VIII. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.
PART III. [Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, March 4th, 1826.]
[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society vol. i. p. 439 — 461.]
INTRODUCTION.
Of the six systems of philosophy received among learned Hindus, four have been noticed in the preceding parts of this essay, viz. the theistical and atheistical Sanc'hyas, the dialectic Nyaya, and the atomical Vaiseshica. The prior or practical Mimansa will be now considered; reserving the later or theological Mimansa, usually named Vedanta, for a future disquisition, should it appear requisite to pursue the subject, much concerning it being already before the public.
The object of the Mimansa is the interpretation of the Vedas. "Its purpose," says a commentator, [Somanat'ha in the Mayuc'ha, 2. 1. 17.] "is to determine the sense of revelation." Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty. Here duly intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the Vedas. The same term [dharma) likewise signifies virtue, or moral merit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one, (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion. [Medini cosha.] It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed; and its meaning is by commentators explained to be "the scope of an injunction; the object of a command; [Part'ha 1. 1. 2. Didh. ibid.] a purpose ordained by revelation with a view to a motive, such as sacrifice commanded by the Vedas, for the attainment of bliss;" [Apadeva; Nyaya-pracasa.] and such indeed is the main scope of every disquisition.
The prior (purva) Mimansa then is practical, as relating to works (carma) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly termed Carma-mimansa, in contradistinction to the theological, which is named Brahme-mimansa.
It is not directly a system of philosophy; nor chiefly so. But, in course of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation, it incidently touches upon philosophical topics; and scholastic disputants have elicited from its dogmas principles of reasoning applicable to the prevailing points of controversy agitated by the Hindu schools of philosophy.
Writers on the Mimansa.
The acknowledged founder of this school of scriptural interpretation is JAIMINI. He is repeatedly named as an authority in the sutras which are ascribed to him. Other ancient writers on the same subject, who are occasionally quoted in those aphorisms, as Atreya, Badari, Badarayana, [Author of the Brahme-sutras.] Labucayana, Aitisayana, &c. are sometimes adduced there for authority, but oftener for correction and confutation.
It is no doubt possible, that the true author of a work may speak in it of himself by name, and in the third person. Nor, indeed, is that very unusual. A Hindu commentator will, however, say, as the scholiasts of Menu's and of Yajnyawalcya's institutes of law do, that the oral instructions of the teacher were put in writing by some disciple; and, for this reason, the mention of him as of a third person is strictly proper.
The sutras, or aphorisms, thus attributed to Jaimini, are arranged in twelve lectures, each subdivided into four chapters, except the third, sixth, and tenth lectures, which contain twice as many; making the entire number sixty chapters. These again are divided into sections, cases, or topics (Adhicaranas), ordinarily comprising several sutras, but not uncommonly restricted to one; and instances may be noted where a single sentence is split into several adhicaranas; or, on the contrary, a single phrase variously interpreted becomes applicable to distinct cases; and sutras, united under the same head by one interpreter, are by another explained as constituting separate topics. The total number of sutras is 2,652, and of adhicaranas 915, as numbered by Mad'hava Acharya.
Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, those sutras are extremely obscure; or without a gloss utterly unintelligible. They must have been from the first accompanied by an oral or written exposition; and an ancient scholiast (Vritticara), is quoted by the herd of commentators for subsidiary aphorisms, supplying the defect of the text, as well as for explanatory comments on it.
Besides the work of the old scholiast, which probably is not extant in a complete form, the sutras have, as usual, been elucidated by a perpetual commentary, and by corrective annotations on it.
The author of the extant commentary is Sabara Swami Bhatta, from whom it takes the name of Sahara bhashya. He quotes occasionally the ancient scholiast, sometimes concurring with, sometimes dissenting from him.
The annotations (vartica) are by Bhatta Cumarila Swami, who is the great authority of the Mimansaca school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhatta, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sabara's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, but in many instances passes entire sections without notice, as seeing no occasion for emendation or explanation of the commentary, which he must be considered therefore as tacitly ratifying. The ancient scholiast is sometimes cited by him, adopting or amending the scholia; and he criticises the text itself, and arrangement of Jaimini.
Next to him in celebrity is a writer usually cited under the title of Guru; more rarely under the designation of Prabhacara. [MADH. 1.1.3.] His work I have had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present essay, and he is known to me chiefly from references and quotations; as in Madhava's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Cumarila's; and in the text and commentary of the Sastra-dipica, where his positions are canvassed and compared with those of numerous other writers.
Cumarila Bhatta figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sancara Acharya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Vedas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. [Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xix.] He does, indeed, take every occasion of controverting the authority and doctrine of Sacya or BUDDHA, as well as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, Bod'hayana and Masaca; and he denies them any consideration, even when they do concur upon any point with the Vedas. [Mim. 1. 3. 4.] The age of Cumarila, anterior to Sancara, [Sabara Swami Acharya is expressly named by Sancara in his commentary on the latter Mimansa (see Brahma Sutra, 3. 3. 53); and there are allusions to Cumarila Bhatta, if no direct mention of him.] and corresponding with the period [of the persecution of the Bauddhas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand years. He is reputed to have been contemporary with Sudhanwa, but the chronology of that prince's reign is not accurately determined. [Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xviii.]
Next in eminence among the commentators of the Mimansa is Part'ha-Sarat'hi Misra, who has professedly followed the guidance of CUMARILA BHATTA. His Commentary, entitled Sastra-dipica, has been amply expounded in a gloss bearing the title of Mayuc'ha- mala, by Somanat'ha, a Carnataci-Brahman, whose elder brother was high priest of the celebrated temple at Vencatadri (or Vencatagiri). [135 miles west from Madras.] Part'ha-Sarat'hi is author likewise of the Nyaya-ratna- mala and other known works.
A compendious gloss on the text of Jaimini, following likewise the same guidance (that of Cumarila), is the Bhatta-dipica of C'handa-deva, author of a separate and ampler treatise, entitled Mimansa-caustubha, to which he repeatedly refers for a fuller elucidation of matters briefly touched upon in his concise but instructive gloss. This work is posterior to that of Madhava Acharya, who is sometimes quoted in it, and to Part'ha-Sarat'hi, who is more frequently noticed.
The Mimansa-nyaya-viveca is another commentary by a distinguished author, Bhavanat'ha Misra. I speak of this and of the foregoing as commentaries, because they follow the order of the text, recite one or more of the aphorisms from every section, and explain the subject, but without regularly expounding every word, as ordinary scholiasts, in a perpetual gloss.
Among numerous other commentaries on Jaimini's text, the Nyayavali-didhiti of Raghavananda is not to be omitted. It contains an excellent interpretation of the sutras, which it expounds word by word, in the manner of a perpetual comment. It is brief, but clear; leaving nothing unexplained, and wandering into no digressions.
It results from the many revisions which the text and exposition of it have undergone, with amendments, one while arriving by a different process of reasoning at the same conclusion, another time varying the question and deducing from an unchanged text an altered argument for its solution, that the cases (adhicaranas) assume a very diversified aspect in the hands of the many interpreters of the Mimansa.
A summary or paraphrase of Jaimini's doctrine was put into verse by an ancient author, whose memorial verses are frequently cited by the commentators of Jaimini, under the title of Sangraha.
Another metrical paraphrase is largely employed in the Vartica, or is a part of that work itself. An entire chapter occurs under the title of Sloca vartica: other whole chapters of Cumarila's performance are exclusively in prose. In many, verse and prose are intermixed.
The most approved introduction to the study of the Mimansa is the Nyaya-mala-vistara by Madhava Acharya. It is in verse, attended with a commentary in prose by the same author. It follows the order of Jaimini's text; not by way of paraphrase, but as a summary (though the title rather implies amplification) of its purport, and of approved deductions from it; sometimes explaining separately the doctrine of Bhatta and of Guru, under each head; at other times that of the old scholiast; but more commonly confined to that of Bhatta alone; yet often furnishing more than one application to the same text, as Bhatta himself does.
MADHAVA ACHARYA was both priest and minister, or civil as well as spiritual adviser of Bucca-Raya and Harihara, sovereigns of Vidyanagara on the Godovari, as his father Mayana had been of their father and predecessor Sangama, who reigned over the whole peninsula of India.
Like the numerous other writings which bear his name, the Nyalamala was composed, not by himself, but by his directions, under the more immediate superintendence of his brother, Sayana-Acharya; and it appears from its preface to have been the next performance undertaken after the completion of their commentary on Parasara's institutes of law; and it suitably enough preceded the great commentary of the same authors on the whole of the Vedas.
According to history, confirmed by authentic inscriptions, Madhava flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century: the sovereigns whose confidence he enjoyed reigned from that time to the end of the century.
Analysis of the Mimansa.
From this brief notice of the principal writers on the Mimansa, I pass to the subject which has occupied them.
A complete adhicarana, or case, consists of five members, viz. 1, the subject, or matter to be explained; 2, the doubt, or question arising upon that matter; 3, the first side (purva-pacsha), or prima facie argument concerning it; 4, the answer (uttara) or demonstrated conclusion (siddhanta); 5, the pertinence or relevancy.
The last-mentioned appertains to the whole arrangement as well as to its subdivisions; and commentators are occupied with showing the relation and connexion of subjects treated in the several lectures and chapters, and their right distribution, and appropriate positions.
The text of Jaimini's aphorisms does not ordinarily exhibit the whole of the five members of an adhicarana. Frequently the subject, and the question concerning it, are but hinted, or they are left to be surmised; sometimes the disputable solution of it is unnoticed, and the right conclusion alone is set forth. The rest is supplied by the scholiasts; and they do not always concur as to the most apposite examples, nor concerning the presumed allusions of the text.
Its introductory sutras propose the subject in this manner. "Now then the study of duty is to be commenced. Duty is a purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must be inquired." [JAIM. l. 1. 1 — 3.]
That is, according to the interpretation of commentators, 'Next, after reading the Veda; and therefore, for the sake of understanding it; the duty enjoined by it is to be investigated. Duty is a meaning deduced from injunction: its ground must be sifted. A command is not implicitly received for proof of duty.'
The business of the Mimansa, then, being to investigate what is incumbent as a duty to be performed, the primary matter for inquiry is proof and authority (pramana). This, accordingly, is the subject of the first lecture, comprising four chapters, which treat of the following matters: 1st, precept and its cogency; 2, affirmation or narrative (art'havada), as well as prayer and invocation (mantra), their cogency as inculcating some duty; 3, law memorial (smrti), and usage (achara), their authority as presumption of some cogent revelation; 4, modifying ordinance and specific denomination, distinguished from direct or positive injunction.
Proceeding with the subject as above proposed, the Mimansa declares that perception or simple apprehension is no reason of duty, for it apprehends a present object only, whereas duty concerns the future. [JAIM. 1. 1. 4.] Simple apprehension is defined in these words: "when the organs of man are in contiguity with an object, that source of knowledge is perception.''
The ancient scholiast has here introduced definitions of other sources of knowledge which the author had omitted, viz. inference, verbal communication, comparison, presumption, and privation. None of these are reasons of duty except verbal communication; for the rest are founded on perception, which itself is not so. Verbal communication is either human, as a correct sentence (apta-vacya), or superhuman, as a passage of the Vedas. It is indicative or imperative; and the latter is either positive or relative: Ex. 1. "This is to be done:" 2. "That is to be done like this."
"On sight of one member of a known association, the consequent apprehension of the other part which is not actually proximate, is (anumana) inference. [Anc. Schol. Didh., Part'h., &c.] The association must be such as had been before directly perceived, or had become known by analogy.
"Comparison (upamana) is knowledge arising from resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one before observed: and likeness or similitude is concomitancy of associates or attributes with one object, which were associated with another.
"Presumption (art'hapatti) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.
"Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or subject to perception) derived through understood sound, that is through words the acceptation whereof is known, is (sastra) ordinance or revelation. It is (sabda) verbal communication."
These five sources of knowledge, or modes of proof, as here defined, are admitted by all Mimansacas: and the followers of Prabhacara are stated to restrict their admission to those five. [Vedanta-sic'hamani.] Bhatta with his disciples, guided by the ancient scholiast, adds a sixth, which is privation (abhava); and the Vedantis or Uttara Mimansacas concur in the admission of that number.
The Charvacas, as noticed in the first part of this essay, [Ante, p. 152.] recognise but one, viz. perception. The followers of Canade and those of Sugata (Buddha) acknowledge two, perception and inference. The Sanc'hyas reckon three, including affirmation. [Ante, p. 165 — 168.] The Naiyayicas, or followers of Gotama, count four, viz. the foregoing together with comparison. The Prabhacaras, as just now observed, admit five. And the rest of the Mimansacas, in both schools, prior and later Mimansa, enumerate six. [Vedanta sic'ham.] It does not appear that a greater number has been alleged by any sect of Indian philosophy.
The first six lectures of Jaimini's Mimansa treat of positive injunction: it is the first half of the work. The latter half, comprising six more lectures, concerns indirect command: adapting to a copy, with any requisite modifications, that which was prescribed for the pattern or prototype.
The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts (or appendant members, contrasted with the main act), and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next, and complete the subject of "that which is to be performed." The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth.
The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferrible changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth: that is, the co-operation of several acts for a single result is the subject of the one; and the incidental effect of an act, of which the chief purpose is different, is discussed in the other.
These which are the principal topics of each lecture are not, however, exclusive. Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main subject or its exceptions.
In the first chapter of the first lecture occurs the noted disquisition of the Mimansa on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense. [A passage cited by writers on the dialectic Nyaya from the disquisition on the perpetuity of sound (see ante, page 185), is not to be found in Jaimini's sutras: it must have been taken from one of his commentators.]
"It is a primary and natural connexion," Jaimini affirms, "not merely a conventional one. The knowledge of it is instruction, since the utterance of a particular sound conveys knowledge, as its enunciation is for a particular sense. It matters not whether the subject have been previously apprehended (the words being intelligible, or the context rendering them so). Precept is authoritative, independently of human communication." [JAIM. 1. 1. 5.]
Grammarians assume a special category, denominated sp'hota, for the object of mental perception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word. Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption. [Didh., Part'h, and Madh.] They insist, however, that "sound is an effect, because it is perceived as the result of effort; because it endures not, but ceases so soon as uttered; because it is spoken of as made or done; because it is at once apprehended in divers places at the same instant, uttered by divers persons; because it is liable to permutation; and because it is subject to increase of intensity with the multitude of utterers." To all which the answer is, that " the result of an effort is uniform, the same letters being articulated. Sound is unobserved though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended). [Didh.] Sound is not made or done, but is used; it is uttered, not called into existence. Its universality is as that of the sun (common to all). The permutation of letters is the substitution of a different one (as a semivowel for a vowel), not the alteration of the same letter. Noise, not sound, is increased by a multitude of voices. Sound is perpetual, intended for the apprehension of others: it is universal, a generic term being applicable to all individuals. Its perpetuity is intimated by a passage of the Veda, which expresses "Send forth praise, with perpetual speech." [JAIM. 1. 1. 6. 1—18 and Com.]
The first chapter terminates with an inquiry into the authority of the Veda, which is maintained to be primeval and superhuman; although different portions of it are denominated from names of men, as Cat'haca, Caut'huma, Paishpala, &c. and although worldly incidents and occurrences are mentioned. Those denominations of particular portions, it is affirmed, have reference to the tradition by which a revelation has been transmitted. They are named after the person who uttered them, as to him revealed.
The eternity of the Veda, or authenticity of its revelation, is attempted to be proved by showing that it had no human origin; and for this purpose, the principal argument is, that no human author is remembered. In the case of human compositions, it is said, contemporaries have been aware that the authors of them were occupied in composing those works: not so with the Veda, which has been handed down as primeval, and of which no mortal author was known.
It is, however, acknowledged, that a mistake may be made, and the work of a human author may be erroneously received as a part of the sacred book by those who are unacquainted with its true origin. An instance occurs among those who use the Bahvrich, a sac'ha of the Rigveda, by whom a ritual of Aswalayana has been admitted, under the title of the fifth Aranyaca, as a part of the Rigveda.
The Veda received as holy by orthodox Hindus consists of two parts, prayer and precept (mantra and brahmana). Jaimini has attempted to give a short definition of the first, adding that the second is its supplement; "whatever is not mantra, is brahmaha." [Mim. 2. 1. 7.] The ancient scholiast has endeavoured to supply the acknowledged defect of Jaimini's imperfect definition, by enumerating the various descriptions of passages coming under each head. Later scholiasts have shown, that every article in that enumeration is subject to exceptions; and the only test of distinction, finally acknowledged, is admission of the expert, or acceptance of approved teachers, who have taught their disciples to use one passage as a prayer, and to read another as a precept, Jaimini's definition, and his scholiast's enumeration, serve but to alleviate "the task of picking up grains."
Generally, then, a mantra is a prayer, invocation, or declaration. It is expressed in the first person, or is addressed in the second. It declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object. It asks a question or returns an answer; directs, inquires, or deliberates; blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates, &c.
Here is to be remarked, that changes introduced into a prayer to adapt it, mutalis mutandis, to a different ceremony from that for which primarily it was intended, or the insertion of an individual's personal and family names where this is requisite, are not considered to be part of the mantra.
It is likewise to be observed, although mantras of the Vedas are ordinarily significant, that the chants of the Samaveda are unmeaning. They consist of a few syllables, as ira ayira, or gira gayira, repeated again and again, as required by the tune or rhythm. Nevertheless, significant mantras are likewise chanted; and two of the books of the Samuveda are allotted to hymns of this description. The hymns consist of triplets {inch) or triple stanzas.
The first, or pattern verse or stanza, is found, with the name of the appropriate tune, in the Chhandas or Yonigrant'ha; and the two remaining verses or stanzas, to complete the triplet, are furnished in the supplementary book called Uttara-grant'ha.
Mantras are distinguished under three designations. Those which are in metre are termed rich, those chanted are saman, and the rest are yajush, sacrificial prayers in prose (for yajush imports sacrifice). Nevertheless, metrical prayers occur in the Yajurveda, and prose in the Samaveda.
Metrical prayers are recited aloud: those termed saman with musical modulation; but the prose inaudibly muttered. [Mim. 3. 3. 1.] Such, however, as are vocative, addressed to a second person, are to be uttered audibly, though in prose: for communication is intended. [Ib. 2. 1. 7—14.]
Metrical prayers, however, belonging to the Yajurveda are inaudibly recited; and so are chants belonging to the same inaudibly chanted: for prayers take the character of the rite into which they are introduced; and where the same rite is ordained in more than one Veda, it appertains to that with which it is most consonant, and the prayer is either audibly or inaudibly chanted accordingly. [Ib. 3. 3. 1— 3. Instances of the same prayer recurring either word for word, or with very slight variation, in more than one Veda, are innumerable. An eminent example is that of the celebrated Gayatri, of which the proper place is in the Rig-veda (3. 4. 10.), among hymns of Viswamitra. It is, however, repeated in all the Vedas, and particularly in the 3d, 22d and 36th chapters of the white Yajush. (3, § 35; 22, § 9; and 36, § 3.) Another notable instance is that of the Purusha-sucta, of which a version was given, from a ritual in which it was found cited (ante, p. 104). It has a place in the Rig-veda (8. 4. 7.) among miscellaneous hymns; and is inserted, with some little variation, among prayers employed at the Purusha-medha, in the 31st chapter of the white Vajur-veda. On collation of those two Vedas and their scholia, I find occasion to amend one or two passages in the version of it formerly given: but for this I shall take another opportunity. That remarkable hymn is in language, metre, and style, very different from the rest of the prayers with which it is associated. It has a decidedly more modern tone; and must have been composed after the Sanscrit language had been refined, and its grammar and rhythm perfected. The internal evidence which it furnishes, serves to demonstrate the important fact, that the compilation of the Vedas, in their present arrangement, took place after the Sanscrit tongue had advanced, from the rustic and irregular dialect in which the multitude of hymns and prayers of the Veda was composed, to the polished and sonorous language in which the mythological poems, sacred and prophane (puranas and cavyas), have been written.]
The prayers termed rich and saman are limited by the metre and the chant respectively; but those which are in prose are regulated as to their extent by the sense. A complete sentence constitutes a single yajush: the sense must be one, and would be deficient were the phrase divided. Nevertheless, the sentence which constitutes a prayer may borrow, from a preceding or from a subsequent one, terms wanting to perfect the sense, unless an intervening one be incompatible with that construction. [Mim. 2. 1. 14—18.]
The brahmum of the Veda is in general a precept; or it expresses praise or blame, or a doubt, a reason, or a comparison; or intimates a derivation; or narrates a fact or an occurrence: and a characteristic sign of it is that it very generally contains the particle "so" (iti or itiha); as a mantra usually does the pronoun of the second person "thee," either expressed or understood, "(thou) art." [Sab. &c. on Mim. 1. 4. 1. and 2. 1. 7.]
In a still more general view the brahmana is practical, directing religious observances, teaching the purpose, time, and manner of performing them, indicating the prayers to be employed, and elucidating their import. The esoteric brahmana comprises the upanishads, and is theological.
It becomes a question which the Mimansa examines at much length, whether those passages of the Veda which are not direct precepts, but are narrative, laudatory, or explanatory, are nevertheless cogent for a point of duty. In this inquiry is involved the further question, whether a consciousness of the scope of an act is essential to its efficacy for the production of its proper consequence. The Mimansa maintains that narrative or indicative texts are proof of duty, as concurrent in import with a direct precept. There subsists a mutual relation between them. One enjoins or forbids an act; the other supplies an inducement for doing it or for refraining from it: "Do so, because such is the fruit." The imperative sentence is nevertheless cogent independently of the affirmative one, and needs not its support. The indicative phrase is cogent, implying injunction by pronouncing benefit.
It virtually prescribes the act which it recommends. [Mim. 1. 2. 1-3.] Inference, however, is not to be strained. It is not equally convincing as actual perception: a forthcoming injunction or direct precept has more force than a mere inference from premises. [Ib. 1. 2. 3.]
A prayer, too, carries authority, as evidence of a precept bearing the like import. This is a visible or temporal purpose of a prayer; and it is a received maxim, that a perceptible purpose being assignable, prevails before an imperceptible one. But the recital of a particular prayer at a religious rite, rather than a narrative text of like import, is for a spiritual end, since there is no visible purpose of a set form of words. [Mim. 1. 2. 4.]
Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (sruti) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (smriti) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents. Nor was it superfluous to compose anew what was there to be found; for a compilation, exhibiting in a succinct form that which is scattered through the Veda, has its use. Nor are the prayers which the smrti directs unauthorized, for they are presumed to have been taken from passages of revelation not now forthcoming. Those recollections have come down by unbroken tradition to this day, admitted by the virtuous of the three tribes, and known under the title of Dharma-sastra, comprising the institutes of law, civil and religious. Nor is error to be presumed which had not, until now, been detected. An express text of the Veda, as the Mimansa maintains, [lb. 1. 3. 1.] must then be concluded to have been actually seen by the venerable author of a recorded recollection (smrti).
But if contradiction appear, if it can be shown that an extant passage of the Veda is inconsistent with one of the smriti, it invalidates that presumption. An actual text, present to the sense, prevails before a presumptive one. [lb. 1. 3. 2.]
Or though no contrary passage of the Veda be actually found, yet if cupidity, or other exceptionable motive may be assigned, revelation is not to be presumed in the instance, the recollection being thus impeached. [1b. 1 3. 3.]
The 'Sacyas (or Bauddhas) and Jainas (or Arhatas), as Cumarila acknowledges, are considered to be Cshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their recollections were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in revelation, for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the Sacyas are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, [lb. 1. 3. 4.] tainting what else is virtuous. The entire Veda which is directed to be studied is the foundation of duty; and those only who are conversant with it are capable of competent recollections.
Usage generally prevalent among good men, and by them practised as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, evidence of duty: but it is not valid if it be contrary to an express text. From the modern prevalence of any usage, there arises a presumption of a correspondent injunction by a holy personage who remembered a revelation to the same effect. Thus usage presumes a recollection, which again presupposes revelation. Authors, however, have omitted particulars, sanctioning good customs in general terms: but any usage which is inconsistent with a recorded recollection is not to be practised, so long as no express text of scripture is found to support it.
In like manner, rituals which teach the proper mode of celebrating religious rites, and are entitled Calpa-sutra or Grihya-grant'ha, derive their authority, like the Dharma-sastra, from a presumption that their authors, being persons conversant with the Veda, collected and abridged rules which they there found. The Calpa-sutras neither are a part of the Veda, nor possess equal nor independent authority. It would be a laborious enterprise to prove a superhuman origin of them; nor can it be accomplished, since contemporaries were aware of the authors being occupied with the composition of them. [GURU on Mim. 1. 3. 7.] Whenever a sutra (whether of the culpa or grihya) is opposed to an extant passage of the Veda, or is inconsistent with valid reason, it is not to be followed; nor is an alternative admissible in regard to its observance in such case, unless a corroborative text of the Veda can be shown. [C'handa-Deva.]
Neither are usages restricted to particular provinces, though certain customs are more generally prevalent in some places than in others: as the Holaca (vulg. Huli) or festival of spring in the east; the worship of local tutelary deities hereditarily, by families, in the south; the racing of oxen on the full moon of Jyesht'ha, in the north; and the adoration of tribes of deities (matri-gana), in the west. Nor are rituals and law institutes confined to particular classes: though some are followed by certain persons preferably to others; as Vasisht'ha, by the Bahvrich sac'ha of the Rigveda: Gautama, by the Gobhiliya of the Samaveda; Sanc'ha and Lic'hita, by the Vajasaneyi; and Apastamba and Baudhayana, by the Taittiriya of the Yajurveda. There is no presumption of a restrictive revelation, but of one of general import. The institutes of law, and rituals of ceremonies, were composed by authors appertaining to particular sac'has, and by them taught to their fellows belonging to the same, and have continued current among the descendants of those to whom they were so taught.
A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the Mimansa, [1. 3. 5.] on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are yava, signifying in Sanscrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named priyangu: varaha, in the one a hog, and in the other a cow; pitu, a certain tree, [The name is in vocabularies assigned to many different trees.] but among barbarians an elephant; vetusa, a rattan cane and a citron. The Mimansa concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (aryas), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (Mlech'ha), who are apt to confound words or their meanings.
Concerning these instances, Cumarila remarks that the words have no such acceptation, in any country, as is by the scholiast alleged. He. is wrong in regard to one, at least, for pitu is evidently the Persian fit or pit. Modern vocabularies [JATADHARA, &c.] exhibit the word as a Sanscrit one in the same sense; erroneously, as appears from this disquisition.
Then follows, in Cumarila's Vartica, much upon the subject of provincial and barbaric dialects; which, adverting to the age in which he flourished, is interesting, and merits the attention of philologists. He brings examples from the Andhra and Dravida dialects, and specifies as barbaric tongues the Parasica, Yavana, Raumaca, and Barbara, but confesses his imperfect acquaintance with these.
Jaimini gives an instance of a barbaric term used in the Veda, viz., pica, a black cuckow (cuculus indicus); to which his scholiasts add nema, half, tamarasa, a lotus, and sata a wooden colander; but without adducing examples of the actual use of them in any of the Vedas. Such terms must be taken in their ordinary acceptation, though barbarous; and the passage quoted from the Veda where the word pica occurs, must be interpreted "sacrifice a black cuckow at night." It will here be remarked, that pica corresponds to the Latin picus, and that nem answers to the Persic nim.
On the other hand, a barbaric word, or a provincial corruption, is not to be employed instead of the proper Sanscrit term. Thus go (gauh), and not gawi, is the right term for a cow. [Vart. 1. 3. 4.] Orthography, likewise, is to be carefully attended to; else by writing or reading aswa for aswa in the directions for the sacrifice of a horse, the injunction would seem to be for the sacrifice of a pauper (a-swa, destitute of property).
Generally, words are to be applied in strict conformity with correct grammar. The Sacyas, and other heretics, as Cumarila in this place remarks, [Vart. 1. 3. 7.] do not use Sanscrit (they employ Pracrit). But Brahmanas should not speak as barbarians. Grammar, which is primeval, has been handed down by tradition. Language is the same in the Vedas and in ordinary discourse, notwithstanding a few deviations: the import of words is generic, though the application of them is specific.
The peculiarities of the dialect of the Veda are not to be taken for inaccuracies. Thus, tman stands for atman, self or soul; and Brahmanasah for Brahmanah, priests; with many other anomalies of the sacred dialect. [Mim. 1. 3. 10.]
When the ordinary acceptation of a term is different from that which it bears in an explanatory passage, this latter import prevails in the text likewise, else the precept and its supplement would disagree. Thus trivrit, triplet, is specially applied to a hymn comprising three triplets or nine stanzas, which is the peculiar sense it bears in the Vedas.
Again, charu, which in ordinary discourse signifies boiler or cauldron, is in the Vedas an oblation of boiled food, as rice, &c. So aswabala, which literally means horse-hair, is a designation of a species of grass (saccharum spontaneum) into which it is said the tail of a consecrated horse was once transformed; and of that grass a cushion is made for certain religions rites.
It will be observed, as has been intimated in speaking of the members of an adhicarana in the Mimansa, that a case is proposed, either specified in Jaimini's text or supplied by his scholiasts. Upon this a doubt or question is raised, and a solution of it is suggested, which is refuted, and a right conclusion established in its stead. The disquisitions of the Mimansa bear, therefore, a certain resemblance to juridical questions; and, in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. The logic of the Mimansa is the logic of the law; the rule of interpretation of civil and religious ordinances. Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law: and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the Mimansa. Jaimini's arrangement, however, is not philosophical; and I am not acquainted with any elementary work of this school in which a better distribution has been achieved. I shall not here attempt to supply the defect, but confine the sequel of this essay to a few specimens from divers chapters of Jaimini, after some more remarks on the general scope and manner of the work.
Instances of the application of reasoning, as taught in the Mimansa, to the discussion and determination of juridical questions, may be seen in two treatises on the Law of Inheritance, translated by myself, and as many on Adoption, by a member of this Society, Mr. J. C. C. Sutherland (See Mitacshara on Inheritance, 1. 1. 10, and 1. 9. 11, and 2. 1. 34; Jimuta Vahana, 11, 5. 16 -19. Datt. Mim. on Adoption, 1. 1. 35-41, and 4. 4. 65-66 and 6. 6. 27-31. Datt. Chand. 1. 1. 24 and 2. 2. 4).
The subject which most engages attention throughout the Mimansa, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect.
That unseen virtue is termed apurva, being a relation superinduced, not before possessed.
Sacrifice (yaga), which, among meritorious works, is the act of religion most inculcated by the Vedas, and consequently most discussed in the prior Mimansa, consists in parting with a thing that it may belong to a deity, whom it is intended to propitiate. [Mim. 4. 4.12.] Being cast into the fire for that purpose, it is a burnt offering (homa). Four sorts are distinguished; a simple oblation (ish'ti), the immolation of a victim (pasu), the presenting of expressed juice of the soma plant (asclepias acida), and the burnt-offering above-mentioned. [lb. 4. 4. 1.] The object of certain rites is some definite temporal advantage; of others, benefit in another world. Three ceremonies, in particular, are types of all the rest: the consecration of a sacrificial fire, the presenting of an oblation, and the preparation of the soma. The oblation which serves as a model for the rest, is that which is offered twice in each month, viz. at the full and change of the moon. It is accompanied, more especially at the new moon, with an oblation of whey from new milk. Accordingly, the Yajurveda begins with this rite. It comprehends the sending of selected cows to pasture after separating their calves, touching them with a leafy branch of palasa (butea frondosa) cut for the purpose, and subsequently stuck in the ground in front of the apartment containing the sacrificial fire, for a protection of the herd from robbers and beasts of prey: the cows are milked in the evening and again in the morning; and, from the new milk, whey is then prepared for an oblation.
Concerning this ceremony, with all its details, numerous questions arise, which are resolved in the Mimansa: for instance, the milking of the cows is pronounced to be not a primary or main act, but a subordinate one; and the parting of the calves from their dams is subsidiary to that subordinate act. [lb. 4. 3. 10.] The whey, which in fact is milk modified, is the main object of the whole preparation; not the curd, which is but incidentally produced, not being sought nor wanted. [Mim. 4. 1. 9.]
In the fourth chapter of the first book, the author discriminates terms that modify the precept from such as are specific denominations. Several of the instances are not a little curious. Thus it is a question, whether the hawk-sacrifice (syena-yaga), which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim, that "a term intimating resemblance is denominative." Hawk, then, is the name of that incantation: "it pounces on the foe as a falcon on his prey." [Ib. 1. 4. 5. and 3. 7. 23.] So tongs is a name for a similar incantation, "which seizes the enemy from afar as with a pair of tongs;" and cow, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations.
It is fit to remark in this place, that incantations for destruction of hated foes, though frequent in the Vedas (and modes of performing them, with greater or less solemnity, are there taught), cannot be deemed laudable acts of religion; on the contrary, they are pronounced to be at least mediately criminal; and pains in hell, as for homicide, await the malevolent man who thus practices against the life of his enemy.
Another instance, discussed in the same chapter, is chitra, applied to a sacrifice performed for acquisition of cattle. It is questioned whether the feminine termination, joined to the ordinary signification of the word, indicates a female victim of a varied colour. It intends, however, an offering termed various, as consisting of no less than six different articles: honey, milk, curds, boiled butter, rice in the husk as well as clean, and water. [1b. 1. 4. 3.]
In like manner, udbhid is the name of a sacrifice directed to be performed for the like purpose: that is, by a person desirous of possessing cattle. The sense approaches to the etymology of the term: it is a ceremony "by which possession of cattle is, as it were, dug up." It does not imply that some tool for delving, as a spade or hoe for digging up the earth, is to be actually employed in the ceremony.
A question of considerable interest, as involving the important one concerning property in the soil in India, is discussed in the sixth lecture. [lb. 6. 7. 2.] At certain sacrifices, such as that which is called viswajit, the votary, for whose benefit the ceremony is performed, is enjoined to bestow all his property on the officiating priests. It is asked whether a paramount sovereign shall give all the land, including pasture-ground, highways, and the site of lakes and ponds; an universal monarch, the whole earth; and a subordinate prince, the entire province over which he rules? To that question the answer is: the monarch has not property in the earth, nor the subordinate prince in the land. By conquest kingly power is obtained, and property in house and field which belonged to the enemy. The maxim of the law, that "the king is lord of all excepting sacerdotal wealth," concerns his authority for correction of the wicked and protection of the good. His kingly power is for government of the realm and extirpation of wrong; and for that purpose he receives taxes from husbandmen, and levies fines from offenders. But right of property is not thereby vested in him; else he would have property in house and land appertaining to the subjects abiding in his dominions. The earth is not the king's, but is common to all beings enjoying the fruit of their own labour. It belongs, says JAIMINI, to all alike: therefore, although a gift of a piece of ground to an individual does take place, the whole land cannot be given by a monarch, nor a province by a subordinate prince 5 but house and field, acquired by purchase and similar means, are liable to gift." [SAB. MADH. and C'HANDA, ad locum.]
The case which will be here next cited, will bring to recollection the instance of the Indian Calanus, [Calyana.] who accompanied Alexander's army, and burnt himself at Babylon after the manner of his country.
This particular mode of religious suicide by cremation is now obsolete; as that of widows is in some provinces of India, and it may be hoped will become so in the rest, if no injudicious interference by direct prohibition arouse opposition and prevent the growing disuse. Other modes of religious suicide not unfrequently occur; such as drowning, burying alive, falling from a precipice or under the wheels of an idol's car, &c. But they are not founded on the Vedas, as that by burning is.
Self-immolation, in that ancient form of it, is a solemn sacrifice, performed according to rites which the Vedas direct, by a man desirous of passing immediately to heaven without enduring disease. He engages priests, as at other sacrifices, for the various functions requisite to the performance of the rites, being himself the votary for whose benefit the ceremony is undertaken. At a certain stage of it, after wrapping a cloth round a branch of udumbara (ficus glomerata), which represents a sacrificial stake, and having appointed the priests to complete the ceremony, he chants a solemn hymn, and casts himself on a burning pile wherein his body is consumed. Afterwards, whatever concerns the rite as a sacrificial ceremony, is to be completed by the attendant priests: Omitting, however, those matters which specially appertain to the votary, and which, after his death, there is no one competent to perform. [Mim. 10, 2. 23.]
In like manner, if the principal die by a natural death, after engaging Brahmanas to co-operate with him in the celebration of certain rites requiring the aid of several priests, his body is to be burnt, and his ashes kept to represent him; and the ceremony is completed for his benefit, according to one opinion, but for theirs according to another. The ashes, it is argued, do not perform the ceremony, but the priests do. Being inanimate, the bones cannot fulfil the prescribed duties peculiar to the principal: as utterance of certain prayers, shaving of hair and beard, measure of his stature with a branch of udumbara, &c. These and similar functions are not practicable by an inanimate skeleton, and therefore are unavoidably omitted. [Mim. 10. 2. 17-20.]
The full complement of persons officiating at a great solemnity is seventeen. This number, as is shown, includes the votary or principal, who is assisted by sixteen priests engaged by him for different offices, which he need not personally discharge. His essential function is the payment of their hire or sacrificial fee. [lb 3. 7. 8-17.]
They rank in different gradations, and are remunerated proportionably. Four, whose duties are most important, receive the full perquisite; four others are recompensed with a half; the four next with a third; and the four last with a quarter.
On occasions of less solemnity four priests only are engaged, making with the principal five officiating persons. A question is raised, whether the immolator of a victim at the sacrifice of an animal (usually a goat) be a distinct officiating person: the answer is in the negative. No one is specially engaged for immolator independently of other functions; but some one of the party, who has other duties to discharge, slays the victim in the prescribed manner, and is accordingly termed immolator. [Ib. 3. 7. 13.]
The victims at some sacrifices are numerous: as many as seventeen at the vajapeya, made fast to the same number of stakes; and at an aswamed'ha not fewer than six hundred and nine of all descriptions, tame and wild, terrestrial and aquatic, walking, flying, swimming, and creeping things, distributed among twenty-one stakes and in the intervals between them; the tame made fast to the stakes, and the wild secured in cages, nets, baskets, jars, and hollow canes, and by various other devices. The wild are not to be slain, but at a certain stage of the ceremony let loose. The tame ones, or most of them (chiefly goats), are to be actually immolated.
The various rites are successively performed for each victim; not completed for one before they are commenced for another. But the consecration of the sacrificial stakes is perfected for each in succession, because the votary is required to retain hold of the stake until the consecration of it is done. [Ib. 5. 2. 1-5.]
The foregoing instances may suffice to give some idea of the nature of the subjects treated in the Mimansa, and of the way in which they are handled. They have been selected as in themselves curious, rather than as instructive specimens of the manner in which very numerous and varied cases are examined and questions concerning them resolved. The arguments would be tedious, and the reasons of the solution would need much elucidation, and after all would, in general, be uninteresting.
A few examples of the topics investigated, and still fewer of the reasoning applied to them, have therefore been considered as better conveying in a small compass a notion of the multifarious subjects of the Mimansa.