August 9, 1982
Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
Freedom's Advocate the World Over
August 9, 1982
Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
Office of National Security Adviser to the President
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Walter:
Leo Cherne has asked me to send these copies of Freedom Appeals. He has probably told you we have had to cut back this project to meet financial realities. The Independent journal is now combined with Freedom at Issue (as the latest issue of the latter reveals).
We would, of course, want to expand the project once again when, as and if the funds become available. Offshoots of that project appear in newspapers, magazines, books and on broadcast services here and abroad. It's a significant, unique channel of communication.
Best wishes,
Sincerely,
Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director
jm
enc.
[Handwritten notes: Answer - 1. Appreciate ref letter
2.
[Illegible]
***
CENTER FOR CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN STUDIES AT FREEDOM HOUSE
R. BRUCE McCOLM
DIRECTOR
20 West 40th Street
New York, N.Y. 10018
(212) 730-7744
TELEX: 429439-FREEDOM
September 15, 1984
Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
National Security Council
The White House
Old Executive Office Building
Room 351
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Walter:
Enclosed please find a short proposal for the Center's Nicaragua project 1984-85. The project combines elements of the oral history proposal with the publication of The Nicaraguan Papers. The book itself will be a compilation of the key documents, speeches, interviews, given by the Sandinista comandantes from 1961 through the present and arranged according to subject matter. The interviews done with defectors or participants in the FSLN's internal discussions will serve to introduce the theme or document and place it in an historical context.
Maintaining the oral history part of the project adds to the overall costs; but preliminary discussions with film makers have given me the idea that an Improper Conduct-type of documentary could be made based on these materials. Such a film would have to be the work of a respected Latin American filmmaker or a European. American-made films on Central America are simply too abrasive ideologically and artistically poor. Of the three film projects currently under development for television, none fit the bill. The groundwork laid by the oral history part of the project will feed into a documentary at the same time furnish the introductions for each section of The Nicaraguan Papers.
David Nolan's book The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984) is a valuable addition to the massive bibliography on the Nicaraguan situation. It should but probably will not receive wide distribution. Its value lies in tracing the Sandinistas ideological roots from their beginning through the various tactical and strategic debates during the 1977-79 conflict. Using many of the movement's own works, Nolan does a good job in synthesizing the FSLN's ideological zigs-and-zags as they relate to guerrilla war strategy (something he should have made more explicit). The rather arcane subject matter of Marxist-Leninist factional fights limits the audience to academics and foreign policy specialists.
The Nicaraguan Papers attempts something quite different. The Grenada documents, at least the selection available to the public so far, allow the reader an insider's view of how ideological architects set about constructing a Marxist-Leninist state through factional fights, internal repression, diplomatic peace offensives, and covert military and security assistance from East Bloc countries. However, nothing must has been revealed about the seven years of planning and strategy that preceded the New Jewel Party's coup d'etat. Whatever The Nicaraguan Papers lack in terms of juicy accounts of training in the Soviet Union or the personality clashes is more than made up by its following a Marxist-Leninist movement from its creation, its initial failures, the war itself, to its attempts to create a revolutionary state. This would be the book's primary value, especially in light of the ongoing debate in the United States over Central America.
Behind internal ideological debates are objective realities. Nolan's book neglects to discuss some of the regional and global situations which FSLN tactics were addressing. The Nicaraguan Papers, for example, will discuss how much of the present Sandinista state was already formed and in place in 1979 as part of the FSLN's strategy for taking power. A dimension also lacking in the Grenada documents and crucial for understanding more overt power struggles later on. Also, key documents of the 1978-1980 period demonstrate in very nuts and bolts fashion how the FSLN planned to subvert or neutralize all existing free institutions. These documents discuss with some frankness the relationship between maintaining a pluralist front on the diplomatic side, while consolidating the revolution internally.
The Nicaraguan Papers will also be readily accessible to the general reader, the journalist, the opinion-maker, the academic and the like. The book would be distributed fairly broadly to these sectors and I am sure will be extremely useful. They already constitute a form of Freedom House samizdat, since I've been distributing them to journalists for the past two years as I've received them from disaffected Nicaraguans.
Starting September 24th, I'll be in Washington for two weeks for the OAS Inter-American Commission of Human Rights meetings and will be staying at the Anthony House for the duration. Let's see if we can get together to discuss the proposal.
Best Regards,
R. Bruce McColm
***
CENTER FOR CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN STUDIES AT FREEDOM HOUSE
R. BRUCE McCOLM, DIRECTOR
20 WEST 40th STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10018
(212) 730-7744
TELEX: 429439-FREEDOM
THE NICARAGUAN PAPERS
A GRANT PROPOSAL
During the joint American-Caribbean rescue operation in Grenada last October, a treasure trove of documents was discovered that provided the first inside glimpse of the strategy and tactics used by ideological architects to build a Marxist-Leninist state in the Caribbean. The materials documented everything from internal factional fights, the manipulation of American media, secret military agreements with Cuba, Soviet Union and the East block, and a strategy to infiltrate the island's churches and trade unions. The archive, currently being published by the United States Government in several volumes and selectively for a general audience by Prof. Paul Seabury at the University of California at Berkeley, will remain of historical significance for years to come.
A similar, slightly less spectacular set of documents concerning the Nicaraguan Revolution has slowly emerged over the past five years as former Sandinistas and their allies have become disillusioned with the direction of that Central American state. Unlike the Grenada documents, these minutes of party meetings, party platforms and briefings to select FSLN cadres are in the private possession of individuals dispersed over the United States and Latin America. Few of these revealing materials have been published, let alone written about. Others have been published by small radical left publishing houses in Mexico and are only available in Spanish.
While the Grenada documents revealed the most intimate inner-workings of a Marxist-Leninist regime and subsequently dispelled any doubts about the direction of that Revolution, there continues to be a divisive dispute in this country over the Sandinistas' true ideology and the direction of that regime. This debate over the nature of the Nicaraguan Revolution has polarized every significant institution in this country, particularly the church and labor. Consequently, the Nicaraguan government has mobilized in this country the most extensive and sophisticated network of support groups since the Vietnam War. Claiming a commitment to pluralism, economic reform and democracy, the Sandinistas, since their triumph, have been able to organize, along with the Salvadoran guerrillas, this nation-wide network keying each significant sector of the American society for the purpose of mobilizing American public opinion against Washington's policies.
Perhaps more significantly, this network has mobilized vast financial and material resources to disseminate the Sandinista line to the media, religious leaders, academics, local labor leaders as well as congressional staff and members. Material support -- food, medicine, cash donation, and even weaponry -- for the Sandinistas as well as the Salvadoran guerrillas, according to their own statements, amounts to approximately $25 million a year. Much of this support derives from average American citizens, who have been told of the young Revolution and its democratic aspirations.
The dreary tale of Western syncophants of revolutions has been well-documented, especially in Paul Hollander's book Political Pilgrims. In past revolutions, accurate information concerning the repression of free institutions, ethnic minorities, political dissidents and the totalitarian nature of the revolutionary elite was either not available or suppressed.
This is not the case in Nicaragua. Former officials and guerrillas have brought out of the country many of the documents detailing the FSLN's strategy to manipulate world opinion, while consolidating the revolution internally. The documents, already in the Center's possession, discuss the methods to be used for discrediting the Archbishop of Managua and the traditional Catholic Church, suppressing the free trade unions and eventually eliminating the private sector. One document even urges cadres to tolerate Christmas for the first few years of the Revolution because "Even the Soviet Union took a long time before it eliminated superstitution." Another discusses how elections will enable the "legitimization of a Marxist-Leninist state".
The Nicaraguan Papers covers a longer time-frame than the documents found in Grenada. The book itself would reprint internal documents from the FSLN from its founding through the 1977-79 war and its strategy for consolidating the revolution during the 1980s. While not as extensive as the Grenada archives, by any stretch of the imagination, The Nicaraguan Papers documents the rise of an insignificant Marxist-Leninist organization from guerrillas to the political elite in a state, which foments regional revolution. The key documents of the 1978-1980 period reveal how the Marxist-Leninists gained total control over the revolutionary organizations and actually put in place the organizational structure which would become post-revolutionary Nicaragua.
The book itself would be approximately 250-400 pages long. An introduction would written either by R. Bruce McColm or a well-known former Sandinista diplomat. To make it more accessible to the journalist, student and academic, it will be divided in sections according to key themes. These sections will be introduced by the commentary of a variety of former Sandinistas such as Alfonso Robelo, Eden Pastora, Arturo Cruz, Sr., and Donald Castillo who will place the documents into an historical context and elaborate on the discussions between the comandantes at that time.
Alfonso Robelo
Background. Alfonso Robelo was active in Nicaraguan politics for over 30 years. He was an original member of a five-person ruling junta of the Sandinista Government, a Southern Front Contra political leader and later Ambassador to Costa Rica during the presidency of Violetta Chamorro. Robelo's opposition to the Sandinistas crystallized in mid-1980 when he resigned his position on the Sandinista Council of State to protest the Council's expansion and addition of FSLN members. By early 1982, Robelo -- along with Eden Pastora and Brooklyn Rivera -- formed ARDE.
Allegations of Drug Trafficking. An October 1984 cable to Headquarters reported that a Sandinista newspaper, El Nuevo Diaro, had stated on October 10, 1984 that Robelo and ARDE had accepted help from an unidentified drug trafficker in Miami. The article also said that two FRS/ARDE helicopters had been painted with a black substance to make them invisible to radar.
In June 1987, CIA learned that Robelo had been contacted by two Bolivians -- Enrique Crespou and Fernando Perou -- who had offered to make a "significant" monetary contribution to the Contras. Robelo said that they offered $150 million to the Contras with "no strings attached." Robelo said that the Bolivians were evasive in their answers about the origins of the funds. Robelo was advised not to accept any money from the Bolivians until its origins could be determined.
CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. No information has been found to indicate that CIA took any actions to follow up on the 1984 Sandinista newspaper allegation that Robelo and ARDE were involved in dealings with a drug trafficker.
In October 1988, a cable reported to Headquarters that Perou and Crespou had been accused during a press conference by Roberto Suarez Levy, son of imprisoned cocaine "king" Roberto Suarez Gomez, of being CIA agents. Suarez Levy also alleged that CIA and DEA were operating a cocaine lab in "Huanchaca," Bolivia. A Headquarters response stated that the only relevant information it had regarding Perou and Crespo was that they had met with Robelo in June 1987 and offered him $150 million for the Contras.
Robelo says he does not recall the meeting with the Bolivians or their reported offer of $150 million. He does not deny that the meeting may have taken place, but states that he participated in approximately 10 situations when people offered to donate large sums of money to the Contras but did not do so.
Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. No information has been found to indicate that CIA informed U.S. law enforcement or other agencies or the Congress about the 1984 Sandinista newspaper allegation. CIA informed Congress about the alleged offer of $150 million from the Bolivians in 1997 in the context of another matter.
***
Eden Pastora
Background. Eden Pastora Gomez, whose "war name" was Commandante Zero, joined the Sandinistas in the early 1970s to seek the overthrow of Somoza. Especially popular after he stormed Somoza's National Palace in 1978, he was nonetheless excluded in 1979 from the Sandinista National Liberation Front's (FSLN's) nine-man Directorate and given relatively minor positions in the post-Somoza Sandinista Government. These setbacks displeased Pastora, and he also claimed to be dismayed by the leftward turn of the Sandinista regime. In 1981 Pastora broke with the Sandinistas, and he went into self-imposed exile in Costa Rica shortly thereafter.
Pastora formed the FRS in early 1982 and allied his group with several other Contra organizations to form the Costa Rican-based ARDE in September 1982. Pastora led ARDE's military struggle against the FSLN until July 1984, when the organization's leadership replaced him. An ARDE spokesman attributed Pastora's replacement to injuries received in the May 1984 bomb attack against him at La Penca, but Pastora's leadership had also been undermined by his refusal to join forces with leaders of the Northern Front. Pastora left ARDE in 1986 and withdrew from the military effort.
Between early 1982 and mid-1984, Pastora was the main recipient of the funds CIA channeled to Contras fighting on the Southern Front. However, the funding allocated by Congress for the Contras had been expended by August 1984, and CIA was forced to cease its material support. More comprehensive congressional restrictions on the Agency's ability to support the Contras took effect in October 1984 and remained in place until December 1985.
The cutoff of U.S. funding led associates of Pastora to begin looking for alternative sources of funds. In October 1984, CIA began receiving the reporting mentioned earlier that Southern Front leaders allied with Pastora had agreed to help Miami-based trafficker Jorge Morales bring drugs into the United States in exchange for his material and financial help to the Southern Front. A subsequent October Headquarters cable instructed those dealing with Pastora:
. . . not to take definitive action to declare the relationship with [Pastora] terminated. Rather, we want to back away from the man leaving him guessing as to the status of his relationship with [CIA]. We do not want to initiate contact with him under any circumstances, unless it is done for the purpose of manipulating him towards some objective clearly consistent with [U.S.] policy in the region.
The Agency's relationship with Pastora was one of its most significant with a Contra leader. While the drug trafficking allegations were a factor in the decision to terminate that relationship, the October 1984 Headquarters cable indicated that the Agency was responding to other factors as well. CIA also judged that the advantages of dealing with Pastora were outweighed by the poor performance of his Southern Front fighting forces, by counterintelligence issues arising from his contacts with the Sandinistas in Managua, and by operational restrictions imposed by Congress.
In November 1984, Headquarters instructed that "no direct action is to be taken with [Pastora]. Ideally, you will be able to avoid him altogether." A November reply stated that only four meetings with Pastora had occurred since July 1984 and that the last of these was on October 18. At the last meeting, it had reportedly been made clear that CIA could no longer provide any support, direct or indirect, to Pastora's organization.
Allegations of Drug Trafficking. An October 1982 cable to Headquarters reported that INS had received information indicating that a meeting of Contra members was to be held in Costa Rica to discuss an exchange in the U.S. of arms for narcotics. A November 1982 cable identified Pastora as one of those who would be attending.
CIA began receiving reporting in October 1984 indicating that associates of Pastora in ARDE had agreed to work with known narcotics trafficker Jorge Morales. That same month Harold Martinez Saenz -- a former deputy FRS commander -- said that he could no longer support ARDE due to Pastora's ineffective leadership. Martinez had also stated that he did not want to become involved in drug and arms smuggling activities and corrupt handling of money, thus inferring that Pastora and his staff were involved in those activities.
Regarding the arrangement allegedly worked out with Morales by Pastora's FRS associates in 1984, Adolfo Chamorro says that Pastora was not aware of Morales' drug trafficking activities until after the meetings in October 1984 and after Pastora himself had met with Morales in December 1984. Cables in 1985 indicate that Pastora "temporarily discontinued" the arrangement with Morales in early January 1985 when he realized the potential political fallout from dealing with narcotics traffickers. Pastora says that he ordered that the planes donated by Morales be returned when he learned that Morales was a drug trafficker.
In April 1985, according to a Headquarters cable, the text of a February Sandinista radio broadcast from Managua alleged that Pastora and his associates were completing construction of three landing strips in the Guanacaste area of Costa Rica for light aircraft to be used for drug trafficking. The drug trafficking was being undertaken, the radio broadcast said, to substitute for the financing that was no longer available in the wake of a Congressional cutoff of Contra funding.
An April 1985 cable to Headquarters reported that an employee of Alpa Airlines had said that the company was concealing cocaine in yucca shipments destined for the United States. The cable reported that two of the five persons reported to be owners of Alpa were Gerardo Duran and David Mayorga.(12) Duran had already been identified as a close associate of Pastora. In addition, one of the planes allegedly used by Alpa Airlines was reported to belong to Pastora and ARDE.
A December 1985 Headquarters cable stated that Adolfo Chamorro had told a Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) member that a Panamanian, Cesar Rodriguez, was gathering drug money for Pastora. Rodriguez was identified in this cable as a narcotics trafficker who had business ties to Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega.
A January 1986 cable reported to Headquarters that a Costa Rican associate of Pastora reportedly said that he had 200 kilograms of cocaine he wished to use in helping to finance Pastora's Contra activities.
In June 1986 and July-August 1987, CIA was told of a trip to Panama by Jose Davila, Carol Prado and Pastora. During the trip, Pastora reportedly had accepted $10,000 from Cesar Rodriguez, who was described as a narcotics trafficker from Colombia.
CIA Response to Allegations of Drug Trafficking. CIA terminated its relationship with Pastora in October 1984, within two weeks of receiving the first reporting about ARDE's drug-related dealings with Morales. While other factors were involved, the drug trafficking allegations weighed in the decision.
A February 1986 cable requested an inter-Agency review of the information implicating David Mayorga in narcotics trafficking because he was one of Pastora's closest advisors. The same cable noted that this information "needs to be made available to those still bent on seeing that [Pastora] is given . . . funding." No information has been found to indicate that such a review took place.
On March 1986, a Station asked Headquarters for specific instructions regarding what role Pastora was to play in the Contra unification agreement. The Station outlined the drug allegations against Pastora's associates in the cable and stated that:
. . . .
in COS' view, a political or other kind of accommodation with [Pastora] in which [the Agency] plays a known mediating role places [the Agency] is an untenable and unjustifiable position for which, in COS' view, there can be no reasonable or acceptable explanation.
. . . .
We will work through one united command structure, built around the one which is currently in place. We [w]ill not work through the existing FRS structure because, simply put, it is too badly penetrated by Sandinistas and too many of the players have been associated with narcotics smuggling. We will be willing to incorporate members from the FRS structure into t[h]e unified structure, but only after they have been given a thorough security screening
. . . .
Information Sharing with Other U.S. Government Entities. As explained earlier, the reporting tying Pastora and senior members of his group to drug smuggling operations into the United States was disseminated by CIA to a broad range of senior USG intelligence and law enforcement officials.
OCA files indicate that the Agency forwarded to Steven Berry, Associate Counsel of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), on January 29, 1985, a response to a question regarding Pastora's possible consummation of a working arrangement with Colombian drug dealers. The Agency response noted that all relevant details had been reported in the program summaries to HPSCI. The response added that:
To summarize, intelligence reporting indicates that members of Pastora's organization (FRS) have agreed -- either with Pastora's direct knowledge or tacit approval -- to provide pilots and landing strips inside Costa Rica and Nicaragua to a Miami-based Colombian drug dealer in exchange for financial and material support. Information pertaining to Pastora's involvement in drug trafficking has been forwarded to the appropriate Enforcement Agencies. [sic]
On August 1, 1986, CATF legal officer Louis Dupart forwarded to CATF Chief Fiers, LA Division Chief and LA Division Deputy Chief a MFR for a meeting with HPSCI Staffer Mike O'Neil held on July 9, 1986 in CATF Chief's office at O'Neil's request to discuss another topic. The memorandum stated that, in response to other questions from O'Neil, Chief/CATF said that Pastora had voluntarily renounced his role as a resistance leader.
On April 25, 1986, Headquarters authorized the sharing with DEA of documents that described the October 1984 agreement between ARDE officials and Morales. DEA reportedly planned to use the documents as background information prior to debriefing Adolfo Chamorro in Miami.
In July 1987, a Station reported to Headquarters that, unless advised otherwise, the Station intended to provide the local DEA office with a message from Octaviano Cesar. The message indicated that Marcos Aguado wanted to contact the CIA to provide specific information that tied Eden Pastora to "past drug trafficking."
On July 31, 1987, CATF Chief Alan Fiers testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) concerning the allegations that Morales had made in testimony at the Kerry Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) regarding Contra involvement in narcotics trafficking. Fiers discussed what CIA knew about drug trafficking allegations concerning Pastora and a number of former FRS/ARDE members. Fiers stated that the Agency did not have knowledge that Pastora was directly involved in the Morales narcotics deal, but also said:
We have a significant body of evidence with regard to involvement of the former members of ARDE in the Southern Front--Pastora's people being directly involved in cocaine trafficking to the United States. . . .
In addition, according to SSCI transcripts, Fiers used one of his biweekly meetings with the SSCI to share information with that Committee regarding allegations that Southern Front personnel were involved in narcotics trafficking. On October 14, 1987, Fiers stated to the SSCI regarding Pastora's plans to return to Nicaragua:
We frankly don't very much care what [Pastora] does right now. We don't think it would be a terrible problem for us. You must always remember that the Sandinistas know what we know. This guy is a cocaine runner. Period. He ran cocaine. And they know that and we know that and they don't want him back. He's a hot potato for anybody.
A January 4, 1988 MFR drafted by Robert Buckman, OCA, indicated that CATF provided a summary briefing on the Nicaraguan program for SSCI on the same date. At that briefing, Senator Bill Bradley inquired about allegations of drug trafficking, and Fiers responded that "Pastora had been involved with a Colombian trafficker, but the FDN was clean."
-- Office of Inspector General Investigations Staff Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking in the United States
The project calls for a coordinator, who will interview former Sandinistas and locate those documents not currently in the Center's possession. Materials obtained from taped interviews will also form the basis of a documentary film on many of the subjects covered by the book. An editorial assistant would be in charge of publication and distribution. Since the book will be published in both English and Spanish, the project has substantial translation costs.
The project coordinator for The Nicaraguan Papers tentatively is Adriana Guillen, a former Sandinista and reporter for La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in the country. Ms. Guillen for many years was an insider to the deliberations of the FSLN before she left the Nicaragua. Since then, she was the American representative of Misura, the Nicaraguan Indian organization for the past three years.
At this date, the Center has not decided on whether to publish the book out of Freedom House or through a commercial publisher. Although a commercial publisher has advantages in the continental United States, Freedom House is more able to distribute the book in Latin America and Europe through two newly established programs created for this purpose.
The Nicaraguan Papers will be an important addition to the massive bibliography on Central America as well as a much needed antidote to the public's confusion over the true nature of the Sandinista revolution. It will be aggressively marketed and distributed, especially in the trade market. Marketing plans include:
* free distribution to members of Congress and key public officials;
* distribution of galleys in advance of publication for maximum publicity and timely reviews in newspapers and current affairs magazines.
* press conference at Freedom House in New York and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.
* op-ed circulation to more than 100 newspapers (and translation into foreign languages for circulation abroad.)
* distribution of a Spanish-language edition through Hispanic organizations in the United States and in Latin America.
* arrangement of European distribution through Freedom House contacts.
BUDGET
Salaries
Project Coordinator: $25,000
Editorial Assistant: 16,000
[Total]: $41,000
Translation: $7,000
Honoria and fee for introduction: 8,000
Typing of drafts and final manuscript: 3,000
Transcription of interview tapes (100 hours of taped interviews): 8,100
Research materials: 2,500
Overhead: (International phone calls, office space, copying, secretarial services, etc.): 8,000
Graphic Artist fee for cover: 1,500
Publishing Costs (2,000 hardcover and 10,000 trade paperback): 45,000
Distribution Costs: 10,000
Total Costs (Including printing): $134,100
Cost of Project (Commercial publisher assumes printing and distribution costs in the continental United States): $79,100