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Notes:1 In a note to the first publication in French of a translation of the Introduction ("La Remonté au Fondement de la Métaphysique"), the translator, Joseph Rovan observes that the Introduction "est conçu comme une préface à une postface [was conceived as a preface to a postscript]" to the lecture. Fontaine (Paris) 10, #58, March 1947, p. 888.
2 Another possible version of the subtitle is "The Nothing at the Heart of Metaphysics." The adjective 'rückgängig' can mean "null and void" [nichtig]. Thus the subtitle suggests that the ground of metaphysics is no-thing [das Nichts], which is the message of the lecture. For this translation of 'das Nichts', see the lecture. Notes preceded by (*) are Heidegger's marginalia gleaned from his copies of the various editions of the lecture.
3 Heidegger's citation is to René Descartes, Oeuvres, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1971 [1897-1910]), Volume IX,2, p. 14. Descartes' letter to Abbé Picot constitutes his introduction to the Principia in Picot's translation. For information on Picot, see Descartes' Correspondance, Volume V (1947) Paris: Presses Universaires de France, pp. 402- 404. The current translation, by John Cottingham, of the "Preface" is in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (1985) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Volume I, p. 186.
4 "Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree, whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk of which is physics, and the branches which extend out from that trunk are the rest of the sciences."
5 In this translation, frequent interpolation of the original German terms will be made. Sometimes an entire sentence will be given in a footnote. Other times, a variant rendering will be given, again in a footnote. This procedure is often decried as interfering with the flow of the text. It is doubtful than anyone reading the text will regret not having to turn back to the original German, especially when its inclusion strengthens the attempt to understand Heidegger's meaning. Besides, the study of Heidegger's texts requires and repays the labor of long reflection on the play of language in them.
6 Heidegger will play on two senses of 'Grund': the soil in and out of which living things grow and the basis or grounds or reasons for something, presented as evidence for coming to a certain decision about it. I will translate 'Grund' with "ground," "grounds," "basis" or even "at the heart of." "In den Grund" is rendered "at bottom." The phrase "Grund und Boden" is translated as "earth" or "land," the earth one farms or tends. "Grund und Boden" also functions idiomatically to mean "utterly." "Im Grunde" becomes "at the heart of," "fundamentally," "really," or "at (the) bottom (of)."
7 Sometimes 'Wesen' is translated "nature."
8 By 'das Seiende' Heidegger has in mind effective actuality, real "goings on" of any kind, in contrast with the "nothing going on" of no-thing [das Nichts].
9 An important theme of the Introduction is how asking a question [eine Frage zu vorstellen] has become, in metaphysics, formulating, designating, proposing, making suppositions and apodeictic assertions [Vorstellungen], professing, representing (that is, or presenting something a second time and therefore in a second version), assigning meanings -- rather than letting those meaning emerge on their own. To formulate or designate as metaphysics does is to affirm as incontrovertibly true, almost as a confession of faith. In professing, metaphysics also invariably promotes what it proposes. It seeks to further itself and what it puts forward. By contrast, teaching, like poetic speaking, is quite different from professing. The phenomenological ideal, we recall, is knowledge without belief.
10 Heidegger's marginal notes in his copies of the various editions of the lecture are included in the Gesamtausgabe edition of Wegmarken. They will be cited with edition number. *Fifth edition (1949): "Lichtung [illuminating]." (EWM 365) The term "light" is used in the phrase "in light of."
11 With this term, Heidegger announces the 'be-' ['das Sein'] in 'be-ing' ['das Seiende'], that is, the 'Sei-' (root) of 'das Seiende'. I choose the form 'be[ing]' to underscore how awkward this must come to sound. This linguistic contraption is meant to give pause. I pronounce it 'be'. In a certain way, the bare infinitive 'be' has been the most questionable matter for Heidegger's thinking.
12 For this translation of 'die Gleiche', see my essay "Who Is Heidegger's Nietzsche," a review article of the English translations of Heidegger's Nietzsche (1960).
13 The sense is of something stepping out of the shadows or coming out of seclusion and being turned over to someone after having been in hiding. As ᾽Αλήθεια, emergence is determined as having been deprived or relieved of forgetfulness (λήθη) by be[ing]. Perhaps "emergedness" would work here.
14 *Fifth edition (1949): "An-bringen: Gewähren die Unverborgenheit und in dieser Unverborgenes, Anwesendes. Im Anwesen verbirgt sich: An-bringen von Unverborgenheit, die Anwesendes answesen läßt. 'das Sein selbst' ist das Sein in seiner Wahrheit, welche Wahrheit zum Sein gehört, d.h. in welche Wahrheit 'Sein' entschwindet [bringing along: affording / granting of emergence, and in this emerging, apprésenting (making present to). In apprésenting is hidden the bringing along of emergence, which apprésenting lets itself apprésent. 'Be[ing] itself' is be[ing] in its truth, truth which belongs to be[ing], that is, truth in which 'be[ing]' vanishes]." (EWM 366)
15 The verb 'wesen' will be translated as "to come to be" or "to come to pass." What 'west' arrives precisely in order to pass on; it never "is" in the sense of the verbs 'εἶναι', 'esse', and '(to) be', all of which imply some kind of fixity or stasis. 'Wesen' also connotes "being brought to pass."
16 That is, as something philosophical . . .
17 *Fifth edition (1949): "Sein und Grund: das Selbe [Be[ing] and basis: the same]." (EWM 367)
18 First philosophy or authentic philosophy, πρώτη φιλοσοφία, philosophy in the primary sense, which Heidegger wants to ground. Metaphysics is also being characterized here as the beginning of philosophy. First thinking, a play on πρώτη φιλοσοφία, is more basic than first philosophy, i.e., metaphysics.
19 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Second Edition, 1787), translated by Norman Kemp Smith [1929] New York: St. Martin's Press (1965), p. 56. " . . . metaphysics actually exists, if not as a science, yet still as a natural disposition [Metaphysik ist, wenn gleich nichts als Wissenschaft, doch als Naturanlage] (metaphysica naturalis)." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Gesammelte Schriften (1911), Band III, Berlin: Reimer, p. 41 [B 21].) In Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Can Qualify as Science (1783), translated by Paul Carus [1902], New York: Open Court (1988), metaphysics had also been referred to as a "natural tendency" of man (p. 135). (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, in Gesammelte Schriften, Band IV, p. 363.)
20 *Fifth edition (1949): "was heißt Denken [what do we call thinking]?" (EWM 368) Variant: What cries out to be thought?
21 *Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis [event / (the) coming into its own / enownment]." (EWM 368)
22 *Fifth edition (1949): "Brauch [customary usage]." (EWM 369)
23 Man and be[ing] perform the relationship in two-part counterpoint. I think of Bach's twopart fugues or his Praeambula (Inventionen). Be[ing] calls the tune, man sings it. Be[ing] sounds the ground bass with which man harmonizes and against which he plays the melody. This Bezug [relationship] is the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) [Contributions about Philosophy (On the Event)] (1936-38), Gesamtausgabe 65 (1989) Frankfurt: Klostermann.
24 *Fifth edition (1949): "entbergende bergende Ge-währnis als Ereignis [discovering hiding warranty as event / enownment]." (EWM 369)
25 See the essay of the same name, first published in 1930, in Wegmarken, pp. 177-202, and in the translations by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being (1949) Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1988, pp. 292-324, and by John Sallis, in Basic Writings (1977) San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco (rev. ed., 1993), pp. 111-138.
26 *Fifth edition (1949): "Veritas bei Thomas immer in intellectu, und sei der intellectus divinus [veritas according to Thomas Aquinas is always in intellectu (in the mind), and is the intellectus divinus (mind of God)]." (EWM 369)
27 *Fifth edition (1949): "Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, , Ereignis [be[ing], truth, world, [], event / enownment]." (EWM 369) '' refers to 'Sein' not vocalized, unenunciated.
28 *Fifth edition (1949): "Λήθη als Verbergung [forgetting as hiding]." (EWM 370) (In EWM, there is a misprint of the spelling of Λήθη.)
29 *Fifth edition (1949): "Verwechslung : die Gebundenheit in das Hinüber zu Sein und das Herüber zu Seiendem. Eines steht stets im anderen und für das andere, 'Auswechslung', 'Wechsel', bald so, bald so [mix-up: being caught up in crossing over to be[ing] and crossing back to be-ing. The one is always in the other and for the other, 'exchange', 'changeover / alteration', now this way, now that]." (EWM 370)
30 This is a revealing use of the fundamental term in Heidegger's vocabulary, 'Ereignis'. In this passage, an 'Ereignis' is contrasted with a 'Fehler'. A 'Fehler' is a mishap or mistake or accident, which comes unexpectedly, while an 'Ereignis' is an event that is bound to happen. It may have been planned or hoped for, as in the usage when 'Ereignis' refers to the birth of a child.
31 The various combinations beginning with the morpheme 'Sein-' will be translated with either "of be[ing]," by be[ing]," "of and by be[ing]," or "about be[ing]." In every case, Heidegger sees the "action" of be[ing] in counterpoint with the other element of the term; for example, in ' -verständnis', ' -verlassenheit', ' -vergessenheit', or ' -geschick', be[ing] is both the source and destination of the 'understanding', 'abandonment', 'forgottenness', or 'venture'.
32 *Fifth edition (1949): "Das an-fangende, im An-fangen wesende Ereignis -- brauchend -- die Enteignis [the originating, at the outset présenting eventuality -- having use of (needing) -- dispossession (dépassement)." (EWM 370)
33 Variant: . . . what one is to have thought . . .. *Fifth edition (1949): "Zu-gesagten, Ge-währten, Ereigneten [what is to have been said, what has been afforded / brought forth, what has eventuated / been brought into its own / come to pass]."
34 In that event, what is thought of (remembered) and what is thought about coincide.
35 "Doch wer denkt noch an Gedachtes?" (EWM 372) Variant: To whom does it occur to think about what has already been thought about? The point is that most people are sure that everything worth thinking about has already been thought through thoroughly enough, especially such matters as what counts as worth thoughtful reflection, was heißt Denken.
36 *Fifth edition (1949): "Wahrnis als Ereignis [observance as eventuality]." (EWM 372) 'Wahrnis' is thus being considerate of, looking after, observing (as one would an anniversary or religious feast) the truth of be[ing].
37 According to the entry 'essence' in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd. ed., 1989), the word 'essentia' is a "fictitious present participle of esse, to be, in imitation of Greek οὐσία."
38 Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (1962) Oxford: Basil Blackwell [= Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe 2, p. 55].
39 "Dieses Ausstehen wird unter dem namen 'Sorge' erfahren." (EWM 374) Variants: This ekstasis goes by the name of sorrow. It goes by the name (as an alias) sorrow. In English translations of Being and Time 'care' has been the alias of 'sorrow'. For an argument for the translation of 'Sorge' as "sorrow," see the Part Two of my book Preparatory Thinking in Heidegger's Teaching (1987) New York: Philosophical Library.
40 "Das so erfahrene Ausstehen ist das Wesen der hier zu denkenden Ekstasis." (EWM 374)
41 Variant: . . . standing apart from . . ..
42 The fundamental meaning of στάσις with which Heidegger is working in this passage is, of course, at play with ἔκστασις. στάσις here means one's position on a matter, while ἔκστασις effects a change of position, changing of one's mind.
43 Or: "(em)ergency." Existence is nature's emergency situation. To be human is to be pressed of one's own doing to do things.
44 Or: . . . giving birth to . . ..
45 Or: . . . to the nth degree . . .; that is, to death.
46 *Fifth edition (1949): "Auf sich zu-kommen lassen den Tod, sich halten in der Ankunft des Todes als des Ge-Birgs des s [to leave it open for death to come to pass, to hold out for the arrival of death as the salvage of []]." (EWM 374)
47 *Fifth edition (1949): "Wohnen, das 'bauende' [living / dwelling, the 'cultivating' / 'growing']." (EWM 374)
48 Variants: Only man exists. Only the human kind of be-ing exists.
49 "Das Seiende, das in der Weise der Existenz ist, ist der Mensch. Der Mensch allein existiert. Der Fels ist, aber er existiert nicht. Der Baum ist, aber er existiert nicht. Das Pferd ist, aber es existiert nicht. Der Engel ist, aber es existiert nicht. Gott ist, aber er existiert nicht."
(EWM 374)
I take the opening sentences of this paragraph to be essential to understanding Heidegger. The verb 'existieren' is reserved exclusively for the human kind of be-ing. Forms of 'sein' apply to everything else: things of nature, things fabricated by human beings, divine things. 'Existenz' is human life, the life of 'biography', the life that has, makes and is (a) history.
50 Human be-ing is notable "in the eyes of" be[ing]. We who exist, who can say "we" and therefore "we exist," are marked men, marked by the blaze of existence.
51 *Fifth edition (1949): "ereignet-gebrauchte [eventful-accustomed]." (EWM 375)
52 Or selfness, as below. Some of Heidegger's neologisms ending in '-sein' seem to have been inspired by the peculiar construction of the noun 'Bewußtsein', which literally means "knownness" or "what is to have been known." Thus 'Selbstsein' would mean "what is to be itself."
53 These are the sections entitled "Die für eine Interpretation des Seinssinnes der Sorge gewonnene hermeneutische Situation und der methodische Charakter der existenzialen Analytik überhaupt [The Kind of Hermeneutic Situation Reached for the Interpretation of the Sense of Be[ing] and the Methodological Character of the Existential Analytic in General]" and "Sorge und Selbstheit [Sorrow and Selfhood]." See Being and Time, pp. 358-370 [= Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe 2, pp. 411-428].
54 Or: seeming, sembling.
55 The 'Vorname' is the given name of a person. Heidegger here suggests that "the truth of be[ing]" is the earliest name for time.
56 That is, speaking Greek.
57 "Wir sagen nichts." (EWM 376) Variant: We don't really say anything at all.
58 Or: making a present (gift) of.
59 παροὐσία means "presence" (with beings); ἀπουσία means absence (without any being).
60 "Sein als solches ist demnach unverborgen aus Zeit." (EWM 374) Variant: Accordingly, be[ing] as such comes (out) of time / (just) in (the nick of) time. Be[ing] is in and of time. Heidegger here implies a neologism 'unverbergen' used transitively.
61 *Fifth edition (1949): "Zeit ist vierdimensional: Die erste, alles versammelnde Dimension ist die Nähe [Time is four-dimensional: the first, all-encompassing dimension is imminence]." (EWM 377) A fifth dimension must be supposed to provide access to the other four: time, volume, surface, length. Or is this further dimension coincident with the pre-dimensional point? 'Nähe' means nearness in time, impendence (with a suggestion of danger), which is contrasted with what is long ago and far away, distant in time and difficult to regain. These extremes meet and have their origin for thinking in be[ing].
This Introduction drew out of Heidegger clarifications of a kind that are rare in his writings, let alone in the notes he made in his copies of his books. Heidegger's note at this point in the text provides a hint about the importance of the Introduction among Heidegger's ventures in thinking. A certain frontier is reached here, the view from which is powerfully evocative.
62 *Fifth edition (1949): "Diese Epoche ist die ganze Geschichte des Seins [This era is the whole history of be[ing]]." (EWM 377)
63 *Fifth edition (1949): "Zeit-Raum [time-space]." (EWM 377) That is, space is not conceived according to the schema of the three geometric co-ordinates.
64 "Es ist der ekstatische, d.h. im Bereich des Offenen innestehende geworfene Entwurf." (EWM 377) *Fifth edition (1949): "Geworfenheit und Ereignis. Werfen, Zu-werfen, Schicken; Ent- Wurf: dem Wurf entsprechen [begottenness and eventuality. Begetting, expelling, sending; progeny: corresponding to the utterance]." (EWM 377)
65 *Fifth edition (1949): "sich zu-bringt [is brought to]." (EWM 377) That is, in the way a ship is "brought to" (turned into the wind).
66 *Fifth edition (1949): "Sinn -- Wegrichtung des Sach-Verhalts [sense -- setting the course of the fact of the matter]." (EWM 377)
67 Sein und Zeit, p. 201. The passage is part of Section 32, "Verstehen und Auslegung [Understanding and Explanation]." 'Auslegung' is displaying something, getting it out into the open, delivering oneself of it.
68 "'Sinn von Sein' und 'Wahrheit des Seins' sagen das Selbe." (EWM 377) 'Die Gleiche' is "the equivalent"; 'das Selbe' is "the same (thing)."
69 *Fifth edition (1949): "ermöglichen [possibilizing]." (EWM 378)
70 These are the sections entitled "Das Da-sein als Verstehen [Being There as Understanding]," "Verstehen und Auslegung [Understanding and Explanation]," "Die Aussage als abkünftiger Modus der Auslegung [The Statement (Proposition) as the Original Mode of Explanation]," "Dasein und Rede. Die Sprache [Being There and Speech. Language]," and "Die Zeitlichkeit der Erschlossenheit überhaupt. a) Die Zeitlichkeit des Verstehens. (b) Die Zeitlichkeit der Befindlichkeit. c) Die Zeitlichkeit der Verfallens. d) Die Zeitlichkeit der Rede. [The Temporality of Openness. a) The Temporality of Understanding. b) The Temporality of Situatedness. c) The Temporality of Distractedness. d) The Temporality of Speech]," Being and Time, pp. 182-210, 384-401 [= Sein und Zeit, pp. 190-221, 444-463]. I have translated 'Da-sein' with "being there" when it is hyphenated.
71 Compared to 'Auslegung', which displays the obvious, 'Interpretation' exposes what lies hidden in a matter, exhumes it.
72 "Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von 'Sein' ist die Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung. Die Interpretation der Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt ist ihr vorläufiges Ziel."
73 First philosophy or philosophy in the primary sense.
74 "Hat nicht zur Torheit werden lassen der Gott die Weisheit der Welt?" (EWM 379)
75 'Verbergen' means "to hide," used either intransitively (hiding oneself, going into hiding) or transitively (concealing something from view). Taken intransitively, the state of being in hiding is seclusion [Verborgenheit]. Coming out of seclusion is expressed by the neologism 'unverbergen' and translated as "(to) emerge." In this passage, a form of the verb 'unverbergen' is being used transitively and in the passive mood. Thus, one is brought out of seclusion. So it is in the case of any sort of be-ing, which is brought out of seclusion thanks to be[ing], not by virtue of its be-ing.
76 *Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the difference]." (EWM 380) The question "What is metaphysics?" asks a "backwards" question. Many of those who heard the lecture in 1929 surely wondered why the question had been raised at all. Moreover, the lecture "answers" the question raised in the title with another question, What is be[ing]?
77 Sein und Zeit, p. 18. The text of Wegmarken cites p. 13.
78 "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" (EWM 381) Variant: Why is there any kind of be-ing and not no-thing instead?
79 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz: Die philosophischen Schriften, edited by C.I. Gerhardt (Berlin, 1875-90), Volume VI, p. 607, n.7. Heidegger omits the phrase "based on reason" in Leibniz's title. The work was written in 1714, though not published by the author.
80 *Fifth edition (1949): "und Schelling [and Schelling]." (EWM 382)
81 *Fifth edition (1949): "für die Metaphysik [for metaphysics]." (EWM 382) That is, what is, for metaphysics, no-thing. This is the "es" of "es gibt."
82 Fifth edition (1949): "als solchen [as such]." (EWM 382) See the next note.
83 "Woher kommt es, daß Es mit dem Sein eigentlich nichts ist und das Nichts eigentlich nicht west?" (EWM 382) This is certainly the climactic question of the essay. Variant: How does it happen that nothing comes of be[ing] / it is actually nothing to be and no-thing does not come to be? It seems to me that Heidegger's usage of 'Sein' here justifies my translation of the word throughout as 'be'.
84 That is, that the word 'Sein' is unspoken in every articulation of any kind of be-ing. Be[ing] is taken for granted in be-ing.
85 "Kommt gar von hier der unerschütterte Anschein in alle Metaphysik, daß sich 'Sein' von selbst verstehe und daß sich demzufolge das Nichts leichter mache als Seiende?" (EWM 382)
86 "Since nothing is simpler and easier than something."
87 "Was bleibt rätselhafter, dies, daß Seiendes ist, oder dies, daß Sein 'ist'?" (EWM 383)
88 Variant: . . . has come to pass . . .. *Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis der Vergessenheit des Unterschieds [the eventuality of the forgottenness of the difference]." (EWM 383)
89 *Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the difference]." (EWM 383)
90 "Die Philosophie ist ihrer Natur nach etwas esoterisches, für sich weder für den Pöbel gemacht, noch einer Zubereitung für den Pöbel fähig; sie ist nur dadurch Philosophie daß sie dem Verstande, und damit noch mehr dem gesunden Menschenverstande, worunter man die lokale und temporäre Beschränktheit eines Geschlechts der Menschen versteht, gerade entgegengesetzt ist; im Verhähltniß zu diesem ist an und für sich die Welt der Philosophie eine verkehrte." G.W.F. Hegel, "Einleitung. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt, und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesonderes[ Introduction. On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism in General, and its Relation to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular]" (1802), in Hegel's Gesammelte Werke, edited by Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968) IV, p. 124-25. The text is Hegel's general introduction to the Critical Journal of Philosophy which he and Schelling edited.
91 'Da-sein' (hyphenated) stresses the being there of existence and will be translated as "being there." This instance and the next occurrence of 'Da-sein' are exceptions.
92 "Worauf der Weltbezug geht, ist das Seiende selbst -- und sonst nichts." (WM 105) Variant: The relationship to the world extends to be-ing -- and nothing else besides.
93 *First edition (1929): "Man hat diesen Zusatz hinter dem Gedankenstrich als willkürlich und künstlich ausgegeben und weiß nicht, daß Taine, der als Vertreter und Zeichen eines ganzen, noch herrschenden Zeitalters genommen werden kann, wissentlich diese Formel zur Kennzeichnung seiner Grundstellung und Absicht gebraucht [The addition after the hyphen may seem arbitrary and artificial without knowing that Taine, who can be called the representative and symbol of the whole of the still prevailing era, knowingly used this formula as the characterization of his starting point and purpose]." (WM 105) Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine (1828-1893), philosopher and "psychologist," was one of the leading lights of positivism in France and an influence, for example, on Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology and, indirectly, on contemporary cognitive psychology.
94 I have translated 'das Nichts' as no-thing (hyphenated) to reflect Heidegger's point that 'das Nichts' is the absence of any effective actuality (be-ing) of any kind whatsoever. No thing of any sort can be detected. This contrasts with 'das Seiende' (be-ing) in all its various modes. Here begins a proliferation of terms used by Heidegger in his discussion of no-thing. Some are in common use in German, some have technical resonances in the literature of philosophy, and some are Heidegger's neologisms (marked with an *). Occasionally, an English neologism (marked **) has been required. The terms and their place of first appearance in the text are as follows: the pronoun 'nichts' [nothing, nothing (at all)] (105) and its related noun *'das Nichts' [no-thing] (105); the noun *'das Nicht' [the not] (108); the verb *'nichten' [to nihilate] (114), its related present participle and adjective *'nichtend' [nihilating] (114), and the nouns *'die Nichtung' [nihilation] (114) and 'das Nichten' [nihilating] (115); the noun *'das Nichthaft' [the not-like] (108), based on an implied neologism, the adjective *'nichthaft'; the verb 'vernichten' [to annihilate] (113) and the noun 'die Vernichtung' [annihilation] (113); two composite nouns 'das Nicht-Seiende' [what is not be-ing; i.e. what is other than one kind of being or another] (108) and 'das Nichtseiend' [not-be-ing; i.e. what is not at the time be-ing] (119); the nouns *'das Nichtige' [the null and void] (106) and 'die Nichtigkeit' [nullity] (119) (from the adjective 'nichtig' [null, invalid, void]); the verb 'verneinen' [to negate] (109), its past participle 'verneint' [negated] (109) and related adjective 'verneinend' [negative, negating] (113), based on the present participle of 'verneinen', and five related nouns: 'die Verneinung' [negation, in the sense of what is accomplished by placing a negative sign in front of a term in symbolic logic or mathematics)] (107), *'das Verneint' [the negated, the **negatived] (108), *'die Verneintheit' [negativity] 108), *'das Zu-verneinend' [what is do the negating] (116), and 'das Verneinen' [negating] (117); the noun *'das Verneinbar' [the **negatable], based on a neologism, the adjective 'verneinbar' [**negatable] (116); the adverb 'nein' ['no'] used as an interjection (118), and its related noun *'das Nein' [the No] (117); and the adverb 'kein' [no, none, or not any] (112).
95 "Wir wissen es, indem wir von ihm, dem Nichts, nichts wissen wollen." (WM 106)
96 *Fifth edition (1949): "die positive and ausschließlich Haltung zum Seienden [the positive and exclusive attitude toward be-ing]." (WM 106)
97 *Third edition (1931): "ontologische Differenz [ontological difference]." (WM 106) *Fifth edition (1949): "Nichts als 'Sein' [no-thing as 'be(ing)]'." (WM 106)
98 "Die Wissenschaft gibt es, mit einer überlegenen Gleichgültigkeit gegen es, preis als das, was 'es nicht gibt'." (WM 107)
99 *Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied, die Differenz [the distinction, the difference]." (WM 107) 'Unterschied' also refers to the difference in a subtraction problem. 'Differenz' may also mean difference of opinion or discrepancy (implying error).
100 *First edition (1929): "d.h. Logik im gewöhnlichen Sinne, was man so dafür nimmt [that is, logic in the usual sense that one uses the term]." (WM 107)
101 "Nur mit seiner Hilfe können wir doch überhaupt nur das Nichts betstimmen und als ein wenn auch nur sich selbst verzehrendes Problem ansetzen." (WM 107)
102 This sense of negation is exemplified by what the negative sign does in mathematics.
103 "Gibt es das Nichts nur, weil es das Nicht, d.h. die Verneinung gibt? Oder liegt es umgekehrt? Gibt es die Verneinung und das Nicht nur, weil es das Nichts gibt?" (WM 108)
104 *Fifth edition (1949): "Ursprungsordnung [(in the) order of origin or origination]." (WM 108)
105 *Fifth edition (1949): "die blinde Eigensinnigkeit: die certitudo des ego cogito, Subjektivität [blind single-mindedness: the certainty of the I think, subjectivity]." (WM 108)
106 "Zunächst und zumeist vermag der Mensch nur dann zu suchen, wenn er has Vorhandensein des Gesuchten vorweggenommen hat." (WM 109)
107 'Zumal' also means "at the same time."
108 The "thought up" is in one sense the imaginary. The point is, we can never imagine away everything.
109 "Aber das Nichts ist nichts . . .." (WM 109)
110 'Unterschiedslösigkeit' also means indifference, the condition of having lost all capacity for making (a) difference or for making differentiations.
111 Here Heidegger is pointing to the patent [seienden] latency [Nichts] of anything whatsoever.
112 The fundamental sense of "das Seiende im Ganzen" seems to be "be-ing at all."
113 This is the unity of what is simultaneously minimally ("at all") and maximally ("all") delimited.
114 The sense here is of when we are whiling away the time, fooling around, tinkering about.
115 This is the "at all" of "being at all."
116 Today Heidegger would likely have referred to watching television, playing video games, or passing the time with other such diversions.
117 'Gegenwart' actually means "the present" (in contrast with "the past" and "the future") or the grammatical "present tense." This is a telling usage. Heidegger here points to the coincidence of tense and temporal mode in existence. He refers in the same way to no-thing (WM 112).
118 Finding ourselves at all means finding ourselves somewhere, in a particular place, as χώρα.
119 'Begleiterscheinung' may also mean "side-effect."
120 'Ursprünglich' also means originatively, in a way that occasions or originates the event in question.
121 "Im Ganzen ist einem so." (WM 111) Variant: There is also something of this about the "at all" (as in "be-ing at all").
122 *Fifth edition (1949): "das Seiende spricht nicht mehr an [be-ing no longer appeals to this]."
123 In the following lines, Heidegger plays off the verbs 'bedrängen' (to pressure, in the sense of forcing someone's hand), 'umdrängen' (to close in on the way a storm approaches), and 'andrängen' (to play against, the way actors "play off" one another on stage).
124 "Es bleibt kein Halt." (WM 112) Variant: There's no getting a hold on anything.
125 Variant: We are "at sea" in dread.
126 The play is on the convertibility of the expressions "human being" and "be-ing human," in which be-ing means effective actuality.
*Fifth edition (1949): "aber nicht der Mensch als Mensch 'des' Da-sein [but not man a man 'in' existence]." (WM 112) Heidegger is not speaking of the "human (being)" (man or woman) understood as somehow the result (therefore, a "finished" being) of being there at all [Da-sein]. The additional play here is on 'Dasein' [existence], 'Da-sein' [(the emphatic state of) being there], and the verb 'da-sein' [to be there].
127 All that remains is pure, unalloyed being there. Variant: Here, in the shuddering of such suspense, where there is no thing of any kind to hold on to, there remains only / nothing other than pure being there. *Fifth edition (1949): "das Da-sein 'im' Mensch [the being there 'of' man]." The point is that existence belongs only to human beings. See the Introduction to the address.
128 "Die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort." (WM 112) Variant: Dread leaves us speechless (with nothing to say, without words to express ourselves).
129 "In der Tat: das Nichts selbst -- als solche -- war da." (WM 112) *Fifth edition (1949): "heißt: enthüllte sich; Entbergung und Stimmung [that is to say, discloses itself; opening up and mood]." 'Entbergung' is a neologism with allusions to confessing, letting one's real "feelings" show through, opening up, letting go.
130 In dread, we have caught up with existence and see it as it first comes to pass.
131 *Fifth edition (1949): "als Subjekt! Da-sein aber schon denkend heir vorerfahren, nur deshalb die Frage "Was ist Metaphysik?" hier fragbar geworden [as subject! Only by thinking of being there as already having been experienced beforehand has the question "What Is Metaphysics?" become questionable]." (WM 113)
132 *Fifth edition (1949): "Entbergung [opening up]." (WM 113)
133 "Die Angst ist kein Erfassen des Nichts." (WM 113)
134 Fifth edition (1949): "Unheimlichkeit und Unverborgenheit [uncanniness and emergence]." (WM 113)
135 " . . . das Nichts begenet in der Angst in eins mit dem Seienden im Ganzen." (WM 113)
136 *Fifth edition (1949): "der Unterschied [the difference]."
137 "Das Nichts begegnet vordem schon." (WM 114)
138 "In der Angst liegt ein Zurückweichen vor . . ., das freilich kein Fliehen mehr ist, sondern eine gebannte Ruhe." (WM 114) Variant: This falling back in the face of / retreating from what we find in dread is admittedly not a fleeing but rather a spellbound calm.
139 Two senses of 'abweisen' are at work here: turning away from (actively rejecting) and turning down (refusing, as in turning down a job offer).
140 This may also be construed as a referring (back [zurück]) to be-ing as a whole, based on another sense of 'Verweisen' (referring).
141 *Fifth edition (1949): "ab-weisen: das Seiende für sich; ver-weisen: in das Sein des Seienden [to turn away or turn down: be-ing in and of itself; to expel or refer back: within the be[ing] of be-ing]."
142 "Das Nichts selbst nichtet." (WM 114) *Fifth edition (1949): "als Nichten west, währt, gewährt das Nichts [in the way nihilating makes be, sustains, gives (up) no-thing]." (WM 114)
143 Nihilating does not begin at some point. The sense seems to be that nihilating only goes on happening. We never see its inception. No-thing has always already gotten underway.
144 *Fifth edition (1949): "d.h. Sein [that is, be[ing]]." (WM 114) Be[ing]] is the predecessive potential for be-ing at all or as a whole. In the predecessor, we find that event which Heidegger calls 'das Ereignis', the event that ushers in be-ing at all, the ground zero that marks a world for each existence. We, who exist, are thus the place holders (ciphers) of be[ing].
145 Variant: Originally nihilating no-thing brings forward being there in advance of / face to face with any such be-ing. *Fifth edition (1949): "eigens vor Sein des Seienden, vor den Unterschied [in particular, before (the) be(ing) of be-ing, before the difference]." (WM 114)
146 *First edition (1929): "1.) u.a. nicht nur, 2.) daraus nicht folgern: also ist alles Nichts, sondern umgekehrt: Übernehmen und Vernehmung des Seienden, Sein und Endlichkeit [(1) but it does not mean only this; (2) thus it does not follow that all is no-thing, but rather the other way around: the taking over and questioning of be-ing, be[ing] and finitude]." (WM 115)
147 "Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts." (WM 114) Variant: Existence means involvement in no-thing.
148 *Fifth edition (1949): "wer hält ursprünglich [who originally holds]?" (WM 115)
149 *Fifth edition (1949): "d.h. Nichts und Sein das Selbe [that means: no-thing and be[ing] the same]." (WM 115) The paratactic structure is familiar from Heidegger's late translations; for example, of the fragments of Parmenides in Was heißt Denken?.
150 *Fifth edition (1949): "Freiheit und Wahrheit im Vortrag 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' [freedom and truth in the essay 'On the Essence of Truth]." (WM 115) The essay, first given in 1930, was not published until 1943. Variant: No no-thing, no selfhood and no freedom.
151 *Fifth edition (1949): "nicht 'durch' [not 'in']." (WM 115)
152 *Fifth edition (1949): "Wesen: verbal; Wesen des Seins [essence: linguistic; essence of be[ing]]." (WM 115) Variant: . . . no-thing is the very essence of be[ing].
153 This is the first appearance of the term 'das Sein' in the lecture.
154 Fifth edition (1949): "weil in das Sein des Seienden [because in the be[ing] of be-ing]." (WM 116)
155 Using 'continually' here would more clearly preserve the temporality of the nihilating of no-thing.
156 The imagery and language here are suggestive of mathematics: givens, the negative sign [die Verneinung].
157 "Wie soll aber ein Verneinbares und Zu-verneinendes als ein Nichthaftes erblickt werden können, es sei denn so, daß alles Denken als solches auf das Nicht schon vorblick?" (WM 116)
158 *First edition (1929): "gleichwohl hier -- wie sonst Aussage -- die Verneinung zu nachträglich und äußerlich gefaßt [even here negation in the usual way of expressing it is too extraneous and superficial]." (WM 117)
159 *First edition (1929): "'Logik', d.h. die überlieferte Auslegung des Denkens ['logic', that is, (as) the traditional explanation of thinking]." (WM 117)
160 'Geworfenheit' refers to the basic condition of existence that it is given historically in such and such a way. Where and when we are born are fundamental to how our projects in life will be formulated and unfold. This endowment both allows and forces upon us a certain range of possibilities. Heidegger's usage implies our being fated to the particular conditions of our existence. In English we say some has been "had" when he has been deceived, taken in, made a fool of. There is something of this in 'Geworfenheit', too, but also a sense of mission and endowment that having been had in the human way brings into the picture. We might even try 'hadhood' here for 'Geworfenheit', since it is a German neologism. 'Geworfenheit' also refers to the status of what has to be, the givens, for example, of a problem in logic or mathematics. One sense of 'werfen', the root of term, is "having a baby." Each of us has also been "had" in this sense.
161 "Der Tiefe ihres Waltens entspricht das Geringfügige ihrer möglichen Veranlassung." (WM 118) Variant: Just because its possible occasions are rare, the sway of dread is very great when it does occur.
162 Heidegger is playing on the meaning of 'umreißen' in this sentence. The sense is that one is immobilized, hemmed in by dread.
163 Variant: Existence, which questions, i.e. the human being, brought up for questioning / put in question when any metaphysical question is brought up.
164 "From no-thing comes the created thing."
165 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (1812), translated by A.V. Miller as Hegel's Science of Logic (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, p. 82 [Volume I, Book One, Section One, Chapter 1]. "Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe."
166 Variant: . . . in their uncertainty or vagueness and unmediatedness.
167 *First edition (1929): "d.h. immer der überlieferten Logik und ihr Logik als Ursprung der Kategorien [this always means traditional logic and logic as the origin of the categories]." (WM 120)
168 "Every thing as a thing comes from no-thing."
169 "Im Nichts des Daseins kommt erst das Seiende im Ganzen seiner eigensten Möglichkeit nach, d.h. in endlicher Weise, zu sich selbst." (WM 120)
170 See Introduction to the lecture (above), written twenty years later, in which the meaning of 'existieren' is re(de)fined. Only man exists, since [the] no-thing comes of [his] existing. Man is an original.
171 "Das Hinausgehen über das Seiende geschieht im Wesen des Daseins." (WM 121) Variants: Exceeding be-ing is of the essence of existence. The essence of existence is being more than be-ing.
172 The reference is to Kant. See the Introduction to the lecture where it is repeated.
173 "For by nature, my friend, philosophy is in the mind of man." Hackforth's translation: "For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains an innate tincture of philosophy." The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns (1961) Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 524.
174 *In the first edition of Wegmarken (1967): "zweierlei gesagt: 'Wesen' der Metaphysik und ihre eigene seinsgeschickliche Geschichte; beide später genannt in der 'Verwindung' [said two ways: [the] 'essence' of metaphysics and its own befitting history; both [are] named in 'getting over (metaphysics)']." (WM 122)
175 "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"
176 The following note preceded this postscript in the fourth edition (1943) of the lecture "What Is Metaphysics?," which was the first to include the postscript: " Metaphysics is a word, no matter how abstract and near to thinking the word may be, from which everyone more or less flees, as from someone afflicted with the plague." Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Werke, Band XVII, p. 400."
177 Variant: . . . the inability to stand by what is given by the truth of this knowledge.
*Fifth edition (1949): "Ge-setz; Ereignis [(the) giv-en (com-mand); eventuality]." (NWM 304)
178 The question "What is metaphysics?" thus "comes to life" in a fresh way or even for the first time. It is roused from the slumber of ordinary treatments of it. It also "comes to" in becoming reoriented as a question with respect to us, the questioners: the question thus comes to have a new face. Like a ship, the question changes direction, "comes to" or "comes about."
179 *Fourth Edition (1943): "Auch dies noch metaphysisch vom Seienden her gesagt [but this still speaks about be-ing metaphysically]." (NWM 306)
180 *Fourth Edition (1943): "vom Seienden [of be-ing]." (NWM 306)
181 *Fifth edition (1949): "das Gewährende [the granting]." (NWM 306)
182 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of 'nie': "wohl [probably, no doubt]." Notes containing the original (1943) version of postscript are preceded by (†).
183 *Fourth edition (1943): "In der Wahrheit des Seins west das Seyn qua Wesen der Differenz; dieses Seyn qua ist vor der Differenz das Ereignis und deshalb ohne Seiendes [Bey[ing] comes to be in the truth of be[ing] as the [the] essence of difference; this bey[ing] as [] is the eventuality before the difference and therefore without be-ing]." (NWM 306) Heidegger's crossing out of the word 'be[ing]' in known from essay Zur Seinsfrage [On the Question of Being] (1955) New York: Twayne, 1958. The silence of the grammatical "voice" (Aktionsart or genus verbi) of be[ing] is indicated by the crossing out of the word, which becomes an unspoken word. Is this Heidegger's attempt to find a middle voice in German? *Fifth edition (1949): "Vordeutung aus Seyn qua Ereignis, aber dort (in der 4. Auflage) nicht verständlich [pre-understanding of bey[ing] as eventuality, but not understandable there (in the fourth edition)]." (NWM 306) Just as in German 'Seyn' is an antiquated spelling of 'Sein,' in English 'beying' is an antiquated spelling of 'being'. In pointing to the near antiquity of the spelling of 'Sein', he shows how pliable language is. It is readily compliant with the need for giving verbal expression to thought. Hölderlin, of course, still spelled the word 'Seyn'.
184 *Fifth edition (1949): "Wesen von Sein: Seyn, Unterschied; 'Wesen' von Sein mehrdeutig: 1. Ereignis, nicht durch Seiendes bewirkt, Ereignis—Gewährende; 2. Seiendheit—Washeit: während, dauernd, ἀεί [essence of be[ing]: bey[ing], distinction; 'coming to pass' of be[ing] [is] ambiguous: 1. eventuality, not effected by be-ing, eventuality—granting; 2. be-ingness— whatness; granting, lasting (going on), (for)ever]." (NWM 306) Be[ing] brings about be-ing or makes be-ing comes to pass without itself coming to pass or bringing itself about.
185 *Fifth edition (1949): "im Sinne von Seyn [in the sense of bey[ing]." (NWM 306)
186 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of 'niemals': "niemals aber [though nowhere]." (NWM 306)
187 *Fifth edition (1949): "'das Sein' (Austrag) als die lautlose Stimme, die Stimme der Stille ['be[ing]' (deliverance) as the inaudible voice, the voice of silence]." (NWM 306) The sense is that something issues forth, is brought to term (images of parturition are unmistakable here), something is come to terms with.
188 Variant: Man experiences that there is be-ing, not no-thing. This becomes the basis for consciousness, which is after the fact of having come to know [bewußt] about be-ing.
189 "Der also in seinem Wesen in die Wahrheit des Seins Gerufene ist daher stets in einer wesentlichen Weise gestimmt." (NWM 307) Variants: What is called (for) in the truth of be[ing] is always in tune with it in an essential way. The truth of be[ing] and what is, in truth, called for are in tune with each other there.
190 Or: . . . to stand up to, bear, put up with no-thing.
191 Heidegger's figure his is one of both arithmetic computation and control. Everything that is subjected to calculative thinking must be divisible into discrete discernible units and accountable to the operator of the computer. The explanations that calculative thinking produce must add up. Every problem has a solution. Everything must be submitted to analysis, understood, figured out. The results must be measurable, fixed to standards or measurement and expressible in statistical terms.
192 *Fifth edition (1949): "Rechnen: Herrschaft -- Bestellung; Denken: Gelassenheit in die Vereignung des Brauchs -- Ent-sagen [figuring out: control -- order; thinking: the composure of acclimation to custom -- re-nouncing]." (NWM 309)
193 "Statt mit dem Seienden auf das Seiende zu rechnen, verschwendet es sich im Sein für die Wahrheit des Seins." (NWM 309)
194 "Diese Denken antwortet dem Anspruch des Seins, indem der Mensch sein geschichtliches Wesen dem Einfachen der einzigen Notwendigkeit überantwortet, die nicht nötigt, indem sie zwingt, sondern die Not schafft, die sich in der Freiheit des Opfers erfüllt." (NWM 309) Variant: . . . just as man puts his historical essence in the hands of all that is of the essence . . .. 'Opfer' is, of course, sacrifice, but the basic meaning of sacrifice is giving up something.
195 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Das anfängliche Denken . . .": "'Das ursprüngliche Danken [Original thanking] . . ." (NWM 310). The note implies something in the ellipsis; but is it thanks for, thanks to, thanks of? The sense of 'anfänglich' applied here casts a wide net. It is thinking that sets one on the right track (steadying, consoling), begins ever anew (in which one is always a beginner), is innovative (starts something new), is unusual (exceptional, maybe even "excessive"). All of these attributes apply, of course, to Heidegger's way of thinking and writing. "The opening thought" sounds like the opening tone(s) of a piece of music.
196 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of " . . . in der sich das Einzige lichtet und sich ereignen läßt:": " . . . in der es sich lichtet und das Einzige sich ereignen läßt [in which it sheds light on itself and lets the unique come to pass]:." (NWM 310)
197 *Fifth edition (1949): "Ereignis [eventuality]." (NWM 310)
198 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Die Antwort des Denkens . . .": "Die sprachlose Antwort des Dankens im Opfer [the speechless reply of thanks in sacrifice]. . .." (NWM 310)
199 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Denken": "Danken [thanking]." (NWM 310)
200 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Danken": "Denken [thinking]." (NWM 310)
201 †In the fourth edition (1943), we read instead of "Bedanken": "Andenken [recalling (memory)]." (NWM 310)
202 " . . . als welches das Sein den Menschen für die Wahrheit des Seins in den Anspruch nimmt." (NWM 311) Man is then engrossed in speaking on behalf of the truth. Here Heidegger plays on 'ansprechen' (to speak to), the colloquial expression 'in den Anspruch nehmen' (to claim) , and 'ansprechend' (mutually attracting, in this case be[ing] and man). *Fifth edition (1949): "er-eignet, braucht [comes to pass, uses]." (NWM 311)
203 Or: balanced, as the books are balanced by an accountant, or miscalculated.
204 The point is that giving something up or sacrificing (in this case be-ing) does not mean losing anything.
205 Both the objective and subjective genitive are in play here.
206 "Das Denken des Seins sucht im Seiende keinen Anhalt." (NWM 311) Variant: Thinking of be[ing] hasn't got a clue about be-ing.
207 "Das Denken, gehorsam der Stimme des Seins, sucht diesem das Wort, aus dem die Wahrheit des Seins zur Sprache kommt." (NWM 311) These are words that fit or are appropriate to the truth of be[ing].
208 Variant: Thinking of be[ing] oversees or looks after words . . ..
209 Heidegger's use of 'Sorge' here carries the additional message of his sorrow about the way language was being used.
210 Clearing up of meanings of words in light of what thinks be[ing].
211 "Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige." (NWM 312) Variant: The thinker announces / heralds be[ing].
212 †The remaining lines of this paragraph were added to the postscript beginning with the fifth edition (1949) of the lecture. The Gesamtausgabe edition of Wegmarken does not note this addition.
213 The distinction being made is between 'der Dichter' (the classical poet), 'das Dichten' (what the classical poet does) and 'die Dichtung' (poetry or literature in general), on the one hand, and between 'das Dichten' (writing poetry) and 'die Poesie' ("creative writing"), on the other. As Heidegger had already noticed by 1949, philosophy and literary criticism were mingling in continental intellectual life.
214 The quotation is from Friedrich Hölderlin's "Patmos," lines 11-12. " . . . und die Liebsten / Nah wohnen, ermattend auf / Getrenntesten Bergen." See the bi-lingual edition of Hölderlin. Poems and Fragments, translated by Michael Hamburger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 463-464.
215 Variant: None other than be-ing is the veil of be[ing].
216 *Fifth edition (1949): "Das Nichts: das Nichtende, d.h. als Unterschied, ist als Schleier des Seins, d.h. des Seyns im Sinne des Erignisses des Brauchs [no-thing: what is nihilating, that is, as difference, is the veil of be[ing], that is, of bey[ing] in the sense of the eventuality of what is customary]." (NWM 312) One more neologism ('das Nichtende') is added at this point to the basic terms of the lecture.
217 In Scene 8, lines 1777-79, the Chorus speaks the last lines of the play:
Now let the weeping cease;
Let no one mourn again.
These things are in the hands of God.
Sophocles, Volume 1, in The Complete Greek Tragedies, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, edited by David Grene and Richard Lattimore (1941) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 155. Heidegger adds a line to Sophocles' text!
218 Apart from several letters and some verse, the following essays appear in bi-lingual editions: The Concept of Time (1992) London: Blackwell (William McNeill); "Messkirch's Seventh Centennial," in Listening (Dubuque) 8, 1973, 41-57 (Thomas Sheehan); The Essence of Reasons (1969) Evanston: Northwestern University Press (Terrence Malick); Identity and Difference (1969) New York: Harper and Row (Joan Stambaugh); "The Pathway," in Listening (Dubuque) 8, 1973, 32-39. Reprinted in Thomas Sheehan (ed.), Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker (1981) Chicago: Precedent Publishing Company, 69-72 (Thomas Sheehan); "The Question of Being (1958) New York: Twayne (William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde); What Is Philosophy? (1958) New York: Twayne, 1989 (William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde).