by Thomas Aquinas
Translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke and Charles J. O'Neil
New York: Hanover House, 1955-57
Edited, with English, especially Scriptural references, updated by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
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Table of Contents:
• BOOK ONE: GOD translated by Anton C. Pegis
1. The office of the wise man
2. The author’s intention in the present work
3. On the way in which divine truth is to be made known
4. That the truth about God to which the natural reason reaches is fittingly proposed to men for belief
5. That the truths the human reason is not able to investigate are fittingly proposed to men for belief
6. That to give assent to the truths of faith is not foolishness even though they are above reason
7. That the truth of reason is not opposed to the truth of the Christian faith
8. How the human reason is related to the truth of faith
9. The order and manner of procedure in the present work
10. The opinion of those who say that the existence of God, being self-evident, cannot be demonstrated
11. A refutation of the above-mentioned opinion and a solution of the arguments
12. The opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated but is held by faith alone
13. Arguments in proof of the existence of God
14. That to know God we must use the way of remotion
15. That God is eternal
16. That there is no passive potency in God
17. That there is no matter in God
18. That there is no composition in God
19. That in God there is nothing violent or unnatural
20. That God is not a body
21. That God is His essence
22. That in God being and essence are the same
23. That no accident is found in God
24. That the divine being cannot be determined by the addition of some substantial difference
25. That God is not in some genus
26. That God is not the formal being of all things
27. That God is not the form of any body
28. The divine perfection
29. The likeness of creatures to God
30. The names that can be predicated of God
31. That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not opposed to the divine simplicity
32. That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things
33. That not all names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way
34. That names said of God and creatures are said analogically
35. That many names said of God are not synonyms
36. How our intellect forms a proposition about God
37. That God is good
38. That God is goodness itself
39. That there cannot be evil in God
40. That God is the good of every good
41. That God is the highest good
42. That God is one
43. That God is infinite
44. That God is intelligent
45. That God’s act of understanding is His essence
46. That God understands through nothing other than through His essence
47. That God understands Himself perfectly
48. That primarily and essentially God knows only Himself
49. That God understands things other than Himself
50. That God has a proper knowledge of all things
51. Arguments inquiring how a multitude of intellectual objects is in the divine intellect
52. Continued
53. The solution of the above difficulty
54. How the divine essence, being one and simple, is the proper likeness of all intelligible objects
55. That God understands all things together
56. That God’s knowledge is not habitual
57. That God’s knowledge is not discursive
58. That God does not understand by composing and dividing
59. That the truth of enunciables; is not excluded from God
60. That God is truth
61. That God is the purest truth
62. That the divine truth is the first and highest truth
63. The arguments of those who wish to take away the knowledge of singulars from God
64. The order of what is to be said on the divine knowledge
65. That God knows singulars
66. That God knows the things that are not
67. That God knows future contingent singulars;
68. That God knows the motions of the will
69. That God knows infinite things
70. That God knows lowly things
71. That God knows evils
72. That God has will
73. That the will of God is His essence
74. That the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence
75. That in willing Himself God also wills other things
76. That God wills Himself and other things by one act of will
77. That the multitude of the objects of the will is not opposed to the divine simplicity
78. That the divine will extends to singular goods
79. That God wills even the things that are not yet
80. That His own being and His own goodness God wills necessarily
81. That God does not will other things in a necessary way
82. Arguments leading to awkward consequences if God does not necessarily will things other than Himself
83. That God wills something other than Himself with the necessity of supposition
84. That the will of God is not of what is in itself impossible
85. That the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor does it impose absolute necessity on them
86. That a reason can be assigned to the divine Will
87. That nothing can be the cause of the divine Will
88. That in God there is free choice
89. That in God there are not the passions of the appetites
90. That in God there are delight and joy, but they are not opposed to the divine perfection
91. That in God there is love
92. How virtues may be held to be in God
93. That in God there are the moral virtues that deal with actions
94. That in God there are contemplative virtues
95. That God cannot will evil
96. That God hates nothing, and the hatred of no thing befits Him
97. That God is living
98. That God is His life
99. That the life of God is everlasting
100. That God is blessed
101. That God is His blessedness
102. That the perfect and unique blessedness of God excels every other blessedness
• BOOK TWO: CREATION translated by James F. Anderson
1. The connection between the following considerations and the preceding ones
2. That the consideration of creatures is useful for instruction of faith
3. That knowledge of the nature of creatures serves to destroy errors concerning God
4. That the philosopher and the theologian consider creatures in different ways
5. Order of procedure
6. That it is proper to God to be the source of the being of other things
7. That active power exists in God
8. That God’s power is His substance
9. That God’s power is His action
10. How power is attributed to God
11. That something is said of God in relation to creatures
12. That relations predicated of God in reference to creatures do not really exist in Him
13. How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God
14. Continued
15. That God is to all things the cause of being
16. That God brought things into being from nothing
17. That creation is neither motion nor change
18. How objections against creation are solved
19. That in creation no succession exists
20. That no body is capable of creative action
21. That the act of creating belongs to God alone
22. That God is omnipotent
23. That God does not act by natural necessity
24. That God acts conformably to His wisdom
25. How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things
26. That the divine intellect is not confined to limited effects
27. That the divine will is not restricted to certain effects
28. How dueness is entailed in the production of things
29. Continued
30. How absolute necessity can exist in created things
31. That it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed
32. Arguments of those who wish to demonstrate the world’s eternity from the point of view of God
33. Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from the standpoint of creatures
34. Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making of things
35. Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God
36. Solution of the arguments proposed from the point of view of the things made
37. Solution of the arguments taken from the point of view of the making of things
38. Arguments by which some try to show that the world is not eternal
39. That the distinction of things is not the result of chance
40. That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things
41. That a contrariety of agents does not account for the distinction of things
42. That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the world of secondary agents
43. That the distinction of things is not caused by some secondary agent introducing diverse forms into matter
44. That the distinction of things does not have its source in the diversity of merits or demerits
45. The true first cause of the distinction of things
46. That the perfection of the universe required the existence of some intellectual creatures
47. That intellectual substances are endowed with will
48. That intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting
49. That the intellectual substance is not a body
50. That intellectual substances are immaterial
51. That the intellectual substance is not a material form
52. That in created intellectual substances, being and what is differ
53. That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality
54. That the composition of substance and being is not the same as the composition of matter and form
55. That intellectual substances are incorruptible
56. In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body
57. The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body
58. That in man there are not three souls, nutritive, sensitive, and intellective
59. That man’s possible intellect is not a separate substance
60. That man derives his specific nature, not from the passive, but from the possible, intellect
61. That this theory is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle
62. Against Alexander’s opinion concerning the possible intellect
63. That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen maintained
64. That the soul is not a harmony
65. That the soul is not a body
66. Against those who maintain that intellect and sense we the same
67. Against those who hold that the possible intellect is the imagination
68. How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body
69. Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form
70. That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form
71. That the soul is united to the body without intermediation
72. That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts
73. That there is not one possible intellect in all men
74. Concerning the theory of Avicenna, who said that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect
75. Solution of the seemingly demonstrative arguments for the unity of the possible intellect
76. That the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul
77. That it is not impossible for the possible and agent intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul
78. That Aristotle held not that the agent intellect is a separate substance, but that it is a part of the soul
79. That the human soul does not perish when the body is corrupted
80. Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [and their solution]
81. Continued
82. That the souls of brute animals are not immortal
83. That the human soul begins to exist when the body does
84. Solution of the preceding arguments
85. That the soul is not made of God’s substance
86. That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen
87. That the human soul is brought into being through the creative action of God
88. Arguments designed to prove that the human soul is formed from the semen
89. Solution of the preceding arguments
90. That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form
91. That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies
92. Concerning the great number of separate substances
93. Of the non-existence of a plurality of separate substances of one species
94. That the separate substance and the soul are not of the same species
95. How in separate substances genus and species are to be taken
96. That separate substances do not receive their knowledge from sensible things
97. That the intellect of a separate substance is always in act of understanding
98. How one separate substance understands another
99. That separate substances know material things
100. That separate substances know singulars
101. Whether separate substances have natural knowledge of all things at the same time
• BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE (Q. 1-83) translated by Vernon J. Bourke
1. Prologue
2. How every agent acts for an end
3. That every agent acts for a good
4. That evil in things is not intended
5. Arguments which seem to prove that evil is not apart from intention
6. Answers to these arguments
7. That evil is not an essence
8. Arguments which seem to prove that evil is a nature or some real thing
9. Answers to these arguments
10. That good is the cause of evil
11. That evil is based on the good
12. That evil does not wholly destroy good
13. That evil has a cause of some sort
14. That evil is an accidental cause
15. That there is no highest evil
16. That the end of everything is a good
17. That all things are ordered to one end Who is God
18. How God is the end of all things
19. That all things tend to become like God
20. How things imitate divine goodness
21. That things naturally tend to become like God inasmuch as He is a cause
22. How things are ordered to their ends in various ways
23. That the motion of the heavens comes from an intellectual principle
24. How even beings devoid of knowledge seek the good
25. That to understand God is the end of every intellectual substance
26. Whether felicity consists in a will act
27. That human felicity does not consist in pleasures of the flesh
28. That felicity does not consist in honors
29. That man’s felicity does not consist in glory
30. That man’s felicity does not consist in riches
31. That felicity does not consist in worldly power
32. That felicity does not consist in goods of the body
33. That human felicity does not lie in the senses
34. That man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in acts of the moral virtues
35. That ultimate felicity does not lie in the act of prudence
36. That felicity does not consist in the operation of art
37. That the ultimate felicity of man consists in the contemplation of God
38. That human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God which is generally possessed by most men
39. That human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God gained through demonstration
40. Human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God which is through faith
41. Whether in this life man is able to understand separate substances through the study and investigation of the speculative sciences
42. That we cannot in this life understand separate substances in the way that Alexander claimed
43. That we cannot in this life understand separate substances in the way that Averroes claimed
44. That man’s ultimate felicity does not consist in the kind of knowledge of separate substances that the foregoing opinions assume
45. That in this life we cannot understand separate substances
46. That the soul does not understand itself through itself in this life
47. That in this life we cannot see God through His essence
48. That man’s ultimate felicity does not come in this life
49. That separate substances do not see God in His essence by knowing Him through their essence
50. That the natural desire of separate substances does not come to rest in the natural knowledge which they have of God
51. How God may be seen in His essence
52. That no created substance can, by its own natural power, attain the vision of God in His essence
53. That the created intellect needs an influx of divine light in order to see God through His essence
54. Arguments by which it seems to be proved that God cannot be seen in His essence, and the answers to them
55. That the created intellect does not comprehend the divine substance
56. That no created intellect while seeing God sees all that can be seen in Him
57. That every intellect, whatever its level, can be a participant in the divine vision
58. That one being is able to see God more perfectly than another
59. How those who see the divine substance may see all things
60. That those who see God see all things in Him at once
61. That through the vision of God one becomes a partaker of eternal life
62. That those who see God will see Him perpetually
63. How man’s every desire is fulfilled in that ultimate felicity
64. That God governs things by His providence
65. That God preserves things in being
66. That nothing gives being except in so far as it
67. That God is the cause of operation for all things that operate
68. That God is everywhere
69. The opinion of those who take away proper actions from natural things
70. How the same effect is from God and from a natural agent
71. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things
72. That divine providence does not exclude contingency from things
73. That divine providence does not exclude freedom of choice
74. That divine providence does not exclude fortune and chance
75. That God’s providence applies to contingent singulars
76. That God’s providence applies immediately to all singulars
77. That the execution of divine providence is accomplished by means of secondary causes
78. That other creatures are ruled by God by means of intellectual creatures
79. That lower intellectual substances are ruled by higher ones
80. On the ordering of the angels among themselves
81. On the ordering of men among themselves and to other things
82. That lower bodies are ruled by God through celestial bodies
83. Epilogue to the preceding chapters
• BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE (Q. 84-163) translated by Vernon J. Bourke
84. That the celestial bodies make no impression on our intellects
85. That the celestial bodies are not the causes of our acts of will and choice
86. That the corporeal effects in things here below do not necessarily result from the celestial bodies
87. That the motion of a celestial body is not the cause of our acts of choice by the power of its soul moving us, as some say
88. That separate created substances cannot be directly the cause of our acts of choice and will, but only God
89. That the movement of the will is caused by God and not only the power. of the will
90. That human acts of choice and of will are subject to divine providence
91. How human events may be traced back to higher causes
92. How a person is favored by fortune and how man is assisted by higher causes
93. On fate: whether and what it is
94. On the certainty of divine providence
95. That the immutability of divine providence does not suppress the value of prayer
96. That some prayers are not granted by God
97. How the disposition of providence has a rational plan
98. How God can act apart from the order of His providence, and how not
99. That God can work apart from the order implanted in things, by producing effects without proximate causes
100. That things which God does apart from the order of nature are not contrary to nature
101. On miracles
102. That God alone works miracles
103. How spiritual substances do certain wonderful things which, however, are not truly miracles
104. That the works of magicians are not solely due to the influence of celestial bodies
105. Where the performances of the magicians get their efficacy
106. That the intellectual substance which provides the efficacy for magic works is not morally good
107. That the intellectual substance whose help the arts of magic use is not evil in its own nature
108. Arguments whereby it seems to be proved that there can be no sin in demons
109. That sin can occur in demons, and in what way
110. Answer to the previous arguments
111. That rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a special way
112. That rational creatures are governed for their own sakes, while others are governed in subordination to them
113. That the rational creature is directed by God to his actions not only by an ordering of the species, but also according to what befits the individual
114. That laws are divinely given to man
115. That the divine law principally orders man toward God
116. That the end of divine law is the love of God
117. That we are ordered by divine law to the love of neighbor
118. That through divine law men are bound to the right faith
119. That our mind is directed to God by certain sense objects
120. That the cult proper to latria is to be offered to God alone
121. That divine law orders man according to reason in regard to corporeal and sensible things
122. The reason why simple fornication is a sin according to divine law, and that matrimony is natural
123. That matrimony should be indivisible
124. That matrimony should be between one man and one woman
125. That matrimony should not take place between close relatives
126. That not all sexual intercourse is sinful
127. That the use of food is not a sin in itself
128. How man is ordered by the law of God in regard to his neighbor
129. That some human acts are right according to nature and not merely because they are prescribed by law
130. On the counsels that are given in divine law
131. On the error of the attackers of voluntary poverty
132. On the ways of life of those who practice voluntary poverty
133. In what way poverty is good
134. Answers to the arguments brought forward above against poverty
135. Answer to the objections against the different ways of life of those who embrace voluntary poverty
136. On the error of those who attack perpetual continence
137. Another error concerning perpetual continence
138. Against those who attack vows
139. That neither meritorious acts nor sins are equal
140. That a man’s acts are punished or rewarded by God
141. On the diversity and order of punishments
142. That not all rewards and punishments are equal
143. On the punishment due to mortal and venial sin in relation to the ultimate end
144. That by mortal sin a man is eternally deprived of his ultimate end
145. That sins are punished also by the experience of something painful
146. That it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments
147. That man needs divine help to attain happiness
148. That by the help of divine grace man is not forced toward virtue
149. That man cannot merit divine help in advance
150. That the aforesaid divine help is called grace, and what sanctifying grace is
151. That sanctifying grace causes the love of God in us
152. That divine grace causes faith in us
153. That divine grace causes hope in us
154. On the gifts of gratuitous grace, including a consideration of the divinations of demons
155. That man needs the help of grace to persevere in the good
156. That he who falls from grace through sin may again be restored through grace
157. That man cannot be freed from sin except through grace
158. How man is freed from sin
159. That it is reasonable to hold a man responsible if he does not turn toward God, even though he cannot do this without grace
160. That man in the state of sin, without grace, cannot avoid sin
161. That God frees some men from sin and leaves others in sin
162. That God is not the cause of sin for any person
163. On predestination, reprobation, and divine election
• BOOK FOUR: SALVATION translated by Charles J. O'Neil
1. Foreword
2. That there is generation, paternity, and sonship in the Divinity
3. That the Son of God is God
4. The opinion of Photinus on the Son of God, and its refutation
5. The opinion of Sabellius on the Son of God, and its refutation
6. The opinion of Arius about the Son of God
7. Refutation of the opinion of Arius on the Son of God
8. Solution of the authorities which Arius proposed for himself
9. Solution of the authorities of Photinus and of Sabellins
10. Arguments against divine generation and procession
11. How generation is to be understood in divinity, and what is said of the Son of God in Scripture
12. How the Son of God may be called the wisdom of God
13. That there is but one Son in the Divinity
14. Solution of the arguments against divine generation previously introduced
15. On the Holy Spirit, that He is in divinity
16. Arguments which made some think the Holy Spirit a creature
17. That the Holy Spirit is true God
18. That the Holy Spirit is a subsistent Person
19. How one must understand what is said about the Holy Spirit
20. On the effects attributed to the Holy Spirit in Scripture regarding the whole creation
21. On the effects attributed to the Holy Spirit in Scripture regarding the rational creature, so far as God’s gifts to us are concerned
22. On the effects attributed to the Holy Spirit in that He moves the creature to God
23. An answer to the arguments given above against the divinity of the Holy Spirit
24. That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son
25. Arguments of those who want to show that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son and the answers
26. That there are but three Persons in divinity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
27. On the Incarnation of the Word according to the tradition of Scripture
28. On the error of Photinus about the Incarnation
29. On the error of the Manicheans about the Incarnation
30. On the error of Valentine about the Incarnation
31. On the error of Apollinaris about the body of Christ
32. On the error of Arius and Apollinaris about the soul of Christ
33. On the error of Apollinaris, who says there was no rational soul in Christ; and the error of Origen, who says the soul of Christ was created before the world
34. On the error of Theodore of Mopsueste and Nestorius on the union of the Word to man
35. Against the error of Eutyches
36. On the error of Macarius of Antioch, who holds there is but one will in Christ
37. Against those who said that the soul and body do not constitute a unity in Christ
38. Against those who put two supposits or hypostases in the one Person of Christ
39. What the Catholic faith holds about the Incarnation of Christ
40. Objections against faith in the Incarnation
41. How one should understand the Incarnation of the Son of God
42. That the assumption of human nature was most suited to the Word of God
43. That the human nature assumed by the Word did not pre-exist its assumption, but was assumed in the conception itself
44. That the human nature assumed by the Word in the conception itself was perfect in soul and body
45. That it became Christ to be born of a virgin
46. That Christ was born of the Holy Spirit
47. That Christ was not the son of the Holy Spirit in the flesh
48. That Christ must not be called a creature
49. Solution of the arguments against the Incarnation given above
50. That original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his descendants
51. Objections against original sin
52. Solution of the objections proposed
53. Arguments which seem to prove that God’s Incarnation was not suitable
54. That it was suitable for God to be made flesh
55. Answer to the arguments previously set down against the suitability of the Incarnation
56. On the necessity of the sacraments
57. The distinction of the sacraments of the Old and the New Law
58. On the number of the sacraments of the New Law
59. On baptism
60. On confirmation
61. On the Eucharist
62. On the error of the infidels about the sacrament of the Eucharist
63. Solution of the difficulties set down: first, about the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ
64. Solution of the objections made regarding place
65. Solution of the objections regarding accidents
66. Solution of the objections regarding action and passion
67. Solution of the objections regarding fraction
68. Solution of the authority introduced
69. On the kind of bread and wine that are to be used in this sacrament
70. On the sacrament of penance, and, first, that men after receiving sacramental grace are able to sin
71. That a man sinning after the grace of the sacraments can be converted by grace
72. On the necessity of penance and of its parts
73. On the sacrament of extreme unction
74. On the sacrament of orders
75. On the distinction of orders
76. On the episcopal power and that therein one is the highest
77. That the sacraments can be dispensed by evil ministers
78. On the sacrament of matrimony
79. That through Christ the resurrection of bodies is to come
80. Objections against the resurrection
81. Solution of the objections mentioned
82. That men will rise immortal
83. That among the risen there will be no use of food or sexual love
84. That the bodies of those who rise will be the same in nature
85. That the bodies of the risen will have another disposition
86. On the quality of glorified bodies
87. On the place of the glorified bodies
88. On the sex and age of the risen
89. On the quality of the risen bodies among the damned
90. How incorporeal substances may suffer from bodily fire
91. That immediately after their separation from the body the souls will receive punishment or reward
92. That the souls of the saints have after death an unchangeable will in the good
93. That after death the souls of the wicked have a will unchangeable in evil
94. On the immutability of will in souls detained in purgatory
95. On the immutability of wills commonly in all souls after their separation from the body
96. On the last judgment
97. On the state of the world after the judgment
To proceed against individual errors, however, is a difficult business, and this for two reasons. In the first place, it is difficult because the sacrilegious remarks of individual men who have erred are not so well known to us so that we may use what they say as the basis of proceeding to a refutation of their errors. This is, indeed, the method that the ancient Doctors of the Church used in the refutation of the errors of the Gentiles. For they could know the positions taken by the Gentiles since they themselves had been Gentiles, or at least had lived among the Gentiles and had been instructed in their teaching. In the second place, it is difficult because some of them, such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree with us in accepting the authority of any Scripture, by which they may be convinced of their error. Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against heretics we are able to argue by means of the New Testament. But the Muslims and the pagans accept neither the one nor the other. We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which all men are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters the natural reason has its failings.
***
By this truth, too, are refuted the Gentiles, who, taking their beginning in the errors of the philosophers we have listed, posited that the elements of the world and the powers in them are gods; for example, the sun, the moon, the earth, water, and the like.
***
Thus, then, is removed the error of the Gentiles, who said that God is the soul of the heavens, or even the soul of the whole world. Thereby they defended the error of idolatry, by saying that the whole world was God not by reason of the body but by reason of the soul; just as man is said to be wise not by reason of the body but by reason of the soul. On the basis of this error the Gentiles thought it to follow that, not unfittingly, divine worship should be shown to the world and its parts. The Commentator also says that this point was the place where the Zabii stumbled and fell from wisdom—because, namely, they posited that God is the form of the heavens [In XII Metaphysicorum].
***
If, again, there are several gods, the nature of the godhead cannot be numerically one in two of them. There must, therefore, be something distinguishing the divine nature in this and in that god. But this is impossible, because, as we have shown above, the divine nature receives the addition neither of essential differences nor of accidents. Nor yet is the divine nature the form of any matter, to be capable of being divided according to the division of matter. It is impossible, therefore, that there be two gods.
Then, too, the proper being of each thing is only one. But God is His being, as we have shown. There can, therefore, be only one God.
Moreover, a thing has being in the manner it possesses unity. Hence, each thing struggles as much as it can against any division of itself, lest thereby it tend to nonbeing. But the divine nature has being most powerfully. There is therefore, in it the greatest unity, and hence no plurality is in any way distinguished within it.
Furthermore, we notice in each genus that multitude proceeds from some unity. This is why in every genus there is found a prime member that is the measure of all the things found in that genus. In whatever things, therefore, we find that there is an agreement in one respect, it is necessary that this depend upon one source. But all things agree in being. There must, therefore, be only one being that is the source of all things. This is God.
Again, in every rulership he who rules desires unity. That is why among the forms of rulership the main one is monarchy or kingship. So, too, for many members there is one head, whereby we see by an evident sign that he to whom rulership belongs should have unity. Hence, we must admit that God, Who is the cause of all things, is absolutely one.
This confession of the divine unity we can likewise gather from holy Scripture. For it is said in Deuteronomy (6:4): “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one God”; and in Exodus (20:3): “You shall not have strange gods before Me”; and in Ephesians (4:5): “One Lord, one faith, one baptism.”
Now by this truth are refuted those Gentiles who accepted a multitude of gods. However, many of them said that there was one highest God, by whom all the others whom they named gods were according to them caused. For they attributed the name of divinity to all everlasting substances, and this especially because of their wisdom and felicity and the rulership of things. This manner of speaking is found also in Sacred Scripture, in which the holy angels, or even men, or judges, are called gods. Thus, this verse of the Psalms (85:8): “There is none among the gods like You, O Lord”; and elsewhere: “I have said: You are gods” (Ps. 81:6). Many such expressions are found in different places in Scripture.
Hence, it is mainly the Manicheans who seem opposed to this truth, in that they posit two first principles of which one is not the cause of the other.
The Arians likewise attacked this truth by their errors, in confessing that the Father and the Son are not one but several gods; although the authority of Scripture forces me to believe that the Son is true God.
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The position of Hermes is disposed of by these considerations, for he spoke as follows, as Augustine reports it in the City of God [VIII, 23]: “Just as God is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the maker of the gods who are in the temples, content in their nearness to man. I mean the animated statues, endowed with sense and spirit, that do such great and unusual things; statues that foresee future events, predicting them from dreams and from many other things, that cause weaknesses in men and also cure them, that give sorrow and joy, in accord with one’s merits.
This view is also refuted by divine authority, for it is said in the Psalm (134:15-17): “The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the works of men’s hands. They have a mouth and they do not speak... neither is there any breath in their mouths.”
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Therefore, it is clear from what we have said that the cult of latria is due to the one, highest God only. Thus it is said in Exodus (22:20): “He who sacrifices to the gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord”; and in Deuteronomy (6:13): “You shall fear the Lord Your God, and shall serve Him only.” And in Romans (1:72-73) it is said of the Gentiles: “For, professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts and of creeping things”; and later (verse 25): “Who changed the truth of God into a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, Who is God above all blessed for ever.”
So, since it is unfitting for the cult of latria to be offered to any other being than the first principle of things, and since to incite to unworthy deeds can only be the work of a badly disposed rational creature, it is evident that men have been solicited by the urging of demons to develop the aforesaid unworthy cults, and these demons have been presented in place of God as objects of men’s worship because they craved divine honor. Hence it is said in the Psalm (95:5): “All the gods of the Gentiles are devils”; and in 1 Corinthians (10:20): “the things which the heathens sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God.”
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But malign spirits strive to corrupt the truth of the faith, just as they make bad use of the working of wonders, in order to lead to error and weaken the proof of the true faith, even though they do not perform miracles in the proper sense, but things that appear wonderful to men, as we showed above—so also they abuse prophetic prediction, not, of course, prophesying, but foretelling certain things according to the order of causes hidden to man, so that they seem to know in advance future events in themselves. Now, though contingent effects come from natural causes, these spirits, as a result of the subtlety of their understanding, can know more than men as to when and how the effects of natural causes may be obstructed. So, in foretelling future things, they appear to be more astonishing and more truthful than men, no matter how learned the latter may be. Of course, among natural causes, the highest and farthest removed from our knowledge are the powers of the celestial bodies. That these are known to the spirits under discussion, in accord with what is proper to their nature, is evident from earlier explanations. Therefore, since all lower bodies are controlled through the powers and motions of the higher bodies, these spirits are far more able than any astronomer to foretell future winds and storms, changing conditions of the atmosphere, and other such things which occur in the changing of lower bodies as a result of the motion of the higher bodies. Also, though celestial bodies can make no impression directly on the intellectual part of the soul, as we showed above, a good many men follow the impulse of their bodily passions and tendencies, on which we have shown that the celestial bodies do have an influence. In fact, it is only possible for wise men, of whom the number is small, to resist this kind of passion by using their reason. So, the result is that many predictions can be made concerning man’s acts, although even these spirits fail at times in their predictions because of freedom of choice.
However, they do not make their predictions of what they foreknow by enlightening the mind, as is done in the case of divine revelation. Indeed, it is not their intention that the human mind be perfected in order to know the truth, but, rather, that it be turned away from the truth. Now, they sometimes predict, indeed, by impressing the imagination, either during sleep, as when they show the signs of certain future events through dreams, or while one is awake, as is apparent in the case of people in a trance or frenzy who foretell future events. At other times, too, they do it through external signs, for instance, by the movement and chirping of birds, and by means of the appearances of the inner parts of animals, and by the drawing of certain kinds of mathematical figures, and in other like ways which seem to work by some kind of lot. At still other times, they do it by visual apparitions and by predicting future events in speech that can be heard.
Although the last of these ways is obviously the work of evil spirits, some people have made efforts to explain the other ways in terms of natural causes. They say, in fact, that when a celestial body moves toward definite effects in these things here below, some signs of the result of the influence of the same body appear, because different things receive the celestial influence in different ways. On this basis, then, they say that the change that is produced in a thing by the celestial body can be taken as a sign of the change in another thing. Hence, they say that movements that are apart from rational deliberation, such as visions in people who are dreaming and in those who are out of their mind, and the flight and crying of birds, and the drawing of figures, when a person does not deliberate on how many points he should draw, are all the results of the influence of a celestial body. So, they say that things like these can be the signs of future effects that are caused by the motion of the heavens.
However, since this has little reason, it is better to think that the predictions that are made from signs of this kind take their origin from some intellectual substance, by whose power the aforesaid motions occurring without deliberation are controlled, in accord with what befits the observation of future events. And while these movements are sometimes controlled by the divine will, through the ministry of good spirits, since many things are revealed by God through dreams -- as to Pharaoh (Gen. 41:25), and to Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 2:28), and “lots that are cast into the lap, that are also at times disposed of by the Lord,” as Solomon says (Prov. 16:33).Yet most of the time they happen as a result of the working of evil spirits, as the holy Doctors say, and as even the Gentiles themselves agree. For Maximus Valerius says that the practice of auguries and dreams, and that sort of thing, belongs to the religion in which idols were worshiped. And so, in the Old Law, along with idolatry, all these practices were prohibited. Indeed, it is said in Deuteronomy (18:9-11): “beware lest you have a mind to imitate the abominations of those nations,” that is, those that serve idols; “neither let there be found among you anyone who expiates his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or who consults soothsayers, or observes dreams and omens; neither let there be any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone who consults pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers, or who seeks the truth from the dead.”
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Thus, of course, one avoids the error of certain ancient Gentiles, who used to hold that “the same periods and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the philosopher Plato having taught at the school in Athens which is called the Academy, so numberless ages before, at long but certain intervals, this same Plato and the same school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be repeated during the endless cycles yet to come”; so Augustine describes the position in the City of God. To this position, so he himself tells us in the same place, some like to refer the words of Ecclesiastes (1:9-10): “What is it that has been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that has been done? The same thing that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it has already gone before in the ages that were before us.” This is not, indeed, to be understood as though things numerically the same are repeated through various generations, but things similar in species. So Augustine explains in the same place. And Aristotle at the end of De generatione [II, 11], taught the same thing, speaking against the group mentioned.
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It is, furthermore, found expressly in Scripture that the Son of God is a creature. For Sirach (24:12, 14) says: “The creator of all things said to Me: and He that made Me rested in My tabernacle”; and again: “From the beginning, and before the world, was I created.” Therefore, the Son is a creature.
What is more, the Son is numbered among creatures. For it says in the person of Wisdom: “I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures” (Sirach 24:5). And the Apostle says of the Son that He is “the firstborn of every creature” (Col. 1:15). The Son, then, seems to belong to the order of creatures as one who holds the first rank therein.
The Son, moreover, says in John (17:22), praying for the disciples to the Father: “The glory which You hast given Me, I have given to them; that they may be one, as We also are one.” Therefore, the Father and Son are one as He wished the disciples to be one. But He did not wish the disciples to be essentially one. Therefore, the Father and Son are not essentially one. Thus it follows that He is a creature and subject to the Father.
Now, this is the position of Arius and Eunomius. And it seems to have arisen from the sayings of the Platonists, who used to hold that there was a supreme God, the Father and Creator of all things, and from Him there emanated a certain “Mind” in which were the forms of all things, and it was superior to all things; and they named this the “paternal intellect”; after this they put the soul of the world, and then the other creatures. Therefore, what is said in sacred Scripture of the Son of God they used to understand of the mind just mentioned; and the more so because sacred Scripture names the Son of God “the Wisdom of God” and “the Word of God.” And with this opinion the position of Avicenna agrees; he holds that above the soul of the first heaven there is a first intelligence moving the first heaven, and further beyond this he placed God at the summit.
In this way, then, the Arians were inclined to think that the Son of God was a kind of creature, pre-eminent over all other creatures, the medium by which God had created all things; they were all the more so inclined by the fact that certain philosophers also held that things proceeded from their first source in an order, resulting in the creation of all things through one first creature.
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Furthermore, since the proper action of anything at all follows its very nature, a thing’s proper action is fitting to nothing to which the nature of that thing is not fitting; thus, what does not have the human species does not have the human action. Now, the proper actions of God belong to the Son: to create (as already shown), to contain and conserve all things in being; and to wipe away sins. That these are proper to God is clear from the foregoing. But of the Son it is said that “by Him all things consist” (Col. 1: 3-7); and that He upholds “all things by the word of His power, making purgation of sins” (Heb. 1:3). The Son of God, then, is of the divine nature, and is not a creature.
But because an Arian might say that the Son does these things not as a principal agent, but as an instrument of the principal agent which acts not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent, our Lord excluded this argument, saying in John (5:19): “what things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.” Then, just as the Father operates of Himself and by His proper power, so also does the Son.
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Since, however, truth cannot be truth’s contrary, it is obvious that the points of Scriptural truth introduced by the Arians to confirm their error cannot be helpful to their teaching. For, since it was shown from divine Scripture that the essence and divine nature of the Father and Son are numerically identical, and according to this each is called true God, it must be that the Father and Son cannot be two gods, but one God. For, if there were many gods, a necessary consequence would be the partition in each of the essence of divinity, just as in two men the humanity differs in number from one to the other; and the more so because the divine nature is not one thing and God Himself another. This was shown above. From this it follows necessarily that, since there exists one divine nature in the Father and the Son, the Father and the Son are one God. Therefore, although we confess that the Father is God and the Son God, we are not withdrawing from the teaching which sets down that there is one only God, which we established both by reasonings and by authorities in Book I. Hence, although there is one only true God, we confess that this is predicated of the Father and of the Son.
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Thus, then, it is clear that the testimonies of the Scriptures which the Arians were taking for themselves are not hostile to the truth which the Catholic faith maintains.
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Consideration must, furthermore, be given to this: Since in any nature the procession of the son from the father is natural, from the fact that the Word of God is called the Son of God He must proceed naturally from the Father. This is in agreement with the things said above, as one can perceive from what takes place in our intellect. For our intellect knows some things naturally; thus the first principles of the intelligibles, whose intelligible conceptions—called interior words—naturally exist in the intellect and proceed from it. There are also certain intelligibles which our intellect does not know naturally; rather, it arrives at the knowledge of these by reasoning. The conceptions of these last do not exist in our intellect naturally, but are sought after by study. Manifestly, however, God understands Himself naturally just as He is naturally. For His act of understanding is His being (as was proved in Book I). Therefore, the Word of God understanding Himself naturally proceeds from Him. And, since the Word of God is of the same nature as God speaking and His likeness, this follows: This natural proceeding is unto a likeness of Him from whom He does proceed with identity of nature. But, this is the essential of true generation in living things: that which is generated proceeds from him who generates as his likeness, and as identified with him in nature. Therefore, the Word of God is truly begotten by God speaking the Word; and His proceeding can be called “generation” or “birth.” This is why the Psalmist says: “This day have I begotten You” (Ps. 7:7); that is, in eternity which always is present and in which essentially there is neither past nor future. In this way the falsity of what the Arians maintained is clear, that the Father generated the Son by His will. For things which are by will are not natural things.
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It seems, therefore, that the Holy Spirit, since He does not receive the divine nature by generation, does not receive it in any way at all. He thus appears not to be true God.
Now, this was the position of Arius, who said that the Son and the Holy Spirit were creatures: the Son, to be sure, greater than the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit the servant of the Son; just so, he said that the Son was lesser than the Father. Arius was followed in respect of the Holy Spirit by Macedonius, “who rightly held that the Father and the Son were of one and the same substance, but was unwilling to believe this of the Holy Spirit. He said that the Holy Spirit was a creature.” Hence, some call the Macedonians Semi-Arians, because they are in partial agreement with the Arians, and in partial disagreement with the same group.
-- Summa Contra Gentiles, by Thomas Aquinas