III. Philosophy of History in Solov'ev
The true unity of humanity and the hoped-for peace must be based not upon the weakness and subjugation of nations but upon the highest development of their powers and a free interaction between nationalities which serve as a complement to one another. [1]
Introduction
From the very outset of his career, Solov'ev was concerned with the category of progressive development. This category is central in 19th century philosophy of history that developed an examination of world history both in its immanence and in its global nature. Solov'ev found support in this register to emphasise three main points: history, including non-religious institutions, has to be valued positively, and can be directed by men, who gather in a supra-entity, humanity. In PH, in contrast to TH, history is not seen as mere contingency opposed to the true being which is eternity, but is examined in its intrinsic value. Secular forms of collectivity, such as the state and the nation, have to be valued positively. In addition, progress is not initiated and directed by a transcendent plan, but is a law immanent to the subject changing, is initiated from within by men. This view implies that the subject in question is a harmonious entity. Solov'ev identified the chief subject of this process as humanity. In a teleological perspective, he posed that humanity is evolving by virtue of a single metaphysical principle, which he defined as 'all-unity' [vseedinstvo]. All-unity governs the historical process from within and is the goal towards which humanity as a whole is striving, and which it will realise. In this sense, all-unity functions as the metaphysical principle that structures Solov'ev's philosophy of history and can be considered the philosophical equivalent of Bogocelovecestvo. With this concept, Solov'ev strove to pose the values of both individual freedom and collectivity as criteria for historical action. [2] In doing so, he struggled against the tendency to sacrifice the former term, as Pobedonoscev, the neo-Slavophiles and the socialists did, as well as against the neglect or negation of collectivity such as in liberal and subjectivist thought. This also applies to the most comprehensive form of collectivity, humanity, the ontological existence and unity of which Solov'ev defended against nationalist views on history. In this respect, his philosophy of history allowed him to defend universalism on the basis of an immanent conception of history.
In my opinion, Solov'ev developed a philosophy of history of his own, which includes Hegelian and Comtian elements, and bears the influence of his father, Sergej Mikhailovic Solov'ev. Solov'ev did not produce a systematic philosophy of history backed by a great number of facts, as did Hegel, Comte, or Spengler. Nevertheless, he offered broad interpretations of world history, which testify to his powerful and historical range of vision. However, in his effort to simultaneously show continuity and change in world history, his approach remained on the whole highly general, which resulted in a schematic discourse on progress. In the scarce places where he elaborated on history, Solov'ev operated highly selectively with respect to historical data. What strikes the reader is the constant effort to connect these data to a progressive line of history, and to its universal significance within this line. He mainly elaborates on philosophy of history in the introduction to Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, entitled 'Obsceistoriceskoe vvedenie (ol zakone istoriceskogo razvitija)' [General-Historical Introduction (about the Law of Historical Development)], and in Opravdanie dobra. A wide range of other publications also contains elements of philosophy of history, which I use in this analysis.
In order to understand the working of the philosophical register of history in Solov'ev's work, in the first part of this section (1) I deal with (a) his definition of history in philosophical terms, (b) the general framework, (c) periodisations and underlying conception of time, (d) method and criteria, and (e) the actors that play a major role in history. In the second part (2), I examine the relationship of Solov'ev's philosophy of history with that of (a) Hegel, (b) Sergej Solov'ev, and (c) Comte.
1. The Register of Philosophy of History in Solov'ev
a) General definition
Characteristically, it is difficult to find in Solov'ev's work a single definition of history that is entirely formulated in the philosophical register, as it always contains Christian elements or a sophianic colouring. Significantly, rather than defining the term 'history', Solov'ev offers various characteristics of 'historical development' and the 'historical process.' His outspoken preference for such expressions strongly suggests that he saw philosophy of history as the best available means of describing history in terms of continuity, in its immanence and in its concrete forms.
In Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija he announced that the main objective of his examination of history was to solve the question of the goal of human existence. [3] He hereby from the outset established a teleological perspective that remained constant in his work. This goal is common to all men, since it is connected to the life of all people. It is also intrinsic to them as the formal and final cause of their development. [4] He identified this goal as 'integral life organisation' or 'all-unity.' [5] In all-unity, a balance is obtained at the level of humanity between individual freedom and unity of the community. [6] A goal also implies development leading up to it, in which one should take part collectively. This is made possible by the fact that this final goal is understandable to every human being and can be defined in broad lines. [7] For it is not enough to be conscious of this goal:
History (and consequently the world process as a whole) has a goal, which we undoubtedly know, an all-embracing goal which at the same time is sufficiently determined for us to consciously participate in its achievement. [8]
The observation that history is goal-oriented implies active participation in its realisation. We can therefore reconstruct the following syllogism: history is an immanent goal-oriented process; this goal is knowable and achievable; everything knowable and achievable must be done; thus the human collectivity has to contribute to the realisation of this goal.
To sum up, in Solov'ev's philosophy of history, history can be defined as the gradual realisation of all-unity through collective action.
b) Framework
In his philosophy of history, Solov'ev focused on the world alone, namely on the immanent development of humanity towards all-unity, regardless of the transcendent level of divine agency. The framework of history is structured by one and the same global principle of development, to which all beings, whether individual, national, or universal, are subjected. The priority of the principle of a single continuous development determines the general outline of history in Solov'ev as a primarily linear, rather than cyclical, or dialectical, scheme. [9]
In order to build his conception of teleological development as an immanent process on a firm basis, Solov'ev turned to the organicistic model of explanation. The analogy between human society and a biological organism offers three main advantages. Firstly, it permits an understanding of human society, and thus by extension, history, as an immanent entity moving forward on the basis of its own force, not that of God as in theology of history. [10] Secondly, it presupposes that there is a certain unity or continuity of evolution between the natural and the human realm, within the immanent world, i.e. between nature and culture. [11] Solov'ev discussed, mainly with reference to Darwin, the biological and psychological evolution of animals into human beings, even though his interest in evolutionism focused on human beings and human society. [12] The framework of his philosophy of history is shaped by the evolution of the collective forms of human existence towards the ideal society, that is, organic unity or solidarity at all levels: local, national, and universal.
In addition to the unity of the temporal framework, which is thoroughly structured by the category of progressive development, Solov'ev posited the unity of the spatial or geographical framework. Two factors come to the fore in Solov'ev's approach. On the one hand, the main actor and ultimate achiever of all-unity is humanity in its entirety, i.e. humanity realising its potency. In this respect, the third advantage of the organicistic metaphor is that it permits an intrinsic link between the parts and the whole, similar to the link between organs and the organism. This notably implies a mutual influence between the individual, the various forms of collectivity, and humanity as a whole. [13] On the other hand, Solov'ev divided humanity into several groups and sketched a movement of history from East to West, from the Middle and Near East to Europe. He largely left out America, Africa, and Oceania, and displayed a strong Eurocentrism, which included Russia and which found support in the idea of cultural imperialism. [14] According to the latter, to which Solov'ev adhered, Europe, including Russia, was the starting point for bringing true values to humanity as a whole and realising (all-)unity of the whole planet. It is precisely this goal, and the immanent development leading to it, which are the objects of Solov'ev's philosophy of history.
c) Periodisation and conception of time
i) Periodisation
Properly speaking we find in Solov'ev only one periodisation of world history, namely in the first chapter of Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija. Significantly, the succinctness of this survey (only about twenty pages!) reveals that Solov'ev was interested in general lines rather than in particular events. In an attempt to deal with human activities exhaustively, he divided these into the theoretical (theology, philosophy, science), practical (spiritual, political, economic society), and creative (mysticism, fine arts, technical arts) fields. Examining their evolution throughout history, he posed that history is made up of three successive phases, undifferentiated unity, separation, and differentiated unity between and within these fields. [15] These three phases as it were form Solov'ev's universal law of historical development. In the first phase, which took place in Ancient India, Greece, and Rome, the three fields were not differentiated. [16] Later on, after the distinction between theory, practice, and creation had occurred, a fusion still remained within each of the three fields, for example, in knowledge, between theology, philosophy, and science. A second phase began with the appearance of Christianity, which introduced the separation of the sacred from the profane. In this phase Western civilisation dominated, which excessively distinguished between all fields of human activities. For instance, in practical life, church, state, and economy were separated. Besides, each of these successively played the leading role in Western history, ending with the domination of economics, as was claimed by socialism in Solov'ev's time. [17] In a near future, a third phase of synthesis or differentiated unity, would follow, in which 'human development' would realise its 'absolute content.' In this phase, the reconciliation would take place between the forces of the first (mainly Eastern) and second (mainly Western) phase. The task of performing this reconciliation would be that of the Slavic people, especially Russia. Solov'ev characterised this phase in religious terms, and thus at this point left open the register of pure philosophy of history [see synthesis Part Two].
In Opravdanie dobra, he completed the general picture of world history by examining, in the first place, what we could identify as the phase preceding the process sketched above. Solov'ev comprehensively analysed the evolution of human community from the clan through Eastern monarchies up to the state. [18] Solov'ev borrowed much of the argumentation from Sergej Solov'ev for this account [see subsection 2b]. In the second place, he depicted the progressive unification of humanity in secular terms, by pointing to the intensification of internal relationships and the globalisation of culture [see Aei-ii).
We may conclude that, rather than in periodisations per se, Solov'ev seemed interested in certain episodes in history, the interval between which he might have considered as periods, but which he did not examine as such. This is most obvious in his treatment of Russian history. Solov'ev pointed to three fundamental episodes: first the call to the Varangians in the 9th century, second the opening towards Europe under Peter I, and third the abolition of serfdom under Alexander II. [19] As a matter of fact, Solov'ev's teleological perspective on history dictates a tendency to examine the events that are constitutive for the establishment of the goal, rather than examining the phases between those events, which would require more detailed investigations.
ii) Conception of time
Solov'ev hardly ever devoted special attention to the question of time. In the short entry 'Vremja' [Time] written for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia, he approached time in a Kantian manner as a universal form of Anschauung. He argued that no explanation of time could be given on an empirical or rational basis, but rather that philosophical elaborations on time all had a metaphysical character. [20] It appears therefore that Solov'ev, in contrast with transcendental philosophy, did not consider time a philosophical issue independently from metaphysics. [21] He only mentioned the contribution made by Kant in the conceptualisation of time, yet did not either elaborate on it or propose his own vision on the topic. [22] Nor did he broach the topic of historical time as such, which generally includes a definition of its main components, namely past, present, and future, an analysis of the perception of these by man, as well as an interpretation of the mutual relationships between past, present, and future. One can explain this absence of reflection by the fact that he deliberately reflected on history from a speculative, universalistic, and eternalistic standpoint, from which all questions related to time were unproblematic. Characteristically, he neither questioned nor justified the very standpoint he adopted. Consequently, a personal experience of time such as that which initiated and nurtured Augustine's reflections, for instance, was not relevant for Solov'ev.
Although time is not addressed in Solov'ev, it plays no less fundamental a role than in any other discourse on history. The principles of teleology and continuity that are so determinant in Solov'ev, dictate a certain view on the phenomenon of change in time. Holding to the idea that that which appears as novelty is only the concrete realisation or actualisation of an element that was already working in some form, he interpreted problems of the present as the result of an entire historical process. Besides, he sensed that history had accelerated since the end of the eighteenth century, and felt that Europe and Russia were rapidly changing. [23] As far as his conception of future is concerned, Solov'ev was, like most philosophers of history of his century, deeply optimistic. [24] He perceived the future as the open dimension in which man would be able to implement the final goal of universal solidarity. This goal should be attained while preserving a link of continuity with the past, that is, a respect for the work achieved by ancestors and their values, in short a respect for tradition. Solov'ev's philosophical conception of time is therefore marked by a dynamic tension between an attachment to the past and the effort required to create a future different from the present. [25] In his PH he emphasised man's capacity to achieve this ideal in the future.
d) Criteria and method
i) Criterion: progress
Solov'ev considered progress to be a fundamental force shaping history into a single ascending line. This concept rests on the major contribution made by European science, which, towards the end of the 18th century, developed the concept of a unified and determined historical process. [26] In his eyes, progress in practice included regressions and stagnations, yet improvement remains predominant:
In spite of all the vacillation and the zigzagging of progress, in spite of all of today's exacerbation of militarism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, terrorism, and so on and so forth -- for all that, the fact that the resultant force of history is going from cannibalism toward love of fellowman, from lawlessness to justice, and from hostile disconnection of particular groups toward universal solidarity remains
doubtless. [27]
As is obvious from this passage, Solov'ev needed the concept of progress because of one functional aspect: the structuring of historical phenomena along one single line leading to the goal of all-unity. [28] He had taken great care to preliminarily define this goal, notably because he was opposed to progress that was deprived of any goal, or indefinite progress, as well as to a progress without an end, an endless progress. [29] Progress is also something necessary, in two respects, Firstly, it occurs as the necessary result of inner motives nurtured by individuals and nations. Secondly, it is made up of stages that were and are necessary. Hereby is the meaning of history itself justified. For instance, wild humanity had to go through despotism to overcome it and become civilised. [30] In this respect, Solov'ev's view was akin to Hegel, Comte, and Marx, who all believed in the necessary succession of given stages.
Beside its structuring function, the idea of progress allows the legitimisation of continuity. [31] Solov'ev offered a challenging argumentation on this point. On the one hand, true progress, especially moral progress, implies a conservative attitude, an attachment to tradition: 'moral progress can only consist in a better and wider fulfilling of the obligations which derive from tradition.' [32] Tradition transmits certain principles of order, because, if it was anything other than order, tradition would have disappeared. In other terms, progress is not the negation of order, but rather the progress of order. [33] On the other hand, true progress implies the introduction of positive innovation. In connection to this, Solov'ev defined progress in opposition to stagnation, for which he used the term kitaizm, 'Chin ism" to point to 'the exclusive concern with a traditional order that has been undermined [podkopannogo] from all sides.' [34]
The link that the philosopher formulated between continuity and change shows that he was against what we could call 'progress by making tabula rasa.' He was fiercely opposed to the socialist interpretation of progress coming from revolution that was fashionable in the Russian populist press of the I870s. [35] In his eyes, this conception of progress had been dominant in Western European debates since the 18th century, and implied a chiefly negative relationship to the past, because it rejected the past order en bloc. [36] This was therefore equivalent to suppressing the very essence of progress. A radical break with the past generations would have fatal consequences and was for him equivalent to a destruction of 'the unity of that which develops itself or progresses, i.e. most of all the real inner solidarity of the old and the new generations of progressing humanity.' [37] The motive of Solov'ev's deep-seated aversion against revolution thus lies in the potential destruction of the unity with the past, and, as a result, of humanity. His conviction that positive development was already an embryonic component of the present, and should be introduced gradually, sustained his belief in progress by means of reform instead of revolution.
In conformity with the common tendency in philosophy of history, Solov'ev distinguished between different types of progress that touched upon the most varied of human activities: moral, social, political, technical, cultural, and spiritual progress. [38] Three general factors of progress had been operating from the Middle Ages onwards: the development of nationalities [razvitie nacional'nosti], the corresponding development of international relationships, and the geographical extension of the unity of culture to the entire globe, or, in present-day terms, the globalisation of culture [see next subsection on humanity and nations.] [39]
Interestingly, Solov'ev also brought war to the fore as a motor of progress. Here we encounter one of the very few historical analyses made by Solov'ev entirely in the register of philosophy of history. [40] War, he argued, 'has been the chief historical means of bringing about the external political unification of humanity.' [41] War had first led to the formation of states. It had then initiated other positive developments such as the abolition of war within the states' own boundaries, conditions for a mutual rapprochement between the states, a reduction of active military forces for more effective results, and a decrease in the number of human lives sacrificed. Solov'ev stated that war had also played an active role as a condition of technical and scientific progress in the nineteenth century, and in the propagation of ideas in general. Apart from the question whether war in itself promoted the above-mentioned developments, one can note that his considerations in no way address the question of the damage caused by war, such as the destruction of cultural heritage. Generally, he perceived a progress towards fewer conflicts; they were becoming shorter and more rare, from which he concluded that humanity would witness the end of war. [42] His treatment of the phenomenon of war shows that on the very few occasions that that the philosopher made a historical analysis, his perspective was restricted to the point, namely on war as a factor of unification.
Solov'ev also pointed out progress as far as Russian history was concerned, albeit in low key. When he commented on the abolition of serfdom, he ironically explained that there had actually been no moral progress between the heroes of Homer and the Russian landowners of the 1840s. [43] It was only in the last thirty years (1865-1895) that an elevation of moral demands had occurred through the abolition of serfdom in Russia, parallel to the abolition of slavery in the United States of America (1865). What had happened, he argued, was that an idea that had been so far restricted to the subjective area of morality had now become a common and objective task. [44] For progress to become objective, an idea had first to reach collective awareness. The main tool for fostering this awareness is the use of speculative reason.
ii) Method: speculative reason
Speculative reason, and its main device deduction, is the key instrument used by Solov'ev to convince his fellow men of the rationality of the historical world and to exhort them to take active part in the historical process towards all-unity. The result of his accounts, however, is often disappointing. The philosopher applied deduction in a hastened way, and as a result strongly simplified history in order to integrate particular episodes in his own picture. He carried out these simplifications in three ways. Firstly, by defining a phenomenon on the basis of an abstract principle, for instance 'Byzantinism', the manifestation of which he quickly deduced from historical events, he ended up yielding historical misinterpretations and circular arguments. [45] Secondly, by imposing his law of historical development, he was highly selective. [46] Thirdly, as a result of this approach, characterised by the exclusive search for signs and symptoms in history that could confirm his thesis, he tended to reduce collective historical participation to the action of its most prominent figures, mostly political leaders. In the description of an epoch, he often limited himself to portraying individual deeds of heroes, such as Vladimir, Peter I, Catherine II and Alexander II. Such an arrangement of the world can be justified only speculatively, which the philosopher did by untiringly pointing to the goal of all-unity, out of which all empirical things could be deduced. [47] He showed himself reluctant to take historical experience for more than a verification of his own metaphysical theses.
Speculative reason can nevertheless find assistance in the empirical examination of sources, which is at work in historical science. One of Solov'ev's very few reflective moments on the relationship between philosophy and history is a review of the historical journal run by his old school companion, historian Nikolaj Kareev. [48] Solov'ev contested the claim made by the historian that philosophy relates to subjective data, and historical science to objective data, and attempted to show philosophy as contributor to 'a theory of the world process.' [49] Against Kareev's defence of a separation between philosophy and historical science, Solov'ev pleaded for cooperation between the two fields, in which he proposed the following division of labour. Philosophers pointed to general principles, to paths of reflection, such as the explanation of the unity that makes up history, while historians provided concrete objects of reflection. [50] He argued that Kareev's distinction between objective and subjective, used to differentiate the work of the historian from that of the philosopher, was irrelevant, for that what is true subjectively, is true objectively. He replaced the dichotomy objectivity/subjectivity by the dichotomy true/false, but did not answer the question about what the criteria of truth are. [51] By this omission, he placed truth, which he considered the norm, by which we should judge history, above method. So even within an epistemological reflection, his philosophical account of history often results in a dogmatic discourse.
The division of labour between philosophers and historians did not however stop him from applying the main method of historians, namely the use of sources such as empirical observations made by others, on a number of occasions. The manner in which he treated the famine of 1891-1892 is a brilliant and rare counter-example to his usual deductive method. He made use of geographical and statistic data, and outlined the worsening of the peasant situation over the last decades in factual terms [see case study V 'The famine of 1891- 1892']. Solov'ev also turned to the empirical method for other studies that, with rare exceptions, can be situated on the border between empirical and speculative history. [52] Characteristically, in his sketch of the formation of the character of a people, Solov'ev investigated neither the historical life of peoples in their concrete variety, nor for instance external influences such as climate, but addressed precisely an issue that can hardly be submitted to empirical investigation, namely the origin of the national character. [53] He ascribed the latter to the character of the founder of the clan [rodonacal'nik] and pointed to the religious dimension at work, hereby situating himself on the border between phenomenal history and religion. [54]
In sum, Solov'ev operated mostly with speculative reason in his philosophical register on history in order to demonstrate that the pervasiveness of the principle of all-unity was being realised. Because of a lack of historical data, the results of these accounts are mostly unconvincing.
e) Actors
Man not only understands the rational meaning of history, but shapes history through the participation of an increasingly large community. For a philosopher of history, the challenge consists in emphasising the agency of larger groups without neglecting the plurality of the individuals:
The true subject of moral progress -- as well as of historical progress in general -- is the individual man together and inseparably from collective man or society. [55]
According to Solov'ev, the forms of this collective being are most of all humanity, the nations, and the state; great (states)men form the prominent category of individual actors.
i) Humanity
Throughout Solov'ev's work, humanity is the chief subject of history: 'The subject of development here is humanity as a real, though also collective organism.' [56] The role of the organicistic model for the definition of humanity as an immanent and autonomous force has been pointed out above [see subsection I b]. [57] With respect to humanity, the analogy also permits a distinction between, on the one hand, humanity's organs, or composite parts, i.e. nations, and, on the other hand, the systems that form it and which are common to all nations, i.e. knowledge, practical activity and creation. [58] On the basis of this programmatic statement, one would expect Solov'ev to examine all these domains in the context of their development in one or several nations, and observe the complementary character of these contributions from the perspective of humanity. However, as we have seen, the philosopher did not elaborate on any of these domains and only offered sketches. Obviously, he was most eager to integrate all the composing elements into the totalising perspective, rather than in a precise analysis of the multiple forms of manifestation of and interrelationships between these categories.
It is a recurring feature in Solov'ev's work to advocate a consideration of national developments from the perspective of humanity. He stated that 'civilised humanity' as a whole was rising, which tended 'increasingly to become the whole of humanity.' [59] What did he mean precisely? International relationships had intensified, a world market had appeared, as well as a 'constant collaboration of all civilised countries in technical and scientific work', and inventions in communication media and transport, which suppressed geographical distance. [60] In his eyes, the same process included the penetration of European culture in increasing numbers of areas, and thus, colonialism, which he regarded highly as a propagator of civilised culture to the whole planet. [61] By the 1890s, when he equated civilised culture with European culture, Solov'ev showed himself a eurocentrist and at the same time a universalist, in his own terms, a Westerniser. [62]
As a matter of fact, it was Solov'ev's fundamental contribution to the Russian tradition of philosophy of history to conceive of history from a consistently universalist perspective. [63] In his early years, he focused on Russia's mission, and later, moored Russia's history to that of the West by interpreting it on the basis of the criteria of the Enlightenment: freedom, emancipation, and progress [see case studies IV and V). At stake was the extension of solidarity to humanity as a whole, which should not be realised at the expense of individual rights. In this respect, his motivation to engage in a polemic with the Russian proponent of the theory of separate cultural types, Nikolaj Danilevskij, also becomes clear. Against the view that a cultural type develops separately and does not transmit its values to others, Solov'ev was eager to defend the conception of humanity as an organic whole, structured by strong relationships. This whole, humanity, he saw precisely as the ontological and epistemological condition for the universalisation of the good. [64]
This scheme of gradual unification of humanity is challenged by another, similarly powerful scheme in his work, namely that of a humanity divided into two conflicting components, East and West. The antagonism between the Eastern and the Western world is one of Solov'ev's most permanent historical topics, not only in theological, but also in philosophical terms. [65] Solov'ev filled these categories with varying geographical contents. The East meant first the Middle-East (India), then Eastern Christianity (Byzantium), and finally, with a sharper perception of the 'yellow peril', the Far East (China and Japan). [66] As to the notion of Europe, he regarded it first as excluding Russia, then as including it, but only up to a certain point, because his fatherland perfectly embodied the conflict between East and West, between exclusive conservatism and progress.
However, this conflict between East and West was not to last forever. The Russian philosopher was convinced that humanity was not ontologically determined by this dichotomy, but could and should be unified because it was in essence a unity. [67] In this sense, he was not a civilisationist, and his polemic with Danilevskij confirms his universalist position. He predicted that the struggle between East and West would continue between the two halves of the world, in a future armed struggle between Europe and Mongol Asia, which would be the last war, a world war. The victory of one of them would ensure 'peace to the rest of the world', and a 'world empire' or world monarchy would be established. [68] In this way, he believed that humanity was destined to ultimately become one.
ii) Nations
Solov'ev did not offer a systematic view on the role of nations in world history, as did Hegel or Danilevskij, but only a short survey in Filosofskie nacala cel 'nogo znanija, a more extensive overview in Opravdanie dobra, and passages in various works. [69] They testify, if not to his sustained interest in the question, to his range of vision. In these surveys he showed himself to be a typical nineteenth century thinker, in the sense that, at least since Herder, it was common to reflect on history in terms of historical nations. [70]
Solov'ev considered nations to be central categories of world history and consistently related their existence to humanity. [71] He picked up on four fundamental Hegelian characterisations of the nation [see subsection 2aii] and more specifically described the character of certain nations on the basis of their historical achievements, mostly in the fields of art, science and culture (Italy, Germany, England, Poland, Russia), religion (Spain, Germany) and civil rights (England, France). [72] Spain served humanity by defending Europe against Islam. [73] The English nation developed geniuses in literature and science, brought to the fore the principles of religious and civil freedom, which influenced the formation of the United States of America, and had scientists who demonstrated the physical unity of the universe. England also succeeded in expanding civilisation to India and Australia. Whereas France introduced the idea of human rights, Germany contributed to world history with the Reformation, poetry, Kant and Hegel's philosophy. Solov'ev focused on national geniuses, dropping names in art and science, and hastily mentioned significant religious events and conquests in order to produce this hurried picture of national characters. If a nation is true to its idea, he held, it does not attach an absolute significance to its material interest, but only to its ideal, universal mission, and that it feels this universal dimension in itself.
The essential message that Solov'ev wanted to convey was clear: the significance of a nation is determined by its contribution to humanity. From this perspective, a theory such as that of Danilevskij on cultural types, which denied the supra-unity of humanity, was totally incoherent. He found it also to be invalidated by current developments, such as an intensification of internal exchange in politics, economy and culture. [74] However, Sternkopf's conclusion that he totally subordinated the existence of nations to humanity is exaggerated. [75] Solov'ev's valuation of the existence of nations was undeniably positive. These nations could only achieve what they achieved by virtue of their particularity, and were bound to remain until the end of history.
By arguing that nations find their essential meaning in humanity, he was aiming at two targets. Firstly, he sought to formulate a consistent answer to the supporters of nationalism. His point was that a nation lives only in the supra-national and international environment, only in relationship to humanity and to other nations. [76] Unfortunately, this remains one of the least developed aspects of his philosophy of history. Secondly, and more fundamentally, by claiming that 'the reason for the existence of nations does not find itself in them, but in humanity', he was pointing out what he considered the main priority, or in other terms, the ideal entity to be realised in the future, namely all-unity or universal solidarity. [77] His emphasis that this goal should be realised by man makes his philosophy of history a call for action. From a teleological perspective, he kept emphasising humanity, and only briefly described the formation of such and such a nation.
