Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 5:58 am

APPENDIX D: The Mass-Oriented Insurgency: How it Organizes, How to Counter it

This appendix describes the mass-oriented insurgency, the most sophisticated insurgency in terms of organization and methods of operation. It is difficult to organize, but once under way, it has a high probability of success and is the type of insurgency most likely to require external assistance to defeat. Consequently, it is the form of insurgency US forces may most often encounter.

This type of insurgency originated in China under Mao Tse-Tung. Mass-oriented insurgency relies on the mobilization of very large numbers of people into an alternative government with many highly specialized political and military agencies. It bases its mobilization on a clear identification of social dysfunctions and an appealing program for fundamental political change. The element of popular participation is such that the method can be consistent with US values and objectives. Thus, the United States may support or oppose mass-oriented insurgency. It is not always against such a movement.

Mass-oriented insurgency combines political and military resources to attack and destroy the existing government. Therefore, organized military action will probably be a necessary part of a program to counter it. US armed forces must understand mass-oriented insurgency's organizational and operational methods, if they are to oppose it successfully.

STRUCTURE

The structure of mass-oriented insurgency generally includes the following elements:

• A control element to perform centralized policy-making and supervisory functions. The control element is normally compartmentalized to provide security against penetration by intelligence agencies.
• Mass civil organizations that connect people with the leadership. Through these, the leadership can effect control and receive popular support.
• Overt or covert armed elements or both.

Image
Figure D-1. Organization of a Mass-oriented Insurgency.

The heart of every mass-oriented insurgency is a disciplined political element that directs both military forces and mass organizations. In the Maoist tradition, the political element is the central committee of the Communist party. (Figure D-1 depicts the organization of a mass-oriented insurgency in simplified form.)

PHASES

The evolution of any phase in a mass-oriented insurgency may extend over a long period of time. A successful insurgency may take decades to start, mature, and finally succeed.

The classical phases of a mass-oriented insurgency are-

• Latent and incipient (phase I)
• Guerrilla warfare (phase II)
• War of movement (phase III)

An insurgency may not require all phases for success, nor are these phases separate and distinct from each other. Regardless of the number or the duration of the actual phases the insurgency undergoes, its leadership necessarily will initiate some type of final consolidation activities. These may include removing potential enemies or establishing additional control mechanisms. At a minimum, they will probably include educating the society about its new government. (Figure D-2 presents typical activities that may occur in each phase of a successful insurgency.)

PHASES AND TYPICAL ACTIVITIES

PHASE I. (LATENT AND INCIPIENT)


• ORGANIZATION: Organize, educate, proselytize; infiltrate other organizations; form party
• PROBATION- Infiltrate government and other organizations; create local cells. expand national cells, train groups; conduct political activity more openly:
o Labor organization
o Front groups/political organization
o Strikes

PHASE II. (GUERRILLA WARFARE)

• INITIATION: Initiate low-level violence-sabotage, terrorism; conduct propaganda; mobilize masses; seek international support; create base areas/low-level guerrilla action
• INSURRECTION; Establish/expand base areas; expand guerrilla attacks; proclaim counter government
• CONSOLIDATION: Expand attacks; expand political activity; enlarge forces; enlarge. link base areas

PHASE III. (WAR OF MOVEMENT)

• CONFRONTATION: Begin conventional war; continue guerrilla war
• FINALIZATION: Establish national government; neutralize/eliminate political front allies; consolidate military-political front allies; consolidate military- political dominance; neutralize/eliminate former political elite

GOAL: POLITICAL CONTROL/REPLACEMENT OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM

Figure D-2. Typical Activities Within Phase of Insurgency

Latent and Incipient Phase

This phase ranges from circumstances in which insurgent activity is only a potential threat (latent or incipient) to incidents and activities which occur frequently and in an organized pattern. This phase involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

Starting from a relatively weak position, the insurgents plan and organize their campaign and select initial urban or rural target areas. They make basic decisions regarding ideology and determine fundamental leadership relationships. They also establish overt and covert organizations. If the insurgents' movement is illegal, the organizations they create are normally covert; if their movement is legal, they may establish overt organizations. A covert control element should exist in either case. Throughout this period, the insurgents use PSYOP to--

• Exploit grievances
• Heighten expectations
• Influence the populace
• Promote the loyalty of insurgent members

As the insurgents consolidate their initial plans, their organization coalesces into a shadow government. After this, they concentrate on--

Gaining influence over the populace.

• Infiltrating government, economic, and social organizations
• Challenging the government's administrative ability
• Recruiting, organizing, and training armed elements

Various elements may attack government forces. They may also carry out intimidation activities and some minor military operations. These tactics gain additional influence over the populace, provide arms for the movement, and damage the government's public Image by demonstrating its inability to provide adequate security. In this first phase, the groundwork is laid for broad external support needed to expand the insurgency.

Guerrilla Warfare Phase

The movement reaches the guerrilla warfare phase when it gains sufficient local external support to begin organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. Activities begun in Phase I continue and expand. Insurgent control, both political and military, over territory and the populace intensifies.

The insurgents form a government of their own in insurgent-dominated areas as the military situation permits. In areas not yet controlled, insurgent forces make efforts to neutralize actual or potential opposition groups and to increase infiltration into existing government agencies. Intimidation through induced fear and threat of guerrilla action increases.

The insurgents' major military goal is to control additional areas; the government must then strain its resources to protect many areas at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie down government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroy LOC, and capture or destroy supplies and other government resources.

War of Movement Phase

Mass-oriented insurgency moves from phase II to phase III when it becomes primarily a conventional conflict between the organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government. However, some insurgences may be successful even before they reach this stage.

Activities conducted in Phases I and II continue and expand. Larger units fight government forces, attempting to capture key geographical and political objectives in order to defeat the enemy.

THE MAOIST EXAMPLE: THE PARTY

The Maoist and Marxist party organization illustrates how to achieve effective centralized direction of a mass-oriented insurgency. Analysis of this organization provides a basis for understanding mass-oriented insurgency.

The party focuses on eventual control over all three main elements of the organization: the core element, mass organizations, and armed elements. It begins with control of "liberation" committees that parallel the country's existing government at the local, subnational, and national levels. These committees interlock organizationally to ensure party control over their activities. The interrelationships of these elements may vary from one insurgency to another, but this interlocking arrangement, with its high degree of centralized control, usually emerges. (Figure D-3 illustrates the numerous elements of a party infrastructure.)

The Party Core

The cell is the basis of the mass-oriented insurgent party structure. A party member usually belongs to two or more cells-the local party cell and one or more functional cells such as those in schools, in factories, or in trade organizations. Parallel chains of command exist between the party structure and the various functional organizations. Party cells and functional cells often overlap.

Party groups normally control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Each party group, in turn, is responsible to a higher office, the interparty committee. This committee is responsible to its counterpart committee at the next higher political echelon. The chain of command within the overall party structure extends downward from the central committee at the national level through each interparty committee at the national, subnational, and local levels.

Although all authority stems from the cellular party organization, functional committees carry out the party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization for this purpose is the party executive committee, often called the party revolutionary committee. Such committees normally exist at national, subnational, and local levels. Functional cells perform their tasks under the direction of local committees. The secretariat of the central committee exercises control at the national level.

At each political level, the membership of the party core cellular organization intertwines with its counterpart revolutionary committee. All members of the revolutionary committee concurrently are party members and members of a party organization cell.

A youth organization is another structure which parallels the party as an indispensable affiliate. Its members engage in many insurgency activities and acquire experience in party work. This experience prepares them to enter the core of the organizational apparatus when they are eligible.

Mass Civil Organizations (Front Groups)

Image
Figure D-3. Party Infrastructure

Front groups are mass civil organizations and are the primary means used by the insurgents to achieve control and influence over the populace. The insurgents use these groups for intelligence, logistics, and recruiting requirements. Some of the individuals recruited may initially be unaware of the organization's true role.

There are three types of front groups: popular organizations, special interest groups, and local militia. Popular organizations are the most important of the mass civil organizations because they are large and organized on a countrywide scale. They have committees at the national, subnational, and local levels. Special interest groups focus on particular issues. They have a smaller range of interests than popular organizations. The local militia bridges two categories. It is a mass civil organization but is also somewhat military in nature. Its functions are listed in the next section.

Armed Elements

The local militia isolates the populace from government control. It is not normally in the military chain of command. It has three distinct paramilitary elements: the local guerrilla or self-defense force; the combat guerrilla unit; and the secret guerrilla unit.

The local guerrilla or self-defense force organizes, trains, and deploys to defend communities and to secure base areas. It is the local instrument for inflicting damage on the government and for gaining and maintaining population control. The combat guerrilla unit supports insurgent military forces. It also conducts independent small operations. The secret guerrilla unit enforces the will of the party in a given area. The great majority of its personnel are party members.

Insurgent military forces often fall into two classes: main forces and regional forces. The main force is a body of well-trained soldiers forming a highly motivated, elite fighting group. The main force is under national-level control and is deployable where needed. Personnel recruited directly from the mass civil organizations or promoted from the ranks of the local militia normally compose the regional force. This force generally confines its operations to its specific region, state, or province.

The military forces are only one of several instruments through which the party seeks to achieve power. Mass-oriented insurgency anticipates military reversals and the possible need to retrench, restructure, or temporarily disband should the opposing government's strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy assumes that as long as the party core and the mass civil organizations remain intact, the military forces can reactivate or rebuild. Without the party nucleus and mass civil organizations base, however, the movement cannot succeed.

COUNTERING THE MASS-ORIENTED INSURGENCY

A government may achieve significant success in countering an insurgency in any of its phases if it designs its strategy for a twofold mission: to prevent insurgent activities from escalating and, ultimately, to eliminate the insurgent threat. The ideal response is flexible and the government adjusts it to the intensity of insurgent activities and conditions within the country. The government tailors its activities to fit a situation. It monitors operations and continues only those that contribute to success.

The government should begin new programs to prevent the insurgency from recurring and continue ongoing programs that help improve conditions. The following is a brief outline for an integrated, government-wide response to a mass-oriented insurgency.

Phase I

Certain counterinsurgency activities are particularly important during the latent and incipient phase. They are-

• Government-wide developmental actions to improve political, economic, or social conditions
• Measures to strengthen the psychological and organizational links between government and populace
• Measures to control the insurgents' access to the populace and resources
• Military civic action. (See JCS Pub 1-02 definition)
• Action to improve police performance, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations
• Psychological operations
• Action to upgrade security forces
• Action to tram military forces

Phase II

The guerrilla warfare phase begins when the insurgent employs full-time organized forces in combat. It normally requires changes in emphasis in activities begun earlier and the introduction of other measures. These include-

• Strengthening territorial security forces
• Increasing PRC measures and PSYOP to isolate the insurgents physically and psychologically from the populace
• Conducting tactical operations to seek out and defeat insurgent armed elements

Phase III

Should the government fail to contain insurgency in earlier phases, it faces the danger of military defeat in the war of movement phase. The government must begin more comprehensive internal defense activities and administer them more strictly as it attempts to consolidate its support and defeat the insurgent forces. In phase III, combat may approach the levels of conventional warfare and will probably take priority over all other activities.
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:01 am

Part 1 of 2

APPENDIX E: A Guide to Counterinsurgency Operations

This appendix builds on the discussion of the counterinsurgency process outlined in Chapter 2. It develops strategies, policies, and programs, known collectively as the internal defense and development concept. The IDAD concept can help a government defeat an insurgency. It explains the concepts, objectives, and methods armed forces of an affected country can employ.

GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

A government facing the challenge of insurgency must reorder the organization of its society so as to eliminate the causes of conflict. The government must address two groups-the populace and the insurgents. These two target groups are the objects of the IDAD concept. The IDAD concept provides measures to mobilize the populace and ward off, destroy, isolate, or convert the insurgents.

The Populace

The populace will mobilize on behalf of the government when the people feel that its policies meet their needs and they are reasonably free of the threat of insurgent violence. Unless the people feel safe, they are cautious about supporting government programs. Their reluctance to do so may give the appearance that they do not care which side wins. The government must protect the people; then it must engage in balanced development to redress their social, political, and economic grievances. A government under attack normally does not have the resources to respond to all the needs of all the people at once. If it did, it would probably not be faced with an insurgent threat in the first place. The government must analyze the situation and establish priorities for programs for which it does have resources and which will tip the balance of mobilization in its favor. (A guide to counterinsurgency analysis is at Appendix C.)

Institutional development is a major way in which a government promotes social cohesion and popular mobilization. Institutional development is the process of creating mechanisms within a society that enable people to identify common goals and work together to achieve them. Institutional development involves people at the local level and links them to the national community. It promotes organizations and methods for the two-way communication essential to mobilizing popular support for national objectives. Institutional development integrates disparate groups around common social, political, and economic needs, establishing new structures where none existed. It strengthens existing institutions. It modifies or eliminates those that work against national unity.

The government, however, must be prepared for the adverse effects of institutional development. These will inevitably arise from changes in familiar ways of doing things. But these discontents, in the long nm, are less dangerous than maintaining the status quo. Government provides encouragement, leadership, and material and financial support to constructive institutions. Institutions enable the government to ascertain the needs of the people, to formulate development programs, and to evaluate their effect. They permit the government to exert influence and to be influenced.

The Insurgents

In order for the government to address the causes of insurgency through balanced development, it must also protect the people from insurgent violence and separate them from insurgent control. This requires rendering the insurgent leadership and organization ineffective by persuasion, prosecution, or destruction. Denied its infrastructure, the insurgent organization will lack direction and sources of personnel, materiel, and intelligence. The insurgent tactical forces will be cut off, forced to fight on the government's terms, and vulnerable to disintegration. Government police, paramilitary, and military forces provide security, eliminate the infrastructure, and destroy, disperse or capture insurgent combat and support units. Information programs support both development and combat operations. They explain and promote the government's programs and discredit the insurgents. They offer an inducement for individual insurgents to leave the movement.

THE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

The IDAD concept flows from the nature of insurgency, in which opposing forces-the insurgents and the government-compete for legitimacy by mobilizing support from the same pool of resources. The IDAD concept incorporates four mutually-supporting functions. The government should perform them using the four principles of implementation discussed in Chapter 2 as a guide. The four functions of IDAD are-

• Balanced development
• Security
• Neutrality
• Mobilization

Balanced development seeks improvement in the social, political, and economic well-being of all groups and classes of people.

Security protects the people from insurgent violence, separates them from insurgent control, and establishes the conditions in which development can occur.

Neutralization renders the insurgents' effort ineffective by preempting valid parts of their program, physically or psychologically separating insurgents from the people, converting their members, disrupting their organization, or capturing or killing them.

Mobilization develops human and materiel resources from within the country through programs which enlist the voluntary, active support of a plurality of politically active people and assure the acquiescence of the rest.

The four principles which guide the implementation of the IDAD concept are-

• Unity of effort
• Maximum use of intelligence
• Minimum use of violence
• Responsive government

Unity of effort ensures coordinated employment of all civil and military agencies and private organizations in mutually supportive actions to achieve a common goal.

The maximum use of intelligence calls for the identification of all issues around which the insurgents mobilize and to which groups respond. It also calls for identification of the insurgent leaders, infrastructure, and combat forces so the government can neutralize them with minimal harm to noncombatants and their property.

The government should employ the minimum amount of violence necessary in any given situation, and an emphasis on the denial of support to the insurgents by persuasion and preemption of issues. It also avoids the creation of new issues by unintentional injury of noncombatants or damage to their property.

Administrative efficiency and competence will lead to a responsive government, able to administer and bolster internal defense and development.

PLANNING

The national strategy guides all programs. Effective planning integrates all counterinsurgency programs, to the extent possible, into an overall plan. For example, programs to correct the causes of an insurgency should complement operations to defeat insurgent organizations.

Programs planned at the national level guide activities at regional, state, and local levels. Planning activities at the lower levels contribute to national plans and to the achievement of national objectives. Plans allow for integrated and area-oriented execution by civil and military agencies.

The government prepares a national plan to set forth objectives and broad, general guidance on priorities of effort, budget limitations, and resource allocation. The plan includes both short- and long-range goals.

The plan undergoes review and updating for relevance on a periodically scheduled basis. It includes detailed and comprehensive guidance for national-level planning. At the same time, it provides a foundation for planning at regional, state, and local levels. The various government departments and agencies whose resources and capabilities aid in implementing the national plan have supplemental plans to support it. These concern specific programs and describe how to Implement them. National plans must reflect realistic assessments of local conditions, resources, and the needs and desires of the people.

The bases for plans at all political subdivisions of a nation are national priorities, conditions in each area, and higher-level plans. Departments and agencies of government at each level assist in preparing the plan by developing programs and projects for their areas of responsibility.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGNS

Planners at the national and subnational level create campaigns for operations in support of the overall program. The campaigns encompass a given period of time, a designated area, and specific goals. They include one or more of the following objectives:

• To implement development programs
• To establish control in populated areas
• To neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and tactical forces
• To deny the use of insurgent bases
• To establish government strength and authority in selected areas.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Development plans identify social, economic, and other problems which are or may become political issues. The plans assess methods and resources available to alleviate the problems. They determine priorities and time-tables. They allocate resources-civilian and military, public and private. They create a synergistic combination of all national efforts, so that taken together, the result is greater than the sum of its important parts. They ensure that the security forces' defensive and development plans complement each other.

SECURITY FORCE PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Security forces include the regular armed forces, reserve and paramilitary forces, and the police. They coordinate their operations with each other and with the development efforts in which they participate. Security force planning seeks to achieve unity of effort and efficient use of all forces in support of the IDAD program. It includes an agenda for improving the capabilities of the forces. Later, planning emphasizes security for the population, neutralization of the insurgents, and balanced development.

Security forces conduct major operations within IDAD campaigns in support of national and subnational counterinsurgency plans. The principal types are consolidation operations and strikes.

Consolidation Operations

Consolidation operations are interdepartmental, civil-military efforts which integrate counterinsurgency activities to restore government control of an area and its people. They combine military action to destroy or drive out the insurgents with programs for social, political, and economic development. The government may conduct consolidation operations during any phase of an insurgency. But the operations are more likely to succeed if they begin when the insurgency is in its weak, early stages.

State-level authorities usually control consolidation operations. National, subnational, and other levels of government provide the resources for these operations. Consolidation operations first establish firm control of an operating base area. Then they expand outward to enlarge the area of government control. This requires seizing, and consolidating control over contested areas. The forces' objectives are to obtain and keep control of population centers, natural and man-made resources, and LOC.

Once the force has cleared an area of insurgent tactical forces, the government must maintain an adequate defense. The defensive mission shifts to police and paramilitary forces as the situation improves. But military units continue to provide security as long as a credible insurgent threat remains. Police and paramilitary action to neutralize the insurgents' infrastructure ensures that the area remains secure. Balanced development seeks to mobilize the people to the government side.

Consolidation campaigns have four overlapping stages:

• Preparation
• Offensive
• Development
• Completion

Preparation Stage

During the preparation stage, civil and military forces plan, train, organize, and equip for operations. Civilian and military planners must synchronize their efforts.

The bases for consolidation operation plans are national plan priority areas, available civilian and military resources and estimated capability to achieve objectives. Security force planning must ensure sufficient personnel and materiel for tactical, psychological, CA, PRC, and intelligence missions at the beginning of the consolidation operation, and throughout its execution. Forces allocated must be superior to the insurgent threat in the AO. Air power provides transportation and resupply and, where appropriate, tightly controlled close air support. Plans include C2 measures for effective use of all resources. The ACC coordinates all operations.

Participating organizations form a TF which may be subdivided into local TFs. All TFs are joint and interdepartmental; all TFs include civilian and military elements.

When possible, boundaries and phase lines include entire political subdivisions. The chief governmental official in whose area of responsibility consolidation operations occur normally controls the operations. Communications provide parallel, interlocking, and integrated networks for police, armed forces, paramilitary, intelligence, and internal development organizations. All personnel conducting consolidation operations require training before actual operations begin. Special emphasis should be given to the training of the lowest echelons of government personnel.

Offensive Stage

In the offensive stage the security force's first goal is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. After this, adequate government forces, including available police and paramilitary personnel, stay in the area to protect the population from remaining insurgent elements.

The offensive stage involves-

• Moving the TF into the operational area
• Destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces horn the area
• Locating and destroying elements of the insurgency's supporting base area system
• Identifying and apprehending members of the insurgency's political infrastructure

The selective use of combat power prevents unnecessary harm to the population. Nonselective application of combat power may produce effects which are counterproductive to the overall effort.

TFs can conduct offensive tactical operations with C2 exercised through the military chain of command. Tactical operations conducted by large forces destroy any large and well-trained insurgent units. The TFs employ ambushes, cordon and search, and other techniques in these operations.

Typically, despite the overall scale of the operation, the majority of the action should occur at the small-unit level. Thus, training should focus on small unit operations, small unit leadership and the control of such operations at the task force level. The task force makes maximum effective use of air power by assigning Air Force liaison parties to the lowest organizational level possible and making maximum use of forward air controllers.

The police and other security organizations use PRC measures to deprive the insurgent of support and to assist in identifying and locating members of his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their necessity. The government informs the population that, although its actions may cause inconvenience, the threat posed by the insurgents makes them necessary.

Intelligence agencies and police forces operate an intelligence-collection program. They conduct interrogations and loyalty screenings and collect information to help identify and locate members of the insurgent infrastructure.

Development Stage

During the development stage, civil and military forces take action-

• To eliminate remaining insurgent elements
• To establish firm government control
• To prevent the return of insurgents
• To ensure internal security
• To put developmental organizations into operation

Emphasis shifts from offensive action to national development. The armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect the secured areas established during the offensive stage. Small military elements can live among the population and work with local security forces. This permits other TF elements-the political, economic, social, and psychological action cadres-to conduct their activities effectively. Informational and psychological activities continuously motivate the population to support all governmental efforts.

Development activities and supporting military civic action demonstrate the government's concern for the population. Civic action projects should be simple, highly visible, and easily accomplished by the people with assistance from military resources. Air power can assist by supporting the establishment of efficient communications means with other government controlled sectors. These provide for the movement of goods and services to bolster institutional and infrastructure development. Security force activities include training local self-defense forces or other paramilitary forces to participate in territorial security and development programs. Ongoing offensive tactical operations eliminate the remaining insurgent elements and their supporting base areas. The defense of population centers, bases, installations, and LOC is also a continuing requirement.

Military forces conduct saturation patrolling over the entire area. They seek out the insurgent and block approaches into the controlled area. Military forces normally continue to conduct offensive tactical operations in nearby areas to relieve pressure on secured areas.

Police forces maintain law and order. They establish controls over the movement of personnel and supplies and guard critical food supplies and materiel during production and storage.

Completion Stage

The completion stage involves the speedup and expansion of development programs and the enhanced ability of local authorities to defend against insurgent attacks. The government begins efforts to return all responsibility for local government to local authorities. Task forces gradually release unneeded armed forces and development cadre elements.

As local administrators become proficient in performing administrative functions, outside cadres move on to other assignments with the TF. As the local police and local paramilitary force become effective and assume more security responsibilities, TF security elements withdraw and redeploy. They must take care, however, not to redeploy too soon. As a safety factor, if needed, a local reserve force and higher level reserves can assist. The government ensures that it has adequate resources to carry out ongoing programs before extending the area under its control.

Strike Operations

Strike operations consist of major combat operations in remote, contested, or insurgent-controlled zones. They contribute to security by disrupting and disorganizing the enemy and reducing his morale. Strike operations help set the stage for a consolidation operation in the area when conditions are right. The guiding principles of maximizing intelligence and minimizing violence help avoid counterproductive collateral damage in order to make a future transition to consolidation operations possible. The ACC coordinates strike operations (see Chapter 2).

Organization

When the authorities designate forces to conduct strike operations, they should relieve them of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of the operation. National, regional, or state-level authorities normally control strike forces. Strike forces organize as self-sufficient TFs able to operate for extended periods of time in areas remote from home bases. Strike forces contain Intelligence, PSYOP, CA, police, and paramilitary elements as well as combat forces.

Operations

The strike force maneuvers to destroy identified insurgent forces. Since the insurgents may hide their weapons and assume noncombatant guises in attempts to avoid capture, the strike force must make a thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. The strike force must treat captured suspects fairly, and in accordance with recognized laws to avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers.

When small units conducting reconnaissance operations sight relatively large insurgent tactical forces, they maintain surveillance and quickly deploy reaction forces to destroy them. In areas suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, reaction forces conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and follow with an immediate attack or raid when sufficient information has been developed on the target. Good communications and mobility are essential for success in these operations.

Offensive ground operations include movements to contact, raids, hasty or deliberate attacks, and exploitations and pursuit. CS and CSS operations can ensure responsiveness to operational requirements. Operations outside the support range of fixed CSS installations may require that these elements be attached or assigned directly from field depots and tactical bases. The TF commander and the appropriate headquarters coordinate these activities.

A hasty attack or raid can immediately follow air and ground reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional intelligence. Ground reconnaissance emphasizes the thorough reconnoitering of an area; operations are continuous, decentralized and conducted by small units. If they find a sizable insurgent force, friendly air and ground elements maintain contact until reaction forces can assist in its destruction.

EFFECTS OF SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

This section addresses operations in remote, urban, and border areas. It stresses the unique operational requirements of each environment.

Remote Area Operations

Counterinsurgency forces conduct remote area operations to establish a government presence in a contested or insurgent-controlled area. Such a presence can delay or disrupt insurgent operations, especially mobilization efforts. Remote area operations can also be a source of valuable intelligence concerning future insurgent operations. Small, light, irregular combat forces normally conduct these operations backed by a highly mobile reserve. They attempt to mobilize ethnic, religious, or other isolated minorities to support the government. Aerial resupply and close air support reaction forces must help sustain remote area operations. Remote area operations may lead to strike or consolidation operations.

Urban Area Operations

Operations in an urban environment require different emphases and techniques than those in rural areas. Population density and other characteristics of the area influence both insurgent and government operations. Local police may require military forces to reinforce them in controlling insurgent-provoked riots and disorders. Combat may be necessary if the insurgents take direct action to seize urban areas or their critical installations.

Principles

Use of the minimum essential force to minimize the loss of life and destruction to property is vital. This requires detailed planning, coordination, and control.

Covert insurgent activity can be extensive in urban areas. The government must emphasize intelligence and police operations to counter the insurgents' clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and terrorist activities.

Operations in urban areas may be part of a counterinsurgency consolidation plan. Urban areas require continuing counterinsurgency effort whether or not they are included in a specific operation. Counterinsurgency planning should include the military forces' participation in urban area operations during all phases of an insurgency. Military forces need preparation to assist national security and law enforcement agencies as the situation dictates.

Environment

Urban areas need more governmental services than rural areas, and require more, and possibly larger, government organizations. Commanders should consider the activities and capabilities of all government agencies in planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.

A subversive element intent on destroying the government may strain the capabilities of local authorities. Insurgents make attempts to exploit local civilian organizations by subverting their goals and objectives, thus placing them in opposition to the government. Intimidation activities and PSYOP take place along with covert insurgent organizational, intelligence, and logistical operations. Police, internal security, and other government organizations are high priority targets for the insurgents.

Operations

Operations require careful planning and coordination-particularly those which involve the use of force. Military forces should set up communications with police and other agencies involved in the operations. They collect and keep available detailed information on important installations. This should include detailed city plans, maps of subterranean construction, and descriptions of the locations of important installations. Personnel in the field check the data for accuracy. Data on counterinsurgency activities and the insurgent situation must be accurate and current to be useful in operations planning.

Populace and resources control is important in urban area operations. The best use of PRC comes before the insurgent has the capability for armed conflict. Police intelligence operations support PRC programs. Criminal acts such as robberies, kidnapings, terrorism, and extortion may accompany insurgent PSYOP or money-raising activities. Careful records and surveillance keep officials aware of government and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Intelligence operations should also target locations and types of materiel production, collection, and storage activities that may form part of the insurgent's logistical system. Friendly PSYOP explain and justify necessary restrictive measures; for example, rationing, curfews, searches, and setting up checkpoints and restricted areas. Urban PRC operations require military support if other security forces cannot handle insurgent activity.

Government forces may stage tactical operations inside or near an urban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgent attempt to seize and hold an urban area will spark operations in nearby areas as well. When the police and other internal security forces can cope with the attack inside the urban area, military forces can best participate by establishing security around the urban area and by denying the insurgents reinforcement or support. When military forces reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area, operations must be closely controlled and coordinated. Military forces should withdraw as soon as police forces can handle the situation.

The concentration of mass media in urban areas and the size and composition of the target audience increase the importance of PSYOP. The government must seek and win the support of the major opinion makers. These include community leaders whose support of the counterinsurgency effort will increase its chance of success: news editors, radio and television personalities, heads of religious groups, and educators. The government must maintain a favorable image. for its forces when they operate in urban areas. Authorities should swiftly punish misconduct by security forces and let the civilian population know about it.

The military may need to support CA operations in urban areas. Plans to assist civilians in case of an insurgent armed attack are essential. This assistance may include-

• Providing rescue, evacuation, and medical care
• Performing recovery and disposition of the dead
• Handling refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons
• Providing prepared food and shelter
• Issuing food, water, and essential supplies and materiel
• Restoring utilities
• Clearing debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail systems, and shelters
• Assessing damage

Border Area Operations

Border area operations prevent infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. They can provide valuable intelligence concerning patterns of insurgent operations, status of insurgent forces and future insurgent activity. Armed forces may have to help other nonmilitary forces with border security, immigration, customs, analysis of intelligence, and internal security operations.

Tasks

Tasks that may help forces prevent infiltration include --

• Security operations in populated areas
• Intelligence and counterintelligence operations
• Operation of authorized points of entry
• Refugee control
• Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions
• PSYOP
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
• Attacks against insurgent forces
• Destruction of insurgent base areas

Barrier and denial operations

Early in an insurgency, border operations are normally a function of police, customs, and other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces assist these organizations, particularly in remote areas. Later, denial of external support to the insurgency leads to combat-type border operations. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved.

Barrier and denial operations occur only after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, the infiltrator's probable targets, and his methods of operation. Physically sealing the border may not be possible; it could require the commitment of more government forces and materiel than national resources permit.

The government classifies border crossing points according to importance because it may be impossible to guard or barricade every one. Natural barriers are preferred because they save resources. Using patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increases the effectiveness of natural barriers. Border police and guards form the nucleus of national border forces. Paramilitary and regular armed forces may support them, or take direct responsibility for portions of the international border.

Leaders at the national level plan, direct, and supervise border operations. Subnational and other area commanders may receive the authority to conduct these operations. Commanders should tailor border TFs to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They should contain sufficient CS and CSS elements to support operations for extended periods.

Border units normally use operational bases that require airpower, communications, engineer, and fire support assistance. The units can establish restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones as needed.

A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Authorities normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities give public notice that they will regard all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.

A friendly population buffer zone is an area in which civilians living in the AO are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. The government relocates all persons whose loyalty it cannot establish. The government may use this operation to establish information nets and employ loyal citizens in self-defense border units. The operation denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.

The creation of restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones requires relocating many persons. These operations need careful planning. Although armed forces may assist them, civilian authorities normally plan and carry out a relocation program, holding forced relocation to a minimum. The authorities must employ a continuing PSYOP effort to maintain the morale and loyalty of the population.

Continuous and detailed surveillance can determine--

• Infiltration and exfiltration routes and support sites
• Frequency and volume of traffic
• Type of transportation
• Number and type of personnel
• Amount and type of materiel
• Terrain and traffic conditions
• Probable locations of base areas and sanctuaries

Authorities may use air and ground reconnaissance, as well as unattended ground sensors, in surveillance efforts.

Surveillance and control of coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground, air, and sea power. Strategically located observation posts and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft greatly assist this effort.

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Authorities employ security forces to conduct the types of campaigns and operations described in the preceding paragraphs. But certain military functional areas are also very important. They require adaptation in their conduct and special consideration in planning. Commanders must design the following operations so that they are adaptable to changing circumstances or environments:

• Intelligence
• Logistics
• Civil military operations
• Psychological operations
• Civil affairs
• Health services support
• Public affairs and information
• Tactical operations
• Deceptions
• Populace and resources control
• Command, control, and communications

In addition, a friendly foreign country, such as the United States, can provide security assistance, including advice. The supported and supporting countries must work together to integrate this help into the host nation's overall plans. To do otherwise risks degrading the legitimacy of the government fighting the insurgency, and is self-defeating. The following discussion concerns the host nation's forces, but its principles apply equally to US forces providing materiel, and advisory and training assistance.
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:02 am

Part 2 of 2

Intelligence

The challenge insurgency poses to the intelligence community is wider in scope than other types of conflict. Intelligence agencies must monitor an enemy who may not yet be conducting continuous or even frequent operations. He also may not have organized his forces into easily observable military formations. Counterinsurgency forces need detailed economic, political, cultural, geographic, and law enforcement information. Military intelligence organizations may have to collect, evaluate, and disseminate these types of intelligence products, along with more conventional intelligence reports concerning insurgent combat forces. As part of the total national effort, well-coordinated military intelligence operations must begin as early as possible. Intelligence operations aim to identity the insurgent infrastructure and aid in development of the national !DAD program. National leaders must assign a high priority to them.

Intelligence supports counterinsurgency planning and operations by providing both general and specific knowledge of the AO and the insurgent forces. Early intelligence objectives should already have been met in general terms. These early objectives are-

• To identity the indicators of impending insurgency, and respond with appropriate action
• To obtain information about the insurgents, weather, terrain, and populace
• To reduce insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage to a minimum

Subversion is an early indicator of the presence of an insurgent organization. It precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire effort. Subversion alienates the population from the government.

Basic Intelligence

Basic intelligence on a specific area and situation comes from strategic reports and studies augmented by available current intelligence. Effective intelligence operations require a study of the internal and external forces subverting a society; they are the basis for the government's counterinsurgency plans, estimates, and training. Intelligence collection planning has three general areas:

• Strategic intelligence
• Assessment of the insurgent infrastructure and exploitation of it for additional information
• All-source intelligence collection, threat intelligence, and area information

Strategic intelligence exposes actual or potential insurgency problems. It uses political, economic, and sociocultural information. Leaders use strategic intelligence to develop national and regional plans and programs (including support operations) as well as specific military counterinsurgency operations.

Assessment and exploitation of the insurgent infrastructure includes studying its mass civil organizations, and its C3, recruiting, and logistics systems. These insurgent efforts involve covert and overt activity and require significant numbers of people to carry them out. Intelligence collection efforts targeted against these activities can lead to early detection and identification of key members of the infrastructure.

All-source intelligence collection, threat assessment, and area information on terrain, weather, and manmade features provide operational and tactical-level commanders the information necessary for military action.

A unified, centralized all-source intelligence system is especially important to the effective conduct of counterinsurgency operations. It should exist at all government centers at and below the national level for proper coordination of intelligence efforts. This intelligence system should-

• Operate throughout the nation
• Maintain a central registry of information
• Maintain a centralized system of source control
• Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence programs
• Provide direction, collection, processing, and dissemination for the intelligence effort
• Prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates
• Conduct covert operations as directed

When insurgent groups form, intelligence agencies should identify them and make recommendations for future surveillance or neutralization operations. The value of good human intelligence (HUMINT) and police intelligence operations cannot be overstated.

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence operations include the following activities:

• Formulating and conducting training programs
• Carrying out measures necessary to protect national security information, personnel, facilities, and materiel against insurgent intelligence operations
• Passive security measures; for example, document registry, use of secure means of communication, and noise and light discipline
• Active measures; for example, continuous tactical patrols designed to overburden the insurgent's intelligence network, establishment of defensive sources, and coordination of tactical agent operations

Production

Accurate and timely intelligence satisfies requirements at each operational echelon. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must provide several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities requires careful analysis.

Dissemination

Timely dissemination of intelligence is essential. The need to react immediately to intelligence information requires quick establishment of systems to process and transmit information to units at operational levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should exist when facilities and resources permit.

Security

All personnel use every available means to protect security information. They entrust such information only to persons with appropriate security clearances who require it to accomplish their official duties. Authorities closely supervise and observe cleared personnel as the latter may encounter insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure.

Planning

The intelligence portion of the military annex to counterinsurgency plans identifies all available assets. It furnishes the guidance necessary to collect, process, and disseminate information concerning the insurgent, the weather, the terrain, and the population. It provides guidance for counterintelligence activities to minimize insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. It includes intelligence information for PSYOP, CA, and communications security monitoring and support.

Logistics

In counterinsurgency operations, traditional concepts of logistics require modification. In these operations, logistics often playa leading role in nation building. CS and CSS units greatly bolster humanitarian, CA, and PSYOP programs. CS and CSS forces can have a decisive psychological impact in building legitimacy by providing supplies and services for nation building. This in itself can help alleviate the causes of insurgency. Indeed, combat forces may perform security operations in a supporting role to the logistical efforts that is, to make an environment available for development. Logistics elements may precede combat units into the AO or may be the only forces to deploy.

However, the logistics base for counterinsurgency is often inadequate. Therefore, the government may seek assistance from an external power. US or other foreign elements providing logistical support must be aware of its possible impact on the country's resources. Their purchase or other use of local supplies, services, and facilities may impose an excessive burden on the host nation. Planners must consider this risk. US elements should rely on locally contracted support only when US forces can use it without detriment to the host nation.

Simplicity is an essential ingredient of logistics support; it allows the flexibility needed for effective support under adverse conditions. A streamlined logistics chain should permit units in the field to requisition supplies, directly from the depot, bypassing intermediate echelons.

Operations typically may have to rely on relatively unskilled manpower, and will often lack automated data processing support. Logisticians should design or modify provisions so that they are workable.

Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations are political, economic, social and psychological activities to support-

• Operations affecting the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and the population
• The development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral., friendly, or hostile groups

Two major CMO functions are CA and PSYOP. Counterinsurgency operations call for close and continuous coordination of these functions.

Psychological Operations

Both the government and the insurgent use informational instruments, including PSYOP, to mobilize the people. Informational activities target not only enemy or foreign groups, but also populations internal to the nation. PSYOP activities are integral to counterinsurgency. Planners tailor PSYOP to meet specific requirements for each area and operation. They consider all courses of action in terms of their psychological impact. This requires them to sacrifice short-range tactical advantages to preserve long-range psychological objectives.

Objective

Psychological operations support the achievement of national objectives and target specific groups. The PSYOP objectives for the main target groups are as follows:

• Insurgents- to create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the government's side
• Civilian population-to gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the government and its counterinsurgency programs
• Military forces-to gain, preserve, or strengthen military support with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating insurgency
• Neutral elements-to gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside of the threatened nation by revealing the insurgency's subversive activities. Also important is bringing international pressure to bear on any hostile power sponsoring the insurgency
• External hostile powers-to convince the hostile power supporting the insurgents that the insurgency will fail

National Program

The national PSYOP program contains national objectives, plans, guidance, and desired approaches. Planners prepare and coordinate an informational program at the national level. A single agency should be responsible for coordinating these efforts to avoid conflicting themes and programs.

Agencies at all levels base their PSYOP on the national plan, interpreting them in terms of local requirements, and coordinating them through appropriate ACCS. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all informational activities depend on clearly established channels.

Civilian and Military Organizations

PSYOP organizations conduct and support informational activities at the national level and at the subnational and local levels.

A single agency at the national level-

• Plans a coordinated national PSYOP program
• Organizes, trains, and allocates PSYOP units and resources
• Conducts strategic PSYOP
• Develops program effectiveness criteria
• Monitors the PSYOP program
• Produces, analyzes, and disseminates PSYOP intelligence
• Provides an analysis of specific target groups

At the subnational level, the ACC translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for local ACCS and all government agencies. At the local level, the ACC provides direction to area agencies, forces, and PSYOP teams. Paramilitary organizations normally do not have their own PSYOP teams. Civilian or armed forces organizations provide PSYOP support.

Judgments about the behavior of military forces are a major factor in the formation of popular attitudes toward the government. Commanders should be aware of the psychological effects of operations and of the behavior of their troops during operations. The success of an operation depends on the commander's awareness of the psychological and political implications of his unit's actions.

Planning

An effective PSYOP plan depends on information and includes-

• Knowledge of the history, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential target groups
• Knowledge of the insurgency's organizations, motivation, and sources of men and materiel and how they are obtained
• Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political opponents
• Unity of effort in support of national objectives

The annex to the military plan prescribes the required PSYOP missions, objectives, roles, and resources. It categorizes the target audience and prescribes the themes. It bases military PSYOP on the national informational plan and objectives.

Themes

The unity of effort required in the counterinsurgency environment dictates that PSYOP staffs at subnational and national levels regularly monitor locally developed PSYOP material. They may delegate authority to approve specific PSYOP messages, based on approved themes, to local-level PSYOP personnel with a knowledge of distinctive local target groups. This should enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the PSYOP program with the local groups.

The PSYOP themes support current operations and campaigns. The PSYOP themes supporting operations in remote areas, for example, maintain the morale of government forces and win the support of the local population. Those supporting PRC operations stress the need and benefits of law enforcement. They emphasize that the insurgents are the cause of restrictions on freedom such as curfews and identification cards. Themes that support consolidation operations stress the security and benefits that the people have and can gain if they lend their support. Themes supporting strike operations emphasize the need for the operations and the government's efforts to provide for the safety of the civilian population.

Overall themes directed against the insurgent forces stress the futility of fighting, the importance of family ties, and the acceptability of amnesty programs. Planning should carefully coordinate PSYOP with tactical operations to avoid losing the element of surprise and to maximize the effectiveness of tactical operations.

Civil Affairs

Civil affairs include any activity concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. They are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. In addition to helping the commander meet his legal and moral obligations, CA operations provide assistance to civil authorities and help to organize and motivate the people. to support counterinsurgency projects. Activities may range from military civic action projects to the exercise of authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

Scope

The scope of CA operations varies with the type of local government and reflects the economic, social, and political background of the country and people. The CA effort is the linchpin of the military role in national development. Military CA personnel coordinate efforts of PSYOP, engineer, medical, logistics, military police, and administrative elements.

The CA effort is closely coordinated with, and in direct support of, civilian efforts. It supplements the civilian effort with activities such as construction in remote areas and extension of LOC. Engineer, signal, medical, and logistics units can often directly contribute to the development process and increase the country's military capability in remote or insecure areas where commercial firms are unable to operate. CA coordinates the military role in development, and prevents civilian interference with military operations. It also coordinates all other civil-military affairs such as community relations, routine military civic action projects, PRC, and civil defense.

Objectives

The overall objective of CA in counterinsurgency is to mobilize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. Successful CA operations eliminate or reduce military, political, economic, and sociological problems. The objective of CA is to restore stability, contribute to national development, and promote support for the government. Close and continuous PSYOP support maximizes the effect of CA.

Organization

Regardless of service affiliation, all military units have a capability to conduct CA, particularly military civic action. The CA projects range from an individual act to the use of substantial forces and equipment for large-scale development projects on behalf of an entire community or country. They address the fundamental needs of the nation and its people and support the national development plan. Engineer, transportation, medical, signal, and other units frequently undertake roles in such actions. Military civic action used as part of the total government effort to attack the causes of discontent contributes significantly to the prevention of an insurgency, or its defeat.

Units of all sizes may be assigned CA elements and a CMO staff officer to assist in carrying out CA plans. Organizations or staff elements specifically designed for CA liaison and coordination establish and maintain contact between military forces and government agencies.

Operations

Civil affairs operations require good relationships with the population. To establish a good relationship, military discipline, courtesy, and honesty in dealing with the people are absolutely vital. If they are not enforced, the counterinsurgency will likely fail. When sound rapport has been established between the armed forces and the population, properly administered CA operations contribute materially to the attainment of IDAD objectives.

Planning for CA includes political, economic, social, psychological, and military considerations. Comprehensive CA planning considers-

• The national development plan to support programs that meet the needs and desires of the people
• Civic action projects conducted by military forces
• Personnel and units required to support host nation agencies at subnational levels
• Training program requirements for national and allied forces
• Requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country which need it

A unit commander may require specialized CA personnel or units to execute his civil affairs responsibilities. CA plans include provisions for support to tactical unit commanders.

Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgent activities. Whatever the level of military civic action, planners must design and coordinate projects to fit in with internal development programs. In the prevention of insurgency or in its very early phases, military civic action concentrates on social and economic development. When they are not involved in tactical operations, many military resources support military civic action projects providing both long- and short-range benefits.

During later phases of the insurgency, military civic action concentrates on projects that prevent the insurgency from greater expansion. These are projects which can produce noticeable improvements in a relatively short time.

Examples of such projects are-

• Farm-to-market roads
• Bridges
• Short-range educational programs
• Basic hygiene
• Medical immunization programs
• Simple irrigation projects

Projects must conform to the national plan, and fit the development program for the area. Direct local beneficiaries of the project should have a voice in the selection of projects and establishment of priorities.

Health Services Support

Military medicine is perhaps the least controversial and most cost-effective means of using military forces in support of national development. Medical teams can enter the affected area to remove some important causes of discontent even before the situation degenerates into open conflict.

Medical services appropriate to a counterinsurgency effort include-

• Public health and preventive medicine-hygiene, immunization, and training in nutrition, safety, child care, home remedies, and paramedical skills
• Diagnosis and treatment of trauma and disease
• Provision of medical supplies, prostheses, and eye glasses
• Provision of continuing education for civilian doctors, nurses, and technicians.
• Consultation with local medical personnel

Counterinsurgency may require a new or expanded role for military medical personnel, especially in upgrading local civilian skills and facilities. These make a major contribution to the national development effort, CA, PSYOP, and collection of medical intelligence.

Public Affairs and Information

Leaders and advisors in a government facing the challenge of insurgency must understand the role and functions of the news media. The images and information which the news media present influence public opinion. Involved parties regularly try to exploit the news to gain public support.

Counterinsurgency operations are, by nature, political. For this reason, they attract media interest. The closeness of news reporters to combat and the near-real-time broadcast of events can readily focus public attention and affect opinion on specific issues. At the same time, reporters can be a source of intelligence for belligerents. A coordinated PA program can attract popular support, bolstering a cause while reducing collusion with opponents. The PA program must serve the information policies of the nation, including maximum disclosure within security limitations. At the same time, the program must remain credible and not become either a real or perceived propaganda tool.

A mutual respect between PA officials and the news media can ensure that security restrictions on release of information about military operations are understood and followed. Establishing a joint or combined press bureau is the best approach to support this goal. Provisions for such a bureau and other PA efforts should be included in all aspects of counterinsurgency planning.

Tactical Operations

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all activities employed in counterinsurgency; military forces normally carry them out. Paramilitary, police, or other internal security forces also may participate in tactical operations. Operations may emanate from remote base. These may be permanent or semi-permanent installations and must contain essential C3, CS, and CSS elements. Operations cannot be ends unto themselves. They must support the overall goals of the counterinsurgency effort.

Objectives

Tactical operations destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment in which to carry out balanced development programs. They are part of an approved campaign, coordinated with other operations through the ACCs.

Organization

Organization for tactical operations emphasizes appropriate firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate CS and CSS elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Tactical forces must have CA and PSYOP capabilities.

Operations

Tactical operations generally include-

• Ambushes
• Raids
• Movements to contact
• Hasty or deliberate attacks
• Exploitation and pursuit
• Defense of key installations

Small units operating in dispersed areas are the norm in counterguerrilla operations. If they encounter large-sized insurgent units, additional combat power deploys to the area to destroy them.

A mobile warfare threat by insurgents demands modified tactics. This condition requires massed artillery fire and maintenance of larger reserves, operating units, and security and defense detachments. In mobile warfare, use of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are critical in seizing and holding the initiative. Commanders should not expect envelopments, penetrations, or turning movements to affect insurgent forces in the same way they would If occupation of terrain were the key consideration.

Insurgent tactical units locate caches and safe havens in several areas so that they need not depend on, or protect, a single critical logistical base. Thus, they can disperse units and move in several directions ill reaction to an offensive maneuver.

The insurgent's use of logistics highlights one of the key differences between counterinsurgency military operations and those in conventional war. The insurgent gets the majority of his logistical support from the population, as a result of his mobilization efforts. Thus, when he is successful, he advances toward his source of support; as he advances, he shortens his LOC rather than extends them as is normally the case. It is better for the counterinsurgent to mobilize the people against the insurgent than to try to deny him logistical support by coercive means. This is because the insurgent's LOC are not supply routes in the literal sense. It is the friendly political environment which enables him to draw logistical support directly from the people.

Commanders must maintain continuous pressure against insurgent forces; they cannot consider insurgent forces destroyed merely because active opposition has ceased. Merely by surviving, the insurgent has accomplished one of his aims; time is a critical element in planning counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgent forces should not permit the insurgents time to rest, reorganize, and prepare for offensive operations.

Successfully countering an insurgency requires patience, determination, and an offensive spirit tempered with discretion. The insurgency may retreat into quiescence only to come back strongly when the opportunity arises. Therefore, the government must persist in its defense and development efforts. Counterinsurgent tactical operations focus on denying the insurgents access to the population. They also stress the security of installations critical to mission accomplishment or overall objectives.

Offensive tactical operations destroy or disrupt the operations of organized insurgent forces. These actions require a force conditioned to operate in different environments and trained to operate in dispersed independent formations. By taking the offensive and operating in the insurgent's own environment, the opposing commander denies him the ability to train and sustain his force. Night operations restrict the insurgent's freedom of action, denying him the initiative and agility gained by operating under the cloak of darkness.

When confronting an enemy using guerrilla tactics, the commander must seize the initiative and deprive the enemy of any local advantages gained. The activities of the insurgent force will fluctuate between the use of organized forces and ambushes by small forces to acts of terrorism. Commanders must be adaptable enough to recognize these changes in operations.

Defensive tactical operations normally are coordinated military and civilian programs. They are designed to--

• Protect installations, bases, and the population
• Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action
• Deny the insurgent entry into an area
• Destroy or trap the insurgent force
• Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action
• Economize forces in one area so that decisive force can be applied elsewhere.

Retrograde operations preserve the integrity of a force. They also--

• Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation
• Permit the use of the force elsewhere
• Avoid combat under undesirable conditions
• Gain time without fighting a decisive engagement
• Disengage from combat
• Relocate forces in relation to other friendly forces
• Shorten LOC

Deceptions

Deceptions should be part of the normal staff planning processes for counterinsurgency operations; as such, they require attention well in advance of force deployment. Deception is an art whose success depends on a proper mix of the following ingredients:

• An objective assessment of the extent to which police, security, and paramilitary and military forces are conscious of operations security
• Political proscriptions or prescriptions concerning the use of deception (for example, who can and cannot be targets; what stories and objectives are acceptable or unacceptable). Centralized control is vital
• The imaginative thinking of planners throughout the counterinsurgency
• An assessment of whether the use of deception provides a potential operational payoff and achieves the military objective
• The accuracy and completeness of the intelligence data base on the insurgent intelligence collection system, decision cycle, and troop control processes

Objectives

Deception operations provide an advantage to the commander by misleading the enemy or concealing from him-

• The size of the force (in terms of manpower and equipment)
• The force's mission
• The force's location
• The time of the operation
• The force's morale, state of readiness, and leadership
• The status of equipment
• The commander's intent and style

Organization

All military units can conduct deception operations. Deceptions range from individual actions to elaborate schemes with many events. They involve organic resources or deception-specific organizations.

Planners at the national level thoroughly coordinate and monitor strategic deception operations. The ACCS can plan independent deception operations. They can also plan for the execution of parts of national deception plans.

Operations

Regardless of the planning level, deception operations support attacks against the insurgents' center of gravity-the insurgent-population relationship. Deception efforts should focus on weaknesses and internal divisions in the various insurgent operations.

Principles

The following principles are fundamental in planning deceptions:

• Planners may assign deceptive tasks to lower organizational levels with or without revealing the deceptive intent of the tasks. If deceptive intent is revealed, coordination is mandatory
• Deception plans must be comprehensive to minimize unwanted side effects, self-deception, and other negative impacts on the counterinsurgency program
• Operations should target the insurgent decision-making apparatus. They should consider the influence of sponsoring, or surrogate, third-party powers on the insurgency
• Operations should normally last for relatively long periods of time, particularly at the strategic level

Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control operations consist of measures to deny support and assistance to the insurgents by controlling the movement of people, information, and goods. They are an important method in counterinsurgency, but they have a high potential for harm if they are used excessively or incorrectly. Ideally, the police should conduct PRC operations with the armed forces providing support. If it is necessary to use military units in PRC, they should receive police training and police personnel should accompany them.

PRC measures can include-

• Suspension of hubeas corpus
• Curfews and blackout
• Travel restrictions
• Excluded or limited access areas
• Registration and pass systems
• Declaration that selected items or quantities of items, such as weapons, food, and fuel, are contraband
• Licensing, rationing, and price controls
• Checkpoints, searches, and surveillance
• Censorship

Among the products of the above measures is a wealth of statistical data which is valuable input to the intelligence process. Any plan for imposition of PRC measures should include measures for the use of this information. Otherwise a major benefit of these measures will be lost. By themselves, PRC measures cannot be decisive in counterinsurgency. The intelligence they can generate, on the other hand, can be.

These measures all impose a burden on the people, who will resent them unless they believe they are necessary and prudent. PRC must be limited to the least restrictive measures which will accomplish the purpose. The government uses PSYOP to explain and justify PRC, making it clear that the operations are necessary because of the insurgents' actions. The government should use the information generated by PRC to improve the security of the population. In this way, the people may see the benefits of the measures and accept them more readily. Enforcement must be consistent and impartial. Above all, the government should lift these restrictions as soon as the situation permits.

Command, Control, and Communications

Coherent, integrated C3 is essential to the success of counterinsurgency. The complex character of counterinsurgency poses a challenge to policy makers. The nature of the counterinsurgency threat calls for effective civil-military C3 mechanisms to implement national policy from the strategic to the tactical level.

Political constraints and stringent rules of engagement are the norm for military involvement in counterinsurgency. A commander rarely commits forces from a single service. Thus, he should establish a clearly understood chain of command to ensure unity of effort and economy of force.

C3 must also support objectives which are not wholly military. Traditional military operations usually are not designed for counterinsurgency with Its inherent problems of integrating civilian and military actions. C3 planning for counterinsurgency requires interoperability and coordination among all services, agencies, and allies involved in the operation.
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:05 am

APPENDIX F: How to Prepare an Area Handbook for Peacekeeping Operations

This appendix provides an outline as guidance for the preparation of an area handbook for peacekeeping operations. The headquarters deploying as the US contingent to a peacekeeping operation prepares this pocket-sized handbook. The book contains information on the peacekeeping organization, the history and culture of the people, the terrain, the weather, and the local armed forces. Its graphics portray the insignia, markings, and identifying characteristics of armed forces, military weapons, and equipment. Each member of the peacekeeping force should receive a copy of the handbook.

SAMPLE OUTLINE


The area handbook should contain sections or parts describing-

• Rules of engagement
• The AO, including maps and descriptions of the topography
• Organization of the peacekeeping forces, their location, and terrain features
• General climatic data and the estimated effects of weather and terrain on operations
• Descriptions of the armed forces engaged in the conflict, including
o Size and organization
o Uniforms with rank and branch insignia
o Weapons and equipment characteristics and markings
o Culture and customs including interpretation and significance of possible offending gestures and body language
o Common and frequently used phrases and words
• Descriptions of each of the national contingents providing peacekeeping forces, with the same type of information provided on forces engaged in the conflict
• Location and markings of known minefield, areas suspected of having unmarked minefields, and descriptions and safety precautions concerning mines which may be found in the area
• Operational security, including physical security against terrorist attacks, document security, communications security, and personnel security
• Training requirements
• Pictures and sketches of vehicles and aircraft
• Local environmental hazards such as poisonous plants, dangerous animals, diseases, or heat
• First aid references and medical evacuation procedures
• Flags or symbols of forces engaged in the conflict
• Status of forces' agreements and pertinent host nation laws (for example, laws concerning drug trafficking)
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:14 am

Glossary

ACC area coordination center
AECA Arms Export Control Act
AFM Air Force manual
AFP Air Force pamphlet
AFR Air Force regulation
AIASA Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance procedures
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AR Army regulation
AT antiterrorism
AWACS airborne warning and control system
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
CA civil affairs
CDR consolidated data report
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC Commander-in-Chief
CMO civil-military operations
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CT counterterrorism
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
DOD Department of Defense P
DOJ Department of Justice
DSAA Defense Security Assistance Agency
ESF Economic Support Fund
ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FC US Army field circular
FMLN Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FID foreign internal defense
FIDAF foreign internal defense augmentation force
FM US Army field manual
FMF foreign military financing
FMS foreign military sales
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance
HUMINT human intelligence
IDAD internal defense and development
IED improvised explosive device
IMET international military education and training
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IRA Irish Republican Army
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF joint task force
JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LIC low intensity conflict
LOC lines of communication
LOI letter of instruction
MAAG military assistance advisory group
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available
MTT mobile training team
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA National Command Authorities
NCO noncommissioned officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operations
NSC National Security Council
PA public affairs
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC populace and resources control
PSYOP psychological operations
ROE rules of engagement
SAO security assistance organization
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status of forces agreement
TAFT technical assistance field team
TAT technical assistance team
TC US Army training circular
TF task force
TOR terms of reference
TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIA United States Information Agency
USIS United States Information Service
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW unconventional warfare
WPR War Powers Resolution
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:23 am

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Airlift commander: The airlift commander coordinates and directs activities of the airlift control element during noncombatant evacuation operations. The airlift commander is responsible to the evacuation force commander, and coordinates all actions with the ground force commander and representatives of the US diplomatic mission in the affected area.

Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance: Report submitted by the US diplomatic mission which, in addition to an assessment of the host country's capabilities, contains recommended and projected levels of security assistance. Also called AIASA.

antiterrorism: See combatting terrorism.

area coordination center: See coordination center(s).

area coordination group: A composite organization, including representatives of local military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their US counterparts, responsible for planning and coordinating internal defense and development operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

border operations: Operations designed to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries.

campaign plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (JCS Pub 1-02)

civil affairs: Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called CA.

civil-military operations: Military efforts to support resistance auxiliary organization development. undermine government claims, gain support for an insurgent government, and attain national objectives without fighting. Civil-military operations are basic to any insurgency program. Successful civil-military operations increase civilian support to resistance organizations and improve US intelligence and logistical support to the resistance organization. Also called CMO.

civil war: A war between factions of the same country; there are five criteria for international recognition of this status: the contestants must control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military operations.

close air support: Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called CAS.

coercion: The attempt to enforce desired behavior on individuals, groups, or governments.

combatting terrorism: Actions, including anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called C2.

communications: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. (JCS Pub 1-02)

consolidation operations: An operation organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the state level, this operation integrates counterinsurgency programs designed to establish, maintain, or restore host nation governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the economic, political, and social activities of the populace can be pursued and improved.

coordination center(s): The established operational locations from which area coordination groups conduct their activities. There is a single national-level center, supported by a number of specifically designated subnational or "area" centers which generally correspond to the number of political or administrative jurisdictions within the country. See also area coordination group.

counter-drug operations: See drug interdiction.

counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JCS Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence: Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (JCS Pub 1-02)

countersubversion: That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent subversive activities through the identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting subversive activities. (JCS Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism: See combatting terrorism.

country team: The executive committee of an embassy, headed by the chief of mission, and consisting of the principal representatives of the government departments and agencies present (for example, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the USIA, USAID, DEA, and CIA.)

crisis: A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

crisis action procedures: Crisis action procedures define the process the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, services, and Department of Defense agencies use to develop timely recommendations and implement the decisions of the NCA concerning the deployment and employment of military forces. These procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of the crisis and progressing through the employment of US military forces.

deception: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JCS Pub 1-02)

deterrence: The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JCS Pub 1-02)

doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JCS Pub 1-02)

drug interdiction: Military or police action to prevent trafficking in illegal drugs; includes intelligence, surveillance, border patrol, inspections, raids, and other operations.

economic actions: The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power or to generate economic stability within a friendly power. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Economic Support Fund: Program by which economic assistance is provided on a loan or grant basis, to selected foreign governments having unique security problems. The funds are used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance in accordance with terms of a bilateral agreement; counterpart funds thereby generated may be used as budgetary support. These funds enable a recipient government to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes than it otherwise could do without Serious economic or political consequences. Also called ESF.

end state: The ultimate conditions resulting from a course of events.

foco: Foco (or Cuban model) insurgency is one in which a guerrilla band enters a rural area where it has never operated before with the hope of serving as an "insurrectional focus" for a larger rebellion.

force protection: A security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.

foreign assistance: Assistance ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. US assistance takes three forms-development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. See also internal defense. (JCS Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense augmentation force: A specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the commander of a unified command for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in limited and general war. Foreign internal defense augmentation force organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements. Also called FIDAF.

foreign military sales: That portion of US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and-Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called FMS.

guerrilla warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare. (JCS Pub 1-02)

hasty attack: In land operations, an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity. (JCS Pub 1-02)

host country: A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation and/or international agreement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

host nation: A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JCS Pub 1-02)

human intelligence: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUM INT. (JCS Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance: Assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property. Assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. (JCS Pub 3-05)

improvised explosive device: Those devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components. Also called IED. (JCS Pub 1-02)

indirect action: Military action in support of political, economic, and informational initiatives which are so dominant that they shape the form of the military action; military action through support of another party, such as security assistance to friendly foreign armed forces.

informational actions: Communication with a foreign government, its supporters, its opponents, and others to explain one's own policies and actions.

infrastructure: In an insurgency, the leadership organization and its system for command and control. In a broader sense, the systems of communications and the institutions which support the political and economic functions of a society.

insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

internal defense and development strategy: The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called the IDAD strategy.

international military education and training: Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intimidation: The attempt to prevent an unwanted action by individuals, groups, or governments by the use of threats or by other means.

lead agency concept: The assignment of primary responsibility for a class of activity to one agency of government with assistance provided by and to other agencies.

LIC imperatives: Prerequisites for the successful prosecution of low intensity conflict; political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. (JCS Pub 1-02)

low intensity conflict: Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications. Also called UC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

mandate: A commission, authorization, or charter of authority given to a person or organization to carry out specific responsibilities.

Marxist-Leninist ideology: A set of political beliefs generally based on the philosophy of Karl Marx, and V. I. Lenin, which relies on economic determinism to predict the inevitability of a revolution which will replace capitalism with rule by the proletariat (working class), and eliminate all private ownership of the means of production.

military assistance advisory group: A joint service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the secretary of defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. See also security armistice organization. (JCS Pub 1-02)

military civic action: The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace at all levels in fields such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JCS Pub 1-02)

mobile training team: One or more US personnel drawn from service resources and sent on temporary duty to a foreign nation to give instruction. The mission of the team is to provide, by training instructor personnel, a military service of the foreign nation with a self-training capability in a particular skill. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called MTT.

mobilization: The process of bringing people and things together and preparing them for action; to assemble, organize, make ready for duty, to meet either the requirements of a national emergency or war or more limited social goals. In an insurgency, mobilization produces organization, leadership, skilled workers, and fighters; it raises money and acquires weapons, equipment, and supplies of all kinds. Mobilization grows out of popular dissatisfaction with existing conditions and occurs because of the appeal of programs to ameliorate them.

National Command Authorities: The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (JCS Pub 1-02)

neutralize: To render a thing ineffective or unusable; to render a person or group politically and militarily ineffective or irrelevant, by persuasion or coercion.

operational categories: Groupings of methods of military operations in low intensity conflict, according to shared characteristics; they are: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.

paramilitary forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)
peacekeeping operations: Military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between the belligerents.

peacemaking operations: A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.

peacetime contingency operations: Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war.

players: Participants or active parties in a conflict.

political actions: Diplomacy; communication with a foreign government or group to persuade or compel it to support one's own policies, by means of argument, promises, and threats.

professional terrorists: Persons who earn their living by terrorism, with or without commitment to a political cause. They are frequently emotionally addicted to excitement, violence, and intrigue; ideology is not a dominating factor in their motivation.

propaganda: Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JCS Pub 1-02)

psychological operations: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP (JCS Pub 1-02)

raid: An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal on completion of the assigned mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)

remote area operations: Government operations undertaken in contested areas to establish host nation strongholds. These areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area operations may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population and in which insurgent forces have established training areas, rest areas, logistical facilities, or command posts. The remote area tactical force should be composed mainly of personnel indigenous to the operational area.

resistance movement: An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JCS Pub 1-02)

routine, peaceful competition: The condition of relations among states in which each seeks to protect and advance its interests by political, economic, and informational means without employing violence.

security assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)
security assistance organization: All DOD elements located in a foreign country with responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. For example, military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, liaison groups, defense attache personnel and other groups which perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO.

strategic intelligence: Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)

strike operations: Combat operations in zones under insurgent control or in contested zones. They are targeted against insurgent tactical forces and bases outside areas of government control. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces during combat operations. Strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

subversion: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological or political strength of a regime. (JCS Pub 1-02)

surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence: Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tailor: To design the organization, strength, equipment, and methods to meet the requirements of a specific mission or situation.

terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02).

unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source or sources during all conditions of war or peace. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called UW.

urban area operations: Counterinsurgency operations in an urban environment characterized by close coordination between the armed forces, police forces, paramilitary forces, and other security forces for the protection of critical installations and control of subversive activities. Counterinsurgency operations in an urban area also may be part of a consolidation campaign or a continuing effort not specifically designated as a campaign.

vigilante group: A group organized without government authority to enforce its own concept of law and order or to advance its own interests outside the established process of law.
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:32 am

REFERENCES

RELATED PUBLICATIONS


Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Department of Defense

Department of Defense of Defense Manuals and Regulations


2000.12-H: Protection of DOD Personnel Against Terrorist Acts
2055.3-D: Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel
S5105.38-M: Security Assistance Management Manual
5132.3-D: DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications


JCS Pub 0-2 : Unified Action Armed Forces
JCS Pub 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JCS Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations
JCS Pub 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Military Operations in Low Intensity conflict
JCS Pub 5-02.4: Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), Vol. IV (Crisis Action Procedures)

Department of the Army

Army Regulations (ARs)


12-15: Joint Security Assistance Training
380-13: Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations
525-13: The Army Terrorism Counteraction Program

Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAMs)

27-1: Treaties Governing Land Warfare
27-1-1: Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
190-52-1: Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism

Field Manuals (FMs)

19-15: Civil Disturbances
19-30: Physical Security
19-40: Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons
27-2: Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War
27-10: The Law of Land Warfare
31-20(C): Special Forces Operations (U)
31-24: Special Forces Air Operations
33-1: Psychological Operations
34-1: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
34-3: Intelligence Analysis
34-60A(S): Counterintelligence Operations (U)
41-10: Civil Affairs Operations
46-1: Public Affairs
90-2: Tactical Deception
90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations
90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
100-1: The Army
100-5: Operations
100-10: Combat Service Support
100-26: The Air-Ground Operations System
100-27: USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations
100-37: Terrorism Counteraction
101-5: Staff Organization and Operations

Department of the Air Force

Air Force Manuals (AFMs)


1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Forces
2-1: Tactical Air Operations-Counter Air, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction
2-2: Tactical Air Operations in Conjunction with Amphibious Operations
2-4: Tactical Air Force Operations-Tactical Airlift
2-6: Tactical Air Operations-Reconnaissance
2-36: Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations
2-50: USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations
2-53: Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-2: Tactical Bare Base Operating Manual

Air Force Regulations (AFRs)

1-2: Assignment of Responsibilities for Development of Aerospace Doctrine

Department of the Air Force Pamphlets


AFP 110-31: International Law-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and, Air Operations
AFP 110-34: Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:51 am

Index

Active supporters,
of terrorists, 3-6
Adaptability, 1-5
Advisors, US,
to a counterinsurgency, 2-19
and security assistance, A-15
Aerial resupply and remote area
operations, E-8
Air Force,
antiterrorism (AT) prpgram, 3-12
combatting terrorism center,
duties of, 3-12
corporate approach of toward terrorism, 3-12
inspector general's office,
as focal point for antiterrorism program,
3-12
role of, in LIC, 1-10
Air Force pamphlet (AFP) 3-20,
as capstone guidance for LIC, v
implementing doctrine for, vi
All-source intelligence,
and counterinsurgency operations, E-12 thru
E-13
in peacetime contingency operations, 5-2
vital to raids, 5-6
vital to strikes, 5-6
Antiterrorism (AT) program, 1-6, 3-8
defensive measures in, 3-11 thru 3-12
elements of, 3-11 thru 3-12
manuals for Army actions, 3-12
Area coordination center (ACC),
and consolidation operations, E-4
as coordinator in counterinsurgency
operations, 2-26
and counterinsurgency, 2-12
regional, locations and functions of, 2-12
Area handbooks,
how to prepare them, F1
in peacekeeping, 4-10
sample outline for, F-l
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 2-23
Army regulation (AR) 525-13,
and combatting terrorism, 3-11
Arson, 3-3
Assassination, 3-3
Balanced development,
as deterrence to insurgency, 2-9
as a factor in counterinsurgency J C-8
as an IDAD concept, 2-9
Board for Low Intensity Conflict, A-2
Bombing, 3-3
Border area operations, E-9 thru E-IO
barrier and denial operations, E-9
and civilian relocation, E-IO
and surveillance, E-9 thru E-IO
Cadre,
of terrorists, 3-6
Captives,
protection of, in insurgencies, 2-16 thru 2-17
US policy toward, 2-16 thru 2-17
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and foreign assistance, A-2
responsibilities of, A-2
and War Powers Resolution (WPR), A-2
China's communist revolution,
as an example of a mass-oriented
insurgency, 2-6
Civil affairs (CA),
and counterinsurgency operations, 2-22,
E-16 thru E-18
objectives of,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-16
thru E-18
operations in urban areas,
elements of, E-9
planning in counterinsurgency operations.
elements of, E-16 thru E-18
Civilian advisory committees, 2-12
leaders of, 2-12 thru 2-13
Civil-military operations (CMO),
in counterinsurgency, 2-22
definition of, E-14
Combat operations, US,
aims of, in LIC, 1-11
and IDAD strategy, 2-24
strategically defensive,
in counterinsurgency, 2-24 thru 2-25
Combatting terrorism.
as an aspect of force protection, 3-11
audiences addressed, 3-8
and the domestic population, 3-8
focus of, 3-0
and the international community. 3-8
national programs,
functions of, 3-9
similarity to counterinsurgency program.
3-9
use of intelligence for, 3-9
organizations for, 3-9
policies of, 3-8
principles of, 3-8 thru 3-9
and PA, 3-10
and PSYOP, 3-10
and public diplomacy, 3-10
and security. 3-10
"stand alone" doctrine for, vi
Combatting terrorism program,
two major parts of, 3-11 thru 3-12
Command relationships,
between US and host nation forces, 2-25
need for clarity in,
in peacetime contingency operations, 5-1
in peacekeeping,
specified in LOIs, 4-9, 4-10
Command and control (C2),
elements of,
of terrorist groups, 3-5
in peacetime contingency operations, 5-2
thru 5-3
in support to insurgencies, 2-17
Command, control and communications
(C3),
in counterinsurgency operations, E-22
in peacekeeping, 4-8
Commander,
central questions for,
in campaign planning, 1-7
and constraints on his authority to deal
with terrorists, 3-7
and control of peacekeeping forces, 4-3
duty of,
to clearly communicate ROEs, 5-3
to monitor restrictions on the use of
force, 1-9
to provide clear guidance, 2-14
evacuation force,
constraints on the influence of, 5-4
and FBI or Department of State, 3-7
and flexibility in decisionmaking, 2-14
importance of vision of in LIC, 1-9
intent of,
importance of in LIC, 1-9
and integrated C3, E-22
in LIC, 1-9
mission of,
in peacekeeping, 4-4
need of.
to anticipate hostilities in evacuation
plans, 5-4
to apply LIC imperatives, 2-0
for clarity in statement of intent, 1-7
to consult FM 27-10, and AFR 110-34,
2-16
to consult legal advisors, 2-16
to inspire action by persuasion, 1-9
for perseverance in LIC campaigns, 1-6
to seize the initiative, against guerrillas,
E-20
to understand the kinds of terrorism, 3-0
planning considerations for,
in peacetime contingency operations, 5-2
and planning for uncertainty, 5-2
providing and receiving,
inactive and reserve components, 1-9
thru 1-10
and readiness of his troops for a volatile
environment, 5-2
and rehearsals of strikes and raids, 5-6 thru
5-7
relationship of,
with civilian agencies in LIC, 1-5
responsibility of,
for civilians during evacuations, 5-4
in a LIC environment, 1-9
to protect the force, 3-8
and strikes and raids, 5-5 thru 5-6
and tailoring the force, 5-3
and when to deploy patrols in peacekeeping,
4-7
and when to withdraw his peacekeeping
force. 4-5
and the WPR, B-1
Concurrent action,
in peacekeeping 4-2
Consent,
in peacekeeping, 4-1
Consolidation campaigns, E-4
and air power, E-4, E-6
completion stage of, E-6
development stage,
action during, E-6 thru E-6
and intelligence, E-5
offensive stage, E-5
preparation stage, E-4
Counter-drug operations, 1-7, 2-4
as example of support to US civil authority,
5-B
as raids, 5-5 thru 5-6
Countering an insurgency.
qualities of mind required for, E-20
Counterinsurgency,
and administrative competence. C-B
analysis of, C-1
and balanced development, C-8
and CA, E-14
and civilian advisory committees, 2-12 thru
2-13
and CMO, E-14
and command and staff actions. 2-14
and courses of action for the military
planner, C-9
focus of, 2-0
government objectives in. E-}
and HCA, 2-21, 2-23
and IDAD, 2-7 thru 2-9
and intelligence 2-21
and joint and combined exercises, 2-22
and logistical support, 2-23
and mobilization, 2-9, C-8, E-l
nature of, 2-7
organizational guidance for, 2-10
and PA, E-18
and PRC, 2-23 thru 2-24
principles of, 2-9 thru 2-10
and PSYOP, E-14
role of, armed forces in. 2-13 thru 2-14
role of, paramilitary forces during. 2-14
role of, the police in, 2-13
and security force operations, 2-13
US military support to, 2-18
US role in, 2-15
Counterinsurgency operations,
and all-source intelligence, E-12
and C3, E-22
and CA, E-16 thru E-18
and CMO, E-14
and counterintelligence, E-t3
and deception, E-21
and logistics, E-13 thru E-14
PRC measures for, E-22
and retrograde operations. E-20
and tactical operations, E-19 thru E-20
Counterterrorism, 1-6 thru 1-7, 3-12
Country team,
components of, A-IO
composition of, A-IO
example of, A-10
and security assistance, 1-9 thru 1-10
Courses of action,
for the military planner,
in insurgency analysis, e-9
Critical-cell insurgency,
examples of. 2-5
foco variation of, 2-6
types of, 2-5 thru 2-6
Cuban insurgency.
as an example of the foco, 2-6
Cultural bias,
as a barrier to understanding an
insurgency, 2-3
Death squads, 1-4
Defense Security Assistance Agency,
(DSAA),
functions of, A-4
Department of Defense (DOD),
main staff organizations of, A-a, A-4
organization of,
for security assistance, A-a
role of, in assisting counterinsurgency, 2-0
role of, in assisting an insurgency, 2-0
security assistance, programs of, A-I3
and terrorism, 3-8
Department of Justice (DOJ),
and terrorist acts, 3-7
Department of State,
and foreign assistance, A-O thru A-I
and low intensity conflict. 1-7
organizations for foreign assistance, A-2
role in disaster relief, 5-8
role in humanitarian and civic assistance,
2-23
and security assistance programs, A-I3
and support to insurgencies or
counterinsurgencies, 2-16
and terrorism, 3-.8
Department of the Treasury,
and LIC, 1-7
Developmental assistance programs, A-11
goals of. A-11
loans. A-1
technical assistance, A-11
Disaster relief,
definition of, 5-8
goals of, 5-8
Discontent, as a cause of LIC, 1-2
Drug trafficking,
and terrorism, 1-4
Economic Support Fund (ESF) program,
A-14 thru A-15
Environment,
examples of importance of, to terrorists, 3-3
as a factor in insurgency, C-4
and geography,
impact of, on an insurgency. 2-4
Ewskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), 3-1
External support,
as a factor in insurgencies, C-6
importance of, to an insurgency, 2-4
types of, 2-4
Fairness,
importance of, in peacekeeping, 4-7
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
and terrorist attacks on aircraft, 3-8
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and terrorism, 3-8
Foreign internal defense augmentation
forces (FIDAF), A-7 thru A-8
as aids to SAOs, A-7
deployment considerations, A-8 thru A-9
example of, A-8
organization of, A-7 thru A-S
FM 100-20,
as framework for successful military
operations in LIC, v
implementing doctrine for, vi
as capstone guidance for UC, v
FM 100-37,
and combatting terrorism, 3-11
Foco insurgency,
as a variation of the critical cell
insurgency, 2-6
Foreign assistance,
and CIA, A-2
coordinating and directing agencies for, A-O
and Department of State, A-l
and NSC, A-I thru A-2
US government organizations for. A-O
Foreign Assistance Act, 2-23
Foreign internal defense (FID),
and counterinsurgency, 2-18
Freedom of movement,
in peacekeeping, 4-2
Front groups (see mass civil organizations)
Geneva Conventions,
and insurgencies, 2-16
and terrorism, 3-7
Government,
national strategy of, (see counterinsurgency)
Guerrillas,
role of, in a mass-oriented insurgency, 2-6
and traditional insurgency, 2-7
urban, 1-4
Habeas corpus, suspension of, E-22
Health services support,
and counterinsurgency operations, E-18
Hijacking, 3-3
Hoaxes,3M 4
impact of,
on security personnel) 3-4
Host nation,
laws of, and LIC, B-O
responsibility of, for combat operations in
counterinsurgency, 2-24
Hostage-taking, 3-3
Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA),
in counterinsurgency, 2-23
emergency relief, A-11 thru A-12
programs, A-2, A-11 thru A-12
as a US interagency program, 2-23
welfare, A-11
Ideology,
uses of,
in an insurgency, 2-2 thru 2-3
Imperatives,
of LIC, v
and tenets of conventional war, v
Improvised explosive device (IED), 3-3
Incompetence,
governmental,
as a progenitor of insurgency. 2-8
Information,
as an ingredient against terrorism, 3-10
thru 3-11
Information gathering,
importance of,
in peacekeeping, 4-8
Injustice,
as a cause of LIC, 1-2 thru 1-3
Insurgency p
analysis of, Col
and courses of action for the military
planner, C-9
and economic performance, C-2
and governmental legitimacy, C-3 thru C-4
and political dynamics, C-4
and social history, C-3
and social organization. C-I thru C-2
anti-Marxist type, 1-4
causes and beginnings of, 2-0
compared to counterinsurgency, 2-0
countermeasures for, E-2
and death squads, 1-4
and drug trafficking, 1-4
external support of, C-S thru C-7
focus of, 2-0
four types of, 2-5 thru 2-7
goals of, 2-0 thru 2-1
influence of environment and geography on,
2-4
importance of external support to, 2-4
importance of ideology for, 2-2 thru 2-3
leadership of, C-5 thru C-S
Leninist model of, 2-5
mass-oriented,
typical activities of, D-2
and mobilization, 2-1
nature of, 2-0, C-4
objectives of, C-4 thru C-5
operational objectives of 2-3
organizations and operations, patterns of, C-5
organizational patterns of, 2-5 thru 2-7
phases of, 2-4
political struggles of, 2-1
pre-emptive strategy for, C-5
seven elements of, 2-1
subversive, 2-5
supported by terrorism, 3-1
tactics of, C-G
and time, 2-5
and urban guerrillas, 1-4
US military support to, 2-17 thru 2-18
US role in, 2-15 thru 2-17
and vigilante groups, 1-4
Intelligence,
basic,
and counterinsurgency operations, E-12
as a byproduct of PRC, E-22
and counterinsurgency, 2-21
objectives of, E-12
dissemination of, in counterinsurgency
operations, E-13
as key to AT and CT, 3-9 thru 3-10
maximum use of,
in counterinsurgency, 2-10, E-4
operations,
for counterinsurgency, 2-21
production of,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-13
and rescue and recovery operations, 5-5
security of,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-13
Internal defense and development (IDAD),
2-7 thru 2-13, E-2
four principles of, E-2
campaigns,
objectives of, E-3
concept for, 2-7, E-2
and balanced development, E-2
four functions of, 2-8 thru 2-9, E-2
and mobilization, E-2
and neutralization, E-2
and security, E-2
strategy for, 2-7
and combat operations, 2-24 thru 2-25
International Law,
and LIC, B-O
and insurgency, 2-16
Intimidation, 3-2
in urban area operations, E-B
Investigation of complaints,
in peacekeeping, 4-7
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 3-5
Israel,
and security assistance surges, 5-8
Joint and combined operations,
exercises in counterinsurgency. 2-22
and LIC, i
Kidnapping, 3-4
Law and order,
maintenance of, in consolidation campaigns,
E-6
and LIC, B-O thru B-2
Lead agency concept, 3-7
Leadership,
challenges to, in LIC, 1-9 thru HO
in insurgencies, C-5
in LIC, 1-9 thru HO
qualities needed for, 1-9 thru 1-10
role of,
in counterinsurgency, 2-12 thru 2-13
in an insurgency. 2-2
Legal considerations,
and counterinsurgency, 2-16
and insurgency, 2-1 a
and LIC, B-O
Legitimacy, 1-6
and the acceptance of external support, 2-4
as the center of gravity for an insurgency,
2-3
competition for, E-2
contest for, in an insurgency. 2-1
disintegration of,
leading to a foco revolution, 2-6
and focus of US efforts, 2-15
of host nation,
with US forces present, 2-24 thru 2-25
impact of CS and. CSS on, in
counterinsurgency operations, E-14
importance of,
to a mass oriented insurgency. 2-6
and military actions, 1-10
and terrorist names, 3-2
undermining of, by USSR, 1-5
and US assistance to insurgents. 2-17
weakening of,
by a insurgency, 2-5
Leninist model,
of an insurgency. 2-5
Letter of instruction (LOI),
elements of, 4-9 thru 4-10
in peacekeeping. 4-9
Libyan "hit teams", 3-1
Lines of communication (LOC),
of the insurgents,
as key difference between
counterinsurgency campaigns and
conventional war, E-20
Logistics,
base of,
often inadequate for counterinsurgency.
E-14
in counterinsurgency, 2-23
and counterinsurgency operations,
importance of simplicity to, E-14
modified for counterinsurgency operations,
E-14
for peacekeeping,
identified in LOI, 4-9 thru 4-10
and peacetime contingency operations, 5-3
Low intensity conflict (LIC),
aim of military operations in, iv
and Air Force role, 1-10
and AFP 3-20 guidance, v
as an American perspective, iv
and Army role, 1-10
central questions in planning for, 1-7 thru 1-8
and CINCs, 1-10
and conventional war, iv
and country teams, 1-9
and CSS, 1-11
definition of, 1-1
dynamics of, 1-2 thru 1-3
essential perspectives for. 1-8 thru 1-10
and ethical and moral challenges, I-B
and FM 100-20 capstone guidance. vi
historical perspective for, 1-3
imperatives of. vii, 1-5 thru 1-6
and insurgency assistance. 2-0
and the law, B-O
and leadership, 1-7 thru 1-10
locations where it occurs, 1-4
and mass communication, 1-4
as a misnomer, iv
and NBC weapons, 1-4
and operational categories, 1-6 thru 1-7
and perseverance, 1-6
players in, 1-4
and protection of the force, 1-9
and reserve component forces~ 1-10
and results of successful operations in, 1-1
and results to US of unfavorable outcomes
in, 1-1
and routine peaceful competition, iv, 1-1
security assistance as principal US
instrument in LIC, I-I
and sequencing events, 1-8
and the Third World, I-I
trends in, 1-3
types of military operations in, v
and US global interests, I-I
and use of chemical herbicides, B-l
use of combat operations in, 1-2
and use of military power, v
and use of riot control agents, B-1 thru B-2
uses of SOF in, 1-11
Maiming, 3-4
Maoism,
as a mass oriented insurgency, D-3
Mandate,
for peacekeeping, 4-1
Marxist-Leninist ideology,
and the Third World, 1-5
Mass civil organizations, D-5
local militia, D-5
popular, D-5
special interest groups, D-5
Mass popular revolution, leaderless,
co-option of, by a critical cell insurgency,
2-5 thru 2-6
Mass-oriented insurgency, 2-6
and cells, D-3
examples of, 2-6
and guerrillas, 2-6
and guerrilla warfare, D-2
guerrilla warfare phase of, D-2
how to counter it, D-5 thru D-6
latent and incipient phase of, D-l thru D-2
the Maoist example, D-3
and mass civil organizations, D-5
and neutralization, D-2
party core of, D-3
and party groups, D-3
party infrastructure of, D-4
phases of, D-l
Marxism,
as a mass oriented insurgency. 2-6, D-3
Maximum use of intelligence, 2-10, E-2
Military area command,
in peacekeeping, duties of, 4-4
reports to military peacekeeping command.
4-4
Military command,
authority and duties of, 4-3 thru 4-4
missions of, 4-2 thru 4-4
in peacekeeping, 4-3 thru 4-4
Military power,
indirect application of, 1-2
use of in LIC, v
use of in war, v
Mobilization,
and ODAD, E-2
insurgent,
and counterinsurgency campaigns, E-20
importance of, to successful
counterinsurgency. 2-9
and insurgencies, 2-17
Mobile training team (MTT),
and LIC security assistance, 1-11
length of deployment of,
in security assistance, A-8
as a self-training aid for host nations, A-S
National Command Authorities (NCA).
approve raids. 5-6
approve strikes, 5-6
and counterterrorism. 3-12
and counterterrorism JTF. 3-8
as decision maker, 2-15
and shows of force. 6-4
and SOF use in LIC, 1-11
National power f
instruments of, iv, 2-15
National Security Council (NSC).
and antiterrorism, 3-12
and CIA policy advice, A-l thru A-2
and national security, A-I thru A-2
Nazi, rise to power of, as an example of a
critical-cell insurgency. 2-5-
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
operations and legal claims, B-I
Neutrality,
in peacekeeping, 4-2
Neutralization,
definition of, 2-9
and IDAD, E-2
and legitimacy, 2-9
programs of,
not the responsibility of the US,
2-24
Noncombatant evacuation operations, 5-4
thru 5-5
characteristics of, 5-4 thru 5-5
and chief of the US diplomatic mission, 5-4
and Department of State input, 5-4
and host nation resources, 5-4 thru 5-5
influence of the environment on, 5-4 thru
5-5
and peacekeeping, 5-5
and peacemaking, 5-5
and protection of the force, 5-4 thru 5-5
Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC),
defense. in peacekeeping,
addressed in LOIs, 4-10
weapons,
possible use of during Lie, 1-3
use of by terrorists, 3-4 thru 3-5
Nuclear parity,
impact of, on Lie, 1-3
Objectivity.
importance of,
in peacekeeping, 4-7
Observation,
in peacekeeping, 4-5 thru 4-6
Operations,
border area, E-9 thru E-11
remote area, E-7 thru E-8
urban, E-8 thru E-9
Organizations,
economic, in insurgency. C-2
of a mass oriented insurgency, n-o
patterns of, in insurgencies, C-5
political, in insurgency, C-3
social,
in insurgency. Col
reordering of, during insurgencies, E-1
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
3-5
Paramilitary forces,
role of,
in counterinsurgency. 2-14
in tactical counterinsurgency
operations, E-19
Passive supporters,
of terrorists, 3-6
Patrolling,
in peacekeeping,
tasks of, 4-6 thru 4-7
Peacekeeping, 1-6 thru 1-7
administration, 4-8
and area handbooks, 4-10
and balance, 4-2
and the belligerents' actions, 4-5
and the commander, 4-3 thru 4-5
and concurrent action, 4-2
and consent, 4-1
and consent of the belligerents, 4-1
eight principles of, 4-1 thru 4-2
environment of, 4-1
and freedom of movement. 4-2
how US participates in, 4-1
implied tasks of, 4-8
and information, 4-8
and investigation of complaints. 4-7
logistics for, 4-9
and LOI, 4-9 thru 4-10
mandate for, 4-1
and military area command, 4-4
and military peacekeeping command. 4-3,
4-4
and negotiation and mediation, 4-7
and neutrality, 4-2
and observation, 4-5 thru 4-6
operations in, 1-7, 4-4 thru 4-6
organizations for, 4-4
and patrolling, 4-6 thru 4-7
and personnel and administrative
procedures, 4-9
and political councils, 4-2
principles of, 4-1 thru 4-2
and publicizing a presence, 4-6
and self-defense, 4-2
and single-manager control, 4-2
as a soldier's job, 4-1
and supervision, 4-6
as support to diplomacy, 4-1
surveillance during, 4-6
techniques for control of violence in, 4-5
and TOR, 4-8 thru 4-9
and transition from combat to diplomacy,
4-5
and unqualified sponsor support, 4-2
versus peacemaking, 4-10
Peacekeeping forces,
composition of, 4-4
main responsibilities of, 4-9
need for flexible administration of, 4-8
situation-dependent nature of, 4-4
Peacekeeping organizations, 4-2 thru 4-4
schematic of, 4-3
three tiers of, 4-2 thru 4-4
Peacemaking, 4-10, 5-7
definition of, 5-7
impact of political complexities on, 5-7
long-range goals of, 5-7
and protection of the force, 5-7
requirements for success in, 5-7
ROE for, 5-7
versus peacekeeeping, 4-10
Peacetime contingency operations, 1-7, 5-1
and all-source intelligence, 5-2
area of responsibility of CINC in, 5-2 thru
5-3
and balance. 5-2
and C2. 5-2 thru 5-3
as a complement to political initiative, 5~1
constraints on, 5-3
and coordination, 5-2
and country team, 5-3
and crisis action procedures. 5-3
definition of, 5-1
and factors of METT-T, 5-1
and JCS, 5-3
LOCs for, 1-7
and logistics, 5-3
major types of, 5-4 thru 5-9
and the NCA. 5-4
operational planning of. 5-2 thru 5-3
and planning for uncertainty. 5-2
principles of. 5-1 thru 5-2
and protection of the force, 5-3
and PSYOP, civil affairs.
and PA, 5-3
requirements for, 1-7
and ROEs, 5-3
types of. 1-7
and unique ROE. 5-3
US ambassador and, 5-3
Perseverance9
importance of, to success in LIC, 1-6
Persuasion,
need for, in LIC planning, 1-g
use of, in LIC operations, 1-9
Phases of insurgency,
typical activities in. D-1 thru D-2
Players,
in LIC, 1-4
Police,
role of,
in counterinsurgency. 2-13
in PRC, E-22
Political council,
duties of, 4-3
Populace and resource control (PRC),
in counterinsurgency, 2-23 thru 2-24
in counterinsurgency operations, E-22
importance of,
in urban area operations, E-8 thru E-g
as an intelligence-gathering tool. E-22
Protection of the force,
in LIC, 1-9
and noncombatant evacuation operations,
5-9
in peacemaking, 5-7
Provocation,
usual objectives of, 3-2 thru 3-3
Psychological operations (PSYOP),
activities by insurgents, 2-3
and CMO, E-14
and combatting terrorism, 3-10 thru 3-11
and consolidation campaigns, E-4
and counterinsurgency operations, E-15 thru
E-16
national program for counterinsurgency
operations, E-15 thru E-16
needed to justify PRC in counterinsurgency
operations, E-22
objectives of,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-15
thru E-16
organizations,
for counterinsurgency operations, E-15
thru E-16
planning,
for counterinsurgency, key factors of,
E-15 thru E-16
target groups. and objectives for,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-15
thru 5-16
themes,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-15
thru 5-16
Public affairs (PA),
and combatting terrorism, 3-10 thru 3-11
and counterinsurgency operations, E-18 thru
E-19
and the news media,
in counterinsurgency operations, E-18
thru E-19
and peacetime contingency operations. 5-3
Public opinion,
effect of LIC military operations on, 1-9
Publicizing a presence,
in peacekeeping, 4-6
Raids, 5-5 thru 5-6
C2 requirements for, 5-6
commander's responsibility during, 5-6
key planning questions for, 5-6
planning ce1l's duties, 5-6
purposes and characteristics of. 1-11, 5-5
thru 5-6
rehearsal of, 5-6
target selection for, 5-5 thru 5-6
by terrorists, 3-4
Red Brigades, 3-1, 3-5
Remote area operations, E-7 thru E-8
and aerial resupply, E-7 thru E-8
Rescue and recovery operations, 5-5
definition and characteristics of, 5-5
and timely intelligence, 5-5
Responsibilities,
for combat operations in counterinsurgency.
2-24 thru 2-25
of commanders,
to their troops in LIC, 1-9
for security of the force, 1-9
for communications,
in peacekeeping, 4-10
of the military services in security
assistance, 2-15 thru 2-16
of peacekeeping forces, 4-9
of the police,
in insurgencies, 2~13
of the secretary of state, in foreign
assistance, A-O thru A-3
Responsive government, E-2
Restricted zones,
and civilian relocation,
in border area operations, E-10 thru E-11
Rules of engagement (ROE), 1-9
in peacekeeping, 4-1, 4-2
Russian revolution,
as a critical-cell insurgency. 2-5
Sabotage,
objectives of, 3-4
as a terrorist act, 3-4
Security assistance,
aim of, 1-2
basis for, A-12
categories of, A-12 thru A-13
constraints on, A-12
and ESF, A-14 thru A-15
major programs of, A-13 thru A-14
as a military instrument in LIC, A-12
narrowly defined, A-12
operationally. A-12
organizations for, 2-18 thru 2-19
as strategy in foreign po1icy, A-12
Security assistance agencies, A-3 thru A-4
Security assistance organizations (SAO),
A-5 thru A-6
Security assistance surges,
characteristics of, 5-8
examples of, 5-8
Security force,
planning and operations, E-4
tasks of,
in counterinsurgency, 2-13
Self-defense,
in peacekeeping, 4-2
Sendero Luminoso,-
as a mass-oriented insurgency, 2-6
Shows of force, 1-11, 5-4
examples of, 5-4
legal and political constraints on. 5-4
and sustainment, 5-4
Single-manager control,
in peacekeeping, 4-2
Special activities,
approved the the President, A-2
Special environments,
effects of,
on military operations, E-? thru E-11
Special operations forces (SOF),
and insurgencies. 2-17
use of, in LIC, 1-11
Strikes, 1-11, 5-5, E-6 thru E-7
and the ACC, E-7
C2 requirements, 5-6
commander's responsibilities during, 5-5
thru 5-6
key planning questions for, 5-6
organization for, E-6 thru E-7
planning cell's duties during, 5-6
purposes and characteristics of, 5-5 thru 5-6
rehearsals of, 5-6 thru 5-7
target selection for, 5-5 thru 5-6
Supervision,
in peacekeeping, 4-6
Support to US civil authority, 5-8 thru 5-9
Surveillance,
and border area operations, E-11
in peacekeeping. 4-6
Tactical operations,
in counterinsurgency,
organizations for, E-19 thru E-20
types of, E-19 thru E-20
in counterinsurgency campaigns,
goals of, E-19 thru E-20
objectives of, E-19 thru E-20
as an unusual occurrence in
counterinsurgency, 2-21
in urban areas, E-8
Terms of reference (TOR). 1-7
peacekeeping,
elements described in, 4-8 thru 4-9
Terrorism,
and arson, 3-3
and assassination, 3-3
and bombing, 3-3
and coercion, 3-2
and the commander's duties, 3-7
definition of, 3-0
and Department of Defense, 3-8
and the Department of Justice, 3-7
and the Department of State, 3-8
enhancement of physical security for, 3-10
and the FBI, 3-7
and the Geneva Conventions, 3-7
and hijacking, 3-3
and hoaxes, 3-4
and hostage-taking, 3-3
importance of media coverage to, 3-1, 3-2,3-4
and intimidation, 3-2
and kidnapping, 3-4
and the JCS response, 3-8
and the "lead agency concept", 3-7
legal considerations concerning, 3-7
and maiming, 3-4
and narcotics traffickers, 3-0
and provocation, 3-2
and raids, 3-4
and sabotage, 3-4
and seizures, 3-4
in support of an insurgency, 3-3
the threat of, 3-1
Terrorists,
active supporters of, 3-5, 3-6
categories of, 3-1
financing of. 1-4
leadership, 3-6
meeting the threat of, 3-6
mercenary. 1-4
methods of, 3-1
need for recognition of. 3-1
nonstate-supported, 3-1
objectives of, 3-2 thru 3-3
passive supporters of, 3-5. 3-6
professional, 1-4
quest for legitimacy of, 3-2
security a primary concern of, 3~5
selection of targets, 3~1
state directed, 3-1
state supported, 3-1
tactics of, 3-1 thru 3-5
and use of biological and chemical
weapons, 3-4
and use of NBC weapons, 3-4
Terrorist groups,
C2 of, 3-5
cellular structure of, 3-5
internal conflicts and splintering of, 3-5
leadership of, 3-5, 3-6
organization and structure of, 3-5 thru 3-6
similarity to military organizations, 3-5 thru
3-6
Third World.
conflicts and US presence in, 2-15
and drugs, 1-4
and LIC, 1-3
US advisors in, 2-19
US humanitarian assistance to, 2-20
and USSR's indoctrination aims, 1~5
Time,
and an insurgency, 2-5
on the side of the insurgent, E~20
Traditional insurgency, 2~ 7
use of violence in. 2-13
Trainers,
mission of,
in counterinsurgency. 2-19
Unconventional warfare (UW). 5-7 thru 5-8
definition of, 5-7 thru 5-8
differences of, from insurgency, 5-7 thru 5-8
similarity of, to an insurgency, 5-8
and SO F, 5-7 thru 5-8
by SOF in support of an insurgency, 2-17
techniques and tactics for. 5-7 thru 5-8
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR).
advisors of, in LIC, 1-5
interests of, and LIC, 1-3
methods of, to undermine a government's
legitimacy, 1-5
and military assistance in LIC, 1-5
role of in LIC, 1-5
and the Third World, 1-5
United Nations (UN).
and single manager control of peacekeeping,
4-2
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), A-2
role of,
in disaster relief, 5-8
in security assistance, 1-11, 2-16
United States Information Agency (USIA),
and foreign assistance, A-I, A-2
role of in an insurgency, 2-16
United States Uniform Code of Military
Justice,
and LIC, B-O
and captive insurgents, 2-17
Unity of effort, 1-5, E-2
and counterinsurgency, 2-9
Unqualified sponsor support,
in peacekeeping, 4-2
Urban area operations, E-8 thru E-9
environment of, E-8 thru E-9
principles of, E-8 thru E-9
Use of chemical herbicides and riot
control agents, B-1 thru B-2
Vietcong insurgency,
as a mass-oriented insurgency, 2-6
Violence,
to alter political behavior, 3-0
criminal, 3-0
minimum use of,
in counterinsurgency. 2-10
techniques for the control of, in
peacekeeping, 4-5
and terrorism, 3-0 thru 3-1
use of, in LIC, 1-2 thru 1-3
War,
confrontations below the level of, 1-1
contingency operations in,
compared with those in peacetime, 5-1
conventional,
and differences from LIC, iv thru vi
and political objectives, 1-5
crimes during, 3-7
and Geneva Conventions, 3-7
kinds of, v
laws of, 2-16
mutual deterrence of, 1-3
use of military force in, v
and UW, 5-7
when a counterinsurgency becomes one, 2-21
War Powers Resolution (WPR),
and special activities of the CIA, B-1, A-2
and LIC, B-1
Yom Kippur War,
and security assistance surges.
airlift and sealift, 5-8
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Re: Field Manual No. 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet No. 3-20

Postby admin » Wed Dec 16, 2015 8:56 am

Foreword

Field Manual 100-201 Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 represents the combined efforts of the Army and Air Force to develop comprehensive military doctrine and guidance to support the US government's activities in an environment of low intensity conflict (LIC).

This publication provides the basic foundation for Army and Air Force personnel to understand the complexities of operating in the LIC environment. It discusses the four major types of operations typically found in LIC-support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations-and it explains the subtle yet critical differences between LIC and other conventional operations.

Low intensity conflicts have been a predominant form of engagement for the military over the past 45 years. In all likelihood, this will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. All military personnel must understand the characteristics of low intensity conflict if we are to conduct military operations successfully in this environment.

Larry D. Welch
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Carl E. Vuono
General, USA
Chief of Staff

FM 100-20
AFP 3-20
5 DECEMBER 1990

By Order of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force:

CARL E. VUONO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

MERRILL A. MCPEAK
General, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff

Official:
THOMAS F. SIKORA
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

Official:
EDWARD A. PARDIN, COLONEL,
USAF
Director of Information Management

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, and USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 E,
Requirements for FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (Qty rqr block no. 513).

USAF:

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994 a - 160-919
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