Part 2 of 2
The Army Timeline and The Purposeful Distortion of FactBy March 2021, both Chief Contee and Chief Sund had testified in congressional hearings about Army leaders, Piatt and Flynn, displaying an overconcern about the optics of military personnel at the Capitol, about their lack of urgency during the 2:30PM conference call, about their indicating that they would not recommend that the Secretary of the Army authorize troops at the Capitol based on the information they had at the time, and about their desire that the DCNG plan to deploy troops away from the Capitol in the midst of the riot to free up police to move to the Capitol11. MG Walker testified about the same issues, and about what he felt were unusual restrictions placed on his command authority and freedom of maneuver in the run up to 6th January. Walker’s testimony also highlighted the 3 hours and 19 minutes that elapsed between Chief Sund’s emergency pleas for assistance at 1:49PM and when MG Walker received notice to deploy to the Capitol at 5:08 PM, and the lack of personal communication between Secretary McCarthy and MG Walker during the afternoon and early evening of 6 January.
The cumulative impact of the Contee, Sund and Walker testimonies, and the attendant negative news stories, coupled with the revelation that Army leaders had for a time falsely denied that LTG Flynn was even on the 2:30PM call worked to create a narrative which made Army Senior Leadership look bad. In March 2021, MG Walker was told by a friend that LTG Piatt was so upset with MG Walker that he directed the development of an Army “White Paper” to retell events of 6 January in a light more favorable to LTGs Flynn, Piatt, Secretary McCarthy and the Army Staff. The initial version of the “White Paper” was so incendiary that other Army Senior Leaders convinced LTG Piatt not to release the paper shortly after MG Walker’s testimony in March 2021. When he became aware of the document, MG Walker asked a senior Army officer (a 3-star general) for a copy and was told by the officer that the report “wasn’t mine to share.”
At the direction and under the supervision of LTG Piatt, however, with the assistance of BG Chris LaNeve, the “White Paper” morphed into the Army’s Report (Report of the United States Army Operations on January 6, 2021). The judgment of history is depends on who writes it. With respect to the Army on January 6, Piatt was determined to be that author. The Army Staff sought to change that narrative and to create an alternate history which would be the Army’s official recollection of events. Piatt and LaNeve literally changed facts and recollections overnight. The end product, a revisionist tract worthy of the best Stalinist or North Korea propagandist, was close hold.
Where MG Walker indicated in his Senate testimony that he did not talk directly to Secretary McCarthy between 1:49PM and roughly 6:00PM on January 6, 2021, Walker was now directly tasked by Secretary McCarthy at 2:30PM, 3:05PM, 4:35PM and again at 5:00PM. Where Walker had once directed on his own that the QRF be moved to the Armory from Joint Base Andrews, now McCarthy made that decision. Where Walker was told about the deployment authorization via SVTC from the Chief of Staff of the Army 5:08PM, he now found out directly from the Secretary at 4:35PM. Under the new fabricated timeline supervised by LaNeve and Piatt, McCarthy was an active participant in the 2:30PM phone conference. Mayor Bowser was now in meetings she did not actually attend, making statements she did not actually utter. McCarthy had to call Walker twice because, presumably due to his bumbling incompetence, he had inexplicably not followed Secretary McCarthy’s order to deploy forces to the Capitol campus. The Army Staff and not Joint Task Force-DC under BG Robert K. Ryan was now primarily responsible for the movement of DCNG forces to the Capitol on 6 January. The buses left at 17:02, not at 17:08 as Walker swore under oath. Piatt had to know these insertions into the timeline and official narrative were incorrect. Still he presented this timeline to a congressional committee as fact as developed from an official unbiased Army product, the Army Report, which he directed be written.
The DoDIG then adopted Piatt and LaNeve’s narrative wholesale, in some places verbatim, subsequently releasing it as if it was the authoritative word of God, and creating the impression that Walker was deceitful during his congressional testimony. The official Army narrative also found Army leadership was blameless in the delay in National Guard reaching the Capitol.
Piatt, Flynn and LaNeve engineered a multitude of demonstrable falsehoods and misstatements about Army activities leading up to and on 6 January, especially on the afternoon of 6 January, and then submitted this report to select members of Congress in an effort to absolve Army leadership (especially Piatt who was slated to be nominated for promotion) of any missteps on 6 January. The document is an effort to mislead the Congress and to retroactively change history. The very existence of the document calls into question the honesty and integrity of LaNeve, Piatt and Flynn. The Army Staff most significantly has avoided releasing this document to the public, but we know it contains a few things from Piatt and Flynn’s perjured testimony before Congress. The report states, quite falsely that McCarthy contacted Walker at around 3:05PM and at 4:35PM gave him a go order to deploy to Capitol Hill. At 4:35PM the link up location and the name of the name of the lead law enforcement officer were provided to MG Walker (according to Piatt’s testimony)
McCarthy apparently had to call back at 5:00PM (although Piatt and Flynn’s testimonies don’t state this, it’s likely in the Army Report). We also know from their testimonies that the first DCNG buses departed the DCNG Armory at 17:02. That is what the Army Report states. DCNG’s Joint Task Force-DC records indicate that the buses actually departed at 17:08, after Walker received authorization from McConville. It’s unclear how the Army Staff could have a more accurate recollection of when the buses left than the DCNG Joint Task Force which actually controlled the buses. There were no Army Staff representatives or embedded liaison officers at the D.C. Armory when the buses left. However, having the buses depart from the Armory at 17:02 allows for the narrative that it took MG Walker 27 minutes to get the first buses off after McCarthy first directed him at 4:35PM.
When Congressmen Lynch and Raskin, during June 2021 hearing, questioned Piatt and Flynn about the timeline discrepancies, Piatt and Flynn referred to their more accurate Army Report (a fabricated distortion) and made sure to laud the DCNG for doing the best it could under the circumstances. The questioning by Lynch and Raskin is revealing.
The Army Report indicates that MG Walker was notified to deploy at 16:35 by the Secretary of the Army. LTG Piatt knows this assertion to be incorrect, because Piatt was on a secure video conference with MG Walker and other Army and DCNG leaders at 16:35. He repeated the false assertion in his testimony before a congressional committee anyway. To support this assertion he relied on the official Army timeline contained in the Army Report, the document he directed be drafted and which he influenced heavily. This is the definition of a self-serving document. It is preposterous to assert that MG Walker would have received authorization to deploy personnel from the Armory at 16:35 and then stayed on video conference without directing at least some of the personnel awaiting at the Armory to head to the Capitol. As MG Walker has publicly stated, minutes mattered.
How was McCarthy able to brief Walker with all the details of the link up and the name of the officer and still call Governor Hogan at 16:40 while participating in a live nationally televised press conference at 16:30 or 16:45?
Whether Walker was told to deploy at 16:35 or 17:08 is a small point, what matters is the lie being crafted by senior officials who know better. This lie seems aimed and discrediting Walker for his testimony. Also, the lie is easily revealed because the Army timeline doesn’t withstand simple scrutiny.
Lying Under OathAn analysis of the facts demonstrates that Piatt, Flynn and their confederates repeatedly and deliberately made false statements under oath or false official statements to the DoDIG and/or a congressional committee in order to support their contrived narrative, to discredit MG Walker, to absolve Army Senior Leaders of any responsibility in the delays on 6 January, and to burnish the promotion chances of Walter Piatt.
Piatt repeated a narrative that he knew to be untrue to both the DoDIG and to the House Oversight Committee. Piatt claims that on the conference call, “the SecArmy asked MG Walker how quickly the 40-member QRF could respond; MG Walker stated the QRF could be ready to move in 20 minutes. The SecArmy directed MG Walker to prepare to move the QRF to the Capitol Building and support the USCP, but to remain at the Armory until he confirmed approval from the Acting SecDef.” That sentence is drawn from whole cloth and did not occur. In later testimony Piatt and Flynn would state that the QRF was ill-equipped and ill-suited to respond to Capitol Hill, but here Piatt states as early as 2:30PM, before meeting with Miller, McCarthy had already saliently determined and directed Walker to posture the QRF to move to the Hill.
In sworn testimony, under penalty of perjury, Piatt and his confederates, falsely claim that an elected official, Muriel Bowser, the Mayor of the Nation’s capital, is present on a conference call that she very obviously was not present on. They have her making comments that she did not utter, and then they falsely imply that false stories spread by her caused a delay in the federal response to a riot at the Capitol because McCarthy had to deal with media inquiries generated by her rather than the urgent crisis underway12. They do this in a DoDIG report that is supposed to accorded great deference and to form part of the historical record for our grandchildren, long after we are gone. Secretary McCarthy was not on the 2:30PM call, certainly did not task MG Walker to prepare to move the QRF to the Capitol at 2:30PM and certainly did not talk to the Mayor during that call as Piatt and others associated with him suggested in sworn testimony and in official statements to the DoDIG and the House Oversight committee. According to Piatt’s official January press statement, “As soon as Secretary McCarthy received the specific request for assistance from the Capitol Police on the phone call at 2:22 p.m., he ran to the Acting Secretary of Defense’s office to request approval.”13 Piatt’s story changed in June to where McCarthy now stays until 2:30 on the conference call, hears Mayor Bowser and Chief Sund’s pleas and questions and tasks MG Walker. None of which occurred. Further Piatt’s statement conflict’s with LTG Flynn’s statement from the same hearing.
Flynn states: “At 1421, my Executive Officer interrupted the meeting stating that the Capitol was under attack and the Secretary of the Army’s office had called for me to come up to his office. I paused the meeting, gave guidance for my directors to remain in my office, and left. . .for Secretary McCarthy’s office, he was walking out and giving instructions to staff members who were already in the room.” Secretary McCarthy’s office is one flight up from LTG Flynn’s office in the Pentagon. Assuming it took 5 minutes for Flynn to reach the Secretary’s office (which it would not), Flynn still has McCarthy headed to Acting Secretary Miller’s office. Piatt’s story has McCarthy staying. According to Piatt, at roughly 2:25PM, McCarthy was sitting next to Piatt in McCarthy’s office. Surely Flynn would not have seen him leaving the office when he did.
Piatt in his sworn testimony, repeatedly made false or misleading or statements to inflate and exaggerate the insignificant role played the Army Staff in support of DCNG operations on the afternoon of 6 January:
“General Flynn's immediate interpretation of the urgency of the situation allowed the Army Staff to begin identifying the many critical actions and considerations we needed to address and adjust rapidly. We needed to redeploy the D.C. National Guard from 37 locations throughout the district, alert and recall soldiers from their civilian workplace, organize into unit configurations, equip the force, prepare deployment plan to include communications, specific routes, link up locations, casualty evacuation, the rules for the use of force, determine if the D.C. Guard would be armed or not armed, with or without riot control gear, and how and where the D.C. National Guard would be deputized to support federal law enforcement.
Piatt is falsely asserting that the Army Staff is performing the delineated actions on behalf of the DCNG, which it was not. The DCNG Joint Task Force under BG Robert K. Ryan had a very capable staff on 6 January that was not in contact with the Army Staff. None of the tasks Piatt lists in the preceding paragraph were performed by the Army Staff to support DCNG. Piatt implies that the Army Staff was planning for the “re-mission” and “re-equipping” of DCNG personnel employment of the DCNG and that this was a source of delay in getting SecArmy or SecDef’s approval to deploy to the Capitol. This is false. The Army Staff had no involvement in the movement or consolidation of DCNG personnel from the 30 traffic control points or 6 metro stations (indeed Guardsmen at the TCPs were never recalled to the Armory from the TCPs as Piatt implies).
Further, the Army Staff had no involvement in the recall of DCNG personnel from their civilian workplaces or in unit sizing as Piatt implies. Piatt states “we” needed to determine if the D.C. Guard would be armed or unarmed—in reality there was absolutely no discussion or request to arm the DCNG on 6 January. MG Walker did not request this, nor did the Chiefs Sund or Flynn on the 2:30PM call. DCNG personnel performing civil disturbance response duties are typically unarmed as there is enhanced risked that a demonstrator could go for a soldier’s firearm, when the soldier is kitted out with shield, baton and firearm. Keep in mind that Piatt and Flynn wanted DCNG personnel to perform duties for the police away from the Capitol, they certainly didn’t want those personnel armed. Piatt states that “we” needed to determine whether they would be with or without riot control gear. This is similarly an absurdity and altogether implausible. MG Walker had been adamant about his troops having helmets and body armor when the traffic control mission was being planned on January 4, 2021.
The troops at the TCPs had riot control gear in their vehicles (although admittedly they weren’t suppose to have this equipment, they did have it). The QRF had riot control gear on their persons. The DCNG had over 500 individual riot control kits stored at the Armory, left over from summer 2020 civil disturbance operations. There is no way MG Walker would have brooked a discussion about his troops not having riot control gear in the midst of a riot. Concerns about optics would be the only reason DCNG personnel would not have been in riot gear, and Piatt and Flynn claim optics were not an issue. Piatt implies that the Army Staff was involved in equipping the DCNG on 6 January which is an absolutely false insinuation. Piatt evoked issues of deputization and rules for the use of force, legal issues handled on the 6th by DCNG judge advocates outside the purview of the Army Staff.
Piatt mentions communications, specific routes, link up locations, CASEVAC routes.14 These were all tactical issues handled internally by the DCNG Joint Task Force on January 6th without any Army Staff involvement. These issues were certainly not addressed or handled by the 3 and 4-star generals, and civilian political appointees on the secure teleconference started by Charlie Flynn. These issues were the purview of BG Robert K. Ryan, COL Jon Ebbert and LTC Craig Hunter, LTC Sekou Richardson, and other DCNG officers on 6 January. Ultimately the issues belonged to MG Walker. These matters were not an Army Staff responsibility. In short, the Army Staff was not involved in the planning of any of the matters on January 6, that Piatt references before the House Overnight Committee during his opening statement . If the Army Staff developed a plan for the deployment of the DCNG on 6t January, it was done without DCNG input and outside of our purview. DCNG is still waiting to see this purported plan. The entirety of the referenced paragraph in Piatt’s opening statement is deceptive and misleading, designed to continue a false narrative. The main communications link and interface between the Army Staff and the DCNG on 6 January was the secure video conference bridge established by LTG Flynn.
In his sworn statement, LTG Piatt states:
“No personnel, including the QRF, were armed with lethal weapons, and none of the TCP or Metro station personnel had any equipment beyond their helmets and ballistic vests stored in their vehicles.”
That assertion is not a reflection of reality as events unfolded on the afternoon of 6 January. The mention of lethal weapons is a deflection. DCNG civil disturbance response personnel would typically not have lethal weapons and this of course avoids the potential of a Kent State scenario. Neither Sund nor Contee requested Guardsmen have lethal weapons. Through fortuitous oversight, each of the TCP and Metro station teams had full riot gear in their GSA vehicles15.
Piatt states:
“As a soldier who has commanded numerous times in combat, I knew we needed a plan to safely and properly redeploy forces from the traffic control mission, equip, arm, remission, and then deploy our Guardsmen to the Capitol from over 37 dispersed locations”
Piatt’s statement is misleading. MG Walker, the DCNG CG, BG Dean, the DCNG TAG, BG Ryan, the JTF-DC CDR and LTC Craig Hunter the TF Guardian CDR, were all experienced combat veterans. With the exception of LTC Hunter, they were all also experienced in riot control operations in the District of Columbia. They all wanted to send as many DCNG personnel to the as they could as Capitol as soon as possible. They had a plan to do that if allowed to exercise it. Piatt was implying that he cared more about the safety and well-being of DCNG personnel than did their own commanders. Additionally, the traffic control element was never redeployed, despite having full riot kits with them.
At the start of his testimony, Piatt notes:
The Army's role on 6 January began as unarmed support by the D.C. National Guard to metropolitan police. By midday, the mission had changed drastically to respond to the attack on the Capitol. That change of mission was unforeseen, and we were not positioned to respond with immediate supports.
While the attack on the Capitol was not anticipated, LTG Piatt is misleading the committee when he implies that the DCNG could not have been able to respond immediately to the riot on Capitol Hill. Indeed, MG Walker, BG Dean, BG Ryan and LTC Hunter all wanted to respond immediately. They could have directed their 40 person QRF to move immediately from Joint Base Andrews to link up with USCP near the Capitol. DCNG could also have diverted personnel supporting the traffic control mission to the Capitol. These soldiers and airmen possessed the requisite riot gear in their vehicles.16 DCNG estimates 131 riot gear-equipped troops could have been mustered immediately and an additional 200 Guardsmen within the following 2 hours.
In his sworn statement, LTG Piatt falsely asserts the following:
“In the meantime, the Army Staff was planning with the DCNG to recall forces and redeploy the forces committed to traffic control posts and Metro station control. We assisted in directing the staging of the DCNG forces in order to be as ready, as quickly as possible, once a plan for commitment was approved.”
The above statement is untrue in its entirety. The Army Staff conducted no planning with the DCNG to recall forces and redeploy the forces committed to traffic control posts and Metro station control. Indeed the dayshift at the TCPs were never recalled. The night shift was converted into a civil disturbance response posture at roughly 2:14PM at the direction of the DC Adjutant General. The Army Staff played no role in this decision. The Army Staff did not assist in directing the staging of the DCNG forces in order to be ready, as quickly as possible, once a plan for commitment was approved.
In his sworn testimony, Flynn claims, a team under his direction of “40 officers and noncommissioned officers, immediately worked to recall the 154 D.C. National Guard personnel from their current missions, reorganize them, reacquaint them, and begin to redeploy them to the Capitol.” Flynn’s sworn statement is so astounding on its face that it defies reason. If it does not constitute the willful and deliberate misleading of Congress, than nothing does. Flynn was referring to 154 D.C. Guardsmen who were already on duty, were trained in civil disturbance response, already had area familiarization with Washington, DC, were properly kitted and were delayed only because of inaction and inertia at the Pentagon. Why would the DCNG need the assistance of “40 officers and noncommisioned officers” from the Army Staff to “organize and acquaint” these Guardsmen?
GEN Flynn states: “Members of my G-3/5/7 staff supported the SecArmy and LTG Piatt by coordinating planning and decisions for the recall of the 350 DCNG personnel from their current mission, so the DCNG could re-deploy, re-organize, re-equip and re-mission their force to be federalized and employed by the Lead Federal Agency.” Flynn’s statement is willfully inaccurate and designed to mislead Congress and re-write history. The Army Staff was not in contact or coordination with the DCNG Joint Task Force, under BG Robert K. Ryan. Ryan, not anyone working for Flynn was responsible organizing, and directing the soldiers referenced. Ryan was a member and the leader of the referenced 350 DCNG personnel. The very able LTC Sekou Richardson, a Master Logistician, was responsible for equipping the 350 soldiers. Richardson ensured Ryan’s people had all the kit they needed. Neither Ryan nor Richardson was in coordination with anyone who worked for Charlie Flynn on the afternoon of 6 January. Flynn implies there was an intent to federalize the D.C. National Guard. His inclusion of this notion proves that he had no clue about the history, purpose and structure of the DCNG on 6 January or when he testified in June. The D.C. National Guard was created by an Act of Congress to respond to rioting and other civil disturbances in the Nation’s Capitol. DCNG already worked for the President, through SecArmy and SecDef. There was no need to federalize it.
Piatt and Flynn consistently and repeatedly misrepresented, understated, or misled the House Oversight Committee and the DoDIG regarding the capability, readiness and motivation of the DCNG to respond on the afternoon of 6 January. They falsely claimed that the DCNG did not have, the training and resources to move quickly, to pivot from traffic control to civil disturbance operations. This was untrue. Flynn falsely stated that the Army Staff (which is supposed to be running the global operations of the U.S. Army) had to devote 30 to 40 officers and non-commissioned officers to get 154 ill-prepared DC Guardsmen to Capitol Hill. This assertion constituted the willful deception of Congress. It is not just imprecision, it is lying. Senior Army officers lied about little stuff. Their lies contributed to the deficiencies in the DoDIG’s findings because the DoDIG allowed the Army Staff to define the DCNG and to set the narrative, allowed LTG Piatt (and Flynn and LaNeve) to define the story. DoDIG also didn’t talk to anyone from the DCNG who could challenge the false Army Staff narrative. What’s most stunning is that they almost got away with it. If they hadn’t gratuitously attacked MG Walker’s character and integrity and then publicized the DoDIG report, they would have gotten away with it.
The D.C. National Guard in Piatt and LaNeve’s narrative was poorly led, poorly motivated, under resourced, and lacked equipment and training to respond immediately to the Capitol. This notion is an outright lie and is not borne out by a review of what really was happening on the afternoon of the 6tth What was occurring between the Army Staff and the DCNG on the afternoon of 6 January, after the breach and before receiving permission to deploy to the Capitol, can in no way be characterized as military planning. Piatt and Flynn knew this when they falsely testified to the House Oversight and Reform Committee on June 15, 2021.
It is important to note that neither Piatt nor Flynn were in the Chain-of-Command of the DCNG. The Commanding General, MG Walker, worked for Secretary McCarthy who was incommunicado or unreachable for most of the afternoon. The Army Staff was not providing any independent direction or guidance to MG Walker. They were only sharing information. The only orders Walker received that afternoon, through secure video, were the decision to mobilize the DCNG after 3:04PM and the 5:08PM authorization to deploy forces to the Capitol.
The main channel of communication between the DCNG and the Army Staff on the afternoon of 6 January was the secure video bridge established by LTG Flynn. This communication was occurring mostly at the general officer level. MG Walker was in his office with his Deputy, BG Dean, his Senior Enlisted Leader, CSM Brooks, his aide-de-camp (who was taking thorough notes) and his staff judge advocate, COL Matthews. On the other end were mostly 3-star Army Staff principals, or their deputies, and 2 to 3 senior civilian officials. These individuals were mostly in their personal offices in the Pentagon. The open channel was essentially a “general officer chat line” to relay information back in forth. With the exception of MG Walker’s aide-de-camp, COL Matthews was probably the lowest ranking officer on the teleconference.
The Army Staff was not in communication with Joint Task Force-DC, under BG Robert K. Ryan, which was running on the ground operations. DCNG required none of the technical, administrative or logistical assistance or support from Army Headquarters that Piatt and Flynn falsely implied during their congressional testimony. DCNG had all the equipment it needed. On the afternoon of January 6, 2021, the DCNG likely had more civil disturbance or riot gear on a per capita basis than any state National Guard in the country.17 Enough to equip roughly 500 Guardsmen if necessary. These were left over from the summer of 2020 and were in good condition. Flynn and Piatt either didn’t know this when they testified, which they should have, or they willfully deceived Congress. Further, DCNG personnel at the traffic control points and Metro stations had full riot kits with them in their vehicles at the TCPs and Metro stations. This fact was in direct contravention of the SecArmy and SecDef guidance on 4 January. The word had not passed to the DCNG supply officers who equipped the TCP personnel with the gear anticipating they might need it.
By the time of the breach, the Joint Task Force leadership knew their troops at the TCPs and Metro stations had the necessary riot gear and could be directed to designated rally points for formation and movement to the Capitol. That was LTC Hunter’s plan if the DCNG had been given permission to move. The TCP based troops would not have required the assistance and coordination from the Army Staff that Piatt and Flynn falsely stated they required in their sworn testimony. To a person, every leader in the DCNG wanted to get to Capitol Hill with deliberate speed when the Capitol security perimeter was breached. Their attitude was “This is What We Do.” “Send Me.”
In fact, responding to civil unrest within the confines of the District of Columbia was a foundational mission, a statutory mission of the D.C. National Guard, given it by the Congress. It is part of the reason the moniker of the D.C. National Guard is “Capital Guardians.” The Dome of the U.S. Capitol is literally on the uniform of every D.C. Guardsman. DCNG has responded to civil unrest in the District in 1968 after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it did so again during the 1971 anti-Vietnam War May Day riots, the 2000 IMF riots and the recent riots in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. BG Robert K. Ryan had commanded 5,530 joint service members from 12 states and the District during the unrest in the city following the Floyd murder. He was a retired career ATF special agent. He took some unfair hits because of a helicopter incident in the city, but no one doubted Ryan’s competence or dedication to the mission or his people. Ryan enjoyed the full confidence of the DCNG command team. He would lead 25,711 joint service members from 50 states, three territories, and the District in the immediate aftermath of the 6 January unpleasantness. In their perjured testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Piatt and Flynn were saying, by implication, that this Joint Task Force Commander, his headquarters and staff did not exist.
Piatt and Flynn were similarly trying to airbrush the work of Craig Hunter. Hunter, was a unicorn, an African-American originally from Florida, who started his career as an enlisted sailor, but became an Army Apache pilot and CIA operations officer, before becoming a medavac pilot in the D.C. Guard. He had extensive special operations experience, served on the Joint Staff, and was a resident NDU grad. Many people considered him the future of the D.C. Guard. MG Walker had referenced his initiative in immediately rushing to the Capitol and linking up with USCP and MPD once the Capitol was breached, during his March 2021 Senate testimony. The testimony Piatt and Flynn were trying to discredit with their fake timelines and statements. Hunter and Sergeant Major Barrick, his senior enlisted leader, were on the Hill scouting rally points and coordinating with MPD and USCP early after the breach. Incidentally, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Task Force on the afternoon was a Colonel, like Hunter a resident NDU grad and a combat-experienced aviator, and unlike Hunter, he was a still-serving CIA officer. Piatt and Flynn’s testimony airbrushed these men (and women) and many others from history and falsely replaced them with the Army Staff, who according to them, was doing all the heavy lifting [“40 officers and noncommissioned officers” who never left the Pentagon]. This was wrong.
In his testimony, Piatt states:
During a January 4, 2021 back brief from MG Walker to the SecArmy, MG Walker briefed the commitment criteria for employment of the QRF and expressed no concerns with the guidance for the use of the QRF.
The above statement is misleading and disingenuous. On the morning of 4 January 2021, at 11:31AM, Colonel Jon Ebbert, J-3, Director of Operations for the DCNG sent an e-mail to MG Walker, copying Colonel Matthews. Subject was, “Triggers for QRF Deployment,” the e-mail read:
The QRF will be on standby but won't be used unless required. The CG will deploy the QRF based on a MPD Chief of Police request.
Indicators that the QRF may deploy include the following events: Flash crowd that is not manageable by assembled Law Enforcement; Civil unrest not manageable by assembled Law Enforcement Civil Disturbance Units; Large scale vandalism and looting (ie City Center area); Vandalism or damage to National Monuments or Museums; Attempts to breach Federal or District government buildings; Acts of arson.
Very respectfully,
COL Jonathan S. Ebbert
During the afternoon meeting that Piatt references in his statement, with the Secretary, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff presents, the discussion of what might happen in an emergency came up. MG Walker listed the triggers for QRF employment contained in COL Ebbert’s e-mail to the Secretary and no one objected. However, at 9:12PM, on the evening of 4 January, an Army Staff action officer changed the draft document that MG Walker had reviewed with the Secretary earlier in the afternoon. The draft delegation to MG Walker had initially read:
You may employ the DCNG Quick Reaction Force (QRF) only as a last resort, in response to a request from an appropriate civil authority. If the QRF is employed, DCNG personnel will be clearly marked and/or distinguished from civilian law enforcement. You will notify me immediately upon your authorization.
The changed delegation memo read:
I withhold authority to approve employment of the DCNG Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and will do so only as a last resort, in response to a request from an appropriate civil authority. I will require a concept of operation prior to authorizing employment of the QRF. If the QRF is employed, DCNG personnel will be clearly marked and/or distinguished from civilian law enforcement personnel. You will notify me immediately of any requests for QFR employment.
The change effectively limited the discretion of Walker to deploy the QRF when the very trigger scenarios that COL Ebbert had identified 2 days prior actually occurred on 6 January. The Chief of MPD made an urgent request for DCNG to assist with a: “flash crowd that is not manageable by assembled law enforcement,”; with “civil unrest not manageable by assembled law enforcement civil disturbance units”; with “large scale vandalism and looting” and with “attempts to breach federal or district government buildings.” Now Piatt and Flynn were deceitfully testifying that the QRF was never at all contemplated to be employed in those scenarios.
In a Question for the Record submitted by Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, LTG Piatt is asked when he became aware of Acting Secretary Miller’s determination that “all available forces of the D.C. National Guard [were] required to support the MPD and USCP” at the Capitol? Piatt answers:
“I learned that Acting Secretary of Defense’s approval of the full mobilization of the District of Columbia National Guard at a time after 3:04 p.m. To the best of my recollection, I learned of the approval during the Army planning meeting on a secure teleconference that began before 3:00 p.m.”
The above statement is one of the few times Piatt answered a question somewhat truthfully. His statement tells us a few things. Piatt did not learn of Miller’s decision from McCarthy. He also did not see McCarthy tell Walker of the decision. Walker was on the same Army “planning meeting.” That such a momentous determination by the Acting SecDef was not conveyed by Secretary McCarthy to his principal staff officer speaks volumes as to McCarthy’s priorities on the afternoon of 6 January. The answer also shows that Piatt perjured himself when he says McCarthy personally tasked Walker at 3:05PM. The one untruthful part of the answer was that the video conference on the afternoon of the 6th was an actual Army planning meeting.
Piatt stated:
“The Secretary [McCarthy] surveyed the Capitol to establish where the best anchor point would be.”
If true, that assertion was a new revelation and is not mentioned in the public DoD timeline. Why the Secretary of the Army is conducting tactical reconnaissance is unknown. This statement is likely untrue, designed to mislead a congressional committee. The DoDIG report says McCarthy’s aide-de-camp carried a map with him to the Mayor’s office, not the Capitol. If McCarthy surveyed the Capitol, why didn’t he stop by and see Steve Sund, Chief Carroll or LTC Hunter? If the statement is true, it begs the question, of how it was safe for a civilian Army Secretary to reach the Capitol, but too dangerous to employ the DCNG?
In a Question for the Record, Chairwoman Malone noted that the D.C. National Guard timeline shows that at 4:20PM, more than an hour after Acting Secretary Miller’s 3:00PM authorization—Piatt advised Walker to “plan and prepare to transition from [traffic control points] and be placed around other federal buildings and monuments.” Piatt was asked if it was accurate that you recommended that the DCNG conduct a mission other than helping secure the Capitol? Piatt’s reply is easily parsed as a lie. He states:
I do not believe the D.C. National Guard timeline accurately describes my conversation with MG Walker. I believe the Army’s Report (Report of the United States Army Operations on January 6, 2021) more accurately describes the relevant details. I believe the description at page of the Army’s Report to be more accurate where it states that, at 3:04 p.m., “Immediately upon Acting SecDef’s approval, SecArmy directed MG Walker to recall all personnel and to initiate movement to posture forces to support the [Metropolitan Police Department]; SecArmy directed MG Walker to create a hasty plan to employ DCNG personnel and to ensure the Guardsmen were properly equipped for the mission.” It is important to note that, as a staff officer whose role it is to carry out the Secretary of the Army’s orders, I would not recommend to the D.C. National Guard’s Commander that he carry out preparations that would be inconsistent with the Secretary of the Army’s intent.
Piatt’s comment that the DCNG consider missions away from the Capitol was not just heard by Walker but a room full of other DCNG personnel. His sentiments were recorded contemporaneously by a 1st Lieutenant with no reason to lie. An officer who in his civilian capacity is a member of the Uniformed Division of the U.S. Secret Service. Piatt relies on the Army Report to refute the DCNG timeline because he knows the Army Report is a work of historical fiction that he himself wrote and controls. Further, by his own admission, at 3:04PM, Piatt had not spoken with McCarthy and may not have spoken with him by 4:20PM. Piatt likely didn’t know what McCarthy’s intent was. McCarthy was at MPD Headquarters with Mayor Bowser preparing for a nationally televised press conference, or alternatively, “drafting a plan.” According to the DoD public timeline, McCarthy would have been on a call with Miller, Milley and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau at 4:20PM.
When asked in a Question For the Record to explain the discrepancies between the DCNG and official Army Timelines, Piatt replies:
“Unfortunately, I cannot explain why that timeline differs from my recollection and the Department of the Army’s timeline. After the Capitol was breached on January 6, 2021, it was a chaotic day. It is possible that some of the reports that were used to put together the D.C. National Guard’s timeline came from individuals who misperceived or misremembered the events of that day. For example, many of the participants were distressed and talking over one another.”
Piatt’s reply meets the definition of chutzpah. He is claiming the DCNG personnel who heard his remarks misunderstood, misremembered or misstated them. Piatt knew exactly why the D.C. National Guard and Army timelines differed. He directed and supervised the creation of the Army timeline (which has not been publicly released or otherwise subjected to public scrutiny) which he knew to be false. Piatt shielded the Army Report from public disclosure and selectively released it when it inured to his benefit. The DCNG timeline portrayed him in a negative light, while he held the pen on the Army timeline, it was guaranteed to comport with his faulty memory. He provided the Army Report, or portions thereof, to congressional committees in order to discredit MG Walker.
Piatt is next asked if at any other time between 3:00PM and 4:32PM on January 6, he advised anyone in the D.C. National Guard’s chain of command that Guard personnel should not deploy directly to the Capitol. Piatt dishonestly replies:
At no point on January 6 did I tell anyone that the D.C. National Guard should not deploy directly to the Capitol. My role that day was to make recommendations and to help guide the Army’s planning efforts that ultimately led to the re-taking and re-securing of the Capitol. Between 3:00 p.m. and 4:32 p.m., the Army Staff, which included myself, was assisting with coordinating numerous tasks, including assisting the D.C. National Guard to prepare to conduct their new mission once it was approved by the Acting Secretary of Defense.
Piatt’s above answer is again false and misleading. First, Piatt did not limit himself from 3:00PM to 4:32PM, he replied that at no time during January 6 did I tell anyone that the D.C. National Guard should not deploy directly to the Capitol. Although not in the chain of command, or a decisionmaker, Piatt did tell the 2:30PM conference call participants that it was his best military advice that the DCNG not be deployed to the Capitol. The Secretary of the Army was incommunicado. Walker was communicating through Piatt. Walker sought permission to at a minimum to deploy the QRF. Presumably, Piatt conveyed MG Walker’s request to deploy to the Capitol to Secretary McCarthy, and then recommended that the Secretary reject Walker’s request. Lastly, Piatt repeats the falsity that the Army Staff was assisting the DCNG with preparations to conduct its new mission when approved. The Army Staff provided no technical, administrative, logistical, medical or legal support to the DCNG Joint Task Force—directly or indirectly—between the time of the breach and the 5:08PM movement of 154 D.C. Guardsmen to the Capitol.
Chairwoman Maloney last asked Piatt to clarify whether at any point on January 6, he expressed a concern about the visuals, image, or public perception of the sending the D.C. National Guard to the Capital even if you did not specifically use the term “optics”? She asked what specifically Piatt had stated.
I do not recall using the term optics, visuals, image, public perception or any similar term during the 2:30 p.m. phone call, or in any other conversation on January 6, 2021. I respect and understand that others may recall things differently, but ultimately, on that day, my chief concern was developing a plan to effectively assist D.C. and Federal authorities in regaining control of the U.S. Capitol. This is what I was ordered to do during the 2:30 p.m. phone call by the Secretary of the Army, as he ran to get approval for the use of the D.C. National Guard from the Acting Secretary of Defense.
During the 2:30 p.m. call, in gathering necessary information to help develop and coordinate a plan, I recall asking those on the call to identify specific tasks that were needed to be performed by the D.C. National Guard. I asked questions to help determine the mission requirements and the best ways to employ the National Guard Soldiers. I asked if there were other buildings or monuments that needed protection to seek ways to free up law enforcement officers so they could immediately respond to the U.S. Capitol. I also asked if there were any additional armed law enforcement personnel conducting missions from which the National Guard Soldiers could relieve them. I knew that the forces that the Army had available were not postured, prepared, or equipped to conduct this type of law enforcement operation.
Piatt’s response is again troubling. Piatt told the DoDIG that optics were a concern as the Army prepared to deploy Soldiers into downtown D.C. in response to the D.C. RFA, but he could not remember making that statement during the telephone call specifically about Chief Sund’s request for immediate assistance during the 2:30PM. Chief Contee, Chief Sund, and MG Walker each recounted Piatt expressing concerns about optics during their sworn testimony before various Congressional committees.
Four other DCNG soldiers heard Piatt say optics were an important consideration. Two Army witnesses on the conference called [based at the Pentagon] told the DoDIG that LTG Piatt questioned the impression that the or “optic” of uniformed Soldiers rushing into the Capitol would make with the public. In a January 2021 media interview, Chief Steven Sund recalled that, after he pleaded for immediate and urgent National Guard assistance during the 2:30PM conference call, Piatt said “I don’t like the visual of the National Guard standing a police line with the Capitol in the background.” Piatt at first publicly denied making the comment, then later “backtracked” according to a media report stating that although he didn’t recall saying anything about optics but Army note-takers in the room told him he “may” have said something similar to what Sund recalled.18 However, by March 2021, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Salesses appeared in the same joint Senate HSGAC and Senate Rules Committee meeting where MG Walker was appearing. Salesses stated in his sworn testimony, that in preparing for the hearing, he had spoken directly with Piatt on the issue and Piatt denied saying anything about optics during the meeting.
Piatt evidently forgot about the Army notetaker present in McCarthy’s office with him who heard and recorded his statements. Notetakers on two different sides of the river heard Piatt say the optics matter. At least 9 people then who were in the meeting heard Piatt mention optics. Only Piatt and Flynn are adamant that he did not. Lastly and very importantly, Piatt asserts that the forces the “Army______ had available were not postured, prepared, or equipped to conduct this type of [civil disturbance] law enforcement operation.” Piatt’s last sentence is true only if you place the word “Staff” between “Army” and “had” and
you forget that we are talking about a civil disturbance response mission, a core mission of the D.C. National Guard. There is a reason the United States Government gave all of those CD or riot kits to the D.C. National Guard. Hint/Hint, it wasn’t to plan. It was to respond to civil disturbances in Washington, D.C. Every leader in the D.C. Guard wanted to respond and knew they could respond to the riot at the seat of government. They set stunned watching in the Armory while for the first time in its 219 year history, the D.C. National Guard was not allowed to respond to a riot in the city.In a Question For the Record from Chairwoman Maloney,
GEN Flynn is asked if at any point he observed LTG Piatt express a concern about visuals, image, or public perception of sending the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol even if he did not specifically use the term “optics”? What specifically did he state and when? GEN Flynn replies:No, I did not observe LTG Piatt express concern about the visuals, image, or public perception of sending the D.C. National Guard to the U.S. Capitol at any point on January 6, 2021 or in the following days. In the few minutes that I listened to the 2:30 p.m. phone call, LTG Piatt’s demeanor was calm, that of a combat-experienced leader reacting to a violent, unpredictable event. It was in clear contrast to others on the call.
MG Walker, BG Dean, COL Matthews and CSM Brooks have a combined 130 years of service to our Army. They had served multiple tours to Iraq and Afghanistan among them. Each is a recipient of at least 1 Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service during combat operations. Walker is a 32 veteran of federal agent and intelligence officer He has been shot at and he has shot people. Sullivan, Sund and Contee have over 90 combined years of police service in some of the toughest streets of our country. None of the men on the call (and they were all men) were strangers to violence.
Flynn’s comment suggests that Piatt’s calm demeanor was a reflection of his combat experience. Others would say it reflected his indifference and tone deafness. Flynn’s comment was aimed at denigrating these soldiers and public servants because they expressed an urgent desire to re-establish security at the Capitol and to protect the Congress of the United States. That is the noticeable contrast that Flynn observed.Chairwoman Maloney also asked Flynn, “At any point during this call, or during an other communication on January 6, did you personally express a concern about the visuals, image, or public perception of sending the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol even if you did not specifically use the term “optics”? What specifically did you state and when? Flynn replied:
No. I never expressed a concern about the visuals, image, or public perception of sending the D.C. National Guard to the U.S. Capitol. When the Army received the request for D.C. National Guard support, my focus was to facilitate the planning and execution of Secretary McCarthy’s decisions and guidance regarding Army support on January 6, 2021.
In the above answer Flynn again engaged in outright perjury. MG Walker and COL Matthews, and others on the call were very familiar with whom Flynn was, knew his voice, and had spoken to him in different contexts. Both Walker and Matthews heard Flynn identify himself and unmistakably heard him say that optics of a National Guard presence on Capitol Hill was an issue for him. That it would not look good. Either Piatt or Flynn mentioned “peaceful protestors.”19 Flynn likely did very little if any planning to facilitate the immediate and urgent movement of D.C. National Guard soldiers and airmen to the U.S. Capitol. Flynn’s only personal contact with the DCNG on 6 January would be via the 2:30PM call and the secure VTC he set up. The Army Staff action officers who worked for him had no direct contact with Joint Task Force-DC under BG Robert K. Ryan.
In response to a Question For the Record from Ranking Member Comer, LTG Piatt replies:As established by the 18 U.S.C. 1385 (the Posse Comitatus Act), the Army does not conduct law enforcement operations against American citizens, subject to a few limited exceptions.
Piatt is intentionally seeking to obfuscate issues. Posse Comitatus did not apply to the DCNG, sitting in its Armory on 6 January, while the Capitol was being overrun. He is well aware that the Posse Comitatus Act is not applicable to the D.C. National Guard, or any National Guard, in a militia status. Piatt was involved in the uplift of over 5,000 out-of-state National Guardsmen into the District of Columbia, ironically under the command of BG Robert K. Ryan, during the first week of June 2020. Posse Comitatus was inapplicable to those forces. Even if the Act applied to National Guard in a militia status, the Act would not apply to the D.C. National Guard because the D.C. National Guard was created by a specific act of Congress. The D.C. Code is such an act, an in pertinent part states: § 49–103. Suppression of riots.
When there is in the District of Columbia a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men acting together by force with attempt to commit a felony or to offer violence to persons or property, or by force or violence to break and resist the laws, or when such tumult, riot, or mob is threatened, it shall be lawful for the Mayor of the District of Columbia, or for the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia, or for the National Capital Service Director, to call on the Commander-in-Chief to aid them in suppressing such violence and enforcing the laws; the Commander-in-Chief shall thereupon order out so much and such portion of the militia as he may deem necessary to suppress the same, and no member thereof who shall be thus ordered out by proper authority for any such duty shall be liable to civil or criminal prosecution for any act done in the discharge of his military duty.
ConclusionGiven the glaring deficiencies with respect to the DoD IG investigation, and given that his name was unfairly besmirched, MG Walker requests an independent review of the investigative findings of the DoDIG report and most importantly, the Army Report that was created at LTG Piatt’s direction should be publicly released, independently reviewed and substantiated. The timeline the Army produced should be carefully scrubbed for accuracy. Evidence of the actually planning activities of the Army Staff, and especially of the G3/5/7/ under BG LaNeve and LTG Flynn should be reviewed. What planning and coordination did these individuals actually conduct? How did this planning enable DCNG to support the U.S. Capitol Police on 6 June after the Capitol had been breached? What evidence is there of the planning and support the Army Staff provided to DCNG after the Capitol’s breach and before DCNG deployed to the Capitol after 5PM on January 6, 2021.
Unanswered QuestionsDid Miller believe that he had authorized the actual deployment of the DCNG to the Capitol so that McCarthy’s decision to seek his concurrence of a deployment plan was not required?
Where was Ryan McCarthy on the afternoon of 6 January, what is his personal timeline?
Where did Secretary McCarthy call MG Walker from at 3:05PM, 4:35PM and 5:00PM?
What phones were used to call Acting Secretary Miller and MG Walker?
Where is the plan that Secretary McCarthy generated with the Mayor?Why didn’t McCarthy and or LaNeve invite DCNG participation in the planning that occurred at MPD?
Who conveyed the plan (any plan) to DCNG?
Where is the plan? Why wasn’t it implemented on 6 January?Were congressional leaders and the press mislead by being told that the DCNG was mobilized (with an inference that the DCNG had been approved to come to the Capitol)?
What kind of operation are Troy O’Donnell [Sean O'Donnell? Acting Inspector General, DoD]and Marguerite C. Garrison [Deputy Inspector General Administrative Investigations, DoD OIG Senior Leadership] running, what is their agenda? _______________
Notes:1 The Capitol Insurrection: Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions (Part II) | House Committee on Oversight and Reform
2 HHRG-117-GO00-Wstate-FlynnC-20210615.pdf (house.gov)
3 HHRG-117-GO00-Wstate-PiattW-20210615-U1.pdf (house.gov)
4
https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Arti ... -to-prepa/5 The QRF was actually directed to move at 2:14PM, according to JTF-DC records.
6 BG Dean directed BG Ryan to move the QRF from JBA to the Armory at 14
7 Mayor Bowser incorrectly introduces McCarthy as Mr. McCartney at the beginning of the news engagement.
8 It should be noted that this so-called plan for the deployment of the DCNG was developed by McCarthy between 4:05PM and 4:30PM, but that the publicly released DoD timeline for 6 January states that McCarthy participated in a 4:18PM phone call with the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, further shortening the supposed 20 minutes that McCarthy used to develop his detailed plan to employ the DCNG.
9 The DCNG SGS did not participate or observe the 2:30PM or the follow-on secure teleconference but signed the document as a staffing action. The timeline is drawn largely from the contemporaneous notes of MG Walker’s aide-de-camp, designated notetaker during the day.
10 Piatt’s January 2021 public statement was in response allegations from Steve Sund about the 2:30PM call. The statement no appears on the Army Public Affairs website as Piatt’s narrative has changed.
11 Notably neither Sund, Contee, nor Walker in recounting the 2:30PM phone call ever stated the either McCarthy or Mayor Bowser were on the call.
12 It is unclear why the Secretary of the Army who had a 1-star general and a lieutenant colonel on his personal staff to address media inquiries, needed to personally address false news stories while the Capitol was under siege and the D.C. National Guard had not been authorized to move.
14 The TF Guardian Commander, LTC Craig Hunter, was an actual combat-seasoned medevac pilot. He required no instruction or direction from the Army Staff.
15 Despite the restrictions imposed by the civilian chain of command.
16 DCNG logisticians had not received word of the restrictions on riot gear imposed by SecDef and SecArmy. They made sure full riot gear for each Guardsmen were contained in their GSA vehicles.
17 Much of the equipment DCNG had in stock on 6 January was left over for the summer 2020 civil unrest.
18 Pentagon restricted commander of D.C. Guard ahead of Capitol riot - The Washington Post
19 Matthews did not know Flynn well, but had been around MG Walker when he spoke to Flynn in person at the Pentagon.
