Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Postby admin » Wed Dec 07, 2016 6:16 am

https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/3774

Congrats!

From: john.podesta@gmail.com
To: hrod17@clintonemail.com
Date: 2014-09-27 15:15
Subject: Congrats!

Send our love to Chelsea, Marc and Grandpa. Can't wait to meet Charlotte.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:

Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves.

Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, Libya?
Worth analyzing for future purposes.

*From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com]
*Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
*To*: H
*Subject*: Re: Here's what I mentioned

Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, "John Podesta" <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
>> in the region.
>>
>>
>>
>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage
>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
>> real defeat on ISIL.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be
>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air
>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
>> ISIL.
>>
>>
>>
>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The
>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be
>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.
>>
>>
>>
>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to
>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
>> temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving
>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>> other radical Sunni groups in the region.
This effort will be enhanced by
>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put
>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By
>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.
>>
>>
>>
>> 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are
>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the
>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.
>>
>>
>>
>> 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>> support for moderate government forces.)
>>
>>
>>
>> 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our security
>> policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of ISIL
>> veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by Islamist
>> forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where fighters are
>> returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only the latest and
>> most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to defeat them in
>> Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will develop. Successful
>> military operations against these very irregular but determined forces can
>> only be accomplished by making proper use of clandestine/special operations
>> resources, in coordination with airpower, and established local allies.
>> There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of opportunity on this issue, as
>> we need to act before an ISIL state becomes better organized and reaches
>> into Lebanon and Jordan.
>>
>>
>>
>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result of
>> this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq and
>> the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG controlled
>> territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can reassure the
>> concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the KRG will not
>> exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the management of the
>> oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric facility. At the
>> same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as they pursue ISIL
>> into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with FSA troops who can
>> move against ISIL from the North. This will make certain Basher al Assad
>> does not gain an advantage from these operations. Finally, as it now
>> appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer contractors as advisors to
>> the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a position to coordinate more
>> effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army.)
>>
>>
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Re: Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Postby admin » Wed Dec 07, 2016 8:39 am

https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/8396

Qatar, Brazil, Peru, Malawi, Rwanda

From: adesai@clintonfoundation.org
To: blindsey@clintonfoundation.org, lgraham@clintonfoundation.org, doug@presidentclinton.com, justin@presidentclinton.com
CC: john.podesta@gmail.com
Date: 2012-04-16 18:56
Subject: Qatar, Brazil, Peru, Malawi, Rwanda

Last Thursday, April 12, I met individually with the Ambassadors from Qatar, Brazil, Peru, Malawi, and Rwanda, in Washington, DC. Below is a summary of key points from each meeting, and we are following-up on each point. I'd welcome your feedback. Sincerely, Ami

QATAR

- Would like to see WJC "for five minutes" in NYC, to present $1 million check that Qatar promised for WJC's birthday in 2011.

- Qatar would welcome our suggestions for investments in Haiti - particularly on education and health. They have allocated most of their $20 million but are happy to consider projects we suggest. I'm collecting input from CF Haiti team.


BRAZIL

- President Rousseff may come to NYC for UN in September; I pitched CGI, again, and will continue to do so.

- We agreed to try to arrange a WJC-Rousseff meeting whenever she and he are next in the same city.

- With regard to Rio climate conference, Ambassador's team is going to think about any sites that WJC could visit to highlight Brazil's leadership on climate issues. [I made clear WJC visit to Rio is undecided.] They said they'd be happy for WJC to come.

- I committed to send them details on CCI in Brazil.

- Ambassador mentioned Lula receiving an award in Iowa and how much Lula enjoyed Iowa. I suggested Lula come to Little Rock when WJC convenes meeting of former heads of state (Club of Madrid). Also discussed Ambassador going to Little Rock to speak with Clinton School students - he said he'd like to. I'll work with Stephanie on this.\

- We discussed Lula's health - Ambassador said he's recovering and still committed to agriculture work in Africa. We agreed it would be good for WJC and Lula to do something together on agriculture in Africa.

PERU

- Per CGSGI, I asked for Ambassador's ideas on which sectors/parts of Peru to focus on in order to create jobs. He suggested we speak with his son, an alderman in Lima, about jobs projects for young men who otherwise could be recruited by gangs. Ambassador also suggested speaking with Minister for Women and Vulnerable Populations, Ms. Ana Jara, for jobs projects for women.

MALAWI

- Ambassador told story of Mutharika's death (said he collapsed with no prior symptoms during a morning meeting, was taken to hospital, then flown to South Africa but passed away en route); and emphasized significance of smooth transition to successor, within their constitutional framework. Sounds like new President is laying low until the memorial service for Mutharika, and then plans to announce her new government.

- Ambassador again urged that CDI consider dairy/cattle projects; I reminded him we'd be happy to speak with minister of agriculture or whoever Ambassador suggests in the industry; he said he'd let us know.

RWANDA

- Kagame is organizing an event in June to commemorate closing of Gacaca process for the genocide. They asked if WJC could go. I said Africa trip is probably in July and we haven't decided countries yet but if there's anything they'd want WJC to do in Rwanda in July, to let us know. I also said to let us know if they'd want a message from WJC for the June event; they'll let us know.

- Ambassador asked if WJC/CF/CGI could do anything to help on education/universities in Rwanda. I explained we are constrained by funding but if they have specific ideas, to let us know. He said they'll put together some ideas for us.

- Ambassador asked about attracting more investments/businesses to Rwanda, including mining/natural resources investors. I emphasized CGI as an opportunity for Kagame to engage investors. I also mentioned Barclays interest in doing something at CGI on investing in Africa. Also mentioned Kagame doing a side-meeting at/around CGI that convenes investors interested in Rwanda, akin to WJC's investor meeting for Ireland or session WJC did for Haiti last year at CGI.

- Ambassador said criticism of Kagame seems to have quieted, partly due to WJC and Blair's unwavering support for Kagame. Ambassador said Kagame and Rwanda very much appreciate WJC's unflinching support.
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Re: Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Postby admin » Wed Dec 07, 2016 8:44 am

Clinton Foundation Donors Got Weapons Deals From Hillary Clinton's State Department
by David Sirota and Andrew Perez
05/26/15

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Even by the standards of arms deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia, this one was enormous. A consortium of American defense contractors led by Boeing would deliver $29 billion worth of advanced fighter jets to the United States' oil-rich ally in the Middle East.

Israeli officials were agitated, reportedly complaining to the Obama administration that this substantial enhancement to Saudi air power risked disrupting the region's fragile balance of power. The deal appeared to collide with the State Department’s documented concerns about the repressive policies of the Saudi royal family.

But now, in late 2011, Hillary Clinton’s State Department was formally clearing the sale, asserting that it was in the national interest. At press conferences in Washington to announce the department’s approval, an assistant secretary of state, Andrew Shapiro, declared that the deal had been “a top priority” for Clinton personally. Shapiro, a longtime aide to Clinton since her Senate days, added that the “U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army have excellent relationships in Saudi Arabia.”

These were not the only relationships bridging leaders of the two nations. In the years before Hillary Clinton became secretary of state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contributed at least $10 million to the Clinton Foundation, the philanthropic enterprise she has overseen with her husband, former president Bill Clinton. Just two months before the deal was finalized, Boeing -- the defense contractor that manufactures one of the fighter jets the Saudis were especially keen to acquire, the F-15 -- contributed $900,000 to the Clinton Foundation, according to a company press release.


The Saudi deal was one of dozens of arms sales approved by Hillary Clinton’s State Department that placed weapons in the hands of governments that had also donated money to the Clinton family philanthropic empire, an International Business Times investigation has found.

Under Clinton's leadership, the State Department approved $165 billion worth of commercial arms sales to 20 nations whose governments have given money to the Clinton Foundation, according to an IBTimes analysis of State Department and foundation data. That figure -- derived from the three full fiscal years of Clinton’s term as Secretary of State (from October 2010 to September 2012) -- represented nearly double the value of American arms sales made to the those countries and approved by the State Department during the same period of President George W. Bush’s second term.

The Clinton-led State Department also authorized $151 billion of separate Pentagon-brokered deals for 16 of the countries that donated to the Clinton Foundation, resulting in a 143 percent increase in completed sales to those nations over the same time frame during the Bush administration. These extra sales were part of a broad increase in American military exports that accompanied Obama’s arrival in the White House. The 143 percent increase in U.S. arms sales to Clinton Foundation donors compares to an 80 percent increase in such sales to all countries over the same time period.


American defense contractors also donated to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state and in some cases made personal payments to Bill Clinton for speaking engagements. Such firms and their subsidiaries were listed as contractors in $163 billion worth of Pentagon-negotiated deals that were authorized by the Clinton State Department between 2009 and 2012.

The State Department formally approved these arms sales even as many of the deals enhanced the military power of countries ruled by authoritarian regimes whose human rights abuses had been criticized by the department. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar all donated to the Clinton Foundation and also gained State Department clearance to buy caches of American-made weapons even as the department singled them out for a range of alleged ills, from corruption to restrictions on civil liberties to violent crackdowns against political opponents.

As secretary of state, Hillary Clinton also accused some of these countries of failing to marshal a serious and sustained campaign to confront terrorism. In a December 2009 State Department cable published by Wikileaks, Clinton complained of “an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority.” She declared that “Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is considered the worst in the region.” She said the Kuwaiti government was “less inclined to take action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators plotting attacks.” She noted that “UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a variety of terrorist groups.” All of these countries donated to the Clinton Foundation and received increased weapons export authorizations from the Clinton-run State Department.

Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Clinton Foundation did not respond to questions from the IBTimes.

In all, governments and corporations involved in the arms deals approved by Clinton’s State Department have delivered between $54 million and $141 million to the Clinton Foundation as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments to the Clinton family, according to foundation and State Department records. The Clinton Foundation publishes only a rough range of individual contributors’ donations, making a more precise accounting impossible.

Winning Friends, Influencing Clintons

Under federal law, foreign governments seeking State Department clearance to buy American-made arms are barred from making campaign contributions -- a prohibition aimed at preventing foreign interests from using cash to influence national security policy. But nothing prevents them from contributing to a philanthropic foundation controlled by policymakers.

Just before Hillary Clinton became Secretary of State, the Clinton Foundation signed an agreement generally obligating it to disclose to the State Department increases in contributions from its existing foreign government donors and any new foreign government donors. Those increases were to be reviewed by an official at the State Department and “as appropriate” the White House counsel’s office. According to available disclosures, officials at the State Department and White House raised no issues about potential conflicts related to arms sales.

During Hillary Clinton’s 2009 Senate confirmation hearings, Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., urged the Clinton Foundation to “forswear” accepting contributions from governments abroad. “Foreign governments and entities may perceive the Clinton Foundation as a means to gain favor with the secretary of state,” he said. The Clintons did not take Lugar’s advice. In light of the weapons deals flowing to Clinton Foundation donors, advocates for limits on the influence of money on government action now argue that Lugar was prescient in his concerns.

“The word was out to these groups that one of the best ways to gain access and influence with the Clintons was to give to this foundation,” said Meredith McGehee, policy director at the Campaign Legal Center, an advocacy group that seeks to tighten campaign finance disclosure rules. “This shows why having public officials, or even spouses of public officials, connected with these nonprofits is problematic.”

Hillary Clinton’s willingness to allow those with business before the State Department to finance her foundation heightens concerns about how she would manage such relationships as president, said Lawrence Lessig, the director of Harvard University’s Safra Center for Ethics.

“These continuing revelations raise a fundamental question of judgment,” Lessig told IBTimes. “Can it really be that the Clintons didn't recognize the questions these transactions would raise? And if they did, what does that say about their sense of the appropriate relationship between private gain and public good?”

National security experts assert that the overlap between the list of Clinton Foundation donors and those with business before the the State Department presents a troubling conflict of interest.

While governments and defense contractors may not have made donations to the Clinton Foundation exclusively to influence arms deals, they were clearly “looking to build up deposits in the 'favor bank' and to be well thought of,” said Gregory Suchan, a 34-year State Department veteran who helped lead the agency’s oversight of arms transfers under the Bush administration.

As Hillary Clinton presses a campaign for the presidency, she has confronted sustained scrutiny into her family’s personal and philanthropic dealings, along with questions about whether their private business interests have colored her exercise of public authority. As IBTimes previously reported, Clinton switched from opposing an American free trade agreement with Colombia to supporting it after a Canadian energy and mining magnate with interests in that South American country contributed to the Clinton Foundation. IBTimes’ review of the Clintons’ annual financial disclosures also revealed that 13 companies lobbying the State Department paid Bill Clinton $2.5 million in speaking fees while Hillary Clinton headed the agency.

Questions about the nexus of arms sales and Clinton Foundation donors stem from the State Department’s role in reviewing the export of American-made weapons. The agency is charged with both licensing direct commercial sales by U.S. defense contractors to foreign governments and also approving Pentagon-brokered sales to those governments. Those powers are enshrined in a federal law that specifically designates the secretary of state as “responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales” of arms, military hardware and services to foreign countries. In that role, Hillary Clinton was empowered to approve or reject deals for a broad range of reasons, from national security considerations to human rights concerns.

The State Department does not disclose which individual companies are involved in direct commercial sales, but its disclosure documents reveal that countries that donated to the Clinton Foundation saw a combined $75 billion increase in authorized commercial military sales under the three full fiscal years Clinton served, as compared to the first three full fiscal years of Bush’s second term.

The Clinton Foundation has not released an exact timetable of its donations, making it impossible to know whether money from foreign governments and defense contractors came into the organization before or after Hillary Clinton approved weapons deals that involved their interests. But news reports document that at least seven foreign governments that received State Department clearance for American arms did donate to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary Clinton was serving as secretary: Algeria, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Thailand, Norway and Australia.


Sales Flowed Despite Human Rights Concerns

Under a presidential policy directive signed by President Bill Clinton in 1995, the State Department is supposed to specifically take human rights records into account when deciding whether to approve licenses enabling foreign governments to purchase military equipment and services from American companies. Despite this, Hillary Clinton’s State Department increased approvals of such sales to nations that her agency sharply criticized for systematic human rights abuses.

In its 2010 Human Rights Report, Clinton’s State Department inveighed against Algeria’s government for imposing “restrictions on freedom of assembly and association” tolerating “arbitrary killing,” “widespread corruption,” and a “lack of judicial independence.” The report said the Algerian government “used security grounds to constrain freedom of expression and movement.”

That year, the Algerian government donated $500,000 to the Clinton Foundation and its lobbyists met with the State Department officials who oversee enforcement of human rights policies. Clinton’s State Department the next year approved a one-year 70 percent increase in military export authorizations to the country. The increase included authorizations of almost 50,000 items classified as “toxicological agents, including chemical agents, biological agents and associated equipment” after the State Department did not authorize the export of any of such items to Algeria in the prior year.

During Clinton’s tenure, the State Department authorized at least $2.4 billion of direct military hardware and services sales to Algeria -- nearly triple such authorizations over the last full fiscal years during the Bush administration. The Clinton Foundation did not disclose Algeria’s donation until this year -- a violation of the ethics agreement it entered into with the Obama administration.

The monarchy in Qatar had similarly been chastised by the State Department for a raft of human rights abuses. But that country donated to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary Clinton was running the State Department. During the three full budgetary years of her tenure, Qatar saw a 14-fold increase in State Department authorizations for direct commercial sales of military equipment and services, as compared to the same time period in Bush’s second term. The department also approved the Pentagon’s separate $750 million sale of multi-mission helicopters to Qatar. That deal would additionally employ as contractors three companies that have all supported the Clinton Foundation over the years: United Technologies, Lockheed Martin and General Electric.


Clinton foundation donor countries that the State Department criticized for human rights violations and that received weapons export authorizations did not respond to IBTimes’ questions.

That group of arms manufacturers -- along with Clinton Foundation donors Boeing, Honeywell, Hawker Beechcraft and their affiliates -- were together listed as contractors in 114 such deals while Clinton was secretary of state. NBC put Chelsea Clinton on its payroll as a network correspondent in November 2011, when it was still 49 percent owned by General Electric. A spokesperson for General Electric did not respond to questions from IBTimes.

Defense Contractors Donated To The Clinton Foundation

The Clinton Foundation accepted donations from six companies benefiting from U.S. State Department arms export approvals.

Defense Contractor / Donation Min. ($)

Boeing / 5,000,000
General Electric / 1,000,000
Goldman Sachs (Hawker Beechcraft) / 500,000
Honeywell / 50,000
Lockheed Martin / 250,000
United Technologies / 50,000

Source: Clinton Foundation donor data and Defense Security Cooperation Agency foreign military sales records Get the data


The other companies all asserted that their donations had nothing to do with the arms export deals.

“Our contributions have aligned with our longstanding philanthropic commitments,” said Honeywell spokesperson Rob Ferris.

"Even The Appearance Of A Conflict"

During her Senate confirmation proceedings in 2009, Hillary Clinton declared that she and her husband were “committed to ensuring that his work does not present a conflict of interest with the duties of Secretary of State.” She pledged “to protect against even the appearance of a conflict of interest between his work and the duties of the Secretary of State” and said that “in many, if not most cases, it is likely that the Foundation or President Clinton will not pursue an opportunity that presents a conflict.”

Even so, Bill Clinton took in speaking fees reaching $625,000 at events sponsored by entities that were dealing with Hillary Clinton’s State Department on weapons issues.

In 2011, for example, the former president was paid $175,000 by the Kuwait America Foundation to be the guest of honor and keynote speaker at its annual awards gala, which was held at the home of the Kuwaiti ambassador. Ben Affleck spoke at the event, which featured a musical performance by Grammy-award winner Michael Bolton. The gala was emceed by Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski, hosts of MSNBC’s Morning Joe show. Boeing was listed as a sponsor of the event, as were the embassies of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar -- the latter two of which had donated to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state.

The speaking fee from the Kuwait America Foundation to Bill Clinton was paid in the same time frame as a series of deals Hillary Clinton’s State Department was approving between the Kuwaiti government and Boeing. Months before the gala, the Department of Defense announced that Boeing would be the prime contractor on a $693 million deal, cleared by Hillary Clinton’s State Department, to provide the Kuwaiti government with military transport aircraft. A year later, a group sponsored in part by Boeing would pay Bill Clinton another $250,000 speaking fee.

“Boeing has sponsored this major travel event, the Global Business Travel Association, for several years, regardless of its invited speakers,” Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesperson, told IBTimes. Johndroe said Boeing’s support for the Clinton Foundation was “a transparent act of compassion and an investment aimed at aiding the long-term interests and hopes of the Haitian people” following a devastating earthquake.

Boeing was one of three companies that helped deliver money personally to Bill Clinton while benefiting from weapons authorizations issued by Hillary Clinton’s State Department. The others were Lockheed and the financial giant Goldman Sachs.

Lockheed is a member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, which paid Bill Clinton $250,000 to speak at an event in 2010. Three days before the speech, Hillary Clinton’s State Department approved two weapons export deals in which Lockheed was listed as the prime contractor. Over the course of 2010, Lockheed was a contractor on 17 Pentagon-brokered deals that won approval from the State Department. Lockheed told IBTimes that its support for the Clinton Foundation started in 2010, while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state.

“Lockheed Martin has periodically supported one individual membership in the Clinton Global Initiative since 2010,” said company spokesperson Katherine Trinidad. “Membership benefits included attendance at CGI annual meetings, where we participated in working groups focused on STEM, workforce development and advanced manufacturing.”

In April 2011, Goldman Sachs paid Bill Clinton $200,000 to speak to “approximately 250 high level clients and investors” in New York, according to State Department records obtained by Judicial Watch. Two months later, the State Department approved a $675 million foreign military sale involving Hawker Beechcraft -- a company that was then part-owned by Goldman Sachs. As part of the deal, Hawker Beechcraft would provide support to the government of Iraq to maintain a fleet of aircraft used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Goldman Sachs has also contributed at least $250,000 to the Clinton Foundation, according to donation records.

“There is absolutely no connection among all the points that you have raised regarding our firm,” said Andrew Williams, a spokesperson for Goldman Sachs.

Federal records show that ethics staffers at the State Department approved the payments to Bill Clinton from Goldman Sachs, and the Lockheed- and Boeing-sponsored groups without objection, even though the firms had major stakes in the agency’s weapons export decisions.

Stephen Walt, a Harvard University professor of international affairs, told IBTimes that the intertwining financial relationships between the Clintons, defense contractors and foreign governments seeking weapons approvals is “a vivid example of a very big problem -- the degree to which conflicts of interest have become endemic.”

“It has troubled me all along that the Clinton Foundation was not being more scrupulous about who it would take money from and who it wouldn’t,” he said. “American foreign policy is better served if people responsible for it are not even remotely suspected of having these conflicts of interest. When George Marshall was secretary of state, nobody was worried about whether or not he would be distracted by donations to a foundation or to himself. This wasn’t an issue. And that was probably better.”

UPDATE (7:38pm, 5/26/15): In an emailed statement, a spokeswoman for the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office told IBTimes: "Taiwan’s 2003 donation was for the fund to build the Clinton Presidential Library. This was way before Mrs. Clinton was made the U.S. Secretary of State. We have neither knowledge nor comments concerning other issues."

This story has been updated to include an additional link to a 2010 State Department press conference about the U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms deal.
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Re: Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Postby admin » Wed Dec 07, 2016 8:53 am

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE131801_a.html

TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE

Date:2009 December 30, 13:28 (Wednesday) Canonical ID:09STATE131801_a
Original Classification:SECRET,NOFORN Current Classification:SECRET,NOFORN
Handling Restrictions-- Not Assigned --
Character Count:28453
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:AE - United Arab Emirates | EFIN - Economic Affairs--Financial and Monetary Affairs | KTFN - Terrorism Finance Traffic | KU - Kuwait | PINR - Political Affairs--Intelligence | PK - Pakistan | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | QA - Qatar | SA - Saudi Arabia Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:Secretary of State Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:Department of the Treasury | Kuwait Kuwait City | Pakistan Islamabad | Qatar Doha | Saudi Arabia Riyadh | United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi

ContentRaw contentMetadataPrintShare
Show Headers
B. (B) RIYADH 1499
C. (C) KUWAIT 1061
D. (D) KUWAIT 1021
E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057
F. (F) DOHA 650
G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799

Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary
Douglas C. Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.

2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to
the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP)
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in coordination with the
Department of Treasury established the interagency Illicit
Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is chaired by Treasury
A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting illicit finance
activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the external
financial/logistical support networks of terrorist groups
that operate there, such as al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF's activities are a vital
component of the USG's Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak)
strategy dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows
between the Gulf countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The
IFTF has created a diplomatic engagement strategy to assist
in the accomplishment of this objective. The strategy
focuses on senior-level USG engagement with Gulf countries
and Pakistan to communicate USG counterterrorism priorities
and to generate the political will necessary to address the
problem. The IFTF has drafted talking points for use by all
USG officials in their interactions with Gulf and Pakistani
interlocutors. These points focus on funding for terrorist
groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been cleared
through the relevant Washington agencies.

3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials
for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming
visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in
January, the Department requests all action posts deliver the
general talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific
talking points contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi
Arabia ) para 8, (2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12,
and (4) Pakistan ) para 13. The talking points should be
delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D'Affaires.

4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has
received responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
Doha, and Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities
devoted towards these efforts. The Department also received
each Mission's evaluation of the effectiveness of host
country institutions working on combating terrorism financing
along with post's recommendations on ways forward.

----------------------------------------
General talking points for all Embassies
----------------------------------------

5. (SBU) Threat financing:

Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and
achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.

These objectives require effective actions against terrorist
fundraising in the Gulf by
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other Af/Pak-based violent
extremist groups, all of which undermine the security of the
entire international community. We will not succeed without
your cooperation.

Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a
comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following
elements:

(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter
terrorist donors, fundraisers and facilitators;

(2) appropriate legal measures, including effective
prosecution, to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators
publicly accountable and to send a strong message of
deterrence to current and would-be donors that their actions
face significant legal and social repercussions.

(3) strong oversight of charities, including their
overseas branches, to ensure that these organizations are not
supporting terrorist and extremist elements;

(4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and

(5) full compliance with international anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
standards, including vigorous enforcement.

6. (SBU) Charities:

The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable
activities and is a strong proponent of private charitable
giving.

We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within
Islam and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and
organizations in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate
charitable activities thrive.

At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts
to ensure that extremists and terrorists do not exploit
charitable giving.

--------------------------------------------- ----------
Country-specific background material and talking points
--------------------------------------------- ----------

7. (U) Saudi Arabia background

(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes
seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has
been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to
treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a
strategic priority. Due in part to intense focus by the USG
over the last several years, Saudi Arabia has begun to make
important progress on this front and has responded to
terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States
through proactively investigating and detaining financial
facilitators of concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia
constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni
terrorist groups worldwide. Continued senior-level USG
engagement is needed to build on initial efforts and
encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the
flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists
and extremists worldwide.

(S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi
Government on terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008
of a Treasury attache office presence in Riyadh contributes
to robust interaction and information sharing on the issue.
Despite this presence, however, more needs to be done since
Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups,
including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars
annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan.
In contrast to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt
al-Qa'ida's access to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has
taken only limited action to disrupt fundraising for the UN
1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups that are also aligned with
al-Qa'ida and focused on undermining stability in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.


(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to
criminalize terrorist financing and restrict the overseas
flow of funds from Saudi-based charities. However, these
restrictions fail to include multilateral organizations
such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO),
Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth (WAMY.) Intelligence suggests that these groups
continue to send money overseas and, at times, fund extremism
overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised to set up a
Charities Committee that would address this issue, but
has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism,
however, is secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining
Saudi acknowledgement of the scope of this problem and a
commitment to take decisive action.

(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post's
comments regarding embassy staffing at Riyadh and
recommendations for enhancing bilateral cooperation (ref B).
The Department agrees with post's recommendation that the
U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia
Government's recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups
other than al-Qa'ida are a threat both to it and to regional
stability. The Department also supports post's assessment
that consistent engagement, including the exchange of
actionable intelligence, by senior USG officials is
paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG
during upcoming senior-level USG visits.

8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points

(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government's efforts to
disrupt al-Qa'ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our
commitment to support the Saudi government in its actions on
terror finance. We encourage your government to continue
efforts against al-Qa'ida and stress the importance of
sharing and acting on information related to terrorist
financing.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in
the Kingdom by al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups and urge
decisive action to enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze
against Taliban and LeT fundraising similar to Saudi efforts
to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and take other appropriate
action to target al-Qa'ida.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qa'ida and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume
responsibility for the overseas operations of charities and
NGOs headquartered in the Kingdom. We encourage you to
prevent terrorists and their supporters from exploiting
religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds. We
acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial
controls on charities, but urge greater regulation and
oversight of the Saudi charitable sector.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in
broadening and deepening this dialogue and information
exchange as we still lack detailed information on the
ultimate sources of terrorist financing emanating from the
Kingdom. We commend your government for recent efforts to
put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we
encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to
maximize the deterrent effects.

(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and
deterring financial facilitators. However, we encourage your
government also to focus on the long-term and more
fundamental goal of dissuading donors from funding violent
extremism.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government's effort over the
past several years to use the media, internet, and other
forms of public outreach to discourage extremism. We
emphasize that a critical component in this campaign is
cutting off the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to foreign
religious, charitable, and educational organizations that
propagate violent extremist ideologies to vulnerable
populations.

9. (U) Kuwait background

(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of
Kuwait (GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist
financiers in country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism
abroad, and Kuwait's lack of a comprehensive anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. While the
GOK has demonstrated a willingness to take action when
attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined to take
action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators
plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa'ida and other
groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds
and as a key transit point.


(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb
terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct
cash donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques
and charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of
regulations by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It
also recently arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa'ida
facilitators, but it is too early to assess whether this
marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of co-opting terrorists as a
means of deflecting potential attacks against Kuwaiti
interests.

(S/NF) Kuwait's law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack
Arab neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa'ida
facilitators, Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) country that has not criminalized terrorist
financing. The GOK faces an uphill battle to implement
comprehensive terror finance legislation due to a lack of
parliamentary support. However the government is also not
currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at
times has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated
asset freezes of Kuwait-based entities.


(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and
Kuwait concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).
In June 2008 the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices
RIHS under Executive Order 13224 for providing financial and
material support to al-Qa'ida and UN 1267-listed al-Qa'ida
affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah,
and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States nominated RIHS
for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a technical
hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS's
presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold - probably
at Kuwait's behest - citing insufficient information on
RIHS's activities. Indonesia has rotated off the United
Nation's Security Council so only Libya's hold on RIHS
remains. (Department note: Libya's hold will drop in 2010
unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members places a hold on
our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys broad
public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has
not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS's
headquarters or its branches, which is consistent with GOK
tolerance of similar behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and
organizations as long as the behavior occurs or is directed
outside of Kuwait.

(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs
thorough description of the staffing situation at Mission
Kuwait (ref B). The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait
for taking an active approach in proposing a strategy to
build GOK capacity in combating financial crimes through
training and seminars focused on legislation and law
enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on
improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is
enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington.
Washington agencies appreciate post's assessment and
identification of several focal areas that deal with
financial crimes. These goals closely track the work of the
IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The Department
commends Embassy Kuwait's recent support of Kuwait's National
Anti Money Laundering Committee's AML conference in early
December 2009. In response to post's request, the Department
will work with relevant members of the Washington
inter-agency to provide comments and feedback to the draft of
Kuwait's amended AML law.

10. (U) Kuwait talking points

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our
strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our
cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level
that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas.
In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering
conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti
donors serve as an important source of funds and other
support for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.
The arrest
in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist
attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step
in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you
to keep up the positive momentum.

(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qaida
and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government's generosity
for a wide range of important causes and for the positive
contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait
for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of
charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent
the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your
government to separate and protect legitimate charitable
activity from those that fund terror. We have particular
concerns about their foreign activities.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued
absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing
terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective
counterterrorist efforts.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the
passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and
comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror
financing laws will enhance your government's ability to
prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait's security, but
will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait's financial sector
as a whole.

(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our
concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous
occasions. We designated the organization in the United
States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on
information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups
in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its
concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have
taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their
countries.

(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work
more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities
cannot be used to support terrorists.

11. (U) United Arab Emirates background

(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a
variety of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups, including Hamas.

Washington agencies note, however, that they have limited
information on the identity of Taliban and LeT donors and
facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information
to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point
can be emphasized that the UAE's role as a growing global
financial center, coupled with weak regulatory oversight,
makes it vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers and
facilitation networks.

(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the
challenges post faces. The Department is supportive of the
action plan laid out on engaging with the UAE on Taliban
finance issues (ref E). The Department assesses that a
bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE to
focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures
is an important step in making progress on strengthening UAE
efforts to disrupt potential terrorist financing.

12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points

(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our
bilateral relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a
strong partnership with your government in countering
financial support for al-Qa'ida, and more recently, in
constricting Iran's ability to use UAE financial institutions
to support its nuclear program.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and
partnership to efforts to deal with the threat represented by
Taliban and LeT fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the
United States and UAE, which both have troops in the field in
Afghanistan, share a common interest in curtailing any
Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and fully implementing
UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf of these
groups in the UAE.

(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have
been raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT
fundraising. We also commend the calls for increased
vigilance, information sharing, and enforcement actions to
disrupt and deter this activity.

(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban
and LeT with al-Qa'ida means that our mutual efforts to
disrupt the financing of these groups also is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to
travel and raise funds.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government's willingness
to work with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note
that such efforts are crucial to undermine al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, and other groups' ability to exploit the UAE as a
fundraising and facilitation hub.
We urge your government to
strengthen its regulatory and enforcement regime to interdict
cash couriers transiting major airports.

13. (U) Pakistan background

(S/NF) Pakistan's intermittent support to terrorist groups
and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional
security and endanger U.S. national security objectives in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior
officials have publicly disavowed support for these groups,
some officials from the Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue to maintain ties with
a wide array of extremist organizations, in particular the
Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations. These
extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan
and exploit Pakistan's extensive network of charities, NGOs,
and madrassas. This network of social service institutions
readily provides extremist organizations with recruits,
funding and infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the
international stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR
1267 listings of Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by
requesting that China place holds on the nominations. China
recently placed a technical hold on the designation of three
Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists nominated by India,
although China did not prevent the most recent
Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in June.


(S/NF) The Department has received post's comments regarding
personnel staffing and the detailed description of the
challenges faced by Embassy Islamabad in the area of
terrorism finance (ref D). Department leaves it to post
discretion to determine which departments within the host
government should receive the points provided in para 16 so
that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places
on this issue.

14. (U) Pakistan talking points

(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan's support for
disrupting financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory
pursuant to their obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor
resolutions, and is critical to achieving stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has
failed to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards.
As you may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a
International Co-Operation Review Group exercise, that
is likely to have very negative multilateral repercussions if
the Parliament does not pass an adequate AML/CTF law.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government's obligation,
under UNSCR 1267, and successor resolutions to strictly
enforce existing sanctions against the 142 Taliban, LeT
leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid Trust, al Akhtar Trust
and other individuals and entities on the UN 1267
Consolidated List.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the
international community's efforts to combat terrorist
financing. Your government's views of UNSCR 1267 listing
requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups
should be made on the merits of the requests and not linked
to politics, including what country made the nomination or
which countries are referenced in the public statements of
the cases.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN
and domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the
Pakistan-based, UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al
Akhtar Trust, and all successor organizations that continue
to funnel money and provide other forms of support to the
Taliban and LeT.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided
by NGO extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD)
challenge the legitimacy of your government to provide for
its people. This includes relief efforts in the Internally
Displaced Person (IDP) camps of the Northwest Frontier
Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity Falah-e Insaniyat
Foundation.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work
together to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to
terrorist-controlled social welfare networks upon which IDPs
and other vulnerable populations currently rely. We must
work together to develop and support NGOs not affiliated with
terrorist groups, and establish a comprehensive oversight and
enforcement mechanism for NGOs that is consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force's international standard.

(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest
possible terms to take action against the Haqqani network,
which is funneling weapons and fighters across the border to
fight U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This
network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who was listed by the UN
under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through illicit
activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery,
narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.


(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the
anti-money laundering decree recently promulgated by your
Executive Branch with legislation fully consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and to
ensure that the current decree can stand in court. The FATF
Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are international standards,
which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the
Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.

15. (U) Qatar background

(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf
countries included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF
developed the background information included in para 16 for
inclusion in the diplomatic engagement strategy. However,
given the current focus of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on
terror finance related to Hamas, it would be
counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at this
time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to
cooperating with the U.S. against terrorist financing.
Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is
considered the worst in the region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban,
UN-1267 listed LeT, and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar
as a fundraising locale. Although Qatar's security services
have the capability to deal with direct threats and
occasionally have put that capability to use, they have been
hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for
appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking
reprisals.


(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing and the thorough
description of the coordination process on terrorist finance
issues at Embassy Doha (ref F). Department appreciates post's
assessment that GOQ definitions of what constitutes terrorism
differs occasionally from those of the USG. Department agrees
with post's suggested approach on this issue of engaging with
direct discussions with host government officials.

----------------------------------------
Points of contact and reporting deadline
----------------------------------------

16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this
request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht).
Posts are requested to report back on responses from other
governments by January 19, 2010.
CLINTON
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 24270
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: Qatar and Saudi Arabia Providing Support to ISIL

Postby admin » Thu Dec 08, 2016 8:38 am

https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/43648

Re: Here's what I mentioned

From: john.podesta@gmail.com
To: hrod17@clintonemail.com
Date: 2014-08-19 16:04
Subject: Re: Here's what I mentioned

Yes and interesting but not for this channel.

On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:

> Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves.
>
> Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli,
> Libya?
> Worth analyzing for future purposes.

>
> *From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com]
> *Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
> *To*: H
> *Subject*: Re: Here's what I mentioned
>
> Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
> On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, "John Podesta" <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
>> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
>>> in the region.

>>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
>>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
>>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
>>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
>>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
>>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
>>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage
>>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
>>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
>>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
>>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
>>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
>>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
>>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
>>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
>>> real defeat on ISIL.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
>>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
>>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be
>>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
>>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
>>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
>>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
>>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
>>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air
>>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
>>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
>>> ISIL.
>>>
>>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
>>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
>>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The
>>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
>>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be
>>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.

>>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
>>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
>>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
>>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
>>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to
>>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
>>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
>>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
>>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
>>> temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving
>>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
>>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>>> other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by
>>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put
>>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
>>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By
>>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
>>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
>>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.

>>> 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
>>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
>>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are
>>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
>>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
>>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
>>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
>>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
>>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the
>>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
>>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.

>>> 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>>> support for moderate government forces.)

>>> 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our
>>> security policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of
>>> ISIL veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by
>>> Islamist forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where
>>> fighters are returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only
>>> the latest and most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to
>>> defeat them in Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will
>>> develop. Successful military operations against these very irregular but
>>> determined forces can only be accomplished by making proper use of
>>> clandestine/special operations resources, in coordination with airpower,
>>> and established local allies. There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of
>>> opportunity on this issue, as we need to act before an ISIL state becomes
>>> better organized and reaches into Lebanon and Jordan.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result
>>> of this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq
>>> and the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG
>>> controlled territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can
>>> reassure the concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the
>>> KRG will not exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the
>>> management of the oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric
>>> facility. At the same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as
>>> they pursue ISIL into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with
>>> FSA troops who can move against ISIL from the North. This will make
>>> certain Basher al Assad does not gain an advantage from these operations.
>>> Finally, as it now appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer
>>> contractors as advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a
>>> position to coordinate more effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi
>>> Army.)
>>>
>>>
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