Part 1 of 2
IX. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.
PART IV. [Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, April 7, 1827.]
[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. ii. p. 1-39.]
INTRODUCTION.
A PRECEDING essay on Indian philosophy contained a succinct account of the Carma-mimansa. The present one will be devoted to the Brahma mimansa; which, as the complement of the former, is termed uttara, later, contrasted with purva, prior, being the investigation of proof, deducible from the Vedas in regard to theology, as the other is in regard to works and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mimansa is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but, differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as in a philosophical view.
The ordinary designation of the Uttara-mimansa is Vedanta, a term likewise of more comprehensive import. It literally signifies "conclusion of the Veda,'' and bears reference to the Upanishads, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the Vedas to which they belong. It implies, however, the doctrine derived from them, and extends to books of sacred authority, in which that doctrine |is thence deduced; and in this large acceptation, it is "the end and scope of the Vedas."
The followers of the Vedanta have separated in several sects, as 'ancient' and 'modern' Vedantins, and bearing other designations. The points on which they disagree, and the difference of their opinions, will not be a subject of the present essay, but may be noticed in a future one.
Among numerous Upanishads, those which are principally relied upon for the Vedanta, and which accordingly are most frequently cited, are the Ch'handogya, Caushitaci, Vrihad aranyaca, Aitareyaca, Taittiriyaca, Cat'haca, Cat'havalli, Mundaca, Prasna, Swetaswatara; to which may be added the Isa-vasya, Cena, and one or two more.
Certain religious exercises, consisting chiefly in profound meditation, with particular sitting postures rigorously continued, are inculcated as preparing the student for the attainment of divine knowledge, and promoting his acquisition of it. Directions concerning such devout exercises are to be found in several of the Upanishads, especially in the Swetaswatara; and likewise in other portions of the Vedas, as a part of the general ritual. These are accordingly cited by the commentators of the Vedanta, and must be considered to be comprehended under that general term; [For instance, the Agni rahasya brahmana of the Canwas and of the Vajins (or Vajasaneyins); the Rashasya brahmana of the Tandins and of the Paingins.] and others from different sac'has of the Vedas, as further exemplified in a note below. [The Udgit'ha brahmana of the Vajasaneyins, the Panchagni-vidya pracarana of the same, the C'hila grant'ha of the Ranayainyas, the Prana-samvada or Prana-vidya. Dahara-vidya, Harda vidya, Paramatma vidya Satya-vidya, Vaiswanara-vidya, Sandilya vidya, Vamadevya vidya, Upacosala vidya, Paryanca-vidya, Madhu-vidya, Shodasacala-vidya, Samvarga-vidya, &c.]
Besides the portion of the Vedas understood to be intended by the designation of Vedanta, the grand authority for its doctrine is the collection of sutras, or aphorisms, entitled Brahme-sutra or Sariraca-mimansa, and sometimes Sarira-sutra or Vedanta-sutra. Sarira, it should be observed, signifies embodied or incarnate (soul).
Other authorities are the ancient scholia of that text, which is the standard work of the science; and didactic poems comprehended under the designation of smriti, a name implying a certain degree of veneration due to the authors. Such are the Bhagavad gita and Yoga-vasisht'ha, reputed to be inspired writings.
Writers on the Vedanta.
The Sariraca-mimansa or Brahme sutra, above-mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms attributed to Badarayana, who is the same with Vyasa or Veda-vyasa; also called Dwaipayana or Crishna-dwaipayana. According to mythology, he had in a former state, being then a brahmana bearing the name of Apantara-ta-mas. [SANC. &c. on Br. Sutr. 3. 3. 32.] acquired a perfect knowledge of revelation and of the divinity, and was consequently qualified for eternal beatitude. Nevertheless, by special command of the deity, he resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was compiler of the Vedas, as his title of Vyasa implies.
In the Puranas, and by Parasara, he is said to be an incarnation (avatara) of Vishnu. This, however, is not altogether at variance with the foregoing legend; since Apantara-Tamas, having attained perfection, was identified with the deity; and his resumption of the human form was a descent of the God, in mythological notions.
Apart from mythology, it is not to be deemed unlikely, that the person (whoever he really was) who compiled and arranged the Vedas, was led to compose a treatise on their scope and essential doctrine. But Vyasa is also reputed author of the Mahabharata, and most of the principal puranas; and that is for the contrary reason improbable, since the doctrine of the puranas, and even of the Bhagavad gita and the rest of the Mahabharata, are not quite consonant to that of the Vedas, as expounded in the Brahme-sutras. The same person would not have deduced from the same premises such different conclusions.
The name of Badarayana frequently recurs in the sutras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the reputed author of the Purvamimansa, in his. I have already remarked, in the preceding essay, [See p. 189, of this volume.] on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in literature or science of other nations: but a Hindu commentator will account for it, by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher.
Besides Badarayana himself, and his great predecessor Jaimini, several other distinguished names likewise occur, though less frequently: some which are also noticed in the Purva-mimansa, as Atrieyi and Badari; and some which are not there found, as Asmarat'hya, Audulomi, Carshnajini, and Casacritsna; and the Yoga of Patanjali, which consequently is an anterior work; as indeed it must be, if its scholiast, as generally acknowledged, be the same Vyasa who is the author of the aphorisms of the Uttara-mimansa.
The Sariraca is also posterior to the atheistical Sanc'hya of Capila, to whom, or at least to his doctrine, there are many marked allusions in the text.
The atomic system of Canade (or, as the scholiast of the Sariraca, in more than one place, contumeliously designates him, Cana-Bhuj or Canabhacsha) is frequently adverted to for the purpose of confutation; as are the most noted heretical systems, viz. the several sects of Jainas, the Bauddhas, the Pasupalas with other classes of Maheswaras, the Pancharatras or Bhagavatas, and divers other schismatics.
From this, which is also supported by other reasons, there seems to be good ground for considering the Sariraca to be the latest of the six grand systems of doctrine (darsana) in Indian philosophy: later, likewise, than the heresies which sprung up among the Hindus of the military and mercantile tribes (cshatriya and vaisya) and which, disclaiming the Vedas, set up a Jina or a Buddha for an object of worship; and later even than some, which, acknowledging the Vedas, have deviated into heterodoxy in their interpretation of the text.
In a separate essay, [See p. 243, of this volume.] I have endeavoured to give some account of the heretical and heterodox sects which the Sariraca confutes: and of which the tenets are explained, for the elucidation of that confutation, in its numerous commentaries. I allude particularly to the Jainas, Bauddhas, Charvacas, Pasupatas, and Pancharatras.
The sutras of Badarayana are arranged in four books or lectures (adhyaya), each subdivided into four chapters or quarters (pada). Like the aphorisms of the prior Mimansa, they are distributed very unequally into sections, arguments, cases, or topics (adhicarana). The entire number of sutras is 555; of adhicaranas 191. But in this there is a little uncertainty, for it appears from Sancara, that earlier commentaries subdivided some adhicaranas, where he writes the aphorisms in one section.
An adhicarana in the later, as in the prior Mimansa, consists of five members or parts: 1st, the subject and matter to be explained; 2d, the doubt or question concerning it; 3d, the plausible solution or prima facie argument; 4th, the answer, or demonstrated conclusion and true solution; 5th, the pertinence or relevancy and connexion.
But in Badarayana's aphorisms, as in those of Jaimini, no adhicarana is fully set forth. Very frequently the solution only is given by a single sutra, which obscurely hints the question, and makes no allusion to any different plausible solution, nor to arguments in favour of it. More rarely the opposed solution is examined at some length, and arguments in support of it are discussed through a string of brief sentences.
Being a sequel of the prior Mimansa, the latter adopts the same distinctions of six sources of knowledge or modes of proof [Vedanta paribhasha.] which are taught by Jaimini, supplied where he is deficient by the old scholiast. There is, indeed, no direct mention of them in the Brahme-sutras, beyond a frequent reference to oral proof, meaning revelation, which is sixth among those modes. But the commentators make ample use of a logic which employs the same terms with that of the Purva-mimansa, being founded on it, though not without amendments on some points. Among the rest, the Vedantins have taken the syllogism (nyaya) of the dialectic philosophy, with the obvious improvement of reducing its five members to three. [Vedanta paribhasha.] "It consists," as expressly declared, "of three, not of five parts; for as the requisites of the inference are exhibited by three members, two more are superfluous. They are either the proposition, the reason, and the example; or the instance, the application, and the conclusion."
In this state it is a perfectly regular syllogism, as I had occasion to remark in a former essay: [See p. 185, of this volume.] and it naturally becomes a question, whether the emendation was borrowed from the Greeks, or being sufficiently obvious, may be deemed purely Indian, fallen upon without hint or assistance from another quarter. The improvement does not appear to be of ancient date, a circumstance which favours the supposition of its having been borrowed. The earliest works in which I have found it mentioned are of no antiquity. [Sanc. 3. 3. 53.]
The logic of the two Mimansas merits a more full examination than the limits of the present essay allow, and it has been reserved for a separate consideration at a future opportunity, because it has been refined and brought into a regular form by the followers, rather than by founders of either school.
The Sariraca-sutras are in the highest degree obscure, and could never have been intelligible without an ample interpretation. Hinting the question or its solution, rather than proposing the one or briefly delivering the other, they but allude to the subject. Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, they must from the first have been accompanied by the author's exposition of the meaning, whether orally taught by him or communicated in writing.
Among ancient scholiasts of the Brahme-sutras the name of BAUDHAYANA occurs: an appellation to which reverence, as to that of a saint or rishi, attaches. He is likewise the reputed author of a treatise on law. An early gloss, under the designation of vritti, is quoted without its author's name, and is understood to be adverted to in the remarks of later writers, in several instances, where no particular reference is however expressed. It is apparently Baudhayana's. An ancient writer on both mimansas (prior and later) is cited, under the name of upavarsha, with the epithet of venerable (bhagavat), [In the Vedanta paribhasha and Padart'ha dipica.] implying that he was a holy personage. He is noticed in the supplement to the Amera-cosha [Tricanda sesha.] as a saint (muni), with the titles or additions of Hala-bhriti, Crita-coti, and Ayachita. It does not appear that any of his works are now forthcoming.
The most distinguished scholiast of these sutras, in modern estimation, is the celebrated Sancara Acharya, the founder of a sect among Hindus which is yet one of the most prevalent. I have had a former occasion of discussing the antiquity of this eminent person; and the subject has been since examined by Rama Mohen Raya and by Mr. Wilson. [Sanscrit Dict., first edit,, pref. p. xvi.] I continue of opinion, that the period when he flourished may be taken to have been the close of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century of the Christian era; and I am confirmed in it by the concurring opinions of those very learned persons.
How much earlier the older scholia were, or the text itself, there is no evidence to determine. If the reputed author be the true one, it would be necessary to go back nearly two thousand years, to the era of the arrangement of the Vedas by Vyasa.
Sancara's gloss or perpetual commentary of the sutras bears the title of Sariraca-mimansa-bhashya. It has been annotated and interpreted by a herd of commentators; and among others, and most noted, by Vachespati Misra, in the Bhamati or Sariraca-bhashya-vibhaga.
This is the same Vachespati, whose commentaries on the Sanc'hya-carica of Iswara Chandra, and on the text and gloss of Patanjali's Yoga and Gotama's Nyaya, were noticed in former essays. [See pp. 147, 148, 166, of this volume.] He is the author of other treatises on dialectics (Nyaya), and of one entitled Tatwa-vindu on the Purva-mimansa, as it is expounded by BHATTA. All his works, in every department, are held in high and deserved estimation.
Vachespati's exposition of Sancara's gloss, again, has been amply annotated and explained in the Vedanta-calpataru of ANALANANDA, sumamed Vyasasrama; whose notes, in their turn, become the text for other scholia: especially a voluminous collection under the title of Parimala, or Vedanta-calpataru-parimala, by Apyayadicshita (author of several other works); and an abridged one, under that of Vedanta calpataru-manjari, by Vidyanat'ha Bhatta.
Other commentaries on Sancara's gloss are numerous and esteemed, though not burdened with so long a chain of scholia upon scholia: for instance, the Brahma-vidya-bharana by Adwaitananda, [It is by Mr. Ward named Vedanta sutra vyac'hya by Brahma-vidyabha-rana, mistaking the title of the work for the appellation of the author. Yet it is expressly affirmed in the rubric and colophon to be the work of Adwaitananda, who abridged it from an ampler commentary by Ramananda Tirt'ha. The mistake is the more remarkable, as the same Adwaitananda was preceptor of SADANANDA, whose work, the Vedanta-sara, Mr. Ward attempted to translate; and the only part of Sadananda's preface, which is preserved in the version, is that preceptor's name. Mr. Ward's catalogue of treatises extant belonging to this school of philosophy exhibits other like errors. He puts Madhava for Madhusudana, the name of an author; converts a commentary (the Muctavali) into an abridgment; and turns the text (mula) of the Vedanta-sara into its essence. Ward's Hindus, vol., iv. pp. 172, 173.] and the Bhashya-ratnaprabha by Govindananda; both works of acknowledged merit.
These multiplied expositions of the text and of the gloss furnish an inexhaustible fund of controversial disquisition, suited to the disputatious schoolmen of India. On many occasions, however, they are usefully consulted, in succession, for annotations supplying a right interpretation of obscure passages in Sancara's scholia or in Vyasa's text.
Another perpetual commentary on the sutras of the Sariraca by a distinguished author, is the work of the celebrated Ramanuja, the founder of a sect which has sprung as a schism out of the Vedantin. The points of doctrine, on which these great authorities differ, will be inquired into in another place. It may be readily supposed that they are not unfrequently at variance in the interpretation of the text, and I shall, therefore, make little use of the scholia of Ramanuja for the present essay. For the same reason, I make no reference to the commentaries of Ballabha Acharya, Bhatta Bhascara, ANANTA Tirt'ha surnamed Madhu, and Nilacant'ha, whose interpretations differ essentially on some points from Sancara's.
Commentaries on the Sariraca-sutras by authors of less note are extremely numerous. I shall content myself with naming such only as are immediately under view, viz. the Vedanta-sutra-muctavati by Brahmananda-Saraswati; [Mr. Ward calls this an abridgment of the Vedanta-sutras. It is no abridgment, but a commentary in ordinary form.] the Brahma-sutra-bhashya or Mimansa- bhashya, by Bhascaracharya; the Vedanta-sutra-vyac'hya-chandrica, by BHAVADEVA Misra; the Vyasa-sutra-vritti, by RANGANAT'HA; the Subodhini or Sarira-sutra-sarart'ha-chandrica, by Gangadhara; and the Brahmamritra-vershini, by Ramananda.
This list might with ease be greatly enlarged. Two of the commentaries, which have been consulted in progress of preparing the present essay, are without the authors name, either in preface or colophon, in the only copies which I have seen; and occasions have occurred for noticing authors of commentaries on other branches of philosophy, as well as on the Brahma-mimansa (for instance Vijnyana Bhicshu, author of the Sanc'hya-sara and Yoga-vartica). [See p. 146, 148, of this volume.]
To these many and various commentaries in prose, on the text and on the scholia, must be added more than one in verse. For instance, the Sancshepa-sariraca, which is a metrical paraphrase of text and gloss, by Sarvajnyatmagiri a sannyasi: it is expounded by a commentary entitled Anwayart'ha-pracasica, by Rama Tirt'ha, disciple of Crishna Tirt'ha, and author of several other works; in particular, a commentary on the Upadesa-sahasri, and one on the Vedanta-sara.
Besides his great work, the interpretation of the sutras, Sancara wrote commentaries on all the principal or important Upanishads. His preceptor, Govinda, and the preceptor's teacher, Gaudapada, had already written commentaries on many of them.
Sancara is author, likewise, of several distinct treatises; the most noted of which is the Upadesa-sahasri, a metrical summary of the doctrine deduced by him from the Upanishads and Brahma-sutras, in his commentaries on those original works. The text of the Upadesa-sahasri has been expounded by more than one commentator; and among others by Rama Tirt'ha, already noticed for his comment on the Sancshepa-sariraca. His gloss of the Upadesa-sahasri is entitled Pada-yojanica.
Elementary treatises on the Vedanta are very abundant. It may suffice to notice a few which are popular and in general use, and which have been consulted in the preparation of the present essay.
The Vedanta-paribhasha of Dharma-raja Dicshita explains, as its title indicates, the technical terms of the Vedanta; and, in course of doing so, opens most of the principal points of its doctrine. A commentary on this work by the author's son, Rama-Crishha Dicshita, bears the title of Vedanta-sic'hamani. Taken together, they form an useful introduction to the study of this branch of Indian philosophy.
The Vedanta-sara is a popular compendium of the entire doctrine of the Vedanta. [Mr. Ward has given, in the fourth volume of his View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus (third edition) a translation of the Vedanta-sara. I wish to speak as gently as I can of Mr. Ward's performance; but having collated this, I am bound to say it is no version of the original text, and seems to have been made from an oral exposition through the medium of a different language, probably the Bengalese. This will be evident to the oriental scholar on the slightest comparison: for example, the introduction, which does not correspond with the original in so much as a single word, the name of the author's preceptor alone excepted; nor is there a word of the translated introduction countenanced by any of the commentaries. At the commencement of the treatise, too, where the requisite qualifications of a student are enumerated, Mr. Ward makes his author say, that a person possessing those qualifications is heir to the Veda (p. 176). There is no term in the text, nor in the commentaries, which could suggest the notion of heir; unless Mr. Ward has so translated adhicari (a competent or qualified person), which in Bengalese signifies proprietor, or, with the epithet uttara (uttaradhicari) heir or successor. It would be needless to pursue the comparison further. The meaning of the original is certainly not to be gathered from such translations of this and (as Mr. Ward terms them) of other principal works of the Hindus, which he has presented to the public. I was not aware, when preparing the former essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus which have been inserted in the first volume of the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, that Mr. Ward had treated the same topics: but I think it now unnecessary to revert to the subject, for the purpose of offering any remarks on his explanation of other branches of Indian philosophy.] It is the work of Sadananda, disciple of Adwayananda or ADWAITANANDA before-mentioned, and has become the text for several commentaries; and, among the rest, the Vidwanmano-ranjini, by RAMA-TIRT'HA, who has been already twice noticed for other works; and the Subodhini, by Nrisinha Saraswati, disciple of Crishnananda.
A few other treatises may be here briefly noticed.
The Sastra-siddhanta-lesa-sangraha, by Apyaya or (Apyai) or CSHITA, son of Ranganat'ha or RANGARAJA DICSHITA, and author of the Parimala on the Siddhanta calpataru, before-mentioned, as well as of other works, has the benefit of a commentary, entitled Crishnalancara, by Achyuta Crishnananda Tirt'ha, disciple of SWAYAMPRACASANANDA SARASWATi. The Vedanta-siddhanta-vindu, by MADHUSUDANA, disciple of VISWEWA-RANANDA SARASWATI, and author of the Vedanta-calpalatica, and of other works, is in like manner commented on by BRAHMANANDA, disciple of Narayana Tirt'ha.
Analysis.
[In this analysis of the sutras, a portion of the scholia or explanations of commentators is blended with the text, for a brief abstract and intelligible summary of the doctrine.]
The Uttara-mimansa opens precisely as the Purva, announcing the purport in the same terms, except a single, but most important word, brahme instead of dharma. 'Next, therefore, the inquiry is concerning God.' [Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 1.] It proceeds thus: '[He is that] whence are the birth and [continuance, and dissolution] of [this world]: [He is] the source of [revelation or] holy ordinance.' [1b. § 2 and 3.] That is, as the commentators infer from these aphorisms so expounded, 'He is the omnipotent creator of the world and the omniscient author of revelation.' It goes on to say, 'This appears from the import and right construction of holy writ.' [1b. § 4.]
The author of the sutras next [1b. § 5. (sutr. 5. 11.)] enters upon a confutation of the Sanc'hyas, who insist that nature, termed prad'hana, which is the material cause of the universe, as they affirm, is the same with the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the world recognised by the Vedas. It is not so; for 'wish' (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause, which moreover is termed (atman) soul: 'He wished to be many and prolific, and became manifold.' And again, 'He desired to be many, &c.' [Ch'handogya, 6.] Therefore he is a sentient rational being; not insensible, as the pracriti (nature) or pradhana (matter) of Capila is affirmed to be.
In the sequel of the first chapter [§ § 6 to § 11.] questions are raised upon divers passages of the Vedas, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes are seemingly assigned to the world's cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are shown to intend the supreme one.
The cases (adhicaranas) or questions arising on them are examined and resolved concisely and obscurely in the sutras, fully and perspicuously in the scholia.
'The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is (anandamaya) essentially happy. [Taittiriya.] He is the brilliant, golden person, seen within (antar) the solar orb and the human eye. [Ch'handogya, 1.] He is the etherial element (acasa), from which all things proceed and to which all return. [Ch'handogya, I.] He is the breath (prana) in which all beings merge, into which they all rise. [Udgit'ha.] He is the light (Jyotish) which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, everywhere throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the breath (prana) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, with which Indra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, identifies himself.' [Caushitaci.]
The term prana, which is the subject of two of the sections just quoted (§ 9 and 11), properly and primarily signifies respiration, as well as certain other vital actions (inspiration, energy, expiration, digestion, or circulation of nourishment); and secondarily, the senses and organs. [Br. Sutr. 2. 4. § 1, 6. (S. 1, 13.)] But, in the passages here referred to, it is employed for a different signification, intending the supreme Brahme; as also in divers other texts of the Vedas: and, among the rest, in one where the senses are said to be absorbed into it during profound sleep; [SANC. &c. on Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 9.] for 'while a man sleeps without dreaming, his soul is with Brahme. '
Further cases of the like nature, but in which the indications of the true meaning appear less evident, are discussed at length in the second and third chapters of the first book. Those in which the distinctive attributes of the supreme being are more positively indicated by the passage whereon a question arises, had been considered in the foregoing chapter: they are not so clearly denoted in the passages now examined, such as concern God as the object of devout meditation and worship, are for the most part collected in the second chapter; those which relate to God as the object of knowledge, are reserved for the third. Throughout these cases, completed where requisite by the scholiast, divers interpretations of a particular term or phrase are first proposed, as obvious and plausible, and reasons favourable to the proposed explanation set forth; but are set aside by stronger arguments, for a different and opposite construction. The reasoning is here omitted, as it would need much elucidation; and the purpose of this analysis is to exhibit the topics treated, and but summarily the manner of handling them.
It is not the embodied (sarira) and individual soul, but the supreme Brahme himself, [Brahman is, in this acceptation, a neuter noun (nom. Brahme or Brahma); and the same term in the masculine (nom. Brahma) is one of the three Gods who constitute one person. But it is more conformable with our idiom to employ the masculine exclusively, and many Sanscrit terms of the same import are masculine; as Paramatman(-tma), Paramesnara &c.] on whom devout meditation is to be fixed, as enjoined in a passage which declares: 'this universe is indeed Brahme; [Ch'handogya, 3. 'Sanditya-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 1, (S. 1, 8.)] for it springs from him, merges in him, breathes in him: therefore, serene, worship him. Verily, a devout man, as are his thoughts or deeds in this world, such does he become departing hence [in another birth]. Frame then the devout meditation, "a living body endued with mind ..."' [Cat'havalli, 2. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 2. (8. 9, 10).]
It is neither fire nor the individual soul, but the supreme being, who is the 'devourer' (attri) described in the dialogue between YAMA and Nachicetas: [Cat'havalli. 3. Br. S. 1. 2. § 3. (S. 11, 12.)] ' who, then, knows where abides that being, whose food is the priest and the soldier (and all which is fixt or moveable), and death is his sauce?'
In the following passage, the supreme spirit, and not the intellectual faculty, is associated with the individual living soul, as "two occupying the cavity or ventricle of the heart" (guham pravish'tau atmanau). 'Theologists, as well as worshippers maintaining sacred fires, term light and shade the contrasted two, who abide in the most excellent abode, worthy of the supreme, occupying the cavity (of the heart), dwelling together in the worldly body, and tasting the certain fruit of good (or of evil) works.' [Ch'handogya 4. Upacosala-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 4. (S. 13, 17.)]
In the following extract from a dialogue, [Vrihad aranyaca, 5. Br. Sutr. 1 . 2. § 5. (S 18, 20.)] in which Satyacama instructs Upacosala, the supreme being is meant; not the reflected image in the eye, nor the informing deity of that organ, nor the regent of the sun, nor the individual intelligent soul. 'This being, who is seen in the eye, is the self (atman): He is immortal, fearless Brahme. Though liquid grease, or water, be dropped therein, it passes to the corners (leaving the eye-ball undefiled).'
So, in a dialogue, in which Yajnyawalcya instructs Uddalaca, [Mundaca, an Upanishad of the At'harvana. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 6. (S. 21, 23.)] "the internal check" (antaryamin) is the supreme being; and not the individual soul, nor the material cause of the world, nor a subordinate deity, the conscious informing regent of the earth, nor a saint possessing transcendent power: where premising, 'he who eternally restrains (or governs) this and the other world, and all beings therein,' the instructor goes on to say: 'who standing in the earth is other than [the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who interiorly restrains (and governs) the earth: the same is thy soul (and mine), the "internal check" (antaryamin), immortal, &c,'
Again, in another dialogue, Angiras, in answer to Mahasala, who with SAUNACA visited him for instruction, declares 'there are two sciences, one termed inferior, the other superior. The inferior comprises the four Vedas, with their appendages, grammar, &c.' (all of which he enumerates): 'but the superior (or best and most beneficial) is that by which the unalterable (being) is comprehended, who is invisible (imperceptible by organs of sense), ungrasped (not prehensible by organs of action), come of no race, belonging to no tribe, devoid of eye, ear (or other sensitive organ), destitute of hand, foot (or other instrument of action), everlasting lord, present every where, yet most minute. Him, invariable, the wise contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the head and body grows from the living man, so does the universe come of the unalterable... ' Here it is the supreme being, not nature or a material cause, nor an embodied individual soul, who is the invisible (adresya) ungrasped source of (all) beings (bhuta-yoni).
In a dialogue between several interlocutors, Prachinasala, UDDALACA, and ASWAPATi, king of the Caiceyis, (of which a version at length was inserted in an essay on the Vedas, [ See p. 50, of this volume.] the terms vaiswanara and atman occur (there translated universal soul). The ordinary acceptation of vaiswanara is tire: and it is therefore questioned, whether the element of fire be not here meant, or the regent of tire, that is, the conscious, informing deity of it, or a particular deity described as having an igneous body, or animal heat designated as alvine fire; and whether likewise atman intends the living, individual soul, or the supreme being. The answer is, that the junction of both general terms limits the sense, and restricts the purport of the passage to the single object to which both terms are applicable: it relates, then, to the supreme being. [Ch'handogya, 5. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 7. (S. 24, 32.)]
Under this section the author twice cites Jaimini: [1b. S. 28 and 31.] once for obviating any difficulty or apparent contradiction in this place, by taking the term in its literal and etymological sense (universal guide of men), instead of the particular acceptation of fire; and again, as justifying, by a parallel passage in another Veda, [Vajasaneyi brahmana.] an epithet intimating the minute size of the being in question (pradesa-matra), a span long. [By an oversight, the expression relative to diminutive dimension was omitted in the translated passage.] On this last point other ancient authors are likewise cited: one, Asmarat'hya, who explains it as the result of shrinking or condensation; the other, Badari, as a fruit of imagination or mental conception. [Br Sutr. I. 2. 29. 30.] Reference is also made to another sac'ha of the Veda, [Jabala.] where the infinite, supreme soul is said to occupy the spot between the eye-brows and nose.
'That on which heaven and earth and the intermediate transpicuous region are fixt, mind, with the vital airs (or sensitive organs), know to be the one soul (atman): reject other doctrines. This alone is the bridge of immortality.' [Mundaca. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 1. (S. 1, 7.)] In this passage of an Upanishad of the At'harvana, Brahme is intended, and not any other supposed site (ayatana) of heaven, earth, &c.
In a dialogue between Nareda and Sanatcumara, the (bhuman) 'great' one, proposed as an object of inquiry for him who desires unlimited happiness, since there is no bliss in that which is finite and small, is briefly defined. 'He is great, in whom nought else is seen, heard, or known, but that wherein ought else is seen, heard, or known, is small.' [Ch'handogya. 7. Bhumavidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 2. (S. 8, 9.)] Here the supreme being is meant; not breath (prana), which had been previously mentioned as greatest, in a climax of enumerated objects.
So, in a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and his wife Gargi, [Vrihad arany. 5. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 3. (S. 10, 12.)] being asked by her, 'the heaven above, and the earth beneath, and the transpicuous region between, and all which has been, is, and will be, whereon are they woven and sewn?' answers, the ether (acasa); and being further asked, what it is on which ether is woven or sewn? replies, 'the unvaried being, whom Brahmanas affirm to be neither coarse nor subtile, neither short nor long ...' It is the supreme being who is here meant.
The mystic syllable om, composed of three elements of articulation, is a subject of devout meditation; and the efficacy of that meditation depends on the limited or extended sense in which it is contemplated. The question concerning this mode of worship is discussed in a dialogue between Pippalada and Satyacama. [Prasna, an Upanishad of the At'harvana. Br, Sutr. 1. 3. § 4. (S. 13.)]
If the devotion be restricted to the sense indicated by one element, the effect passes not beyond this world; if to that indicated by two of the elements, it extends to the lunar orb, whence however the soul returns to a new birth; if it be more comprehensive, embracing the import of the three elements of the word, the ascent is to the solar orb, whence, stripped of sin, and liberated as a snake which has cast its slough, the soul proceeds to the abode of Brahme, and to the contemplation of (purusha) him who resides in a corporeal frame: that is, soul reposing in body (purisaya).
That mystic name, then, is applied either to the supreme Brahme, uniform, with no quality or distinction of parts; or to Brahme, not supreme, but an effect (carya) diversified, qualified; who is the same with the Viraj and Hiranya-Garbha of mythology, born in the mundane egg.
It appears from the latter part of the text, that it is the supreme Brahme to whom meditation is to be directed, and on whom the thoughts are to be fixed, for that great result of liberation from sin and worldly trammels.
In a passage descriptive of the lesser ventricle of the heart, it is said: 'within this body (Brahme-pura) Brahme's abode, is a (dahara) little lotus, a dwelling within which is a (dahara) small vacuity occupied by ether (acasa). What that is which is within (the heart's ventricle) is to be inquired, and should be known.' [Ch'handogya, 8. Dahara-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 5. (S. 14, 21.)] A question is here raised, whether that 'ether' (acasa) within the ventricle of the heart be the etherial element, or the individual sensitive soul, or the supreme one; and it is pronounced from the context, that the supreme being is here meant.
'The sun shines not therein, nor the moon, nor stars: much less this fire. All shines after his effulgence (reflecting his light), by whose splendour this whole (world) is illumined.' [Mundaca, Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 6. (S. 22, 23.)] In this passage it is no particular luminary or mine of light, but the (prajnya) intelligent soul (supreme Brahme) which shines with no borrowed light.
In the dialogue between Yama and Nachicetas, before cited, are the following passages. [Cat'ha. 4. Br. Sutr. 1 . 3. § 7. (S. 24, 25.)] 'A person (purusha) no bigger than the thumb abides in the midst of self;' and again, 'the person no bigger than the thumb is clear as a smokeless flame, lord of the past (present) and future; he is to-day and will be to-morrow: such is he ( concerning whom you inquire ).' This is evidently said of the supreme ruler, not of the individual living soul.
Another passage of the same Upanishad [Cat'ha. 6. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 10. (S. 39.)] declares: 'this whole universe, issuing from breath (prana), moves as it impels: great, terrible, as a clap of thunder. They, who know it, become immortal.' Brahme, not the thunderbolt nor wind, is here meant.
'The living soul (samprasada) rising from this corporeal frame, attains the supreme light, and comes forth with his identical form.' [Ch'handogya 8. Prajapati-vidya, Br. Sutr. I. 3. § 11. (S. 40.)] 'It is neither the light of the sun, nor the visual organ, but Brahme, that is here meant.
'Ether (acasa) is the bearer (cause of bearing) of name and form. That in the midst of which they both are, is Brahme: it is immortality; it is soul.' [Ch'handogya 8 ad finem. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 12. (S. 41.)] Acasa here intends the supreme being, not the element so named.
In a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and Janaca, [Vrihad aranyaca, 6. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 13. (S. 42. 43.)] in answer to an inquiry 'which is the soul?' the intelligent internal light within the heart is declared to be so. This likewise is shown to relate to the supreme one, unaffected by worldly course.
It had been intimated in an early aphorism of the first chapter, that the Vedas, being rightly interpreted, do concur in the same import, as there expressed concerning the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. [Br. S. 1. 1. § 4.] An objection to this conclusion is raised, upon the ground of discrepancy remarked in various texts of the Vedas, [Ch'handogya. Taittiriya. and Aitareya.] which coincide, indeed, in ascribing the creation to Brahme, but differ in the order and particulars of the world's development. The apparent contradiction is reconciled, as they agree on the essential points of the creator's attributes; omnipotent and omniscient providence, lord of all, soul of all, and without a second, &c.: and it was not the object of the discrepant passages to declare the precise succession and exact course of the world's formation.
Two more sections are devoted to expound passages which define Brahme as creator, and which are shown to comport no other construction. In one, [Caushitaci brahmana. Br. S. 1. 4. §5. (S. 16-18.)] cited from a dialogue between Ajatasatru and Balaci, surnamed Gargya, the object of meditation and worship is pronounced to be, 'he who was the maker of those persons just before mentioned (regents of the sun, moon, &c.), and whose work this universe is.'
In the other, cited from a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and MAITREYI, [Vrihad aranyaca, Maitreyi brahmana. Br. Sutr. 1. 4. § 6. (S. 19-22.)] soul, and all else which is desirable, are contrasted as mutual objects of affection: 'it is for soul (atman) that opulence, kindred, and all else which is dear, are so; and thereunto soul reciprocally is so; and such is the object which should be meditated, inquired, and known, and by knowledge of whom all becomes known.' This, it is shown, is said of the supreme, not of the individual soul, nor of the breath of life.
Under this last head several authorities are quoted by the author, for different modes of interpretation and reasoning, viz. Asmarat'hya, Audulomi and Casacritsna, as Jaimini under the next preceding (§ 5).
The succeeding section [Br. Sutr. 1.4. § 7. (S. 23-27.)] affirms the important tenet of the Vedanta, that the supreme being is the material, as well as the efficient, cause of the universe; it is a proposition directly resulting from the tenour of passages of the Vedas, and illustrations and examples adduced.
The first lecture is terminated by an aphorism, [Br. Sutr. 1. 4. § 8. (S. 28.)] intimating that, in the like manner as the opinion of a plastic nature and material cause (termed by the Sanc'hyas, pradhana) has been shown to be unsupported by the text of the Veda, and inconsistent with its undoubted doctrine, so, by the like reasoning, the notion of atoms (anu or paramanu) and that of an universal void (sunya), and other as unfounded systems, are set aside in favour of the only consistent position just now affirmed. (Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 5 and 1. 4. § 7.)
Not to interrupt the connexion of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digression, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this chapter, [Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 8, 9. (S. 26-38.)] wherein it is inquired whether any besides a regenerate man (or Hindu of the three first tribes) is qualified for theological studies and theognostic attainments; and the solution of the doubt is, that a sudra, or man of an inferior tribe, is incompetent; [Br. Sutr. 1. 3. (S. 28-29.)] and that beings superior to man (the Gods of mythology) are qualified.
In the course of this disquisition the noted question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favourite topic in both Mimansas, being intimately connected with that of the eternity of the Veda, or revelation acknowledged by them.