U.S. government gave $3.7 million grant to Wuhan lab at cent

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White House security director has part of leg amputated after falling severely ill with COVID-19, fundraiser says: It is the most serious publicly reported case linked to the White House.
by Ben Gittleson
abcnews.go.com
December 16, 2020, 2:04 PM

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YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

The director of the White House security office, Crede Bailey, was in an intensive care unit for three months and had part of his leg amputated after contracting COVID-19 several months ago, according to a fundraising campaign set up to help him.

Bailey, who recently moved to a full-time rehabilitation facility, now faces significant medical bills, according to the online fundraiser. He was hospitalized in September after falling ill with the coronavirus, people familiar with his condition told ABC News.

His illness came as dozens of White House staffers and allies of President Donald Trump tested positive for COVID-19 in a series of outbreaks tied to the White House. Among them were the president, first lady and their teenage son.

While a number of coronavirus cases were linked to a Sept. 26 White House celebration for then-Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett, Bailey had been hospitalized before the event, according to the people familiar with his situation.

According to the fundraising page, Bailey suffered permanent injuries from his bout with COVID-19, including the amputations of his right foot, lower right leg, and big toe on his left foot.

In appealing for donations, the person listed as the campaign's organizer, Dawn McCrobie, wrote that Bailey would need to pay for a prosthetic leg, a wheelchair and modifications to his home, among other medical expenses. McCrobie said that "even with insurance," the expenses were "astronomical."

McCrobie did not respond to requests for comment. Bailey and his relatives also did not respond to requests for comment.

The White House last week declined to comment to ABC News on his condition, but asked about him at a news conference on Tuesday, White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany for the first time publicly acknowledged his battle with the virus.

"Our heart goes out to his family," McEnany said. "They have asked for privacy. And he is recovering, from what I understand. We are very pleased to see that. But he and his family will be in our prayers."

Trump has not publicly commented about Bailey's situation. McEnany said she was "not sure if the president's had a private conversation with him, nor would I confirm any private conversation that he did have."

Bailey's experience with COVID-19 is the most serious publicly reported case linked to the White House.

Trump and several close allies were also hospitalized and received exceptional access to treatment or therapeutics. Among them were the president's personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani; former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, who is also an ABC News contributor; and Ben Carson, the secretary of housing and urban development.

Trump has for months minimized the severity of the virus and its impact on those it sickens. “Remember, when you catch it, you get better, and you’re immune," he said in an interview with Fox Business following his own recovery, which was aided by a world-class medical team and an experimental treatment that had, at the time, only been offered to a handful of people outside of clinical trials. In reality, COVID-19 has killed over 300,000 Americans.

Last week, a White House spokesman did not respond when asked whether Trump had donated, or considered donating, to Bailey. The official on Wednesday declined to comment.

The online fundraiser had raised over $30,000 by last week and more than doubled that total this week after a Monday article by Bloomberg News -- and the mention at McEnany's briefing -- brought more attention to Bailey's situation.

ABC News' Katherine Faulders and John Santucci contributed to this report.

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‘Subpoenas are necessary’: House watchdog details extensive meddling with CDC Covid-19 reports: New documents show political appointees sought to influence at least 13 reports as they ignored warnings from career officials.
by Dan Diamond
Politico
12/21/2020 10:02 AM EST
Updated: 12/21/2020 11:45 AM EST

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The House panel probing the Trump administration's coronavirus response released new documents detailing political appointees’ extensive efforts to modify or scuttle scientific Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports, as it also ordered top Trump health officials to quickly provide documents.

Trump appointees attempted to “alter or block” at least 13 scientific reports on the coronavirus as outbreaks surged across the spring and summer, Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-S.C.), the chair of the House select subcommittee on coronavirus, wrote on Monday in a letter that was shared with POLITICO.

"Top political officials at [Health and Human Services] and [the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] not only tolerated these efforts, but in some cases aided them," Clyburn added in the letter to HHS Secretary Alex Azar and CDC Director Robert Redfield.

Clyburn issued subpoenas to Azar and Redfield, ordering them by Dec. 30 to produce "full and unredacted" documents that Clyburn said his panel has sought for months.

The panel’s probe into administration’s coronavirus response began in mid-September, shortly after a POLITICO story revealed how appointees meddled with the famed Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports, which are authored by career scientists and are typically free of political interference. In recent weeks, the panel released evidence alleging that Redfield ordered agency staff to delete an email that appeared to show political interference and that a political adviser repeatedly advocated a controversial “herd immunity” strategy regarded by most public health experts as reckless.

Clyburn's subcommittee on Monday produced dozens of new documents detailing how Trump appointees — including then-science adviser Paul Alexander, the department's top spokesperson Michael Caputo and other health department officials — worked to subvert the CDC's MMWR reports.

Among the MMWRs that were targeted for edits: reports on the use of masks, the spread of Covid-19 in children, the virus' transmission during an April 7 primary election in Milwaukee and other reports that were seen as politically sensitive.

The newly released documents further detailed appointees' extensive efforts to suppress and even write a rebuttal to planned reports on hydroxychloroquine, the malaria drug favored by President Donald Trump as a coronavirus treatment despite little evidence of its effectiveness. CDC has historically insisted that political appointees not review the draft content of the MMWRs, but in at least one case, Trump appointees obtained the full text of a pending report.

"I got the draft of the WWMR [sic] about hydroxychloroquine and media that was supposed to be released on Tuesday," then-CDC adviser Nina Witkofsky wrote on June 29 to Alexander, Caputo and Caputo's aide Madeleine Hubbard. Witkofsky, who served as a contractor helping plan events for Medicaid chief Seema Verma before joining the Trump administration this summer, was tapped in August to be the CDC's acting chief of staff.

The MMWR on hydroxychloroquine, which reviewed how doctors prescribed the drug, was originally scheduled to be published on June 30 but was not published until Sept. 4.

The reasons for the delay were not immediately clear, but Trump appointees in the meantime further strategized on how to minimize the CDC’s findings – including Alexander’s plans to publicly dismiss the agency’s hydroxychloroquine report. “The authors of this study are a disgrace to public service,” Alexander wrote in a planned rebuttal that does not appear to have been publicly released.

In his letter to HHS, Clyburn said the department continues to block his panel's scheduled interviews with Redfield, CDC principal deputy director Anne Schuchat and Witkofsky, among other officials that HHS previously agreed to make available. HHS also waited until after the election to release its documents, which were mostly pulled from Alexander's files, Clyburn wrote, rather than from officials like Azar and Caputo despite a previous commitment to do so.

"Given the importance of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation and the continued obstruction by HHS, subpoenas are necessary," Clyburn wrote.

Asked about the House panel's findings, HHS said that it had pulled more than 1 million documents for the subcommittee's probe and that Alexander, who has since left the department, did not set strategy.

"While the Administration is focused on vaccination shots, the Subcommittee is focused on cheap shots to create headlines and mislead the American people," said HHS spokesperson Caitlin Oakley.

HHS did not respond to a question about whether the department would comply with the panel's subpoena. CDC did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Alexander and Witkofsky did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Caputo, who took medical leave the same day that Alexander left the department in September, has referred previous inquiries to HHS.

According to the new documents, Bill Hall, the top career civil servant in the HHS press shop, on June 5 warned Alexander, Caputo and other officials that they should not interfere with the MMWRs, comparing the CDC's flagship reports to a "peer-reviewed journal" akin to the Journal of the American Medical Association.

"[A]s matter of long-standing policy, we do not engage in clearing scientific articles, as that arena needs to remain an independent process," Hall wrote in an email obtained by the subcommittee.

But the subcommittee's documents reveal that political appointees instead kept trying to edit a series of internal and external reports.

"Hi Michael, is this not the article we were shelving?" Alexander wrote to Caputo and Witkofsky on June 29 about a pending CDC-authored report on hydroxychloroquine that was set to run in JAMA. The House panel concluded that Alexander "appeared to mistake" the planned JAMA report for the MMWR report that would be delayed.

The subcommittee also released documents showing how Alexander repeatedly petitioned Charlotte Kent, the MMWR editor-in-chief, to make changes to planned reports, such as an upcoming MMWR on the spread of Covid-19 at a Georgia summer camp amid a robust debate about whether it was safe to reopen schools in the fall. In a separate email chain, CDC career officials discussed how best to navigate the political pressures, and Kent ultimately sent Alexander an email seeking to placate him.

"In response to thoughtful comments from CDC leadership and you, the opening sentence of Georgia’s report has been reframed," Kent wrote to Alexander and other officials on July 28. "The opening sentence was the only reference to schools or institutions of higher learning in the report, and reference to them has been removed."

However, the Georgia summer camp report, which was released on July 31, still angered the health department’s Trump appointees, sparking another effort to author their own response that they believed would be more favorable to the president.

“I am not sure where it can be published but this has very re-assuring information and even for the White House,” Alexander wrote in a planned rebuttal to the report.

HHS has insisted that there was no interference in the MMWRs, pointing to comments from Kent, the reports' editor, who during a Dec. 7 interview with House investigators said that the agency published reports that were scientifically sound.

"Dr. Kent’s interview established there was no political interference in the publication of MMWR Articles," Sarah Arbes, the HHS assistant secretary for legislation, wrote to Clyburn last week.

Clyburn, however, said Kent's testimony made clear there was political pressure to alter her office's reports.

"To the extent career staff were successful in limiting the damage, as Dr. Kent stated she was, that is a testament to the career staff’s integrity and resilience — not an indication that the Trump Administration’s political pressure tactics were appropriate or scientifically sound," Clyburn wrote Monday.

The documents released by Clyburn's panel also further shed light on interactions between Trump appointees and career health department officials as the outbreak worsened. In one exchange, a CDC official complaining about the "pattern of hostile and threatening behavior" from Caputo, the department's top spokesperson who was personally installed by the president.

"In what world did you think it was your job to announce an Administration public service announcement to CNN?” Caputo wrote to a CDC official who confirmed to a CNN reporter in June that the health department was pursuing a vaccine education campaign. Caputo had previously told the reporter she was "wildly incorrect" when she inquired about the campaign.

In another set of July emails, Caputo demanded the name of a CDC press officer who arranged an interview between a senior official and NPR about the health department's data changes without his permission.

After POLITICO obtained emails of Alexander pressuring infectious-disease expert Anthony Fauci to not speak publicly about the risks of Covid-19 to children, Alexander protested to colleagues that he wanted to go public with his complaints about Fauci.

"They have no clue what they are saying and I welcome the chance to inform them," Alexander wrote on Sept. 9. HHS announced that Alexander, who is a part-time professor at a Canadian university, would exit the department a week later.

[admin]

Health Officials Subpoenaed in Probe of Political Interference at CDC
by Brad Kutner
Courthouse News Service
December 21, 2020

WASHINGTON (CN) — The Democratic leader of a House panel overseeing the federal government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic said Monday that Trump administration health officials tried to bury alarming information in scientific reports on the outbreak.

Congressman Jim Clyburn, a South Carolina Democrat who chairs the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, said in a letter that he has subpoenaed Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and Robert Redfield, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Clyburn wants to get unredacted documents that he says show efforts by appointees of President Donald Trump to “block or alter” over a dozen CDC reports on the pandemic and hydroxychloroquine, a drug the president touted for months as a possible treatment despite a lack of medical evidence.

“These appointees targeted reports that provided evidence of the virus’s ‘early spread’ across the country and ‘massive spread’ this summer, which they believed sent ‘the wrong message’ about the Administration’s policies,” the letter states. “These appointees also drafted rebuttals aimed at undercutting CDC’s credibility and providing ‘very re-assuring information … for the White House.’”

One of the draft rebuttals, which was never published, reportedly attacked a CDC report on an increase in prescriptions for hydroxychloroquine after the drug’s emergency use authorization was revoked based on findings of potential harms outweighing the benefits. According to the letter, the rebuttal drafted by HHS officials stated that the hydroxychloroquine report “presents factual information with an agenda” and could “prevent the news from giving the proper coverage of a true ‘miracle cure.’”

Clyburn said the subpoenas come after three months of obstruction by the administration and evidence showing Redfield ordered subordinates to delete an email about a report on the risk of Covid-19 to children.

“Top political officials at HHS and CDC not only tolerated these efforts, but in some cases aided them—even after a senior career official warned that CDC’s scientific writing ‘needs to remain an independent process’ and that the administration’s attempts to influence these reports violated ‘long-standing policy,’” the letter states.

The 20-page letter cites several internal documents obtained by the House committee, including communications between CDC members over a report on an outbreak at a Georgia summer camp that showed “massive spread” at the facility while the White House was touting a plan to reopen schools.

“I find it incredible this piece would be put out the way it is written at a time when CDC and its leader Dr. Redfield is trying to showcase the school re-open guidance and the push is to help schools re-open safely,” Paul Alexander wrote in a July email obtained by the committee. “It just sends the wrong message as written and actually reads as if to send a message of not to re-open.”

Alexander joined the Department Health and Human Services in April but has since been let go. According to a Politico report, he spent much of his short tenure advocating for herd immunity, which would require most Americans to get infected by the virus. Experts estimate that strategy would lead to 1 to 2 million deaths.

“There is no other way, we need to establish herd, and it only comes about allowing the non-high risk groups expose themselves to the virus. PERIOD,” Alexander wrote in a different July email obtained by Politico. Despite Alexander’s push, Azar told Congress in October that “herd immunity is not the strategy of the U.S. government with regard to coronavirus.”

Clyburn’s committee also seeks to explore claims that staff scientists were bullied after they shared information the Trump administration did not want spread.

“If you disobey my directions, you will be held accountable,” HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Michael R. Caputo wrote in a July email warning several communications staffers after CDC epidemiologist Daniel Pollock did an interview with NPR in which he was critical of a White House policy telling hospitals to bypass the CDC and send its Covid-19 data to a different database.

The subpoenas have a document turnover deadline of Dec. 30.

CDC and HHS officials, as well as Republican members of the coronavirus committee, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

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Part 1 of 2

Letter from Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, James E. Clyburn, Chairman, to The Hon. Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services and Dr. Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
December 21, 2020

One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6143
Phone (202) 22504400
https://coronavirus.house.gov

James E. Clyburn, Chairman
Maxine Waters
Carolyn B. Maloney
Nydia M. Velazquez
Bill Foster
Jamie Raskin
Andy Kim
Steve Scalise, Ranking Member
Jim Jordan
Blaine Luetkemeyer
Jackie Walorski
Mary E. Green, M.D.

December 21, 2020

The Honorable Alex M. Azar II
Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue,
S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201

Dr. Robert R. Redfield
Director
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
395 E Street, S.W., Suite 9100
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Secretary Azar and Director Redfield:

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis issued subpoenas today compelling you to produce all of the documents requested by the Select Subcommittee on September 14, 2020, relating to efforts by political appointees at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to interfere with scientific work conducted by career officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The subpoenas require you to produce a full and unredacted set of these documents by December 30, 2020.

The subpoenas were necessary because the Select Subcommittee’s investigation has revealed that efforts to interfere with scientific work at CDC were far more extensive and dangerous than previously known. Documents recently obtained by the Subcommittee show that over a period of four months, as coronavirus cases and deaths rose around the country, Trump Administration appointees attempted to alter or block at least 13 scientific reports related to the virus. These appointees targeted reports that provided evidence of the virus’s “early spread” across the country and “massive spread” this summer, which they believed sent “the wrong message” about the Administration’s policies. These appointees also drafted rebuttals aimed at undercutting CDC’s credibility and providing “very re-assuring information … for the White House.” Top political officials at HHS and CDC not only tolerated these efforts, but in some cases aided them—even after a senior career official warned that CDC’s scientific writing “needs to remain an independent process” and that the Administration’s attempts to influence these reports violated “long-standing policy.”

Documents show that HHS officials also attempted to muzzle CDC scientists by retaliating against career employees who provided truthful information to the public and targeting CDC staff with what one employee described as a “pattern of hostile and threatening behavior.”

These unprecedented efforts to influence CDC’s reports and bully its staff occurred at the same time HHS officials were privately advocating for a “herd immunity” strategy to spread the coronavirus widely among Americans, as the Select Subcommittee revealed in a December 16, 2020, staff memorandum.1 The Select Subcommittee needs to obtain all the documents sought in its September 14 request to understand who in the Trump Administration was responsible for this political pressure campaign, whether it was intended to cripple the nation’s coronavirus response in a misguided effort to achieve herd immunity, and what steps must be taken to end this outrageous conduct and protect American lives.

HHS has made clear that it will not provide a timely and complete response to the Select Subcommittee’s requests on a voluntary basis. Although the Select Subcommittee has made extensive efforts to obtain cooperation over the last three months, HHS continues to withhold responsive documents related to senior HHS and CDC officials. Evidence obtained by the Select Subcommittee last week indicates that Director Robert Redfield instructed employees to destroy a key document in the Select Subcommittee’s investigation, raising the possibility that other evidence may have been hidden or destroyed. HHS is also blocking the Select Subcommittee from interviewing five key witnesses, including Director Redfield, his principal deputy, and his acting chief of staff.2 For these reasons and those set forth below, the Select Subcommittee had no choice but to issue subpoenas compelling production of documents that have been withheld by HHS and CDC since September.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION’S CAMPAIGN TO INTERFERE IN CDC SCIENTIFIC REPORTS WAS MORE EXTENSIVE AND DANGEROUS THAN PREVIOUSLY KNOWN

Spearheaded by HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Michael Caputo and his Senior Advisor, Paul Alexander, efforts to influence or block CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) and other scientific publications went on for months and involved numerous high-level officials at CDC and HHS.

In a December 7, 2020, transcribed interview with Select Subcommittee staff, MMWR Editor-in-Chief Charlotte Kent confirmed that Dr. Alexander contacted her directly on numerous occasions to pressure her to make changes to MMWRs and to seek a larger role in the review process, in violation of longtime CDC and HHS policy to maintain the independence of these reports. She said she “felt it was important to respond” to his demands, but said that Dr. Alexander’s efforts, if successful, would have impacted the integrity of CDC’s scientific work. She explained, “if we chose to collaborate with Dr. Alexander, there could be a perception that that was influencing the scientific integrity of MMWR, and that was something that we were not going to do.”3

HHS has falsely claimed that Dr. Kent’s testimony shows that there was no political interference with MMWRs.4 To the contrary, as demonstrated by the transcript, Dr. Kent stated that she was “surprised” that Dr. Alexander sought to make changes to MMWRs, that his efforts were “not typical,” and that she raised the issue to her superiors’ attention “because it was an unusual situation.”5 Dr. Kent’s testimony and documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that she and other career officials were forced to fend off more than a dozen attempts to influence CDC’s scientific publications, and in some cases were instructed to make changes recommended by political officials. To the extent career staff were successful in limiting the damage, as Dr. Kent stated she was, that is a testament to the career staff’s integrity and resilience—not an indication that the Trump Administration’s political pressure tactics were appropriate or scientifically sound.

Former CDC Chief of Staff Kyle McGowan, who was at CDC when this pressure campaign began, recently confirmed that HHS appointees attempted to interfere in the publication of MMWRs, saying that Dr. Alexander “absolutely put pressure on the CDC on different guidance documents, on MMWRs,” and that these efforts “delayed MMWRs from getting them out as quickly as possible to be effective.”6

A. Despite Warning from Career Staff, HHS Attempted to Interfere with More than 12 Coronavirus Reports from May to September 2020

Documents reveal that efforts by HHS officials to interfere in CDC scientific reports, with the apparent goal of helping President Trump politically, began in May 2020 and continued through mid-September—despite an early warning from a career official that these actions violated longstanding policies intended to protect the scientific independence of CDC reports.

On May 22, 2020, Dr. Alexander wrote to HHS Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Hall, the top career official in HHS’s Public Affairs Office, requesting that CDC alter the title and contents of an upcoming MMWR, entitled, “Evidence for Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January – February 2020.” Dr. Alexander explained that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Caputo and wanted to insert language praising what he called the Administration’s “[s]trong mitigation and containment measures.” He also asked to revise the report’s title, which he claimed was “misleading and little inflamming [sic]” because it indicated that “COVID was in US prior to when it was first detected etc.”7 Ultimately, CDC did not add the reference to the Administration’s actions but did change the report’s title in a manner that downplayed the report’s key finding. The revised title was: “Evidence of Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020.”8

On June 5, 2020, Dr. Alexander wrote to Mr. Caputo, Mr. Hall, and other HHS officials seeking to insert language into another CDC study related to coronavirus prevention. Mr. Hall wrote back:

The MMWR is a peer-reviewed journal no different than, say, JAMA or NEJM, and, like those journals, the text of articles is negotiated between the submitting authors and the MMWR editorial team. The article has already been published and been distributed. [The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs] is not a science or medical program office and, as matter of long-standing policy, we do not engage in clearing scientific articles, as that arena needs to remain an independent process.9

Despite receiving this admonishment from a senior career official, Dr. Alexander began reaching out to CDC officials directly, attempting to alter the contents of at least 11 other scientific reports, including the following:

• A July 3 MMWR regarding characteristics of adult inpatients and outpatients with coronavirus;10

• An MMWR regarding hydroxychloroquine prescription trends, originally scheduled for release on June 30 but not published until September 4;11

• A July 14 MMWR on the use of cloth face coverings among adults during the pandemic;12

• A July 24 MMWR regarding underlying medical conditions associated with the risk of severe COVID-19;13

• A July 31 MMWR regarding efforts to mitigate coronavirus transmission during the April 7 primary election in Milwaukee, Wisconsin;14

• A July 31 MMWR regarding vaccination among children in New York City during the pandemic;15

• An MMWR scheduled for early release on July 29 regarding a coronavirus outbreak among children attending an overnight summer camp in Georgia, which was delayed until after Director Redfield testified before the Select Subcommittee;16

• An August 14 MMWR, originally scheduled for release on August 7, regarding hospitalization rates for children diagnosed with the coronavirus;17

• An August 14 MMWR, originally scheduled for release on August 7, regarding multi-inflammatory syndrome in children with coronavirus;18

• A September 4 MMWR regarding coronavirus outbreaks at four summer camps in Maine; and19

• A September 18 MMWR on coronavirus-associated deaths among children, adolescents, and young adults.20

Hydroxychloroquine Report

On June 29, 2020, Director Redfield’s Senior Advisor Nina Witkofsky obtained a copy of a planned June 30 MMWR on hydroxychloroquine and provided it to Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander.21 The CDC study found that hydroxychloroquine prescriptions increased 80-fold between March 2019 and March 2020.22 Hydroxychloroquine—which President Trump lauded as a “miracle” treatment for the coronavirus—received Emergency Use Authorization by the Food and Drug Administration to treat coronavirus in March 2020, but this authorization was revoked in June after it was determined that the potential harms of the drug outweighed the benefits.23

Less than an hour after he received a copy of this MMWR, Dr. Alexander sent an email to Mr. Caputo and Ms. Witkofsky, saying, “Hi Michael, is this not the article we were shelving?”24 The following day, a staffer in Mr. Caputo’s office wrote to Ms. Witkofsky, copying Dr. Alexander, making clear that political officials intended to make changes to the MMWR:

I am reviewing the MMWR on hydroxychloroquine you sent to Michael yesterday. There are quite a few edits on it. I forwarded that Word Document to Paul who is going to look over the MMWR. If you could please keep Dr. Paul Alexander, who is CC’d here, and myself in the loop on this MMWR, it would be much appreciated.25

HHS officials went so far as to draft a rebuttal attacking this MMWR. This document—which does not appear to have been published—argued erroneously that the MMWR “presents factual information with an agenda” and could “prevent the news from giving the proper coverage of a true ‘miracle cure.’” The rebuttal also asserted that “there is no academic value in this study whatsoever.”26 The op-ed called the authors of the MMWR “a disgrace to public service” and accused them of being “self-aggrandizing, looking to grab headlines” and “ignoring and [sic] the Americans currently dying from COVID-19.”27 When asked about this rebuttal document during her interview, Dr. Kent stated that she was not aware of it at the time but that the rebuttal “could undermine confidence in CDC and in the quality of science that is in MMWR.”28 The MMWR, originally scheduled for release on June 30, was published on September 4.29 It is not clear whether the final report included edits from HHS.

Report on Outbreak at Georgia Summer Camp

On July 26, 2020, Dr. Kent circulated a summary of a draft report on a coronavirus outbreak at a Georgia summer camp to a group of HHS and CDC officials. Dr. Alexander responded hours later with an eight-point list of questions and comments, asserting that the report would undermine the Administration’s push to quickly reopen schools. He wrote:

This CDC MMWR also concluded by saying in spite of adhering to CDC guidance, the spread was massive, with elevated attack rates. … This confuses me because you, in fact, are CDC and the piece reads as if CDC’s own guidance is not adequate and that even if a school or similar implements most recommended strategies to prevent transmission, that there will still be massive spread. I find it incredible this piece would be put out the way it is written at a time when CDC and its leader Dr. Redfield is trying to showcase the school re-open guidance and the push is to help schools re-open safely. It just sends the wrong message as written and actually reads as if to send a message of NOT to re-open.30

The following morning, on July 27, HHS officials asked to see a full copy of the report.31 Later that day, CDC Principal Deputy Director Anne Schuchat instructed Dr. Kent to remove the opening sentence of the abstract, which stated that understanding transmission of the virus among children “is critical for developing guidance for schools and institutes of higher education.”32

The revised abstract eliminated this reference to schools and colleges, replacing it with a sentence asserting that “[l]imited data are available about transmission” of the coronavirus among youth. In an email to Dr. Alexander, copying Director Redfield and others, Dr. Kent explained:

In response to thoughtful comments from CDC leadership and you, the opening sentence of Georgia’s report has been reframed. The opening sentence was the only reference to schools or institutions of higher learning in the report, and reference to them has been removed.33

Director Redfield also inserted two changes to the MMWR, although HHS has not provided the Select Subcommittee with documentation of these changes.34

The initial release of the MMWR, originally set for July 29, was delayed to July 31 at the direction of Director Redfield and HHS.35 Dr. Kent informed the Select Subcommittee that she understood this delay was due to Director Redfield’s scheduled testimony before the Select Subcommittee on the morning of July 31, adding that “there were some very important things that they wanted to convey during that meeting.”36 At the July 31 hearing, Director Redfield testified of the “very significant public health consequences of the school closure,” but did not discuss the CDC study, which found that the virus spread widely among children at the Georgia summer camp.37

At the same time they sought to influence the text of the MMWR, HHS officials also coordinated to rebut the report’s key finding that children can transmit the virus to each other and to adults. On July 27, Dr. Alexander wrote to Mr. Caputo, Ms. Witkofsky, and HHS Senior Advisor Brad Traverse regarding a rebuttal piece he was asked to draft:

Hi Michael, as requested, here is the piece to rebut that poor CDC MMWR…I am not sure where it can be published but this has very re-assuring information and even for the White House. You can now tweak this how you wish.38

The op-ed, which went through several drafts at HHS but does not appear to have been published, sought to downplay the risk of children transmitting the coronavirus and reaffirm the Administration’s position that schools should quickly and fully reopen.39

HHS’s attacks on this MMWR continued the following week. On August 8, 2020, Dr. Alexander demanded that Director Redfield and Mr. Caputo intervene to alter this report, along with a second MMWR, or stop the publication of all MMWRs.40 As described in my December 10, letter, Dr. Kent told the Select Subcommittee she was ordered to delete this email, and that she understood the direction to delete the email came from Director Redfield.41

Although Director Redfield did not accede to Dr. Alexander’s demand to alter the report or halt publication of all MMWRs, Dr. Alexander continued to reach out to Dr. Kent seeking to influence other MMWRs following this incident.42

B. Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Attempted to Retaliate Against CDC Officials

Evidence obtained by the Select Subcommittee shows that Mr. Caputo aggressively bullied and retaliated against CDC staff who provided truthful information to the press without his permission and that Director Redfield was aware of this behavior.

Retaliation for Revealing Advertising Campaign

In June 2020, a CNN reporter wrote to Mr. Caputo, asking whether “Operation Warp Speed is working on a vaccine education campaign.” Mr. Caputo refused to confirm the story, claiming it was “wildly incorrect.” The reporter then followed up, noting that a career CDC official had referred her to Mr. Caputo and indicated that Mr. Caputo himself was “spearheading” the campaign.43

Mr. Caputo then excoriated the career official for providing truthful information to CNN, writing, “In what world did you think it was your job to announce an Administration public service announcement to CNN?” He later followed up, stating, “We will discuss this on a teleconference tomorrow. I want your HR representative in attendance.” Mr. Caputo added Director Redfield to the exchange, writing, “I’m adding Dr Redfield back in this email exchange. Do not remove him again.”44

Retaliation for Discussing Removal of Hospital Data Collection from CDC

In July 2020, a senior CDC scientist was interviewed by NPR about the Administration’s decision to strip CDC of its longstanding role in collecting hospital data—which experts warned could cause researchers, reporters, and the public to lose access to crucial data needed to combat the pandemic. The scientist, Dr. Daniel Pollock, explained in the interview that CDC had a successful “track record” and “expertise” in collecting this data.45

When Mr. Caputo learned the interview occurred without his personal permission, he called the action “reckless,” and demanded to know the name of the CDC press officer who arranged it, warning CDC’s senior staff: “If you disobey my directions, you will be held accountable.” Following Mr. Caputo’s outburst, CDC Deputy Communications Director Kate Galatas informed Mr. Caputo that the incident was caused by a mistake and that CDC was planning to issue the employee a “formal letter of reprimand.” She then sought assistance from Director Redfield and his Chief of Staff for assistance in handling Mr. Caputo’s demands, stating: “Please intervene and have someone else at CDC send the appropriate program person’s name to Mr. Caputo … I respectively request that you not require me to do so.” 46

Ms. Galatas also wrote to HHS’s Deputy Chief Counsel about Mr. Caputo’s conduct, saying, “I see this as a pattern of hostile and threatening behavior directed at me, Michelle [Bonds, Director of CDC’s Division of Public Affairs], and communication staff at CDC.”47

C. Senior Administration Officials Allowed Dangerous Interference by Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander to Continue Until it Became Public

Although HHS and CDC officials have recently tried to distance themselves from Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander, emails show Trump Administration officials were aware of their conduct for months but took no action until the press became aware of this behavior and the Select Subcommittee launched an investigation.

For example, Ms. Witkofsky—a top advisor to Director Redfield who became Acting Chief of Staff in August 2020—worked closely with Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander beginning in June 2020 to facilitate their efforts to obtain and review MMWRs prior to their release.48 Both Director Redfield and Ms. Witkofsky were copied on multiple emails in which Dr. Alexander attempted to alter MMWRs and Mr. Caputo bullied CDC career staff.49

However, no action was taken against Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander until their disgraceful conduct became public. On September 9, 2020, a reporter from Politico reached out to HHS seeking comment on concerns regarding Dr. Alexander.50 Two days later, on September 11, Ms. Witkofsky directed Dr. Kent to remove Dr. Alexander—but not Mr. Caputo—from the distribution list for MMWR summaries.51 That same day, Politico published an article revealing publicly for the first time that Dr. Alexander had tried to change and block MMWRs.52

On September 14, the Select Subcommittee launched this investigation and requested to interview both Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander, among others, the following week. Two days later, on September 16, the Department announced that both officials would leave their roles, with Mr. Caputo taking a leave of absence and Dr. Alexander exiting the Department entirely.53

II. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE

As explained in my December 10, 2020, letter to you, the Select Subcommittee launched this investigation more than three months ago, yet HHS has repeatedly refused to provide key documents and witnesses that the Select Subcommittee needs to complete its inquiry.

A. Refusal to Voluntarily Produce Documents and Witnesses

The Select Subcommittee’s September 14, 2020, letter requested transcribed interviews with seven HHS and CDC officials beginning on September 22, and the production of documents on September 28.54

On September 18, HHS responded, claiming the Select Subcommittee’s requests were “pretextual” and demanding “additional clarity” on how the request “satisfies the requirement that oversight inquiries be conducted pursuant to a valid legislative purpose.”55

pretextual: constituting a pretext; dubious or spurious; denoting or relating to a minor offense that enables authorities to detain a suspect for investigation of other matters.

The Select Subcommittee responded on September 22, explaining that the Select Subcommittee’s investigation is clearly authorized by House Resolution 935, that ensuring Americans have access to accurate public health information during the pandemic is an issue that is amenable to legislation, and that evidence of ongoing political interference at HHS made the investigation even more urgent.56

HHS wrote back on September 25, claiming again that the Select Subcommittee’s requests were “pretextual” and demanding answers to a list of logistical questions.57 Select Subcommittee staff responded to HHS’s questions by email and asked the Department to confirm dates for the interviews.58 In response, HHS staff claimed on September 28 that the Department was “assessing witness availability to sit and prepare for interviews.”59 On October 2, Secretary Azar confirmed in sworn testimony before the Select Subcommittee that HHS would soon make documents and witnesses available, stating:

Our staffs are working to secure the agreements on the procedures to make that happen. We want to make that happen. … I think they’re in the final stages of getting things arranged.60

However, instead of moving forward with interview arrangements or document production, HHS staff sent an email to Select Subcommittee staff on October 7 with a series of new demands, stating, “Until these outstanding issues and processes are resolved, it is not appropriate to commit to specific dates for interviews.” HHS staff also indicated that the Department planned to withhold responsive documents from the Select Subcommittee, writing that HHS “will be conducting document searches and reviewing responsive materials” in advance of any interviews but “these document pulls are solely for the Department’s use,” and stating, “The Subcommittee should not expect to receive any documents before the transcribed interviews occur.”61 Select Subcommittee staff asked HHS to confirm dates for interviews and a schedule for document production on October 14 and October 21, but HHS refused.

B. Inadequate Document Production Following Subpoena Warning

On October 22, 2020, the Select Subcommittee wrote to HHS, warning that if the Department did not voluntarily comply, the Select Subcommittee would be forced to consider issuing subpoenas.62 On October 27, HHS responded, again questioning the premise of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation and refusing to commit to a production schedule.63 After further negotiation, HHS agreed on October 29 to make five witnesses available for transcribed interviews—excluding Mr. Caputo and Dr. Alexander, who were no longer serving in their previous roles—and to make a full document production by November 23, writing:

HHS will target November 9 for a complete production of documents for the five named custodians, as well as others whom we have identified to date. … We will also commit to target November 23 for a complete production for the remaining political appointees.64

HHS did not meet the agreed upon production schedule. Instead, the Department slowly produced a fraction of the requested documents, along with thousands of pages of repetitive, non-responsive, and redacted materials. For example:

• HHS agreed to produce documents from Mr. Azar, Director Redfield, Mr. Caputo, Dr. Alexander, and Mr. Traverse by November 9, but the Department’s actual productions have included a substantial production of emails from just one of these five custodians—Dr. Alexander.

• Although HHS has produced just over 15,000 pages, thousands of these pages consist of duplicative copies of public reports and documents that are entirely non-responsive—including some that are more than a year old and predated the coronavirus pandemic entirely.65

• Dozens of pages are entirely redacted and marked “withheld as privileged”—without any indication of the basis for the redaction or the privilege being asserted. In one instance, HHS completely redacted more than 50 consecutive pages without any further explanation.66

HHS has refused to agree to any timeframe to complete its production, notwithstanding the Department’s previous commitment to produce all documents by November 23.

C. Abrupt Cancellation of Interviews Following Troubling Testimony by Career Official

HHS further obstructed the Select Subcommittee’s inquiries by abruptly canceling four transcribed interviews the Department had previously agreed to conduct during the week of December 7, 2020. HHS canceled these interviews just hours after Dr. Kent revealed in her interview that Director Redfield may have ordered staff to delete key evidence of political interference.67

The Department claimed that it canceled these interviews because Select Subcommittee counsel infringed upon the attorney-client privilege by asking Dr. Kent whether, in addition to being instructed to delete a key email, she was instructed to withhold any other information from Congress. This claim has no basis whatsoever. Given the clear evidence that CDC officials were instructed to delete evidence, the Select Subcommittee has a strong interest in determining whether anyone at HHS or CDC ordered staff to obstruct this investigation. Such obstruction is potentially illegal and is not protected by any privilege.68

D. Final Warning Letter and HHS’s Refusal to Comply

On December 10, 2020, I wrote to both of you requesting full compliance with the Select Subcommittee’s outstanding document requests by December 15, and warned that if you did not comply, I would have no choice but to issue subpoenas to obtain the remaining documents.69 The letter also asked you to reschedule the four canceled interviews. Finally, in light of the new evidence that Director Redfield ordered CDC officials to destroy evidence of political interference, the letter requested additional documents by December 15 and a transcribed interview with Director Redfield on December 17.

These deadlines have now passed, and HHS did not comply with any of the Select Subcommittee’s requests. The Department’s document production remains woefully incomplete. The Department has not rescheduled any of the canceled interviews with senior CDC officials.

HHS also refused to make Director Redfield available for a transcribed interview, claiming that “an interview of Dr. Redfield is not warranted at this time.”70 Notably, however, HHS did not refute Dr. Kent’s statements that she was instructed to delete a key email, that she understood the instruction came from Director Redfield, and that the email was in fact deleted from her inbox by another individual. HHS also did not address the critical questions of whether Director Redfield or other political appointees ordered other staff at CDC or HHS to delete or conceal evidence of political interference. These are critical questions, and the Select Subcommittee intends to get answers.

III. ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA

HHS and CDC have indicated their unwillingness to voluntarily cooperate with the Select Subcommittee’s investigation. Given the importance of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation and the continued obstruction by HHS, subpoenas are necessary.

The Select Subcommittee has a broad mandate to investigate “issues related to the coronavirus crisis,” including the “preparedness for and response to the coronavirus crisis,” “executive branch policies, deliberations, decisions, activities, and internal and external communications related to the coronavirus crisis,” and “cooperation by the executive branch” with the Select Subcommittee’s oversight. Political interference in scientific work necessary to respond to the coronavirus crisis is central to the Select Subcommittee’s mandate and could be the subject of legislation.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The congressional power to obtain information is ‘broad’ and ‘indispensable.’”71 The Court has also recognized that the “scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”72

For the reasons described in this letter, I have issued subpoenas to both of you to compel production of all the documents that were first requested by the Select Subcommittee on September 14, 2020. The subpoenas, which were shared with the Ranking Member more than 48 hours ago, require you to produce a full and unredacted set of these documents by December 30, 2020.

Please note that the Select Subcommittee also expects you to provide a complete response to the requests in our December 10, 2020, letter. If you fail do so, additional subpoenas may be necessary.

Sincerely,

__________________________
James E. Clyburn
Chairman
 
cc: The Honorable Steve Scalise, Ranking Member

[admin]

Part 2 of 2

_______________

Notes:

1 Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Supplemental Memorandum on Investigation into Political Interference with Coronavirus Response (Dec. 16, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... munity.pdf).

2 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Investigation Finds Evidence Career CDC Officials Were Directed to Destroy Record of Political Interference by Trump Administration (Dec. 10, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/pres ... cials-were).
 
3 Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 651 – 654, 1619 – 1622.

4 Letter from Sarah C. Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Dec. 15, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 201215.pdf).

5 Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 648 – 654, 1460 – 1463, 1503 – 1518, 1551 – 1572; see also id. at 1792 – 1803.

6 ‘We Want Them Infected’: Trump Appointee Demanded ‘Herd Immunity’ Strategy, Emails Reveal, Politico (Dec. 16, 2020) (online at http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/16 ... egy-446408).

7 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Bill Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services (May 22, 2020) (SSCC-008869 – 71) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

8 Dr. Michelle A. Jorden, et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (June 5, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm) (emphasis added).

9 Email from Bill Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (June 5, 2020) (SSCC-0007790 – 92) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) (emphasis added).

10 Dr. Mark Tenforde, et al., Characteristics of Adult Outpatients and Inpatients with COVID-19 — 11 Academic Medical Centers, United States, March–May 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 3, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6926e3.htm); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services (June 22, 2020) (SSCCManual-000106 – 09) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

11 Dr. Lara Bull-Otterson, et al., Hydroxychloroquine and Chloroquine Prescribing Patterns by Provider Specialty Following Initial Reports of Potential Benefit for COVID-19 Treatment — United States, January–June 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Sept. 4, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a4.htm); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Nina Witkofsky, Senior Advisor, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services (June 29, 2020) (SSCC-0007294 – 305) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

12 Dr. Kiva A. Fischer, et al., Factors Associated with Cloth Face Covering Use Among Adults During the COVID-19 Pandemic — United States, April and May 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 17, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6928e3.htm); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (July 14, 2020) (SSCC-0006018 – 24) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

13 Hilda Razzaghi, et al., Estimated County-Level Prevalence of Selected Underlying Medical Conditions Associated with Increased Risk for Severe COVID-19 Illness — United States, 2018, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 24, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6929a1.htm); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 21, 2020) (SSCCManual-000094 – 97) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

14 Dr. Heather Paradis, et al., Notes from the Field: Public Health Efforts to Mitigate COVID-19 Transmission During the April 7, 2020 Election ― City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, March 13–May 5, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 31, 2020), Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6930a4.htm); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 27, 2020) (SSCC-0005359 – 63) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

15 Marisa Langdon-Embry, et al., Notes from the Field: Rebound in Routine Childhood Vaccine Administration Following Decline During the COVID-19 Pandemic — New York City, March 1–June 27, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (July 31, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6930a3.htm); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 27, 2020) (SSCC-0005359 – 63) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

16 Christine M. Szablewski, et al., SARS-CoV-2 Transmission and Infection Among Attendees of an Overnight Camp — Georgia, June 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Aug. 7, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6931e1.htm); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 28, 2020) (SSCC-0002881 – 88) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 1256 – 1259, 1283 – 1305.

17 Dr. Lindsay Kim, et al., Hospitalization Rates and Characteristics of Children Aged <18 Years Hospitalized with Laboratory-Confirmed COVID-19 — COVID-NET, 14 States, March 1–July 25, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Aug. 14, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6932e3.htm); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Aug. 6, 2020) (SSCCManual-000032 – 38) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

18 Dr. Shana Godfred-Cato, et al., COVID-19–Associated Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Children — United States, March–July 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Aug. 14, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6932e2.htm); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Aug. 6, 2020) (SSCCManual-000032 – 38) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

19 Dr. Laura L. Blaisdell, et al., Preventing and Mitigating SARS-CoV-2 Transmission — Four Overnight Camps, Maine, June–August 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Sept. 4, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935e1.htm); Email from Michael Iademarco, Director of the Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Aug. 27, 2020) (SSCCManual_000017 – 22) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

20 Dr. Danae Bixler, et al., SARS-CoV-2–Associated Deaths Among Persons Aged <21 Years — United States, February 12–July 31, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Sept. 18 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6937e4.htm); Email from Nina Witkofsky, Acting Chief of Staff, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Sept. 11, 2020) (SSCCManual_000007 – 10) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

21 Email from Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services (June 30, 2020) (SSCC-0007093 – 110) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf). Dr. Kent, the Editor-in-Chief of the MMWR, told the Select Subcommittee that the full text of articles are not shared outside of CDC. See Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 308, 1053 –1059.

22 Dr. Lara Bull-Otterson, et al., Hydroxychloroquine and Chloroquine Prescribing Patterns by Provider Specialty Following Initial Reports of Potential Benefit for COVID-19 Treatment — United States, January–June 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Sept. 4, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a4.htm).

23 Trump Tells the Story of a ‘Miracle’ Cure for COVID-19. But Was it?, National Public Radio (Apr. 7, 2020) (online at http://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus ... but-was-it); Letter from Rear Admiral Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food and Drug Administration, to Gary L. Disbrow, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (June 15, 2020) (online at http://www.fda.gov/media/138945/download).

24 The email attached a journal article regarding hydroxychloroquine prescription trends from October 2019 through March 2020, which Dr. Alexander appeared to mistake for the MMWR itself. See Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Nina Witkofsky, Senior Advisor, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services (June 29, 2020) (SSCC-0007294 – 305) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

25 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services (June 30, 2020) (SSCC-0006952 – 53) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

26 Email from Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services, to Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services, Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, and Brad Traverse, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services (July 2, 2020) (SSCC-0007178 – 81) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

27 Id.

28 Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 1471 – 1483.

29 Id. at 765 – 802.

30 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 28, 2020) (SSCC-0002881 – 88) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) (emphasis added).

31 Email from Michael Beach, Associate Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Henry Walke, Incident Manager for COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 27, 2020) (SSCCManual-000064 – 70) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

32 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Anne Schuchat, Principal Deputy Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 27, 2020) (SSCCManual_00071) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 28, 2020) (SSCC-0002881 – 88) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

33 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 28, 2020) (SSCC-0002881 – 88) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) (emphasis added).

34 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to MMWR staff (July 27, 2020) (SSCCManual-000086 – 93) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

35 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Michael Iademarco, Director of the Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 28, 2020) (SSCCManual-000059 – 61) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

36 Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 1256 – 1259, 1283 – 1305.

37 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus” (July 31, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommit ... oronavirus).

38 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 27, 2020) (SSCC-0002911 – 13) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

39 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services (July 31, 2020) (SSCC-0003286 – 93) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Aug. 2, 2020) (SSCC-0005298 – 301) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Aug. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0008029 – 33) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

40 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Michael Caputo, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services, and Robert Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (Aug. 8, 2020) (online at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000176- ... de870a0000).

41 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II and Director Robert R. Redfield, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Dec. 10, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 281%29.pdf).

42 See, e.g., Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Noah Aleshire, Associate Director for Policy and Strategy, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Sept. 17, 2020) (SSCCManual-000001 – 02) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

43 Email from Communications Specialist, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Kate Galatas, Deputy Communications Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Communications Specialist, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (June 27, 2020) (SSCCManual-000186 – 89) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

44 Id.

45 White House Strips CDC of Data Collection Role for COVID-19 Hospitalizations, National Public Radio (July 15, 2020) (online at http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shot ... alizations).

46 Email from Kate Galatas, Deputy Communications Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (July 17, 2020) (SSCCManual-000190 – 95) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

47 Email from Kate Galatas, Deputy Communications Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Anne Schuchat, Principal Deputy Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (July 17, 2020) (SSCCManual-000174 – 79) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... cted_0.pdf).

48 Email from Madeleine Hubbard, Special Assistant, Department of Health and Human Services, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services (June 30, 2020) (SSCC-0007093 – 110) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); see also Transcribed Interview of Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf) at 726 – 729, 804 – 810.

49 See, e.g., Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (July 14, 2020) (SSCC-0006018 – 24) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (July 28, 2020) (SSCC-0002881 – 88) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Kate Galatas, Deputy Communications Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (July 17, 2020) (SSCCManual-000190 – 95) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

50 Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Katherine McKeogh, Press Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Sept. 9, 2020) (SSCC-0008026 – 28) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

51 Email from Michael Iademarco, Director of the Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Sept. 11, 2020) (SSCCManual-000016) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

52 Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at http://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11 ... -19-412809).

53 HHS Spokesman Caputo to Take Medical Leave After Reportedly Accusing CDC Officials of Plotting Against Trump, CNBC (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at http://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/16/hhs-spok ... trump.html).

54 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Sept. 14, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-14.Majority%20to%20Azar%20and%20Redfield%20re%20HHS%20and%20CDC%20on%20Political%20Interference%20.pdf).

55 Letter from Sarah C. Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Sept. 18, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Clyburn%20TI%20Request%20Response%20%28signed%29.pdf).

56 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20HHS%20TIs%20.pdf).

57 Letter from Sarah C. Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Sept. 25, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/09252020%20Clyburn%20TI%20Request%20Follow%20Up%20Response.pdf).

58 Email from Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Staff, Department of Health and Human Services (Sept. 27, 2020).

59 Email from Staff, Department of Health and Human Services, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Sept. 28, 2020).

60 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-secretary-health-and-human-services-alex-m-azar-ii).

61 Email from Staff, Department of Health and Human Services, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 7, 2020).

62 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Oct. 22, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-10-22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20TIs%20.pdf).

63 HHS’s letter stated that the Department could begin producing documents on November 9, but only agreed to provide an “initial” production without revealing what this production would include or when the full set of responsive documents would be provided. Letter from Sarah C. Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 27, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 0FINAL.pdf).

64 Email from Staff, Department of Health and Human Services, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 29, 2020). The five “named custodians” are Alex M. Azar II, Robert R. Redfield, Michael Caputo, Paul Alexander, and Brad Traverse.

65 See, e.g¸ Email from Brett Giroir, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services, to Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (Aug. 22, 2019) (SSCC-00013457) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf); Email from Robert Levitt to Robert Levitt (Nov. 28, 2019) (SSCC-0013402 – 11) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

66 See SSCC-0002546 – 96 (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 546-96.pdf). In another instance, HHS appears to have withheld a copy of “a paper just published,” also on the basis of privilege. See Email from Paul Alexander, Senior Advisor, Department of Health and Human Services, to Michael Pratt, Director of Strategic Communications and Campaigns, Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (Aug. 30, 2020) (SSCC-0014927 – 29) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... dacted.pdf).

67 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II and Director Robert R. Redfield, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Dec. 10, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 281%29.pdf).

68 Moreover, counsel’s questions—which sought information regarding whether anyone instructed Dr. Kent to withhold information from Congress—did not implicate attorney-client communications.

69 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II and Director Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Dec. 10, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 281%29.pdf).

70 Letter from Sarah C. Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Dec. 15, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/dem ... 201215.pdf).

71 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

72 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).

[admin]

Letter from Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, James E. Clyburn, Chairman, to The Hon. Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services and Dr. Robert R. Redfield, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
December 10, 2020

One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6143
Phone (202) 22504400
https://coronavirus.house.gov

James E. Clyburn, Chairman
Maxine Waters
Carolyn B. Maloney
Nydia M. Velazquez
Bill Foster
Jamie Raskin
Andy Kim
Steve Scalise, Ranking Member
Jim Jordan
Blaine Luetkemeyer
Jackie Walorski
Mary E. Green, M.D.

December 10, 2020

The Honorable Alex M. Azar II
Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue,
S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201

Dr. Robert R. Redfield
Director
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
395 E Street, S.W., Suite 9100
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Secretary Azar and Director Redfield:

I write today to express my serious concern about what may be deliberate efforts by the Trump Administration to conceal and destroy evidence that senior political appointees interfered with career officials’ response to the coronavirus crisis at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This week, a career CDC official stated in a transcribed interview with Select Subcommittee staff that she was instructed to delete an email in which a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appointee demanded that CDC alter or rescind truthful scientific reports he believed were damaging to President Trump. She also stated that she understood the instruction to delete the email came from CDC Director Robert Redfield. After the career official provided this troubling testimony, HHS abruptly canceled four transcribed interviews the Select Subcommittee had scheduled with other CDC employees. These actions follow months of obstruction by HHS, during which the Department has failed to produce key documents your staff promised to provide more than a month ago.

I am deeply concerned that the Trump Administration’s political meddling with the nation’s coronavirus response has put American lives at greater risk, and that Administration officials may have taken steps to conceal and destroy evidence of this dangerous conduct. It is critical that the Department end its stonewalling, preserve or recover all responsive documents, and provide the documents and witnesses that the Select Subcommittee needs to investigate this conduct and help protect American lives during this deadly pandemic.

Interview Reveals Instructions to Delete Critical Email and Delay Scientific Report

On December 7, 2020, Select Subcommittee staff conducted a transcribed interview of Dr. Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch and Editor-in-Chief of the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) at CDC. During the interview, Dr. Kent stated that she was instructed to delete an August 8, 2020, email sent by HHS senior advisor Dr. Paul Alexander, and that she understood the direction came from Director Redfield. An excerpt from this email was later published in the press. However, the Department has not produced the email to the Select Subcommittee in response to our requests.

In the email, Dr. Alexander demanded that CDC insert new language in a previously published scientific report on coronavirus risks to children or “pull it down and stop all reports immediately.” He also wrote:

CDC tried to report as if once kids get together, there will be spread and this will impact school reopening. … Very misleading by CDC and shame on them. Their aim is clear. … This is designed to hurt this Presidnet [sic] for their reasons which I am not interested in.1

Dr. Kent stated in her interview that this email was sent to her, Dr. Redfield, and possibly HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Michael Caputo on Saturday, August 8. She stated that she was on vacation at the time, and she received a call “early Sunday morning” from the career CDC official who was editing the MMWR in her absence. This official explained that Dr. Michael Iademarco, who was Dr. Kent’s supervisor, had passed on an instruction from Dr. Redfield to delete the August 8 email from Dr. Alexander.

Dr. Kent stated in her interview, “I was instructed to delete the email.” She stated that she did not speak directly to Director Redfield about this instruction, but was informed that the instruction came from him, explaining, “that’s what I understood, that it came from Dr. Redfield.” She continued, “I went to look for it after I had been told to delete it, and it was already gone.” When asked who deleted the email, she replied, “I have no idea.”2

Dr. Kent stated, “I considered this to be very unusual.” When asked if she would normally retain this type of email, she stated, “typically it would have been.”3

Federal employees have affirmative obligations to preserve documents, and destruction of federal records is potentially illegal. The Federal Records Act requires the head of each federal agency to “make and preserve records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency.”4 Federal law also provides for up to three years of imprisonment for willful destruction of federal records.5

Dr. Kent also revealed other troubling conduct by HHS and CDC political appointees. For example, she stated that CDC delayed the publication of an MMWR article regarding a coronavirus outbreak at a Georgia summer camp to ensure that the scientific report would not be released until after Dr. Redfield’s July 31, 2020, testimony before the Select Subcommittee. Documents show that the article was originally scheduled to be released to the public on July 29, but the release was delayed for two days following a “requested delay by Dr. Redfield and HHS.”6 Dr. Kent explained that she understood that the reason for the delay was, “there was an interview with the congressional Oversight Committee, and there were some very important things that they wanted to convey during that meeting.” When asked whether she was referring to Dr. Redfield’s July 31 testimony before the Select Subcommittee, she responded, “that’s probably it,” adding, “[a]nd then the report would be released afterward.”7

At the July 31 hearing, Dr. Redfield testified that he believed schools should reopen for “face-to-face learning” in September 2020 and noted, “There’s really very significant public health consequences of the school closure.”8 He did not discuss the CDC study, which found that the virus spread widely among children at a summer camp in Georgia.9 The hearing ended at approximately 12:45 p.m., and CDC released the report approximately 15 minutes later at 1:00 p.m.10

HHS Is Obstructing the Select Subcommittee’s Investigation

The Select Subcommittee requested documents and transcribed interviews from HHS on September 14, 2020, following press reports indicating that political appointees had sought to block, alter, and delay CDC publications related to the coronavirus pandemic. The Select Subcommittee’s letter requested interviews beginning on September 22, 2020, and documents by September 28, 2020.11

On September 22, 2020, after HHS refused to make any witnesses available by the deadline, the Select Subcommittee sent a follow-up letter seeking compliance with the requests.12 The Department did not produce any documents by the September 28 deadline.

On October 2, 2020, Secretary Azar testified before the Select Subcommittee. During the hearing, I raised concerns about “clear political interference in the CDC’s efforts to carry out the department’s science-based mission.” I also stated, “I will hope that you will agree and begin producing the documents and allowing these witnesses to come forward next week.”13

Following the hearing, HHS did not produce any documents or witnesses, despite outreach from Select Subcommittee staff. On October 22, 2020, I wrote to Secretary Azar again, stating:

I urge you to end your obstruction of this crucial investigation, allow CDC officials to speak freely to Congress, and produce responsive documents. If you refuse to comply voluntarily, you will force the Select Subcommittee to consider issuing subpoenas.14

Our staffs subsequently engaged in several days of negotiations. On October 29, 2020, HHS agreed to make a complete production of all responsive documents by November 23, 2020, and to make five witnesses available for interviews. With respect to documents, Department staff wrote:

HHS will target November 9 for a complete production of documents for the five named custodians, as well as others whom we have identified to date. This will take a good amount of resources and will likely require contract-attorney reviewers, but we will aim to have the production to you by the 9th. We will also commit to target November 23 for a complete production for the remaining political appointees.15

Unfortunately, HHS has not honored this agreement. The Department has produced some documents, which consist primarily of publicly available articles, incomplete sets of emails related to Dr. Alexander, and a small number of other emails from CDC. During a call on December 2, 2020, Department staff refused to provide even an estimate of when HHS would produce the remaining documents, including responsive emails involving Secretary Azar, Dr. Redfield, and other senior officials.

On November 30, 2020, the Department agreed to make five witnesses available for transcribed interviews beginning on December 7, 2020. However, hours after Dr. Kent’s interview in which she revealed she was instructed to delete a key document, your staff wrote to Select Subcommittee staff that the Department is “cancelling the interviews that were scheduled for this week,” baselessly attacking the Select Subcommittee staff’s integrity as a pretextual justification for doing so.16

Need for Compliance

On September 14, 2020, the Select Subcommittee explained that this investigation seeks “to determine the scope of political interference with CDC’s scientific reports and other efforts to combat the pandemic, the impact of this interference on CDC’s mission, whether this interference is continuing, and the steps that Congress may need to take to stop it before more Americans die needlessly.”17

Those goals are even more urgent in light of the information obtained by the Select Subcommittee showing that top CDC and HHS officials may have taken steps to obstruct oversight into their activities and to delay the release of accurate scientific information regarding the coronavirus for political purposes. With coronavirus cases, hospitalizations, and deaths in the United States reaching new records, it is critical that the American people can trust the federal government to provide accurate public health information based on the best science—not based on politics.

For all these reasons, please produce all remaining responsive documents by December 15, 2020. If you do not make a complete production by that date, the Select Subcommittee will have no choice but to issue subpoenas to compel production.

In addition, the Select Subcommittee requests a transcribed interview with Director Redfield on December 17, 2020. The Select Subcommittee also requests that the transcribed interviews of the other four CDC officials that HHS abruptly canceled be rescheduled immediately.

Finally, please produce the following additional documents by December 15, 2020:

1. All documents and communications related to efforts to delete, conceal, or withhold Dr. Alexander’s August 8, 2020, email;

2. All documents and communications related to efforts to delete, conceal, or withhold any documents responsive to the Select Subcommittee’s September 14, 2020, requests;

3. All documents and communications related to instructions or guidance provided to any HHS or CDC employee to withhold information, documents, or testimony from the Select Subcommittee; and

4. A list of all federal officials and employees involved in any of the activities described in Requests 1 through 3.

Sincerely,

__________________________
James E. Clyburn
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Steve Scalise, Ranking Member

APPENDIX

Excerpts from Transcribed Interview with Dr. Charlotte Kent

Director Redfield Instructed CDC Officials to Delete Email from Dr. Alexander

Q: Who was that email sent to?

A: I don’t have a copy. I believe it was sent to me and Dr. Redfield, and I’m not exactly sure who -- it would -- given, you know, he’s addressing Michael, I would assume it was also sent to Mr. Caputo.

Q: You said -- you said that this was sent while you were on vacation. Do you recall when that was approximately?

A: It was, I think -- I think he sent it -- I think it was maybe, like, August. It was -- he sent it, I think, on a Saturday in August around -- I can’t -- I don't remember the date exactly, but, like, August 7th, 8th, around in there, whatever that Saturday is.

Q: You said you don’t have a copy. I realized we haven’t given you one because we don’t seem to have one. Did you -- do you still have one in your possession?

A: I don’t have one in my possession.

Q: Why is that?

A: While I was on vacation, the woman who was serving as the acting and editor-in-chief, there was discussion with her -- her name is [REDACTED] -- and Dr. Iademarco about this. Dr. Iademarco reached out to Dr. Redfield, and so Dr. Redfield said we wouldn’t be doing this according to this -- you know, about what I heard from [REDACTED] who heard from, you know, Admiral Iademarco, and that we did not -- that I was instructed to delete the email because it would be part of Dr. Redfield’s, you know, the documentation that he has in his email. So actually when I went back to delete, it was already gone.

Q: Sorry. Who instructed you to delete it?

A: I heard from [REDACTED], who, as I understood, heard from Dr. Iademarco, who heard from Dr. Redfield to delete it.

Q: Sorry. I just want to make sure I understand. It sounds like you’re saying Dr. Redfield told Dr. Iademarco --

A: Yes.

Q: -- who told [REDACTED], who told you.

A: Yes, right. Yeah. So I did not have direct -- that’s what I understood, that it came from Dr. Redfield, and that it was also stated that it would -- because of Dr. Redfield, you know, all of his email are part of the public record, that it would be maintained in that.

Q: I see. When you say it was already gone, what does that mean?

A: That means when I went to look for it, it was not there.

Q: Did you go to look for it in response to a request from our -- the Select Subcommittee to produce documents?

A: No, I went to look for it after I had been told to delete it, and it was already gone.

Q: Why did you go to look for it?

A: Because I had been instructed to delete it, and so I went to look for it to delete it, and it was already gone.

Q: Oh, I see. You didn’t actually delete it yourself because it was already gone.

A: No. No, uh-huh. It was already -- yes.

Q: Do you know -- do you know who deleted it?

A: I have no idea.
. . .

Q: Did you -- so you learned while you were on vacation at this point in August that -- about this email and Dr. Alexander’s efforts to -- you referenced that he’d wanted to change MMWRs. What else -- did anything else happen? Did you learn about that through anyone other than the conversation you referenced with [REDACTED]?

A: I mean -- I mean, we just discussed the content of this email, but, you know, I had been assured, you know, that Dr. Redfield was not going to -- you know, didn’t think this was appropriate.

Q: He didn’t think that what was appropriate?

A: To comply with the request in this email.
. . .

Q: Do you recall when [REDACTED] told you to delete the email?

A: It would be the day after it was sent. So as I recall, Dr. Alexander sent it at night, and she called me early Sunday morning about it. I think I actually -- I read it and told her that I, you know, I would be happy to talk to her whenever she was available.

Q: You read what?

A: Oh, so sorry. So I read the email early -- I think early Sunday morning. I believe he sent it late Saturday, and he -- I just -- and I think she had sent me a heads up about it. And so she and I talked early in the morning, and then she talked -- and then she just told me that Dr. Iademarco and Dr. Redfield will discuss it on Sunday --

Q: Yeah.

A: -- at a civil hour, and then I think she communicated after that discussion. You know, it was sort of down -- you know, back up, like, that she would -- you know, after Dr. Redfield talked to Dr. Iademarco, he -- and told him that, you know, we would not be complying with this request, that’s when she got back to me with that statement and the request to delete the email.

Q: Did you discuss any -- did anyone raise any concerns to you about the request to delete the email?

A: Well, certainly the request is not typical. It’s not something that we would -- you know, it was clear that the director said he would not comply with it. I mean, I think it’s -- you know, it’s surprising, you know, when you receive something like this.

Q: Are you aware of -- have you received training or are otherwise aware of document retention obligations for government officials?

A: Yes, the -- I’m aware that we are to keep documents.

Q: So when you were told to delete the email --

A: Mm-hmm.

Q: -- did you discuss with anyone whether that request raised any concerns regarding those obligations?

A: I didn’t discuss with anyone. I’m also familiar with the -- that, you know, the director’s email is something that, you know, is not tampered with. And so when I was -- I considered this to be very unusual. I think that the request to -- you know, I do know that, you know, certain parts of -- persons in the Agency, like Center directors and the director, their email, you know, cannot be deleted. So I felt like there -- honestly, I felt like there were safeguards that if it was needed to discover this information, it would be readily discoverable.

Q: Is this a type of email that you would’ve normally kept under your typical practices?

A: Yes, typically it would have been.
. . .

Q: Do you know if anyone other than the people that you’ve described in the -- in the chain that was communicated down to you were aware of the request to delete that email?

A: I am not aware of -- you know, I can’t remember if I discussed it with -- I might’ve discussed it with the [REDACTED] of MMWR. It’s the sort of thing I typically would have, but I don’t remember if I did for sure because, technically, I was on vacation. So, but that, you know, that would’ve been the only people within the Agency, other person possibly.

Q: I'm sorry. What’s the name of that person?

A: Her name is [REDACTED].

Q: Did anyone ever tell you not to discuss Dr. Alexander’s request?

A: I don’t recall that. I don’t. Yeah, I don’t -- I don’t recall that.

Q: Did anyone ever tell you how you should address Dr. Alexander’s request? And I’m not talking about prep for this interview.

A: I don’t -- I don’t recall being given explicit guidance about, you know, that particular email other than to delete it.
 
Director Redfield and HHS Officials Delayed Release of Damaging Scientific Report Until After Congressional Testimony

Q: These two emails relate to each other. They were both sent within about a minute apart. One is from you to Michael Iademarco, and it says at the top: “Amanda called me to say -- request a delay by Dr. Redfield and HHS. Delay will make for better timing.” That’s Exhibit 12. On Exhibit 13, four emails down the chain, you write, “Just got the call. Request a delay until Friday by Dr. Redfield. Timing will be better.” So in any case, this, I think, is the delay that you’ve already talked to us about.

A: Yes.

Q: Do you have any understanding of why was the timing better?

A: The timing was better -- well, one, it was only a 2-day delay, so it’s not a long delay, and it couldn’t be -- because of our production processes, it couldn't be -- it couldn’t be released on Thursday because that’s when we do our regular content. So as I understood, that there was a desire to make the communication about this report, you know, kind of front and center, that there wouldn’t be a distraction because of other things that were occurring, and so that was why the delay. Like, when we schedule reports, we really try to think about the communication because generally you can only communicate effectively about one topic, you know. And if there’s a lot of other things that are going to be in the news, then we try to do -- you know, kind of do things in a smooth way so that there’s not a lot of dissonance. So the -- my understanding was that they felt it would be more effectively communicated if it was delayed until Friday.

Q: You said other things that were happening. Do you know what other things?

A: I think the -- as I understood, on Thursday, there was an interview with the congressional Oversight Committee, and there were some very important things that they wanted to convey during that meeting.

Q: Is this the only time that you’re -- that you can recall at any -- at any point in time during your response or otherwise where somebody asked you to delay the publication of an MMWR, other than for a, you know, scientific review and whatnot?

A: This is the only time I -- well, you know, this is -- I can’t say that there wasn’t some other time. We published 163 reports, and I cannot say that there has never been another time where we decided to delay something because it would be better from a communications perspective to release it a little bit later because there was going to be guidance that was coming out that was going to be ready, and they, you know, amplified the message. I certainly would have discussions about that all the time. This is the only time that I recall getting a request, you know, that was related to, you know, Dr., you know, Redfield and communication around him. Because we do try to be -- again, effectively communicate things and to have things be -- you know, the timing not be disruptive, it didn’t stand out especially in my mind that this, you know. And, again, it was only delaying it by 2 days, so. You know, as we -- as you -- if you go through, we’ve delayed a number of reports, but --
. . .

Q: You mentioned -- you said a briefing with congressional Oversight. Was that the -- Dr. Redfield’s testimony before the Select Committee that you’re mentioning?

A: I am not -- I’m not -- you know, I can’t recall exactly, you know, if that’s the proper, you know, thing. It was something that was happening on the Thursday.
. . .

Q: Sorry. Just to follow up on that, I believe there was a hearing that Friday on July 31st.

A: Oh, okay. So yeah.

Q: At which Dr. Redfield testified before our committee. So is it possible that’s what was being referred to? That was -- that was Friday, July 31st at 9:00 a.m.

A: Possibly, yeah. Yeah. So, oh, that’s probably it.

Q: Okay. Thank you.

A: And then the report would be released afterward.

_______________

Notes:

1 See Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at http://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11 ... -19-412809) (quoting from August 8, 2020, email from Dr. Alexander).

2 Transcribed Interview of Dr. Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020).

3 Id.

4 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107 (Chapter 31, Records Management by Federal Agencies); 44 U.S.C. §§3301-3314 (Chapter 33, Disposal of Records); and 36 C.F.R., Chapter XII, Subchapter B (Records Management).The definition of “records” includes emails. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(2) (defining “records” as inclusive of “all traditional forms of records, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including information created, manipulated, communicated, or stored in digital or electronic form”).

5 18 U.S.C. § 2071.

6 Email from Charlotte Kent, Chief of the Scientific Publications Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to Michael Iademarco, Director of the Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 28, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCCManual-000059-61_Redacted.pdf).

7 Transcribed Interview of Dr. Charlotte Kent (Dec. 7, 2020).

8 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus” (July 31, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-urgent-need-national-plan-contain-coronavirus).

9 Christine M. Szablewski, et al., SARS-CoV-2 Transmission and Infection Among Attendees of an Overnight Camp — Georgia, June 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Aug. 7, 2020) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/m ... mm6931e1_w).

10 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Media Statement: Study Highlights Importance of CDC Mitigation Strategies (July 31, 2020) (online at stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/91341) (noting that CDC’s media statement concerning the MMWR article was “Embargoed until: Friday, July 31, 2020, 1 p.m. ET”).

11 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, et al. to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II and Director Robert R. Redfield, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Sept. 14, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-14.Majority%20to%20Azar%20and%20Redfield%20re%20HHS%20and%20CDC%20on%20Political%20Interference%20.pdf).

12 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20HHS%20TIs%20.pdf).

13 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-secretary-health-and-human-services-alex-m-azar-ii).

14 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Oct. 22, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-10-22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20TIs%20.pdf).

15 Email from Staff, Department of Health and Human Services, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 29, 2020).

16 Email from Staff, Department of Health and Human Services to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Dec. 7, 2020). HHS counsel claimed that the basis for this sudden cancellation was that Select Subcommittee staff counsel asked the witness whether, in addition to being instructed to delete a key email, she was instructed by anyone to withhold other information from Congress. Instructing an agency employee to obstruct a congressional matter is highly inappropriate, potentially illegal, and not protected by any valid privilege. The Select Subcommittee has a strong interest in understanding whether agency officials are instructing employees to obstruct this investigation, especially in light of Dr. Kent’s statement that she was directed to delete a document that was subsequently withheld from the Select Subcommittee.

17 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, et al., to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II and Director Robert R. Redfield, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Sept. 14, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-14.Majority%20to%20Azar%20and%20Redfield%20re%20HHS%20and%20CDC%20on%20Political%20Interference%20.pdf).

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Interim Staff Report: INEFFICIENT, INEFFECTIVE, AND INEQUITABLE: The Trump Administration's Failed Reponse to the Coronavirus Crisis
As New Cases Skyrocket, Report Finds Response is Among the ‘Worst Failures of Leadership in American History’
by Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
October, 2020

PDF HERE:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC CAUSED A PUBLIC HEALTH CATASTROPHE
o The President Downplayed the Crisis, Contradicting Internal White House Reports
o Political Appointees Have Improperly Interfered in the Nation's Public Health Response More Than 60 Times
o The Trump Administration’s $765 Million Loan to Kodak
o The Administration Has Failed to Address Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Development
o The Administration and Some States Have Not Done Enough to Help Americans Vote Safely During the Pandemic
• THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO PROTECT MILLIONS OF AMERICANS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS
o Treasury and IRS Delayed Delivery of Economic Impact Payments to Nine Million Americans
o The Administration Has Not Provided Critical Housing Protections to Struggling Americans
• THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIZED WALL STREET OVER MAIN STREET AND LEFT FEDERAL RELIEF PROGRAMS VULNERABLE TO FRAUD
o Treasury and SBA Neglected Underserved Communities and Allowed Billions of Dollars in Potential Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program
o Fed and Treasury Lending Facilities Prioritized Big Corporations and Investors Over Small Businesses, Workers, and States
o The Administration Weakened the Payroll Support Program, Allowing Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs
• APPENDIX A: KEY SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIONS
• APPENDIX B: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S PATTERN OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
• ENDNOTES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis was established by the House of Representatives on April 23, 2020. Modeled after the Truman Committee that saved lives and taxpayer dollars by preventing waste, fraud, and abuse during World War II, the panel is charged with investigating the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the nation’s response to the public health and economic crises caused by the coronavirus pandemic.1

This report describes some of the Select Subcommittee’s key findings during its first six months. In that time, the Subcommittee launched 30 investigations—many of them ongoing— sent more than 120 letters, and reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. The Subcommittee held 15 public hearings and briefings with senior Administration officials, experts in public health and economics, and Americans personally impacted by the pandemic. The Subcommittee also published seven staff reports detailing its initial findings.

The Select Subcommittee’s findings demonstrate that the Trump Administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic is among the worst failures of leadership in American history. The virus is a global scourge, but it has been an American fiasco, killing more people in the United States than in any other country. President Trump’s decision to mislead the public about the severity of the crisis, his failure to listen to scientists about how to keep Americans healthy, and his refusal to implement a coordinated national plan to stop the coronavirus have all contributed to devastating results: more than 227,000 Americans dead, more than 8.8 million Americans infected, and a dangerous virus that continues to spread out of control nine months after it reached our nation’s shores.

The Trump Administration’s failure to contain the coronavirus also exacerbated and extended an economic collapse of historic proportions, with tens of millions of Americans losing their jobs and at least six million Americans falling into poverty. The Administration’s response to this economic crisis has benefited larger companies and wealthy Americans, while leaving behind many disadvantaged communities and struggling small businesses. The Administration’s implementation of relief programs passed by Congress has also been marred by fraud, waste, and abuse. As described below and in Appendix A, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations identified more than $4 billion in potential fraud in small business programs, led the Administration to halt a potentially wasteful $765 million loan, and returned more than $100 million in taxpayer dollars to the U.S. Treasury.

The Trump Administration’s Failed Response to the Pandemic Caused a Public Health Catastrophe

As of October 28, 2020, more than 227,000 Americans have died from the coronavirus, and 8.8 million have been infected.2 The coronavirus is set to be the third-highest cause of death in the United States this year, behind only heart disease and cancer.3 The country appears to be entering a third wave of the crisis, with cases on the rise in 45 states. Hospitalizations are up 46 percent in the past month, with more than 43,000 Americans currently hospitalized with the coronavirus.4 The nation hit a single-day record of more than 85,000 new cases on October 23, 2020.5 Experts predict another 90,000 Americans are likely to die from the virus before the end of 2020.6

The United States has the highest number of cases and highest number of deaths from the coronavirus of any country in the world.7 It has fared worse than most other countries, even when accounting for differences in population size. The United States has the eleventh highest per capita coronavirus death rate among 168 countries reporting cases.8

The loss of life from the coronavirus—more American deaths than the battles of World War I, the Korean War, Vietnam War, Afghanistan War, and Iraq War combined9—could have been significantly reduced by an effective federal response. Instead, as described in Part I of this report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations show that the Trump Administration downplayed the threat of the virus and undermined the nation’s public health:

• The Trump Administration Refused to Take Responsibility and Implement a National Plan to Defeat the Virus. At the Select Subcommittee’s first public briefing in May 2020, top scientific experts—including a former Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner appointed by President Trump—urged the Administration to develop and implement a coordinated national strategy to respond to the crisis.10 Since then, the Select Subcommittee has held three more public hearings to call on the Administration to implement a national plan on testing, contact tracing, public health measures, and protective equipment.11 Yet the Administration has refused to lead, pushing the burden to state and local governments instead. At a July 31, 2020, Select Subcommittee hearing, Dr. Anthony Fauci testified that the government’s failed response led the United States to have a far worse virus outbreak than in Europe.12 On October 2, 2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar shrugged off the Administration’s failed leadership, telling the Subcommittee, “We wish we didn’t have this unprecedented coronavirus pandemic but people do die in pandemics,” and saying: “The disease spreads. It’s dependent on all of us acting with individual responsibility.”13

• The President Downplayed the Crisis, Contradicting Internal White House Reports. Since June 2020, the White House Coronavirus Task Force has privately sent weekly reports to states that track the growing outbreak and urge swift action to contain the virus. These private reports contradict the rosy public statements from the President, Vice President, and other political appointees. The Select Subcommittee released 14 weeks of these private reports, which show that the number of states in the “red zone” due to severe outbreaks grew from seven states on June 23, 2020, to 31 states on October 18, 2020. The reports also show that all 50 states need to do more testing to contain the virus—contrary to the President’s efforts to “slow the testing down.” 14 The Select Subcommittee also found that after months of political pressure from President Trump, the Task Force weakened some public health recommendations, including calls for mask mandates in certain states.15

• Political Appointees Have Improperly Interfered in the Nation’s Public Health Response More Than 60 Times. The Select Subcommittee has identified at least 61 instances in which Trump Administration officials injected politics into public health decisions. As shown in Appendix B, President Trump and others in his Administration engaged in a persistent pattern of political interference, repeatedly overruling and sidelining top scientists and undermining Americans’ health to advance the President’s perceived political interests. These incidents degraded efforts to provide Americans access to testing and protective equipment, develop treatments and vaccines, and provide scientifically sound public health advice. The Subcommittee’s investigations led the Administration to reverse some of these actions, including correcting inaccurate Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance on testing, removing senior appointees from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) who tried to alter accurate scientific reports, and committing to revise CDC school reopening guidance that does not reflect the best science.16

• The Administration Directed Funding for Critical Supplies, Often Without Competition, to Companies that Have Political Connections, Lack Experience, and Failed to Perform. The Select Subcommittee is investigating questionable contracts and loans that may be hindering the nation’s ability to quickly produce and distribute protective equipment and other supplies needed to contain the virus. In August 2020, the Subcommittee launched an investigation into a planned $765 million loan to the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) to produce pharmaceutical ingredients—even though the company lacked any pharmaceutical experience and its executives and directors reaped huge stock windfalls before the deal was announced.17 The Trump Administration put the loan on hold after the investigation was announced, potentially saving taxpayers three-quarters of a billion dollars.18 The Subcommittee is also investigating other multimillion contracts that four federal agencies issued to seven different contractors that raise significant red flags.19

• The Administration Has Failed to Address Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Development. The Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into potential conflicts of interest among scientific advisors to Operation Warp Speed (OWS), the Administration’s program to develop and manufacture coronavirus vaccines and treatments. The Select Subcommittee’s investigation revealed that top advisors to this project have potential conflicts of interest—including financial interests in companies being funded by the federal government to develop vaccines—that do not appear to be resolved.20

• The Administration and Some States Have Not Done Enough to Help Americans Vote Safely During the Pandemic. Problems during the 2020 primary elections— including closed polling places, long lines, and poll worker shortages—highlighted the risk that some states were not prepared to carry out a free, fair, and safe general election during the pandemic. The Select Subcommittee investigated impediments to voting during the pandemic in four states: Florida, Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin. The Subcommittee found that voters in these states may face long lines and limited polling places and urged swift state action and federal financial support.21

The Trump Administration Failed to Protect Millions of Americans in Financial Distress

The nation’s economic crisis is a direct result of the ongoing public health crisis, and the Trump Administration’s failures to contain the coronavirus made the economic crisis more severe and protracted. On September 23, 2020, Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Jerome Powell testified before the Select Subcommittee that “the path of the economy is going to depend on our ability to retain control, to get control of the virus and keep control.”22

The economic contraction has taken a heavy toll on American workers and families. Since February 2020, the economy has lost $16 trillion due to lost economic output, premature deaths, and health impairments caused by the pandemic.23 More than 60 million unemployment claims have been filed—more than at any other time in American history.24 Since May, between six and eight million Americans have fallen into poverty.25 In October, 12 percent of households with children did not have enough food to eat in the last week.26 At least one-third of adults are concerned that “eviction or foreclosure in the next two months is either very likely or somewhat likely.”27 The job losses from the coronavirus pandemic have disproportionately impacted minority communities and workers earning lower wages, resulting in the most unequal recession in modern U.S. history.28

As described in Part II of this report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations reveal how the Trump Administration’s response to this crisis has often failed to help the most vulnerable Americans:

• The Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service Delayed Delivery of Economic Impact Payments to Nine Million Americans. In the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Congress provided for Economic Impact Payments (EIPs) of up to $1,200, but nine million disproportionately low-income Americans were still waiting to receive their checks in September—more than six months after the CARES Act was enacted. In response to the Select Subcommittee’s investigation and repeated follow-up efforts, Treasury and IRS admitted these EIPs were still outstanding,29 sent notices to the nine million Americans waiting for their checks, and extended the deadline for them to claim their EIPs.30

• The Administration Has Not Provided Critical Housing Protections to Struggling Americans. Following the expiration of the CARES Act eviction moratorium and enhanced unemployment benefits in late July 2020, millions of Americans have faced the danger of losing their homes. The Select Subcommittee obtained data showing that in August 2020, more than 31,000 homeowners were over 60 days delinquent on their federally backed mortgage but had not received forbearance and therefore could be at risk of foreclosure in January 2021. This data also shows lower-income borrowers were less likely that those with higher incomes to get forbearance. The Subcommittee has urged the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to provide automatic forbearance to homeowners who miss two or more payments.31

• The Administration Refused to Extend Enhanced Unemployment Insurance, Hurting the Economy. At a Select Subcommittee’s hearing in July 2020, Former Fed Chair Janet Yellen testified that failure to extend the enhanced federal jobless benefits from the CARES Act “would be a catastrophe.”32 Yet the Trump Administration refused to agree to comprehensive legislation extending the benefits before they expired on July 26, 2020.33 In October 2020, unemployment remained unacceptably high, and a growing number of people have been unemployed for more than six months.34

The Trump Administration Prioritized Wall Street Over Main Street and Left Federal Relief Programs Vulnerable to Fraud

Congress enacted relief programs to support Americans workers and small businesses during the pandemic. These programs, many of which have now expired, were critical in preventing the economic crisis in Spring and Summer 2020 from getting even worse. Yet, as described in Part III of this report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations show that the Trump Administration weakened these programs by prioritizing larger and wealthier businesses over truly struggling small businesses, exacerbating inequity in the economic downturn. The Administration also failed to institute adequate financial controls, leading to significant fraud, waste, and abuse.

• Treasury and the Small Business Administration Neglected Underserved Communities and Allowed Billions of Dollars in Potential Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program. The Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that Treasury and SBA ignored the CARES Act’s call to issue guidance to prioritize small businesses in underserved markets, including minority and women-owned businesses.35 Documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that Treasury privately encouraged banks to limit their Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) lending to existing customers, thereby excluding many minority-owned businesses who were less likely to have existing banking relationships.36 The Administration also failed to implement robust fraud controls, and a Subcommittee analysis identified more than 22,500 loans worth $4 billion that may have been subject to fraud.37

• The Fed Bought Corporate Bonds Issued by Large Companies that Laid Off or Furloughed More Than a Million Workers—and Sent Billions of Dollars to Shareholders. During the pandemic, the Fed—for the first time in its history—directly purchased corporate debt.38 This action lowered the cost of raising capital for large corporations, leading to record bond issuances.39 But the Fed failed to protect workers at these companies. The Select Subcommittee found the Fed bought bonds issued by companies that laid off or furloughed more than one million workers between March and September 2020, and from 383 companies that issued dividends to shareholders during the pandemic.40

• The Fed’s Programs to Help Smaller Businesses and States Were Not Effective. The Fed set up the Main Street Lending Program to help small and medium-sized businesses but set restrictive terms that drastically limited the program’s usefulness. The program has $600 billion in lending capacity, but the Fed has issued just 252 loans totaling less than 0.4 percent of available capital.41 The Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility failed to deliver relief to state and local governments, issuing only two notes totaling $1.7 billion out of the available $500 billion,42 largely because of onerous interest rates and a short repayment period.43 Large corporations are awash in cheap credit, but cities, states, and small businesses—which employ tens of millions of Americans and provide critical services—continue to struggle.44

• The Administration Weakened the Payroll Support Program, Allowing Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose their Jobs. Congress created the Payroll Support Program (PSP) to “preserve aviation jobs,” but the Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that the Trump Administration weakened the program by delaying funding, allowing companies to conduct massive layoffs while their applications were pending without losing any funding, and failing to impose a deadline to spend PSP funds. Treasury permitted aviation contractors to lay off or furlough more than 16,500 workers before receiving funding.45 As a result of the Select Subcommittee’s inquiries, four aviation contractors committed to preserve over 30,000 jobs until their PSP funding is exhausted.46

This report identifies several recommendations to address the Select Subcommittee’s preliminary findings and improve the Administration’s failed response to the pandemic. Four elements are critical: (1) the federal government needs a coordinated national plan to defeat the coronavirus, save American lives, and revive our economy; (2) this plan must be guided by the best available science, not political expediency; (3) Americans need Congress to pass and the President to sign comprehensive relief legislation to tackle the virus and support workers, families, and communities; and (4) economic relief legislation must be implemented in a manner consistent with Congress’s intent to target assistance to the most vulnerable Americans rather than wealthy corporations.

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Why Covid Numbers Will Get Worse Even With The Vaccines--A Surgeon Explains
by Duc C. Vuong
Dec 22, 2020

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Why Vaccines Won’t "Keep" You From Catching COVID--A Surgeon Explains It Easily
by Duc C. Vuong
Dec 25, 2020

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The New UK Coronavirus Strain Is Already In The USA--A Surgeon Explains Why
by Duc C. Vuong
Dec 23, 2020



The new UK strain is already in the United States. I promise you, they just haven't found it yet. Okay?

Now what happens when we combine a much more virulent strain PLUS the American "attitude"? And I'll finish it with that number 10.

This new, more virulent UK strain + American "attitude" + Christmas = Disaster.

I've been telling you guys that the peak is coming in mid-January and it's going to be awful. If you didn't see my video yesterday, 4-5 million Americans traveled for Thanksgiving. For Christmas it's predicted that 85 million Americans are going to travel for the holidays. We see what's happening with Thanksgiving service now. 2-3 weeks from now it's going to be a shit-show! A disaster! PLUS this new, more virulent strain is here in the United States, they just haven't told you. Y'all don't know about it. You know about it because you heard it from me. That's it.