Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the Stud

That's French for "the ancient system," as in the ancient system of feudal privileges and the exercise of autocratic power over the peasants. The ancien regime never goes away, like vampires and dinosaur bones they are always hidden in the earth, exercising a mysterious influence. It is not paranoia to believe that the elites scheme against the common man. Inform yourself about their schemes here.

Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:41 am

APPENDIX B: Information Systems and Social Ethics

by GEOFFREY VICKERS

On Information Systems

In [earlier chapters] you almost omit reference to what I regard as the most revolutionary scientific image change of our time (although you rely on it in later chapters). And insofar as you do refer to it in Chapter 4, you do not distinguish it from other later and still pending changes. I refer to the revolutionary impact of the distinction which science has learned to draw in the last 30 years between energy and information. This, more than anything else (in my view), has changed the scientific image of reality by negating reductionism and substituting a hierarchic concept of levels of organization, each dependent on but not explicable in terms of the level below (thus confirming what Michael Polanyi has been saying) [without its aid].

It has also legitimized the scientific study of human communication (which you barely mention) and thus introduced a new scientific image of man as communicating social man and of the hierarchic development of both persons and societies by attaining different levels of communication. D. M. Mackay, for example, has tried to show why and how dialogue differs from attempts at mutual manipulation by words. I once heard Professor Ham at Toronto interrupt a similar demonstration to show how far the diagram he had drawn fell short of the kind of mutual communication described by Martin Buber in I and Thou. Saul Gorn writes, "We spend the first year of our lives learning that we end at our skin, and all the rest of our lives learning that we don't." These men are a physicist, an engineer, and a designer of computer languages.

Note that this huge change results not at all (as yet) from studying ESP and all that. It comes from studying those familiar powers at which science had declined to look, even when it took them for granted. Science itself has always developed far more by listening, talking, and reflecting than by observing, experimenting, and reasoning. Knowledge of (not merely about) other human beings depends even more on social communication. Our main input comes neither from our five accepted senses, nor from our more esoteric ones, but from the activity of our own minds in intimate linguistic communication with others. This fact, emerging from scientific tabu, makes the human dimension respectable.

Brief references to this revolution are to be found in Chapter 4 (e.g. the reference to hierarchy). I would like to see them developed, separated and put earlier. . . . The revolution is itself both earlier in time and distinct in character from those to which you look forward. It has already taken place. It is a shift in scientific categories as important as the distinction of energy from matter which marked the previous 250 years. And, incidentally, it is essential to understanding how any kind of ethic arises.

Let me expand a little on the revolution. (I have written about this in many papers, e.g. in "Science and the Regulation of Society.") When Driesch in the 1890s asserted that his divided sea-urchin embryos could not grow into complete sea urchins unless they somehow knew where they were going, he wrongly postulated a goal-seeking force (entelechy) and was reviled, because forces must not be thought of as seeking goals. If he had advanced the much more daring, but more correct, hypothesis that every cell was saturated with information about the future shape of the whole, he would have been ignored because information was not then a scientific concept. It became a scientific concept half a century later — and within another decade Crick and Watson had identified (not broken) the genetic code. Three centuries earlier Descartes had had to postulate a special kind of matter (res cogitans) to account for mind, just as Driesch had to postulate a special kind of energy to account for form-making. Both men lacked an acceptable universe or discourse adequate to express their insights.

Similarly Freud, trying to describe form in terms of energy, was driven into difficulties which would simply not have arisen if he had been born a few decades later. His successors are beginning to fill out his concept of the ego as a creator of form, rather than a resultant of forces.

If this view is acceptable to you, I hope you will be able to squeeze it in, partly as an example of prematurity and tabu, but chiefly as the most important conceptual revolution of our time — hardly a debt to science (non-scientists have always known that men lived in a conceptual world of their own making) but the withdrawal of a scientific tabu which legitimizes human communication as the means by which men humanize themselves and their children and build a human world hierarchically distinct from the biological organ with which they build it. Every computer engineer knows that there is a category difference between a program and a computer. An un-programmed computer cannot compute. And even the activities of a programmed computer, if described in physical terms, give no clue at all to what the program is all about. Some psychologists and biologists may still think it a scandal to distinguish mind from brain as complementary categories hierarchically ordered. But such distinctions are common assumptions to programmers and electronic engineers.

So even if there were no other states of consciousness, we should be in for a major revolution by being allowed to think about the ones we know we have.

I am most interested in all Chapter 4 has to say about research into different states of consciousness and about psi phenomena. I find all this much more relevant and important than I expected. But I think it will greatly gain if you can separate it from this other element. This would also enable you to deal more adequately with general systems theory which owes its development on the psycho-social side to the concept of information. It would be well, in doing so, to mark the distinction between systems open only to the exchange of energy and those open also to the exchange of information. This is an important distinction in general systems theory as I understand it, and an essential ingredient in the building of hierarchies of organization.

On Social Ethics

This lacuna (as I see it) in your presentation seems to me also to weaken Chapter 5. . . . Ethics appear as something we need but we have been told virtually nothing about how they originate except that they are influenced by images of man. Now whatever their origin, ethics can only be understood (by me at least) as standards of what to expect from each other and from ourselves in concrete situations. They are possible only because we can engage through communication in these social and inter-personal transactions.

You rightly stress that these standards reflect images of man current in the culture. But because you understress (in my view) the specifically social nature of man (humanized by membership of a specific society), you leave the reader to assume that the cogency of an ethic in your view derives directly from belief in a metaphysic, i.e. that the "ought" is derived directly from the "is." Apart from the fact that this is generally regarded as very imperfectly true, it leaves a weakness which becomes apparent in Chapter 5 when we are invited to plan the development of an ecological ethic and self-realization ethic. From then on we search, almost in vain, for an indication that the new image of man is to imply any sense of responsibility towards his neighbour next door.

Now it seems to me self-evident that a world such as you describe would have to pay for being de-politicized and decentralized by a huge increase in social responsibility and that this would greatly limit all this self-actualization except insofar as it became (as it should) a main channel through which individuals actualize themselves. A more human world will be a more socially responsible world and this responsibility will have costs as well as benefits, limitations as well as enlargements in terms of "self-actualization." This verity is the great tabu of the counter-culture. It seems to me to have infected you also. The resolution or containment of conflict is not explained, but simply assumed.

Everyone knows that I do not further my neighbour's self-actualization by seeking my own any more (or less) than I further his wealth by seeking my own. On the other hand, to find one's own self-actualization simply in helping others to find theirs has always been one definition of a saint. Yet your summary of "an adequate image of man," suddenly replete with ethics, seems to have no room for social ethics at all. A duty to the ecosphere is the only duty expected of this abstract Man — except the duty to "actualize himself." It does not expressly deny that no one can actualize his potential in one way without denying its actualization in another, or actualize it in any way in isolation from his neighbour. But it makes no reference to the social demands and constraints within which this personal artistry is to be performed, and which are inseparable from its value.

So my basic question (if not yours) remains unanswered. An adequate image of man for the U.S.A. in A.D. 2000 would find a jointly acceptable position for the negro, assure integrity in the White House and produce a markedly different distribution of wealth, earnings, and incomes (I could produce a similar catalogue for Britain). It is not clear to me how these would flow merely from the changed images of man described in Chapter 5.

This comment is the residue of my original objection that changing images of man will not of itself change social ethics and cannot even be convincingly described without including an account of social ethics and the reciprocal effect of social ethics on it. In other words, it complains that all this thinking lacks an adequate sociological dimension. (Philosophical thinking nearly always does. I regard Man with a capital letter as a danger signal.) You cannot fully meet this point even if you wanted to, but I think it would help if you were to give more importance to the emergence of human communication as a subject for study at its familiar levels and not only at the higher levels which most interest you and thus to the current change in the image of communicating, social man, member, creator, and creation of a specific social group.
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:41 am

APPENDIX C: A View of Modified Reductionism (excerpted from The Method of Science and the Meaning of Reality)

by HENRY MARGENAU

The problem of "levels of explanation" recurs frequently . . . and it merits attention.

It needs to be faced . . . because it involves the question whether all phenomena in this world, including the most complex, can find their ultimate explanation in the constructs of the simpler sciences. The answer is not an unqualified Yes or No.

First of all, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between levels of explanation and levels of organization. The term levels of explanation refers, strictly speaking, to degrees of abstractness of the explanatory scheme, to what one might call metaphorically the distance of the constructs of explanation from the protocol plane of experience. Levels of organization, on the other hand, designate stages of complexity of phenomena. Theories which postulate the need of different types of law, i.e. of different modes of explanation at different levels of complexity, are also characterized as theories of different levels of explanation. In the present context the sense of this phrase will be thus construed.

The problem of levels appears also as the problem of reducibility of phenomena. It asks whether observations on a plane of high complexity are reducible to the laws active on a lower plane, for instance whether biological phenomena such as growth, cellular organization, teleological function, etc., are ultimately explicable by reference to the laws of physics and chemistry. Every question about levels can therefore be transformed to one with respect to reducibility.

Two essential resolutions of the problems of reducibility have been proposed. One is the radical negative one which claims that different laws act at different levels of complexity and that these laws may well be logically unrelated or even contradictory. According to this view, there is no continuity of explanation between levels. The other thesis insists upon a continuous connection between explanatory modes at different stages of complexity. This latter view may take two forms:

(a) The laws at the lowest level and sufficient to explain phenomena on all levels. These basis laws, to be sure, may not be fully known at the present time, but it is expected that when they are at hand they will explain all possible observations in the entire universe.

(b) The second view is milder. It does not claim, for example, that the laws of physics and chemistry are necessarily sufficient to account for happenings in the biological realm, but it insists that the laws in the more complex biological field, while not identical with those of physics and chemistry, are nevertheless logically compatible with them. This last view, (b), which asserts limited reducibility will be espoused in this discussion and in this book we proceed to describe it now in more explicit terms.

Perhaps at the lowest level of scientific interest is the mechanics of particles. Here the physicist is able to operate with simple theories involving Newton's laws and the idea of forces. The state of a small system of particles is fully described in terms of the positions and velocities of the particles and the forces that act between them.

Greater complexity is met at the level of large aggregates of particles such as gases and liquids. Here it is useless to describe conditions in terms of positions and velocities of all individual molecules. Higher level concepts like temperature, pressure, phase, entropy, etc., are needed. These concepts, while perfectly clear in their reference to aggregates, have no meaning with respect to a single molecule; a single molecule has no temperature, no pressure, no entropy, etc. Yet there is no logical contradiction at all between the assumption that a gas has temperature and a single one of its constituents has not. Furthermore, knowledge of the positions and velocities of each individual molecule permits an inference (through well-known theorems of statistical mechanics of all the collective properties of the gas. The reverse, however, is not true: knowing the temperature, pressure, entropy, etc., of a gas one cannot infer the positions and velocities of the individual molecules. This state of affairs is best characterized by saying that there is continuity of explanation from below, but not from above. One can go continually toward an understanding of matters on the higher plane if one starts with knowledge on the lower plane, though not in the reverse direction. But in this ascent, knowledge on the lower plane becomes irrelevant because new concepts like temperature, etc., emerge, and these have no direct reference to particles.

Another example may further clarify the situation. Many problems of atomic physics can be understood on the basis of so-called dynamical laws, the laws which control the behavior of individual electrons, protons, and other so-called elementary particles. These are regulated by the Schrodinger equation (or some other "wave" equation) which is, in a certain sense, the equivalent of Newton's second law in classical mechanics. If, however, several electrons or several other particles of the same kind are present, another, more important law supervenes upon the Schrodinger equation; this is Pauli's Exclusion Principle which rules that no two electrons can be in the same state. It is this remarkable principle, dealt with more fully in the next chapter, which makes possible all so-called cooperative effects in inorganic matter: the unique regularities of atomic structure, chemical binding, crystal shapes, magnetism, electrical conductivity, and many others. This principle, on the other hand, has absolutely no relevance for single electrons; its significance arises only in connection with collectives. Once more, explanation is continuous from below but discontinuous from above.  

There is at present no road toward a full explanation of biological effects from the domains of physics and chemistry. In accordance with the present interpretation of level theory, however, higher level "organizational" laws which will be discovered in researches on biological phenomena are likely to be sui generis, not derivable from what is known at present in the physical realm. Yet when discovered they are expected to be compatible with what is known on this lower level.

It is this cautious view of reducibility, this modern version of the theory of levels of explanation, that is being held in this book when reference is made to the problems of reducibility, or of levels of explanation. Many aspects of these levels are clarified and used extensively by Taylor (Chapter 5); they play an important role in our understanding of social organization.
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:42 am

APPENDIX D: Scientific Images of Man and the Man in the Street

Comment by Rene Dujbos


I do not share the common belief that the images of man have been profoundly influenced by science. But I realize that the report is organized precisely around this assumption. To quote your own words, "The focus of the study is directed at images that are largely derivative from industrialism and science. ..." It is obvious, of course, that technology has influenced somewhat the attitude of the man in the street but I am much more skeptical concerning the effects of theoretical science. I suspect that a learned and sophisticated man of Greece or of China 2500 years ago would have had an image of himself and of his relation to the cosmos not very different from that of academic people in America today. As to the man in the street, I doubt that he is more concerned with this problem than was an average citizen anywhere in the Western world a few hundred years ago.

Comment by David Cahoon

I will share with you a line of rumination that the chapters evoked in me, a "fear" that I have seen given little attention (except by Donald Michael in The Unprepared Society and his recent book on Planning for Change). What "hits" me from your perspective on "Images" is that there seems to be a growing gap between a generalized "popular mind" and perhaps a "professional mind" regarding "Image of Man." For example,... it seems to me that the "popular mind" is rather unaffected by what you call the "industrial era images" that might be in conflict or alternatives to the "Am. Creed" Image (man as "beast," man as "mechanism," man as "holon," "Perennial Phil." image).

The "professional mind," on the contrary, is strongly troubled by these conflicting "images." In other words, the religious and political heritage seems dominant for the "popular mind," while increasingly the scientific heritage is dominant for the "professional mind." True, the "popular mind" buys materialism and technology, an offshoot of science and "economic man," but as William Thompson has recently emphasized (in The Edge of History) this seems to be more "pragmatic" than empirical-positivistic, and the surge toward Edgar Cayce and Jesse Stern-type "spiritualism" would seem to reflect an old "soul" image more than a new para-psychic scientific image. Thus the "popular mind" image is probably much less aware of or threatened by such trends as "friendly fascism," Ellul's technological out-of-human-control dynamism, Roger MaGowan Mechanized Cy-Borg phantasies, or a Kafka-esque diffused paranoia.

Also, it seems likely that the "popular mind" will react to Toffler's "future shock" increased pace of change, confusion, uncertainty, etc., by over-stimulation threat, retreat, regression, etc., while more of the "professional mind" will respond with stimulation, challenge, adaptation.

So if, as you argue, science "images of man" will increasingly displace the religious heritage as formative in the culture, I wonder if this will not be differentially true with these two "publics," and possibly not very true at all with the "popular mind"? If this is so, we face a dangerously "elitist" planning or social engineering gap in the culture, where the democratic heritage would operate increasingly without power or impact on the directions of change. It seems to me that this "Images" gap from the heritage of science will only get much larger as the "professional mind" is strongly influenced by the new astronomy, DNA-RNA life-tampering, para-psychic and meditative disciplines, bio- genetics, systems analysis, anti-matter worlds and "flying torches," etc.! I oversimplify, of course, and there are great diversities within the two categories "popular mind" and "professional mind"... but some differential "Images" impact seems strongly inevitable and elitist — especially so, since the intellectual community of communications- math-cybernation-etc. will surely be the new priesthood of the post- industrial society?
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:42 am

APPENDIX E: Some Projects Suited to Government or Foundation Support

Without claiming that they have been, or could be, demonstrated, Chapter 8 laid our five premises that are at least plausible on the basis of the arguments presented therein. In summary, they are:

1. There are increasingly evident signs of the imminent emergence of a new image of man.

2. An interrelating set of fundamental dilemmas, growing apparently ever more pressing, seem to demand for their ultimate resolution a drastically changed image of man-on-earth.

3. There is a serious mismatch between modern industrial-state culture and institutions and the emerging new image of man.

4. There is, and will continue to be, deep psychological resistance to both the new image and its implications.

5. The evolutionary transformation described in Chapter 7 is desirable, indeed necessary, if highly undesirable future outcomes are to be avoided.

Based on these premises six elements of an overall strategy for a non-disruptive transition were derived. In summary form these are:

1. Promote awareness of the unavoidability of the transformation.

2. Foster construction of a guiding vision of a workable society built around the new image of man and new social paradigm.

3. Foster a period of experimentation and tolerance for diverse alternatives.

4. Encourage a politics of righteousness and a heightened sense of public responsibilities of the private sector.

5. Promote systematic exploration of, and foster education regarding, man's inner life, his subjective experience.

6. Plan adequate social controls for the transition period while safeguarding against longer-term losses of freedom.

Following are some exemplary projects that derive from or are compatible with this overall strategy.

Promoting National and World Awareness

• Generate dialogue, possibly in connection with the American Issues Forum to be conducted during the U.S. Bicentennial year, relating to the nature, necessity, and timing of the transformation, and the definition of a more workable post-industrial society.

• Prepare dialogue-focusing materials (pamphlets, videotapes, etc.) relating to the broad characteristics of the transformation, the challenge of the "new scarcity," the future of work, economic incentives to foster ecologically sound behavior, alternate fates of the poor nations, possibilities of a "steady-state" economy, etc.

Addressing Global and Large-scale Problems

• Following Piatt (1969), initiate and support coordinating councils to focus and legitimate research on solutions to our major future systemic crises.

• Support projects to generate images of post-industrial social organization and global community, test for resolution of key dilemmas of high-technology society, deduce norms of human behavior which would permit these images to be realized.

• Develop a multi-level planning network to provide coordinated participative planning in such areas as economic development, land use, education, environment, transportation, family assistance, communications. (A model for the national-level portion of such a network is delineated in Senator Humphrey's Balanced National Growth and Development Policy Bill, S-3050.)

• Develop the capability to carry out anticipatory planning for future crises (as contrasted with reactive planning after the crisis has occurred).

• Fund research to develop the application of systems analysis to the global environment, to allow more rapid assessment of interconnectivity of global systems, the nature of the relationships among them, and the varying contribution of major regions of the world to perturbations of the systems.

• Develop simulation and general systems-analysis tools for application to complex environmental systems, management of organizations, ecological simulation, etc.

• Map the major global systems, indicating nations/corporations responsible for their management plus assessment of the minimum conditions necessary for their maintenance.

• Study ways of making complex social systems less vulnerable to system breakdown (either accidental or deliberately caused), e.g. development of system-independent alternative technologies for continued life-support during breakdown.

• Explore the possibility of a general-systems anthropological-sociological-biological paradigm of human ecology, taking into account cultural images, biological rhythms, relations with nature, rapid environmental changes, etc.

Fostering Social and Institutional Experimentation

• Promote experiments with steady-state economics, new forms of "general-benefit" corporations, new life styles, etc.

• Fund experimental communities to test various alternative future scenarios.

• Develop "Blueprint for Survival" types of projects.

• Promote experiments to improve communications and reconciliation of differences between groups holding different conceptual paradigms.

Studies of Ethics and Values

• Carry out research on changing ethics and values in advanced societies, focusing particularly on implications for the future of the advanced world.

• Study historical examples of relative amounts of competitive versus cooperative behavior as affected by stress conditions, with particular emphasis on the cultural factors influencing the balance.

• Explore uses of mass media to alert populations to the social macro-problem and to behaviors essential to its ultimate resolution.

Research on the Nature of Man

• Research into the broadest possible range of conscious processes via drug research, hypnosis, biofeedback, etc., to actively investigate the state-specific nature of science and to break loose from present limitations on the current technological paradigm.

• Investigation of man's perception of time: the sense of emergency is directly related to the temporal sense of the individual. What are the factors controlling this? What are the possibilities in modulation of time sense so that we become alert to potential crises with a longer lead time?

• Active research into alternate problem-solving modes, employing methods of stimulating creativity, inventive states of mind, etc.

• Research into the training and use of paranormal perception (possibly via behavioral techniques) to accentuate the evolution of certain essential aspects of man's consciousness.

• Investigation of the sensitivity of the human organism to the changes wrought in the environment by industrial activities — e.g. electromagnetic pollution, noise pollution — and techniques for the lowering of these. What are the effects of population density of image-of-man concerns? What kinds of characteristics in environmental design are essential to the overall health of the human being? This latter is crucial as man spends more and more total time in completely artificial spaces.

• Investigation of the effects of biological entrainment, biological rhythms, etc.

• Research on the effects of one's thoughts (attitudes, emotional states) on the lower microorganisms in the body — which together form essential symbiotic sybsystems on which the functioning of the larger human system depends; relationship to psychosomatic illness.

• Research into how to develop capacity to use seven new "senses of the mind" (proposed by Teilhard de Chardin in The Phenomenon of Man, suggested to us by Professor Jonis A. Roze) that would allow an expanded evolutionary picture to become comprehensible:

1. A sense of spatial immensity, recognizing everything, from the subatomic to the supergalactic and all that is in between, as an immensity within which we can follow in our minds the lines and radii that lead toward us from every object, however far away and however close or within.

2. A sense of depth, or a sense of time, breaking out from the narrow confines of the immediate past events and known histories that condition the perception of our whole life. This would enable us to sense endless sequences in time going far beyond the immediate human time-reference scale, even for humanity as a whole, and to encompass sequences and events of billions of years of duration and flow.

3. A sense of number, denoting the profound interdependence and interaction that every movement and change, however slight, demonstrates "the bewildering multitude of material or living elements." This is akin to the expression that one cannot pluck a blade of grass without the trembling of a star, i.e. the simplest act reverberates and touches myriads of things around it.

4. A sense of proportion, acknowledging in our mind levels upon levels of organization of the universe, each expressing its own unique reality: the world of quarks and atoms with its lawfulness and interaction, the world of minerals and crystals, the world of animals and plants, the world of man with its unique laws and interactions, and so on, spreading from microcosms to macrocosms.

5. A sense of quality, recognizing certain new stages of evolutionary growth and perfection and the excellence of their expression that is complete in itself, yet without isolating them or stopping the process or "breaking the physical unity of the world."

6. A sense of movement, perceiving within the seeming immobility, slowness and repetitiousness of the world the underlying and ongoing development and recognizing the inner push and explosive power impulsing an irresistible move toward creating the evolutionary newness.

7. A sense of the organic, "discovering physical links and structural unity under the juxtaposition of successions and collectivities" by which the natural development of any process and structure is seen as an organic or authentic phenomenon, part of the natural ecology of the universe.
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:43 am

APPENDIX F: The Basic Paradigm of a Future Socio -cultural System [ i]

by VIRGINIA H. HINE

Center member Virginia Hine is an anthropologist at the University of Miami. She has been collaborating with anthropologist Luther P. Gerlach of the University of Minnesota on studies of "movements" — political, social, religious, self-help, and others. Hine and Gerlach characterize these structures as "segmented polycephalous networks." In the following paper written for World Issues Hine draws an analogy between these non -hierarchical groups and multinational corporations.


Futurists of various persuasions extrapolate trends, create scenarios, design global cultures and computerize Utopias. Unwilling to accept the apparently haphazard trial-and-error process by which evolutionary changes have occurred in the past, many who were trained in the man-in-control-of-nature myth are now heroically attempting to fill the role of man-in-control-of-evolution. As various schools of futurists compete for funds, influence, and a crack at the global controls, evolution has been bumbling along in its accustomed way, caroming off the walls of resistance to change, picking up a viable mutant here and there, and spawning even more glorious variations. Even the rational plans of the futurists are grist for its multi-faceted mill.

Perhaps the time has come when we can penetrate the mists and see the shape of things to come, not as we might have planned them, but as they are in fact emerging. Piecing together a range of observations by anthropologists, sociologists, it is possible to suggest that the basic paradigm of a future socio-cultural system is already born — muling and puking in its infantile state, but here.

Most futurists assume the bureaucratic mode to be the only mechanism by which large numbers of people can be organized. Therefore, in contemplating the emergence of a global society they take it for granted that a global bureaucracy of some sort is inevitable. They argue only about whether it can be democratic in nature or will, of necessity, be a "Leviathan," costing large sums of individual freedoms. Others, often considered impractical idealists, talk of debureaucratization and decentralization, but offer few ideas as to how this state of affairs could come about. The assumption is made that those in positions of economic and political power are unlikely to voluntarily change their mode of operation because the source of their power is the bureaucratic structure.

In the past fifteen years there has been an intensification of effort by the powerless in nations around the world to organize themselves to effect social structural change. During the last ten of these years, Luther P. Gerlach of the University of Minnesota and I have been doing research in a wide range of these so-called "movements." We have found that no matter what the "cause," the goals, or the beliefs, and no matter what type of movement it is — political, social, religious — there is the same basic structural form and mode of functioning. Wherever people organize themselves to change some aspect of society, a non-bureaucratic but very effective form of organizational structure seems to emerge.

We called the type of structure we were observing a "segmented polycephalous network," a clumsy phrase that led to an acronym SPN, pronounced "spin." For reasons which will become clear as the discussion unfolds, it will henceforth be written as SP(I)N.

Conventional organization charts usually involve boxes arranged in a hierarchical order with the controlling box either at the top or the bottom. An organization chart of a SP(I)N would look like a badly knotted fishnet with a multitude of nodes or cells of varying sizes, each linked to all the others either directly or indirectly. Some of those cells within the network would, in themselves, be hierarchically organized bureaucracies recognized by the public as regional, national, or even international organizations. Examples from the environmental movement were the Audubon Society or the Sierra Club. Counterparts in Black Liberation would be the NAACP, the Urban League or CORE. Feminism has its NOW and Red Power its National Congress of American Indians. But in all these movement networks, the majority of cells are local groups of varying sizes from a handful of members to several hundreds, some organized according to the conventional mode, many ad hoc, egalitarian, face-to-face groups that are here today and gone or reorganized tomorrow. The multitude of nodes or cells within a movement structure can be loosely lumped into segments which hang together ideologically or in terms of preferred tactics. This factionalism functions to escalate the speed with which the movement grows and to bring about changed responses from the "establishment" more effectively than any one segment could do alone. In addition, factionalism prevents takeover by any one segment through the mechanism of temporary coalitions between other segments to offset attempted control by one.

While a bureaucracy is segmented in the sense that it has divisions and departments, it is an organic whole in that its parts are designed to perform specialized tasks necessary to the functioning of the whole. Decapitate it, or destroy a vital organ, and the social organism ceases to function effectively. A SP(I)N, on the other hand, is composed of autonomous segments which are organizationally self-sufficient, any of which could survive the elimination of all of the others. The biological analogy of the bureaucratic mode of organization is the vertebrate, that of a SP(I)N, an earthworm. This is the feature of movement organization that is so frustrating to those who would like to suppress one or gain control of it.

The second characteristic of the SP(I)N mode of organization is decentralization. Movements do not have a single paramount leader who can control or even speak for the entire movement. Each cell has its own cell or segment and may not be recognized as a leader by members of other segments of the movement. Leaders are often charismatic individuals who collect circles of devoted followers. Often, however as his segment grows, unsung organizational leaders rise to promote the functioning of the local groups identified with him, and the linked segments survive the death or jailing of the charismatic individual very well. Frequently a leader is no more than primus inter pares, or first among equals, who speaks for the group only on certain occasions and can influence consensus decision-making rather than make decisions for the group. Those who have tried to suppress a movement by silencing its most visible leaders find that they are coping with a hydra-headed monster where new leadership seems to pop up out of nowhere. In addition, any one leader has influence only within his own cell or segment and may not be known to active participants in other groups identified with the movement.

The real key to understanding the power of a SP(I)N is recognizing the nature of the unifying forces that keep the structure from disintegrating. One of the forces that integrates a SP(I)N is a range of horizontal organizational linkages; the other is ideological.

Non-vertical organizational linkages are of several types. First, there is overlapping membership. When numbers of people mobilize to effect social change, the segmented organizational pattern that emerges involves individual participation in more than one segment. Participants in any movement characteristically belong to, support, or interact with several different nodes in the network — sometimes nodes that are very differently organized and have apparently conflicting goals and ideological variations. Frequently the schismatic tendencies characteristic of the segmentary mode of organization result in a split within one node, like the well-publicized split within the Sierra Club leadership during the height of the environmental movement. This resulted in the formation of another organization, the Friends of the Earth, by the ousted faction. Many Sierra Club members, unscathed by the soul-searing eruption and at the core, cheerfully joined FOE while continuing to be active in the Sierra Club, forming linkages between the two groups in spite of their differences.

There is a great deal of interaction between leaders of cells in a movement structure which may link a few local groups into a close association or connect hundreds of groups across the country in loose and indirect ways. Frequently the leader of one group will be a follower-member in another. Often the linkage is maintained by periodic visits by the leader of one group who speaks to or works with another's for a time. These types of ties tend to cement groups of similar ideology into large interacting segments, or may operate across segment lines linking groups with quite disparate forms of organization or ideological approach.

Still another type of linkage is the "ritual activity" — the rallies, demonstrations, marches, conferences, revival meetings, joint activities of one sort or another. The temporary collaboration between disparate groups within the movement required by these types of activities cut across segment cleavages and bind the autonomous cells in significant, unifying events.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the segmentary mode of organization is the role of the ideological bond. The real glue of a SP(I)N is represented by the I in the parenthesis. The S, the P, and the N represent organizational factors which can be handled at the sociological level of analysis. But the power of a unifying idea adds a qualitatively different element to the equation. The power lies in a deep commitment to a very few basic tenets shared by all. Agreement on all of the ideological variations would be non-functional for the segmentary form of organization. It is the passionate argument about these conflicting variations and about conflicting concepts of how to implement movement goals that keep the segments separate and in enough opposition to prevent an attempted takeover by any one segment.

The segmentary mode of organization is not a recent innovation, nor has it been useful only to those who want change. Many pre-industrial societies in Africa and the Middle East were organized according to the segmentary principle. It provided an efficient mode of organization for groups of several hundreds of thousands of people and tended to remain relatively stable over tens of thousands of years. This is in contrast to the hierarchical, stratified modes of organization which are notable for their inherent instability, in what has come to be known as the rise and fall of civilizations. In those societies structured on the segmentary principle, unifying ideology was usually that of common ancestry. The classic example is the desert tribes in Arabia who were in continual fratricidal conflict but who always surprised their would-be conquerors by an incredible capacity to coalesce, apparently overnight, into a unified fighting force.

It is impossible to explore properly, in this space, why the SP(I)N might be an adaptive pattern of social organization for the global society of the future. Suffice it to say that it is precisely the sort of pattern consistent with a vision of "the global village," "debureaucratization," "decentralization," and "re-humanization." In very practical terms, our research data suggest that the SP(I)N type of structure does several things: it encourages full utilization of individual and small-group innovation while minimizing the results of failure; it promotes maximum penetration of ideas across socio-economic and cultural barriers while preserving cultural and sub-cultural diversity; it is flexible enough to adapt quickly to changing conditions; and it puts a structural premium on egalitarian, personalistic relationship skills in contrast to the impersonalistic mode of interaction suited to the bureaucratic paradigm.

How about the picture seen from the top down? It is suggested that we do indeed now have what "one-worlders" have been demanding for decades — a supra-national level of organization capable of reducing international conflict and assuming the task of global resource management. Rational attempts to invent such a structure — the League of Nations and then the United Nations — have failed, it is said, because they were built upon the very form of social organization they were designed to supersede — the nation state. I would suggest that these attempts also failed because their creators were unable to break out of the cultural assumption of the inevitability of the bureaucratic mode of organization.

What has, in fact, emerged is a qualitatively different form of organization, a novel mechanism of global management that is already functioning to make large-scale warfare impractical, therefore obsolete, and is in fact allocating global resources and managing global productivity. Just as participants in grass roots movements often fail to recognize the organizational genius of the SP(I)N within which they are operating, and call for more centralized control, so many individuals who are participants in the global management SP(I)N also fail to recognize it as an organizational structure.

Academicians from a variety of disciplines use a variety of terms to describe the actors in this supranational network. Many speak of an "oligarchy." Others use terms like "global power elites," "managerial elites," and "global managers." Most of these discussions, of course, center around the phenomenal growth of the multinational corporations since World War II. Many are pointing out that this new level of organization is already beyond the capacity of the nation states to control it, as if the power of the multinational corporation and the authority of the nation state represented opposing forces.

The most penetrating insight into the true nature of this emergent, supra-national level of social organization has come from anthropologist Alvin Wolfe who began to catch the outlines of it during his study of the mining industry in South Africa. He suggests that it is a new level of socio-cultural integration, a new system of social control "somewhat independent of the currently troublesome units, the nation states," though these are components. Wolfe calls it an "imperfectly bounded network" which "binds groups that are different both structurally and functionally." The segmentary nature of this global organizational structure becomes clearer as one pieces together the work of scholars like Wolfe, the Center's Neil Jacoby, G. William Domhoff, Richard N. Goodwin in his The American Condition, and Richard Barnet's and Ronald Muller's Global Reach.

The four major segments of the global management network are upper level decision-makers in the multi-national corporations, in international financial institutions, in the governments of both industrialized and underdeveloped "host" countries, and representatives of powerful families in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, South Africa, the Philippines and Asia.

In our analysis of the SP(I)Ns at the grass roots level, we noted that some of the component segments within the network are hierarchically organized and centrally controlled but that the network as a whole was polycentric, no one component able to exert control over the rest. Wolfe and others note the same characteristic of the supra-national network. Multinational corporations are organized according to different modes, some using a decentralized mode of operation transnationally and some maintaining highly centralized control in the international headquarters. Nation states also vary in the degree of centralization. In any case, the internal structure of any one component in a SP(I)N is irrelevant to the structure of the network as a whole. As Wolfe points out, at the global level of operation, even the most bureaucratic segments "lose their hierarchical/centralized/pyramidal structure" and interact with the upper echelons of other corporations, governments, financial institutions and family representatives in an "interlocking/overlapping structure." He stresses the lack of absolute power in the hands of any of the components. Even though this relatively small group of global decision-makers may have absolute power within their own segments, the conflicting goals and interests of different segments prevent permanent structural unity, and therefore centralized control by any one group.

Examining the types of linkages that bind the segments of the global network, we find some remarkable parallels with the types of linkages we observed in the grass roots SP(I)Ns. Where we saw patterns of overlapping memberships and personal ties between leaders in a movement, students of the global power structure note such linking mechanisms as interlocking directorships, common shareholdings, shared subsidiaries (often by a multinational corporation and the government of a "host" country), and the well-documented phenomenon of interchangeability of personnel.

The rise of a "managerial elite" provides another linking mechanism. Networks of personal ties are formed as corporate executives move from one hierarchy to another in their ascent to positions of global influence.

The temporary coalition of segments in a grass roots movement for a specific activity has parallels in the global power structure in the phenomenon of the "project team." The rise of temporary, special-task organizations leads to what Alvin Toffler calls "adhocracy," sets of horizontal linkages that cut across bureaucratic hierarchies. It involves flexible formation, dissolution and reformation of teams drawn from different levels within a bureaucratic hierarchy and from comparable levels in other corporate or governmental hierarchies, and requires a type of interaction that is more characteristic of network interchange than formal hierarchy.

The linking function of the revival meeting, the demonstration, the rally, and the "ritual activities" of the grass roots SP(I)Ns is paralleled in the global managerial network by a variety of overlapping social clubs and policy organizations. G. William Dumhoff has documented the role of social clubs in cementing personal ties and creating ideological consensus among corporate executives, financial leaders, high level government officials, and members of powerful families under such irreverent titles as "How the Fat Cats Keep in Touch." The powerful meet not only in exclusive playgrounds among the California redwoods, but in policy-making groups like the Business Council, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Committee for Economic Development which supply personnel for a wide range of special commissions and important government appointments.

The power of ideology to unify an organizationally segmented structure is the key to understanding the emerging paradigm. This unifying force has very little to do with external "agreement." The outside observer of any SP(I)N sees mostly conflicting ideological stances and divergent goals. The binding force, as noted earlier, is in the commitment to a few basic and shared assumptions. The ideological conflict between variations on these basic themes, manifested in the structural diversity, produced what some have called the "fission-fusion" tension. Components within the global SP(I)N shift patterns of alliances — antagonists on one set of issues or problems and "bedfellows" in tackling the next. Individual participants in the global SP(I)N seem to have a remarkable capacity for shifting loyalties. They can function at the upper level of a number of types of organization — governmental or corporate — even though the functions of the different organizations may be conflicting. It is the power of a shared conceptual framework that keeps a SP(I)N unified and makes it possible for individuals to shift allegiances within it. It is the conflicting concepts of goals-means that prevent any one segment from taking permanent control over all the others.

The point here is to recognize the power of a r °w basic assumptions to unify organizationally disparate groups. It is the key to recognizing this qualitatively different mode of organization — one so alien to the bureaucratically minded that it appears to be either non-existent or is interpreted as a "conspiracy." Many observers of the protest movements during the Sixties fell into both traps. The first trap is now catching people who press for legislation requiring dismantling of large corporations or tighter control over multinationals by nation states. This is to misunderstand the organizational structure binding the upper levels of the corporate giants and the nation states into a network of shared and conflicting interests. The "conspiracy" trap catches many particularly in discussions of the oil crisis. As Goodwin points out, there is no need for conspiracy. It is only necessary that managers, corporate or governmental, understand and follow the "rules of behavior dictated by the structure that binds them" and the "set of stable assumptions," often unspoken, that inform decision-making. Decisions made by people who share assumptions, even though there has been no discussion between them, will produce actions so similar that there appears to be collusion even though the actors themselves feel they occupy conflicting positions.

We would argue that the SP(I)N mode of organization is not only a viable one for a global society, more functional than the bureaucratic mode of the passing era, but that it is in fact the one that is emerging whether we choose it or not. Both the powerless and the powerful have utilized it as they have tried to meet the changing conditions. The powerless find it functional in fighting inequities. The powerful have found it workable as they expanded their sphere of activity beyond national boundaries to the global scene. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, there is increasing evidence of many middle-range regional and transnational networks cutting across traditional vertical lines of power. The principle of "horizontal" integration is emerging at many levels.

None of these SP(I)Ns have emerged as a result of rational planning. Like any other evolutionary novelty, they emerge out of functional necessity. Only after the fact can we bring reason and logic to bear in understanding what is happening and is making rational decisions about what might facilitate or inhibit the changes. If this model of the emerging paradigm has any validity, the organizational structure of the future is already being created by the most as well as the least powerful within the present paradigm. It is very clear, however, that the ideologies which inform SP(I)Ns at the two levels are diametrically opposed. Perhaps one of the crucial tasks in the immediate future is to clarify and expose the underlying assumptions that provide the ideological "glue" for SP(I)Ns emerging at various levels of the global social structure. The key to the future may very well be conceptual rather than organizational.

_______________

Notes:

i. World Issues (published by the Center for Democratic Institutions), April/May 1977.
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

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Index

Aaronson, B., and Osmond, H. 92, 151
Abundance, poverty of 50-52
Acupuncture 87
Adamenko, V. G. 96
Adelman, I., and Morris, C. T. 57
Adey, W. R. 86
Affluence, freedom in 53, 55-56
Age of Faith 26-27
Ahura Mazda 23
Allen, F. L. 51
American Creed 35-40, 63, 64
American Humanist Association 31
American Psychological Association 83
Anand, B. K., Chhina, G. S., and Singh,
B. 92
Anderson, M., and White, R. 95
Angra Mainyu 23
Anokhin, P. 86
Appositional mind 84
Aquinas, T. 27
Arbib, M. 74
Ardrey, R. 28, 29
Arendt, H. 71
Aristotle 25, 104
Artificial intelligence 79
Aserinsky, E., and Kleitman, N. 90
Ashby, W. R. 73, 100
Assagioli, R. 93, 125, 129, 130, 136, 151
Association for Humanistic Psychology
31,41
Association for Transpersonal Psychology
31
Augustine, Saint 27
Aurobindo, Sri 93, 125, 132, 153, 222
Awareness, gradient of 128-129

Backster, C. 134
Barber, T. X. 89
Barnothy, M. 87
Barron, F. 151
Bateson, G. 99, 102
Baudouin, C. 4, 153
Beal, J. B. 96
Beale, G. 71
Becker, R. O. 86
Behaviorism, view of modern 29-30
Behavioristic man 166
Bellman, R. 175
Bernal, J. D. 82
Bertalanffy see von Bertalanffy
Bioelectric fields 86-87
Biofeedback 85,89-90,151
Biological freudianism 81
Biological rhythms 86-87
Bogen, J. 84
Bohm, D. 72
Bohr, N. 75
Boulding, E. xv, 2, 17, 49, 81, 90, 145, 151,
219-222
Boulding, K. E. 100, 153
Boisen, A. T. 146, 147
Brain research 72, 83-86
Brand, W. G. and L. W. 95
Bremerman, H. J. 72
Brinton, C., el al. 46
Bronowski, J. 76
Brooks, C. H. 4, 149, 153
Bucke, R. M. 35
Buckley, W. 100
Bureaucrats 8

Cahoon, D. xv, 177, 179, 233-234
Campbell, D. T. 104, 132
Campbell, J. vii, xv, xx, xxii, 7, 125, 146,
149, 152
Casteneda, C. 91
Cerebral cortex 100
Chaitanya, K. 87
Chapanis, A. 78
Chaudhuri, H. 151
China 21, 22
Christianity 23, 46-47
Churchill, W. 177
Ciba Foundation 102
Cicero 36
Civilization, literate 21
Claiborne, R. 54
Clairvoyance 95
Clark, K. B. 30, 83, 84, 86
Clifford, W. 75
Collins, K. vii, xviii
Colquhoun, W. P. 86
Commoner, B. 79
Computer sciences 78
Conant, J. B. 68
Conceptual feasibility 138-141
Consciousness research 87-94,116,134, 138
Control deficiencies 59
Copernicus, N. 27, 67, 71
Cosmic consciousness 34-35
Coue, E. 4
Creativity 34, 85
Cultural diffusion 17
Cummins, G. 132
Cybernetics 78, 99-102

Darwin, C. 28-29, 67, 71, 80, 81
Dean, E. D. 95
de Beauvoir, S. 178
Deficiency needs 129
Deikman, A. 92, 116
Delgado, J. 30, 83, 84, 85
de Ropp, R. S. 69
Deutsch, M. 69
Dixon, H. L. vii
Dixon, N. F. 71, 93, 97
Dobzhansky, T. 80
Dole, S. H. 82
Downs, A. 55
Dreaming 90-91
Duane, T. D., and Behrendt, T. 95
Dubos, R. vii, xv, xxiii, 58-59, 71, 79, 81,
178, 231
Dumhoff, G. W. 244
Dunn, E. S., jr. xv, 121, 125, 138, 140, 142,
156, 180
Dunne, J. W. 91

Earth, developed nations of 13
Earth ecology 10
Easterlin, R. 52
Eccles, J. 97
Ecological ethic 114
Economic image, growing impotence of
62-64
Economic man, image of 45-64
Eddington, A. S. 76
Edelstein, K. L. 104
Education: aim of society 174
Ehrlich, P. R. 79
Einstein, A. 75, 76, 85
Electrical stimulation of the brain
(ESB) 84, 86
Electroencephalograph (EEG) patterns
88, 90, 92, 98
Elgin, D. vii
Eliade, M. 1, 137
Eliot, T. S. 137
Elsasser, W. 81
Emerson, R. W. 34
Emmet, D. xxi
Englebart, D. C. 78
Epimetheus 68-69
Epistemology 104, 105
Erasmus, D. 36
Erikson, E. 146
Ethics 38-39, 221-223, 225-227, 230-231,
236-237
Ethnological man 166
Ethnology, the "other" 167
Evans, W. O., and Kline, N. S. 93
Everett, A. 77
Evolutionary transformationalist image
63-64, 165, 171-180, 205
Exobiology 82
Extrasensory perception (ESP) 71, 91, 95,
96, 220, 223
Extraterrestrial intelligence 82

Fadiman, J. xv
Faraday, A. 91
Farberow, N. 71
Farrington, D. 104
Fascism, friendly 169, 170-171, 234
Ferguson, M. xx
Fingarette, H. 147
Fischer, R. 77, 85, 86
Fisher, Sir Ronald 101
Forbes, R. J. 45
Fox, S. W. 82
Frank, J. D. 120
Franklin, W. vii, xviii
Free will 37
Freud, S. 28, 68, 81, 90, 91, 93, 129, 166,
224
Fromm, E. 178
Fuller, R. B. 73, 79
Functions 7-8
Fundamental anomaly
nature of 190-191
resolution of 191-194
Future shock 163, 234
Future trends, contrasting 164-166

Galbraith, J. K. 45, 193
Galileo, G. 27, 71, 171
Galvani, L. 83
Garfield, E. 79
General Systems Theory 99-102
Genetics 81
Gerlach, L. P. xv, xxi, 148, 238-239
Germany 155-156
Gestalt Therapy 3, 118, 145, 152-153,
159
Gnostic path 24
Goals, individual and social 173-175
Goedel 72, 79
Goertzel, V. and M. G. 147
Good versus evil 36
Gordon, W. J. 151
Gradient 125-133, 205
Graves, C. 52, 130
Greek views 24-25
Green, E. 96
Gross, B. M. 40, 165, 166, 169, 170
Gross national product (GNP), growth
of 53-54

Haldane, J. B. S. 79
Ham (son of Noah) 22-23
Hampden-Turner, C. xv, 41, 132
Handler, P. 80, 82-83
Harman, W. vii, xvii, 67
Harman, W., Markley, O., and Rhyne,
R. xvii
Hastings, A. vii
Hastings Center 14
Hawthorne effect 74
Hayes, W. 81
Healer, J. 86
Heard, G. 159
Heilbroner, R. 47, 48, 57, 157
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 74
Hess, W. R. 83
Hilgard, E. 71, 88
Hine, V. H. xx, 238-247
History, alternative interpretation of
219-220
Hobbes, T. 36, 166
Hoffer, E. 3
Holistic sense of perspective 112, 114,
121, 139, 140, 155, 160
Hollander, S. 59
Holon 32-33, 135
Honorton, C. 95
Hubbard, L. R. 125, 132, 151
Hubble, E. 76
Hudson Institute 8, 164
Human
as beast 28-29
as evolving holon 32-33
as mechanism 29-30
as person 30-31
as spirit 33-35
attributes, categories of 3
biocomputer, gradient in 127-129
history, contrasting epochs of 12
morality, gradient of 130-132
needs, gradient of 129-130
numbers, growth of 9
systems 10
Humanistic Capitalism 167
Humankind
Gestalt perception of 3
image of 1, 53, 54, 62 et seq., 112-122,
141
throughout history 18-20
Humans as species 79-81
Huss, J. 27
Hutchins, R. 174
Huxley, A. 33, 125, 154, 167
Huxley, J. 78, 81
Hynek, J. A. 71
Hypnosis 88-89, 99

Image of man
definition of 2-3
early 17-22
economic 45-64
evolutionary 124-161
historical and modern 17-37
operational feasibility of new 141-161
supportive 170
Image /society resolution, in search
of 56-62
Imagery
subsystem and supersystem 135-136
transpersonal and personal 133-135
Images
and social policy 1-2
consequences of changing 163-181
contrasts between alternative 168
Incremental change 120
Incubation 148
India 21, 22, 23, 33, 36
Individual identity 53, 55, 165
Individualism 46-47
Industrial era, recent 53, 62
Industrial state
control of 58-61
paradigm 64, 206
power of 57-58
Inflation 14
Information systems 223-225
Inkeles, A. 57
Inspiration 34
Institutions 175-177
Interdependence, increasing 60-61
Internal dynamic 62

Jaeger, W. 174
Jeans, J. H. 76
Jefferson, T. 36
Johnson, R. 135
Judeo-Christian view of man 104, 140
Judge, A. 222
Jung, C. G. 77, 90, 125, 138

Kahn, H., and Bruce-Briggs, B. 9
Kamiya, J. 85, 89
Kantor, R. E. 125, 147
Kelley, D. M. 158-159
Kelvin, P. 71
Keniston, K. 51,57,59,62
Keynes, J. M. 51
Kinser, B., and Kleinman, N. 155
Klapp, O. E. 31
Kleitman, N., and Dement, W. C. 71
Knower — Gnostic View 23-24
Knowledge paradigm 144
Koestler, A. 97, 135
Kohlberg, L. 125, 130, 131, 132
Kozyrev, N. A. 97
Krippner, S. xv, 71, 73, 88, 91, 92, 94, 95,
130, 138, 151
Kropotkin, Prince P. A. 28, 29, 221
Krueger, A. P. 86
Kuhn, T. S. 69-70, 98, 144, 145, 146, 149,
150, 161, 187
Kuznets, S. 59

Land, G. T. 132
Laszlo, E. xv, xx, 79, 102, 124, 160
Lavoisier commission 71
Leary, T. 195
LeShan, L. 77, 99
Life-in-nature, community of 115
Life, origin of 82-83
Lifton, R. J. 1
Lilly, J. C. 94, 124, 129
Locke, J. 29, 36, 121, 167
Lodge, G. C. xv, 122
Lonergan, B. 87
Lorenz, K. 28
Lovejoy, A. O. 47
Lowe, A. 193
Luce, G. 87
Luckman, B. 64
Luthe, W. 89
Luther, M. 27

Machiavelli, N. 36
Mackay, D. M. 223
Malinowski, B. K. 7
Man
and nature 38
as master 47-48
as process 136-138
as growth of population 10
Man-in-the-universe, images of 17, 42, 69,
77, 120, 133, 135, 143, 177
Manifold trend 14
Mankind, past and future history of 11,
12
Manning, S. vii
Margenau, H. vii, xv, 70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 95,
105, 160-161, 229-230
Marien, M. xv, 1,6, 38, 40, 92, 1 15, 132, 139,
151, 155, 156, 159, 161, 163, 169, 176
Markley, O. W. vii
Markley, O., Curry, D., and Rink, D. xviii
Martin, P. W. 91, 125, 145, 147, 148, 156
Maruyama, M. vii, xv, 32, 110, 118, 119,
122, 140
Maslow, A. 52, 125, 128, 129, 150, 172
Masters, R. E., and Houston, J. 92, 151,
153-154, 220-221
Material distribution, problems of 1
Matson, F. vii
Maxwell, J. C. 75
May, R. 46, 47
Mazeway 143, 144
McBain, W. N. 134
McHale, J. vii, 9, 10, 11
McKinney, D. vii
McLuhan, M. 78
Mead, M. vii, xv, 49, 56, 125, 136, 145,
154
Meadows, D. 79
Meadows, D., et al. xviii
Meditation 91-92
Mendel, G. J. 70, 80
Mesthene, E. G. 59
Metaprograms 129
Metzner, R. xv, 41, 42, 116
Michael, D. vii, 60, 157, 231
Miller, D. C, and Form, W. H. 45
Miller, N. E. 85, 89
Miller, S. L. 82
Mind versus matter 38
Minsky, M. L. 79
Modern society, relevance of images
to 3-15
Molecular biology 81
Monod, J. 80
Monomyth 146, 149
Moral development, stages of 131
Morality 38-39
More, T. 36
Morrisson, P. 71
Mortal versus immortal 38
Moss, T. 95, 96
Multifold Trend of Western Culture 8-9,
164
Mumford, L. 146
Muses, C. 94, 97
Myers, F. W. H. 93, 135
Myrdal, G. 35-37, 40
Mythic transformations 146-147
Myths, current 8

Nancy school of psychology 4
Natural law 47
New Empire 27-28
New scarcity 191-193, 196-197
Newton, I. 27, 67, 74, 85
Noah 22
Noyes, R. 71

Oates, J. C. 105
Oistraker, A. 82
Ontogenesis 142
Operant conditioning 30
Operational feasibility 157-161
O'Regan, B. vii
Orne, M. 74
Ostrander, S., and Schroeder, L. 96
Ouspensky, P. D. 125


Paidea 174
Paradigm
definition of 160-161, 205
in transmutation 68-72
possibly emergent 102-109
Parapsychology 94-99
Paul of Tarsus, Saint 26
Pearce, J. C. 13
Pearson, L. 13
Perceptions 4, 85
Perennial Philosophy 33-35, 41, 124, 135,
167, 183
Perls, F. S. 91, 152-153
Personal change 152
Personal transformations 147-148
Personal-transpersonal mind/body model
134
Phylogenesis 142
Physical sciences 78-87
Physics and cosmology, modern 75-77
Pillsbury, B. vii
Planck, M. K. E. L. 75
Plato 25, 30
Piatt, J. R. vii, 88, 101, 123, 235
Polak, F. 17, 120, 154
Polanyi, M. 70, 85, 118, 124, 132, 173, 223
Pollution 14
Population biology 79
Precognition 95
Presman, A. S. 86, 90
Problems, societal 13
Process theology 121
Production, factors of 45
Promethean-Epimethean conflict 69
Prometheus 68-69
Propositional mind 84
Protestant Ethic 48
Psychedelic drugs 92-93
Psychic research 74, 94-99, 103
Psycho-civilized society 30, 40, 84
Psychokinesis 95, 98
Psychological relativity 85
Psychotechnologies 84, 170
Puthoff, H., and Targ, R. 98

Quantum theory 77
Quarton, G. 170
Quigley, C. 146

Rapid eye movement (REM) 88, 90
Rational beings 55
Rationalism 46
Regulation 38-39
Reinhold, H. A. 134
Reiser, O. 40
Renaissance 46, 47, 104
Rhine, J. B., and Pratt, J. G. 95
Rhine, L. E. 95, 96
Rhyne, R. xvii
Rima, I. H. 47, 54
Robotomorphic images 86
Roethlisberger, F., and Dickson, W. 74
Rogers, C. R. xv, xx
Rogers, E. 59
Roll, W. G. 96
Rome 26
Rorvik, D. 151
Rosenthal, R. 74
Rousseau, J. J. 36
Ryzl, M. 95

Saint-Exupery, A. de 108
Salk, J. xviii, 11, 12, 79, 102, 139
Saoshyant 23
Satin, M. xx
Schlegel, R. 73, 102
Schmeidler, G., and McConnell, R. 95
Schmookler, J. 59
Schneider, L. vii
Science
conceptual revolutions in 144-145
influence of 67-110
limitations of classical 68-75
normal 70
of consciousness 94
Science and society, interaction be-
tween 102-105
Scientific
inquiry, crucial frontiers in 75-102
knowledge 8
paradigm 69-70, 75
progress, limitations of 72-75
Secular progress 47
Segmented polycephalous network
[SP(I)N] 240-247
Self 133-138
Self-realization ethic 115-116
Seligman, D. 158
Semitic tradition 22-23, 37
Sense of the whole 14
Shainess, N. 71
Silberman, C. E. 55
Simon, H. 119
Skinner, B. F. xv, 30, 71, 117, 129, 173
Slater, P. E. 56
Smith, A. 191
Smith, R. A. xv, 150, 156, 157, 176
Snow, C. P. xxii, 157
Social change, analyzing 14
Social ethics 225-227
Societal
changes 60
choices 163-180
problems, interconnected impact of 7
progress, measures of 59
realities 52-56
reform 10
systems 60-61
Sociogenesis 142
Socrates 25, 30, 36
Sparks, L. 88
Spencer, H. 29
Split-brain research 84, 86
Stent, G. 70, 71
Strategies, comparison of basic 186-190
Strategies for transformation 182-199
Stulman, J. 40
Subliminal perception 97-98
Subliminal stimulation 93, 97
Sullivan, H. S. 147
Superconscious 93-94, 206
Symbiosis 119
Symbolic thinking 1
Synergy 74
Szent-Gyorgi, A. 73

Taboos 71, 72
Taoistic philosophy 22
Targ, R., and Hurt, D. 96
Tarski, A. 72
Tart, C. T. 91,92,94,95,125,134
Taylor, S. vii
Technological ethic 25
Technological extrapolationist image 63,
166-171, 182, 206
Technological imperative 53, 54-55
Technological /industrial era, problems
of 6
Technology, highly developed system
of 6-7
Teilhard de Chardin, P. 81, 93, 125, 220
Telepathy 95
Thermodynamics, Second Law of 78
Thomas, W. I. 4
Thompson, W. 233-234
Thought photography 98
Thrasymachus 36
Toffler, A. 163, 234, 245
Toynbee, A. 125, 146
Transcendentalism, new 71
Transformation
cycle of 146, 148, 206
strategies for 182-199
Transformational discovery 159
Transition, non-disruptive 194-199
Trehub, A. 83
Trobriand Islanders 7
Tumin, M. 54

Ullman, M., and Krippner, S. 91, 95
Unconscious processes 93
Unemployment 14
Unidentified flying objects (UFOs) 71,
103
United States 13, 14, 17, 24, 39, 40, 117,
171, 186
Bureau of Mines 12
dominant image in 39
Office of Education xvii, xviii
urbanization in 10
Universe, new conception of 21
Urban-industrial environment 64
Utilitarian values 53

Vedic era of India 33, 38
Vendanta philosophy 22
Vickers, Sir Geoffrey vii, xv, xx, 33, 116,
223-227
von Bertalanffy, L. 99, 100, 124
von Foerster, H. 80, 81

Waddington, C. H. 80
Walker, E. H. 96, 97
Wallace, Alfred 29
Wallace, Anthony F. C. xv, 125, 142-143,
144, 145, 146, 148, 150, 187
Wallace, G. 148, 149
Wallace, R. K. 91
War, threat of 14
Watson, J. B. 29, 80
Weiss, P. 80, 100, 101, 118, 124, 131
Weisskopf, V. F. 86
Weisskopf, W. A. 119, 127
Weitzenhoffer, A. 88
Weizenbaum, J. 60
Western Culture
Basic Long-term Multifold Trend of 8-9
conceptual paradigm of 140
editorial function of 8
Wheeler, J. 76
White, J. xv, 21,94
White, L. 48
Whitehead, A. N. 121
Whitehead, C. 170
Wiener, N. 99, 100, 101, 137, 175
Wigner, E. 77
Wilson, A. and D. 59
Wirt, J., Lieberman, A., and Levien,
R. 146
Witkin, H. A. 91
Wolf, W. 116
Woodruff, W. 48
World hunger 14
World population 11, 12
World reserves, depletion of 12
Wycliffe, J. 27

Yankelovitch, D. 158
Yoga meditation 92, 151
Yogi 21, 22, 118
Youngblood, G. 78

Zen meditation 92
Zoroastrianism 22-23, 24, 27,
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Re: Changing Images of Man: Prepared by the Center for the

Postby admin » Tue Jun 04, 2019 3:53 am

Back Cover:

Prepared by The Center for the Study of Social Policy/SRI International

Edited by O. W. Markley and Willis W. Harman

Stanford Research Institute {now SRI International) released a report in 1974 that has become a classic in the "alternative futures" literature. It has been adopted as a text in non-traditional courses at more than a dozen universities and reprinted repeatedly by SRI.

Changing Images of Man explores the reasons why changes may have to take place in the fundamental conceptual premises, laws, attitudes and ethics once suitable for guiding the development of the United States and other highly industrialized nations if a humane (and "workable") future is to be achievable. It discusses the evidence that such changes may be occurring and the possibility that an evolutionary transformation may be underway that is at least as profound as the transition in Europe when the Medieval Age gave way to the rise of science and the Industrial Revolution.
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