Kautilya's Arthashastra, translated by R. Shamasastry

[admin]

CHAPTER XI. INTERMINABLE AGREEMENT.

THE agreement made under the condition, "Let us colonize waste land," is termed an interminable agreement.

Whoever of the two parties of the agreement colonizes a fertile land, reaping the harvest earlier, overreaches the other.

Which is better for colonization: a plain or watery land?

A limited tract of land with water is far better than a vast plain, inasmuch as the former is conducive to the growth of crops and fruits throughout the year.

Of plains, that which is conducive to the growth of both early and late crops and which requires less labour and less rain for cultivation is better than the other of reverse character.

Of watery lands, that which is conducive to the growth of grains is better than another productive of crops other than grains.

Of two watery tracts, one of limited area and conducive to the growth of grains, and another, vast and productive of crops other than grains, the latter is better, inasmuch as it affords vast area not only to grow spices and other medicinal crops, but also to construct forts and other defensive works in plenty: for fertility and other qualities of lands are artificial (kritrimah).

Of the two tracts of land, one rich in grains and another in mines, the latter helps the treasury, while the former can fill both the treasury and the store-house; and besides this, the construction of forts and other buildings requires grains. Still, that kind of land containing mines and which yields precious metals to purchase large tracts of land is far better.

My teacher says that of the two forests, one productive of timber, and another of elephants, the former is the source of all kinds of works and is of immense help in forming a store-house, while the latter is of reverse character.

Not so, says Kautilya, for it is possible to plant any of timber-forests in many places, but not an elephant-forest; yet it is on elephants that the destruction of an enemy's army depends.

Of the two, communication by water and by land, the former is not long-standing, while the latter can ever be enjoyed.

Which is better, the land with scattered people or that with a corporation of people?

The former is better inasmuch as it can be kept under control and is not susceptible to the intrigues of enemys while the latter is intolerant of calamities and susceptible, of anger and other passions.

In colonizing a land with four castes, colonization with the lowest caste is better, inasmuch as it is serviceable in various ways, plentiful, and permanent.

Of cultivated and uncultivated tracts, the uncultivated tract may be suitable for various kinds of agricultural operations; and when it is fertile, adapted for pasture grounds, manufacture of merchandise, mercantile transactions of borrowing and lending, and attractive to rich merchants, it is still far better (than a cultivated tract).

Which is better of the two, the tract of land with forts or that which is thickly populated?

The latter is better; for that which is thickly populated is a kingdom in all its senses. What can a depopulated country like a barren cow be productive of?

The king who is desirous of getting back the land sold for colonization to another when the latter has lost his men and money in colonizing it, should first make an agreement with such a purchaser as is weak, base-born, devoid of energy, helpless, of unrighteous character, addicted to evil ways, trusting to fate, and indiscreet in his actions. When the colonization of a land entails much expenditure of men and money, and when a weak and base-born man attempts to colonize it, he will perish along with his people in consequence of his loss of men and money. Though strong, a base-born man will be deserted by his people who do not like him lest they may come to grief under him; though possessing an army, he cannot employ it if he is devoid of energy; and such an army will perish in consequence of the loss incurred by its master; though possessing wealth, a man who hesitates to part with his money and shows favour to none, cannot find help in any quarter; and when it is easy to drive out a man of unrighteous character from the colony in which he has firmly established himself, none can expect that a man of unrighteous character would be capable of colonizing a tract of waste land and keeping it secure; the same fact explains the fate of such a colonizer as is addicted to evil ways; whoever, trusting to fate and putting no reliance on manliness, withdraws himself from energetic work, will perish without undertaking anything or without achieving anything from his undertakings; and whoever is indiscreet in his actions will achieve nothing, and is the worst of the set of the colonizers.

My teacher says that an indiscreet colonizer may sometimes betray the weak points of his employer, the conqueror.

But Kautilya says that, just as he betrays the weak points, so also does he facilitate his destruction by the conqueror.

In the absence of such persons to colonize waste lands, the conqueror may arrange for the colonization of waste land in the same way as we shall treat of later on in connection with the "Capture of an enemy in the rear."

The above is what is termed verbal agreement (abhihitasandhih).

When a king of immense power compels another to sell a portion of the latter's fertile territory of which the former is very fond, then the latter may make an agreement with the former and sell the land. This is what is termed "unconcealed peace" (anibhritasandhih).

When a king of equal power demands land from another as above, then the latter may sell it after considering "whether the land can be recovered by me, or can be kept under my control; whether my enemy can be brought under my power in consequence of his taking possession of the land; and whether I can acquire by the sale of the land friends and wealth, enough to help me in my undertakings."

This explains the case of a king of inferior power, who purchases lands.

* Whoever, well versed in the science of polity, thus acquires friends, wealth, and territory with or without population will overreach other kings in combination with him.

[Thus ends Chapter XI, "Interminable Agreement" in the section of "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Friend, Gold, or Land and Agreement for Undertaking a Work”, Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and ninth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XII. AGREEMENT FOR UNDERTAKING A WORK.

WHEN an agreement is made on the condition "Let us have a fort built," it is termed agreement for undertaking a work.

Whoever of the two kings builds an impregnable fortress on a spot naturally best fitted for the purpose with less labour and expenditure overreaches the other.

Of forts such as a fort on a plain, in the centre of a river, and on a mountain, that which is mentioned later is of more advantage than the one previously mentioned; of irrigational works (setu-bandha), that which is of perennial water is better than that which is fed wit water drawn from other sources; and of works containing perennial water, that which can irrigate an extensive area is better.

Of timber forests, whoever plants a forest which produces valuable articles, which expands into wild tracts, and which possesses a river on its border overreaches the other, for a forest containing a river is self-dependent and can afford shelter in calamities.

Of game-forests, whoever plants a forest full of cruel beasts, close to an enemy's forest containing wild animals, causing therefore much harm to the enemy, and extending into an elephant-forest at the country's border, overreaches the other.

My teacher says that of the two countries, one with a large number of effete persons, and another with a small number of brave persons, the latter is better inasmuch as, a few brave persons can destroy a large mass of effete persons whose slaughter brings about the destruction of the entire army of their master.

Not so, says Kautilya, a large number of effete persons is better, inasmuch as they can be employed to do other kinds of works in the camp: to serve the soldiers fighting in battlefields, and to terrify the enemy by its number. It is also possible to infuse spirit and enthusiasm in the timid by means of discipline and training.

Of mines, whoever exploits with less labour and expenditure a mine of valuable output and of easy communication overreaches the other.

Which is better of the two, a small mine of valuable yield, or a big mine productive of commodities of inferior value?

My teacher says that the former is better inasmuch as valuable products, such as diamonds, precious stones, pearls, corals, gold and silver, can swallow vast quantities of inferior commodities.

Not so, says Kautilya, for there is the possibility of purchasing valuable commodities by a mass of accumulated articles of inferior value, collected from a vast and longstanding mine of inferior commodities.

This explains the selection of trade-routes:

My teacher says that of the two trade-routes, one by water and another by land, the former is better, inasmuch as it is less expensive, but productive of large profit.

Not so, says Kautilya, for water route is liable to obstruction, not permanent, a source of imminent dangers, and incapable of defence, whereas a land-route is of reverse nature.

Of water-routes, one along the shore and another in mid-ocean, the route along, and close to the shore is better, as it touches at many trading port-towns; likewise river navigation is better, as it is uninterrupted and is of avoidable or endurable dangers.

My teacher says that of land-routes, that which leads to the Himalayas is better than that which leads to the south.

Not so, says Kautilya, for with the exception of blankets, skins, and horses, other articles of merchandise such as, conch-shells, diamonds, precious stones, pearls and gold are available in plenty in the south.

Of routes leading to the south, either that trade-route which traverses a large number of mines which is frequented by people, and which is less expensive or troublesome, or that route by taking which plenty of merchandise of various kinds can be obtained is better.

This explains the selection of trade-routes leading either to the east or to the west.

Of a cart-track and a foot-path, a cart-track is better as it affords facilities for preparations on a large scale.

Routes that can be traversed by asses or camels, irrespective of countries and seasons are also good.

This explains the selection of trade-routes traversed by men alone (amsa-patha, shoulder-path, i.e., a path traversed by men carrying merchandise on their shoulders).

* It is a loss for the conqueror to undertake that kind of work which is productive of benefits to the enemy, while a work of reverse nature is a gain. When the benefits are equal, the conqueror has to consider that his condition is stagnant.

* Likewise it is a loss to undertake a work of less out-put and of a greater outlay, while a work of reverse nature is a gain. If the out-put and outlay of a work are at par, the conqueror has to consider that his condition is stagnant.

* Hence the conqueror should find out such fort-building and other works as, instead of being expensive, are productive of greater profit and power. Such is the nature of agreements for undertaking works.

[Thus ends Chapter XII, "Agreement for Undertaking a Work," in the section of "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Friend, Gold, or Land and Agreement for Undertaking a Work"' in Book VIII, "The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and tenth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XIII. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT AN ENEMY IN THE REAR.

WHEN the conqueror and his enemy simultaneously proceeded to capture the rear of their respective enemies who are engaged in an attack against others, he who captures the rear of one who is possessed of vast resources gains more advantages (atisandhatte); for one who is possessed of vast resources has to put down the rear-enemy only after doing away with one's frontal enemy already attacked, but not one who is poor in resources and who has not realised the desired profits.

Resources being equal, he who captures the rear of one who has made vast preparations gains more advantages for one who has made vast preparations has to put down the enemy in the rear only after destroying the frontal enemy, but not one whose preparations are made on a small scale and whose movements are, therefore, obstructed by the Circle of States.

Preparations being equal, he who captures the rear of one who has marched out with all the resources gains more advantages; for one whose base is undefended is easy to be subdued, but not one who has marched out with a part of the army after having made arrangements to defend the rear.

Troops taken being of equal strength, he who captures the rear of one who has gone against a wandering enemy gains more advantages; for one who has marched out against a wandering enemy has to put down the rear-enemy only after obtaining an easy victory over the wandering enemy; but not one who has marched out against an entrenched enemy, for one who has marched out against an entrenched enemy will be repelled in his attack against the enemy's forts and will, after his return, find himself between the rear-enemy, and the frontal enemy who is possessed of strong forts.

This explains the cases of other enemies described before.

Enemies being of equal description, he who attacks the rear of one who has gone against a virtuous king gains more advantages, for one who has gone against a virtuous king will incur the displeasure of even his own people, whereas one who has attacked a wicked king will endear himself to all.

This explains the consequences of capturing the rear of those who have marched against an extravagant king or a king living from hand to mouth, or a niggardly king.

The same reasons hold good in the case of those who have marched against their own friends.

When there are two enemies, one engaged in attacking a friend and another an enemy, he who attacks the rear of the latter gains more advantages: for one who has attacked a friend will, after easily making peace with the friend, proceed against the rear-enemy; for it is easier to make peace with a friend than with an enemy.

When there are two kings, one engaged in destroying a friend, and another an enemy, he who attacks the rear of the former gains more advantages; for one who is engaged in destroying an enemy will have the support of his friends and will thereby put down the rear-enemy, but not the former who is engaged in destroying his own side.

When the conqueror and his enemy in their attack against the rear of an enemy mean to enforce the payment of what is not due to them, he whose enemy has lost considerable profits and has sustained a great loss of men and money gains more advantages; when they mean to enforce the payment of what is due to them, then he whose enemy has lost profits and army, gains more advantages.

When the assailable enemy is capable of retaliation and when the assailant's rear-enemy, capable of augmenting his army and other resources, has entrenched himself on one of the assailant's flanks, then the rear-enemy gains more advantages; for a rear enemy on one of the assailant's flanks will not only become a friend of the assailable enemy, but also attack the base of the assailant, whereas a rear-enemy behind the assailant can only harass the rear.

* Kings, capable of harassing the rear of an enemy and of obstructing his movements are three: the group of kings situated behind the enemy, and the group of kings on his flanks.

* He who is situated between a conqueror and his enemy is called an antardhi (one between two kings); when such a king is possessed of forts, wild tribes, and other kinds of help, he proves an impediment in the way of the strong.

When the conqueror and his enemy are desirous of catching hold of a madhyama king and attack the latter's rear, then he who in his attempt to enforce the promised payment separates the madhyama king from the latter's friend and obtains, thereby, an enemy as a friend, gains more advantages; for an enemy compelled to sue for peace will be of greater help than a friend compelled to maintain the abandoned friendship.

This explains the attempt to catch hold of a neutral king.

Of attacks from the rear and front, that which affords opportunities of carrying on a treacherous fight (mantrayuddha) is preferable.

My teacher says that in an open war, both sides suffer by sustaining a heavy loss of men and money; and that even the king who wins a victory will appear as defeated in consequence of the loss of men and money.

No, says Kautilya, even at considerable loss of men and money, the destruction of an enemy is desirable.

Loss of men and money being equal, he who entirely destroys first his frontal enemy, and next attacks his rear-enemy gains more advantages; when both the conqueror and his enemy are severally engaged in destroying their respective frontal enemies, he who destroys a frontal enemy of deep rooted enmity and of vast resources, gains more advantages.

This explains the destruction of other enemies and wild tribes:

* When an enemy in the rear and in the front, and an assailable enemy to be marched against happen together then the conqueror should adopt the following policy:--

* The rear-enemy will usually lead the conqueror's frontal enemy to attack the conqueror's friend; then having set the ákranda (the enemy of the rear-enemy) against the rear-enemy's ally,

* and, having caused war between them, the conqueror should frustrate the rear-enemy's designs; likewise he should provoke hostilities between, the allies of the ákranda and of the rear-enemy;

* he should also keep his frontal enemy's friend engaged in war with his own friend; and with the help of his friend's friend, he should avert the attack, threatened by the friend of his enemy's friend;

* he should, with his friend's help, hold his rear-enemy at bay; and with the help of his friend's friend, he should prevent his rear-enemy attacking the ákranda (his rear-ally);

* thus the conqueror should, through the aid of his friends, bring the Circle of States under his own sway both in his rear and front;

* he should send messengers and spies to reside in each of the states composing the Circle and having again and again destroyed the strength of his enemies he should keep his counsels concealed, being friendly with his friends;

* the works of him whose counsels are not kept concealed, will, though they may prosper for a time, perish as undoubtedly as a broken raft on the sea.

[Thus ends Chapter XIII, "Considerations about an Enemy in the Rear," in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and eleventh chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XIV. RECRUITMENT OF LOST POWER.

WHEN the conqueror is thus attacked by the combined army of his enemies, he may tell their leader: "I shall make peace with you; this is the gold, and I am the friend; your gain is doubled; it is not worthy of you to augment at your own expense the power of your enemies who keep a friendly appearance now; for gaining in power, they will put you down in the long run."

Or he may tell the leader so as to break the combination: "Just as an innocent person like myself is now attacked by the combined army of these kings, so the very same kings in combination will attack you in weal or woe; for power intoxicates the mind; hence break their combination."

The combination being broken, he may set the leader against the weak among his enemies; or offering inducements, he may set the combined power of the weak against the leader; or in whatever way be may find it to be conducive to his own prosperity, in that way he may make the leader incur the displeasure of others, and thus frustrate their attempts; or showing the prospect of a larger profit, he may through intrigue, make peace with their leader. Then the recipients of salaries from two states, exhibiting the acquisition of large profits (to the leader), may satirise the kings, saying, "You are all very well combined."

If some of the kings of the combination are wicked, they may be made to break the treaty; then the recipients of salaries from two states may again tell them so as to break the combination entirely: "This is just what we have already pointed out."

When the enemies are separated, the conqueror may move forward by catching hold of any of the kings (as an ally).

In the absence of a leader, the conqueror may win him over who is the inciter of the combination; or who is of a resolute mind, or who has endeared himself to his people, or who, from greed or fear, joined the combination, or who is afraid of the conqueror, or whose friendship with the conqueror is based upon some consanguinity of royalty, or who is a friend, or who is a wandering enemy,--in the order of enumeration.

Of these, one has to please the inciter by surrendering oneself; by conciliation and salutation; him who is of a resolute mind; by giving a daughter in marriage or by availing oneself of his youth (to beget a son on one's wife?); him who is the beloved of his people, by giving twice the amount of profits; him who is greedy, by helping with men and money; him who is afraid of the combination, by giving a hostage to him who is naturally timid; by entering into a closer union with him whose friendship is based upon some consanguinity of royalty; by doing what is pleasing and beneficial to both or by abandoning hostilities against him who is a friend; and by offering help and abandoning hostilities against him who is a wandering enemy; one has to win over the confidence of any of the above kings by adopting suitable means or by means of conciliation, gifts, dissension, or threats, as will be explained under "Troubles."

He who is in troubles and is apprehensive of an attack from his enemy, should, on the condition of supplying the enemy with army and money, make peace with the enemy on definite terms with reference to place, time, and work; he should also set right any offence he might have given by the violation of a treaty; if he has no supporters, he should find them among his relatives and friends; or he may build an impregnable fortress, for he who is defended by forts and friends will be respected both by his own and his enemy's people.

Whoever is wanting in the power of deliberation should collect wise men around himself, and associate with old men of considerable learning; thus he would attain his desired ends.

He who is devoid of a good treasury and army should direct his attention towards the strengthening of the safety and security of the elements of his sovereignty; for the country is the source of all those works which are conducive to treasury and army; the haven of the king and of his army is a strong fort.

Irrigational works (setubandha) are the source of crops; the results of a good shower of rain are ever attained in the case of crops below irrigational works.

The roads of traffic are a means to overreach an enemy; for it is through the roads of traffic that armies and spies are led (from one country to another); and that weapons, armour, chariots, and draught-animals are purchased; and that entrance and exit (in travelling) are facilitated.

Mines are the source of whatever is useful in battle.

Timber-forests are the source of such materials as are necessary for building forts, conveyances and chariots.

Elephant-forests are the source of elephants.

Pasture-lands are the source of cows, horses, and camels to draw chariots.

In the absence of such sources of his own, he should acquire them from some one among his relatives and friends. If he is destitute of an army, he should, as far as possible, attract to himself the brave men of corporations, of thieves, of wild tribes, of Mlechchhas, and of spies who are capable of inflicting injuries upon enemies.

He should also adopt the policy of a weak king towards powerful king in view of averting danger from enemies or friends.

* Thus with the aid of one's own party, the power of deliberation, the treasury, and the army, one should get rid of the clutches of one's enemies.

[Thus ends Chapter XIV, “Recruitment of Lost Power,” in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and twelfth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XV. MEASURES CONDUCIVE TO PEACE WITH A STRONG AND PROVOKED ENEMY; AND THE ATTITUDE OF A CONQUERED ENEMY.

WHEN a weak king is attacked by a powerful enemy, the former should seek the protection of one who is superior to his enemy and whom his enemy's power of deliberation for intrigue cannot affect. Of kings who are equal in the power of deliberation, difference should be sought in unchangeable prosperity and in association with the aged.

In the absence of a superior king, he should combine with a number of his equals who are equal in power to his enemy and whom his enemy's power of purse, army, and intrigue cannot reach. Of kings who are equally possessed of the power of purse, army, and intrigue, difference should be sought in their capacity for making vast preparations.

In the absence of equals, he should combine with a number of inferior kings who are pure and enthusiastic, who can oppose the enemy, and whom his enemy's power of purse, army, and intrigue cannot react. Of kings who are equally possessed of enthusiasm and capacity for action, a difference should be sought in the opportunity of securing favourable battle fields. Of kings who are equally possessed of favourable battle fields, difference should be sought in their ever being ready for war. Of kings who are equal possessed of favourable battlefields and who are equally ready for war, difference should be sought in their possession of weapons and armour necessary for war.

In the absence of any such help, he should seek shelter inside a fort in which his enemy with a large army can offer no obstruction to the supply of food-stuff, grass, firewood and water, but would sustain a heavy loss of men and money. When there are many forts, difference should be sought in their affording facility for the collection of stores and supplies. Kautilya is of opinion that one should entrench oneself in a fort inhabited by men and provided with stores and supplies. Also for the following reasons, one should shelter oneself in such a fort:--

"I shall oppose him (the enemy) with his rear-enemy's ally or with a madhyama king, or with a neutral king; I shall either capture or devastate his kingdom with the aid of a neighbouring king, a wild tribe, a scion of his family, or an imprisoned prince; by the help of my partisans with him, I shall create troubles in his fort, country or camp; when he is near, I shall murder him with weapons, fire, or poison, or any other secret means at my pleasure; I shall, cause him to sustain a heavy loss of men and money in works undertaken by himself or made to be undertaken at the instance of my spies; I shall easily sow the seeds of dissension among his friends or his army when they have suffered from loss of men and money; I shall catch hold of his camp by cutting off supplies and stores going to it; or by surrendering myself (to him), I shall create some weak points in him and put him down with all my resources; or having curbed his spirit, I shall compel him to make peace with me on my own terms; when I obstruct his movements troubles arise to him from all sides; when he is helpless, I shall slay him with the help of my hereditary army or with his enemy's army; or with wild tribes; I shall maintain the safety and security of my vast country by entrenching myself within my fort; the army of myself and of my friends will be invincible when collected together in this fort; my army which is trained to fight from valleys, pits, or at night, will bring him into difficulties on his way, when he is engaged in an immediate work; owing to loss of men and money, he will make himself powerless when he arrives here at a bad place and in a bad time; owing to the existence of forts and of wild tribes (on the way), he will find this country accessible only at considerable cost of men and money; being unable to find positions favourable for the exercise of the armies of himself and of his friends, suffering from disease, he will arrive here in distress; or having arrived here, he will not return."

In the absence of such circumstances, or when the enemy's army is very strong, one may run away abandoning one's fort.

My teacher says that one may rush against the enemy like a moth against a flame; success in one way or other (i.e., death or victory) is certain for one who is reckless of life.

No, says Kautilya, having observed the conditions conducive to peace between himself and his enemy, he may make peace; in the absence of such conditions, he may, by taking recourse to threats secure peace or a friend; or he may send a messenger to one who is likely to accept peace; or having pleased with wealth and honour the messenger sent by his enemy, he may tell the latter: "This is the king's manufactory; this is the residence of the queen and the princes; myself and this kingdom are at your disposal, as approved of by the queen and the princes."

Having secured his enemy's protection, he should behave himself like a servant to his master by serving the protector's occasional needs. Forts and other defensive works, acquisition of things, celebration of marriages, installation of the heir-apparent, commercial undertakings, capture of elephants, construction of covert places for battle (sattra), marching against an enemy, and holding sports,--all these he should undertake only at the permission of his protector. He should also obtain his protector's permission before making any agreement with people settled in his country or before punishing those who may run away from his country. If the citizens and country people living in his kingdom prove disloyal or inimical to him, he may request of his protector another good country; or he may get rid of wicked people by making use of such secret means as are employed against traitors. He should not accept the offer of a good country even from a friend. Unknown his protector, he may see the protector's minister, high priest, commander of the army or heir-apparent. He should also help his protector as much as he can. On all occasions of worshipping gods and of making prayers, be should cause his people to pray for the long life of his protector; and he should always proclaim his readiness to place himself at the disposal of his protector.

* Serving him who is strong and combined with others and being far away from the society of suspected persons, a conquered king should thus always behave himself towards his protector.

[Thus ends Chapter XV, “Measures Conducive to Peace with a Strong and Provoked Enemy and the Attitude of a Conquered Enemy,” in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and thirteenth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XVI. THE ATTITUDE OF A CONQUERED KING.

IN view of causing financial trouble to his protector, a powerful vassal king, desirous of making conquests, may, under the permission of his protector, march on countries where the formation of the ground and the climate are favourable for the manœuvre of his army, his enemy having neither forts, nor any other defensive works, and the conqueror himself having no enemies in the rear. Otherwise (in case of enemies in the rear), he should march after making provisions for the defence of his rear.

By means of conciliation and gifts, he should subdue weak kings; and by means of sowing the seeds of dissension and by threats, strong kings. By adopting a particular, or an alternative, or all of the strategic means, he should subdue his immediate and distant enemies.

He should observe the policy of conciliation by promising the protection of villages, of those who live in forests, of flocks of cattle, and of the roads of traffic as well as the restoration of those who have been banished or who have run away or who have done some harm.

Gifts of land, of things, and of girls in marriage and absence of fear,--by declaring these, he should observe the policy of gifts.

By instigating any one of a neighbouring king, a wild chief, a scion of the enemy's family, or an imprisoned prince, he should sow the seeds of dissension.

By capturing the enemy in an open battle, or in a treacherous fight, or through a conspiracy, or in the tumult of seizing the enemy's fort by strategic means, he should punish the enemy.

He may reinstate kings who are spirited and who can strengthen his army; likewise he may reinstate those who are possessed of a good treasury and army and who can therefore help him with money; as well as those who are wise and who can therefore provide him with lands.

Whoever among his friends helps him with gems, precious things, raw materials acquired from commercial towns, villages, and mines, or with conveyances and draught-animals acquired from timber and elephant-forests, and herds of cattle, is a friend affording a variety of enjoyment (chitrabhoga); whoever supplies him with wealth and army is a friend affording vast enjoyment (mahábhoga); whoever supplies him with army, wealth, and lands is a friend affording all enjoyments (sarvabhoga); whoever safeguards him against a side-enemy is a friend affording enjoyments on one side (ekatobhogi); whoever helps also his enemy and his enemy's allies is a friend affording enjoyment to both sides (ubhayatobhogi); and whoever helps him against his enemy, his enemy's ally, his neighbour, and wild tribes is a friend affording enjoyment on all sides (sarvatobogi).

If he happens to have an enemy in the rear, or a wild chief, or an enemy, or a chief enemy capable of being propitiated with the gift of lands, he should provide such an enemy with a useless piece of land,; an enemy possessed of forts with a piece of land not connected with his (conqueror's) own territory; a wild chief with a piece of land yielding no livelihood; a scion of the enemy's family with a piece of land that can be taken back; an enemy's prisoner with a piece of land which is (not?) snatched from the enemy; a corporation of armed men with a piece of land, constantly under troubles from an enemy; the combination of corporations with a piece of land close to the territory of a powerful king; a corporation invincible in war with a piece of land under both the above troubles; a spirited king desirous of war with a piece of land which affords no advantageous positions for the manœuvre of the army; an enemy's partisan with waste lands; a banished prince with a piece of land exhausted of its resources; a king who has renewed the observance of a treaty of peace after breaking it, with a piece of land which can be colonized at considerable cost of men and money; a deserted prince with a piece of land which affords no protection, and his own protector with an uninhabitable piece of land.

(The king who is desirous of making conquests) should continue in following the same policy towards him, who, among the above kings, is most helpful and keeps the same attitude; should by secret means bring him round who is opposed; should favour the helpful with facilities for giving further help, besides bestowing rewards and honour at all costs upon him; should give relief to him who is under troubles; should receive visitors at their own choice and afford satisfaction to them; should avoid using contemptuous, threatening, defamatory, or harsh words towards them; should like a father protect those who are promised security from fear; should punish the guilty after publishing their guilt; and in order to avoid causing suspicion to the protector, the vassal-king should adopt the procedure of inflicting secret punishments upon offenders.

He should never covet the land, things, and sons and wives of the king slain by him; he should reinstate in their own estates the relatives of the kings slain. He should install in the kingdom the heir-apparent of the king who has died while working (with the conqueror); all conquered kings will, if thus treated, loyally follow the sons and grandsons of the conqueror.

Whoever covets the lands, things, sons, and wives of the kings whom he has either slain or bound in chains will cause provocation to the Circle of States and make it rise against himself; also his own ministers employed in his own territory will be provoked and will seek shelter under the circle of states, having an eye upon his life and kingdom.

* Hence conquered kings preserved in their own lands in accordance with the policy of conciliation will be loyal to the conqueror and follow his sons and grandsons.

[Thus ends Chapter XVI, "The Attitude of a Conquered King," in Book VII, "The End of the Six-fold Policy,” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and fourteenth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XVII. MAKING PEACE AND BREAKING IT.

THE words sama (quiet), sandhi (agreement of peace), and samádhi (reconcilement), are synonymous. That which is conducive to mutual faith among kings is termed sama, sandhi, or samádhi.

My teacher says that peace, depended upon honesty or oath, is mutable, while peace with a security or an hostage is immutable.

No, says Kautilya, peace, dependent upon honesty or oath is immutable both in this and the next world. It is for this world only that a security or an hostage is required for strengthening the agreement.

Honest kings of old made their agreement of peace with this declaration: "We have joined in peace."

In case of any apprehension of breach of honesty, they made their agreement by swearing by fire, water, plough, the brick of a fort-wall, the shoulder of an elephant, the hips of a horse, the front of a chariot, a weapon, seeds, scents, juice (rasa), wrought gold (suvarna), or bullion gold (hiranya), and by declaring that these things will destroy and desert him who violates the oath.

In order to avoid the contingency of violation of oath, peace made with the security of such persons as ascetics engaged in penance, or nobles is peace with a security. In such a peace, whoever takes as security a person capable of controlling the enemy gains more advantages, while he who acts to the contrary is deceived.

In peace made with children as hostages, and in the case of giving a princess or a prince as an hostage, whoever gives a princess gains advantages; for a princess, when taken as an hostage, causes troubles to the receiver, while a prince is of reverse nature.

With regard to two sons, whoever hands over a highborn, brave and wise son, trained in military art, or an only son is deceived, while he who acts otherwise gains advantages. It is better to give a base-born son as an hostage than a high-born one, inasmuch as the former has neither heirship nor the right to beget heirs; it is better to give a stupid son than a wise one, inasmuch as the former is destitute of the power of deliberation; better to give a timid son than a brave one, inasmuch as the former is destitute of martial spirit; better, a son who is not trained in military art than one who is trained, inasmuch as the former is devoid of the capacity for striking an enemy; and better one of many sons than an only son, since many sons are not wanted.

With regard to a high-born and a wise son, people will continue to be loyal to a high-born son though he is not wise; a wise son, though base-born, is characterized with capacity to consider state matters; but so far as capacity to consider state matters is concerned, a. high-born prince associating himself with the aged, has more advantages than a wise but base-born prince.

With regard to a wise and a brave prince, a wise prince, though timid, is characterized with capacity for intellectual works; and a brave prince though not wise, possesses warlike spirit. So far as warlike spirit is concerned, a wise prince overreaches a brave one just as a hunter does an elephant.

With regard to a brave and a trained prince, a brave prince, though untrained, is characterized with capacity for war; and a trained prince, though timid, is capable of hitting objects aright. Notwithstanding the capacity for hitting objects aright, a brave prince excels a trained prince in determination and firm adherence to his policy.

With regard to a king having many sons and another an only son, the former, giving one of his sons as a hostage and being contented with the rest, is able to break the peace but not the latter.

When peace is made by handing over the whole lot of sons, advantage is to be sought in capacity to beget additional sons; capacity to beget additional sons being common, he who can beget able sons will have more advantages than another king (who is not so fortunate); capacity to beget able sons being common, he by whom the birth of a son is early expected will have more advantages than another (who is not so fortunate).

In the case of an only son who is also brave, he who has lost capacity to beget any more sons should surrender himself as an hostage, but not the only son.

Whoever is rising in power may break the agreement of peace. Carpenters, artisans, and other spies, attending upon the prince (kept as an hostage) and doing work under the enemy, may take away the prince at night through an underground tunnel dug for the purpose. Dancers, actors, singers, players on musical instruments, buffoons, court-bards, swimmers, and saubhikas (?), previously set about the enemy, may continue under his service and may indirectly serve the prince. They should have the privilege of entering into, staying in and going out of, the palace at any time without rule. The prince may therefore get out at night disguised as any one of the above spies.

This explains the work of prostitutes and other women spies under the garb of wives; the prince may get out, carrying their pipes, utensils, or vessels.

Or the prince may be removed concealed under things, clothes, commodities, vessels, beds, seats and other articles by cooks, confectioners, servants employed to serve the king while bathing, servants employed for carrying conveyances, for spreading the bed, toilet-making, dressing, and procuring water; or taking something in pitch dark, he may get out, disguised as a servant.

Or he may (pretend to) be in communion with god Varuna in a reservoir (which is seen) through a tunnel or to which he is taken at night; spies under the guise of traders dealing in cooked rice and fruits may (poison those things and) distribute among the sentinels.

Or having served the sentinels with cooked rice and beverage mixed with the juice of madana plant on occasions of making offerings to gods or of performing an ancestral ceremony or some sacrificial rite, the prince may get out; or by bribing the sentinels; or spies disguised as a nágaraka (officer in charge of the city), a court-bard, or a physician may set fire to a building filled with valuable articles; or sentinels or spies disguised as merchants may set fire to the store of commercial articles; or in view of avoiding the fear of pursuit, the prince may, after putting some human body in the house occupied by him, set fire to it and escape by breaking open some house-joints, or a window, or through a tunnel; or having disguised himself as a carrier of glass-beads, pots, and other commodities, he may set out at night; or having entered the residence of ascetics with shaven heads or with twisted hair, he may set out at night, disguised as any one of them; or having disguised himself as one suffering from a peculiar disease or as a forest-man, he may get out; or spies may carry him away as a corpse; or disguised as a widowed wife, be may follow a corpse that is being carried away. Spies disguised as forest-people, should mislead the pursuers of the prince by pointing out another direction, and the prince himself may take a different direction.

Or he may escape, hiding himself in the midst of carts of cart-drivers; if he is closely followed, he may lead the pursuers to an ambuscade (sattra); in the absence of an ambuscade he may leave here and there gold or morsels of poisoned food on both sides of a road and take a different road.

If he is captured, he should try to win over the pursuers by conciliation and other means, or serve them with poisoned food; and having caused another body to be put in a sacrifice performed to please god Varuna or in a fire that has broken out (the prince's father), may accuse the enemy of the murder of his son and attack the enemy.

* Or taking out a concealed sword, and falling upon the sentinels, he may quickly run away together with the spies concealed before.

[Thus ends Chapter XVII, “Making Peace and Breaking It,” in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and fifteenth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER XVIII. THE CONDUCT OF A MADHYAMA KING, A NEUTRAL KING, AND OF A CIRCLE OF STATES.

THE third and the fifth states from a madhyama king are states friendly to him; while the second, the fourth, and the sixth are unfriendly. If the madhyama king shows favour to both of these states, the conqueror should be friendly with him; if he does not favour them, the conqueror should be friendly with those states.

If the madhyama king is desirous of securing the friendship of the conqueor's would-be friend, then having set his own and his friend's friends against the madhyama, and having separated the madhyama from the latter's friends, the conqueror should preserve his own friend; or the conqueror may incite the Circle of States against the madhyama by telling them; "this madhyama king has grown haughty, and is aiming at our destruction: let us therefore combine and interrupt his march."

If the Circle of States is favourable to his cause, then he may aggrandise himself by putting down the madhyama; if not favourable, then having helped his friend with men and money, he should, by means of conciliation and gifts, win over either the leader or a neigbbouring king among the kings who hate the madhyama, or who have been living with mutual support, or who will follow the one that is won over (by the conqueror), or who do not rise owing to mutual suspicion; thus by winning over a second (king), he should double his own power; by securing a third, he should treble his own power; thus gaining in strength, he should put down the madhyama king.

When place and time are found unsuitable for success in the above attempt, he should, by peace, seek the friendship of one of the enemies of the madhyama king, or cause some traitors to combine against the madhyama; if the madhyama king is desirous of reducing the conqueror's friend, the conqueror should prevent it, and tell the friend: "I shall protect you as long as you are weak," and should accordingly protect him when he is poor in resources; if the madhyama king desires to rout out a friend of the conqueror, the latter should protect him in his difficulties; or having removed him from the fear of the madhyama king, the conqueror should provide him with new lands and keep him under his (the conqueror's) protection, lest he might go elsewhere.

If, among the conqueror's friends who are either reducible or assailable enemies of the madhyama king, some undertake to help the madhyama, then the conqueror should make peace with a third king; and if among the madhyama king's friends who are either reducible or assailable enemies of the conqueror, some are capable of offence and defence and become friendly to the conqueror, then he should make peace with them; thus the conqueror cannot only attain his own ends, but also please the madhyama king.

If the madhyama king is desirous of securing a would-be friend of the conqueror as a friend, then the conqueror may make peace with another king, or prevent the friend from going to the madhyama, telling him: "It is unworthy of you to forsake a friend who is desirous of your friendship," or the conqueror may keep quiet, if the conqueror thinks that the Circle of States would be enraged against the friend for deserting his own party. If the madhyama king is desirous of securing the conqueror's enemy as his friend, then the conqueror should indirectly (i.e., without being known to the madhyama) help the enemy with wealth and army.

If the madhyama king desires to win the neutral king, the conqueror should sow the seeds of dissension between them. Whoever of the madhyama and the neutral kings is esteemed by the Circle of States, his protection should the conqueror seek.

The conduct of the madhyama king explains that of the neutral king. If the neutral king is desirous of combining with the madhyama king, then the conqueror should so attempt as to frustrate the desire of the neutral king to overreach an enemy or to help a friend or to secure the services of the army of another neutral king. Having thus strengthened himself, the conqueror should reduce his enemies and help his friends, though their position is inimical towards him.

Those who may be inimical to the conqueror are a king who is of wicked character and who is therefore always harmful, a rear-enemy in combination with a frontal enemy, a reducible enemy under troubles, and one who is watching the troubles of the conqueror to invade him.

Those who may be friendly with the conqueror are one who marches with him with the same end in view, one who marches with him with a different end in view, one who wants to combine with the conqueror to march (against a common enemy), one who marches under an agreement for peace, one who marches with a set purpose of, his own, one who rises along with others, one who is ready to purchase or to sell either the army or the treasury, and one who adopts the double policy (i.e., making peace with one and waging war with another).

Those neighbouring kings who can be servants to the conqueror are a neighbouring king under the apprehension of an attack from a powerful king, one who is situated between the conqueror and his enemy, the rear-enemy of a powerful king, one who has voluntarily surrendered one-self to the conqueror, one who has surrendered oneself under fear, and one who has been subdued. The same is the case with those kings who are next to the territory of the immediate enemies of the conqueror.

* Of these kings, the conqueror should, as far as possible, help that friend who has the same end in view as the conqueror in his conflict with the enemy, and thus hold the enemy at bay.

* When, after having put down the enemy, and after having grown in power, a friend becomes unsubmissive, the conqueror should cause the friend to incur the displeasure of a neighbour and of the king who is next to the neighbour.

* Or the conqueror may employ a scion of the friend's family or an imprisoned prince to seize his lands; or the conqueror may so act that his friend, desirous of further help, may continue to be obedient.

* The conqueror should never help his friend when the latter is more and more deteriorating; a politician should so keep his friend that the latter neither deteriorates nor grows in power.

* When, with the desire of getting wealth, a wandering friend (i.e., a nomadic king) makes an agreement with the conqueror, the latter should so remove the cause of the friend's flight that he never flies again.

* When a friend is as accessible to the conqueror as to the latter's enemy, the conqueror should first separate that obstinate friend from the enemy, and then destroy him, and afterwards the enemy also.

* When a friend remains neutral, the conqueror should cause him to incur the displeasure of his immediate enemies; and when he is worried in his wars with them, the conqueror should oblige him with help.

* When, owing to his own weakness, a friend seeks protection both from the conqueror and the latter's enemy, the conqueror should help him with the army, so that he never turns his attention elsewhere.

* Or having, removed him from his own lands, the conqueror may keep him in another tract of land, having made some previous arrangements to punish or favour the friend.

* Or the conqueror may harm him when he has grown powerful, or destroy him when he does nut help the conqueror in danger and when he lies on the conqueror's lap in good faith.

* When an enemy furiously rises against his own enemy (i.e., the conqueror's friend) under troubles, the former should be put down by the latter himself with troubles concealed.

* When a friend keeps quiet after rising against an enemy under troubles, that friend will be subdued by the enemy himself after getting rid of his troubles.

* Whoever is acquainted with the science of polity should clearly observe the conditions of progress, deterioration, stagnation, reduction, and destruction, as well as the use of all kinds of strategic means.

* Whoever thus knows the interdependence of the six kinds of policy plays at his pleasure with kings, bound round, as it were, in chains skillfully devised by himself.

[Thus ends Chapter XVIII, "The Conduct of a Madhyama King, a Neutral King and of a Circle of States," in Book VII, "The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and sixteenth chapter from the beginning. With this ends the seventh Book “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya.]

[admin]

Kautilya's Arthasastra: Book VIII, "Concerning Vices and Calamities"

CHAPTER I. THE AGGREGATE OF THE CALAMITIES OF THE ELEMENTS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

WHEN calamities happen together, the form of consideration should be whether it is easier to take an offensive or defensive attitude. National calamities, coming from Providence or from man happen from one's misfortune or bad policy. The word vyasana (vices or calamities), means the reverse or absence of virtue, the preponderance of vices, and occasional troubles. That which deprives (vyasyati) a person of his happiness is termed vyasana (vices or calamities).

My teacher says that of the calamities, viz., the king in distress, the minister in distress, the people in distress, distress due to bad fortifications, financial distress, the army in distress, and an ally in distress,--that which is first mentioned is more serious than the one, coming later in the order of enumeration.

No, says Bháradvája, of the distress of the king and of his minister, ministerial distress is more serious; deliberations in council, the attainment of results as anticipated while deliberating in council, the accomplishment of works, the business of revenue-collection and its expenditure, recruiting the army, the driving out of the enemy and of wild tribes, the protection of the kingdom, taking remedial measures against calamities, the protection of the heir-apparent, and the installation of princes constitute the duties of ministers. In the absence of ministers; the above works are ill-done; and like a bird, deprived of its feathers, the king loses his active capacity. In such calamities, the intrigues of the enemy find a ready scope. In ministerial distress, the king's life itself comes into danger, for a minister is the mainstay of the security of the king's life.

No, says Kautilya, it is verily the king who attends to the business of appointing ministers, priests, and other servants, including the superintendents of several departments, the application of remedies against the troubles of his people, and of his kingdom, and the adoption of progressive measures; when his ministers fall into troubles, he employs others; he is ever ready to bestow rewards on the worthy and inflict punishments on the wicked; when the king is well off, by his welfare and prosperity, he pleases the people; of what kind the king's character is, of the same kind will be the character of his people; for their progress or downfall, the people depend upon the king; the king is, as it were, the aggregate of the people.

Visáláksha says that of the troubles of the minister and of the people; the troubles of the people are more serious; finance, army, raw products, free labour, carriage of things, and collection (of necessaries) are all secured from the people. There will be no such things in the absence of people, next to the king and his minister.

No, says Kautilya, all activities proceed from the minister, activities such as the successful accomplishment of the works of the people, security of person and property from internal and external enemies, remedial measures against calamities, colonization and improvement of wild tracts of land, recruiting the army, collection of revenue, and bestowal of favour.

The school of Parásara say that of the distress of the people and distress due to bad fortifications, the latter is a more serious evil; for it is in fortified towns that the treasury and the army are secured; they (fortified towns) are a secure place for the people; they are a stronger power than the citizens or country people; and they are a powerful defensive instrument in times of danger for the king. As to the people, they are common both to the king and his enemy.

No, says Kautilya, for forts, finance, and the army depend upon the people; likewise buildings, trade, agricu1ture, cattle-rearing, bravery, stability, power, and abundance (of things). In countries inhabited by people, there are mountains and islands (as natural forts); in the absence of an expansive country, forts are resorted to. When a country consists purely of cultivators, troubles due to the absence of fortifications (are apparent); while in a country which consists purely of warlike people, troubles that may appear are due to the absence of (an expansive and cultivated) territory.

Pisuna says that of the troubles due to the absence of forts and to want of finance, troubles due to want of finance are more serious; the repair of fortifications and their maintenance depend upon finance; by means of wealth, intrigue to capture an enemy's fort may be carried on; by means of wealth, the people, friends, and enemies can be kept under control; by means of it, outsiders can be encouraged and the establishment of the army and its operations conducted. It is possible to remove the treasure in times of danger, but not the fort.

No, says Kautilya, for it is in the fort that the treasury and the army are safely kept, and it is from the fort that secret war (intrigue), control over one's partisans, the upkeep of the army, the reception of allies and the driving out of enemies and of wild tribes are successfully practised. In the absence of forts, the treasury is to the enemy, for it seems that for those who own forts, there is no destruction.

Kaunapadanta says that of distress due to want of finance or to an inefficient army, that which is due to the want of an efficient army is more serious; for control over one's own friends and enemies, the winning over the army of an enemy, and the business of administration are all dependent upon the army. In the absence of the army, it is certain that the treasury will be lost, whereas lack of finance can be made up by procuring raw products and lands or by seizing an enemy's territory.

The army may go to the enemy, or murder the king himself, and bring about all kinds of troubles. But finance is the chief means of observing virtuous acts and of enjoying desires. Owing to a change in place, time, and policy, either finance or the army may be a superior power; for the army is (sometimes) the means of securing the wealth acquired; but wealth is (always) the means of securing both the treasury and the army. Since all activities are dependent upon finance, financial troubles are more serious.

Vátavyádhi says that of the distress of the army and of an ally, the distress of an ally is more serious--an ally, though he is not fed and is far off, is still serviceable; he drives off not only the rear-enemy and the friends of the rear-enemy, but also the frontal enemy and wild tribes; he also helps his friend with money, army, and lands on occasions of troubles.

No, says Kautilya, the ally of him who has a powerful army keeps the alliance; and even the enemy assumes a friendly attitude; when there is a work that can be equally accomplished either by the army or by an ally, then preference to the army or to the ally should depend on the advantages of securing the appropriate place and time for war and the expected profit. In times of sudden expedition and on occasions of troubles from an enemy, a wild tribe, or local rebels, no friend can be trusted. When calamities happen together, or when an enemy has grown strong, a friend keeps up his friendship as long as money is forthcoming. Thus the determination of the comparative seriousness of the calamities of the various elements of sovereignty.

* When a part of one of the elements of sovereignty is under troubles, the extent, affection, and strength of the serviceable part can be the means of accomplishing a work.

* When any two elements of sovereignty are equally under troubles, they should be distinguished in respect of their progressive or declining tendency, provided that the good condition of the rest of the elements needs no description.

* When the calamities of a single element tend to destroy the rest of the elements, those calamities, whether they be of the fundamental or any other element, are verily serious.

[Thus ends Chapter I, “The Aggregate of the Calamities of the Elements of Sovereignty,” in Book VIII, “Concerning Vices and Calamities” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and seventeenth chapter from the beginning.]

[admin]

CHAPTER II. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE TROUBLES OF THE KING AND OF HIS KINGDOM.

THE king and his kingdom are the primary elements of the state.

The troubles of the king may be either internal or external. Internal troubles are more serious than external troubles which are like the danger arising from a lurking snake. Troubles due to a minister are more serious than other kinds of internal troubles. Hence, the king should keep under his own control the powers of finance and the army.

Of divided rule and foreign rule, divided rule or rule of a country by two kings, perishes owing to mutual hatred, partiality and rivalry. Foreign rule which comes into existence by seizing the country from its king still alive, thinks that the country is not its own, impoverishes it, and carries off its wealth, or treats it as a commercial article; and when the country ceases to love it, it retires abandoning the country.

Which is better, a blind king, or a king erring against the science?

My teacher says that a blind king, i.e., a king who is not possessed of an eye in sciences, is indiscriminate in doing works, very obstinate, and is led by others; such a king destroys the kingdom by his own maladministration. But an erring king can be easily brought round when and where his mind goes astray from the procedure laid down in sciences.

No, says Kautilya, a blind king can be made by his supporters to adhere to whatever line of policy he ought to. But an erring king who is bent upon doing what is against the science, brings about destruction to himself and his kingdom by maladministration.

Which is better, a diseased or a new king ?

My teacher says that a diseased king loses his kingdom owing to the intrigue of his ministers, or loses his life on account of the kingdom; but a new king pleases the people by such popular deeds as the observance of his own duties and the act of bestowing favours, remissions (of taxes), gifts, and presents upon others.

No, says Kautilya, a diseased king continues to observe his duties as usual. But a new king begins to act as he pleases under the impression that the country, acquired by his own might, belongs to himself; when pressed by combined kings (for plunder), he tolerates their oppression of the country. Or having no firm control over the elements of the state, he is easily removed. There is this difference among diseased kings: a king who is morally diseased, and a king who is suffering from physical disease; there is also this difference among new kings: a high-born king and a base-born king.

Which is better, a weak but high-born king, or a strong but low-born king?

My teacher says that a people, even if interested in having a weak king, hardly allow room for the intrigues of a weak but high-born person to be their king; but that if they desire power, they will easily yield themselves to the intrigues of a strong but base-born person to be their king.

No, says Kautilya, a people will naturally obey a high-born king though he is weak, for the tendency of a prosperous people is to follow a high-born king. Also they render the intrigues of a strong but base-born person, unavailing, as the saying is, that possession of virtues makes for friendship.

The destruction of crops is worse than the destruction of handfuls (of grains), since it is the labour that is destroyed thereby; absence of rain is worse than too much rain.

* The comparative seriousness or insignificance of any two kinds of troubles affecting the elements of sovereignty, in the order of enumeration of the several kinds of distress, is the cause of adopting offensive or defensive operations.

[Thus ends Chapter II, "Considerations about the Troubles of the King and of his Kingdom,” in Book VIII, “Concerning Vices and Calamities,” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and eighteenth chapter from the beginning.]