1. John M. Shalikashvili , National Military Strategy of the United States: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 1995, pp. ii-iii.
2. Posted at World Wide Web site http://www.dtic.dia.mil/
3. Andrew W. Marshall, "Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions - Second Version, " Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, August 23, 1993, p. 3.
4. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 27.
5. For example, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington, The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework, final report of the CSIS Study Group on the MTR, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993; Dan Goure, "Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp . 175-192; and, John W. Bodnar, "The Military Technical Revolution: From Hardware to Information," Naval War College Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp . 7-21.
6. An exception is Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., "Beyond Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp . 15-21. The author does not explain why he uses a term or concept that has largely been abandoned by other analysts.
7. Civilian analysts tend toward "underway." Military officers, perhaps inherently more conservative, see more "evolution" than "revolution" in current events, but readily acknowledge that the future implications of silicon-chip and other advanced technologies may be revolutionary. See, for example. The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, January 1994; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, July 1994; The Summary Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, October 1994.
8. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, p. 32.
9. Robert J. Bunker, "The Transition To Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol . 78, No. 9, September 1994, pp . 20-34.
10. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, p . 21.
11. Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National interest. No. 37, Fall 1994, p. 30.
12. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer," p. 30; Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs , p. 1; in addition, each of the Department of Defense-sponsored service roundtables on the RMA were organized around these four elements. ( See The U.S. Army Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, October 1993; The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs; The Summary Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs.)
13. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 4, Spring 1994, p. 27.
14. The "First Wave" was agricultural, the "Second Wave" industrial. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, pp . 33-85. See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, The Third Wave, New York: Bantam, 1980.
15. See, for example, Pat Cooper, "Information Warfare Sparks Security Affairs Revolution," Defense News, Vol . 10, No. 23, June 12-18, 1995, p. 1.
16. See, for instance, George J. Stein, "Information Warfare," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp . 30- 55; Edward Mann, "Desert Storm: The First Information War?" Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp . 4-14; and, Owen Jensen, "Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War," Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp . 35-44.
17. For intra-military discussion, see The US Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs . For beginning attempts to explore the strategic utilization of information warfare, see Tofflers, War and Anti-War; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!"; John Arquilla, "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance," Strategic Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp . 24-30; and Winn Schwartau, information Warfare : Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994.
18. Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines, "Weapons of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare and Airpower in the Age of Chaos," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 27.
19. Thomas E. Ricks, "New Class of Weapons Could Incapacitate Foe Yet Limit Casualties," Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1993, p. 1.
20. Bradley Graham, "Use of Nonlethal Arms Leaves Pentagon Scrambling," Washington Post, February 24, 1995, p. 8.
21. In June 1993 the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sponsored a conference on the policy implications of nonlethal warfare technologies, but no major publications have yet grown from this. Harvey Sapolsky argues that in the search for nonlethal methods of warfare "isolationism will eventually be our answer." Harvey M. Sapolsky, "War without Killing," in Sam C. Sarkesian and John Mead Flanagin, eds., U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas, Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 39.
22. Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, Vol . 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p. 114.
23. Alan W. Debban, "Disabling Systems: War-Fighting Option for the Future," Airpower Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 46.
24. Marshall, "Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions," p. 5.
25. Michael J. Mazarr, The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
26. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer," p. 31.
27. See John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp . 40-55.
28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994, pp . 28-38.
29. An exception is Ralph Peters who writes, "The latest 'Revolution in Military Affairs' occurred in the 1980s. It is over now." ("After the Revolution," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 7.)
30. While the Tofflers' linkage of economic and modes of warfare is certainly accurate, their understanding of economic and military history is occasionally thin as, for instance, when they attribute the Napoleonic revolution to industrialization despite the fact that the Emperor' s arms were made with the same technology that had been used to equip the armies of Marlborough. Probably a better schema links the military revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries-the predominance of gunpowder, square- rigged ships with artillery in broadside, drilled standing armies, and the like-with the transition from a feudal to commercial economy, while the military revolution of the late 19th century resulted from industrialization and the first stage of the technological revolution.
31. Interestingly, by the early 20th century, maturation of the bolt-action rifle technology restored the importance of superior training and discipline-as the "Old Contemptibles" of the BEF were able to demonstrate at Mons and Le Gateau in 1914. By then, of course, other advances had made deciding the issue of a great power conflict via infantry weapons unlikely. See William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.
32. Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, p. xv.
33. Robert L. O' Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 40.
34. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, pp . 168, 238; Michael Howard, "The Military Factor in European Expansion," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ed., The Expansion of international Society, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.
35. For discussions of the German Army's development of Blitzkrieg, see Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story, New York: Scribner, 1976; Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg : From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, New York: Knopf, 1980; and Byran Perrett, A History of Blitzkrieg, New York: Stein & Day, 1983.
36. See Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, Hamden, CT : Archon, 1985.
37. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer," p. 40; Marshall, "Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions," p. 3.
38. Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," in Peter Paret, ed.. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp . 281-284.
39. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare, New York: Viking, 1989, pp. 100-122.
40. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d revised edition. New York: Signet, 1974; Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987.
41. The German attacks against both France and Russia during World War II can be viewed in this light. Although the German military made some arguments against initiating both campaigns when they did. Hitler strongly felt that Germany' s advantage in military capability would only erode as time passed.
42. The Air Force Roundtable on the RMA, after extensive consideration of the targeting problem, concluded "While technology will increasingly allow us to identify and target specific aim points, one thing that has never changed, and that technology is likely not to change, is the importance of knowing where and when to aim." The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , n.p.
43. Similarly, the U.S. Navy RMA Roundtable conferees concluded: "The focus . . . should be less on identifying any particular state as the most likely future challenger, and more on the characteristics and capabilities of the kinds of states likely to pose a challenge." (italics in original) The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , n.p.
44. On the vulnerability of the United States to nonmilitary information warfare, see Schwartau, information Warfare.
45. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare."
46. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, 1991, p. 197.
47. Peters, "After the Revolution," pp. 8, 9.
48. On this point, American liberalism is a less sophisticated ideology than Soviet Marxism-Leninism, which at least understood that there are powerful elites with vested interests who will oppose the spread of "equality and justice." Americans remain perplexed at elites who oppose the spread of free market democracy.
49. An interesting perspective on many of these issues can be found in Orsan Scott Card, Ender' s Game, New York: Tom Doherty, 1985.
50. For detail, see Steven Metz, "Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy, " Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1991, pp . 49-71.
51. See Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959.
52. The latest thinking on the Army's Force XXI process can be found at World Wide Web site http: //126.96.36.199:1100/ force21.
53. TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXT Operations, August 1994, n.p. (electronic download).
54. For example, Bernard Gray, "Digital Troops on the Horizon," London Financial Times, May 19, 1995, p. 11.
55. Daniel P. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman, " Parameters, Vol 21, No. 3, Autumn 1991, p. 32.
56. A.J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse," The National interest. No. 37, Fall 1994, p. 49.
57. Tofflers, War and Anti-War, p. 29.
58. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse," p. 49.
59. In a recent series of RMA roundtables, each of the individual services independently identified failure to create a climate or culture that "nurtures innovators, revolutionaries, or entrepreneurs" as an impediment to pursuit of the RMA. The U.S. Army Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs , n.p; The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p.
60. "There is a need for an organization free of current, day-to-day operational concerns and charged by OSD with developing R&D, training, operational, and other concepts to fit scenarios in the 2020 timeframe." The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution In Military Affairs , Tab F, n.p.
61. Perhaps distinguished flag officers on their last tour of duty. The Navy Board which fostered carrier and amphibious warfare in the 1920s and 1930s was just so composed. See W. Spencer Johnson, "Shifting Charts: The Navy and the Revolution in Military Affairs," in The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p.
62. Holger H. Herwig, "Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation- State: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp . 242-277.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Richard A. Chilcoat
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Dr. Dr. Steven Metz
Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit
Mrs . Marianne P . Cowling
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
Mr . Daniel B . Barnett
Mr. James E. Kistler