The Origins of COVID-19: An Investigation of the Wuhan Institute of Virology
by House Foreign Affairs Committee
Lead Republican Michael T. McCaul
Report Minority Staff
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
August 2021
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) today [December 19, 2017] lifted a 3-year moratorium on funding gain-of-function (GOF) research on potential pandemic viruses such as avian flu, SARS, and MERS, opening the door for certain types of research to resume.Donald Trump's tenure as the 45th president of the United States began with his inauguration on January 20, 2017 and ended on January 20, 2021.
-- Presidency of Donald Trump, by Wikipedia“The Godfather of [gain-of-function virology research], the head of the pyramid, is a guy you may have heard of called Anthony Fauci,” Rogin said. “So, Anthony Fauci, the hero of the pandemic, is the most important person in the world of gain-of-function research there is . . . Basically, he is the one disbursing all the grants for this, he is the one who pushed to turn it back on after Obama turned it off, that’s another crazy story, he turned it back on without really consulting the White House.”
“He consulted the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which is part of the White House, but the White House put a pause on it and he undid the pause,” Rogin continued. “The details are a little sketchy. I’m not saying he did anything necessarily wrong or illegal, but I’m saying that a lot of people that I know inside the Trump administration had no idea that he had turned this back on. He found a way to turn it back on in the mess of the Trump administration because the Trump administration is full of a bunch of clowns, so you could get things done if you knew how to work the system.”
As Rogin himself admits, “the details are a little sketchy,” and we’ll have to take a look at the sourcing included in whatever article this piece of news appears in before alleging any wrongdoing.
-- Fauci Reportedly Relaunched NIH Gain-of-Function Research without Consulting White House, by Jack Crowe, National Review, April 27, 2021
The action coincides with today's release of a US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) framework for guiding funding decisions about proposed research involving pathogens that have enhanced potential for creating pandemics.
Experts involved in the discussions welcomed the development, but some said the new framework still leaves key unanswered questions, such as how to responsibly report findings from the funded lab work in medical journals. Meanwhile, in research labs, some scientists plan to resume experiments and are relieved the pause has ended. Both groups are eager to see how the new review process works in real life.
In a statement today, NIH Director Francis Collins, MD, PhD, said "We have a responsibility to ensure that research with infectious agents is conducted responsibly, and that we consider the potential biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with such research." He added that he is confident that the review process spelled out in the new framework "will help to facilitate the safe, secure, and responsible conduct of this type of research in a manner that maximizes the benefits to public health."...
In light of controversial research on H5N1 viruses in 2012, the Obama administration in 2014 announced a pause of federally funded GOF research and asked a government advisory group to reevaluate federal GOF funding policies and put together recommendations to help officials make their decisions.
The expert group, called the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), commissioned a 1,000-page risk-benefit assessment to help them make their final guidance, which they finalized in June 2016, along with an ethics white paper. As part of the process, the NSABB held two National Academies symposia on GOF issues....
The framework, condensed into a 6-page document, spells out a multidisciplinary review process that involved the funding agency and a department-level review group that considers the merits and possible research benefits and the potential to create, transfer, or use an enhanced potential pandemic pathogen (PPP). In January in the final days of the Obama administration, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released guidance the departments can use to follow through with the reviews.
There are eight criteria in the framework for guiding HHS funding decisions, which stipulate, for example, that the research has been evaluated by an independent expert review as scientifically sound, that the potential risks and benefits are justified, that there are no other equally effective but less risky options for answering the research question, and that the research team and facility have the capacity to do the work safety and securely and to respond rapidly if there are any accidents, protocol lapses, or security breaches.
Regarding issues surrounding publication, the criterion says that the research results are expected to be responsibly communicated, based on applicable laws, regulations, and policies, along with terms and conditions of funding.
Also, the framework stipulates that the work will be done with the support of funding mechanisms that allow appropriate risk management and ongoing institution and federal oversight of the research. And finally, the criteria state that the research must be ethically justifiable...
Marc Lipsitch, PhD, professor of epidemiology and director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, has been deeply involved in the GOF discussions and has argued for a much more rigorous approach for evaluating the experiments. He has pushed for experts to consider safer ways to assess potential pandemic virus threats and for an international approach to tackling the issues.
"My overall take is that this is a small step forward," he said, adding that it includes a department-level review of the most concerning types of research, which have been defined appropriately after extensive time and debate. "The question is how such reviews will play out in practice."
However, Lipsitch said one problem is that the guidance specifies that research groups that propose work with enhanced pathogens will need to convince reviewers that there is no feasible, equally effective alternative way of addressing the scientific question with a less risky approach.
"If this means no alternative to answer with certainty the question of whether a specific strain that occurs in nature can very easily evolve to acquire a ferret-transmissible phenotype, then this criterion will always be satisfied," he said. "This is a scientific question that can uniquely be answered with dangerous experiments, and cannot be answered safely. But it is not a very useful one, because every strain in nature is different."
Michael Osterholm, PhD, MPH, who was a member of the NSABB during the controversy over the H5N1 papers, said he believes the GOF work can be done safely, but he doesn't agree that scientists doing the federally funded work should be unfettered.
Osterholm said his main concern regards the public health implications of the publicly available details about how the work is communicated, which the new framework doesn't spell out. "How we detail that information needs to be considered," such as more finely specifying when findings are open to the general public, when they're disseminated on a "need to know" basis, and when the information is classified.
"Until we have that part solved, I'm concerned about the work being done," he said.
Osterholm, director of the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, which publishes CIDRAP News, added that some research is needed to answer key questions, such as what it would take for Ebola to become a respiratory virus, findings that would have implications for preparedness. "If it were the case, I don't want the public to have a blueprint on how to do it," he said.
Tom Inglesby, MD, director and chief executive officer at the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, has also been deeply involved in discussions about issues related to the research pause. He said the requirements for the multidisciplinary, department-level pre-funding review and the involvement of the White House OSTP are excellent.
He added that the emphasis on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens is correct and focuses the framework on where it should be, such as on harmful consequences, immunity disruption, conferred resistance, and reconstructed extinct pathogens. "Though for the policy to be successful it needs to, at a minimum, be able to oversee the creation of novel strains that may be highly transmissible and highly virulent and should probably focus on that most intently to start."
A potentially serious weakness of the new framework is that surveillance activities involving potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs), including sampling and sequencing, aren't considered to be enhanced PPPs and would be exempt from reviews, Inglesby said, adding that surveillance as a rationale doesn't change potential risks of novel PPP strains. "There are serious debates about whether specific enhanced PPP projects are materially useful to on-the-ground surveillance programs," he said.
Inglesby's other concerns revolve around the lack of hard details of how the experiment reviews will work, such as the process for weighing the risks and benefits and the criteria for judging if researchers and institutions have the capacity to do the work safely. "I would have liked to see if this framework was working as intended before the moratorium was ended," he said, suggesting that agencies funding the work publish their experiences using the new framework to show how it functions.
-- Feds lift gain-of-function research pause, offer guidance, by Lisa Schnirring, December 19, 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS: [PDF HERE]
• INTRODUCTION TO ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL REPORT
• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• GLOSSARY OF TERMS
• KEY PEOPLE
• ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL REPORT
o I. The City of Wuhan: Epicenter of a Pandemic
o II. Evidence of a Lab Leak
o III. Evidence of Genetic Modification
o IV. Evidence of a Lab Leak Cover-Up
o V. Hypothesis: A Lab Leak That Caused a Pandemic
o VI. Recommendations
o VII. Conclusion
o VIII. Appendix
• Timeline of the WIV Lab Leak and the Start of the COVID-19 Pandemic
• China Center for Disease and Control Memo on Supplementary Regulations
• JPCM Confidential Notice on the Standardization of the Management of Publication of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Scientific Research
• February 6, 2020, Email at 12:43am from Peter Daszak to Ralph Baric, Linfa Wang, and Others Inviting Them to Sign the Statement
• February 6, 2020, Email at 3:16pm from Peter Daszak to Ralph Baric Relaying Wang’s Request Not to Sign the Statement
• February 8, 2020, Email at 8:52pm from Peter Daszak to Rita Colwell Alleging WIV Researchers Requested the Statement
Introduction
Five hundred and four days ago, on March 16, 2020, Committee Minority Staff began its investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 global pandemic at the direction of Ranking Member Michael T. McCaul. The House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Final Report on The Origins of the COVID-19 Global Pandemic, Including the Roles of the Chinese Communist Party and the World Health Organization was published in late September 2020. At the time of its release, there were an estimated 30.8 million cases of COVID-19 around the world, and a death toll of approximately 958,000. Today, the cumulative count stands at more than 196.4 million cases and 4,194,061 dead.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff has continued to investigate the origins of COVID-19, examining new information as it became available, including through expert testimony. We have done so because approximately 48 million of our population are under the age of 12 and without access to a vaccination, while others remain unvaccinated due to underlying medical conditions, leaving a large portion of American citizens at risk of infection. We prepared this addendum as reports increase regarding various strains around the globe, and as PRC authorities continue to withhold critical information about the early months of the pandemic. We have strongly urged our Majority colleagues to take this investigation seriously and conduct a full bipartisan investigation into the origins of COVID-19, and will continue to do so. President Biden has said he wants to discover how the pandemic began, and it is our duty to the American people to use all the tools in our arsenal in pursuit of that goal. As always, we stand ready to address this and other foreign policy challenges together and in a bipartisan manner. We must not let up on pressing General Secretary Xi and CCP authorities for answers.
Here we share the result of these efforts in an addendum to our September 2020 Final Report. In particular, this update focuses on whether the virus may have leaked from a medical research laboratory in Wuhan, Hubei Province, PRC, and the efforts to conceal such a leak. The evidence used to inform this report is based upon open source information and includes published academic work, official PRC publications (both public and confidential), interviews, emails, and social media postings.
Since the publication of the September 21, 2020 Final Report new questions have been raised pertaining to the origins of COVID-19. The PRC’s continued lack of transparency resulted in President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s May 26, 2021, order to the United States Intelligence Community to prepare a report in 90 days on the origins of COVID-19, “including whether it emerged from human contact with an infected animal or from a laboratory accident.”1 [“Statement by President Joe Biden on the Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19.” The White House, 26 May 2021, http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room ... -covid-19/.]
Based on the material collected and analyzed by the Committee Minority Staff, the preponderance of evidence suggests SARS-CoV-2 was accidentally released from a Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory sometime prior to September 12, 2019. The virus, or the viral sequence that was genetically manipulated, was likely collected in a cave in Yunnan province, PRC, between 2012 and 2015. Researchers at the WIV, officials within the CCP, and potentially American citizens directly engaged in efforts to obfuscate information related to the origins of the virus and to suppress public debate of a possible lab leak. It is incumbent on these parties to respond to the issues raised herein and provide clarity and any exonerating evidence as soon as possible. Until that time, it must be assumed General Secretary Xi and the Chinese Communist Party, prioritizes preserving the Party over the lives of its own people and those around the global suffering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Executive Summary
More than one year after the World Health Organization declared a pandemic, the world is still reeling from the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the disease it causes, COVID-19. More than four million people have lost their lives worldwide, including more than 612,000 Americans, while economies around the world have been devastated by the fallout. This report investigates the origin of this virus and looks at how it became a deadly pandemic.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology
Last September, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff, under the direction of Ranking Member Michael T. McCaul, released a report on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. That report highlighted the possibility SARS-CoV-2 could have leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). However, as we continued our investigation and uncovered more information, we now believe it’s time to completely dismiss the wet market as the source of the outbreak. We also believe the preponderance of the evidence proves the virus did leak from the WIV and that it did so sometime before September 12, 2019.
This is based upon multiple pieces of evidence laid out in the report, including:
• The sudden removal of the WIV’s virus and sample database in the middle of the night on September 12, 2019 and without explanation;
• Safety concerns expressed by top PRC scientists in 2019 and unusually scheduled maintenance at the WIV;
• Athletes at the Military World Games held in Wuhan in October 2019 who became sick with symptoms similar to COVID-19 both while in Wuhan and also shortly after returning to their home countries;
• Satellite imagery of Wuhan in September and October 2019 that showed a significant uptick in the number of people at local hospitals surrounding the WIV’s headquarters, coupled with an unusually high number of patients with symptoms similar to COVID-19;
• The installation of a People’s Liberation Army’s bioweapons expert as the head of the WIV’s Biosafety Level 4 lab (BSL-4), possibly as early as late 2019; and
• Actions by the Chinese Communist Party and scientists working at or affiliated with the WIV to hide or coverup the type of research being conducted at there.
Genetic Modification
This report also lays out ample evidence that researchers at the WIV, in conjunction with U.S. scientists and funded by both the PRC government and the U.S. government, were conducting gain-of-function research on coronaviruses at the WIV, at times under BSL-2 conditions. Much of this research was focused on modifying the spike protein of coronaviruses that could not infect humans so they could bind to human immune systems. The stated purpose of this work was to identified viruses with pandemic potential and to create a broad-spectrum coronavirus vaccine. In many instances, the scientists were successful in creating “chimeric viruses” -– or viruses created from the pieces of other viruses –- that could infect human immune systems. With dangerous research like this conducted at safety levels similar to a dentist’s office, a natural or genetically modified virus could have easily escaped the lab and infected the community.
Committee Minority Staff has also identified scientists who are directly tied to the WIV, and who worked on gain-of-function research in the years prior to the start of the current pandemic, who had the ability to modify genetically modify coronaviruses without leaving any trace evidence. An American scientist, Dr. Ralph Baric, assisted in creating a method to leave no trace of genetic modification as early as 2005. And as early as 2016, scientists working at the WIV were able to do the same. This makes it clear that claims by the scientific community that SARS-CoV-2 could not be man-made because it has no genetic modification markers are disingenuous.
We conclude there is ample proof that the virus could have been genetically manipulated, and that it is vitally important we fully investigate this hypothesis to determine if that happened here.
The Cover-Up
In the original report, we laid out many of the ways the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) went to great lengths to cover up the initial epidemic, and how their cover-up likely turned what could have been a local outbreak into a global pandemic. The CCP detained doctors in order to silence them, and disappeared journalists who attempted to expose the truth. They destroyed lab samples, and hid the fact there was clear evidence of human-to-human transmission. And they still refuse to allow a real investigation into the origins. At the same time, the WHO, under Director General Tedros, failed to warn the world of the impending pandemic. Instead, he parroted CCP talking points, acting as a puppet of General Secretary Xi.
In this addendum, we have uncovered further evidence of how top scientists at the WIV and Dr. Peter Daszak, an American scientist, furthered that cover-up. Their actions include bullying other scientists who questioned whether the virus could have leaked from a lab; misleading the world about how a virus can be modified without leaving a trace; and, in many, instances directly lying about the nature of the research they were conducting, as well as the low-level safety protocols they were using for that research.
These actions not only delayed an initial investigation into the possibility of a lab leak costing valuable time, but provide further proof the virus likely leaked from the WIV. These actions also call into question the way in which U.S. government grants are used in overseas labs and call for more oversight of those grants.
Next Steps
After this extensive investigation, we believe it is time to call Peter Daszak to testify before Congress. There are still many outstanding questions about the type of research he funded at the WIV that only he can answer. In addition, we believe there is legislation Congress can pass that would not only hold those responsible accountable but also help to prevent a future pandemic, including but not limited to:
• Institute a ban on conducting and funding any work that includes gain-of-function research until an international and legally binding standard is set, and only where that standard is verifiably being followed.
• Sanction the Chinese Academy of Sciences and affiliated entities.
• List the Wuhan Institute of Virology and its leadership on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and apply additional, appropriate secondary sanctions.
• Authorize new sanctions for academic, governmental, and military bioresearch facilities that fail to ensure the appropriate levels of safety and information sharing.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Gain-of-Function Research: “Research that improves the ability of a pathogen to cause disease.” – U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Spike Protein: A protein structure on the surface of an enveloped virus responsible for anchoring the virus to the host cell’s surface and enabling the injection of the virus’ genetic material into the host cell.
RBD: Receptor-Binding Domain. The specific short fragment in a spike protein of a virus that binds the virus to a specific receptor on the host cell.
Primary Author: The first listed author of an academic paper, usually the person who contributes the most to a paper.
Corresponding Author: The point of contact for editors and outside readers who have questions about an academic paper.
USAID Predict: An epidemiological research grant program funded by the United States Agency for International Development. PREDICT provided funding for biological sampling aimed at virus identification and collection. The program provided grant funding to EcoHealth Alliance.
SARS: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. A viral respiratory disease caused by SARS-CoV, a betacoronavirus. First identified as the cause of a 2002-2003 epidemic.
MERS: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. A viral respiratory disease caused by MERS-CoV, a betacoronavirus. First identified as the cause of a 2012 outbreak.
SARS-CoV-2: The betacoronavirus that causes COVID-19.
Coronavirus: An RNA virus that causes disease in mammals and birds. Range in severity from the common cold to SARS-CoV-2.
Betacoronavirus: One of the four subclassifications of coronaviruses. Found in bats and rodents, this is the genus includes SARS, MERS, and SARS-CoV-2.
Biosafety Level 1 (BSL1): Designed for work on microbes not known to cause disease in healthy adults and present minimal potential hazard to laboratorians and the environment. Work can be performed on an open lab bench or table.
Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2): For work with microbes that pose moderate hazards to laboratorians and the environment. The microbes are typically indigenous and associated with diseases of varying severity. Personal protective equipment includes lab coats and gloves. Work can be performed in the open or in a biological safety cabinet. Commonly compared to the level of safety observed in a dentist’s office.
Bio Safety Level 3 (BSL3): For work with microbes that are either indigenous or exotic, and that can cause serious or potentially lethal disease through respiratory transmission. Respiratory transmission is the inhalation route of exposure. Researchers should be under medical surveillance and potentially immunized for the microbes they work with. Respirators may be required, in addition to standard personal protective equipment. Work must be performed within a biological safety cabinet. Exhaust air cannot be recirculated, and the laboratory must have sustained directional airflow by drawing air into the laboratory from clean areas towards potentially contaminated areas.
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4): This is the highest level of biological safety. The microbes in a BSL-4 lab are dangerous and exotic, posing a high risk of aerosol-transmitted infections. Infections caused by these microbes are frequently fatal and without treatment or vaccines. Researchers must change clothing prior to entering the lab, shower upon exiting, and decontaminate all materials before exiting. All work with microbes must be performed in a Class III biological safety cabinet or while wearing a full body, air-supplied, positive pressure suit. The lab must be in a separate building or in a restricted zone, and must have a dedicated supply and exhaust air, as well as vacuum lines and decontamination systems.
Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV): A research institute in Wuhan, PRC focused on focused on virology, that consists of at least two facilities – the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory and the Wuhan Institute of Virology Headquarters.”
Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory: The WIV’s new campus, located in the Zhengdian Scientific Park in Jiangxia District, Wuhan. The location of the WIV’s Biosafety Level 4 laboratory space.
WIV Headquarters: The older WIV facility, located in Wuchang District, Wuhan near the Wuhan Branch of the Chinese Academies of Science.
Chinese Academy of Sciences: The national academy for natural sciences in the PRC. Reports to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.
WIV1: The first novel coronavirus isolated by WIV researchers. Isolated from bat fecal samples in 2013. A SARS like coronavirus.
WIV16: The second coronavirus isolated by WIV researchers. Isolated from a single bat fecal sample in 2016. A SARS like coronavirus.
Rs4874: The third coronavirus isolated by WIV researchers. Isolated from a single bat fecal sample in 2017. A SARS like coronavirus.
ID4491/RaTG13: A SARS like coronavirus collected in 2013 in a mining cave. 96.1% similar to SARS-CoV-2.
ACE2: Angiotensin-converting enzyme-2, found on the surface of certain cells in a variety of animals, including humans, mice, and civets. The entry point for coronaviruses.
hACE2: The human version of ACE2. Primarily found on the surface of cells and tissues throughout the human body, including the nose, mouth, and lungs. In the lungs, hACE2 is highly abundant on type 2 pneumocytes, an important cell type present in chambers within the lung called alveoli, where oxygen is absorbed, and waste carbon dioxide is released. The primary entry point for SARS-CoV-2 into human cells.
Chimeric Virus: An artificial, man-made virus. Created by joining two or more viral fragments.
Natural Virus: A virus found in nature; “wild type.”
Reverse Genetics System: A method in molecular genetics that is used to help understand the function(s) of a gene by analyzing the phenotypic effects caused by genetically engineering specific nucleic acid sequences within the gene. Can be used to create chimeric viruses indistinguishable from natural viruses.
Furin Cleavage Site: An enzyme in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 that increases how infectious the virus is in humans. SARS-CoV-2 is the only betacoronavirus to have this structure.
Phylogenetic Analysis: The study of the evolutionary development of a species or a group of organisms or a particular characteristic of an organism. Used to identify the relationship between different viruses in the same family.
CGG Double Codon: “CGG-CGG.” This group of six nucleotides (a group of three nucleotides is also know as a codon) is half of the 12 nucleotides that create the furin cleavage site. The CGG double codon is relatively rare in coronaviruses, and SARSCoV- 2 is the only coronavirus in its family to have one.
KEY PEOPLE
Dr. Wang Yanyi: Director General of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Dr. Yuan Zhiming: Director of the WNBL BSL-4 lab. General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Committee within the Wuhan Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to which the WIV belongs.
Dr. Shi Zheng-li: Senior scientist as the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Serves as Director, Research Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases; Director, Chinese Academy of Sciences Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens; Director, Biosafety Working Committee; and Deputy Director of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory’s Biosafety-Level 4 lab.
Dr. Ben Hu: WIV researcher and former doctoral student of Shi Zheng-li. Deeply involved in the WIV’s coronavirus research.
Dr. Linfa Wang: PRC national, Director and Professor of the Program in Emerging Infectious Diseases at the Duke-NUS Graduate Medical School in Singapore. Chair of the Scientific Advisory Board for the Center for Emerging Diseases at the WIV.
Dr. Peter Daszak: CEO of EcoHealth Alliance. Longtime collaborator of Shi and others at the WIV. Provided subgrants to the WIV to help fund coronavirus research.
Dr. Ralph Baric: Researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who has collaborated with Shi and other WIV researchers on coronavirus research.
ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT
I. THE CITY OF WUHAN: EPICENTER OF A PANDEMIC
Wuhan is the epicenter of the coronavirus pandemic. Located in central PRC where the Yangtze River, the PRC’s longest river, and the Han River meet, Wuhan is the capital city of Hubei Province and boasts a population of about 11.1 million in about 3,280 square miles. [2] [“WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part.” Joint WHO-China Study. 30 March 2021, https://www.who.int/health-topics/coron ... -the-virus] It is home to the PRC’s tallest skyscrapers, multiple colleges and universities, including the prominent Wuhan University, major historical and cultural sites, and an influential research laboratory, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). To put the scale of Wuhan in perspective, the city covers an area five times the size of Houston and has a larger population than New York City and Chicago combined.
Wuhan is home to the Hankou railway station, central PRC’s biggest European-style Railway station, and two other major train stations. Hankou Station connects directly to the Tianhe International Airport, the busiest airport in central PRC and the geographic center of the PRC’s airport network. From the Tianhe airport, travelers can fly direct to New York City, San Francisco, Paris, Milan, Rome, Hamburg, Bangkok, Tokyo, Seoul, and Dubai, among many other destinations around the world.
The PRC calls Wuhan one of its nine “National Central Cities,” an official state label that means it leads the way, along with the capital Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities, in developing culture, politics, and the economy. [3] [Xu, Zongwei. “China Unveils National Central City Strategy.” China Watch, 29 Mar. 2018, http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/201803/29/WS ... 67c6c.html.] An August 2016 report by the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, a government agency that operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, identified Wuhan as a major hub not just within the PRC, but also globally within the Chinese “One Belt One Road” initiative due to its accessibility. [4] [Van de Bovenkamp, Judith and Yuan Fei. “Economic Overview of Hubei Province.” Neatherlands Business Support Office Wuhan, Aug. 2016, https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/ ... -China.pdf] The city is also home to significant railway commerce. A 2018 report from Xinhua news expected an estimated 500 freight trains from Wuhan to Europe for the export of goods. [5] [“Central China-Europe Rail Freight to Surge in 2018.” Xinhua, 1 Feb. 2018. http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2018- 02/01/content_50372222.htm]
France, the U.S., the Republic of Korea, and the UK maintain Consulates in the city, which was selected to host the 7th International Military Sports Council (CISM) Military World Games. During the games, more than 9,000 military personnel from over 100 countries stayed in Wuhan in accommodations at an athletes’ village built specifically for the games.
II. EVIDENCE OF A LAB LEAK
As discussed in the previously issued report, the WIV continues to be a focal point of debate concerning the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic. In recent months, new information about the WIV has come to light, enabling us to better understand the institute, the type of research conducted by scientists working there, and its ties to the CCP and their military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). We now believe the preponderance of evidence shows the virus accidentally leaked from one of the WIV’s facilities.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology
The WIV was founded in 1956 as the Wuhan Microbiology Laboratory and has operated under the administration of the Chinese Academy of Sciences since 1978. [6] [“History.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us2016/History2016/.] The institute currently occupies at least two campuses – the much-discussed Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory (WNBL) in Zhengdian Scientific Park (see Figure 1), and the older facility (hereafter WIV Headquarters) located in the Xiaohongshan park in the Wuchang District of Wuhan (see Figure 2). The WNBL is a large complex with multiple buildings that house 20 Biosafety Level II (BSL-2) laboratories, two Biosafety Level III (BSL-3) laboratories, and 3000 square meters of Biosafety Level IV (BSL-4) space, “including four independent laboratories areas and two animal suites.” [7] [World Health Organization. “WHO Consultative Meeting on High/Maximum Containment (Biosafety Level 4) Laboratories Networking.” Meeting Report, Lyon, France, 13-15 Dec. 2018. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/han ... HO-WHECPI- 2018.40-eng.pdf] Construction was completed in 2015, but due to delays the BSL-4 space did not become operational until early 2018. [8] [Zhiming, Yuan. “Current status and future challenges of high-level biosafety laboratories in China.” Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, 1 Sept. 2019, 1(2): 123-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobb.2019.09.005]
Fig. 1: Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory (WNBL)
Missing from the majority of public debates regarding the WIV is the research conducted at the WIV Headquarters, the older location in the Wuchang District of Wuhan. Located 12 miles northeast of the WNBL, in the Wuchang District, this facility remains the administrative headquarters of the WIV. In addition to the BSL-2 labs at this location, the WIV constructed a BSL-3 laboratory at the facility in 2003. [9] [Zheng Qianli, “Jiang Xia plays new essays and plays Yoko on the crane——The construction and research team of P4 laboratory of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” Chinese Journal of Science, 1 Jan. 2018, https://archive.is/V3GHk#selection-517.35-517.202]
It was here, in the center of Wuhan, that Dr. Shi Zheng-li and her team conducted gain-of-function research on coronaviruses in the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Fig. 2: WIV Headquarters in Wuchang
According to the WIV’s website, Shi Zheng-li serves as the Director of the WIV’s Research Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases, the Deputy Director of the WNBL BSL-4 lab, the Director of the BSL-3 lab, and the Director of the Biosafety Working Committee. [10] [“Shi Zhingli.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://www.whiov.cas.cn/sourcedb_whiov_ ... 00074.html] Shi is also the Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and Biosafety, [11] [“Prof. SHI Zhengli elected a fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://english.whiov.cas.cn/ne/201903/t ... 06697.html] which includes the majority of scientists who are conducting gain-of-function research on coronaviruses at the WIV.
It should be noted that the WIV has a Chinese Communist Party Committee within the institute, as well as a Commission for Discipline Inspection. The Party Committee is divided into four party branches, which are then divided into subbranches organized around the individual WIV departments, research centers, and offices. Each subbranch has its own Propaganda Committee. Committee Minority Staff were able to identify eight WIV researchers on these committees, including several who are affiliated with the Key Laboratory that Shi directs.
Table 1: WIV Researchers on CCP Propaganda Committees
WIV Researcher / Lab Affiliation / Propaganda Committee [12] [“Party Branch.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://www.whiov.cas.cn/djkxwh/dqzz/dzb/]
Liu Qiaojiue / Key Laboratory of Special [13] [Wang Q, et. al. “Structural Basis for RNA Replication by the SARS-CoV-2 Polymerase.” Cell, 23 July 2020, 182(2):417-428.e13, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32526208/] Pathogens and Biosafety / Party Branch of Research Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases
Zhang Xiaowei / Key Laboratory of Special [14] [Zhang, Xiaowei et al. “Tick-borne encephalitis virus induces chemokine RANTES expression via activation of IRF-3 pathway.” Journal of Neuroinflammation, 30 Aug. 2016, 13(1):209. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27576490/] Pathogens and Biosafety and Key Laboratory of Virology / Party Branch of the Research Center for Microbiology and Nanobiology
Shen Xurui / Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and Biosafety [15] [Zhou, Peng et al. “A pneumonia outbreak associated with a new coronavirus of probable bat origin.” Nature March 2020, 579(7798): 270- 273. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32015507/] / Graduate Party Branch of the Research Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases
Tang Shuang / State Key Laboratory of Virology [16] [Abudurexiti, Abulikemu, et al. “Taxonomy of the order Bunyavirales: update 2019.” Archives of Virology, July 2019, 164(7): 1949-1965. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31065850/] / Party Branch of the Research Center for Microbial Resources and Bioinformatics
Wu Yan / State Key Laboratory of Virology [17] [Su, Hai-Xia et al. “Anti-SARS-CoV-2 activities in vitro of Shuanghuanglian preparations and bioactive ingredients.” Acta Pharmacologica Sinica, September 2020, 41(9): 1167-1177. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32737471/] Party Branch of Molecular Virus and Pathology Research Center
He Lihong / State Key Laboratory of Virology [18] [Shao, Wei et al. “Functional Characterization of the Group I Alphabaculovirus Specific Gene ac73.” Virologica Sinica, Dec. 2019, 34(6): 701-711. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31317397/] / Party Branch of the Research Center for Microbial Resources and Bioinformatics
Wang Qingxing / State Key Laboratory of Virology [19] [Su, Haixia et al. “Identification of pyrogallol as a warhead in design of covalent inhibitors for the SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease.” Nature Communications, 15 June 2021, (2(1): 3623. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34131140/] / Graduate Party Branch of the Research Center for Molecular Viruses and Pathology
Yang Mengsi / State Key Laboratory of Virology [20] [Zhang, Juan, et. al. “Passive cancer targeting with a viral nanoparticle depends on the stage of tumorigenesis.” Nanoscale, 8 July 2021, 13(26):11334-11342, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34165123/] / Graduate Party Branch of the Research Center of Microbiology and Nanobiology
The Committee for Discipline Inspection is charged with “the implementation of the party's line, policy, party discipline, relevant laws and regulations, and the institute's rules and regulations.” [21] [“Commission for Discipline Inspection.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://www.whiov.cas.cn/djkxwh/dqzz/jw/]
In addition to the researchers serving on propaganda committees, other key figures at the WIV also serve as CCP officials. Dr. Wang Yanyi serves as the Director of the WIV and joined the China Zhi Gong Party, a CCP controlled minority party, in 2010. In 2018, the same year she became the Director General of the WIV, she was elected the Deputy Director of the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee.
Until late 2019, the BSL-4 lab was managed by Dr. Yuan Zhiming. Yuan is the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Committee within the Wuhan Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to which the WIV belongs. Local CCP leaders not only run the WIV itself but also directly managed the BSL-4 lab. [22] [Izambard, Antoine. “L'histoire Secrète Du Laboratoire P4 De Wuhan Vendu Par La France à La Chine.” Challenges, 30 Apr. 2020 http://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/san ... a-lachine_ 707425.]
Director Wang’s 2021 New Year’s speech makes reference to the Party Committee of Wuhan Institute of Virology, pledging that the party committee will “effectively play the role of a battle fortress of grassroots party organizations.” [23] [“New Year's Speech by the Director in 2021.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://www.whiov.cas.cn/gkjj/szzc_160220/] The WNBL also has its own party branch, the Zhengdian Laboratory Party Branch, which was “awarded the title of ‘Red Flag Party Branch’ by the Hubei Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Organization Working Committee, effectively playing an advanced and exemplary role.” [24] [“New Year’s Message from the Director in 2020.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, https://web.archive.org/web/20200701032 ... zc_160220/] Notably, in discussing the COVID-19 pandemic, Director Wang’s 2021 speech takes pains to address questions of lab safety – “The institute's high-level biosafety laboratory operates safely for more than 300 days throughout the year.” [25] [Ibid.] Her 2020 address, posted sometime after April 2020, makes no such mention.
The WNBL’s BSL-4 lab was constructed as a result of an agreement between the PRC and France that was signed after the 2003 SARS pandemic. [26] [“About WIV.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us201 ... ction2016/.] At the time, all BSL-3 labs in the PRC were controlled by the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Then-President of France, Jacques Chirac, and his Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, approved the project despite concerns from both the French Ministry of Defense and French intelligence services – Raffarin himself described it as “a political agreement.” [27] [Izambard, Antoine. “L'histoire Secrète Du Laboratoire P4 De Wuhan Vendu Par La France à La Chine.” Challenges, 30 Apr. 2020, http://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/san ... a-lachine_ 707425.] The PRC was suspected of having a biological warfare program, and the military and intelligence services were worried that the dual-use technology required to build a BSL- 4 lab could be misused by the PRC government. The uneasy compromise reached within the French government was that the agreement would require joint PRC-France research to be conducted in the lab, with French researchers present. [28] [Ibid.]
In 2016, the PRC requested dozens of the containment suits required to work in the lab. The French Dual-Use Commission, tasked with considering exports of sensitive equipment, rejected their request. According to French reporting, the request was “well above the needs of the Wuhan [lab].” [29] [Ibid.] This continued to fuel concerns within the French Ministry of Defense that the PRC was seeking to engage in military research or open a second BSL-4 lab for military means. Despite the agreement that the BSL-4 lab would be a site of joint research, and an announcement at the 2017 inauguration by then Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve of €5 million in funding, there has only been one French scientist assigned to the lab. His tour ended in 2020. [30] [Izambard.]
Safety Concerns and Unusual Maintenance
There have been several reports of safety concerns at PRC labs starting as early as 2004, when it was discovered SARS leaked from a lab in Beijing. Several other accidental releases have happened in the years since.
As discussed in our original report released last year, in 2018 U.S. State Department officials sent cables to Washington, D.C. highlighting concerns with safety issues at the WIV. The cables reported that scientists at the WIV noted “a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory.” [31] [Rogin, Josh. “Opinion | State Department Cables Warned of Safety Issues at Wuhan Lab Studying Bat Coronaviruses.” The Washington Post, 14 Apr. 2020, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ ... -wuhanlab- studying-bat-coronaviruses/.] The cables also questioned the PRC’s commitment to prioritizing the important research for which the lab was designed.
Fig. 4: Excerpt from January 19, 2018 Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to State Department Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
(b)(6) [DELETE] Thus, while the BSL-4 lab is ostensibly fully accredited, its utilization is limited by lack of access to specific organisms and by opaque government review and approval processes. As long as this situation continues, Beijing's commitment to prioritizing infectious disease control -- on the regional and international level, especially in relation to highly pathogenic viruses, remains in doubt.
One year later, in June 2019, George Gao, the Director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, expressed concerns about safety protocols at the WIV. In an almost prophetic statement published in Biosafety and Health, Gao wrote (emphasis added):
Advances in biomedical technologies, such as genome editing and synthetic biotechnology, have the potential to provide new avenues for biological intervention in human diseases. These advances may also have a positive impact by allowing us to address risks in new approaches. However, the proliferation of such technologies means they will also be available to the ambitious, careless, inept, and outright malcontents, who may misuse them in ways that endanger our safety. For example, while CRISPR-related techniques provide revolutionary solutions for targeted cellular genome editing, it can also lead to unexpected off-target mutations within genomes or the possibility of gene drive initiation in humans, animals, insects, and plants. Similarly, genetic modification of pathogens, which may expand host range as well as increase transmission and virulence, may result in new risks for epidemics. For example, in 2013, several groups showed that influenza H5N1 viruses with a few nucleotide mutations and H7N9 isolates reasserted with 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus could have the ability for airborne transmission between ferrets. Likewise, synthetic bat-origin SARS-like coronaviruses acquired an increased capability to infect human cells. Thus, modifying the genomes of animals (including humans), plants, and microbes (including pathogens) must be highly regulated. [32] [Gao, George F. “For a better world: Biosafety strategies to protect global health.” Biosafety and Health, June 2019, 1(1): 1-3. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7147920/]
Three months later, in September 2019, Yuan Zhiming, the Director of the BSL-4 lab at the WNBL and Shi’s superior, published an article in the Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity.
Entitled, “Current status and future challenges of high-level biosafety laboratories in China,” [33] [Yuan Zhinming. “Current status and future challenges of high-level biosafety laboratories in China.” Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, Sept. 2019, 1(2): 123-127. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 0391#b0080] the article discusses at length the construction of the WNBL. Yuan identifies multiple key issues, including inadequate biosafety management systems, insufficient resources for efficient laboratory operation, and deficiency of professional capacity. With a surprising level of transparency, Yuan admits that the enforcement of pathogen, waste, and laboratory animal management regulations “needs to be strengthened.” [34] [Ibid.] Discussing the insufficient level of resources being provided by the PRC government, he stated:
The maintenance cost is generally neglected; several high-level BSLs have insufficient operational funds for routine yet vital processes. Due to the limited resources, some BSL-3 laboratories run on extremely minimal operational costs or in some cases none at all. [35] [Ibid.]
Yuan also raised concerns about a lack of specialized biosafety managers and engineers to run the labs. [36] [Ibid.] It is important to note that researchers at the WIV had previously conducted gain-of-function research on coronaviruses at the BSL-2 and BSL-3 levels. This is important given that both the head of the China CDC and the head of the WIV’s BSL-4 labs had expressed concern about the safety of this research and the labs in which it was being conducted.
Interestingly, there appears to have been ongoing maintenance and repairs projects occurring at the WIV in 2019, before Yuan published his article raising these concerns. It is important to note that at the time of the hazardous waste treatment system renovation project, the WNBL had been operational for less than two years. Such a significant renovation so soon after the facility began operation appears unusual. Procurement announcements published on the PRC’s government procurement website provide evidence of ongoing work at what appears to be both WIV locations.
Table 2: WIV Procurement Projects in 2019
Project Name / Location / Date / Budget (USD)
Maintenance Project of P3 Laboratory and Laboratory Animal Center in Zhengdian Park [37] [“Announcement of Competitive Consultation on Maintenance Project of P3 Laboratory and Laboratory Animal Center in Zhengdian Park, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 1 March 2019, https://archive.is/7eCPU#selection-229.0-229.185] / WNBL / March 1, 2019 / $401,284.10
Procurement of Positive Pressure Protective Clothing [38] [“Announcement of a single source for the purchase of positive pressure protective clothing project by Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 21 March 2019, https://archive.is/VUcNA#selection-229.0- 229.157] / WNBL / March 21, 2019 / $177,161.40
Hazardous Waste Treatment System Renovation Project [39] [ “Announcement on the transaction of the hazardous waste treatment system renovation project in Zhengdian Park, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 31 July 2019, https://archive.is/3CW03#selection- 229.0-229.166] / WNBL / July 31, 2019 / $1,521,279.28
Procurement Project of The Environmental Air Disinfection System and The Scalable Automated Sample Storage Management System [40] [“Announcement of winning the bid for the procurement project of the environmental air disinfection system and the scalable automated sample storage management system of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 14 Aug. 2019, https://archive.is/1nXLD#selection-229.0-229.228] / Unclear / August 14, 2019 / $132,200,025.47
Security Service Procurement Project [41] [“Competitive consultation on the procurement project of security services in Zhengdian Science Park, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 12 Sept. 2019,https://archive.is/tUi75#selection-229.0- 229.156] / WNBL / September 12, 2019 / $1,281,022.33
Central Air Conditioning Renovation Project [42] [“Competitive Consultation on Central Air Conditioning Renovation Project of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.” China Government Procurement Network, 16 Sept. 2019, https://archive.is/bfoTD#selection-229.0-229.131] / Unclear / September 16, 2019 / $606,382,986.11
Procurement of Air Incinerator and Testing Service [43] [“The Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences plans to use a single-source procurement method to publicize the procurement of air incineration devices and test service projects.” China Government Procurement Network, 3 Dec. 2019, https://archive.is/Jifqr#selection-229.0-229.197] / Unclear / December 3, 2019 / $49,388.81
The references to maintenance at the BSL-3 and animal center at the WNBL, the procurement of an environmental air disinfection system, and renovations to the hazardous waste treatment system and central air conditioning system all raise questions about how well these systems were functioning in the months prior to the outbreak of COVID-19.
The Disappearing Database
On September 12, 2019 the WIV’s online, public database of samples and virus sequences was taken offline in the middle of the night between 2:00AM and 3:00AM local time. [44] [“Status breakdown of the database of characteristic wild animals carrying virus pathogens (September 2019).” Scientific Database Service Monitoring & Statistics System. https://archive.is/AGtFv#selection-1553.0-1567.2] The database contained more than 22,000 entries consisting of sample and pathogen data collected from bats and mice. The database contained key information about each sample, including what type of animal it was collected from, where it was collected, whether the virus was successfully isolated, the type of virus collected, and its similarity to other known viruses.
Fig. 6: Example Database Entry [45] [“Database of pathogens of bat and murine viruses.” Wikisource, https://zh.wikisource.org/zhhant/% E8%9D%99%E8%9D%A0%E6%BA%90%E5%92%8C%E9%BC%A0%E6%BA%90%E7%97%85%E6%AF%92%E7 %97%85%E5%8E%9F%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E5%BA%93]
Table 1: Virus data display of bat samples
Data element name / Example
Sample ID / 162387A
Sample tissue type / Anal
Animal type / bat
Source species / Rousettus leschenaultil
Species molecular identificatno / Rousettus sp.
Collection date / 2016-08-21
country / China
province / Yunnan
city / Miaoxin village, Mengna county, Sipsongpanna
GPS information: 101.51944.21.78127
Whether high-throughput sequencing / No
Whether the virus is isolated / No
publishing / Luo Y, Yi B. Jiang RD, et al. Virol. Sin. 2018;33(1):87-95. doi:10.1007/s12250-018-0017-2
Remarks / --
Detection Method / PCR-based
Virus name / Coronaviridae
Test results / Positive
blast result / btcov HKU9
Virus classification / HKU9
Virus sequence / See references for details
Similarity / 9436
Sequence length / 398bp
Sequence-encoded gene / Partial RdRp
To date, there has been no consistent answer provided as to why the database was removed or when or if it will be put back online.
Shi is listed as the data correspondence author for the project. When questioned about the database being taken offline, Shi has given several conflicting answers. During a December 2020 interview with BBC, Shi said the database was taken offline for “security reasons” after cyberattacks against the work and personal emails of WIV staff. She also insisted that WIV virus sequences were saved in the GenBank database, run by the National Center for Biotechnology Information. Shi stated, “It's completely transparent. We have nothing to hide." [46] [Sudworth, John. “Covid: Wuhan Scientist Would 'Welcome' Visit Probing Lab Leak Theory.” BBC News, 21 Dec. 2020, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55364445.]
In a January 26, 2021 email to someone inquiring about the database, however, Shi stated the database was taken down due to cyberattacks “during [the] COVID-19 pandemic.” [47] [Cleary, Tommy. “Prof Zheng-Li Shi Replied to Me, to CNRI,中⽂DOI运维 I Can Only Conclude @PeterDaszak & the Rest of the @WHO Organisation Were given the Same Information Access Ultimatum:No Trust, No Conversation.@SciDiplomacyUSA Has Its Work Cut Out.Data Hostage? Pic.twitter.com/KhiFs42U7j.” Twitter, 10 Mar. 2021, https://twitter.com/tommy_cleary/status ... 25602?s=20.] She also claimed that researchers had “only entered a limit[ed] data in this database” despite it having more than 22,000 entries.
In an apparent contradiction of her BBC interview, Shi admitted that “access to the visitors is limited,” [48] [Sudworth.] but maintains:
…all our work regarding the different type of bat coronavirus (partial sequences or full-length genome sequences) have been published and the sequence and sample information have been submitted to GenBank. [49] [Ibid.]
At the end of her email, Shi writes, “I’ll not answer any of your questions if your curiosity is based on the conspiracy of ‘man made or lab leak of SARS-CoV-2’ or some non-sense questions based on your suspicion. No trust, no conversation” [50] [Ibid.] (emphasis added).