists. Mr. Shultz said the Administration planned to spend $20 million in the current fiscal year and $65 million in the fiscal year 1984. ''If we are to achieve the kind of world we all hope to see, with peace, freedom and economic progress, democracy has to continue to expand,'' he said. ''Democracy is a vital, even revolutionary force. It exists as an expression of the basic human drive for freedom.''

'Trouble' Predicted

But Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, Democrat of Pennsylvania, calling it ''multimillion-dollar propaganda,'' said, ''I don't see how this program can possibly do anything but give us trouble.'' And Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of New York, pressed Mr.Shultz to say without ambiguity that the United States would try to spread democracy everywhere, not only in Communist societies.

Mr. Solarz asked: ''Are we prepared to provide help to democrats in such places as South Korea, the Philippines, in such places as Taiwan, where there are Governments friendly to the United States, but obviously with little respect for democracy?''

Mr. Shultz agreed that the program could founder if it was perceived, in Mr. Solarz's words, to be ''selective democracy.'' But he said the program was not intended ''to support this or that party in a given government'' or ''to threaten or unseat some existing government.'' He also said there would be no role for the Central Intelligence Agency.

As to the possibility of influencing changes in the Communist world, Mr. Shultz said that ''while we are limited in our ability to deal with such closed societies, we propose to strengthen, both in quality and quantity, our information programs reaching these countries.''
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