Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Wed Mar 17, 2021 1:41 am

Vijay Prashad Warns Biden Is “Doubling Down” on Trump’s Anti-China Cold War Policy
by Amy Goodman
Democracy Now!
March 16, 2021
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/3/16/ ... na_rivalry

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GUESTS
Vijay Prashad, author and director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.
LINKS
Vijay Prashad on Twitter
"Biden continues the US conflict with China through the Quad"
"Washington Bullets: A History of the CIA, Coups, and Assassinations"

Beijing has accused the U.S. of perpetuating a Cold War mentality as President Joe Biden and senior administration officials shore up alliances in the Pacific region to counter China’s growing influence and increasingly describe the country as a geopolitical threat. Vijay Prashad, director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, says the “bellicose” tone out of Washington is not because the U.S. sees China as a military threat, but because China threatens U.S. dominance in the scientific, technological and diplomatic spheres. “It’s very chilling what the U.S. government is doing in ramping up this cold war,” says Prashad.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: We begin today’s show looking at U.S.-China relations. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with their counterparts in Japan today and will next head to South Korea as part of their first overseas trip. The meetings are widely viewed as an attempt by the Biden administration to secure allies in Washington’s campaign to counter China’s growing power. Blinken spoke earlier today in Japan.

SECRETARY OF STATE ANTONY BLINKEN: We’re united in the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, where countries follow the rules, cooperate whenever they can, and resolve their differences peacefully. And in particular, we will push back, if necessary, when China uses coercion or aggression to get its way.

AMY GOODMAN: The Japanese foreign minister also spoke at the joint news conference.

TOSHIMITSU MOTEGI: [translated] We agreed to oppose China’s unilateral bid to change the status quo, including in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and shared concerns about China’s coast guard laws.

AMY GOODMAN: And this is Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, also speaking at the joint news conference.

DEFENSE SECRETARY LLOYD AUSTIN: I know Japan shares our concerns with China’s destabilizing actions. And as I have said before, China is a pacing challenge for the Department of Defense.

AMY GOODMAN: Last week, President Biden met virtually with the leaders of India, Japan and Australia in the first meeting of the so-called Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Beijing has accused the Quad of perpetuating a Cold War mentality. On [Thursday], Secretary of State Blinken and national security adviser Jake Sullivan will meet with their Chinese counterparts in Alaska for the first direct talks between Beijing and the Biden administration. Earlier this month, Blinken described China as the “biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century” for the United States.

SECRETARY OF STATE ANTONY BLINKEN: China is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system, all the rules, values and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to, because it ultimately serves the interests and reflects the values of the American people.

AMY GOODMAN: This comes as the United States and China are taking markedly different approaches to vaccines and the COVID pandemic. While the United States faces accusations of hoarding vaccines and blocking efforts to waive vaccine patent rights at the World Trade Organization, China has shipped millions of vaccine doses to nations in the Global South in what’s been described as a form of vaccine diplomacy. China has sent free samples of Sinovac’s vaccine to 53 countries and has exported it to 22 nations that have placed orders. Recipients include Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia.

To talk more about the U.S.-China relations, we are joined by Vijay Prashad, director of the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, author of many books, including The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. His latest book, Washington Bullets: A History of the CIA, Coups, and Assassinations. He’s a senior nonresident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. His latest article for Peoples Dispatch is headlined “Biden continues the US conflict with China through the Quad.”

Welcome back to Democracy Now!, Vijay. Well, let’s begin right there, with that headline. Can you talk about the Biden administration’s approach to China, how it compares to Trump, and what you see needs to happen and change?

VIJAY PRASHAD: It’s great to be back with you, Amy. The first thing I’d like to say is that there are deep continuities not only between the Biden approach to China and the Trump approach, but also, before that, the Obama approach, because Obama, after all, inaugurated something called a “pivot” to Asia.

I just want to point something out, which is that, you know, when they say that China is a threat, as Antony Blinken said in what I thought was a very sharp and rather bellicose speech — when he says China is a threat, what do they mean? I think, here, precision is important. They don’t mean that China is a military threat to the United States. After all, the Chinese military has the capacity to defend its homeland, but it’s not in any way threatening the United States. In fact, it’s U.S. naval vessels that are sailing very close to the Chinese mainland in so-called freedom of navigation sorties right close to Chinese territorial waters. So, the Chinese don’t have a military threat against the United States at all.

What they’re talking about has been very closely clarified at this Quad meeting, which is that the United States government understands that China’s scientific and technological developments, particularly in robotics, in telecommunications, in green technology and so on, has far surpassed that of U.S. and European companies. And this is an existential threat, as far as the United States is concerned, the U.S. government is concerned, to Silicon Valley. China doesn’t threaten the American citizen, the average American citizen. But Chinese telecommunication companies, like Huawei and ZTE, are perhaps a generation ahead of U.S. telecommunications companies. And rather than compete, you know, in a, as it were, free market with these companies, the United States government is using immense military pressure, diplomatic pressure and a sort of information war to push China back into its boundaries. It’s one thing, as far as the U.S. is concerned, Amy, for China to deliver its workers to produce products for U.S. companies. It’s quite another when Chinese companies are competing fair and square against U.S. companies.

That’s the real issue here. It’s not human rights. It’s not military pressure. It’s not what Lloyd Austin, I think quite gingerly, called destabilization. That’s not the issue. The main issue here is scientific and technological competition. And China, I’m afraid, as far as Silicon Valley is concerned, is ahead of the United States in that game.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Vijay, I wanted to ask you about how China is covered in the U.S. and the Western media. You mentioned the technological competition that often gets some play, but the main issues that the U.S. press seems to concentrate on are the trade deficit with China, the democracy movement in Hong Kong or the fate of the Muslim Uyghurs in China. Very little attention is paid to China’s role as the principal reducer of poverty in the world. Today, there are about 112 million manufacturing workers in China. That’s more than the combined workforce, manufacturing workforce, of the United States, Germany, France, Germany, Italy and Japan combined. So, what’s happened over the last 30, 40 years is that China has lifted about 700 million people out of extreme poverty. Could you talk about this role of China as really changing the nature of the distribution in terms of — now, of course, American companies have benefited from that, from the low wages in China, but the Chinese people have also had an enormous change in their living standards, as well, no?

VIJAY PRASHAD: The first thing I’d like to respond to, Juan, is you mentioned the U.S. media. Look, frankly, most of the U.S. corporate media have become stenographers of the U.S. State Department. You know, the credibility to have Mr. Mike Pompeo, former secretary of state, stand up there on behalf of the Muslims of China, after what the United States has done in Afghanistan, in Iraq — and, don’t forget, Pompeo used to head the CIA — I mean, it strains credibility. When the U.S. government is defending people in the Hong Kong — Hong Kong, which was a colony of the British Empire for a hundred years and was ruled as a colony, the British government now standing up for human rights and democracy, it’s extraordinary that nobody asks the question about their own integrity on these questions. But let’s leave that aside.

Yes, it’s certainly true that as far as a developing country is concerned, China has played an extraordinary role in producing the ability for the Chinese people to lift themselves out of poverty. Let’s be clear about one thing: China had the longest Second World War on the planet. It started in 1937, ended in 1949. That’s years more than the Second World War in Europe. The country was devastated when the Chinese communists took power in 1949. They have fought a very serious battle to end poverty. And they didn’t do it merely by transfer payments, by cash payments. They did it by improving social indicators, by improving healthcare, literacy, education in general, and so on. This is an enormous, enormous feat that they’ve done by lifting, as you say, 700 million people out of poverty. This should be the headline, but it’s not.

And even more so, you know, Amy, you’re quite right to mention what’s been called vaccine diplomacy, rather than the vaccine nationalism we’re seeing in North America, Canada, where, for instance, there’s double the number of vaccine doses needed, and Canada, shamefully, has taken vaccine out of the COVAX vaccine fund, which is supposed to provide vaccines to developing countries. Yes, China is producing a kind of vaccine diplomacy rather than vaccine nationalism. But more than that, Chinese medical personnel, like Cuban medical personnel, have been going around the world assisting countries in combating COVID-19. You know, we are all for the Cuban doctors to get the Nobel Peace Prize this year, but we should also recognize the number of Chinese doctors who have been overseas providing assistance in the Global South.

Recently, even The Atlantic magazine ran a story to show that the myth of the Chinese “debt trap” needs to be called into question. In other words, China has been lending enormous amounts of money for development purposes in the Global South, in countries like Bolivia, where the United States has come in with a project called American Crece, trying to undercut Chinese investments by bringing in U.S. private sector investments and strong-arming countries, as we saw in El Salvador, strong-arming the government, saying, “If you don’t take American money and cut the Chinese out, we’re going to make great trouble for you.” I mean, this is old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy, and people need to see it for what it is. If you’re going to talk about human rights, what about the human rights of the people of El Salvador to craft their own foreign policy? Why should they be dictated to by Washington, D.C.?

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Vijay, I wanted to center on that a little bit, the situation in Latin America. Latin America has now become the second major region for Chinese investment abroad, and the kinds of projects that the Chinese are helping to finance, they are really astounding. There’s the $5 billion that’s being spent to build two hydroelectric dams in the Patagonia section of Argentina over the Santa Cruz River, a transcontinental railroad between Peru and Bolivia, and, of course, a new canal across Central America, across Nicaragua, that would basically compete with the monopoly that the Panama Canal has had over world shipping. Could you talk about the sheer size of these projects? Really, most Americans are not aware of this enormous infrastructure that is resulting from the Belt and Road policy of China.

VIJAY PRASHAD: You see, Juan, during this pandemic, people have been aware of what we call the digital divide, you know, some people not having access to the internet. This is, of course, very difficult at a time when 168 million children have not been able to go to school, because they don’t have access to the internet. It’s not just a digital divide. There’s an electricity divide. There’s an infrastructure divide around the planet. It’s one thing to live in the United States and bemoan developments overseas, but you have to understand that in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, even in the southern part of Argentina, there’s an electricity divide, there’s an infrastructure divide, there’s a lack of transportation and so on.

Very little capital has come into these countries from the World Bank, from the International Monetary Fund that’s enabled infrastructural projects. So what the Chinese have done with the Belt and Road Initiative is provide vast amounts of finance, as you mentioned, to develop some of this infrastructure, to bridge the electricity gap, to bridge the transportation gap.

This is very clearly in the case in Bolivia, where, during the administration of Evo Morales, they cut some very important deals with the Chinese, not only to mine lithium, which is a key component of batteries, but also to develop the processing of lithium in Bolivia and to create electric cars. I think people don’t know that during the last year of Evo Morales’s government, Bolivia produced electric cars for domestic consumption. It’s really quite incredible what’s happened in that partnership. They want to upskill these countries, not just leave them as a place to draw out raw materials and to sell products produced in China. They seriously have a project of upskilling, and I’m quite impressed to see, particularly in Bolivia.

But look at what happens to this. In Ecuador, the government of Lenín Moreno, under some pressure from the U.S. — but it must be said, Lenín Moreno of Ecuador doesn’t need much pressure from the U.S. government — decided to cut out Chinese loans, which had been taken by the previous government of Rafael Correa, and substituted for U.S. loans. You know, we looked closely at these two agreements. It was very clear that the Chinese loans were far less onerous than the U.S. loans that were coming in, because the Chinese, during the pandemic, essentially said, “We suspend all payments for another two years.” The U.S. has not been suspending debt servicing payments from developing countries. So, if you just look at the case of Ecuador, it’s a better deal to take the Chinese money.

Rather than accept this, rather than say, “Let’s have a collaborative approach between China and the United States” — I very much hope that in Alaska this becomes part of the worldview, that there should be a collaborative approach — rather than a collaborative approach, I’m afraid the Biden administration is doubling down on the Trump administration’s cold war policy against China.

AMY GOODMAN: So, Vijay Prashad, there is a tweet, a kind of meme, that a lot of the Chinese diplomats are putting out there right now, where they are saying that — oh, what is it? — China hasn’t dropped a single bomb on foreign soil in more than 40 years; meanwhile, the U.S. drops 46 bombs a day, on average. Your response to that?

VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, Amy, the Stockholm Institute for Peace and Research releases their report every year on arms deals and on military spending. And the report recently released shows that the United States government has increased its military spending, and China has actually decreased its military spending. At the same time, just a few weeks ago, Admiral Philip Davidson of the Indo-Pacific Command went before the U.S. Armed Services Committee, and he basically has asked for $5 billion for the Indo-Pacific Command this year and $27 billion over the next period.

Mr. Davidson said something very chilling, Amy, at this hearing. He said the United States government must “be prepared to fight a war” against China. “Be prepared to fight.” The Chinese have not used any belligerent language. In fact, they have cautioned and said, “Look, we need to dial back this tension. This so-called freedom of navigation sorties by the U.S. Navy needs to stop. The United States needs to draw back. There’s no need to militarize Guam.” A conflict is unimaginable between two nuclear powers, and yet United States ramping up the language, spending more to militarize its Pacific outlets, the bases in Japan and so on. I haven’t seen anything comparable coming from China.

This is at a time when the U.S. government has developed a hypersonic cruise missile, which can fire from anywhere in the world, hit Beijing in 15 minutes. It’s very chilling what the U.S. government is doing in ramping up this cold war in the name of human rights, in the name of, you know, non-destabilization, democracy and so on. You’ve got to cut through the rhetoric and see who’s really violating the U.N. Charter.

For this reason, China and a host of other countries, about 10 other countries, have created a group called Friends of the U.N. Charter. This group of friends is going to be a group in the United Nations. They’re going to try and push the objectives of the Charter against groups like the Quad. You know, China has said that the Quad is fine. You can meet as the Quad, but don’t produce groupings like the Quad whose intent is to destabilize a country like China, destabilize another member nation of the United Nations. I think that was a very sober statement coming from Beijing. But more than that, this group of Friends of the U.N. Charter is a significant development, and I hope more people pay attention to it.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Vijay, I wanted to ask you about the role of the major multinational American companies, which clearly have benefited from being able to offshore their production capacity in China while selling the products in the West. Their role, as increasingly U.S. administrations become more and more belligerent toward China, but yet the companies still have to make money as a result of their relationships with China?

VIJAY PRASHAD: See, Juan, these companies know that what they make money on is on the patents against the technology. You know, Apple doesn’t make anything. Apple collects rent off products made by, in fact, a Taiwanese company inside China. Apple doesn’t make iPhones. It outsources the production of the iPhone. They make money off the rent, you know, off the patent. So, when Chinese firms develop new patents — and, indeed, the last couple of years, China has registered more patents than U.S. companies — as China develops new technologies and so on, this is what’s going to outflank U.S. companies.

It’s very significant that during the Trump years, none of the Silicon Valley firms opposed the trade war prosecuted by Mr. Trump against China. In fact, when the head of Apple went to see Mr. Trump, he didn’t say, “Dial back the trade war.” I mean, this is really important. He didn’t say, “Dial back the trade war.” He said that the trade war is unfairly helping South Korean companies like Samsung and that there needs to be a way to figure out this trade war so that a South Korean, a third country, is not benefiting from the U.S. trade war on China, because the real beneficiary, as far as the CEO of Apple was concerned, should be Apple.

You know, in other words, Silicon Valley understands that they require U.S. pressure on China to make China surrender its advances in high-tech, in telecommunications, in robotics, in green technology and so on, so that U.S. firms can continue to make money off the patents, to continue to make money as rent-seeking companies, because they are certainly not making money as innovative producers. You know, what are the new major technologies in green technology produced in the United States? Not much. Most of the big developments have taken place in Germany and in China. This is the reason why U.S. high-tech firms are basically aligned with this Cold War mentality that has emanated in Washington from the Obama administration onwards.

AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to ask you, Vijay Prashad, back to the issue of vaccine, this idea of China dropping vaccines all over, and the U.S. still involved in these wars around the world and fighting waivers at the Word Trade Organization that allow for more vaccines to be made available to the developing world. I mean, The New York Times has a front-page piece. China is giving Latin America vaccines and gaining leverage. It’s about during Trump — under Trump, taking on China. Brazil, which is now in a massive surge of coronavirus, because Jair Bolsonaro was considered the tropical Trump, such a close ally of Trump — he refused to deal with China and Huawei, the large telecommunications company. But now, in their desperation and with Trump gone, they are turning to China in a major way, both around telecommunications and, at the same time, asking China, “Can you get us vaccines?” Chile is the — China is the dominant supplier of vaccines in Chile and, as we said, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia. And here the U.S. is either being accused of hoarding vaccines or fighting the ability to get these vaccines around the world.

VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, India and South Africa — India, a major part of the Quad. Nonetheless, these two countries have asked that the patents on the vaccine be unlocked, so that anybody can produce these vaccines, you know, and that you would have, therefore, ramped-up production. It’s very clear when you talk to people at DHL and other couriers. They say that the issue isn’t getting vaccine places. The issue right now is that the production lines have slowed down, that people are not producing it at the scale that they have to.

Look, this pandemic should not be looked at politically. Countries need to come together under the leadership of the United Nations, under the leadership of the WHO. We need to ramp up the production of these vaccines. By the way, these vaccines are almost all produced with massive public financing. There should be no patent on these vaccines. They need to be unlocked. India and South Africa were quite right to ask for them to be unlocked.

What the Chinese are doing with the Sinovac is, essentially, treating it as if it’s an unlocked vaccine, delivering it at scale to countries around the world. This should not be seen as a political issue. Why should a Swiss company or a U.S.-based company be making billions of dollars, hundreds of billions of dollars, on the pandemic? You know, we used to talk about something, Amy, called war profiteering, during a war, when companies made money producing armaments and so on. There should be no pandemic profiteering. Pandemic profiteering should be an immoral thing. Companies should not be making money during this pandemic. There should be no politics in this. There should be no profit in this. This should be treated as a human tragedy which has to be dealt with in a collaborative way by human beings.

And I must say, once again, here, the Chinese, but not only the Chinese, the Cubans, other countries are showing the way, because they are treating this as a human tragedy. Look, China doesn’t have a political litmus test where it sends its Sinovac. It’s not saying, you know, “Mr. Bolsonaro, you and your son have made horrendous, racist comments about the Chinese, therefore we won’t send you the vaccine.” No, the Chinese say, “We don’t really care what you say. It’s a human tragedy. The Brazilian people should not be held hostage by the ill humor of Mr. Bolsonaro.” And they’ve been providing vaccines. I think this is a very mature attitude.

And I hope this kind of attitude defines the policy not only at the United Nations, but at the WHO. We need a little more maturity in the world. And I feel that all of this warmongering, war talk, this false talk about destabilization and so on, should be set aside. I am not actually governed much by what Blinken said in his speech in early March. I thought a little bit of reality would have been useful. And despite the fact that Mr. Blinken is fluent in French, he is very, very, very much like Mike Pompeo.

AMY GOODMAN: Vijay Prashad, I want to thank you for being with us, author and director of the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, senior nonresident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University in China.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Tue Mar 30, 2021 4:25 am

Capitalism Without Accountability Is at Root of Suez Canal Shipping Crisis, Says Scholar Laleh Khalili (Excerpt]
by Amy Goodman
Democracy Now
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/3/29/ ... obal_trade

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AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to end on a different issue, Laleh Khalili, and that is a piece that you just wrote about, talking about U.S.-China relations, in the London Review of Books, titled “Growing Pains: The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the New Century.” On Friday, President Biden told reporters he discussed plans with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to counter China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: One of the things I suggested we do is — we talked about China and the competition they’re engaging in, in the Belt and Road Initiative. And I suggested we should have, essentially, a similar initiative coming from the democratic states, helping those communities around the world that in fact need help.

AMY GOODMAN: Professor Khalili, your response?

LALEH KHALILI: So, it’s quite interesting, because it seems to me that the U.S. military-industrial-diplomatic complex has always wanted another enemy. And it benefits from having another cold war going. And so, to cast China’s provision of, for example, infrastructures in order to facilitate its trade seems to be a kind of an encouragement of this. Of course, there are lots of problems also associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. For example, in some of the places that these investments are happening, there are all sorts of human rights abuses happening, including in China’s own Xinjiang.

AMY GOODMAN: And briefly explain the Belt and Road Initiative, which is not explained at all in the media in the United States very much.

LALEH KHALILI: So, the Belt and Road Initiative is, essentially, a plan that was put into action in 2013 to actually gather under its title a whole lot of already existing infrastructure projects across the Asian, Eurasian landmass, all the way through Europe, for infrastructure, and particularly transport projects, so high-speed rail, train lines that went through different terminuses and would, for example, end up in Singapore, in Iran and in Budapest, and then, across the oceans, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and through the Mediterranean, essentially, a route for ships, so investments in port and maritime infrastructures. And so, this was called the maritime belt and maritime — the land belt and the maritime road.

And so, essentially, this massive program entailed investment, financing by China, close, actually, to how much — $400-and-something billion, close to actually what the World Bank had invested in that period of time on infrastructures. And part of the reason for this, of course, is that many of these countries did need infrastructures, and they’re often not given it because of sanctions or because of U.S. foreign policy or because of, of course, histories of European colonization of a lot of the places that are destinations for this investment.

And so, this is essentially the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Of course, it facilitates Chinese capital accumulation. It’s not done out of Chinese goodness. And, as I said, it does also have, in areas — for example, in Balochistan and Pakistan or in various provinces in Myanmar or, indeed, in Xinjiang, there are issues associated with this. But it’s also the way that it is being cast. The way that it’s being addressed in Europe and North America is as if China is sort of the next great enemy.

It’s really important also to point out that China, despite sort of this expansion, has not, for example, established — I don’t know — 800 military bases, like the U.S. has done in lots of different places, but, rather, it does have one or two military bases outside of its own periphery, but it also depends on private military companies. So, it’s quite an interesting moment, because, essentially, what China is doing is the enforcement of capitalism with a Chinese face, if you wish, but it is seen as a threat to the U.S. national security, perhaps because, as I said, a cold war is always good for the military business in the U.S. and Europe.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, Laleh Khalili, we want to thank you for being with us, author of Sinews of War and Trade: Shipping and Capitalism in the Arabian Peninsula. And we’ll link to your piece in The Washington Post, “Big ships were created to avoid relying on the Suez Canal. Ironically, a big ship is now blocking it.” Professor Khalili teaches international politics at the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London.

***************************

Growing Pains
by Laleh Khalili
London Review of Books: The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century
by Jonathan E. Hillman
18 March 2021

In​ a short story called ‘The Chinese Road’ written in the 1970s by the Yemeni-Ethiopian Mohammad Abdul-Wali, a Yemeni man befriends a Chinese construction worker on the new road from the port of Hodeida on the Red Sea, ‘cutting through the mountain’, to the capital, Sanaa, more than two hundred kilometres away. Abdul-Wali describes the competent and friendly Chinese labourers who live in tents with the Yemenis. They all learn Arabic, unlike an earlier group of foreigners: the British, sweaty and florid, with their colony in Aden, who remained aloof from the locals, and departed ‘leaving nothing behind but the hatred of [the] people’. The Chinese construction workers, by contrast, leave a lasting legacy.

The completion of the first paved road in Yemen in 1961 was commemorated in a series of stamps that also celebrated the building of a modern port in Hodeida with the help of Soviet engineers. By that point 1100 Chinese construction workers and engineers were building roads in Yemen. Work on the Sanaa-Hodeida road had begun in 1959, the same year China started blasting through the Himalayas to build the Karakoram Highway to Pakistan. In 1967, China completed the sky-high ‘friendship road’ between Lhasa and Kathmandu, and between 1970 and 1975 it built a railway between Tanzania and Zambia. Chinese railway experts were remembered respectfully by their local counterparts for passing on their skills.

These postcolonial Chinese construction programmes were intended to be different from the European schemes of the preceding decades, which were launched by colonial powers to enable the transport of extracted raw materials. As the Guyanese historian Walter Rodney wrote in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972), roads and railways

were not constructed in the colonial period so that Africans could visit their friends. More important still, they were not laid down to facilitate internal trade in African commodities. There were no roads connecting different colonies and different parts of the same colony in a manner that made sense with regard to Africa’s needs and development. All roads and railways led down to the sea.

In the exuberant but brief period immediately after decolonisation most postcolonial states looked to the Soviet Union or China to help with industrialisation and infrastructure, often trying to play these countries off against the US and Europe in order to secure better deals with fewer strings attached. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet and Chinese politics of aid resulted in the construction of hydroelectric dams, steel mills, cement factories, ports and airports, as well as road and rail networks across Asia and Africa. There were more direct forms of aid too. After the Bandung Conference’s call in 1955 for Afro-Asian solidarity, China granted $4.7 million in hard currency to Egypt just as Britain, France and Israel were attacking it over the Suez Canal. China extended credit to a number of recently independent African states – Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, Kenya, Guinea – and gave millions to Nepal, Ceylon (soon to become Sri Lanka), Indonesia and Cambodia. It also provided military aid and armaments to anticolonial guerrilla groups across Asia, Africa and Latin America.

At the same time, the US Army Corps of Engineers was building roads, communication systems, airports and other infrastructure in Libya, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These were always designed to meet US military and strategic needs, often connecting US bases to major transport facilities. In the 1970s I lived in Mashhad in northern Iran, in a neighbourhood next to the recently opened Cento Road. The road was funded by the Central Treaty Organisation, formed in 1955 and modelled after Nato. Its founding members were Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the UK, with the US pulling the strings in the hope of preventing southward Soviet expansion. The US was happy to fund transport routes because, as the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Curtis LeMay, put it in 1962, ‘inadequacies of road and rail facilities in Iran’ limited the ability of the US military to travel easily near Iran’s border with the Soviet Union. We understood, as other collateral beneficiaries of such roads did, that the US never built a road unless its forces might one day travel along it.

There is a temptation in Washington policy cliques to see China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a continuation of Cold War politics. The BRI, which was launched with great fanfare by Xi Jinping in 2013, has two components. On land, multiple train routes are planned to cross the Eurasian landmass via Central Asia, Russia and Iran, with termini in Singapore, Isfahan and Budapest, from where it would connect to the railways of Western Europe. The maritime branch wraps around South-East and South Asia and from there extends to East Africa or through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean.

The numerous road, rail, port and airport projects that form the spine of these new Silk Roads are certainly strategic vectors of alliance like their mid-20th-century counterparts, but there is much less of the discourse of South-South solidarity that emerged out of Bandung, and more of an economic calculation. The China of the 1950s and 1960s was very different from the China of the 21st century. In 1959, when work began on the Karakoram and Hodeida-Sanaa highways, China had a GDP of $55 billion and was in the throes of famine. In 2013, when the BRI was announced (initially under the name One Belt, One Road), its GDP approached $9.5 trillion. In real terms, the Chinese economy grew twentyfold over that half-century.

After China opened up to foreign direct investment in the 1970s, first from Japan and later from Europe and North America, it quickly became the world’s factory. In the last decade of the 20th century, numerous new manufacturing centres grew up along its coasts. Its ports expanded in number and capacity to receive raw materials – coal, oil, ore, bauxite, copper – from all over the globe, and to dispatch in turn huge container ships laden with manufactured goods. By the early 2000s, Chinese ports dominated every top-twenty maritime list.

China’s response to the global crisis of capital in 2008 was a massive stimulus programme. Its central planners encouraged the movement of capital inland and used the state-owned banking system to cultivate manufacturing centres along China’s long land borders with South-East, South and Central Asian states. They also invested in extensive land transport infrastructures, accumulating expertise and manufacturing capacity in railway technologies, which are now being deployed in building the rail components of the BRI. This alternation between mobile capital and its immobilisation in infrastructure – a ‘spatial fix’, in the words of the geographer David Harvey – is one progenitor of Xi’s grand initiative. China’s treatment by the US is another.

In October 2011, Obama’s then secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, announced the birth of ‘America’s Pacific Century’ in an article for Foreign Policy, and boasted that the Asia-Pacific region was ‘eager for our leadership and our business’. Although the Clinton manifesto made gestures to allay China’s fear of a new Cold War, only a few months later the Pentagon issued Defence Strategic Guidance which included a ‘pivot to Asia’. To the jubilation of armchair and actual generals, the strategy document declared the end of the boots-on-the-ground counterinsurgency era and warned of ‘the growth of China’s military power’. The document’s familiar jargon – it called for ‘credible deterrence’ and the need to ‘project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges’ – was followed up with action in the region: new military exercises with Japan, the decision to base US Marines in Australia, arms sales to the Philippines, and a range of other activities. All this built on the Clinton and Bush administrations’ placement of additional naval and air weapons systems in Japan and Guam, the deployment of another aircraft carrier to the Pacific and the construction of a naval base in Singapore.

Trump’s trade wars against China and his unabashedly racist response to Covid showed a US itching for a revival of Cold War rivalries. In his first days in office Biden declared that the term ‘China virus’ would be expunged from federal documents, but while criticising Trump’s approach, Biden’s new secretary of state, Antony Blinken, said that the former president ‘was right in taking a tougher approach to China’; the new secretary of commerce, Gina Raimondo, has said that she will continue Trump’s policy, using ‘the full toolkit at my disposal ... to protect America and our networks from Chinese interference’. Such attitudes have become firmly entrenched among US policymakers.

All this means we should be grateful that a long-established Washington think-tanker like Jonathan Hillman is downplaying the threat of China’s projects to US interests. Hillman is a senior fellow at the centre-right Centre for Strategic and International Studies. His research for The Emperor’s New Road included visiting a number of countries where BRI projects are underway in order to measure the gap between promise and reality. He aspires to a tone of gravity even when his fieldwork largely consists in finding out whether the trains run on time. The effect is disconcerting: in places, his reports read like stories from a Lonely Planet travel guide – trains are missed, there are troubles with Russian border guards, ferries don’t depart from their advertised docks.

Predictably, the book’s cover has a red star on it, and there are further clichés inside: from the travels of Marco Polo, to Central Asian Muslims who both pray to Allah and drink vodka, to the multiple urban centres branded ‘the new Dubai’. He sees China as undergoing an ‘education as a rising power’; it is in need of instruction, presumably from more experienced imperialists. But the imperialists that should serve as paragons and warnings, he thinks, are France and Britain, not the US. The Persian kings Xerxes and Darius are mentioned several times, but the pivot to Asia is not. He portrays the US as a well-meaning, bumbling giant whose best efforts are undermined by its being too nice, too concerned with democratic institutions, arriving too late on the scene in places like Pakistan, not understanding the locals, and not spending enough dollars to compete properly with China. On the ‘dangers’ of China to US national interests, Hillman is equivocal. While the overall message of the book is that the Chinese are too incompetent and their Asian clients too venal to endanger US ambitions in these contested spaces, we nevertheless hear about violent smuggling gangs in the port of Piraeus, Huawei’s supernatural reach, the Chinese military presence in the South China Sea, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia, and the corrupting influence of Chinese money wherever BRI projects are found.

Where Chinese infrastructure projects seem to have failed, Hillman tends to blame corruption and the machinations of local actors. He contends that it was a lack of principles and foresight on the part of Djiboutian politicians that led them in 2018 to invite the Chinese to take over the container terminal of Doraleh after they had seized control of it from the Dubai-based company DP World, which had held the concession. There is nothing here about DP World’s predatory practices in Indian Ocean ports, which resulted, for example, in Yemen buying back the concession for the port of Aden (only for it to be decimated by the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s war on Yemen). Hillman portrays China’s expansion in Piraeus as the Asian hordes at the gates of Europe, but doesn’t tell us that the European troika’s forcible privatisation of Greek state enterprises in the wake of the financial crisis offered the port on a platter to China’s Cosco Shipping. (During the same fire sale, airports on many Greek islands were sold to the German airport management company Fraport AG.)

Belt and Road investments are leading to the development of infrastructure long denied to African and Asian countries. China lends money on favourable terms to its allies, including states that otherwise fail to secure such loans as a result of unforgiving US sanctions. As well as investing in roads, railways and ports, China now manufactures technologies – especially in the field of telecommunications – that challenge US and European hegemony. Its less costly products are easier for countries of the global South to afford. And China’s ‘no interference’ policy means that it has largely avoided the crude regime-change politics emanating from Washington; its military expenditure is still only a third of America’s, and much lower still as a percentage of GDP. China is now at the centre of global capitalism. No longer economically peripheral and with no pretence of being a communist state, China uses its BRI projects to consolidate and expand capitalism ‘with Chinese characteristics’.

Data from Boston University’s Global Development Policy Centre show that between 2008 and 2019, China extended overseas development credit of $462 billion, only slightly less than the $467 billion provided by the World Bank in the same period. The money advanced by the China Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of China reached a peak in 2016, half of which was spent on infrastructure projects. Ten countries – including Venezuela, Pakistan, Russia, Angola, Brazil, Ecuador and Iran – received the lion’s share of the loans.

The terms under which these loans have been offered, and their economic effects, have differed from place to place. To finance development in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, China offered loans at zero interest, perhaps because of Pakistan’s strategic importance. In Sri Lanka, it signed a 99-year lease on the port of Hambantota, in which it has a 70 per cent stake. Hillman isn’t alone in regarding the Hambantota concession as a coercive debt-equity swap: China gets control of the port in return for forgiving some of Sri Lanka’s debt. But the story is more complicated. In 2016, Sri Lanka owed financiers $65 billion, $8 billion of which was owed to China. But 75 per cent of the debt was in government bonds bought up primarily by funds in the US, and much of that debt was accrued not to build infrastructure but to finance the counterinsurgency war against the Tamil Tigers. Ports, airports and other facilities that were built were the vanity projects of the then president, Mahinda Rajapaksa: they were badly situated, poorly designed and overpriced. The money from China intended for the port concession went instead to service interest payments. Rajapaksa, who was booted out of office largely because of the strength of popular feeling against the port, found his way back to power as prime minister in his brother Gotabaya’s administration. The reduction in China’s financing of projects in 2016 was perhaps influenced by its embarrassment over Sri Lanka.

Leaked documents show that, in 2013, Kenya used the port of Mombasa as security on loans taken out with China’s Exim Bank to finance the construction of a railway from Mombasa to Nairobi, with a branch – some of it as yet unbuilt – to the Rift Valley and the Ugandan border, a project that involved murky deals between different factions of the Kenyan elite. The loans Kenya has received from China amount to nearly $5 billion. Given that the railway is yet to turn a profit, Kenya may be forced to cede the port to China. More likely, China will renegotiate the debt, extending the repayment schedule.

Transport infrastructure has historically served to bind fractious peripheral territories to the centre. America’s Pacific Railroad, built in the 1860s, allowed businesses protected by US government troops to expand into Indigenous territories in the West. Where infrastructure goes, commerce follows – but so, often, does war. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which terminates at Gwadar on the Gulf of Oman, crosses Balochistan, where the Pakistani state has for decades disappeared or assassinated activists and waged a brutal war of pacification against those fighting for the region’s autonomy. In Myanmar, the corridor passes through Shan and Rakhine states, where counterinsurgency measures have led to mass killings and the expulsion of minority communities. This year the Shanghai International Port Group will take over the running of the port of Haifa, with the full co-operation of Israel’s security state. In China itself, the BRI train routes across Central Asia pass through Xinjiang, where millions of Uighurs are interned in re-education camps and forced to work in textile and electronics factories.

Although China has a large number of citizens working overseas, it has just one military base beyond its own periphery, in Djibouti. (The former French colony also hosts military personnel from France, the US, Italy, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.) China has relied on private security firms to protect personnel and facilities in Africa and Asia. Chinese logistics firms in East Africa or South-East Asia can secure the assistance of, among others, the Frontier Services Group, a Hong Kong-based company backed by the Chinese state-owned CITIC Group, with offices in Kenya and Dubai. The founder and chairman of Frontier Services is Erik Prince, whose firm of mercenaries, Blackwater, became notorious for killing civilians in Iraq. Frontier Services is rumoured to have set up training camps in Xinjiang and has acted for Chinese firms working in the oilfields of South Sudan and Mozambique, the jade trade in Myanmar, aviation in Kenya and coltan mining in Congo.

Most​ accounts of the BRI focus on its geopolitics or geoeconomics. But large infrastructure projects have wider ramifications: lives are affected, connections forged and knowledge circulated. Chinese workers have a long history in Africa and Asia, going back well before the postcolonial period. At the end of the 19th century, the British Empire relied on Chinese labour to keep many of its mines and plantations going. From the 1850s onwards, Chinese workers toiled in South African gold and diamond mines, tapped rubber and extracted tin in Malaya, harvested Cuban sugar plantations, traded and farmed in Java and Sumatra, extracted guano on islets off the coast of Peru, and prospected for gold and built railroads in the US and Canada. Chinese merchants were, and still are, everywhere in the Indian Ocean basin. By the mid 2oth century, China was spreading its engineering knowhow across Asia and Africa and making its presence felt through sheer force of numbers. As Abdul-Wali wrote in ‘The Chinese Road’, many thousands of Chinese workers lived with and trained local labourers.

The Belt and Road Initiative has had a more mixed reception. Praise for its transformative effects is met by criticism of its meagre impact on local capacity building and knowledge transfer. Authorities in areas where projects are in progress often disagree with central administrations over the implementation and efficiency of the schemes. Unless the BRI host countries have the capacity to negotiate, the percentage of local workers on many construction sites is relatively small, relationships are hierarchical, and the interactions between local and Chinese workers are often fraught. The capitalist system of labour management has travelled along the Belt and Road. In Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania, Chinese administrators manage casualised and precarious African labour in mines and on construction projects, with workers’ collective bargaining rights recognised only in cases where mass protests have eventually led to state intervention. Decisions made by lower courts in favour of local workers have often been overruled by central governments. The lack of transparency in contracting and employment on the Mombasa-Nairobi railway project has led many Kenyans to complain not only about being shut out of well-paid, skilled jobs, but also about outright racism. In many places where Chinese construction firms employ both Chinese and local workers, the Chinese have better living quarters and don’t interact with the locals outside work. Something has changed since the age of anti-colonial solidarity. Trouble along the Belt and Road reflects the transition from state-led co-operation to the international public-private partnerships so characteristic of this era.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Thu Apr 29, 2021 2:53 am

“Empire Politician”: Joe Biden’s Half-Century Record on Foreign Policy, War, Militarism & the CIA
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow
APRIL 28, 2021
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/4/28/ ... my_scahill

"Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden's Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA"
Image Credit: The Intercept

As President Joe Biden nears his 100th day in the White House, we look at his foreign policy record, both as president and over the past five decades. A new project created by Jeremy Scahill, award-winning journalist and senior correspondent at The Intercept, examines Biden’s stances on war, militarism and the CIA going back to the early 1970s, when he was first elected as a senator in Delaware. We air a video discussing the project, titled “Empire Politician,” featuring Scahill.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: President Biden is addressing a joint session of Congress tonight for the first time. It comes on the eve of his 100th day in the White House. Biden is expected to unveil his $1.8 trillion American Families Plan to expand educational opportunities, child care and paid family leave. He’s proposing to fund the plan in part by raising the capital gains tax for the nation’s wealthiest households and cracking down on wealthy dodgers.

While much of tonight’s speech is expected to focus on domestic issues, we spend the hour today looking at Biden’s foreign policy record, both as president and over the past half-century. The Intercept has just launched a sweeping project examining a half-century of Biden’s stances on war, militarism and the CIA, going back to the early ’70s, when Biden was first elected senator of Delaware. The project is called “Empire Politician.” It was created by the award-winning journalist Jeremy Scahill, senior correspondent and editor-at-large at The Intercept, which he helped found. Later in the show, Jeremy will join us, but first we turn to a new video featuring Jeremy Scahill, produced by The Intercept.

JEREMY SCAHILL: We have never had a president with a longer paper trail than Joe Biden. He’s taken so many different positions on the same issues so many times throughout his career that I sometimes wonder if Biden even knows anymore what he actually thinks about a particular issue. Joe Biden might tell you one thing one day and really believe it, and then the next day he’s doing the exact opposite because he’s cut some side deal that maybe we’ll hear about in some years.

Above all, Biden is an empire politician. He is someone who believes that questions of war don’t really matter on a moral level, but how does it impact America’s credibility, security and prestige.

BOB CLARK: The youngest new face in the U.S. Senate next year will be that of Democrat Joseph Biden of Delaware.

JEREMY SCAHILL: When Joe Biden began his run for the U.S. Senate, Richard Nixon was running a lawless administration.

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON: We must never allow America to become the second-strongest nation in the world.

JEREMY SCAHILL: The CIA is conducting operations inside of the United States. There’s secret components to the War in Vietnam. And early on in his Senate career, Biden ends up on a subcommittee that is examining the issue of American war power: Who has the right to send the American people into a war? And he becomes an original co-sponsor of one of the most important laws passed by the United States Congress on questions of war.

NEWS ANCHOR: The War Powers Act grew out of the agony of the Vietnam War. Based on its constitutional authority, Congress passed a joint resolution which obliged the president to get congressional approval.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Also, Biden becomes a very early and ardent critic of the CIA for the perception that the White House and the CIA are regularly circumventing the U.S. Congress. And then, on the other side of it, Biden becomes a totally radical warrior against leaking and against whistleblowers.

Jimmy Carter nominates an outsider to be director of the CIA, Ted Sorensen, a friend of the Kennedy family and adviser to JFK. Carter had said he was going to rein in the CIA, shrink it, reduce its budget. But then Biden discovers, oh, Ted Sorensen actually wrote an affidavit in support of Daniel Ellsberg when the Pentagon Papers prosecution was happening and Ellsberg was facing a century in prison under the Espionage Act. And in that affidavit, Ted Sorensen says everybody in Washington takes classified documents home, and they regularly leak far more sensitive documents to the press than the Pentagon Papers. Ted Sorensen’s nomination was dead in the water after Biden joined the Republicans. Biden was more obsessed with some random admission from a Washington insider that they had taken classified documents home than he was about actually reining in the CIA.

REPORTER: Republican audiences love what he has to say.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Reagan and Bush take power in Washington. Biden understands exactly what they want to do. They want to undo all of the oversight mechanisms that were put in place post-Nixon. So Biden becomes the leading opponent of Reagan’s nominee to be CIA director, William Casey. But then, as Biden sort of gets to know people — and, you know, he’s big on personal relationships — he starts to back away from his own supposedly bedrock positions. So he opposes William Casey’s nomination but ultimately then votes for William Casey.

So, throughout Casey’s tenure, which spanned both of Reagan’s terms, you see Biden, on the one hand, blasting Casey in public, and then, privately, literally collaborating to sell covert options as in American national interest — in some cases, to sell wars that were being done without the very laws being followed that Joe Biden co-sponsored. He had supported the invasion of Grenada in 1983. He supported airstrikes that were intended to kill Muammar Gaddafi in 1986. In Nicaragua, the Reagan administration begins financing and arming the Contra death squads, and this would ultimately lead to the Iran-Contra scandal. Biden publicly is railing against the funding of the Contras, but then does what I think can just be called a Biden.

SEN. JOE BIDEN: Joe Biden. How are you?

JEREMY SCAHILL: So, Biden starts to try to broker deals. “Well, we can support the Contras, Mr. Reagan, if we put this restriction on it and that restriction on it.”

SEN. JOE BIDEN: I think I’m looking forward to helping you on this one, too.

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: Well, bless your heart.

JEREMY SCAHILL: He would say, “Oh, well, that’s because I’m a great compromiser.” You don’t compromise with death squads. And, you know, Joe Biden, very, very early on in the Iran-Contra scandal, came out and said, basically, that Reagan probably should resign. Reagan gives this now-infamous speech in which he says that “At the time, I made these statements saying that we didn’t transfer any arms for hostages.”

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true. But the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Reagan gives this sort of logical gymnastics speech. Who does it resonate with? It resonates with Joe Biden.

SEN. JOE BIDEN: I take the president at his word that he did not know. I accept him at his word.

JEREMY SCAHILL: So, in 1990, 1991, it becomes clear that the United States is going to go to war against Iraq. Joe Biden starts raising holy hell in the U.S. Senate about the War Powers Resolution. Biden gets so furious during this battle with the White House and Bush’s utter disdain for congressional war powers that he takes a principled stand and actually votes against the authorization. And Biden actually lives to regret that he didn’t vote in favor of that war, because it ended up being very popular and was helping to sort of boost the American morale in the post-Vietnam era.

PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH: Aggression is defeated. The war is over.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Biden then, almost overnight, transforms into one of the most hawkish figures on Iraq policy in United States Congress. He becomes a leading voice calling for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

SEN. JOE BIDEN: And it’s going to require guys like you in uniform to be back on foot in the desert taking the son of a — the — taking Saddam down.

JEREMY SCAHILL: And so, what you see is Biden emerging from the 1990s as an empire guy. Now, in the case of the war in the former Yugoslavia, Biden was a very early advocate of the U.S. intervening militarily. Biden was among the first to call it a genocide in Bosnia. But at the same time, Biden also sort of rejected notions that this is just a humanitarian cause. Biden would talk about it throughout the ’90s as defending American prestige.

SEN. JOE BIDEN: We should go to Belgrade, and we should have a Japanese-, German-style occupation of that country.

JEREMY SCAHILL: As Biden is agitating for the United States to be militarily involved in the former Yugoslavia, Haitians in the United States are watching as a brutal junta, death squads, overthrow the democratically elected government of the leftist President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. And Biden gives an interview on Charlie Rose in which he basically says nobody cares about Haiti.

SEN. JOE BIDEN: If Haiti just quietly sunk into the Caribbean or rose up 300 feet, it wouldn’t matter a whole lot in terms of our interest.

JEREMY SCAHILL: He viewed the stakes in Europe as something that the U.S. could gain by getting involved. In the case of Haiti, it would have been purely humanitarian in nature.

And then the Clinton administration, immersed in the Monica Lewinsky scandal, suddenly starts a series of wars and military actions. So Biden supports all of them. He supports the bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. He supports bombing some farm in Afghanistan where maybe Osama bin Laden had been recently.

And when the FBI director comes to testify in front of Congress, Joe Biden is one of the senators who starts saying, “Can you clarify for me: What’s the legality of assassination?” Biden seems to get this — the problem with the idea that America can kill whomever it wants, wherever it wants, however it wants.

Then the 9/11 attacks happen. And the simplest way to put it is that Joe Biden just supports almost everything that the Bush administration wants in the immediate aftermath. Biden not only votes in favor of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, he plays a key role in facilitating a war based on lies.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: No matter how long it takes.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Now as president, Joe Biden is saying he’s going to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: I’ve concluded that it’s time to end America’s longest war.

JEREMY SCAHILL: This doesn’t mean that the war is going to completely end. When Biden was vice president, Biden wanted to use the very forces that actually are at the tip of the spear of assassination operations, instead of the large-scale troop deployment. What he’s doing is finally getting the war waged the way he wanted it, which is the CIA, Special Operations Forces, that are going to hunt down and kill the people that he determines are the enemy.

If Biden had become president, you know, 20 years ago, I think that it would have been easier to predict some of his future actions or policy behavior. But because of his age, because of the political moment that we’re in, I think there are some real wildcards in how Biden is going to approach the world, including on questions of war.

AMY GOODMAN: That was a new video produced by Intercept, featuring Jeremy Scahill talking about his sweeping new investigative project, “Empire Politician,” about Joe Biden’s foreign policy record over the past half-century. Jeremy joins us after break.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Thu Apr 29, 2021 2:55 am

Jeremy Scahill: Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Record Shows Evolution of U.S. Empire Since Vietnam War
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow
APRIL 28, 2021

GUESTS
Jeremy Scahill: co-founder of The Intercept, where he is a senior correspondent and editor-at-large, and host of the podcast Intercepted.
LINKS
Jeremy Scahill on Twitter
"Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden's Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA"

An investigation into President Joe Biden’s foreign policy record reveals “the history of the evolution of the American empire, from the Vietnam War to the present,” says Jeremy Scahill, award-winning journalist and co-founder of The Intercept, which recently published a project titled “Empire Politician” that examines Biden’s stances on war and militarism. Scahill says Joe Biden is the first president in decades to come to the White House after spending significant time in Congress, but it’s not clear whether that will push him toward greater restraint in matters of war and peace. “Biden has spent his entire life railing against executive overreach, demanding that Congress be in charge of declaring war, and he may well be presented with a conflict around the world where it’s going to really call the question on which Joe Biden shows up: Joe Biden, commander in chief, or Joe Biden who spent most of the past 50 years as a senator demanding that Congress be given its proper authority,” says Scahill.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The Quarantine Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González. By the way, you can sign up for our daily news digest email by texting the word “democracynow” — one word, no space, “democracynow” — to 66866. This is Democracy Now!

As President Biden prepares to address a joint session of Congress, we’re looking today at Biden’s foreign policy record, both in his first 99 days in office and over the past five decades. We’re joined by Jeremy Scahill, co-founder of The Intercept, where he’s senior correspondent, editor-at-large, co-founder. Jeremy is also the host of the podcast Intercepted. He has just launched this new remarkable project titled “Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden’s Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA.” Jeremy is author of several books, including Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army and Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield, also the name of his Oscar-nominated film.

Jeremy, welcome back to Democracy Now! It’s great to have you with us. Why don’t you just lay out the big picture for us, as you were doing in that video, what this project is doing, and then where — how you see it fitting in to what President Biden represents today?

JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, you know, Amy, first of all, thank you for having me on. And greetings to you, Juan.

In the big picture, if you study Joe Biden’s history, what you realize is that the history of Joe Biden, particularly on matters of war, the CIA, espionage, the balance of powers between the executive branch and the congressional branch, questions of civil liberties — the history of Joe Biden is really the history of the evolution of the American Empire, from the Vietnam War to the present.

And what I think is significant is that Joe Biden, when he first ran for Senate in 1972, remarkably telegraphed what the sort of thrust of his argument about empire and war would be for the next 50 years. And that was that Joe Biden was not a militant opponent of the Vietnam War. In fact, he had great disdain for antiwar protesters. And he tells a story about walking on his campus when he’s in law school at the height of the Vietnam War with some of his colleagues, and they see fellow students protesting against the Vietnam War, and they call them “a—holes.” Biden says he wasn’t big on flak jackets or tie-dye and that he didn’t really have any moral qualms about the Vietnam War, that his issue was that he thought it was based on lousy policy and was not executed in the correct manner.

And, you know, Biden also really inflated his involvement, which was almost nonexistent, in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. He only later was forced to kind of clarify that he personally supported it, but that he wasn’t doing sit-ins himself, after he had made kind of more sweeping claims.

So, what you see as he starts his political career is that Biden is not really part of the civil rights movement, he has great disdain for the antiwar movement, but he thinks that the empire has made some mistakes in how it has extended itself in Vietnam, in particular.

He gets elected to the Senate. He’s one of the youngest people in U.S. history, and the youngest in modern history at that time, to have been elected. He begins serving at age 30 years old. And Biden ends up on a couple of crucial committees at a very crucial time in U.S. history.

The Richard Nixon administration was, of course, a lawless enterprise. You had not only the overt War in Vietnam, but you had secret components to the War in Vietnam. You had the CIA carrying out a spate of assassinations around the world, conducting coups, running guns, cultivating assets who were dictators, thugs, gangsters, criminals. And for the first time since the creation of the CIA in the aftermath of World War II, Congress was finally getting around to trying to confront the CIA and trying to impose restrictions and oversight of Congress.

And Biden ends up in two crucial roles. On the one hand, he ends up being one of the senators studying war powers. And that leads to an extremely important law getting past called the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Biden is a co-sponsor of that. The Nixon White House decides this is a grave threat to executive power, and they veto it. And then the House ends up overriding the veto, so the War Powers Resolution, which says that the Congress has the right to declare war, not the president, and puts restrictions on the president’s ability to conduct military actions and, certainly, to deploy American troops without consulting with Congress. On the other side, Biden was one of the people who helped to create the Senate Intelligence Committee, which would be the first congressional body that was going to have jurisdiction over CIA activities.

And so, Amy, there is a sort of two-prong part of this history. On the one hand, Biden seems to understand very well what Richard Nixon did during his time in office and very well how out of control the CIA was. On the other hand, Biden, as a new senator, starts to get a taste for what it means to have access to power, powerful people, classified information, and he develops this very complicated relationship with the CIA of sort of, in public, being an aggressive interrogator of the CIA, denouncing its secrecy and withholding of information from Congress, and, on the other hand, Joe Biden aids and abets the CIA not only in pushing covert operations and selling wars to Biden’s Senate colleagues, but also aiding the CIA in an emerging, and continuing to this day, war against whistleblowers and leakers.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Jeremy, I wanted to ask you — Joe Biden is unique among presidents, I guess, since the post-World War II era, in terms of his understanding of how Congress works, because if you look at the previous presidents, from Nixon, Bill Clinton, George Bush, the second George Bush, Jimmy Carter, they all came into the White House as governors. And Herbert Walker Bush obviously had a long history in the CIA before becoming vice president. You’d have to go back to Lyndon Johnson to find a president who actually knows how Congress works, knows how laws are passed, knows how you reach agreements to get legislation passed. But Biden seems to suffer the same problem that Johnson had. Johnson could pass great domestic policy, but when it came to foreign policy, whether it was Vietnam or his invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, was extremely hawkish in foreign policy. I’m wondering your sense of how you see Biden moving forward in terms of the U.S. expanding the U.S. Empire, if it can be still talked about as an empire with possibilities of expansion.

JEREMY SCAHILL: It’s a great question, Juan. And I’ll just answer it by saying that the White House is pushing, as the sort of premier issue on war regarding Biden, this notion that Biden is going to end the war in Afghanistan. I think it’s really important, just for accuracy’s sake, to recognize that the plan that Biden is implementing now was the plan that was developed by the Trump administration. And it’s basically the plan that was on Biden’s desk when he left office — when Trump left office. And so, Biden said, you know, “I would have done this differently, but agreements are agreements. The Trump administration signed this agreement with the Taliban, so we’re going to abide by it.” Now, there are other policies where Biden says we’re not going to continue on with the path of Trump. So he’s playing a little bit with the notion that the U.S. always keeps its agreement.

But what I think is interesting, Juan, and it cuts to the heart of your question, is that when Joe Biden was vice president under Barack Obama, there were a handful of policy issues where Biden sort of decided that he was in the opposition, and he took a dissenting view. The first one was the first year of the Obama-Biden administration. Obama’s advisers, many of them, wanted to surge U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and they ultimately did that. They wanted to engage in the COIN doctrine, counterinsurgency, which is another way of saying sort of nation-building, that you have this large-scale military deployment, you set up your own infrastructure, and you’re basically running an occupation regime in a country, similar to what the United States did, and other European allies, in Europe in the aftermath of World War II.

Biden says, “Whoa, wait a minute. I don’t like what I’m seeing here. I don’t think we should be having large-scale troop deployments. I think we should use our assassins, essentially — the CIA, the Joint Special Operations Command — in a small footprint, to conduct antiterrorism operations to hunt down people that we determine represent an ongoing threat to our national security.”

Ultimately, Biden loses, in part, that argument, because what happens is that Obama decides to do both. He goes with a large-scale surge, and he starts escalating the use of drones — and not just in Afghanistan, as you know, Juan, but in many countries around the world. And they basically empower the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command as really streamlined implementers of an emerging U.S. assassination policy.

Now that Biden is president, essentially, he is getting the war waged the way he proposed back in 2009. He’s going to pull out the large-scale U.S. military presence. There are a few thousand troops and 16,000 contractors that are on the ground there. But what he’s saying is that he’s going to keep these hit teams in the region to do surgical strikes. And the risk for Biden is that he ends up in a scenario akin to what happened with President Barack Obama in 2014, where he actually has to redeploy U.S. troops to Iraq in the battle against ISIS, after having declared the war over and initiated this made-for-television withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

So, you know, to wrap this part of it up, Juan, I think it’s fascinating that Biden has spent his entire life railing against executive overreach, demanding that Congress be in charge of declaring war, and he may well be presented with a conflict around the world where it’s going to really call the question on which Joe Biden shows up: Joe Biden, commander-in-chief, or Joe Biden who spent most of the past 50 years as a senator demanding that Congress be given its proper authority?

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Now, I wanted to ask you about another major foreign policy issue that Biden will deal with, and that’s relations with China. There’s a very interesting column in today’s New York Times by Thomas Friedman, who is arguably —

JEREMY SCAHILL: Is that possible?

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: — one of the most influential — one of the most influential —

JEREMY SCAHILL: That —

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Can you hear me?

JEREMY SCAHILL: Yeah. Sorry.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Yeah, Thomas Friedman’s column in today’s New York Times. He’s arguably one of the most influential voices of the U.S. neoliberal elite. And his column is titled “Is There a War Coming Between the U.S. and China?” And he goes on to say, “What has made this return of Chinese, Iranian and Russian aggressive nationalism even more dangerous is that, in each country, it is married to state-led industries — particularly military industries — and it’s emerging at a time when America’s democracy is weakening.” Of course, he doesn’t mention the United States’s major defense industry and how our state is married to our defense industry.

But he goes on to talk about Taiwan as a major producer of the most advanced chips in the world for — in terms of artificial intelligence. And he goes on to say, “And as much as U.S. strategists are committed to preserving Taiwan’s democracy, they are even more committed to ensuring that TSMC” — the big chip maker in Taiwan — “doesn’t fall into China’s hands.” And, “Because,” he goes on to say, “in a digitizing world, he who controls the best chip maker will control … a lot.” It almost sounds like Friedman is urging Biden to draw a line on the issue of Taiwan, when the entire world has already recognized that Taiwan is historically and legitimately a part of China. Your sense of how Biden will act when it comes to relations with China?

JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, you know, Juan, we just came off of an era, under the Trump administration, where overt xenophobia and racism became official U.S. policy. And the Biden team is still implementing many of the sort of underlying principles of the Trump policy, if you will, but doing it in a more diplomatic manner.

And what’s always absent, and this is certainly — what’s always absent from Thomas Friedman’s columns, for sure, but what is almost always absent from discussions about U.S. relationship with China, U.S. relationship with Russia, is the U.S. role in the world. There is no more hostile, threatening, powerful force in the world right now than the United States government. And you always need to look through the lens of how other nations are responding to the United States. You can’t just say, “Oh, China is aggressively pursuing this technology,” or “China is in countries throughout Africa right now,” and pretend that it’s some ominous development that a major world power with one-seventh of the world’s population would be interested in expanding its influence or securing its future. All discussions about China, all discussions about Russia, regarding U.S. policy, leave out the role that the United States plays in destabilizing the world, but also provoking responses from other nations.

Now, having said that, Juan, I think one of the areas to watch, that does not get a great amount of attention, is the way that the United States, China and other world powers are battling for control of natural resources throughout Africa. The United States has quietly, over the past 10 or 15 years, built up a kind of covert and semi-overt military presence in Africa, while also flooding the zone with a lot of private business and contractors. China is doing the exact same thing. And in fact, China, because it is not bound by any laws requiring that it certify human rights practices, is really taking control of large parts of several African nations’ natural resource supply. And this cuts to the heart of technology, precious metals and an incredibly geostrategical important location in the world.

So, I think that you’re going to see a lot of pressure on Biden to become much more belligerent, much more hostile to China. And the people that are pushing him to do that are going to completely ignore and minimize the role that the United States plays in provoking responses from other powerful nations.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to break and then come back to this discussion. We’re talking to Jeremy Scahill, The Intercept's senior correspondent, editor-at-large, co-founder. The new project, with more than 50 articles across The Intercept website, “Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden's Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA.” Stay with us.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Thu Apr 29, 2021 2:56 am

Jeremy Scahill on Biden’s “War Against Whistleblowers,” from Daniel Ellsberg to Edward Snowden
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow
APRIL 28, 2021

GUESTS
Jeremy Scahill: co-founder of The Intercept, where he is a senior correspondent and editor-at-large, and host of the podcast Intercepted.
LINKS
Jeremy Scahill on Twitter
"Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden's Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA"
"Joe Biden Wanted To Lock Up My Father"

We continue our conversation with The Intercept’s Jeremy Scahill, who just published a groundbreaking new project on Joe Biden’s decades-long foreign policy record. Scahill says that during his years in the U.S. Senate, Biden “almost never meets a war he doesn’t support,” becoming one of the most hawkish figures in Washington in the 1990s and 2000s. Scahill also discusses Biden’s “war against whistleblowers,” from Daniel Ellsberg to Edward Snowden.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The Quarantine Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González. By the way, you can watch, listen and read transcripts using our iOS and Android apps. Download them for free from the Apple App Store or Google Play Store today. And you can get our daily news digest. Just text the word “democracynow” to 66866.

We’re continuing our discussion with The Intercept's Jeremy Scahill, who has just launched a massive new online investigative project titled “Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden's Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA.”

I wanted to go to the 1980s, Jeremy, and also talk about how that links to Joe Biden today. Now, in his address tonight, his first address to the joint session of Congress, it’s expected he’ll be mainly focusing on domestic policy. There, Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez says that President Biden is more progressive than many progressives expected. But we’re talking about his foreign policy.

So, today, in headlines, we talked about a trial that’s going on in El Salvador on the 1981 El Mozote massacre, that horrifying massacre of around 1,000 Salvadorans killed by the Atlacatl Battalion, which was a U.S.-trained Salvadoran military battalion. One of the expert witnesses, Terry Karl, professor at Stanford, detailed the on-site presence of U.S. military adviser Allen Bruce Hazelwood in some of the pretrial testimony. This is extremely significant, what’s happened back then and what’s happening today.

Also, this goes to media criticism. You had Ray Bonner of The New York Times writing, eventually, about this massacre. And within months, because of enormous pressure from the Reagan administration, A.M. Rosenthal, then one of the chiefs at The New York Times, pulls him from covering Central America because he’s exposing what happened in El Salvador.

So, you’ve got the U.S. policy in El Salvador. You’ve got the support for the Contras; in Guatemala, what the U.S. did in its support of the both murderous military and the paramilitary death squads.

And then you look at what’s happening today with, from that very area, the number of immigrants who are fleeing north, and the connection between immigration today and U.S. policy and intervention of the 1980s — not to mention what’s going on with Venezuela with the Biden administration saying they recognize as president not the democratically elected leader, but, in fact, the person that both President Trump and, before that, Democrats also supported. Talk about the policy of yesteryear determining today, and how, in some ways, that isn’t changing, and where you see openings.

JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, I think it’s important to say, because this portion of history often doesn’t get mentioned, that in terms of El Salvador and U.S. administrations, Jimmy Carter emerged, even though he had campaigned on a pledge to sort of confront dictatorships and to respect human rights, as the original supporter of the coup regime that took power in 1979 in El Salvador, and the subsequent killing of protesters started this civil war. Carter, and particularly his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that this is a communist menace, or at least they said that it was. And they said, “Oh, if we don’t support this military regime in El Salvador, we’re going to end up with a Sandinista-style government. Cuba is going to run the deck on Central and Latin America.”

And you have powerful voices in the Catholic Church, such as Archbishop Óscar Romero of San Salvador, who himself was a conservative Catholic until the 1979 coup takes place — he writes to Jimmy Carter, pleading with him not to support the military junta. And Jimmy Carter’s administration ignores Archbishop Romero. And, in fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes to the pope, Pope John Paul II, and says, essentially, “You need to shut Óscar Romero up. You know, he’s starting to sound like a communist, and we’ve warned him about this.” Well, a month after Archbishop Romero writes to Carter a personal letter pleading with him not to send weapons and Huey attack helicopters to the junta, Óscar Romero is assassinated, shot through the heart, while he was saying Mass — a month after he writes to Jimmy Carter.

Joe Biden, at the time, was a critic of the military junta in El Salvador, but he also accepted the framework of the war against communism. And Biden could have become a really militant voice, especially as a Catholic. An overtly Catholic politician could have really gone to town on the fact that nuns, Catholic nuns, including U.S. citizens, were being raped and murdered by what was effectively a client state of the United States.

And eventually, Carter temporarily stops the aid to El Salvador, and he is defeated then in the election by Reagan. Biden writes to Reagan, in a very polite manner, saying, “I think we should maybe link our funding and arming of the Salvadoran dictatorship to investigating the murders of American citizens.” Carter, on his way out the door, gives emergency resumption of military gear and weaponry and financing to the Salvadoran junta. And Reagan takes power, and then it’s the gloves come off, and it’s just a massive bloodshed in El Salvador, sponsored in part by the United States.

And what you see is Joe Biden, on the one hand, denouncing the extrajudicial killings and murder, and, on the other hand, trying to tinker on the edges of American policy, proposing, “Mr. Reagan, I’ll support financing this dictatorship, or in the case of Nicaragua, I can agree to support the Contras, if we put this restriction on it or we make sure that they only spend it in this way.”

And I think that this was a crucial point of development for Joe Biden on questions of war. He almost never meets a war he doesn’t support. And the one time he did oppose a war, in 1991, Gulf War, he regretted it and then immediately became any ultra-hawk after it. But in the '80s, Biden was making deals on these really dirty questions of dictatorships and death squads. And he played a significant role, in terms of his position in the Senate, in not having a very clear line in the sand drawn: “We don't support dictators. We don’t support death squads.” Biden helped negotiate compromises with Reagan rather than just militantly opposing it.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Jeremy, going back to those Carter years, could you talk about when Carter named Ted Sorensen, the former Kennedy adviser, as his CIA director, what happened and how Biden functioned there?

JEREMY SCAHILL: This is a wild story, Juan. So, Ted Sorensen is nominated by Jimmy Carter to be CIA director. And the reason was that Carter has said he basically wanted to cut the budget of the CIA, rein it in. His campaign actually put out a position paper implying that Jimmy Carter intended to prosecute CIA officers who engaged in lawless activity. So, when Carter becomes president, the CIA is not excited, to say the least. And then Carter nominates an outsider, who happens to be a close friend of the Kennedy family. And Kennedy, of course, famously had his conflicts with the CIA.

So, Ted Sorensen is introduced to Joe Biden as the person who’s going to kind of shepherd him through the confirmation process in front of the Intelligence Committee. And Biden says, you know, to Ted Sorensen, “I’m more enthusiastic about you than any other nominee in the Carter — emerging Carter White House.”

Joe Biden, though, starts talking with Senate Republicans, who wanted to kill the Ted Sorensen nomination for a number of reasons. One, because the CIA didn’t want him there. He was a CIA outsider. None of the spooks at the agency wanted Ted Sorensen to be implementing Jimmy Carter’s agenda. Two, there was this sort of whisper campaign that Ted Sorensen was a pacifist who had resisted the Korean War. And three, Ted Sorensen was one of the people involved with the aftermath of the Chappaquiddick incident, where Teddy Kennedy was drunk and drove off a bridge, resulting in the death of a young woman.

But Biden is sort of like playing defense for the Carter White House at the time and trying to resolve those issues. And Biden is tipped off by a Republican colleague that Ted Sorensen had given an — had written an affidavit in support of Daniel Ellsberg during the Pentagon Papers prosecution, where Ellsberg was facing more than a century in prison under the Espionage Act. And Biden gets wind of this. He gets one of his staffers to go and dig up this affidavit, which wasn’t even officially filed. So they had to, like, you know, really dig deep to find Ted Sorensen’s affidavit.

And what that affidavit said, Juan, was, basically, “Everybody in Washington leaks. This is the culture of the elite here.” Ted Sorensen had also said, “I took government documents home when I was writing my biography, Kennedy. You know, this is a common practice. And by the way, many of the things that elite Washington insiders are leaking to The New York Times and The Washington Post for their own reasons are far more sensitive than what Daniel Ellsberg leaked in the Pentagon Papers.”

Well, Biden hits the roof on this, and he starts saying to Jimmy Carter, “This nomination is dead.” And at the end of the day, Joe Biden publicly says of Ted Sorensen, when he kills his nomination with the Republicans, you know, “I don’t know what we should do with you. Maybe you should even be prosecuted under the Espionage Act yourself,” he says about Ted Sorensen, for Ted Sorensen’s crime of stating an open secret, that government officials take home government documents and, at the time, were leaking them for their own political purposes.

That, Juan, then kicks off this relationship between Biden and the CIA, where Biden becomes one of the most aggressive senators in trying to go after leakers and whistleblowers, particularly when Philip Agee comes out, the former CIA operative, and blows the whistle on covert operations around the world. Joe Biden secretly aids the CIA in pressuring the Justice Department to not only go after leakers and whistleblowers, but to go after defense lawyers representing whistleblowers or leakers, who are putting in requests for documents as part of their defense. Joe Biden sponsors legislation to stop this practice of what they called graymailing. Basically, what Biden was saying is, when we arrest leakers or whistleblowers, their lawyers are then requesting in discovery all these documents from the U.S. government about the operations that they were a part of, and this could expose further secrets. So, Biden played a really crucial role in trying to create rules for federal whistleblower cases where defense lawyers were not allowed to subpoena documents that would assist them in the defense of their whistleblower or leaker clients.

Biden also goes on, even though he tries to kill Reagan’s nominee for CIA director — he tries to kill the nomination of William Casey, William Casey, of course, you know, one of the most infamous, notorious spies in American history. And Biden had his number. Biden basically said, “These Reagan people want to undo everything we did in the aftermath of Richard Nixon. They want to get rid of the War Powers Act. They want to circumvent the intelligence committees. And William Casey —

AMY GOODMAN: Jeremy, we have 20 seconds.

JEREMY SCAHILL: “And William Casey is a key player in this.” So, Biden tries to kill it, unsuccessful, votes for Casey, and then aids and abets Reagan’s CIA in pushing covert action, including defending the 1983 invasion of Grenada. So, Biden had a very complicated relationship with the CIA. And his war against whistleblowers endures to this day.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, Jeremy, congratulations on this massive project, that has just been posted, at The Intercept. And thanks for the exclusive use of running that video at the beginning, which people can watch. The Intercept senior correspondent, editor-at-large, co-founder, and host of the podcast Intercepted — the new project, “Empire Politician: A Half-Century of Joe Biden’s Stances on War, Militarism, and the CIA” — Jeremy Scahill, our guest for the hour.

I’ll be speaking with Dan Ellsberg and Ed Snowden Saturday. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Fri Jun 11, 2021 10:32 pm

U.S. Led 2020 Nuclear Weapons Spending; Now Biden Going “Full Steam Ahead” on Trump’s Nuclear Plans
by Amy Goodman
Democracy Now
JUNE 10, 2021
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/6/10/ ... ar_weapons

GUESTS
Alicia Sanders-Zakre: policy and research coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
LINKS
Alicia Sanders-Zakre on Twitter
"Complicit: 2020 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending"

As President Biden prepares for the G7 and NATO summits and a meeting with Vladimir Putin, we look at how the United States, Russia and other nuclear-armed nations continue to spend billions on nuclear weapons during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite President Biden’s criticisms of the Trump administration’s nuclear policies during his candidacy, his administration is continuing initiatives to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal and is seeking $43 billion for nuclear weapons in his new budget. This comes as a new report from the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons reveals global spending on nuclear weapons increased during the pandemic, and found the world’s nine nuclear-armed countries spent $72.6 billion on nuclear weapons in 2020, with the United States alone spending $37 billion. “We’ve been seeing, from year to year, the spending on nuclear weapons has been increasing,” says Alicia Sanders-Zakre, ICAN’s policy and research coordinator. “Despite Biden’s campaign promises of wanting to work for arms control, wanting to work for disarmament, we’re seeing that in reality he’s going full steam ahead with Trump’s legacy nuclear weapons programs and continuing to spend more money on these weapons of mass destruction.”

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: President Biden has begun his first European trip as president. After meeting British Prime Minister Boris Johnson today, Biden will take part in the G7 leaders’ meeting in Cornwall, then head to the NATO summit in Brussels. He’ll end his trip in Geneva, where he’ll meet Russian President Vladimir Putin June 16th. On Wednesday, President Biden addressed U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in Britain.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: We’re not seeking conflict with Russia. We want a stable, predictable relationship. Our two nations share incredible responsibilities, and among them ensuring strategic stability and upholding arms control agreements. I take that responsibility seriously. But I’ve been clear: The United States will respond in a robust and meaningful way when the Russian government engages in harmful activities.

AMY GOODMAN: The Biden-Putin summit comes just weeks after the Biden administration announced it would not rejoin the Open Skies Treaty, a major international arms control deal signed by the George H.W. Bush administration in 1992. Vladimir Putin then announced Russia would withdraw, as well. As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden criticized Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the treaty. In May 2020, Biden said, “Trump has doubled down on his short-sighted policy of going it alone and abandoning American leadership.”

Biden is also continuing a number of Trump’s initiatives to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In his new budget, President Biden is seeking $43 billion for nuclear weapons, including money to develop a new submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile, which, as a candidate, he described as a “bad idea.”


Meanwhile, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, or ICAN, has just published a report revealing global spending on nuclear weapons increased by $1.4 billion last year despite the pandemic. The report found the world’s nine nuclear-armed countries spent $72.6 billion on nuclear weapons in 2020 — that amounts to nearly $138,000 every minute. The United States spent by far the most — $37 billion — three times more than the next country, China, which spent $10 billion. Russia was next at $8 billion, followed by the United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. ICAN released this short video to accompany its new report.

ICAN VIDEO: $72.6 billion. That’s how much the nine nuclear-armed states spent on nuclear weapons in 2020, taxpayer money during the worst global pandemic in a century financing weapons of mass destruction. Although most countries support a global ban on nuclear weapons, these countries and companies spend billions to keep nuclear weapons in business — $72.6 billion for government agencies and private companies that build nuclear weapons. These companies fund major think tanks that write about nuclear weapons and hire lobbyists to make sure policymakers approve enormous nuclear weapon budgets the next year. This is the nuclear weapon funding cycle, a shadowy interplay between governments, private companies, think tanks and lobbyists, all complicit in today’s massive stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. It’s time to stop the cycle. It’s time for the ban.

AMY GOODMAN: That little report produced by ICAN.

We’re joined now by Alicia Sanders-Zakre, policy and research coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. The organization won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its work on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Alicia is the co-author of the new report, “Complicit: 2020 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending.”

So you have a world where the wealthiest countries cannot find the means to inoculate the world, to get the vaccines necessary for the world to be protected from COVID-19, but are spending billions on nuclear weapons. Talk about how the whole system works. Talk about your report, Alicia.

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: Yes. Well, thank you so much for having me on and for sharing the report.

You know, last year we did a report just on how much countries spent on nuclear weapons. We did the methodology to provide that estimate, which hasn’t been done very much in the past. And this year we wanted to show more of the big picture. Why is it that nine countries are spending more than $70 billion on their nuclear weapons in the middle of a global pandemic?

And so we looked at all of the pieces of the puzzle and the flow of money, the cycle of spending on weapons of mass destruction in just one year. And it’s pretty shocking. We saw, after those countries decided to spend $72.6 billion on their nuclear weapons, they gave out billions of dollars, over $27 billion in contracts, to the defense companies that build and maintain these weapons. And then those companies kept spending money to make sure that they kept getting money in years to come. So they spend over $117 million lobbying policymakers to increase spending on defense, and they also spent up to $10 million funding almost all of the major think tanks that research and write about nuclear weapons. So these are all of the actors, all of the players, in this dirty nuclear weapons business that we wanted to highlight and start to hold accountable.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Alicia, you mentioned the companies. Could you name them and tell us how much money they made off these contracts?

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: Absolutely. So, in the report, we feature all of the more than 20 companies that are currently involved in producing nuclear weapons. So, a lot of these companies have existing contract that they’re still fulfilling on nuclear weapons. But in 2020, 11 of those companies received new or modified contracts to work on existing or new nuclear weapon systems, amounting to a total of more than $27 billion. And there are a number of companies involved — just to name a few, of course, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing. Honeywell International is one not a lot of people might know about. The full list of all those companies and the amounts are in the report, so if you want more details, I’d recommend checking that out.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Alicia, despite the fact that, as you document, the U.S. spent over $37 billion on nuclear arms in the last year, that figure is expected to exponentially increase, according to the Congressional Budget Office, in the coming year because of technological upgrades to the nuclear arsenal in the U.S. Could you talk about what we know about forthcoming increases in nuclear spending here?

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: Absolutely. So, we’ve been seeing, I mean, from year to year, the spending on nuclear weapons has been increasing. As was mentioned, there was an increase in $1.4 billion on these weapons even in the middle of a global pandemic. And we know that that number is just going to continue to increase because of a recent report by the Congressional Budget Office looking at 10-year nuclear weapons costs, which found that there would be an increase of $140 billion over those 10 years compared to a previous 2019 report. So, you know, despite Biden’s campaign promises of wanting to work for arms control, wanting to work for disarmament, we’re seeing that in reality he’s going full steam ahead with Trump’s legacy nuclear weapons programs and continuing to spend more money on these weapons of mass destruction.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk, Alicia Sanders-Zakre, about the significance — I mean, he’s going to meet with the G7 countries — and what do nuclear weapons have to do with those countries? — and then the NATO summit. And the report you put out ahead of this summit, ICAN is arguing that members of the transatlantic alliance should embrace the U.N. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in January. So, talk about how these two summits are critical to nuclear weapons and somehow turning the escalation of them around.

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, speaking of the NATO summit, in particular, we saw President Biden wrote, in an opinion piece to The Washington Post recently, that a real focus of this trip was to promote democratic values and to bring the power of democracy to these meetings. And I think that’s very relevant when it comes to nuclear weapons issues in NATO countries and in Europe, because, as this other report shows, that we just released today, in most countries across the NATO there is overwhelming support for the country to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, when you ask the people what they think. But despite popular opinion, democratic support for this treaty, for banning nuclear weapons, these governments continue to say that they don’t support the treaty, to refuse to join it. And this is a NATO position that’s really not in line with the democratic — their democratic values and democratic ideals. So, I think this is an opportunity for NATO to really reevaluate their stance as a democracy that listens to what the people want on key issues like nuclear weapons.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Alicia, could you talk about the extent to which, if at all, the Biden administration has departed from the Trump administration on nuclear weapons policy?

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: I think, so far, we really haven’t seen a departure. And this is clear in the recent 2022 budget request, which, as you mentioned in the introduction, keeps and continues to fund Trump’s additional nuclear weapons programs, as well as kind of the programs of record. So we really need to see more action from President Biden.


I think this upcoming meeting with President Putin is an opportunity for both countries to recognize the increasing risk of nuclear weapons, the devastating humanitarian consequences of these weapons, and take real steps and tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament and towards joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

AMY GOODMAN: Not only the issue of what would happen if a nuclear weapon was used — and, of course, that would be just devastating — but the fact that the money does not go, for example, to dealing with this global pandemic. I wanted to ask you about the report also naming think tanks which receive funding from nuclear weapons manufacturers. The list includes the Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for New American Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hudson Institute and the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Can you talk more about the role of think tanks and these nuclear corporations?

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: Absolutely. I mean, this is really new, I think shocking, research in that it shows that upwards of 10 — in just one year, the companies that produce and work on nuclear weapons spent upwards of $10 million funding really almost all major think tanks that are writing and researching about nuclear weapons. And, you know, it’s not always possible to know exactly the extent of the influence of this funding, but what’s really concerning is, I think, the depth and how widespread this funding is. It’s not just one think tank; as I said, it’s really most of the think tanks that are doing substantial work on nuclear weapons. And I think it’s a systemic problem in the field that, you know, think tanks should be asking themselves, “How can we actually come together and address the perhaps undue influence of nuclear weapon-producing companies in this field, in this sector?”

AMY GOODMAN: As the Biden administration pours billions into developing new nuclear weapons, nuclear resisters are still going to prison for opposing U.S. nuclear policy. On Wednesday, Mark Colville, a member of the Kings Bay Plowshares 7, reported to prison. He was sentenced in April to 21 months in prison, breaking into the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base April 4th, 2018, on the anniversary of the assassination of Dr. King. Colville and six other activists entered the base armed with hammers, crime scene tape, baby bottles containing their own blood, and an indictment charging the U.S. government with crimes against peace. Two other members of the Kings Bay Plowshares 7, Martha Hennessy and Carmen Trotta, were recently released from prison. Martha Hennessy is the granddaughter of Dorothy Day, one of the founders of the Catholic Worker Movement. Your final comments on the role of activism when it comes to nuclear weapons?

ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE: I think it’s absolutely essential. You know, at the end of the day, these are weapons of mass destruction, and they have now been made illegal under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons due to the collaborative work of activists and diplomats and scientists and researchers and people all around the world. And so, it’s really — we really need activism to change the status quo and to finally get rid of these weapons of mass destruction.

AMY GOODMAN: Alicia Sanders-Zakre, we want to thank you so much for being with us, policy and research coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. And we’ll link to the report, “Complicit: 2020 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending,” as we continue to cover in the coming days the G7, the NATO summit, the summit with President Biden and President Putin.

Next up, as President Biden pledges to buy half a billion vaccine doses to give to almost 100 countries in the world, we’ll look at why many Americans are refusing to get vaccinated. We’ll speak with Dr. Syra Madad of NYC Health and Hospitals, the nation’s largest public healthcare system, and why healthcare workers, a number of them, are saying no. Stay with us.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Fri Jun 11, 2021 10:35 pm

“Do Not Come”: VP Harris Sends Anti-Migrant Message in Guatemala, Visits Mexico Amid Deadly Election
by Amy Goodman
Democracy Now
JUNE 08, 2021
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/6/8/k ... n_killings

GUESTS
Erika Guevara-Rosas
human rights lawyer and Americas director for Amnesty International.
LINKS
Erika Guevara-Rosas on Twitter

In her first foreign trip as vice president, Kamala Harris is in Mexico City to meet with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador after first visiting Guatemala to meet with President Alejandro Giammattei. Harris is tasked by President Joe Biden with stemming the flow of Central American migrants fleeing corruption, violence and poverty, even after the two campaigned on allowing more migrants to apply for asylum along the U.S.-Mexico border, and issued a stern warning to migrants: “Do not come.” Her visit comes after voters cast their ballots in one of Mexico’s largest and deadliest elections in history, as over 80 politicians were killed in the run-up to the election, which had 21,000 local and national seats up for grabs. “This electoral process has been one of the most violent,” says Erika Guevara-Rosas, a human rights lawyer and Americas director for Amnesty International. “It is reflective of the human rights crisis that Mexico has been facing for many years.”

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.

In her first foreign trip as vice president, Kamala Harris is in Mexico City today to meet with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador after visiting Guatemala Monday. Harris has been tasked by President Biden with blocking Central American migrants fleeing corruption, violence and poverty from reaching the U.S.-Mexico border, even after the two campaigned on allowing more migrants to apply for asylum.

Harris is the daughter of an Indian mother and a Jamaican father who both immigrated to the United States. During a press conference alongside Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei, she issued this jarring warning.

VICE PRESIDENT KAMALA HARRIS: I want to be clear to folks in this region who are thinking about making that dangerous trek to the United States-Mexico border: Do not come. Do not come.

AMY GOODMAN: In her remarks, Vice President Harris failed to acknowledge how U.S. intervention and foreign policy in Central America have contributed to the root causes of why people flee in the first place.

Her visit to Mexico today comes after voters cast their ballots Sunday in one of the country’s largest midterm elections in history, with about 21,000 local and national seats up for grabs. Final results are expected next week in what could be a referendum on President López Obrador’s government. Preliminary results show his political party, MORENA, and allies won over half of the 500 seats in Mexico’s lower house but failed to secure a supermajority.

The election is also being described as one of Mexico’s deadliest, after human remains were found Sunday in at least two voting booths in the northern Mexican state of Baja California. Over 80 politicians, including 35 candidates, were killed in the run-up to Sunday’s election, which took place as Mexico continues to battle the COVID-19 pandemic and has one of the world’s highest case fatality rates. This is a Mexican voter.

MEXICAN VOTER: [translated] These are the measures I am taking. I am wearing my face mask, and I have alcohol gel. Although they gave us wipes here, it’s better to be prepared.

AMY GOODMAN: For more on all of this, we go to Mexico City to speak with the human rights lawyer Erika Guevara-Rosas, who is the Americas director for Amnesty International.

Erika, welcome back to Democracy Now! I mean, the story right now in Mexico is devastating. Nearly 100 politicians, what, at least 35 candidates who ran in this election, were murdered in the lead-up?

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Yes, Amy. The situation is very complex, and it really represents what has been happening in Mexico for many years. It’s not only the political violence. It’s the violence that is affecting the majority of the states in Mexico. It’s the violence perpetrated by the organized crime, but also it’s the violence perpetrated by security forces that are committing human rights violations all over the country.

This political process, this electoral process, has been one of the most violent. I mean, you just mentioned the numbers. It has been the most violent for women, because out of the 35 candidates who have been killed over the electoral campaign, 21 were women. We have seen hundreds of reports of different type of attacks and violence against candidates and against politicians during the 200 days of electoral campaign.

And unfortunately, we are seeing also a President López Obrador that is denying the reality. I mean, every time that he’s been asked about this political violence, he just mentioned that Mexico is in peace and that this is one of the — not only historical process in terms of the number of people who are being elected for local and federal government, but he also said that it is historical because it’s the first time that democracy is happening in the country, while we are seeing all this type of violence all across the country.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, Erika, could you talk about the — of this violence, is there any indication where it’s coming from? Is it particular political groupings that are being targeted, or is it just a random state-of-the-nation problem?

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Well, a vast majority of the candidates who were killed and the vast majority of the attacks are against candidates of opposition parties. Politicians for opposition parties are the ones who have been targeted by this violence in different parts of the country. But it is also true that those who have been attacked are in locations where the organized crime has increased its influence over the last few years and also where the human rights situation is worse than ever, precisely because of the strong presence of the security forces of the military. So it’s difficult to say where the violence is coming from, because it’s the same violence that is affecting the general population. But the reality is that it is reflective of the human rights crisis that Mexico has been facing for many years.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And Vice President Kamala Harris is scheduled to meet today with President López Obrador. Could you talk about the significance of her coming immediately after these elections in a trip to Mexico and also what you would hope that a vice president would tell the president of Mexico at this point?

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Yeah. Well, Amnesty International sent a letter to Vice President Kamala Harris as soon as we learned about the trip to Guatemala and Mexico. We raised a lot of our concerns about the human rights situation in both countries. And more important, we raised our concerns about the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and these two countries, particularly because over the last few years we’ve seen an increase in the level of support that these countries are getting to increase the power of the security forces, particularly to prevent migration.

So, we are hoping that Vice President Kamala Harris is going to have an open and honest conversation with President López Obrador, raising concerns about the human rights situation that is affecting, of course, the possibility of people to seek asylum at the border. We also need to acknowledge that many Mexicans are seeking asylum on the U.S. side, precisely because of the human rights situation that the country is facing.

Unfortunately, we’ve seen the results of the visit of Vice President Harris in Guatemala and this very contradicting message of telling people not to come and not to seek asylum, when the reality is that it is a human rights — there is a human rights of people to seek asylum that has been violated precisely because of the cruel and inhumane political policies of the Trump administration, that we are seeing continue to be implemented by the Biden administration, including the closing of the border to migrants and asylum seekers using, in a very unlawful way, this Title 42.



The Biden administration’s contradictory statements on refugees
Washington Post
Apr 23, 2021

The Biden administration changed its story on when and how it would increase the refugee admissions cap six times in three weeks.


So, we hope that the conversation is going to lead in an understanding of the need to come up with different methods and policies to not only support people that are seeking asylum, but to provide protection to those people that are seeking asylum at the border.

AMY GOODMAN: Erika, when Harris met with the Guatemalan president and issued this very jarring warning, “Do not come. Do not come,” to immigrants fleeing poverty, fleeing the climate crisis, fleeing violence, but not acknowledging the U.S. role in this over the decades, what has led to this crisis, a part of the efforts that are being worked out with the Guatemalan government — and, I presume, with the Mexican government, with the presidents — are further militarizing the border. Can you talk about what that means?

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Well, that means that they are going to create more risk for people that are trying to seek asylum. You just mentioned that, Amy, these people are being forced to leave their homes, they have been forced to leave their countries, precisely because of the massive violations of human rights that are happening at all levels. It’s not only the inequality, but it’s also the violence and the lack of protection that they are facing from the governments, particularly in Central America and Mexico. So these people are seeking asylum because it’s their right to seek asylum, and governments are obliged by international and domestic law to let people seek asylum, to protect those people who are seeking international protection.

And what we are seeing over the last few years is an increase in the militarization of the response. People that are seeking asylum, people that need international protections, are being treated and seen through the lens of security. And that means that these people are being confronted to a risky reality or of — you know, being confronted by organized crime and all the many risks, because they have been pushed to very risky situations and some of the more dangerous parts of the border, or they are also being confronted by the authorities, who are committing human rights violations against them by committing extortion, or, in very extreme cases, such as in Mexico, these people have been killed, as well, by security forces in collusion with the organized crime.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Erika Guevara, one of the hallmarks, supposedly, of President Biden’s different approach to the refugee and migration crisis was that he was going to embark on a sort of Marshall Plan-type effort to boost the economic life in Central America to induce migrants or those who are seeking to leave to stay in the country. But what’s Amnesty’s assessment of how U.S. foreign aid has been used in regions like especially Central America or Mexico? There was a New York Times report recently about how the bulk of that money that is apportioned out for foreign aid basically goes to U.S. contractors, who take up the bulk of the money, rather than — actually, the money doesn’t make its way down to the folks who need it.

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Yeah, historically, we’ve seen how the humanitarian aid or the assistance that has been provided by the United States have been utilized in countries in Latin America to increase the power of security forces, and many times through the use of these private contractors. I mean, we’ve seen this in countries such as Colombia, and we are seeing now the consequences of this technical support and this assistance that the U.S. government has been provided to security forces. And we are seeing the same situation in Central America and Mexico. The vast majority of the resources are not going directly to support people and to address the root causes.

And in spite of this narrative of all efforts to address the root causes, to improve the economic situation, so that people can stay in the countries, the reality is that we are seeing the contrary. People continue to experience massive human rights violations, that have been fed by impunity, corruption, by the climate crisis and the lack of response from the governments. We are seeing now, for instance, in countries such as Guatemala, a backlash against all efforts to address, to tackle impunity and corruption by the [inaudible] government that Vice President Harris met yesterday. So, unfortunately, there is no hope that only the financial assistance that the U.S. is going to be providing to these countries is truly going to address the root causes of why people are forced to leave their countries, their homes, and take all this risk to seek asylum at the U.S.A. border.

AMY GOODMAN: Before we go, Erika, we wanted to ask you about the situation of COVID. In a moment, we’re going to go down to Peru. Peru and Mexico have some of the highest per capita death rates from COVID in the world. It might surprise some to know that AMLO, the Mexican president, took more of the approach of someone like the far-right president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro. I mean, he would wear amulets. He would hold mass rallies. Now we have news that 1 million Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccines are headed to Mexico from the United States, with most of the shots set to service resort areas and spots along the border. Can you talk about how Mexico and Peru have dealt with COVID?

ERIKA GUEVARA-ROSAS: Well, Latin America really continues to struggle with COVID-19. And we have seen that any effort to try to minimize the impact of COVID has been insufficient. Even in countries such as Chile, where the vaccine rollout has improved over the last few weeks, we are seeing also an increase in the number of cases. Latin America continues to be the epicenter of the pandemic. With only 8% of the population, we have between 32 and 35 of the total death around the world, the number of people who have died because of the virus.

Just recently, a few days ago, Peruvian government acknowledged that the numbers that they were presented were lower, way lower, than the real numbers. I mean, we are talking about more than 180,000 people who have died because of the virus in Peru, when the numbers reported just a few weeks ago were around 70,000.

And in Mexico, there is a similar situation, where the government has acknowledged many times that the numbers that they have presented are lower than reality, precisely because of the lack of testing and the lack of capacity to really track all the cases.

So, the ways that the pandemic has been affected — affected these countries is very reflected of the lack of response and the structural challenges that these countries have been facing in terms of ensuring access to health for its population, for their populations. Right? So, we are seeing now a very slow vaccine rollout in both countries, but also in many countries across the region. People seem to be trapped between the ineffective responses from the governments, the fact of which countries are hoarding all the doses available of the COVID vaccine, but also the impunity and corruption that continue to shadow the efforts of governments to truly address the consequences of the pandemic, not only in terms of the direct impact with the number of cases, but also how the pandemic has been exacerbated the inequalities and the economic situation for millions of people across the continent.

AMY GOODMAN: Erika Guevara-Rosas, we want to thank you so much for being with us, human rights lawyer, Americas director for Amnesty International, joining us from Mexico City.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Fri Jun 11, 2021 10:59 pm

Biden’s DOJ Vows to Stop Spying on Journalists Months After Placing Gag Order on New York Times
by Amy Goodman
Democracy Now
JUNE 07, 2021
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/6/7/j ... lance_fisa

GUESTS
Jameel Jaffer: founding director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University.
LINKS
Jameel Jaffer on Twitter
"The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law"

The New York Times has revealed shocking details about an unsuccessful attempt by the Trump administration, and then the Biden administration, to secretly obtain the email logs of four reporters at the newspaper. As part of the campaign, the Biden Justice Department placed a gag order on the Times in March to prevent many at the paper from even knowing about the request until a federal court lifted it. In recent weeks the Justice Department also disclosed the Trump administration had secretly obtained the call records of four journalists at the Times, as well as three journalists at The Washington Post and one at CNN. Jameel Jaffer, founding director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, says subpoenas for journalists’ records are “really troubling” because of their potential chilling effect on critical journalism. “It’s about the right of the public to have access to information about the government,” he says.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: I’m Amy Goodman. This is Democracy Now!

We turn now to look at a fight over press freedom. The New York Times has revealed shocking details about an unsuccessful attempt by the Trump administration — and then the Biden administration — to secretly obtain the email logs of four New York Times reporters. As part of the campaign, the Biden Justice Department placed a gag order on the Times in March to prevent many at the paper, including its executive editor, from even knowing about the request. The Times reported on the story Friday after a federal court lifted the gag order. In recent weeks the Justice Department also disclosed the Trump administration had secretly obtained the call records of four journalists at the Times, as well as three journalists at The Washington Post and one, Barbara Starr, at CNN.

On Saturday, the Justice Department reversed course and announced it’s changing its policy and will no longer force media companies to hand over source information as part of its leak investigations.

On Sunday, New York Times reporter Adam Goldman appeared on CNN’s Reliable Sources. His phone records were seized by both the Obama and Trump administrations.

ADAM GOLDMAN: It’s certainly disappointing, but I wasn’t surprised. Some of the same prosecutors who were involved in seizing my phone records earlier this year, and unsuccessfully trying get my emails, were involved in secretly obtaining my phone records in 2013 when I worked at the Associated Press. This office, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in D.C., has a history of trampling on the First Amendment. So that’s why I wasn’t surprised. They treat the media, they treat newspapers like drug gangs.

AMY GOODMAN: In late May, President Biden spoke out against the seizing of records from journalists at the very time when The New York Times was still under a gag order. He was questioned by CNN’s Kaitlan Collins.

KAITLAN COLLINS: [Should the government be] seizing reporters’ phone records and emails? And would you prevent your Justice Department from doing that?

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: Only yours. But beyond yours, OK, for them, no.

KAITLAN COLLINS: But honestly.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: And we should — absolutely positively, it’s wrong. Simply, simply wrong.

KAITLAN COLLINS: So you won’t let your Justice Department do that?

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: I will not let that happen.

AMY GOODMAN: It was only this weekend that the Justice Department announced they would not do this.


The White House said in a statement late Monday that it was “not consulted” on the Justice Department continuing to defend former President Donald Trump in E. Jean Carroll’s defamation lawsuit against him, the third time the Biden Administration has distanced itself from the DOJ in recent days as President Joe Biden contrasts himself with Trump by emphasizing the department’s independence.

-- White House Distances Itself From DOJ’s Trump Defense As Biden Breaks With His Justice Department — Again, by Alison Durkee


We’re joined now by Jameel Jaffer, the founding director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, previously the deputy legal director at the ACLU.

Jameel, it’s great to have you back. Can you first respond to what we learned this weekend?

JAMEEL JAFFER: Yeah, sure. And thanks for inviting me.

I mean, I guess the first thing to say is that these kinds of subpoenas are really troubling for a number of reasons. It’s not so much about journalists’ rights; it’s about the right of the public to have access to information about the government. And if reporters’ sources are available to the government, then reporters won’t be able to get the information they need in order to write the stories we want them to write. So there’s a real concern that these kinds of subpoenas can have a chilling effect on journalism that is, you know, really necessary, journalism that goes to the ability of the public to hold government officials accountable for their decisions. So, that’s why I think these reports are so disturbing, these reports of Trump administration subpoenas directed at news organizations, intended to uncover the identities of reporters’ sources. And, you know, as your intro noted, we’ve seen now a number of these; just over the last few weeks, a number of these have come to light.

One sort of background fact that’s important to recognize here is that the Supreme Court hasn’t weighed in on this set of issues for 50 years. And the result is that whatever protections journalists have in this context are really a matter of executive grace. They’re a matter of what protections the Justice Department wants to give them, rather than what protections the First Amendment requires. The First Amendment is kind of strangely absent in this context. The relevant set of rules has come, over the last few years, at least, from the attorney general’s guidelines, which were strengthened under President Obama. Attorney General Holder tightened those restrictions — tightened those rules in some ways to make it slightly — not just slightly, more difficult for prosecutors to obtain reporters’ sources, the identities of reporters’ sources.

But even with that kind of tightening, the Justice Department has found it possible to serve these subpoenas, and not just serve these subpoenas, but this most recent report out of The New York Times involves not just a subpoena intended to obtain reporters’ phone and email records, or subpoenas meant to obtain those records, but a gag order on Times executives that prevented, initially, the Times's lawyer, David McCraw, from disclosing the fact of the subpoena and court order to other Times officials. And that, I think, is a kind of independent First Amendment problem, not just the subpoena directed — you know, intended to uncover the reporters' sources, but then a gag order that prevents the Times from sharing that kind of information even within the organization, let alone with the public.

AMY GOODMAN: And, of course, we don’t know if there are — though the Biden Justice Department says they’re not going to engage in these, whether there are any more of these gag orders out there, because people can’t talk about them. And what do you make of — I mean, Goldman and Matt Apuzzo had been — the Justice Department had gone after them both under the Obama administration — they worked for AP, and now they’re working at The New York Times — and him saying, “They treat us like drug gangs. They’re using the same laws”?

JAMEEL JAFFER: Yeah. Well, I mean, I do think that there’s a real risk here that people will come to see journalists as kind of extensions of law enforcement or extensions of the intelligence agencies, and then, you know, would-be sources won’t go to people like Apuzzo or Goldman with information that is crucial for the public to have. So I do think that the concerns are justified.

I know that President Biden has now said that his administration won’t tolerate these kinds of subpoenas, and the Justice Department has said that it’s going to implement that direction, which is obviously a good thing. You know, what I would say about that, though, just to temper it a little, number one, is, again, it’s really troubling that all of this is a matter of executive grace rather than constitutional law. There should be some set of rules, that is independent of whoever’s in office right now, that limits what kinds of information the Justice Department can get, and when, in these kinds of investigations.

But the other thing I’d say is just that there are real questions about implementation. You know, the definitions matter. Like, who counts as a journalist? What counts as a leak investigation? The attorney general’s guidelines have historically had exception for foreign intelligence investigations. And that means that subpoenas and court orders served under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or national security letters that are sometimes served on technology companies or telecoms, those are essentially exempt from the attorney general guidelines that were put in place under the Obama administration. So there’s a real question now — you know, great that the Biden administration seems willing to go in a different direction, but I think we should ask some questions about the precise scope of the commitment that the Justice Department has now made.

AMY GOODMAN: Would it be up to Congress to pass laws?

JAMEEL JAFFER: Yeah, well, you know, many states have shield laws that protect journalists when state law enforcement seeks access to their records. There is no federal shield law, so, you know, again, we have no background First Amendment law, or almost no background First Amendment law. There’s a 1972 case, Branzburg v. Hayes, which is the last time the Supreme Court weighed in, in this context. But that case is very, very muddy, sort of notoriously muddy. It doesn’t really give journalists any kind of real confidence that their records can be kept secret. So you’ve got that, and, on the other hand, you have no federal shield law. There’s no congressionally enacted protections for journalists.

So, again, what that leaves journalists with is really just whatever protections the Justice Department wants to give. And I don’t think that’s really defensible in a society that is committed to press freedom. You know, you can’t call yourself a society that’s committed to press freedom if the only press freedom that exists is the press freedom that the government wants to provide or the executive branch wants to provide.
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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Fri Jun 11, 2021 11:00 pm

DOJ Announces it will Defend Donald Trump in Defamation Lawsuit brought by E. Jean Carroll
by Glenn Kirschner
Jun 8, 2021

In a disappointing turn of events, the Department of Justice filed a motion in federal court yesterday defending Donald Trump in the defamation lawsuit brought against him by E. Jean Carroll. The court had ruled that the allegedly defamatory statements by Trump about Ms. Carroll were not within the scope of his official presidential duties or employment. The DOJ disagrees and has come to Donald Trump's defense.

Here's is some of what's at stake by the DOJ taking this troubling position.




*****************

DOJ's Position in the E. Jean Carroll Case Explained
by Glenn Kirschner
Jun 9, 2021

President Biden's Department of Justice under the leadership of Attorney General Merrick Garland has been a mixed bag. This video reviews several recent DOJ decisions, from police department "Pattern or Practice" investigations, civil rights prosecutions and high profile subpoenas of folks like Rudy Giuliani to DOJ's decision in the lawsuit for the clearing of protestors from Lafayette Square and the recent decision in the E. Jean Carroll case. Specifically, this vide contains a review of the DOJ's legal rationale for filing an appeal in the Carroll case and the pros and cons of the position DOJ has decided to take in that case.

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Re: Three Dangers of Biden/Harris Admin, by Glenn Greenwald

Postby admin » Fri Jun 11, 2021 11:17 pm

White House Distances Itself From DOJ’s Trump Defense As Biden Breaks With His Justice Department — Again
by Alison Durkee
Forbes Staff
Jun 8, 2021,11:12am EDT

TOPLINE

The White House said in a statement late Monday that it was “not consulted” on the Justice Department continuing to defend former President Donald Trump in E. Jean Carroll’s defamation lawsuit against him, the third time the Biden Administration has distanced itself from the DOJ in recent days as President Joe Biden contrasts himself with Trump by emphasizing the department’s independence.

KEY FACTS

The Trump-era Justice Department tried to intervene in a defamation lawsuit that Carroll brought against Trump for comments he made after she accused him of sexual assault, asking to represent Trump in the case because his denial of Carroll’s allegations was allegedly part of his presidential duties.

After a judge denied the Trump DOJ’s attempt to join the case and the Justice Department appealed the ruling, the Biden DOJ said in a court filing that while it didn’t support Trump’s “crude and disrespectful comments,” it still believed Trump’s response to Carroll’s allegations were answers to questions “posed to him in his capacity as President.”

The White House “was not consulted by DOJ on the decision to file this brief or its contents,” spokesman Andrew Bates said in response to the filing, noting that Biden and his team “have utterly different standards from their predecessors for what qualify as acceptable statements.”

Biden also disputed the DOJ defending a Trump-era Social Security Act provision for Puerto Rico residents in a U.S. Supreme Court filing Monday, saying the provision the Justice Department was backing—part of their “longstanding practice” to defend federal statutes—“is inconsistent with my Administration’s policies and values.”

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki also distanced the administration from the DOJ’s practice of using gag orders when seizing records from journalists, saying in a statement they were unaware of it before a New York Times report Friday.

The Justice Department will no longer subpoena reporters’ records because doing so is “not consistent with the president’s policy direction to the department,” Psaki said.

TANGENT

Biden also attacked Trump having the Justice Department defend him in Carroll’s lawsuit ahead of the presidential election, saying during a town hall the case was an instance of Trump using the DOJ as his “own law firm.”

CHIEF CRITICS

Carroll and attorney Roberta Kaplan have heavily criticized the Biden DOJ’s decision to wade into her case against Trump, which Kaplan said Monday was “truly shocking” and “legally” and “morally wrong.” “As women across the country are standing up and holding men accountable for assault — the DOJ is trying to stop me from having that same right,” Carroll said in a statement.

KEY BACKGROUND

After Trump faced criticism throughout his presidency that he was using his Justice Department and U.S. Attorney General William Barr to do his bidding, Biden has repeatedly emphasized his intention to keep his administration’s judiciary arm as independent as possible. "The Justice Department in my administration will be totally independent of me," Biden said on the campaign trail in September, calling the DOJ’s “politicization” under Trump “the most dangerous thing that's happened so far” during Trump’s presidency. U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland has vowed to be impartial in his work at the department, saying after being confirmed that the “essence of the rule of law” is that there should not be “one rule for Democrats and another for Republicans, one rule for friends, another for foes.” In addition to the Carroll lawsuit, the Biden Administration has also pointed to the DOJ’s independence to justify not getting involved in questions of whether Trump should face prosecution for his alleged role in the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol building, with Psaki saying in February that the issue will be “up to the Department of Justice to determine.” “We’re doing something new here, and there’s going to be an independent Justice Department,” Psaki said.
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