Compiled by William H. Cunliffe
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Select Documents on Japanese War Crimes and Japanese Biological Warfare, 1934-2006
Compiled by William H. Cunliffe
SELECT DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE WAR CRIMES AND JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1934-2006 The enactment of the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act (P.L.106-657) and the issuance of Executive Order 13110 (Jan. 11, 1999) aimed at making U.S. government records related to Japanese war crimes and war criminals in World War II more accessible. Records surveys implementing these requirements disclosed that there were relatively few remaining security-classified relevant documents waiting for disclosure. On the other hand, better identification of relevant documents and improved access to these records was a primary goal of the White House. The Interagency Working Group (IWG) staff took up the admonition from the National Security Advisor that “Agencies should bring to light hitherto unknown relevant unclassified or declassified records encountered in the course of the search for relevant classified records.”
In selecting documents, the IWG Staff focused on several subjects and topics that have longstanding interest and concerns for researchers:
• Japanese research and experiments in biological warfare (BW)
• Japanese instigation of biological warfare attacks in World War II
• Japanese biological warfare experiments on living humans and animals
• Japanese atrocities against prisoners of war
• Japanese atrocities against civilian populations
• Allied decisions to hold Japanese responsible for war crimes
• Allied decisions to hold war crimes trials
• Allied decision to consider Emperor Hirohito as a person responsible for war crimes
• Allied decisions to investigate specific Japanese scientists and military personnel for BW crimes
• American POWs held at Mukden POW Camp Hoten and any evidence of BW experiments on them
Some subjects of current interest, such as “comfort women,” were specifically searched for, but with little success. This collection will continue to expand as new documents are discovered.
Navigating the Select List
This list of Select Documents is being distributed in portable document format (PDF) to maximize worldwide access to the information. Users may request an Access database or Excel spreadsheet version by sending an e-mail request to iwg@nara.gov/.
The list of Select Documents is arranged chronologically. Each entry for a document is linked to a control number [JWC#]. A complete copy of that document is filed under that number in the IWG Reference Collection of Select Documents on Japanese Biological Warfare and on Japanese War Crimes and is available in the Textual Research Room (room 2000) of Archives II, College Park, MD.
Boldfaced type identifies documents of special interest.
Chronological Overview
1934–1940
• Descriptions of prewar experiments by Japanese scientists extracted from postwar interviews by U.S. Army personnel.
1941–1943
• U.S. intelligence acquired knowledge of Japanese tactical biological warfare (BW) incidents that resulted in localized outbreaks of plague or cholera.
• Captured Japanese documents began to reveal personnel and places for primary Japanese Army BW organizations operating under the title of Water Supply & Purification Units.
• Allied intelligence produced limited initial information about Maj. Gen. Shiro Ishii and the research facilities in Manchuria.
• A few reports describe the means of BW attacks from airplanes either by spraying or by dropping glass vials containing cholera or plague bacteria [see JWC 71].
• Reports also describe attacks on horses and other animals by means of glanders bacteria.
• At this stage, intelligence suggested a BW threat that appeared limited and was not believed to be an immediate threat to military operations.
1944 (January–June)
• Allied concerns about BW increased, but it was unclear whether the Japanese were engaged in BW research and development for defensive purposes or were preparing to launch offensive BW as a desperate means to avert defeat [see JWC 77/1].
• Intelligence gathering revealed details about the extensive production of bacteria sources both in Japan and Manchuria; of supplies on hand in Shanghai, Nanking, and Mukden; and potential means of delivery in bacillus bombs or free balloons [JWC 77/1].
1944 (July–December)
• The United States made a significant increase in its efforts to deal with biological warfare. The Army established a Special Assistant (Merck) to the Secretary of War and set up interagency organizations to better coordinate the BW effort.
• Robert Stroud (“Birdman of Alcatraz”) submitted a proposal for use of botulin as a pre-invasion weapon [JWC 184].
• Intelligence gathering—especially from the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS)—produced fuller information on Ishii, identified support facilities in Japanese colleges, universities, Army hospitals and at various research institutes.
• Intelligence reports provided more details about the research at Pingfan and of Japanese testing of BW products.
• Increasingly, the Allies show heightened concern about the Japanese willingness to engage in BW.
1945 (January–June)
• The sharp increase in Japanese attacks using free balloons was seen initially as a potential BW weapon threatening crops, if not people [see JWC 77/3].
• Growing concern about Japanese atrocities against both Allied POWs and civilians resulted in protests by the U.S. to Japan, coupled with warnings about postwar accountability.
• The Army identified potential Japanese BW intelligence targets in China and Japan. Captured documents and POW interrogations provided increasing details about BW facilities in Mukden, Harbin, and Pingfan.
• The United States undertook postwar planning for Japan, including issues of war crimes and questions of the future status of Emperor Hirohito [see JWC 273].
• There was heightened concern by Allied military that the Japanese would resort to BW and CW as part of last desperate defenses.
1945 (July–December)
• The War Department issued Japanese Biological Warfare Project No. 2263 documenting the state of U.S. knowledge and conclusions by the Intelligence Division of probably Japanese actions [JWC 016, see JWC 4, JWC 16].
• Japan’s surrender triggered preparations for international war crimes trials and for investigations of war crimes & war criminals [JWC 305/4].
• POW Camp Hoten, Mukden Manchuria reports [JWC 173, 205, 240, 241, 242, 250, 274, 298 & 299] on living conditions, treatment, health reports, and individual abuse, but no evidence of BW experiments occurring [see JWC 240/2].
• Sanders & Young Report of the Scientific Survey in Japan, Volume V: Biological Warfare compiled extensive interviews with Japanese Scientists on offensive & defensive elements of their research and weapons, but not on specific experiments. This was the first major postwar report back to Washington evaluating Japanese BW [see JWC 2].
• Merck Report to Secretary of War on “Activities of the United States in the Field of Biological Warfare” [see JWC 39 for this 50 page study].
• Compton Report assessment indicated that Japanese scientists were engaged in offensive BW work [see JWC 55 & 212].
• Cole Preliminary Report indicated the primary experimental site for Japanese BW has probably been destroyed [see JWC 192/2].
• U.S. Biological Warfare Committee Report on future research & development of U.S. BW capabilities [JWC 83].
• U.S. Naval Technical Mission Report on Japanese bacteriological research and weapons [JWC 248 & 249].
1946 (January–June)
• Ishii accused of injecting plague into live subjects [JWC 315/52].
• SCAP Legal Section sought Ishii for interrogation but not as a war criminal. Army G-2 sought to locate Ishii for questioning by War Department personnel [JWC 215 & 231].
• Thompson “History of the Mukden Group” provided a primary history of the Allied POWs held at Hoten [see JWC 205].
• Australia listed Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal [JWC 262/04].
• “Merck Report to the Secretary of War” concluded that Japanese were developing offensive BW capabilities [JWC 003].
• Army G-2 sought to determine if American POWs were used in BW experiments [JWC 191].
• Mukden – POW Camp Hoten reports by OSS & SCAP concluded “42 affidavits – now on file – no intimation of experiments” [see JWC 231, 241 & 242/07].
• Materials on Mukden (Hoten) POW Camp shipped to China by SCAP Legal Section [JWC 242/06].
• PACMIRS translated Mukden POW Camp medical records [JWC 298]. United States & Great Britain agreed not to charge Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal [JWC 48/03].
• Emperor Hirohito called for a constitutional convention to establish a democratic government and offers to resign [JWC 48/05].
• “Biological Warfare: Activities and Capabilities of Foreign Nations” report included detailed diagrams of Pingfan facilities and of Japanese bacterial bomb. This represented the first detailed information the United States acquired on Pingfan [see JWC 36].
• Series of interrogations of Col. Toyoaki Morita provided details of Japanese development and use of chemical and gas weapons against the Chinese. Included information on Army medical experiments in Shanghai [JWC 235 series].
• Evidence arose of Japanese use of CW agents against the Chinese [JWC 118].
• IPS concluded that sufficient evidence existed to bring war crimes charges against Japan for use of poison gas against China [JWC 236 series].
• “Bacteria Warfare Report from China” is a 37-page IPS report on plague outbreaks as a consequence of Japanese air dispersal of contaminated grain [see JWC 236/4 & JWC 121].
• IPS concluded “no attempt will be made to prove BW by Japanese against China as evidence ‘not sufficient’” [JWC 120].
• Thompson Report: “Japanese Biological Warfare” (51 pp) Drawn for interrogations of Ishii, Kaneko, Kitano, and Masuda Jan.-Mar. 1946. It provided details of the research facilities at Harbin and described various BW/CW bombs [see JWC 1 and 223 series].
• Takeshi Kino described human experiments at Harbin under Gen. Wakamatsu & Maj. Hosaka for the Ishii BKA. Uncertain if experiments were performed on Chinese laborers or POWs. (Note: Japanese references to “POWs” often included Russians and Chinese captured from other parts of Manchuria & China. It does not specifically reference the Allied POWs held at Hoten POW camps.)
1946 (July–December)
• SCAP CinCFE implemented a policy that all national security matters would fall under Washington control of the JCS and the SWNCC, and release required prior approval of the JCS [JWC 296/03, 243/49].
• SCAP Legal began investigation of Motoji Yamaguchi, et al., for BW activities at the Kwantung Army Quarantine Stables and with the “Ishii unit at Harbin” [JWC 258 series].
• In the “Report on War Criminals,” [see JWC 231/10] Nishimura [fnu] accuses Yamaguchi, et al., of the dissection of “many prisoners of Allied Forces at the outdoor dissecting ground of [Unit] No. 100 Army Corps at Hiainking, Manchuria” and of infecting POWs with glanders [JWC 231 series].
• SCAP Legal established war crimes Case No. 330 listing Motoji YAMAGUCHI, Yujiro WAKAMATSU, Yasutaro HOSAKA, Shiro MATSUSHIDA, fnu YASUZAKA, and Shiro ISHII [261/05].
• Joint Chiefs of Staff directed SCAP to take no action against Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal [JWC 284/01].
• Arrest orders were issued for the murder of eight POWs in medical experiments conducted at Kyushu Imperial University Hospital [JWC 278].
• SCAP Legal opened war crimes case #290, investigating allegations that 48 POWs underwent experimental operations by “medical non-coms” at SAGAMIGAHARA Army Hospital. Thirteen died [JWC 280 series].
• “Japanese Biological Warfare” is a 34-page analysis of Japanese wartime activities and capabilities. Later issued as MIS Project #2263.
• Peatty Diary of conditions at POW Camp Hoten, Mukden, reported on daily life at the officers camp from Nov. 1942–Nov. 1945 [see JWC 173].
• Interrogation of Maj. Gen. Kiyoshi Kawashima disclosed Japanese experiments in dropping plague-infected fleas from airplanes and of undertaking human experiments. These statement marked important official admissions by Japanese of these activities [JWC 137, 138, 139].
• Hiroshi UEKI accused Shiro ISHII of establishing “a large-scale human experiment station” at Harbin where he “executed brutal experiments on many Allied POWs” [see JWC 258/8a & 242/18].
• “Records of ISHII Shiro” was produced by Japanese Government Liaison Office in response to a formal request from SCAP Legal Section [JWC 231/17].
• Imagi alleged that Ishii operated a secret laboratory near Harbin where humans were inoculated with glanders. Further, ISHII used Tokyo & Kyoto Imperial medical Laboratories for the same purpose. As a consequence, SCAP Legal Section consolidated war crimes cases No. 91 & 330 [JWC 242/21].
• “SCAP Legal Section, Investigative Division Case No. 330”: SCAP Intelligence Division (G-2) classified the entire case as SECRET and stopped all further investigation by SCAP Legal Section, Investigative Division [see JWC 261/4, JWC 285].
• Secretary of War and Joint Research & Development Board recommended that all information about the biological warfare program be held at the TOP SECRET level [JWC 305/01].
• Hisashi OKADA reports to CinCFE that bacteriological experiments were conducted on POWs at the Infectious Disease Research Laboratory, Tokyo [JWC 258/18].
1947 (January–March)
• “Request by IMTFE Russian Prosecutor” is a formal request to interrogate Shiro ISHII, Hitoshi KIKUCHI, & Kiyoshi OTA about Unit 631 BW experiments and “cases of mass murders as a result of those experiments” [243 series].
• Ryoichi NAITO described offensive and defensive BW programs of Shiro Ishii. Related that one of the aliases used by Ishii was “Hajime Togo” [JWC 231/38].
• “Bacteriological Warfare Experiments by Japanese” summarized meetings with the Russian prosecutor over repeated requests to interrogate Ishii and Ota [JWC 243/48].
• Ryoichi NAITO alleged that Ishii conducted BW experiments on POWs, and provided names of Japanese scientists working with Ishii [see JWC 242/28].
• SCAP investigated Infectious Disease Research Laboratory (DENSENBYO KENKYSHO) and sought ABE & KOJIMA for interviews about alleged atrocities [JWC 277 series].
• Japanese Bacteriological Research Institute, Changchun, Manchuria reported general destruction of records [JWC 70].
• “Russian Request to Interrogate Japanese on Biological Warfare,” briefing papers by SCAP G-2, weighed war crimes evidence against nondisclosure of BW intelligence [see JWC 243/46].
• Request of the Russian Prosecutor: SCAP notified War Department that the three Japanese scientists are responsible for experiments resulting in the deaths of 2,000 Chinese and Manchurians [JWC 296/02].
• Ryoichi NAITO & Shoji HONGO provided SCAP with details of Ishii’s rise to power, accumulation of wealth, and his research in BW [JWC 255/21 & 308/02b].
• Request of the Russian Prosecutor: SWNCC recommended sending BW experts from the War Department to Tokyo to interview the Japanese scientists prior to any Russian access [JWC 170/3].
• Takeshi KINO testified that Gen WAKAMATSU & Maj. YAMAGUCHI were responsible for the thirteen deaths as the result of secret experiments [JWC 231/36].
• SCAP Criminal Registry Division notified SCAP Legal that it would check to see if a case had been opened against Gen. Shiro Ishii, and would then “take appropriate action to insure that he is located and processed as any other suspected war criminal” [see JWC 259/8 & 256/3].
• Russian delegate to Allied Council for Japan, Lt. Gen. Derevyanko, files a formal request for Ishii and Ota for “war crimes against the USSR” [JWC 243/53].
• Mamoru OICHI, attached to Unit 100, described an autopsy on a POW who had been injected with glanders; stating that he thinks the POW was a Russian [JWC 259/16].
• Request of the Russian Prosecutor: War Department instructed SCAP to make an initial interrogation to determine if there was any sensitive BW information at risk [JWC 5/05 & 296/24].
• “USSR Request to Interrogate and Arrest Japanese Bacteriological Warfare Experts” detailed summary of the decisions and policies made in response to the request on Jan. 7, 1947 [243 series, esp. 243/43].
1947 (April–June)
• War Department, Chemical Warfare Service, set Dr. Norbert Fell to Japan to interrogate Japanese BW scientists [JWC 243/11].
• SCAP rejected Russian request that Ishii and Ota be turned over to USSR for war crimes [JWC 243/13].
• Willoughby, SCAP G-2, halted all prosecution and publicity on Case No. 330 in name of CinCFE and SCAP Chief of Staff [JWC 257/6].
• ”Roster of Personnel connected with Shiro Ishii in the pursuit of Bacterial Warfare” prepared by SCAP Legal for Norbert Fell’s interviews of Japanese scientists [JWC 261/03].
• Hitoshi KIKUCHI instructed not to reveal to Russian interrogators information about human experiments, BW used against the Chinese, or mass production of fleas [JWC 228/12].
• SCAP G-2 notes “documentary immunity from war crimes will be provided to Ishii and others in exchange for cooperation and full disclosure” [JWC 152].
• Interrogation of Shiro Ishii discussed experiments at Pingfan and references to experiments on humans. Issue of immunity still undecided [JWC 228/06].
• Questions for Japanese scientist prepared by War Department CWS for Dr. Norbert Fell to use in the interrogations [JWC 243/15].
• War Department, War Crimes Branch, called for “all possible war crimes evidence or charges against Ishii or any member of his group.” Asked for Ishii’s status before the IPS and IMTFE [JWC 243/16].
• SCAP Legal informed War Crimes Branch that although the “Japanese Communist Party” accused Ishii of conducting experiments on captured Americans at Mukden, IPS stated that neither Ishii nor his subordinates were being held as war crimes suspects, “nor is there sufficient legal evidence on file against them” [see JWC 243/17].
• SCAP G-2 reported that the B.K.A. (Bacterial War Army) engineered the bombardment of its own facilities, including hundreds of laboratory members at the end of the war [JWC 315/26].
• ‘Summary of Information on Shiro Ishii’ for War Department G-2 noted allegations that he injected U.S. POWs with bubonic plague as an experiment. G-2 notes, “[N]aturally these experiments are of the highest intelligence value” [JWC 315/25].
• Fell Report, “Brief Summary of New Information about Japanese BW Activities,” presented Dr. Fell’s findings from his trip to Japan in April 1947, noting a 60-page report in English and ”a separate report from Ishii” would be forthcoming. Fell reported that “it was positively stated that no American or Russian prisoners of war had been used at any time” in human experiments [see JWC 123 & 227].
• SCAP Legal Section notified War Department War Crimes Branch that Ishii violated ”rules of land warfare” in operations in China but IPS said it lacked evidence for a trial [JWC 159].
• Translations of Russian interrogations taken in 1946 on activities of Ishii Unit between 1939-1944 and furnished to SCAP 1947. SCAP was transmitting records to War Department, War Crimes Branch [JWC 243/24].
1947 (July–December)
• Intelligence Report on Japanese Chemical Warfare. War Department Chemical Warfare Service urged FEC, Chemical, to investigate Japanese research and findings, noting the BW study “has brought to light important information not disclosed in previous inquiries” [JWC 136].
• FEC, CIS reported that Ishii got initial financial backing for BW work and, later, for activities in Manchuria from Takahashi, and military backing from Koizumi and Tojo [JWC 315/17].
• CIS reported to SCAP G-2 that Ishii may be wanted by the Chinese as a war criminal. SCAP G-2 advised FEC that information on ISHII was classified TOP SECRET and not releasable to any agency [JWC 315/16].
• Brief: “Interrogation of Certain Japanese by the Russian Prosecutor.” SFE reports the possible disclosure of evidence “that American prisoners of war were used for experimental purposes by the Japanese BW group” [JWC 170/4].
• SWNCC concluded the value of Japanese BW information outweighed war crimes prosecution and pressed for granting immunity [JWC 163].
• SFE argued in favor of immunity, noting that IPS stated there is insufficient evidence for war crimes case against Ishii and that the Chinese are not preparing a case against Ishii [JWC 304/02].
• State argued against granting immunity, asserting it would be “a source of serious embarrassment to the United States” [JWC 170/06].
• IMTFE Prosecutor Joseph Keenan stated, “Had he—Emperor Hirohito—been anyone else, he would have been in the dock, too” [JWC 84/06].
• Hill and Victor Interviews (Oct.-Dec. 1947) of Japanese BW scientists on their basic research began, “No question of immunity guarantees from war crimes prosecution was ever raised during these interviews” [see JWC 35/02] [JWC 35 series & 254 series].
• Interview with Dr. Kozo OKAMOTO on autopsies performed at Harbin, 1938-1945 [JWC 254/18, 254/13 & 35/21].
• Rape of Nanking: Record of trial of Gen Hisao TANI for atrocities at Nanking included an untranslated Chinese language account [JWC 275].
• Summary Report of BW Investigations by Drs. Edwin Hill & Joseph Victor: Detailed (74 pages) findings from investigations and interviews with twenty-two Japanese BW scientists. Hill declared the cost (est. Y250,000) “was a pittance against the millions spent by the Japanese” [JWC 230 & JWC 35/02].
• SFE 188 series referenced a 60-page report [possibly JWC 135] by Shiro Ishii [JWC 203].
1948-2006
• Foreign Documents Branch Translation No. 102: Reports on Japanese Bacteriological Research (vol. 1): Translations of seventeen Japanese bacteriological experiments and reports [JWC 131 & 133].
• Foreign Documents Branch Translation No. 102: Reports on Japanese Bacteriological Research (vol. 2): Translations of eight Japanese bacteriological experiments and reports [JWC 132 & 134].
• Immunity and Interrogation of Certain Japanese by the Russian Prosecutor: Army, CWS notified SWNCC & SFE that “necessary information and scientific data have been obtained to our satisfaction” [JWC 166, & 276/2].
• Immunity Issue: SWNCC & SFE notified JCS & SCAP that “the technical advisors who have returned from your theater indicated that to date necessary information and scientific data have been obtained to your satisfaction” [JWC 5/12, 5/13, & 170/8].
• Immunity Issue: JCS advised SCAP to resubmit its request originally sent in response to SWNCC 351 [JWC 308/03a and 03b].
• Unit 731 members working for the USSR: Army Intelligence unit 441st CIC reported about thirty members of Unit 731 were captured by the USSR and were “working on bacteriological research project near Moscow” [JWC 315/08].
• Report “A” (Anthrax): This 406-page study was produced from Japanese human experiments, interviews by Army technical personnel, and reports by Army BW labs at Ft. Detrick. It provides detailed microscopic investigation of the reaction of human organs to anthax bacillus [JWC 252].
• Report “G” (Glanders): This 372-page study was produced from Japanese human experiments, interviews by Army technical personnel, and from reports by Army BW labs at Ft. Detrick. It provided detailed microscopic investigation of the reaction of human organs to glanders [JWC 251].
• Report of “Q” (Plague): This 744-page study was produced from Japanese human experiments, interviews by Army technical personnel, and reports by Army BW labs at Ft. Detrick. It provided detailed microscopic investigation of the reaction of human organs to plague [JWC 253].
• “Aids to the collection of information for Biological Warfare Intelligence (1949)” The fifteen-page directive included ”Indications of BW activity” and a glossary [JWC 267/4].
• Technical Intelligence Requirement of the Chemical Corps: Included human testing as part of the means for developing offensive and defensive chemical intelligence [JWC 267/5].
• “Russian Trial of Japanese for Biological Warfare”: Twelve trials at Khabarovsk of Japanese for committing BW war crimes. Charges included testing performed on U.S. prisoners of war (Note: Japanese responded with mass demonstrations at Soviet embassy in Tokyo over deaths by USSR of 300,000 Japanese prisoners of war held in Manchuria & Siberia) [JWC 7/1].
• “Russian Trial of Japanese for Biological Warfare”: Confession by Maj. Tomio KARASAWA states that, in 1943, American POWs Mukden were experimented on by Unit 731 personnel “to ascertain the degree of vulnerability of the American Army to different combat infections” [see JWC 84/8].
• “USSR demand for war crimes trial of Emperor Hirohito”: USSR delivered note to Secretary of State (Feb 2, 1950) [JWC 84/10].
• “Checklist of Seized Japanese Records”: James Morley published a 28-page article describing captured and seized Japanese records held by the National Archives and other institutions [JWC 14]. “USSR note to U.S. Secretary of State”: USSR charged Emperor Hirohito, Shiro Ishii, Masajo Kitano, Yujiro Wakamatsu, and Yukio Kasahars with war crimes [see JWC 84/12].
• Summary Report on B.W. Investigations by Drs. Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor (74 pp): Army Chemical Warfare Service formally forwarded the 1947 report to the Secretary of Defense for Research & Development. This may mark its formal release outside of Ft. Detrick [JWC 35/01].
• “Comments on the deaths of Prince Konoe Fumitake and Karasawa Tomio in the USSR” (Jan. 1957): Intelligence reported that two prisoners died under questionable circumstances. Both appeared likely to be repatriated to Japan. Tomio Karasawa (a colleague of Shiro Ishii) was said to have hanged himself in Oct. 1956. Konoe died a few days later [see JWC 27/5].
• “Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records, Part II Japanese Records”: Comprised the official National Archives and Records Administration dossier and disposal correspondence (1953-1960) on the return of Japanese records [JWC 51].
• 505th CIC Group report on national Institute of Health (Japan): Reported that Junichi KANEKI & Yujiro WAKAMATSU are working in NIH infection studies [JWC 254/35]. “Japanese Biological Warfare Experiments in World War II”: On May 26, 1982, the U.S. Congress sought formal comments from the Department of State on biological warfare experiments carried out by Gen. Shiro ISHII [JWC 301/07].
• “Japanese Biological Warfare Experiments in World War II”: On March 10, 1983, Senator Bill Bradley called for a formal Congressional inquiry on the “alleged experimentation on humans by the Japanese during World War II” [JWC 301/12].
• “Department of Defense Questions & Answers Regarding Unit 731 (May, 12, 1995)”: DOD responded that “there does not appear to be any documentary evidence to support claims that U.S. POWs were subjected to biological experimentation by the Japanese Army during World War II” [see JWC 125].
• “Department of Veterans Affairs Responses to Press Inquiries on Mukden POWs” (July 14, 1995): DVA responded, “No confirming evidence has as yet been presented that biological warfare experiments were conducted on those POWs who were held in Mukden” [see JWC 126].
• “National Security Council Press Guidance: Japanese Biological Warfare Experiments in World War II”: NSC provided a summary of the claims by POWs that they were the objects of BW experiments by the Japanese. NSC noted that over years of exhaustive searching, “we have not been able to locate conclusive evidence that U.S. POWs were subjects of biological warfare experiments” [see JWC 244].
• “China-Japan War, 1931-1945: Historiographic Essay” by Prof. David Gordon, included sections on Manchuria, Interlude 1932-37, ”China Incident” 1937-38, Nanking Massacre, China Incident and the Pacific War 1939-45, Nationalist China, 1937-45, Communist Insurgency, Japanese War Crimes, and Politics of Memory [JWC 268].
Contact:
William Cunliffe
william.cunliffe@nara.gov
301-837-3482
November 2006
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