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Part 1 of 2

Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact*
by Roland G. Fryer, Jr. Harvard University Society of Fellows and NBER; Paul S. Heaton University of Chicago; Steven D. Levitt University of Chicago; Kevin M. Murphy University of Chicago
April 2006

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* We would like to thank Jonathan Caulkins, John Donohue, Lawrence Katz, Glenn Loury, Derek Neal, Bruce Sacerdote, Sudhir Venkatesh, and Ebonya Washington for helpful discussions on this topic. Elizabeth Coston and Rachel Tay provided exceptional research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Sherman Shapiro, the American Bar Foundation, and the National Science Foundation.

Abstract

A wide range of social indicators turned sharply negative for Blacks in the late 1980s and began to rebound roughly a decade later. We explore whether the rise and fall of crack cocaine can explain these patterns. Absent a direct measure of crack cocaine’s prevalence, we construct an index based on a range of indirect proxies (cocaine arrests, cocaine-related emergency room visits, cocaine-induced drug deaths, crack mentions in newspapers, and DEA drug busts). The crack index we construct reproduces many of the spatial and temporal patterns described in ethnographic and popular accounts of the crack epidemic. We find that our measure of crack can explain much of the rise in Black youth homicides, as well as more moderate increases in a wide range of adverse birth outcomes for Blacks in the 1980s. Although our crack index remains high through the 1990s, the deleterious social impact of crack fades. One interpretation of this result is that changes over time in behavior, crack markets, and the crack using population mitigated the damaging impacts of crack. Our analysis suggests that the greatest social costs of crack have been associated with the prohibition-related violence, rather than drug use per se.

I. Introduction

Between 1984 and 1994, the homicide rate for Black males aged 14-17 more than doubled and homicide rates for Black males aged 18-24 increased almost as much, as shown in Figure 1. In stark contrast, homicide rates for Black males 25 and older were essentially flat over the same period. By the year 2000, homicide rates had fallen back below their initial levels of the early 1980s for almost all age groups.1

Homicide was not the only outcome that exhibited sharp fluctuations over this time period in the Black community. Figure 2 presents national time series data by race for fetal death rates, low birth weight babies, weapons arrests, and the fraction of children in foster care.2 All of these time series exhibit noticeable increases for Blacks--typically followed by offsetting declines—starting in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The fraction of Black children in foster care more than doubled, fetal death rates and weapons arrests of Blacks rose more than 25 percent, and Black low birth weight babies increased nearly 10 percent.3 Among Whites, there is little evidence of parallel adverse shocks. The poor performance of Blacks relative to Whites represents a break from decades of convergence between Blacks and Whites on many of these measures.4

The concurrent rises and declines in outcomes as disparate as youth homicide, low birth weight babies, and foster care rates presents a puzzle, especially when many standard economic and labor market measures for Blacks show no obvious deviations from trend over the same period (Blank 2001). In this paper, we examine the extent to which one single underlying factor – crack cocaine – can account for the fluctuations in all these outcomes.5

Crack cocaine is a smoked version of cocaine that provides a short, but extremely intense, high. The invention of crack represented a technological innovation that dramatically widened the availability and use of cocaine in inner cities. Virtually unheard of prior to the mid-1980s, crack spread quickly across the country, particularly within Black and Hispanic communities (Bourgois 1996, Chitwood, et al. 1996, Johnson 1991). Many commentators have attributed the spike in Black youth homicide to the crack epidemic’s rise and ebb (Blumstein 1998, Cook and Laub 1998, Cork 1999, and Grogger and Willis 2000). Sold in small quantities in relatively anonymous street markets, crack provided a lucrative market for drug sellers and street gangs (Bourgois 1996, Jacobs 1999). Much of the violence is attributed to attempts to establish property rights not enforceable through legal means (Bourgois 1996, Chitwood, et al. 1996). With respect to other outcomes, the physiological evidence regarding the damage that crack cocaine does to unborn babies suggests that crack usage might explain the patterns in fetal death and low birth weight babies (Frank et. al. 2001, Datta-Bhutatad 1998), although there is no consensus (Zuckerman 2002). The highly addictive nature of crack, combined with relatively high crack usage rates by women (Bourgois 1996, Chitwood, et al. 1996), could contribute to dysfunctional home environments leading to placement of children into foster care.

In spite of the general appreciation of the potential role that crack may have played in driving the patterns observed in the data (e.g., Bennett et al. 1996, Wilson 1990), especially with respect to the Black youth homicide spike (Cook and Laub 1998, Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998, Levitt 2004), there has been remarkably little rigorous empirical analysis of crack’s rise and its corresponding social impact. The scarcity of research appears to be due in part to the great difficulty associated with constructing reliable quantitative measures of the timing and intensity of crack’s presence in local geographic areas. Baumer et al. (1998), Cork (1999), and Ousey and Lee (2004) use cocaine-related arrests as a proxy for crack. Ousey and Lee (2002) supplement arrest data with the fraction of arrestees testing positive for cocaine. Grogger and Willis (2000) use breaks from trend in cocaine-related emergency room visits in a sample of large cities, as well as survey responses from police chiefs in these cities to measure the timing of crack’s arrival. Corman and Mocan (2000) use drug deaths, but the data do not specify which drug is responsible.

In this paper, we take a somewhat different approach to measuring crack cocaine. Rather than relying on a single measure, we assemble a range of indicators that are likely to proxy for crack. These include cocaine arrests and cocaine-related emergency room visits as in the previous literature, but also the frequency of crack cocaine mentions in newspapers, cocaine-related drug deaths, and the number of DEA drug seizures and undercover drug buys that involve cocaine. While each of these proxies has important shortcomings, together they paint a compelling story for capturing fluctuations in crack. As demonstrated in Figure 3, the national time-series aggregates for these variables tend to follow a similar pattern, rising sharply around 1985, peaking between 1989 and 1993, and in most cases declining thereafter. In spite of the aggregate similarities, using just one of the proxies does not appear to be sufficient for describing crack: the average cross-city correlation in the measures is only about .35. By combining the various measures together into a single factor, however, we are able to generate a crack cocaine index that is not particularly sensitive to any one of the individual measures and corresponds well to the ethnographic and media accounts of crack cocaine’s spread and prevalence. Our measure captures the intensity of crack’s presence in a particular place and time and can be constructed for a wide variety of geographic areas. We estimate our crack index annually for large cities and states over the period 1980-2000. These data available to other researchers.6

We find that crack rose sharply beginning in 1985, peaked in 1989, and slowly declined thereafter. Our estimated crack incidence remains surprisingly high over time – in the year 2000 crack remains at 60-75 percent of its peak level. Crack is concentrated in central cities, particularly those with large Black and Hispanic populations. The cities experiencing the highest average levels of crack are Newark, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and New York. Although crack arrived early to the West Coast, the strongest impacts were ultimately felt in the Northeast and the Middle Atlantic States. The Midwest experienced relatively low rates of crack.

Our index of crack is strongly correlated with a range of social indicators. We find that the rise in crack from 1984-1989 is associated with a doubling of homicide victimizations of Black males aged 14-17, a 30 percent increase for Black males aged 18-24, and a 10 percent increase for Black males 25 and over, and thus accounts for much of the observed variation in homicide rates over this time period.7 The rise in crack can explain 20-100 percent of the observed increases in Black low birth weight babies, fetal death, child mortality, and unwed births in large cities between 1984 and 1989. In contrast, the measured impact of crack on Whites is generally small and statistically insignificant. We estimate that crack is associated with a 5 percent increase in overall violent and property crime in large U.S. cities between 1984 and 1989.8

The link between crack and adverse social outcomes weakens, however, over the course of the sample. Even though crack use does not disappear, the adverse social consequences largely do. Thus, by the year 2000, we observe little impact of crack, which accounts for much of the recovery in homicide rates and child outcomes for Blacks over the period. We hypothesize that the decoupling of crack and violence may be associated with the establishment of property rights and the declining profitability of crack distribution. The fading of adverse child outcomes may be attributable to the concentration of crack usage among a small, aging group of hardcore addicts (MacCoun and Reuter 2001, page 123).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief history of crack cocaine. Section III describes the data we use. Section IV presents our methodology for combining the crack proxies into a single index, presents the results of that exercise, and assesses the determinants of the timing and intensity with which crack hits a city or state. Section V analyzes the extent to which crack can account for the observed fluctuations in social indicators since 1985. Section VI concludes. The appendix outlines the sources of data used and the precise construction of the variables and crack cocaine index.

Section II: A Brief History of Crack Cocaine

Cocaine is a powerful and addictive stimulant first extracted from the coca plant in 1862. During the 19th century, cocaine had a variety of medical uses and could be purchased over the counter, including in the original version of Coca-Cola (Bayer 2000). In the 1970s, inhaled cocaine emerged as a popular but high-priced recreational drug. The street price of pure powder cocaine was roughly $100 to $200 per gram (which is equivalent to $300-$600 per gram in 2004 dollars). The high price of cocaine had two important implications: (1) cocaine use was concentrated among the affluent, and (2) retail cocaine purchases required hundreds of dollars because it was impractical to transact in fractions of grams.9

Crack cocaine is a variation of cocaine made by dissolving powder cocaine in water, adding baking soda, and heating. The cocaine and the baking powder form an airy condensate, that when dried, takes the form of hard, smokeable “rocks.”10 A pebble-sized piece of crack, which contains roughly one-tenth a gram of pure cocaine, sells for $10 on the street and provides an intense high, but one that lasts only fifteen minutes.

Crack is an important technological innovation in many regards. First, crack can be smoked, which is an extremely effective means of delivering the drug psychopharmacologically. Second, because crack is composed primarily of air and baking soda, it is possible to sell in small units containing fractions of a gram of pure cocaine, opening up the market to consumers wishing to spend $10 at a time. Third, because the drug is extremely addictive and the high that comes from taking the drug is so short-lived, crack quickly generated a large following of users wishing to purchase at high rates of frequency. The profits associated with selling crack quickly eclipsed that of other drugs. Furthermore, unlike most other drugs, crack is often sold in open-air, high-volume markets between sellers and buyers who do not know one another.

There are three primary reasons why crack may have been so devastating to the Black community. First, street gangs, which already controlled outdoor spaces, became the logical sellers of crack (Venkatesh and Levitt 2000). Gang violence, primarily as a means of establishing and maintaining property rights, grew dramatically, and potentially accounts for the sharp rise in Black youth violence. Second, the increased returns associated with drug dealing attracted young Black males to gangs and may have reduced educational investment. Third, a large fraction of crack users were young women. Prostitution was common among female crack addicts, potentially accelerating the spread of AIDS and the unwanted birth of low birth weight “crack babies.”11 Crack addicted mothers and fathers are unlikely to provide nurturing home environments for their children (and often ended up incarcerated), leading to the relinquishment of parental rights.

Section III: Data

We analyze data separately at the city-level and the state-level. The city-level analysis is carried out on the 144 cities with population greater than 100,000 in 1980. These cities are of particular interest because anecdotal evidence suggests that the problems associated with crack were concentrated in large urban areas. In addition, a number of the variables we use are collected at the city-level, making it a natural unit of analysis. Focusing on the state-level allows us to analyze outcome variables that are not available at the city level, and facilitates a linkage between our work and the large empirical literature carried out using state-level data. In all cases, annual data are used for the period 1980 to 2000.

As noted earlier, we utilize a range of measures to proxy for the prevalence of crack.12 At the city-level, these outcomes are crack-related emergency room visits, cocaine-related arrests, the frequency of crack cocaine mentions in newspapers, DEA drug buys and seizures involving cocaine, and cocaine-related deaths. The emergency room data are based on information from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). These data initially covered 14 cities, with that number growing to 19 by the end of the sample. In later years, these data distinguish between crack and powder cocaine, but for consistency over the whole period, we do not exploit this variation.13 The proxy we use is cocaine-related emergency room visits per capita in the metropolitan area. Arrest data are collected by city police departments and are available through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. Because of incomplete reporting, we follow Levitt (1998) and define our cocaine arrest measure as cocaine arrests as a fraction of total arrests in the city.14 Our measure of crack cocaine mentions in newspapers is the number of news articles in Lexis-Nexis with a city’s name and the words “crack” and “cocaine,” divided by the total number of articles with the city's name and the word “crime.” By constructing the variable as a ratio, we avoid obvious problems associated with the fact that large cities and those with local newspapers included in Lexis-Nexis will appear much more frequently in the database. The frequency of DEA drug buys and seizures per capita is taken from the System to Retrieve Drug Evidence (STRIDE) data base, which catalogs undercover drug buys and seizures carried out by DEA agents and informants, typically in support of criminal prosecutions. These data include approximately 274,000 cocaine transactions. The city in which the transaction occurred is recorded in the data set. STRIDE does not allow one to definitively distinguish between powder and crack cocaine.15 The final proxy for crack that we use is the rate per capita of cocaine-related deaths, drawn from the annual Mortality Detail File produced by the National Center for Health Statistics. The death data include accidental poisonings, suicides, and deaths due to long-term abuse for which cocaine use was coded by physicians as a primary or contributing factor. We cannot distinguish between crack cocaine and powder cocaine drug deaths in these data.

Each of these proxies suffers from important weaknesses. First, with the exception of the newspaper citations, the measures are unable to clearly differentiate between powder and crack cocaine. Second, both the cocaine arrest and DEA drug buy data are affected not just by the prevalence of crack usage, but also by the intensity of government enforcement efforts (see, for example, Horowitz 2001). Third, the DAWN emergency room data covers only a small set of metropolitan areas and the sample of hospitals that participates changes over time (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2003 Appendix B). Both the emergency room data and the drug death data are potentially affected by the subjective nature of physician determination of the contribution of cocaine to an emergency room visit or a death. Finally, the newspaper citation measure is the output of a relatively crude algorithm and suffers both from the criticism that in the early years of the epidemic there were other terms such as “rock cocaine” that were sometimes used to describe the product before crack cocaine became the agreed upon nomenclature, and also that the newsworthiness of crack-related stories may have declined over time, while consumption continued to rise.

The number of observations, means, and standard deviations for all of these city-level crack proxies are presented in the top panel of Table 1. Values are reported separately for the period prior to and after 1985, the year when crack use is believed to have become widespread. All of these indicators are much higher in the post-1985 period, even for those measures that do not directly distinguish between powder and crack cocaine. Crack mentions in newspapers are extremely low prior to 1985; these instances likely represent false positives in our Lexis-Nexis algorithm.16 Note that the number of observations available varies dramatically across measures due to differences in the cities covered by the data, as well as the years in which data are collected. The data appendix describes the statistical corrections that are done to account for missing values in the construction of our crack index.

When conducting our analysis at the state level, we drop the emergency room and crack citation variables since these measures are available only for a limited number of large cities. The rest of our city-level measures are available at the state-level. The state-level crack proxies are shown in the second panel of Table 1. The absolute levels of the crack proxies are generally lower in states than in large cities, but the patterns are otherwise similar.

The final two panels of Table 1 report the criminal, social, and economic outcomes that we are trying to explain using our crack index at the city-level and state-level respectively. These outcomes include age specific homicide rates, the full set of violent and property crimes tracked in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, fetal death, low-birth weight babies (singleton births only), teen births and unwed births, death rates of children aged one to four, weapons arrests, the number of new admissions to prison, the per capita number of children in the foster care system, the unemployment rate, and the poverty rate. When the data are available we analyze these variables separately by race. Some of the variables are available at the state-level only.

Section III: Identifying Crack

The prevalence of crack cocaine is not directly observable. Instead, we must rely on noisy proxies in an attempt to measure crack. The primary approach that we take for extracting the information available in these proxies is to construct a single index measure of crack using factor analysis.17 In particular, we estimate an equation of the form:

(1) Image

where the subscripts i, s, and t correspond to particular proxy measures, geographic units, and years respectively. The left-hand-side variables are the proxy measures all of which are stacked into a single vector. The variable Crack is not directly observed, but rather estimated along with the ß's . One could also include covariates on the right-hand side of equation (1) – indeed we allow for city-fixed effects in our baseline estimates – but for simplicity we omit these covariates from the formal discussion.

Estimation of equation (1) generates predicted values both for a set of factors (Crackst) and a set of coefficients (also known as loadings) ßi. We focus our analysis on the single factor that has the greatest explanatory power. Because our proxies are highly correlated, our data are well-described by a one-factor model which captures roughly 50% of the variation in the proxies.18 Additional factors contribute little in terms of explaining the observed variation in our data. The factor with the greatest explanatory power is what we will call “crack,” but more accurately it is the single index that explains the largest share of the variation in our crack proxies. The loadings tell us the degree to which each estimated factor influences the different outcome variables. The crack index we obtain is a weighted average of the proxy variables underlying it, with weights given by the squares of the loadings on each proxy.

There are three advantages to combining our multiple measures into a single index. First, we are interested in describing the observed patterns of crack’s arrival and fluctuations. Having one summary measure of crack rather than five separate proxies greatly simplifies this task. Second, because each of our individual proxy measures is quite noisy, combining them into a single index substantially increases the signal-to-noise ratio. For instance, in the simplest case where ßi =1 for each proxy, the share of the variance in a given measure that is attributable to a true signal is Image are the variance of the latent crack factor and the measurement error in proxy i respectively. Under the assumption that the measurement errors across proxies are i.i.d, the signal-to-total variance ratio of an equally-weighted index of N proxies is Image

A third possible benefit of using a single crack index arises when we turn to estimating the impact of crack on outcomes such as low-birth weight babies or crime rates. Although it might seem that putting each of the individual proxies directly on the right-hand side of such regressions would be preferable (see, for example Lubotsky and Wittenberg 2004), in the plausible scenario in which one or more of our individual proxies may be endogenous to a particular outcome of interest (e.g. when Black youth homicide is on the rise, police departments may respond by intensifying enforcement against drug sellers, holding constant overall crack use), use of an index provides potential benefits by imposing the restriction that each of the proxies has an identical impact on the outcome variable. If the proxies were each entered separately as explanatory variables, one might greatly overstate the role of crack in explaining fluctuations in social outcomes.

In estimating the impact of crack on social outcomes, an attractive alternative to constructing a single index is to instead use the various proxies as instrumental variables for one another. To the extent that the proxies are correlated with the underlying latent variable crack, but the measurement error in the proxies is uncorrelated, the various crack measures are plausible instruments for one another. We present results both using our single index proxy and using an instrumental variables approach.20

One unique feature of our data that we have not yet emphasized, but proves extremely valuable in our analysis, is the fact that crack cocaine was a technological innovation which was virtually unknown until around 1985. This provides us with a well defined pre-crack period. To the extent that our proxies/index are truly reflecting crack, they should have values near zero in the pre-1985 period. In addition, variation in the proxies prior to 1985 is likely to be almost purely measurement error. Comparing the variation in the proxies before and after crack arrives will provide useful insights into the extent to which fluctuations in our proxies after 1985 can plausibly be viewed as signal rather than noise.21

Section IV: The Prevalence of Crack Across Time and Space

Table 2 presents correlations across the various crack proxies we use in the analysis. The top panel of the table reports correlations across time for the national aggregates of the proxies. Given how similar the time-series patterns are for these variables in Figure 3, it is not surprising that these correlations are high, ranging from .225 to .951. The mean of the off-diagonal elements is equal to .71. The middle panel of the table presents correlations using either the city-year or the state-year as the unit of analysis. City-fixed effects and state-fixed effects have been removed to eliminate systematic and persistent reporting differences across areas. The correlation across the proxies falls, but remains substantial. For both the city and the state sample, all the pairwise correlations remain positive and the mean of the off-diagonal elements is .32 for cities and .36 for states. In other words, when a city or state is high relative to its usual value on one of the proxies in a given year, it tends to be high on all of them – consistent with the hypothesis that a single factor is driving the increase. The bottom panel of the table reports correlations at the city-year and state-year level after removing not only city or state fixedeffects, but also all of the aggregate time series variation using year dummies. Consequently, the correlations in the bottom panel reflect whether a city-year or state-year observation that is high relative to the rest of the sample in that year on one proxy also tends to be high on the other proxies. These correlations are much lower than the others shown in the table. The mean offdiagonal element in the city sample falls to only .07; in the state sample it is .15. The DEA cocaine busts and the newspaper citation index perform particularly poorly. These results highlight the fact that the co-movement of our proxy variables is due in large part to the fact that across many areas, all the proxies tend to be high in some years and low in others.

Table 3 presents our baseline estimates of the loadings obtained using factor analysis. The greater is the value corresponding to a particular proxy, the more influence it is given in constructing the crack index. 22 The factor loadings can be negative, although that is not the case for any of our analysis. We report five sets of estimates corresponding to the correlation matrices in Table 3: national aggregates (column 1), city-level data (columns 2 and 3), and state-level data (columns 4 and 5). At the city and state level, we report results before and after year-fixed effects have been removed. For the national aggregates, the loadings are relatively equal across the five proxies. The same is true at the city level before removing year-fixed effects (column 2), except that the DEA cocaine busts proxy receives less weight than the others. When year-fixed effects are taken out, more weight is given to cocaine deaths at the expense of cocaine-related ER visits and, to a lesser extent, crack-related newspaper citations. At the state level, cocaine arrests and cocaine deaths both get high weight and DEA drug busts are given more influence after year-fixed effects are removed.

Figure 4 presents population-weighted crack indexes that correspond to the factor analysis loadings for the national-level, city-level and state-level analysis in Table 3. We show results for the specifications without year-fixed effects; the patterns are similar for the other specifications. The crack index is identified only up to a scale of proportionality, so the absolute units of the crack measure are not directly interpretable, nor can they be directly compared across the three figures.

Our results regarding the time-series pattern of crack are not particularly sensitive to the level of aggregation used in the analysis. In all three cases, the crack index is low but rising slightly until 1985, at which point there is a sharp increase to a peak in 1989. The timing of crack’s rise that we estimate corresponds nicely with the anecdotal evidence regarding the introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s and its rapid proliferation. Our estimation technique in no way constrains the estimated crack prevalence to be low in the early years of the data; this result is driven purely by the data. The one noticeable difference between the three indexes is the pattern from 1989-2000. In the top figure using national aggregate data, the index falls almost 50 percent between 1989 and the end of the sample. In the city-level and state-level samples the decline is about 25 percent, with much of the decline coming in latter half of the 1990’s. Regardless of the index, one perhaps surprising result is that our crack index remains so high in 2000, a time in which many casual observers had declared the crack epidemic to have faded. Survey measures of crack usage, however, reinforce our conclusion that crack has not disappeared. The percentage of high school seniors reporting having used crack in the last twelve months fell roughly 30 percent (from 3.1 to 2.2 percent) between 1989 and 2000 (Johnston et al 2004). Eighth and tenth graders in the same survey, who were not asked about crack usage until 1990, reported the highest incidence of annual crack usage in 1999. There is also evidence that sharp declines in the price of crack have led those who use crack to consume it in greater quantities (MacCoun and Reuter 2001).

Existing evidence suggests that the impact of crack has been much greater on Blacks and Hispanics than on Whites. Because most of our proxy variables are not available separately by race, we are forced to take an indirect approach to identifying a race-specific crack index. Under the assumption that the loadings on the crack proxies are the same for Blacks and Whites, using the available data we can estimate a model in which the impact of crack varies by race. The overall per capita impact of crack in a city (or state) and year can be decomposed into
(2) Image where the P variables represent population shares by race and the coefficients are race- and city-specific crack estimates. captures how our crack index varies across cities at a given point of time as a function of the racial composition of the city; is the value the crack index would take in a hypothetical city all of whose residents were of the race in question. That coefficient does not necessarily directly reflect the relative rates of crack usage across individuals of different races if, for example, the presence of more Blacks in a city is associated with higher crack use by Whites. To estimate the relative impact of crack by race, we run a separate cross-sectional regression for each year with the crack index as the left-hand-side variable and race proportions as the right-hand-side variables, omitting a constant.

The results of this estimation are reported in Figure 5. For both city- and state-level analyses, crack among Blacks rises until 1989 and then remains relatively steady thereafter. In large cities, the estimated crack index for Whites is consistently 5-10 times lower than Blacks. In the state-level sample, Blacks are again much higher than Whites, and in both samples Hispanics appear roughly comparable to Blacks.

Figures 6 and 7 present crack estimates by region and size of central city respectively. In Figure 6, the Northeast experienced the greatest crack problem, followed by the West. In Figure 7, the time series pattern for crack in cities above and below 350,000 residents is quite similar, except that the crack levels are more than twice as high in the larger cites.23

Table 4 reports the cities and states in our sample with the highest and lowest estimated average crack prevalence over the period 1985-2000.24 Because our estimates are noisy at the city-level and the state-level due to substantial measurement error in our proxies, precise rankings must be viewed with the appropriate caution. The set of cities with the greatest crack problem includes cities one might expect: Newark, Philadelphia, New York, and Oakland, for instance. Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle, however, are perhaps surprising.25 Other cities one would expect to rank high such as New Orleans, Baltimore, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles also rank highly, but are not in the top ten. Among states, Maryland and New York head the list. The cities with the least evidence of crack tend to be smaller, geographically isolated cities, but not exclusively cities with low Black populations. Huntsville and Jackson, two of cities with the very low crack estimates, for example, are thirty and seventy percent Black respectively. The states with low crack tend to have large rural populations and few minorities.

Section V: The Impact of Crack Cocaine

In this section, we attempt to measure the impact that crack had on society by regressing a variety of outcome measures on our estimated crack index and varying combinations of covariates: (3) Image where CrackIndex is one of the crack indices we estimated above, and s corresponds to a geographic area (either national, state, or city), and t represents time. One important point to note is that our crack index is a measure of the severity of crack in an area as a whole. This severity can represent both the composition of the population as well as the intensity of use per person. For instance, since crack use appears to be more prevalent among Blacks than Whites, if two cities have the same value on the crack index, but one city has a higher proportion of Whites, the implication is that crack use per Black and crack use per White are likely to be higher in that city than the other city. Consequently, when we examine socio-economic outcomes as dependent variables, the logical specification involves defining outcomes in terms of rates per overall city population. For example, when we examine Black youth homicide, the dependent variable we use is Black youth homicides per 100,000 city residents, not Black youth homicides per Black youth.26

There are two obvious shortcomings associated with the simple OLS approach that we adopt. The first is that our crack index may suffer from measurement error, which will bias the estimates of crack’s impact, most likely in a downward direction. The second weakness of this approach is that the estimates we obtain reflect correlations, rather than true causal impacts. It is possible that omitted variables such as the erosion of social networks or the decline of two-parent households affects both crack and outcomes like homicide or children in foster care.

Instrumenting one proxy using the others provides a means of dealing with the issue of measurement error, under the assumption that the measurement error in the different proxies are uncorrelated (conditional on the other controls included in the regression). It is important to note, however, that this instrumenting strategy is unlikely to help in providing estimates that are directly interpretable as causal in nature. To the extent that omitted variables or reverse causality lead one of the crack proxies to be correlated with the error term in equation (3), it is likely that all of the crack proxies will suffer the same weakness.

Table 5 shows results from estimating equation (3) on our city-level sample using the city-level crack index. Each row of the table corresponds to a different outcome variable. The first column of the table reports the mean of the dependent variable in the sample; because our outcomes are denominated by the entire city population (not just Blacks or Whites depending on which race we are looking at), the reported means for both races are less than if the variables were per member of the group. Because Blacks make up a smaller percentage of the population, the reported means are particularly small relative to a rate per capita for Blacks. We allow the estimated coefficient on the crack index to vary by time period; columns 2-5 of the table report the coefficients for the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000 respectively.27 All specifications include city-fixed effects, year dummies, and controls for percent of the population that is Black and Hispanic, log population, and log per capita income. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, take into account AR1 serial correlation within cities over time.

The top panel of Table 5 reports outcomes for Blacks. The crack index is positively associated with eight of the nine outcomes we examine in the 1985-1989 time period, with statistically significant estimates at the .01 level in five of the cases. A similar pattern of estimates is present in the 1990-1994 period. After 1995, however, the link between the crack index and these social outcomes for Blacks disappears--more than half of the point estimates become negative in the last period, and only the male age 18-24 homicide rate has a positive and significant coefficients. The middle panel of Table 5 shows city-level estimates for Whites. Although the crack index is generally positively correlated with these outcomes after 1985 (21 of the 27 point estimates are positive), only 5 of the 27 coefficients are statistically different than zero. The bottom panel of the table analyzes results for overall crime rates, which are not separately available by race. The crack index is positively correlated with eight of nine crime categories from 1985-1989, six significantly, and seven of the nine categories from 1990-1994, but the estimated coefficients decline in magnitude and statistical significance in the final period for all categories of crime.

To aid in interpreting the magnitude of the effects implied by the coefficients in Table 5, we report graphically the fraction of the observed variation in the outcomes that can be accounted for by the crack index over the period in which crack rose sharply (1984-1989) in Figure 8, and from the peak of crack to the end of the sample (usually 1989-2000) in Figure 9. In these figures, we compare the observed percent changes for the crime and birth-related outcomes over these time periods to the implied impact of crack calculated in one of two ways: (1) using the crack index as in Table 5, and (2) instrumenting for cocaine arrests using the other crack proxies as instruments.28 The implied impact of crack from the OLS specification in a particular year is the product of the regression coefficient in Table 5 multiplied by the average value of the crack index in that year. The impact of crack between 1984 and 1989 is simply the difference between the measured impact of crack in 1989 and in 1984. Calculating the impact of crack in the instrumental variables regressions is done in a similar manner, with the added complication related to measurement error in the cocaine arrests proxy.29 The corresponding standard error bands are shown in the figure as well.

A number of important points emerge from Figure 8. First, comparing the columns shaded white (OLS estimates) and the columns shaded black (instrumental variables estimates), in most cases the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, although less precisely estimated. These generally larger IV estimates are consistent with the presence of measurement error in our index, leading to attenuation bias in our OLS results. Second, the magnitude of the actual percentage increase in homicide rates among young Black males is far greater than for the other variables considered. Our measure of crack cocaine explains a substantial part of this increase, particularly in the instrumental variables specifications. According to our IV estimates, crack can account for a 100-155 percent increase in Black male homicides among those aged 18- 24, and a change of 55-125 percent for Black male homicide among those aged 14-17. In contrast, our crack measure accounts for only small changes in older Black male homicide and White homicide. Third, for the birth/childhood outcomes, the impact of crack is larger for Blacks than for Whites, but the results are not as stark as for homicide. We estimate that the rise in crack between 1984 and 1989 accounts for roughly one-third of the increase in low birth weight Black babies, less than one-third of the Black rate of unwed births, much or all of the increase in Black child mortality and fetal death. For Whites, there is some apparent positive association between crack and low birth weight babies and child mortality. Finally, we find a positive relationship between crack and a wide range of crimes, although the magnitude is small when compared to the impact on Black youth homicide. In the OLS specifications, violent crime and property crime are both estimated to have increased by roughly 4 percent due to crack over the period 1984-1989; in the IV specifications the increase is approximately 10 percent, but very imprecisely estimated.

Figure 9 shows the estimated impact of changes in crack on the same set of outcomes for the period 1989-2000. One-half to three-fourths of the decline in homicide by Black males aged 14-17 can be attributed to the combined impact of a decline in the level of the crack index, and more importantly, the weakening of the link between crack and violence. By the year 2000, most of the crack-related spike in youth homicide in the late 1980s was gone--because the baseline level of youth homicide is almost three times higher in 1989 than in 1984, a 34 percent decrease in the latter period is equal and opposite to almost a 100 percent increase in the earlier period in terms of number of homicides. For older criminals and Whites, the impact of receding crack does not consistently explain a substantial fraction of the observed homicide declines in the 1990s. For Blacks, the adverse effects of crack on birth outcomes in the 1980s are essentially undone in the 1990s. The impacts on White birth outcomes are small and carry mixed signs. For city-level crime measures, the reductions attributable to crack in the 1990s erase much, but often not all, of the crack-driven increases in the 1980s. The notable exception to this pattern is the IV estimate on violent crime, which suggests that violent crime rose (although not statistically significantly) in the 1990s as crack receded (because the estimated impact of crack on violent crime is negative in the 1990s).

Table 6 replicates the analysis of Table 5, but using states as the unit of analysis rather than our sample of large cities. The regression results in Table 5 are quite similar to what we found for large cities; crack has the greatest impact on Black youth homicide, tends to be positively related to adverse birth outcomes for Blacks and is not significantly related to most outcomes for Whites. The impact of crack once again weakens over time. One important difference relative to the city sample is that overall crime is not positively and statistically related to crack in the state sample. In addition, there is less evidence of a strong impact of crack on Black birth outcomes outside of the large cities. A number of additional outcome measures are available at the state level: foster care rates, new prison commitments, unemployment rates, and poverty rates. None of these outcomes reveals a pattern suggestive of an important impact of crack in the expected direction. The negative relationship between crack and new prison commitments, while perhaps surprising given the enormous increase in drug-related incarceration over this period, hints at the possibility that aggressive punishment of drug sellers may have reduced the severity of the crack epidemic. In other words, the negative coefficient in the prison regression may primarily reflect reverse causality running from imprisonment to crack, rather than vice versa.

Figures 10 and 11 report the fraction of the observed variation in the outcomes at the state level that can be explained by the crack index for the periods 1984-1989, and 1989-2000. Not surprisingly given that crack was concentrated in large cities, the rise and fall of crack has less explanatory value at the state level. For instance, the crack index explains less than one-third of the overall rise in young Black male homicide at the state level, and only one-fifth of the increase in Black low birth weight babies. Overall, comparing the results in Figures 8-11, and noting that about 16 percent of the U.S. population resides in cities included in our city sample, we estimate that about 70 percent of the adverse impact of crack was felt in large cities, implying that the rates per capita were at least 10 times higher in large cities than in the rest of the country.

Section VI: Conclusion

A number of social, criminological, and economic variables experienced negative shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly among Blacks. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the rise of crack cocaine played an important contributing role. To overcome the absence of a reliable quantitative measure of crack, we construct a crack index based on a set of imperfect, but plausible proxies. This crack index reproduces many of patterns described in journalistic and ethnographic accounts including the timing of the crack epidemic and the disproportionate impact on Blacks and Hispanics. We find a strong link between our measure of crack and increased homicide rates by the young, especially among Blacks, in the late 1980s. During that time period, our crack index is also associated with adverse outcomes for babies – especially Black babies. By the early 1990s, however, the relationship between crack and unwelcome social outcomes had largely disappeared. Thus, though crack use persisted at high levels, it did so with relatively minor measurable social consequences. This finding is consistent with an initially high level of crack-related violence as markets responded to the changes in distribution methods associated with the technological shock that crack represented. After property rights were established and crack prices fell sharply reducing the profitability of the business, competition-related violence among drug dealers declined.

One explanation for the weakening relationship between the crack index and birth outcomes is the changing composition of crack users. Following its introduction, crack use was overwhelmingly a drug of adolescents and young adults, and its use was widespread. For instance, 7.2 percent of respondents in the National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health (SAMHSA 2003b) who were 18-22 in 1985 report lifetime crack usage, compared to only 2.8 percent of those who were 33-37 years old in 1985. Later cohorts also use crack at much lower rates than the first cohorts exposed to crack. In 2002, 0.6 percent of the age group that was 18- 22 in 1985 (and by 2002 was 35-39 years old) had used crack in the last month. In stark contrast, less than 0.2 percent of the 18-22 year olds in 2002 report using crack in the prior month. As crack addicts aged, fewer were in the high fertility age group. Presumably, as the dangers of crack to the fetus became clear, women intending to get pregnant may have avoided crack and those using crack may have been less likely to take a pregnancy to term.

If the rise of crack indeed exerted an important influence on social outcomes over the last two decades, then an obvious concern is that studies examining these outcomes which fail to adequately control for crack may generate misleading conclusions. Ayres and Donohue (2003), for instance, conjecture that the findings of Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (2000) regarding the impact of concealed weapons laws are spurious, driven by the omitted variable crack cocaine. Sailer (1999) and Joyce (2004) level the same charges at Donohue and Levitt’s (2001) analysis of the impact of legalized abortion on crime. An important application of the crack index we construct is as a control variable in future research.

Appendix

Data


This paper uses data from the 144 cities with population above 100000 in 1980 and the 50 U.S. States. The following table describes the data used in paper.

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* Cocaine deaths include accidental poisonings, suicides, and other deaths for which cocaine use was coded as a primary or contributing factor. Prior to 1989, deaths were classified using the International Classification of Diseases 9th revision (ICD-9); starting in 1999 deaths were coded using the 10th revision. Cocaine death entries under ICD-9 include ICD codes 8552, 3042, and 3056 as well as ICD codes 8501-8699, 9501-9529, 9620-9629, 972, 9801-9879, 3050-3054, 3057-3059 with a secondary code of 9685. Cocaine deaths under ICD-10 include codes F140-F149 and F190-F199, X42, X44, X62, X64, X85, Y12, and Y14 with secondary code T405. For more information on counting drug-related deaths see Lois Fingerhut & Christine Cox, "Poisoning mortality, 1985-1995", Public Health Reports 113:3, 1998.

** Cocaine busts were defined as busts with primary drug code 9041 and secondary drug codes L000, L005, L010, L269, L900, and L920

Estimating the Crack Index

The procedure for estimating the crack index is:

1. Remove city or state fixed effects from each of the crack proxies. Readjust each proxy to have a grand mean of 0 during the period from 1980-1984.

2. Normalize each of the proxies to have unit variance. This eliminates differences in units of measure across proxies.

3. The factor loadings ( i) and scores (Zst) satisfy the relationship:

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Here i indexes a proxies, s a location, and t a time period. We require a scale restriction to separately identify the loadings and scores. In our analysis, we impose that the sum of the squared loadings is one.

4. Select an initial value for the loadings.

5. Stack each of the available proxies at a particular location/time. Use least squares regression across the proxies to estimate the value of the crack index (score) at each location/time. These regressions are within a location/time, across measures.

6. The squared loadings measure the extent to which each of the proxies contributes to the overall crack index. To account for missing data, at each location/time, multiply the scores calculated in step 5 by Image, where Yi represents the loading associated with proxy i and the summation is made over all available proxies at that location/time.

7. Regress each proxy on the scores calculated in step 5 to generate a new estimate of the loading associated with that proxy. These regressions are within a particular measure, across locations/times.

8. Re-normalize the estimated loadings to satisfy the scale restriction.

9. Repeat steps 5-8 until the loadings converge.30

10. Test multiple initial choices for loadings to ensure that the convergent result is optimal in the sense of minimizing the sum of the squared residuals in (1).

It is important to note that constructed in this manner the absolute mean and variance of the crack index are arbitrary.
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Appendix

Table 1: Estimated Crack Indices for Cities and States


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Notes: The unit of observation is a city-year in the top portion of the table and a state-year in the bottom portion. See the data appendix for precise sources and definitions of the variables. For most variables the sample period covered is 1980-2000; for some measures a shorter time series is available. The city sample is restricted to the 144 cities with population greater than 100,000 in 1980. Rates are measured relative to the total city or state population.

Table 2: Correlations in Crack Proxies

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Notes: The national correlations are the correlations across time of national aggregate annual values of the five crack proxies. The city correlations are correlations across location and time for the 144 U.S. cities with population above 100000 in 1980. The state correlations are correlations across location and time for the 50 U.S. states. The data spans the years 1980-2000.

Table 3: Estimates of Factor Loadings

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Notes: The table reports results of factor analysis to extract the first principle component of the five crack proxies. Each of the proxies was standardized to have unit variance over the period 1980-2000 and a grand mean of zero from 1980-1984 prior to estimation of the loadings. The loadings are restricted to have a squared sum of 1. The "% of Variation" row reports the percentage of the total variance in the transformed variables that can be explained by the first principle component. The city sample includes U.S. cities with a population above 100000 in 1980. The city and state estimates remove city or state fixed effects prior to factor analysis. Columns 3 and 5 also remove year fixed effects from each of the measures prior to factor analysis.

Table 4: Areas With Highest and Lowest Average Crack Levels

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Table 5: Estimated Effects of Crack on Outcome Measures, City Sample

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Notes: The “Coefficient” columns report estimated coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome measures on the crack index interacted with indicator variables for the years 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000. The regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as city and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 5% level; ** denotes significance at the 1% level. The OLS estimates were corrected to allow AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms. The coefficient on crack in the 1980-84 period is imprecisely estimated due to the small amount of variation in crack during this period and is omitted from the table.

Table 6: Estimated Effects of Crack on Outcome Measures, State Sample

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Notes: The “Coefficient” columns report estimated coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome measures on the crack index interacted with indicator variables for the years 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000. The regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 5% level; ** denotes significance at the 1% level. The OLS estimates were corrected to allow AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms. The coefficient on crack in the 1980-84 period is imprecisely estimated due to the small amount of variation in crack during this period and is omitted from the table.

Figure 1: Black Male Homicide Rates by Age

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The figure depicts population-weighted national averages derived from state data.

Figure 2: Outcome Measures

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The figures depict population-weighted annual national averages derived from state-level data.

Figure 3: Crack Proxies

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The figures depict population-weighted annual national averages derived from city-level data.

Figure 4: Crack Indices

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The reported indices are population weighted national estimates of the crack index.

Figure 5: Crack Indices by Race

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The race-specific indices were estimated using year-by-year cross sectional regressions of the city-level crack index on the population percentages of Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics.

Figure 6: Crack Indices by Region

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The regional indices were estimated using year-by-year cross sectional regressions of the city-level crack index on indicator variables for the specified regions.

Figure 7: Crack Indices by City Size

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The indices were estimated using year-by-year cross sectional regressions of the crack index on indicator variables for the specified city size.

Figure 8: Actual Changes in Social Outcomes and Predicted Changes Due to Crack 1984- 1989, City-Level Sample

Crime Categories by Race

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Birth Outcomes by Race

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Index Crime Categories

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† indicates that data are available from 1980 to 1998 only. The leftmost bar (“Actual Change”) plots the actual percent change in the outcome of interest between 1984 and 1989 with 1984 as the base year. To obtain the “OLS Predicted Change Due to Crack” (middle bar), let ß85-89 denote the estimated effect of crack during the 1985-1989 period, Image denote the mean crack index in 1989, and Image denote the mean value of the outcome of interest in 1984. The predicted change is constructed as Image The IV predicted changes are constructed similarly, except that the coefficients are based on an instrumental variables strategy in which cocaine arrests are used as the right-hand-side variable in equation (3) and a crack index constructed using the other crack proxies is used as an instrumental variable. In calculating the implied impact of crack using IV, only the portion of the observed variation in cocaine arrests attributable to variation in crack is relevant. It can be shown that algebraically this equates to scaling down the full variation in cocaine arrests by the signal to signal- plus-noise ratio in cocaine arrests. This signal to signal-plus-noise ratio can be computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the crack proxies, combined with a scaling adjustment across proxies that can be inferred from the ratio of the IV estimates when one proxy is used as the instrument and the other variable is instrumented versus when the roles of the two variables are reversed. OLS and IV regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as city and year fixed effects. The whiskers display 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and IV estimated effects. To facilitate comparison of effect sizes across social outcomes, in some cases confidence intervals were permitted to extend beyond the bounds of the plots. The OLS estimates were estimated allowing AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms; IV standard errors were obtained via the bootstrap.

Figure 9: Actual Changes in Social Outcomes and Predicted Changes Due to Crack 1989- 2000, City-Level Sample

Crime Categories by Race

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Birth Outcomes by Race

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Index Crime Categories

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† indicates that data are available from 1980 to 1998 only. The leftmost bar (“Actual Change”) plots the actual percent change in the outcome of interest between 1989 and 2000 with 1989 as the base year. To obtain the “OLS Predicted Change Due to Crack” (middle bar), let ß85-89 denote the estimated effect of crack during the 1985-1989 period, Image denote the mean crack index in 1989, and Image denote the mean value of the outcome of interest in 1989. The predicted change is constructed asImage For outcomes that were not available through 2000 the change from 1989 through the final year of available data is reported in the final column. The IV predicted changes are constructed similarly, except that the coefficients are based on an instrumental variables strategy in which cocaine arrests are used as the right-hand-side variable in equation (3) and a crack index constructed using the other crack proxies is used as an instrumental variable. In calculating the implied impact of crack using IV, only the portion of the observed variation in cocaine arrests attributable to variation in crack is relevant. It can be shown that algebraically this equates to scaling down the full variation in cocaine arrests by the signal to signal- plus-noise ratio in cocaine arrests. This signal to signal-plus-noise ratio can be computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the crack proxies, combined with a scaling adjustment across proxies that can be inferred from the ratio of the IV estimates when one proxy is used as the instrument and the other variable is instrumented versus when the roles of the two variables are reversed. OLS and IV regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as city and year fixed effects. The whiskers display 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and IV estimated effects. To facilitate comparison of effect sizes across social outcomes, in some cases confidence intervals were permitted to extend beyond the bounds of the plots. The OLS estimates were estimated allowing AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms; IV standard errors were obtained via the bootstrap.

Figure 10: Actual Changes in Social Outcomes and Predicted Changes Due to Crack 1984- 1989, State-Level Sample

Crime Categories by Race

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Birth Outcomes by Race

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Index Crime Categories

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Other Social Outcomes

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† indicates that data are available from 1980 to 1998 only and †† indicates that data are available from 1983 through 1995 only. The leftmost bar (“Actual Change”) plots the actual percent change in the outcome of interest between 1984 and 1989 with 1984 as the base year. To obtain the “OLS Predicted Change Due to Crack” (middle bar), let ß85-89 denote the estimated effect of crack during the 1985-1989 period, Image denote the mean crack index in 1989, and Image denote the mean value of the outcome of interest in 1984. The predicted change is constructed as ImageThe IV predicted changes are constructed similarly, except that the coefficients are based on an instrumental variables strategy in which cocaine arrests are used as the right-hand-side variable in equation (3) and a crack index constructed using the other crack proxies is used as an instrumental variable. In calculating the implied impact of crack using IV, only the portion of the observed variation in cocaine arrests attributable to variation in crack is relevant. It can be shown that algebraically this equates to scaling down the full variation in cocaine arrests by the signal to signal- plus-noise ratio in cocaine arrests. This signal to signal-plus-noise ratio can be computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the crack proxies, combined with a scaling adjustment across proxies that can be inferred from the ratio of the IV estimates when one proxy is used as the instrument and the other variable is instrumented versus when the roles of the two variables are reversed. OLS and IV regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as state and year fixed effects. The whiskers display 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and IV estimated effects. To facilitate comparison of effect sizes across social outcomes, in some cases confidence intervals were permitted to extend beyond the bounds of the plots. The OLS estimates were estimated allowing AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms; IV standard errors were obtained via the bootstrap.

Figure 11: Actual Changes in Social Outcomes and Predicted Changes Due to Crack 1989- 2000, State-Level Sample

Crime Categories by Race

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Birth Outcomes by Race

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Index Crime Categories

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Other Social Outcomes

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† indicates that data are available from 1980 to 1998 only and †† indicates that data are available from 1983 through 1995 only. The leftmost bar (“Actual Change”) plots the actual percent change in the outcome of interest between 1984 and 1989 with 1984 as the base year. . To obtain the “OLS Predicted Change Due to Crack” (middle bar), let ß85-89 denote the estimated effect of crack during the 1985-1989 period, Image denote the mean crack index in 1989, and Image denote the mean value of the outcome of interest in 1989. The predicted change is constructed as Image The IV predicted changes are constructed similarly, except that the coefficients are based on an instrumental variables strategy in which cocaine arrests are used as the right-hand-side variable in equation (3) and a crack index constructed using the other crack proxies is used as an instrumental variable. In calculating the implied impact of crack using IV, only the portion of the observed variation in cocaine arrests attributable to variation in crack is relevant. It can be shown that algebraically this equates to scaling down the full variation in cocaine arrests by the signal to signal- plus-noise ratio in cocaine arrests. This signal to signal-plus-noise ratio can be computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the crack proxies, combined with a scaling adjustment across proxies that can be inferred from the ratio of the IV estimates when one proxy is used as the instrument and the other variable is instrumented versus when the roles of the two variables are reversed. OLS and IV regressions include controls for percent of the population Hispanic, percent of the population Black, log population, and log per capita income as well as state and year fixed effects. The whiskers display 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and IV estimated effects. To facilitate comparison of effect sizes across social outcomes, in some cases confidence intervals were permitted to extend beyond the bounds of the plots. The OLS estimates were estimated allowing AR(1) serial correlation in the error terms; IV standard errors were obtained via the bootstrap.

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Venkatesh, Sudhir, and Steven Levitt, 2000, “Are We a Family or a Business?' History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang,” Theory and Society, 29 (Volume 3): 427- 462.

Welch, Finis. 2003. Catching Up: “Wages of Black Men.” The American Economic Review, 93 (2), pp. 320-325.

Wilson, James Q. 1990. “Against the Legalization of Drugs,” Commentary 89, pp. 21–28.

Zuckerman, Frank, and Mayes. 2002. “Cocaine Exposed Infants and Developmental Outcomes:

“Crack Kids” Revisited.” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 287 (15), 1990- 1991.

_______________

Notes:

1 Homicide rates for young white males (with Hispanics included as whites) followed a similar pattern, although the fluctuations were far more muted. Homicide rates for white males over age 25 have steadily fallen since 1985.

2 We describe the data sources, definitions, sample availability, and precise construction of these variables and others used in the paper in the data appendix.

3 Neal (2004) provides further evidence of a downturn in black educational outcomes.

4 Over the past thirty years, for instance, the black-white ratio of median earnings for male full-time workers increased from .5 to .73 (Welch 2003), the black infant mortality rate fell by two-thirds (Almond, Chay, and Greenstone 2003), the fraction of blacks between the ages of 25-29 with four-year college degrees has increased nearly 3 fold (Blank 2001), and Black academic achievement (as measured by NAEP scores) has increased 0.6 standard deviations relative to whites (Grissmer, Flanagan, and Williamson 1998). The number of black entrepreneurs has more than doubled (Boston 2001). The number of blacks in Congress has increased five-fold.4 Similar advances have been made among high-level executives, professors and administrators at elite colleges and universities, and the fraction of blacks living in middle class neighborhoods.

5 Other competing explanations have also been proposed. Ferguson (2001) argues that the rise in popularity of hiphop music is to blame for the divergence in black-white test score gaps in 1988. McWhorter (2003) makes a similar argument.

6 Data can be found on Roland Fryer’s web page [http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/fryer.html] , or Steven Levitt’s web page [http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/home.html].

7 Victimization data are used instead of offender data because the identity of some offenders is unknown. Among homicides with a known offender, there is a high correlation between the race and age of the victim and offender.

8 All of these conclusions regarding the relationship between crack and social outcomes must be qualified with the important caveat that we are describing correlations in the data, rather than clear causal links.

9 A gram weighs about as much as a dime.

10 Crack differs from freebase cocaine because the creation procedure lacks the final step of removing the base from the mixture.

11 Note, however, that the consensus in the recent medical literature is that there are few long term effects of crack exposure in utero after controlling for the mother’s alcohol and tobacco consumption. (Frank et. al. 2001, Zuckerman, Frank, and Mayes 2002).

12 The exact data sources, definitions, and construction of each of the variables are described in greater detail in the appendix.

13 In an earlier version of this paper, we presented estimates in which we did attempt to differentiate between powder and crack cocaine, obtaining similar results.

14 Arrests for powder versus crack cocaine are not reported separately in the FBI data.

15 The data set includes separate drug codes for cocaine, cocaine hydrochloride, and a variety of cocaine salts. There does appear to be a pattern of classifying crack cocaine, which has the hydrocholoride portion of the molecule removed, as cocaine. It seems, however, that powder cocaine is also sometimes classified under the code “cocaine.”

16 For instance, a newspaper story that reported a cocaine addict, while in the process of committing a crime, got cracked over the head by a police baton, would erroneously register as a crack mention using our methodology.

17 This is similar to how psychometricians measure “intelligence” (g) – taking the results of several individual aptitude tests and determining the single factor that best explains the covariance in these related proxies. Mathematically, factor analysis identifies the eigenvectors (the scores) and corresponding eigenvalues (the loadings) of the variance-covariance matrix of the Y variables.

18 We follow standard practice of normalizing proxy measures included on the left-hand side to have mean zero and variance one whenever we do factor analysis.

19 If measurement error is positively correlated across proxies, then the improvement in the signal-to-noise ratio is less pronounced. The opposite is true if the measurement error is negatively correlated across proxies.

20 Note, however, that this instrumental variables strategy is a possible solution to the measurement error problem, but not to any possible endogeneity in the crack measure, as we discuss later.

21 The existence of a pre-crack period also allows us the opportunity to estimate our factor analysis on the pre-period data only, isolating any common factors that are moving the crack proxies before crack arrives. One can then remove these pre-existing factors in constructing a crack index. In practice, this has little impact on our results. An earlier version of this paper, available from the authors, describes this exercise and the underlying assumptions in detail.

22 The scaling of the loadings is arbitrary; we follow the standard normalization which is to make the square of the loadings sum to one. In constructing a crack index that is a weighted average of the underlying proxies, the weights one would use are the square root of the loadings we report in the table. After taking the square root of these values, the sum of the weights would add to one.

23The patterns observed in Figures 5-7 continue to hold if we simultaneously control for racial composition and the other factors like region and city size.

24 Results for the full set of cities and states in the sample, for the years 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2000 are reported in Appendix Table 1.

25 Recent work by Beckett et. al. (2006) in fact argues that Seattle has an acute crack problem relative to other cities.

26 Imposing the further assumption that the ratio of crack’s incidence across Whites and Blacks is constant across areas in a given year, we have also constructed an index of the crack intensity in a city controlling for racial composition. This measure of intensity more closely corresponds to the crack variable that one would use as a right-hand-side variable when using individual-level data, and is available for download at our website. The results we obtain are quite similar.

27 The crack index is close to zero and exhibits little variation prior to 1985, leading to unstable, imprecisely estimated coefficients in the early part of our sample. Thus, we do not report results for 1980-1984.

28 One could also instrument with each of the remaining crack proxies individually, but because of missing data in some of our proxies, the index approach is preferable in our setting. The results are not sensitive to using a different one of the crack proxies as the right-hand side variable. 29 More specifically, only a portion of the observed variation in cocaine arrests is attributable to variation in crack usage if there is measurement error in cocaine arrests. Assume that cocaine arrests are determined by a latent variable crack and noise, and that our estimated crack index using all of the proxies except cocaine arrests also reflects a combination of movements in crack and noise. Further assume that the error terms in these two measures are uncorrelated, and that these errors are also uncorrelated with the error term in equation (3). Then a consistent estimate of the impact of cocaine arrests can be obtained from two-stage least squares using the index as an instrument. In the standard application, one would then compute the overall impact of a change in cocaine arrests as the product of the change in cocaine arrests multiplied by the estimated coefficient from two-stage least squares. In computing the impact of crack (as opposed to cocaine arrests per se) in equation (3), however, we only wants to use the portion of the variation in cocaine arrests driven by crack. It can be shown that algebraically this equates to scaling down the full variation in cocaine arrests by the signal to signal- plus-noise ratio in cocaine arrests. This signal to signal-plus-noise ratio can be computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the crack proxies, combined with a scaling adjustment across proxies that can be inferred from the ratio of the IV estimates when one proxy is used as the instrument and the other variable is instrumented versus when the roles of the two variables are reversed.

30 Although the paper reports estimates of a single factor model, for verification purposes we also estimated models allowing for multiple factors (i.e. i and Zst are vectors). With multiple factors the estimated loadings and scores are unique only up to a rotation. The algorithm described will not converge unless a specific rotation is imposed at each stage of estimation.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Sun Apr 24, 2016 11:49 pm

23 cents an hour: The perfectly legal slavery happening in modern-day America
In skyrocketing prison populations, corporations and the government have a pool of powerless, exploitable workers

by Terrell Jermaine Starr
Alternet
July 7, 2015

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If you thought slavery was outlawed in America, you would be wrong. The 13th amendment to the Constitution states that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

In plain language, that means slavery in America can still exist for those who are in prison, where you basically lose all of your rights. (You don’t gain a lot of your rights back when you get out of prison, either, but that is a different story.) So, given the country’s penchant for rapacious capitalism, it may not come as a surprise that there is much of the American prison system that exploits American prisoners much like slaves.

In fact there is large-scale exploitation in American prisons benefiting American corporations and the military-industrial complex. UNICOR, better known as Federal Prison Industries, or FPI, is a government-owned corporation that employs inmates for as little as 23 cents per hour, to provide a wide range of products and services under the guise of a “jobs training program.” In theory, this is supposed to give inmates skills that will prepare them for the workforce upon release.

Critics of FPI have long claimed it exploits prisoners who don’t have the right to organize for representation to protect their rights and it unfairly competes with small businesses that can’t provide goods and services for the average pay of 92 cents an hour FPI workers make. The program employs around 13,000 prisoners per year. In 2013, it reported gross revenue of $609.7 million.

According to FPI’s website, inmates employed in the program carry out a wide range of services that include making house and office furniture, mattresses, flags, traffic signs and military items. These items are usually made for other federal agencies, but private companies can contract workers through FPI as well.

It is no surprise that the inmate/slave labor force has grown along with mass incarceration in America. The Prison Policy Initiative counts 2.3 million people in prison, according to the 2010 census, by far the highest rate of incarceration in the developed world.

Many more are ensnared in the criminal justice system’s other branches. At the end of 2013, nearly 5 million adults were either on probation or parole, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics. All of these populations and even those not even convicted of a crime are vulnerable to exploitative fees and byzantine rules seemingly designed to catch people and get them back into the grips of the prison system. Basically, there is a trifecta of exploitation in the American criminal justice system. As reported on AlterNet, the bail system in America keeps many people in jail in a massive form of pretrial detention one has to buy one’s way out of. And police departments are increasingly funding themselves by charging poor people exorbitant fees for minor infractions.

In terms of prison labor, one of its controversial services is the production of solar panels. Reuters reports that Suniva Inc, a Georgia-based solar cell and panel maker, uses prison labor for 10 percent of its manufacturing needs to keep its costs low so it can, in part, keep up with producers from China. The company is also backed by Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Over the last 18 months, Suniva moved all of its solar panel assembly to the United States from Asia. Suniva’s deal with FPI helps it to avoid U.S. government tariffs on Chinese-made panels and capture lucrative government contracts. Roughly 200 inmates make solar panels in factories at prisons in Sheridan, Oregon and Otisville, New York, according to Reuters.

Solar panels made in America are more efficient in generating electricity from the sun, allowing companies like Suniva to sell them at premium rates. As for the inmates, Suniva’s vice president of global sales and manufacturing Mike Card says he doesn’t know how much they are paid.

Manufacturing solar panels is actually a good skill to have, but according to Alex Friedman, managing editor of Prison Legal News, FPI has no job placement program for inmates once they are released.

“You can have lots of skills, but it doesn’t necessarily mean you’re going to get a good job when you get out,” Friedman told AlterNet. “You can be really skilled at whatever it is, diesel engines even, but you also have a felony record. You’re getting out from prison after five or two years or whatever it is and starting from scratch.”

Another field where FPI inmates are providing labor is through military contracts. In 2013, federal inmates stitched more than $100 million worth of military uniforms for the Department of Defense, according to the New York Times. The federal inmates who make these garments earn no more than $2 per hour, something that puts competing small businesses that have to pay at least minimum wage at a major disadvantage.

Cathy Griffiths, operations manager for clothing maker American Power Source of Fayette, Ala., complained in 2012 that she had to let 50 of her 300 employees go after FPI won a lucrative contract with the U.S. Army. During the same year, American Apparel, Inc., an Alabama company that makes military uniforms, said it had to close down a plant and lay off 175 workers because it was forced to compete with FPI for federal contracts.

“We pay employees $9 on average,” Kurt Wilson, an executive with American Apparel, told Prison Legal News at the time. “They get full medical insurance, 401(k) plans and paid vacation. Yet we’re competing against a federal program that doesn’t pay any of that.”

With prisoners lacking even a modicum of labor protection, it is very hard for any company to compete with companies that use this source of dirt-cheap prison labor.

“Prisoners currently don’t fall under any fair labor standard practices or umbrellas,” Christopher Petrella, a researcher at UC Berkeley who studies labor abuses in prisons, told AlterNet. “So, often times, prisoners will get paid but they aren’t afforded the same protections as a worker outside of prison.

No one is complaining about prisoners having the right to work and learn skills that will help them once they are released from prison. But that is not the issue. In reality, FPI is paying far below minimum wage rates. Prison labor takes advantage of a vulnerable workforce that can’t advocate for itself, form a union, fight for its labor rights or seek legal protections for potential workplace abuses.

Prison workers have no political support, either. “There is virtually no constituency that really cares,” Petrella said. “That’s a very sobering and tragic thing to say, but I think it’s actually true. Prisoners are often times disenfranchised. They can’t even vote. So, if they can’t even vote, then what kind of constituency exists that politicians can then lean on to make these sorts of decisions about how they want to move forward with reforming the system?”

The number of inmates working under FPI make up just a small number of the 2.2 million prisoners behind bars in a wide range of state and federal work programs, so it’s just a small part of the larger issue of exploited labor. But it is important to note that the federal government finances and operates FPI, a corporation that outsources labor in exploitive ways.

Friedman says FPI and other work programs in general must undergo major reforms that include giving inmate workers the right to protect themselves from exploitation, paying them as much as a worker who is not locked up would make, and training them for jobs that will actually lead to employment once they leave prison. Without such changes, Friedman says prison labor is nothing more than slave labor.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Sun Apr 24, 2016 11:51 pm

Here's the Latest Evidence of How Private Prisons Are Exploiting Inmates for Profit
by Gabrielle Canon
Jun. 17, 2015

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The for-profit prison industry sells itself as a cost-effective option for cash-strapped states, but according to a new study from the University of Wisconsin, privatized prisons are keeping inmates locked up longer in order to boost profits.

Researcher Anita Mukherjee studied eight years* of data from Mississippi, which has one of the highest incarceration rates in the country, and found that private prisons there doled out twice the amount of infractions against inmates, lengthening their sentences by an average of two or three months. The extra time, Mukherjee found, adds up to an increase of about $3,000 in additional costs per prisoner. Mukherjee also noted that inmates housed in private prisons were more likely to wind up back in the system after being released—despite industry claims of lower recidivism rates.

The study, which compares length of stays in private and public prisons, is not the first to highlight strategies undertaken by the private prison industry to raise returns for stockholders. Last year, Christopher Petrella, a researcher at the University of California-Berkeley, accused the Corrections Corporation of America of including provisions in its contracts with governments to keep the most costly inmates—those with health issues—from being transferred to its prisons. Through open records requests, Petrella found there were 14 different exclusion criteria, including disabled or elderly inmates, those who were HIV-positive, or anyone with "sensitive medical conditions and/or high risk diagnoses."

Today, the $5 billion private prison industry houses close to 20 percent of federal inmates.


Looking specifically at California prisons, Petrella highlights how health expenditures are among the largest costs, second only to security, and account for 31 percent of the overall budget. But, private prisons set up contracts that say they only will house the youngest, healthiest—and cheapest—prisoners.

These details, Petrella writes, failed to make their way into a Temple University cost analysis often cited by the industry as proof that privatization produces cost savings. The economists behind the study were funded by three of the largest prison companies in the United States—a fact they failed to disclose when the study was first published.

Other studies have had similar findings: An analysis by the Arizona Department of Corrections in 2011 found that most prisoners were no less costly when housed in private prisons, and that some cost up to $1,600 more each year than those in public prisons. A cost analysis by the University of Utah in 2007 showed cost savings from private prisons were minimal at best.

Between 2000 and 2010 the number of inmates serving sentences in private prisons doubled. Today, the $5 billion industry houses close to 20 percent of federal prisoners and about 7 percent of state prisoners, and private prisons are increasingly being used as immigration detention centers.

*The time period of the data has been corrected.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Sun Apr 24, 2016 11:57 pm

American Slavery, Reinvented: The Thirteenth Amendment forbade slavery and involuntary servitude, “except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
by Whitney Benns
September 21, 2015

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Image

Crops stretch to the horizon. Black bodies pepper the landscape, hunched over as they work the fields. Officers on horseback, armed, oversee the workers.

To the untrained eye, the scenes in Angola for Life: Rehabilitation and Reform Inside the Louisiana State Penitentiary, an Atlantic documentary filmed on an old Southern slave-plantation-turned-prison, could have been shot 150 years ago. The imagery haunts, and the stench of slavery and racial oppression lingers through the 13 minutes of footage.

The film tells two overlapping stories: One is of accomplishment against incredible odds, of a man who stepped into the most violent maximum-security prison in the nation and gave the men there—discarded and damned—what society didn’t: hope, education, and a moral compass. Burl Cain, the warden of Angola Prison, which is in Louisiana, has created a controversial model for rehabilitation. Through work and religion, they learn to help each other, and try to become better fathers to their children on the outside. Perhaps the lucky few even find redemption.

But there is a second storyline running alongside the first, which raises disquieting questions about how America treats those on the inside as less than fully human. Those troubling opening scenes of the documentary offer visual proof of a truth that America has worked hard to ignore: In a sense, slavery never ended at Angola; it was reinvented.

* * *

Some viewers of the video might be surprised to learn that inmates at Angola, once cleared by the prison doctor, can be forced to work under threat of punishment as severe as solitary confinement. Legally, this labor may be totally uncompensated; more typically inmates are paid meagerly—as little as two cents per hour—for their full-time work in the fields, manufacturing warehouses, or kitchens. How is this legal? Didn’t the Thirteenth Amendment abolish all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude in this country?

Not quite. In the shining promise of freedom that was the Thirteenth Amendment, a sharp exception was carved out. Section 1 of the Amendment provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Simply put: Incarcerated persons have no constitutional rights in this arena; they can be forced to work as punishment for their crimes.

Convict leasing was cheaper than slavery, since farm owners and companies did not have to worry about the health of their workers.


Angola’s farm operations and other similar prison industries have ancestral roots in the black chattel slavery of the South. Specifically, the proliferation of prison labor camps grew during the Reconstruction era following the Civil War, a time when southern states established large prisons throughout the region that they quickly filled, primarily with black men. Many of these prisons had very recently been slave plantations, Angola and Mississippi State Penitentiary (known as Parchman Farm) among them. Other prisons began convict-leasing programs, where, for a leasing fee, the state would lease out the labor of incarcerated workers as hired work crews. Convict leasing was cheaper than slavery, since farm owners and companies did not have to worry at all about the health of their workers.


In this new era of prison industry, the criminal “justice” system, the state determined the size of the worker pool. Scores of recently freed slaves and their descendants now labored to generate revenue for the state under a Jim Crow regime.

* * *

More than a century later, our prison labor system has only grown. We now incarcerate more than 2.2 million people, with the largest prison population in the world, and the second highest incarceration rate per capita. Our prison populations remain racially skewed. With few exceptions, inmates are required to work if cleared by medical professionals at the prison. Punishments for refusing to do so include solitary confinement, loss of earned good time, and revocation of family visitation. For this forced labor, prisoners earn pennies per hour, if anything at all.

Angola is not the exception; it is the rule.

Over the decades, prison labor has expanded in scope and reach. Incarcerated workers, laboring within in-house operations or through convict-leasing partnerships with for-profit businesses, have been involved with mining, agriculture, and all manner of manufacturing from making military weapons to sewing garments for Victoria’s Secret. Prison programs extend into the services sector; some incarcerated workers staff call centers.

Given the scope and scale of prison labor in the modern era, one could reasonably expect some degree of compliance with modern labor standards. However, despite the hard-won protections secured by the labor movement over the past 100 years, incarcerated workers do not enjoy most of these protections.

Employment law makes the status of the worker as an “employee” a critical distinction. If you are an employee, you get protections; if not, you don’t. Courts look to the character of the relationship between the parties and aim to assess, first, whether the employer has sufficient control over the work conditions and, second, whether the relationship is primarily of an economic character.

Incarcerated workers are not expressly excluded from the definition of employee in workers’ protection statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or the National Labor Relations Act. However, in the cases where incarcerated workers have sued their prison-employers to enforce minimum wage laws or the FLSA, courts have ruled that the relationship between the penitentiary and the inmate worker is not primarily economic; thus, the worker is not protected under the statutes. By judging the relationship between prisons and incarcerated workers to be of a primarily social or penological nature, the courts have placed wage and working condition protections out of reach for incarcerated workers.

Incarcerated persons or, more specifically, the “duly convicted,” lack a constitutional right to be free of forced servitude. Further, this forced labor is not checked by many of the protections enjoyed by workers laboring in the exact same jobs on the other side of the 20-foot barbed-wire electric fence.

* * *

Angola for Life raises questions about the potential rehabilitative nature of prison labor. Work, warden Cain posits, is an important part of the rehabilitative process. Prison labor provides a way to pay society back for the costs of incarceration, as well as a pathway to correct deviant behavior and possibly find personal redemption.

Meaningful work helps cultivate self-esteem, self worth, and the sense that one’s existence on this Earth matters. Yet, while some form of work for the incarcerated may be important, the current form is troubling. These workers are vulnerable to the kind of workplace exploitation that America has otherwise deemed inhumane.

Another justification for compulsory prison labor comes from a fairness concern. Why should prisoners sit with idle hands when the rest of us must work to put a roof over our heads and food in our bellies? Perhaps the low-to-no wages paid to incarcerated workers are a form of pay garnishment, a sort of compensation for the costs of room and board?

Yet those costs are not fairly calculated. The American criminal-justice system is rife with fees that shift the financial burden of incarceration to the charged and convicted and their families. Like the “company store” in isolated mining towns which overcharged workers of old, prisoners are left open to similar forms of exploitation.

Finally, some would argue that regardless of its harsh nature, prison labor is simply a matter of just deserts. Don’t workers behind bars deserve less than equal treatment? After all, they are murderers, criminals, all manner of sinners and deviants. The appeal of this argument lies in its simplicity: People who do not behave like decent human beings do not merit being treated like decent human beings.

There is much to say of the inadequacy of this sort of eye-for-an-eye philosophy and the importance of resisting such a reflex in the realm of state action and public policy. As Ta-Nehisi Coates described in his Atlantic cover story, a series of risk factors—including mental illness, illiteracy, poverty, and drug addiction—drastically increase the chance that one will end up among the incarcerated. By one report’s measure, more than half of the inmates in jails and prisons in the United States are suffering from mental illness of some kind. These risk factors are social-welfare and public-health issues. America makes the choice to respond to these outcomes with the penal system, but there are other ways.

There is one further reason to be concerned about the system of prison labor. A brief moment of dialogue in the first few minutes of the video between the inmate driving a buggy and the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg hints at this:

Elderly Inmate: I got locked up July 25, 1981.

Reporter: What was the charge?

Elderly Inmate: Second-degree murder.

Reporter: Did you do it?

Elderly Inmate: Nah.

Reporter: But you’re here.

Elderly Inmate: I’m here.


Maybe we believe him. Likely we don’t. Whether we believe this particular inmate or not, ample experience and research point us to an uncomfortable reality: There are innocent men at Angola. We don’t know which they are, but we do know they are there, and they are disproportionately likely to be black. In American criminal justice, “duly convicted” doesn’t always mean what we wish it to.

* * *

Individual stories are compelling. For the slave toiling in the antebellum south, a kindly master was a godsend. Burl Cain may be the very best that the inmates of Angola prison could hope for, a rare thoughtful, kindly, creative sort of warden. He is almost certainly a man trying to do the best he can for a population damned and forgotten by society with the resources he has available.

But individual narratives are not enough. When we focus on the individual, it’s easy to miss the context. The context here is undeniable, and it is made clear by the very first frames of Angola for Life.

As the camera zooms out and pans over fields of black bodies bent in work and surveyed by a guard, the picture that emerges is one of slavery. It is one of a “justice” system riddled with racial oppression. It is one of private business taking advantage of these disenfranchised, vulnerable workers. It is one of an entire caste of men relegated, as they have long been relegated, to labor for free, condemned to sow in perpetuity so that others might reap.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Mon Apr 25, 2016 12:01 am

The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of Slavery?
by Vicky Pelaez
Global Research
March 31, 2014

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Human rights organizations, as well as political and social ones, are condemning what they are calling a new form of inhumane exploitation in the United States, where they say a prison population of up to 2 million -– mostly Black and Hispanic -– are working for various industries for a pittance. For the tycoons who have invested in the prison industry, it has been like finding a pot of gold. They don’t have to worry about strikes or paying unemployment insurance, vacations or comp time. All of their workers are full-time, and never arrive late or are absent because of family problems; moreover, if they don’t like the pay of 25 cents an hour and refuse to work, they are locked up in isolation cells.

There are approximately 2 million inmates in state, federal and private prisons throughout the country. According to California Prison Focus, “no other society in human history has imprisoned so many of its own citizens.”

The figures show that the United States has locked up more people than any other country: a half million more than China, which has a population five times greater than the U.S. Statistics reveal that the United States holds 25% of the world’s prison population, but only 5% of the world’s people. From less than 300,000 inmates in 1972, the jail population grew to 2 million by the year 2000. In 1990 it was one million. Ten years ago there were only five private prisons in the country, with a population of 2,000 inmates; now, there are 100, with 62,000 inmates. It is expected that by the coming decade, the number will hit 360,000, according to reports.

What has happened over the last 10 years? Why are there so many prisoners?

“The private contracting of prisoners for work fosters incentives to lock people up. Prisons depend on this income. Corporate stockholders who make money off prisoners’ work lobby for longer sentences, in order to expand their workforce. The system feeds itself,” says a study by the Progressive Labor Party, which accuses the prison industry of being “an imitation of Nazi Germany with respect to forced slave labor and concentration camps.”

The prison industry complex is one of the fastest-growing industries in the United States and its investors are on Wall Street. “This multimillion-dollar industry has its own trade exhibitions, conventions, websites, and mail-order/Internet catalogs. It also has direct advertising campaigns, architecture companies, construction companies, investment houses on Wall Street, plumbing supply companies, food supply companies, armed security, and padded cells in a large variety of colors.”

CRIME GOES DOWN, JAIL POPULATION GOES UP

According to reports by human rights organizations, these are the factors that increase the profit potential for those who invest in the prison industry complex:

Jailing persons convicted of non-violent crimes, and long prison sentences for possession of microscopic quantities of illegal drugs. Federal law stipulates five years’ imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of 5 grams of crack or 3.5 ounces of heroin, and 10 years for possession of less than 2 ounces of rock-cocaine or crack. A sentence of 5 years for cocaine powder requires possession of 500 grams -– 100 times more than the quantity of rock cocaine for the same sentence. Most of those who use cocaine powder are white, middle-class or rich people, while mostly Blacks and Latinos use rock cocaine. In Texas, a person may be sentenced for up to two years’ imprisonment for possessing 4 ounces of marijuana. Here in New York, the 1973 Nelson Rockefeller anti-drug law provides for a mandatory prison sentence of 15 years to life for possession of 4 ounces of any illegal drug.

The passage in 13 states of the “three strikes” laws (life in prison after being convicted of three felonies), made it necessary to build 20 new federal prisons. One of the most disturbing cases resulting from this measure was that of a prisoner who for stealing a car and two bicycles received three 25-year sentences.

Longer sentences.

The passage of laws that require minimum sentencing, without regard for circumstances.

A large expansion of work by prisoners creating profits that motivate the incarceration of more people for longer periods of time.

More punishment of prisoners, so as to lengthen their sentences.


HISTORY OF PRISON LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

Prison labor has its roots in slavery. After the 1861-1865 Civil War, a system of “hiring out prisoners” was introduced in order to continue the slavery tradition. Freed slaves were charged with not carrying out their sharecropping commitments (cultivating someone else’s land in exchange for part of the harvest) or petty thievery -– which were almost never proven -– and were then “hired out” for cotton picking, working in mines and building railroads. From 1870 until 1910 in the state of Georgia, 88% of hired-out convicts were Black. In Alabama, 93% of “hired-out” miners were Black. In Mississippi, a huge prison farm similar to the old slave plantations replaced the system of hiring out convicts. The notorious Parchman plantation existed until 1972.

During the post-Civil War period, Jim Crow racial segregation laws were imposed on every state, with legal segregation in schools, housing, marriages and many other aspects of daily life. “Today, a new set of markedly racist laws is imposing slave labor and sweatshops on the criminal justice system, now known as the prison industry complex,” comments the Left Business Observer.

Who is investing?

At least 37 states have legalized the contracting of prison labor by private corporations that mount their operations inside state prisons. The list of such companies contains the cream of U.S. corporate society: IBM, Boeing, Motorola, Microsoft, AT&T, Wireless, Texas Instrument, Dell, Compaq, Honeywell, Hewlett-Packard, Nortel, Lucent Technologies, 3Com, Intel, Northern Telecom, TWA, Nordstrom’s, Revlon, Macy’s, Pierre Cardin, Target Stores, and many more. All of these businesses are excited about the economic boom generation by prison labor. Just between 1980 and 1994, profits went up from $392 million to $1.31 billion. Inmates in state penitentiaries generally receive the minimum wage for their work, but not all; in Colorado, they get about $2 per hour, well under the minimum.

And in privately-run prisons, they receive as little as 17 cents per hour for a maximum of six hours a day, the equivalent of $20 per month. The highest-paying private prison is CCA in Tennessee, where prisoners receive 50 cents per hour for what they call “highly skilled positions.” At those rates, it is no surprise that inmates find the pay in federal prisons to be very generous. There, they can earn $1.25 an hour and work eight hours a day, and sometimes overtime. They can send home $200-$300 per month.


Thanks to prison labor, the United States is once again an attractive location for investment in work that was designed for Third World labor markets. A company that operated a maquiladora (assembly plant in Mexico near the border) closed down its operations there and relocated to San Quentin State Prison in California. In Texas, a factory fired its 150 workers and contracted the services of prisoner-workers from the private Lockhart Texas prison, where circuit boards are assembled for companies like IBM and Compaq.

[Former] Oregon State Representative Kevin Mannix recently urged Nike to cut its production in Indonesia and bring it to his state, telling the shoe manufacturer that “there won’t be any transportation costs; we’re offering you competitive prison labor (here).


PRIVATE PRISONS

The prison privatization boom began in the 1980s, under the governments of Ronald Reagan and Bush Sr., but reached its height in 1990 under William Clinton, when Wall Street stocks were selling like hotcakes. Clinton’s program for cutting the federal workforce resulted in the Justice Departments contracting of private prison corporations for the incarceration of undocumented workers and high-security inmates.

Private prisons are the biggest business in the prison industry complex. About 18 corporations guard 10,000 prisoners in 27 states. The two largest are Correctional Corporation of America (CCA) and Wackenhut, which together control 75%. Private prisons receive a guaranteed amount of money for each prisoner, independent of what it costs to maintain each one. According to Russell Boraas, a private prison administrator in Virginia, “the secret to low operating costs is having a minimal number of guards for the maximum number of prisoners.” The CCA has an ultra-modern prison in Lawrenceville, Virginia, where five guards on dayshift and two at night watch over 750 prisoners. In these prisons, inmates may get their sentences reduced for “good behavior,” but for any infraction, they get 30 days added -– which means more profits for CCA. According to a study of New Mexico prisons, it was found that CCA inmates lost “good behavior time” at a rate eight times higher than those in state prisons.

IMPORTING AND EXPORTING INMATES

Profits are so good that now there is a new business: importing inmates with long sentences, meaning the worst criminals. When a federal judge ruled that overcrowding in Texas prisons was cruel and unusual punishment, the CCA signed contracts with sheriffs in poor counties to build and run new jails and share the profits. According to a December 1998 Atlantic Monthly magazine article, this program was backed by investors from Merrill-Lynch, Shearson-Lehman, American Express and Allstate, and the operation was scattered all over rural Texas. That state’s governor, Ann Richards, followed the example of Mario Cuomo in New York and built so many state prisons that the market became flooded, cutting into private prison profits.

After a law signed by Clinton in 1996 –- ending court supervision and decisions -– caused overcrowding and violent, unsafe conditions in federal prisons, private prison corporations in Texas began to contact other states whose prisons were overcrowded, offering “rent-a-cell” services in the CCA prisons located in small towns in Texas. The commission for a rent-a-cell salesman is $2.50 to $5.50 per day per bed. The county gets $1.50 for each prisoner.

STATISTICS

Ninety-seven percent of 125,000 federal inmates have been convicted of non-violent crimes. It is believed that more than half of the 623,000 inmates in municipal or county jails are innocent of the crimes they are accused of. Of these, the majority are awaiting trial. Two-thirds of the one million state prisoners have committed non-violent offenses. Sixteen percent of the country’s 2 million prisoners suffer from mental illness.

The original source of this article is El Diario-La Prensa, New York and Global Research
Copyright © Vicky Pelaez, El Diario-La Prensa, New York and Global Research, 2014
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Mon Apr 25, 2016 12:07 am

The Massive Prison Industry In The United States: Big Business & Slavery
by Arjun Walia
December 20, 2015

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Despite the fact that various social, political, and human rights organizations have condemned the United States’ prison system, it remains one of the biggest businesses in existence today. Did you know that America has four percent of the world’s population, yet still carries approximately twenty five percent of the world’s prison population? That is a staggering number. America has the highest incarceration rate in the world and it is increasing exponentially each year. Almost half of American juveniles will have been arrested before they reach their 23rd birthday, and children as young as 13 years old have been sentenced to die in prison. The cost of this system? Approximately $75,000,000,000 a year…

These are just a few startling statistics outlined in the video below. Check it out.



Big Business or Slavery? The Massive Incarceration Industry

One thing we may not realize about prison is the fact that millions of people within America’s prison populations, predominantly Black and Hispanic, are working for several different industries in exchange for practically nothing. Is this not another form of slavery? Like the cheap labour and child slave labor practices we condemn overseas, the American prison system is simply another form of slavery — to the benefit of corporations, at almost no cost — that has been disguised as a necessary and favourable part of society. Prison is a gold mine of human capital for massive corporations whose unethical business practices are leading to the destruction of our planet, and whose unmitigated influence in the political sphere has given them nearly free reign to dictate government policy.

The truth is, there is a massive contracting of prisoners for work happening right now, and this only provides more incentive to lock people up. This is the income that prisons depend upon, and the prison industry is actually one of the fastest-growing industries in the United States. Its investors are on Wall Street.

“Prison labor based in private prisons is a multimillion-dollar industry with its own trade exhibitions, conventions, websites, and mail-order/Internet catalogs (Pelaez 2008). . . . The industry also has direct advertising campaigns, architecture companies, construction companies, investment houses on Wall Street, plumbing supply companies, food supply companies, armed security, and padded cell manufacturing, all of which rival those of any other private industry (Pelaez 2008). Furthermore, private prisoners at the state level produce a variety of goods and services, from clothing to toys to telemarketing and customer service (Erlich 2005). The private federal prison industry also produces nearly all military goods, from uniform helmet to ammunition, along with durable goods ranging from paint to office furniture (Pelaez 2008).” (source)

Did you know that corporate stockholders who make money off of prison labor lobby for longer sentences? They do this to expand their workforce, and so, according to a study done by the Progressive Labor Party, “the system feeds itself.” They accuse the prison system of being “an imitation of Nazi Germany” with regards to forced slave labor and concentration camps.

If we look at the history of prison labour in the United States, it becomes immediately apparent that the entire system is birthed out of racism. After the civil wars of the mid to late 18th century, the system of hiring prisoners was established in order to continue the slavery that had dominated previous years. This was, of course, a time when racial segregation was legal across the United States.

“Prison labor has its roots in slavery. After the 1861-1865 Civil War, a system of ‘hiring out prisoners’ was introduced in order to continue the slavery tradition. Freed slaves were charged with not carrying out their sharecropping commitments (cultivating someone else’s land in exchange for part of the harvest) or petty thievery – which were almost never proven – and were then ‘hired out’ for cotton picking, working in mines and building railroads. From 1870 until 1910 in the state of Georgia, 88% of hired-out convicts were Black. In Alabama, 93% of ‘hired-out’miners were Black. In Mississippi, a huge prison farm similar to the old slave plantations replaced the system of hiring out convicts. The notorious Parchman plantation existed until 1972.” (source)

Vicky Pelaez, a Peruvian journalist and columnist for The Moscow News, points out that dozens of states have legalized the contracting of prison labor to corporations, which include such names as: IMB, Boeing, Motorola, Microsoft, AT&T, Wireless, Dell, and many more. Some of these inmates are getting approximately $2 a hour. She also outlines how inmates are commonly imported and exported.

Below is a clip taken from the THRIVE movement of an interview with Van Jones, who brings up some important points.



Prisons Do Not ‘Rehabilitate’ People

Again, prison is a business, and given the horrible conditions, poor food, and various other human rights abuses prisoners face, it’s quite clear that something needs to change here.

First of all, if you want to ‘rehabilitate’ and help somebody, locking them up for hours every single day for large portions of their life is, as I am sure most of you reading this would agree, not a solution.

Prison does not address why people are committing these crimes and it certainly does not do anything to help them deal with those issues. Moreover, the punishments rarely fit the crimes; prison sentences are often disproportionately long in relation to the crime being addressed. We are not acknowledging or dealing with the fact that governments have brought drugs into their countries and glorified crime in order to drive up the prison population. There are a number of factors that go into the business of prison, and helping people better themselves as human beings is not one of them.

There are children and men in there who have been locked up for more than a decade… for stealing. Is that really rehabilitation? Solitary confinement, commonly used in prison, is a form of punishment that is regarded as torture (and should be). The Center For Constitutional Rights states:

Researchers have demonstrated that prolonged solitary confinement causes a persistent and heightened state of anxiety and nervousness, headaches, insomnia, lethargy or chronic tiredness, nightmares, heart palpitations, fear of impending nervous breakdowns and higher rates of hypertension and early morbidity. Other documented effects include obsessive ruminations, confused thought processes, an oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational anger, social withdrawal, hallucinations, violent fantasies, emotional flatness, mood swings, chronic depression, feelings of overall deterioration, as well as suicidal ideation. (source)

As the first video in this article outlines, sure, measures have to be taken against certain individuals to keep others safe, but what is happening here is not a solution.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Mon Apr 25, 2016 12:14 am

Shocking Facts About America's For-Profit Prison Industry
by Beth Buczynski
06 February 2014

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As long as their have been human societies, there have been criminals. Despite the best efforts of lawmakers and religions, humans can’t be trusted to do the right thing, even when we’re aware of the consequences. The prison system used to be a last resort, a place you sent people when other forms of punishment were ineffective. Now it’s grown into something much darker, and even less rehabilitative.

Unbeknownst to many, the prison system has become a for-profit business in which inmates are the product–a system that has shocking similarities to another human-based business from America’s past: slavery.

In late 2013, a new report from In the Public Interest (ITPI) revealed that private prison companies are striking deals with states that contain clauses guaranteeing high prison occupancy rates–sometimes 100 percent. This means that states agree to supply prison corporations with a steady flow of residents–whether or not that level of criminal activity exists. Some experts believe this relationship between government and private prison corporations encourages law enforcement agencies to use underhanded tactics–often targeting minority and underserved groups–to fill cells.

“The report, ‘Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and ‘Low-Crime Taxes’ Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations,’ documents the contracts exchanged between private prison companies and state and local governments that either guarantee prison occupancy rates (essentially creating inmate lockup quotas) or force taxpayers to pay for empty beds if the prison population decreases due to lower crime rates or other factors (essentially creating low-crime taxes),” reports Salon.

As a result, there are now over 2 million people living behind bars in the United States. That’s half a million more than China, which has a population five times greater than the U.S. Many are incarcerated for non-violent crimes, like the use or possession of marijuana, and other problems that would be far better served through a rehabilitation or education program.

The worst part is that once captured by the prison industry, inmates are forced to work for pennies an hour, providing cheap labor for some of the most profitable enterprises in the world, including the U.S. Military.

According to the Left Business Observer, “the federal prison industry produces 100 percent of all military helmets, ammunition belts, bullet-proof vests, ID tags, shirts, pants, tents, bags, and canteens. Along with war supplies, prison workers supply 98 percent of the entire market for equipment assembly services; 93 percent of paints and paintbrushes; 92 percent of stove assembly; 46 percent of body armor; 36 percent of home appliances; 30 percent of headphones/microphones/speakers; and 21 percent of office furniture. Airplane parts, medical supplies, and much more: prisoners are even raising seeing-eye dogs for blind people.”

When you can get that kind of labor for less than a dollar a day, it’s hard to see the government’s motivation for incarcerating fewer people. And it’s all done at the taxpayer’s expense.

Scroll through the infographic below for more shocking facts about America‘s prison industry, and how much it‘s costing taxpayers like you.

Image

This piece was reprinted by Truthout with permission or license. It may not be reproduced in any form without permission or license from the source.

BETH BUCZYNSKI

Beth is a freelance writer and editor living in the Rocky Mountain West. So far, Beth has lived in or near three major U.S. mountain ranges, and is passionate about protecting the important ecosystems they represent. Follow Beth on Twitter as @ecosphericblog or check out her blog.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Mon Apr 25, 2016 12:19 am

21st-Century Slaves: How Corporations Exploit Prison Labor
In the eyes of the corporation, inmate labor is a brilliant strategy in the eternal quest to maximize profit.

by Rania Khalek
AlterNet
July 21, 2011

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This article has been updated.

There is one group of American workers so disenfranchised that corporations are able to get away with paying them wages that rival those of third-world sweatshops. These laborers have been legally stripped of their political, economic and social rights and ultimately relegated to second-class citizens. They are banned from unionizing, violently silenced from speaking out and forced to work for little to no wages. This marginalization renders them practically invisible, as they are kept hidden from society with no available recourse to improve their circumstances or change their plight.

They are the 2.3 million American prisoners locked behind bars where we cannot see or hear them. And they are modern-day slaves of the 21st century.

Incarceration Nation

It’s no secret that America imprisons more of its citizens than any other nation in history. With just 5 percent of the world’s population, the US currently holds 25 percent of the world's prisoners. "In 2008, over 2.3 million Americans were in prison or jail, with one of every 48 working-age men behind bars," according to a study by the Center for Economic and Policy Research(CEPR). That doesn’t include the tens of thousands of detained undocumented immigrants facing deportation, prisoners awaiting sentencing, or juveniles caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline. Perhaps it’s reassuring to some that the US still holds the number one title in at least one arena, but needless to say the hyper-incarceration plaguing America has had a damaging effect on society at large.

The CEPR study observes that US prison rates are not just excessive in comparison to the rest of the world, they are also "substantially higher than our own longstanding history." The study finds that incarceration rates between 1880 and 1970 ranged from about "100 to 200 prisoners per 100,000 people." After 1980, the inmate population "began to grow much more rapidly than the overall population and the rate climbed from "about 220 in 1980 to 458 in 1990, 683 in 2000, and 753 in 2008."

The costs of this incarceration industry are far from evenly distributed, with the impact of excessive incarceration falling predominantly on African-American communities. Although black people make up just 13 percent of the overall population, they account for 40 percent of US prisoners. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), black males are incarcerated at a rate "more than 6.5 times that of white males and 2.5 that of Hispanic males and "black females are incarcerated at approximately three times the rate of white females and twice that of Hispanic females."

Michelle Alexander points out in her book The New Jim Crow that more black men "are in prison or jail, on probation or on parole than were enslaved in 1850." Higher rates of black drug arrests do not reflect higher rates of black drug offenses. In fact, whites and blacks engage in drug offenses, possession and sales at roughly comparable rates.

Incentivizing Incarceration

Clearly, the US prison system is riddled with racism and classism, but it gets worse. As it turns out, private companies have a cheap, easy labor market, and it isn’t in China, Indonesia, Haiti, or Mexico. It’s right here in the land of the free, where large corporations increasingly employ prisoners as a source of cheap and sometimes free labor.

In the eyes of the corporation, inmate labor is a brilliant strategy in the eternal quest to maximize profit. By dipping into the prison labor pool, companies have their pick of workers who are not only cheap but easily controlled. Companies are free to avoid providing benefits like health insurance or sick days, while simultaneously paying little to no wages. They don’t need to worry about unions or demands for vacation time or raises. Inmates work full-time and are never late or absent because of family problems.

"If they refuse to work, they are moved to disciplinary housing and lose canteen privileges" along with "good time credit that reduces their sentences,” reports Chris Levister. To top it off, Abe Louise Young reports in The Nation that the federal government subsidizes the use of inmate labor by private companies through lucrative tax write-offs. Under the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), private-sector employers receive a tax credit of $2,400 for every work release inmate they employ as a reward for hiring “risky target groups” and they can "earn back up to 40 percent of the wages they pay annually to target group workers."

Study after study demonstrates the wastefulness of America's prison-industrial complex, in both taxpayer dollars and innocent lives, yet rolling back imprisonment rates is proving to be more challenging than ever. Meanwhile, the use of private prisons and now privately contracted inmate labor has created a system that does not exactly incentivize leaner sentencing.

The disturbing implications of such a system mean that skyrocketing imprisonment for the possession of miniscule amounts of marijuana and the the expansion of severe mandatory sentencing laws regardless of the conviction, are policies that have the potential to increase corporate profits. As are the“three strikes laws” that require courts to hand down mandatory and extended sentences to people who have been convicted of felonies on three or more separate occasions. People have literally been sentenced to life for minor crimes like shoplifting.

The Reinvention of Slavery

The exploitation of prison labor is by no means a new phenomenon. Jaron Browne, an organizer with People Organized to Win Employment Rights (POWER), maps out how the exploitation of prison labor in America is rooted in slavery. The abolition of slavery dealt a devastating economic blow to the South following the loss of free labor after the Civil War. So in the late 19th century, "an extensive prison system was created in the South in order to maintain the racial and economic relationship of slavery," a mechanism responsible for re-enslaving black workers. Browne describes Louisiana’s famous Angola Prison to illustrate the intentional transformation from slave to inmate:

“In 1880, this 8000-acre family plantation was purchased by the state of Louisiana and converted into a prison. Slave quarters became cell units. Now expanded to 18,000 acres, the Angola plantation is tilled by prisoners working the land—a chilling picture of modern day chattel slavery.”

The abolition of slavery quickly gave rise to the Black Codes and Convict Leasing, which together worked wonders at perpetuating African American servitude by exploiting a loophole in the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution, which reads:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

The Black Codes were a set of laws that "criminalized legal activity for African Americans" and provided a pretext for the arrest and mass imprisonment of newly freed blacks, which caused the rate of African Americans prisoners to “surpass whites for the first time”, according to Randall G. Sheldon in the Black Commentator. Convict leasing involved leasing out prisoners to private companies that paid the state a certain fee in return. Convicts worked for the companies during the day outside the prison and returned to their cells at night. The system provided revenue for the state and profits for plantation owners and wasn’t abolished until the 1930s.

Unfortunately, convict leasing was quickly replaced with equally despicable state-run chain gangs. Once again, stories of vicious abuse created enough public anger to abolish chain gangs by the 1950s. Nevertheless, the systems of prisoner exploitation never actually disappeared.

Today’s corporations can lease factories in prisons, as well as lease prisoners out to their factories. In many cases, private corporations are running prisons-for-profit, further incentivizing their stake in locking people up. The government is profiting as well, by running prison factories that operate as "multibillion-dollar industries in every state, and throughout the federal prison system," where prisoners are contracted out to major corporations by the state.

In the most extreme cases, we are even witnessing the reemergence of the chain gang. In Arizona, the self-proclaimed “toughest sheriff in America,” Joe Arpaio, requires his Maricopa County inmates to enroll in chain gangs to perform various community services or face lockdown with three other inmates in an 8-by-12-foot cell, for 23 hours a day. In June of this year, Arpaio started a female-only chain gang made up of women convicted of driving under the influence. In a press release he boasted that the inmates would be wearing pink T-shirts emblazoned with messages about drinking and driving.

The modern-day version of convict leasing was recently spotted in Georgia, where Governor Nathan Deal proposed sending unemployed probationers to work in Georgia's fields as a solution to a perceived labor shortage following the passage of the country’s most draconian anti-immigrant law. But his plan backfired when some of the probationers began walking off their jobs because the fieldwork was too strenuous.

There has also been a disturbing reemergence of the debtors’ prison, which should serve as an ominous sign of our dangerous reliance on prisons to manage any and all of society’s problems. According to the Wall Street Journal, "more than a third of all U.S. states allow borrowers who can't or won't pay to be jailed." They found that judges "signed off on more than 5,000 such warrants since the start of 2010 in nine counties." It appears that any act that can be criminalized in the era of private prisons and inmate labor will certainly end in jail time, further increasing the ranks of the captive workforce.

Who Profits?

Prior to the 1970s, private corporations were prohibited from using prison labor as a result of the chain gang and convict leasing scandals. But in 1979, the US Department of Justice admits that congress began a process of deregulation to "restore private sector involvement in prison industries to its former status, provided certain conditions of the labor market were met.” Over the last 30 years, at least 37 states have enacted laws permitting the use of convict labor by private enterprise, with an average pay of $0.93 to $4.73 per day.

Federal prisoners receive more generous wages that range from $0.23 to $1.25 per hour, and are employed by Unicor, a wholly owned government corporation established by Congress in 1934. Its principal customer is the Department of Defense, from which Unicor derives approximately 53 percent of its sales. Some 21,836 inmates work in Unicor programs. Subsequently, the nation's prison industry – prison labor programs producing goods or services sold to other government agencies or to the private sector -- now employs more people than any Fortune 500 company (besides General Motors), and generates about $2.4 billion in revenue annually. Noah Zatz of UCLA law school estimates that:

“Well over 600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates are working full-time in jails and prisons throughout the United States. Perhaps some of them built your desk chair: office furniture, especially in state universities and the federal government, is a major prison labor product. Inmates also take hotel reservations at corporate call centers, make body armor for the U.S. military, and manufacture prison chic fashion accessories, in addition to the iconic task of stamping license plates.”

Some of the largest and most powerful corporations have a stake in the expansion of the prison labor market, including but not limited to IBM, Boeing, Motorola, Microsoft, AT&T, Wireless, Texas Instrument, Dell, Compaq, Honeywell, Hewlett-Packard, Nortel, Lucent Technologies, 3Com, Intel, Northern Telecom, TWA, Nordstrom's, Revlon, Macy's, Pierre Cardin, Target Stores, and many more. Between 1980 and 1994 alone, profits went up from $392 million to $1.31 billion. Since the prison labor force has likely grown since then, it is safe to assume that the profits accrued from the use of prison labor have reached even higher levels.

In an article for Mother Jones, Caroline Winter details a number of mega-corporations that have profited off of inmates:

“In the 1990s, subcontractor Third Generation hired 35 female South Carolina inmates to sew lingerie and leisure wear for Victoria's Secret and JCPenney. In 1997, a California prison put two men in solitary for telling journalists they were ordered to replace 'Made in Honduras' labels on garments with 'Made in the USA.'"

According to Winter, the defense industry is a large part of the equation as well:

“Unicor, says that in addition to soldiers' uniforms, bedding, shoes, helmets, and flak vests, inmates have 'produced missile cables (including those used on the Patriot missiles during the Gulf War)' and 'wiring harnesses for jets and tanks.' In 1997, according to Prison Legal News, Boeing subcontractorMicroJet had prisoners cutting airplane components, paying $7 an hour for work that paid union wages of $30 on the outside.”

Oil companies have been known to exploit prison labor as well. Following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig that killed 11 workers and irreparably damaged the Gulf of Mexico for generations to come, BP elected to hire Louisiana prison inmates to clean up its mess. Louisiana has the highest incarceration rate of any state in the nation, 70 percent of which are African-American men. Coastal residents desperate for work, whose livelihoods had been destroyed by BP’s negligence, were outraged at BP’s use of free prison labor.

In the Nation article that exposed BP’s hiring of inmates, Abe Louise Young details how BP tried to cover up its use of prisoners by changing the inmates' clothing to give the illusion of civilian workers. But nine out of 10 residents of Grand Isle, Louisiana are white, while the cleanup workers were almost exclusively black, so BP’s ruse fooled very few people.

Private companies have long understood that prison labor can be as profitable as sweatshop workers in third-world countries with the added benefit of staying closer to home. Take Escod Industries, which in in the 1990s abandoned plans to open operations in Mexico and instead "moved to South Carolina, because the wages of American prisoners undercut those of de-unionized Mexican sweatshop workers," reports Josh Levine in a 1999 article that appeared in Perpective Magazine. The move was fueled by the state, which gave a $250,000 "equipment subsidy" to Escod along with industrial space at below-market rent. Other examples listed by Gordon Lafer in the American Prospect include Ohio's Honda supplier, which "pays its prison workers $2 an hour for the same work for which the UAW has fought for decades to be paid $20 to $30 an hour. Konica, which has hired prisoners to repair its copiers for less than 50 cents an hour. And in Oregon, where private companies can “lease” prisoners at a bargain price of $3 a day."

Even politicians have been known to tap into prison labor for their own personal use. In 1994, a contractor for GOP congressional candidate Jack Metcalf hired Washington state prisoners to call and remind voters he was pro-death penalty. After winning his campaign, he claimed to have no knowledge of the scandal. Perhaps this is why Senator John Ensign (R-NV) introduced a bill earlier this year to "require all low-security prisoners to work 50 hours a week." After all, The New York Times reminds us that "creating a national prison labor force has been a goal of his since he went to Congress in 1995."

In an unsettling turn of events lawmakers have begun ditching public employees in favor of free prison labor. The New York Times recently reported that states are "enlisting prison labor to close budget gaps" to offset cuts in "federal financing and dwindling tax revenue." At a time of record unemployment, inmates are being hired to "paint vehicles, clean courthouses, sweep campsites and perform many other services done before the recession by private contractors or government employees." In Wisconsin, prisoners are now taking up jobs that were once held by unionized workers, as a result of Governor Scott Walker’s contentious anti-union law.

Why You Should Care

Those who argue in favor of prison labor claim it is a useful tool for rehabilitation and preparation for post-jail employment. But this has only been shown to be true in cases where prisoners are exposed to meaningful employment, where they learn new skills, not the labor-intensive, menial and often dangerous work they are being tasked with. While little if any evidence exists to suggests that the current prison labor system decreases recidivism or leads to better employment prospects outside of prison, there are a number of solutions that have been proven to be useful.

According to a study by the Pew Charitable Trusts, “having a history of incarceration itself impedes subsequent economic success.” Pew found that "past incarceration reduced subsequent wages by 11 percent, cut annual employment by nine weeks and reduced yearly earnings by 40 percent." The study suggests that the best approach is for state and federal authorities to "invest in programs that reconnect inmates to the labor market," as well as "provide training and job placement services around the time of release." Most importantly, Pew suggests that in the long term, America must move toward alternative sentencing programs for low-level and nonviolent offenders, and issuing penalties that are actually proportionate with real public safety concerns.

The exploitation of any workforce is detrimental to all workers. Cheap and free labor pushes down wages for everyone. Just as American workers cannot compete with sweatshop labor, the same goes for prison labor. Many jobs that come into prison are taken from free citizens. The American labor movement must demand that prison labor be allowed the right to unionize, the right to a fair and living wage, and the right to a safe and healthy work environment. That is what prisoners are demanding, but they can only do so much from inside a prison cell.

As unemployment on the outside increases, so too will crime and incarceration rates, and our 21st-century version of corporate slavery will continue to expand unless we do something about it.

EDITOR'S NOTE:This article has been corrected since its original publication for more accurate attribution to original sources.
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Re: CNN Tonight with Don Lemon on Bill Clinton & BLM

Postby admin » Mon Apr 25, 2016 12:23 am

These 7 Household Names Make a Killing Off of the Prison-Industrial Complex
by Kelley Davidson
August 30, 2015

You won’t believe who’s on this list.

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Once slavery was abolished in 1865, manufacturers scrambled to find other sources of cheap labor—and because the 13th amendment banned slavery (except as punishment for crimes), they didn’t have to look too far. Prisons and big businesses have now been exploiting this loophole in the 13th amendment for over a century.

“Insourcing,” as prison labor is often called, is an even cheaper alternative to outsourcing. Instead of sending labor over to China or Bangladesh, manufacturers have chosen to forcibly employ the 2.4 million incarcerated people in the United States. Chances are high that if a product you’re holding says it is “American Made,” it was made in an American prison.

On average, prisoners work 8 hours a day, but they have no union representation and make between .23 and $1.15 per hour, over 6 times less than federal minimum wage. These low wages combined with increasing communication and commissary costs mean that inmates are often released from correctional facilities with more debt than they had on their arrival. Meanwhile, big businesses receive tax credits for employing these inmates in excess of millions of dollars a year.

While almost every business in America uses some form of prison labor to produce their goods, here are just a few of the companies who are helping prisoners pay off their debt to society, so to speak.

1. Whole Foods. The costly organic supermarket often nicknamed “Whole Paycheck” purchases artisan cheese and fish prepared by inmates who work for private companies. The inmates are paid .74 cents a day to raise tilapia that is subsequently sold for $11.99 a pound at the fashionable grocery store.

2. McDonald’s. The world’s most successful fast food franchise purchases a plethora of goods manufactured in prisons, including plastic cutlery, containers, and uniforms. The inmates who sew McDonald’s uniforms make even less money by the hour than the people who wear them.

3. Wal-Mart. Although their company policy clearly states that “forced or prison labor will not be tolerated by Wal-Mart”, basically every item in their store has been supplied by third-party prison labor factories. Wal-Mart purchases its produce from prison farms where laborers are often subjected to long, arduous hours in the blazing heat without adequate sunscreen, water, or food.

4. Victoria’s Secret. Female inmates in South Carolina sew undergarments and casual-wear for the pricey lingerie company. In the late 1990’s, 2 prisoners were placed in solitary confinement for telling journalists that they were hired to replace “Made in Honduras” garment tags with “Made in U.S.A.” tags. Victoria’s Secret has declined to comment.

5. Aramark. This company, which also provides food to colleges, public schools and hospitals, has a monopoly on foodservice in about 600 prisons in the U.S. Despite this, Aramark has a history of poor foodservice, including a massive food shortage that caused a prison riot in Kentucky in 2009.

6. AT&T. In 1993, the massive phone company laid off thousands of telephone operators—all union members—in order to increase their profits. Even though AT&T’s company policy regarding prison labor reads eerily like Wal-Mart’s, they have consistently used inmates to work in their call centers since ’93, barely paying them $2 a day.

7. BP. When BP spilled 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf coast, the company sent a workforce of almost exclusively African-American inmates to clean up the toxic spill while community members, many of whom were out-of-work fisherman, struggled to make ends meet. BP’s decision to use prisoners instead of hiring displaced workers outraged the Gulf community, but the oil company did nothing to reconcile the situation.

From dentures to shower curtains to pill bottles, almost everything you can imagine is being made in American prisons. Also implicit in the past and present use of prison labor are Microsoft, Nike, Nintendo, Honda, Pfizer, Saks Fifth Avenue, JCPenney, Macy’s, Starbucks, and more. For an even more detailed list of businesses that use prison labor, visit buycott.com, but the real guilty party here is the United States government. UNICOR, the corporation created and owned by the federal government to oversee penal labor, sets the condition and wage standards for working inmates.

One of the highest-paying prison jobs in the country? Sewing American flags for the state police.
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