Part 1 of 2
X. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.
PART V. [Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Febr. 3, 1827.]
ON INDIAN SECTARIES.
[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. p. 549 -579.] In the present essay, it is ray intention to treat of the heretical systems of Jina and Buddha, as proposed in the first essay of this series on the Philosophy of the Hindus; and to notice certain other Indian sects, which, like them, exhibit some analogy to the Sanc'hyas, or followers of Capila or of Patanjali.
The theological or metaphysical opinions of those sectaries, apart from and exclusive of mythology and ritual ceremonies, may be not inaptly considered as a branch of philosophy, though constituting the essense of their religion, comprehending not only their belief as to the divinity and a future state, but also certain observances to be practised in furtherance of the prescribed means for attaining perpetual bliss: which here, as with most other sects of Indian origin, is the meed proposed for true and perfect knowledge of first principles.
The Jainas and Bauddhas I consider to have been originally Hindus; [As. Res., vol. ix. p. 288.] and the first-mentioned to be so still, because they recognised, as they yet do, the distinction of the four castes. It is true, that in Hindust'han, if not in the peninsula of India likewise, the Jainas are all of one caste: but this is accounted for by the admission of their adversaries (Cumarila Bhatta, &c.), who affirm that they are misguided cshatriyas (Hindus of the second or military tribe): they call themselves vaisyas. On renouncing the heresies of the Jaina sect, they take their place among orthodox Hindus, as belonging to a particular caste (cshatriya or vaisya). The representative of the great family of Jagat Set'h, who with many of his kindred was converted some years ago from the Jaina to the orthodox faith, is a conspicuous instance. Such would not be the case of a convert, who has not already caste as a Hindu.
Both religions of Jina and Buddha are, in the view of the Hindu, who reveres the Veda as a divine revelation, completely heterodox; and that more on account of their heresy in denying its divine origin, than for their deviation from its doctrine. Other sects, as the Sanc'hyas and Vaiseshicas, though not orthodox, do not openly disclaim the authority of the Veda. They endeavour to reconcile their doctrine to the text of the Indian scripture, and refer to passages which they interpret as countenancing their opinions. The Mimansa, which professedly follows the Veda implicitly, is therefore applied, in its controversy with these half-heretics, to the confutation of such misinterpretations. It refutes an erroneous construction, rather than a mistaken train of reasoning. But the Jainas and Bauddhas, disavowing the Veda, are out of the pale of the Hindu church in its most comprehensive range; and the Mimansa (practical as well as theological) in controversy with these infidels, for so it deems them, argues upon general grounds of reasoning independent of authority, to which it would be vain to appeal.
The Uttara mimansa devotes two sections (adhicaranas) to the confutation of the Bauddhas, and one to that of the Jainas. They are the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections in the 2d chapter of the 2d lecture; and it proceeds in the same controversial chapter to confute the Pasupatas and other branches of the Maheswara sect; and the Pancharatra, a branch of the Vaishnava. The Charvacas are alluded to incidentally in a very important section concerning the distinction of body and soul, in the 3d chapter of the 3d lecture (§ 30). In the Purva mmansa, controversy is more scattered; recurring in various places, under divers heads: but especially in the 3d chapter of the first book (§ 4).
The Sanc'hya of Capila devotes a whole chapter to controversy; and notices the sect of Buddha, under the designation of Nasticas; and in one place animadverts on the Pasupatas; and in another, on the Charvacas.
It is from these and similar controversial disquisitions, more than from direct sources, that I derive the information, upon which the following account of the philosophy of Jainas and Bauddhas, as well as of the Charvacas, Pasupatas and Pancharatras, is grounded. A good collection of original works by writers of their own persuasion, whether in the Sanscrit language or in Pracrit or Pali, the language of the Jainas and that of the Bauddhas, is not at hand to be consulted. But, although the information be furnished by their adversaries and even inveterate enemies, it appears, so far as I have any opportunity of comparing it with their own representations, essentially correct.
SECT OF JINA.
The Jainas or Arhatas, followers of Jina or Arhat (terms of like import), are also denominated Vivasanas, Muctavasanas, Muctambaras or Digambaras, with reference to the nakedness of the rigid order of ascetics in this sect, who go "bare of clothing," "disrobed," or "clad by the regions of space." The less strict order of Swetambaras [Transact, of the Roy. Asiat. Soc, vol. i. p. 416.] "clad in white," is of more modern date and of inferior note. Among nicknames by which they are known, that of Lunchita-cesa occurs. It alludes to the practice of abruptly eradicating hair of the head or body by way of mortification, Parswanat'ha is described as tearing five handfuls of hair from his head on becoming a devotee. [Ibid. p. 433.]
According to the Digambara Jainas, the universe consists of two classes, "animate" and "inanimate" (jiva and ajiva), without a creator or ruling providence (iswara). [RAMANUJA on Br. Sutr.] They assign for the cause (carana) of the world, atoms, which they do not, as the Vaiseshicas, distinguish into so many sorts as there are elements, but consider these, viz. earth, water, fire, and air, the four elements by them admitted, as modified compounds of homogeneous atoms.
These gymnosophists distinguish, as already intimated, two chief categories: 1st, Jiva, intelligent and sentient soul (chaitana atma or bodhatma) endued with body and consequently composed of parts; eternal: 2d, Ajiva, all that is not a living soul; that is, the whole of (Jada) inanimate and unsentient substance. The one is the object of fruition, being that which is to be enjoyed (bhogya) by the soul; the other is the enjoyer (bhocta) or agent in fruition; soul itself.
This second comprehensive predicament admits a six-fold subdivision; and the entire number of categories (padart'ha), as distinguished with reference to the ultimate great object of the soul's deliverance, is consequently seven. [Sancara and other commentators on Br. Sutr., and annotators on their gloss.]
I. Jiva or soul, as before-mentioned, comprising three descriptions: 1st, nitya-siddha, ever perfect, or yoga-siddha, perfect by profound abstraction; for instance, Arhats or Jinas, the deified saints of the sect: 2d, mucti or muctatma, a soul which is free or liberated; its deliverance having been accomplished through the strict observance of the precepts of the Jinas: 3d, baddha or baddhatma, a soul which is bound, being in any stage antecedent to deliverance; remaining yet fettered by deeds or works (carma).
II. Ajiva taken in a restricted sense. It comprehends the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air; and all which is fixed (st'havara) as mountains, or moveable (jangama) as rivers, &c. In a different arrangement, to be hereafter noticed, this category is termed Pudgala matter.
III — VII. The five remaining categories are distributed into two classes, that which is to be effected (sadhya) and the means thereof (sadhana): one comprising two, and the other three divisions. What may be effected (sadhya) is either liberation or confinement: both of which will be noticed further on. The three efficient means (sadhana) are as follow:
III. Asrava is that which directs the embodied spirit (asravayati purusham) towards external objects. It is the occupation or employment (vritti or pravritti) of the senses or organs on sensible objects. Through the means of the senses it affects the embodied spirit with the sentiment of taction, colour, smell, and taste.
Or it is the association or connexion of body with right and wrong deeds. It comprises all the carmas: for they (asravayanti) pervade, influence, and attend the doer, following him or attaching to him.
It is a misdirection (mit'ya-pravritti) of the organs: for it is vain, as cause of disappointment, rendering the organs of sense and sensible objects subservient to fruition.
IV. Samvara is that which stops (samvrinoti) the course of the foregoing; or closes up the door or passage of it: and consists in self-command, or restraint of organs internal and external: embracing all means of self-control, and subjection of the senses, calming and subduing them.
It is the right direction (samyac pravritti) of the organs.
V. Nirjara is that which utterly and entirely (nir) wears and antiquates (Jarayati) all sin previously incurred, and the whole effect of works or deeds (carma). It consists chiefly in mortification (tapas): such as fasts, rigorous silence, standing upon heated stones, plucking out the hair by the roots, &c.
This is discriminated from the two preceding, as neither misdirection nor right direction, but non-direction (apravritti) of the organs towards sensible objects.
VI. Baddha is that which binds (badhnati) the embodied spirit. It is confinement and connexion, or association, of the soul with deeds. It consists in a succession of births and deaths as the result of works (carman).
VII. Mocsha is liberation; or deliverance of the soul from the fetters of works. It is the state of a soul in which knowledge and other requisites are developed.
Relieved from the bondage of deeds through means taught by holy ordinances, it takes effect on the soul by the grace of the ever-perfect ARHAT or JINA.
Or liberation is continual ascent. The soul has a buoyancy or natural tendency upwards, but is kept down by corporeal trammels. When freed from them, it rises to the region of the liberated.
Long immersed in corporeal restraint, but released from it; as a bird let loose from a cage, plunging into water to wash off the dirt with which it was stained, and drying its pinions in the sunshine, soars aloft; so does the soul, released from long confinement, soar high, never to return.
Liberation then is the condition of a soul clear of all impediments.
It is attained by right knowledge, doctrine and observances: and is a result of the unrestrained operation of the soul's natural tendency, when passions and every other obstacle are removed.
Works or deeds (for so the term carman signifies, though several among those enumerated be neither acts nor the effect of action) are reckoned eight; and are distributed into two classes, comprising four each: the first, ghatin, mischievous, and asadhu, impure, as marring deliverance: the second aghatin, harmless, or sadhu, pure, as opposing no obstacle to liberation.
I. In the first set is:
1st. Jnyana varaniya, the erroneous notion that knowledge is ineffectual; that liberation does not result from a perfect acquaintance with true principles; and that such science does not produce final deliverance.
2d. Darsana varaniya, the error of believing that deliverance is not attainable by study of the doctrine of the Arhats or Jinas.
3d. Mohaniya, doubt and hesitation as to particular selection among the many irresistible and infallible ways taught by the Tirt'hancaras or Jinas.
4th. Antaraya, interference, or obstruction offered to those engaged in seeking deliverance, and consequent prevention of their accomplishment of it.
II. The second contains: —
1st. Vedaniya, individual consciousness: reflection that "I am capable of attaining deliverance."
2d. Namica, individual consciousness of an appellation: reflection that "I bear this name."
3d. Gotrica, consciousness of race or lineage; reflection that "I am descendant of a certain disciple of Jina, native of a certain province."
4th. Ayushca, association or connexion with the body or person: that, (as the etymology of the term denotes), which proclaims (cayate) age (ayush), or duration of life.
Otherwise interpreted, the four carmas of this second set, taken in the inverse order, that is, beginning with ayushca, import procreation, and subsequent progress in the formation of the person or body wherein deliverance is attainable by the soul which animates it: for it is by connexion with white or immaculate matter that final liberation can be accomplished. I shall not dwell on the particular explanation respectively of these four carmas, taken in this sense.
Another arrangement, which likewise has special reference to final deliverance, is taught in a five-fold distribution of the predicaments or categories (asticaya). The word here referred to, is explained as signifying a substance commonly occurring; or a term of general import; or (conformably with its etymology), that of which it is said (cayate) that "it is" (asti): in other words, that of which existence is predicated.
I. The first is jivasticaya: the predicament, life or soul. It is, as before noticed, either bound, liberated, or ever-perfect.
II. Pudgalasticaya: the predicament, matter: comprehending all bodies composed of atoms. It is sixfold, comprising the four elements, and all sensible objects, fixed or moveable. It is the same with the ajiva or second of the seven categories enumerated in an arrangement before-noticed.
III. Dharmasticaya: the predicament, virtue; inferrible from a right direction of the organs. Dharma is explained as a substance or thing (dravya) from which may be concluded, as its effect, the soul's ascent to the region above.
IV. Adharmasticaya: the predicament, vice: or the reverse of the foregoing. Adharma is that which causes the soul to continue embarrassed with body, notwithstanding its capacity for ascent and natural tendency to soar.
V. Acasasticaya: the predicament acasa, of which there are two, Locacasa and Alocacasa.
1. Locacasa is the abode of the bound: a worldly region, consisting of divers tiers, one above the other, wherein dwell successive orders of beings unliberated.
2. Alocacasa is the abode of the liberated, above all worlds (locas) or mundane beings. Here acasa implies that, whence there is no return.
The Jaina gymnosophists are also cited [RAMANUJA on the Br. Sutr.] for an arrangement which enumerates six substances (dravya) as constituting the world: viz. —
1. Jiva, the soul.
2. Dharma, virtue; a particular substance pervading the world, and causing the soul's ascent.
3. Adharma, vice; pervading the world, and causing the soul's continuance with body.
4. Pudgala, matter; substance having colour, odour, savour, and tactility; as wind, fire, water, and earth: either atoms, or aggregates of atoms; individual body, collective worlds, &c.
5. Cala, time: a particular substance, which is practically treated, as past, present, and future.
6. Acasa, a region, one, and infinite.
To reconcile the concurrence of opposite qualities in the same subject at different times, and in different substances at the same times, the Jainas assume seven cases deemed by them apposite for obviating the difficulty (bhanga-naya): 1st. May be, it is; [somehow, in some measure, it so is]: 2d. May be, it is not: 3d. May be, it is, and it is not [successively]: 4th. May be, it is not predicable; [opposite qualities co-existing]: 5th. The first and fourth of these taken together: may be it is, and yet not predicable: 6th. The second and fourth combined: may be it is not, and not predicable; 7th. The third (or the first and second) and the fourth, united: may be it is and it is not, and not predicable.
This notion is selected for confutation by the Vedantins, to show the futility of the Jaina doctrine. 'It is,' they observe, 'doubt or surmise, not certainty nor knowledge. Opposite qualities cannot co-exist in the same subject. Predicaments are not unpredictable: they are not to be affirmed if not affirmable: but they either do exist or do not; and if they do, they are to be affirmed: to say that a thing is and is not, is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble.' [Sanc. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 6. (S. 33.)]
Another point, selected by the Vedantins for animadversion, is the position, that the soul and body agree in dimensions. [lb. S. 34-36.] 'In a different stage of growth of body or of transmigration of soul, they would not be conformable: passing from the human condition to that of an ant or of an elephant, the soul would be too big or too little for the new body animated by it. If it be augmented or diminished by accession or secession of parts, to suit either the change of person or corporeal growth between infancy and puberty, then it .is variable, and, of course, is not perpetual. If its dimensions be such as it ultimately retains, when released from body, then it has been uniformly such in its original and intermediate associations with corporeal frames. If it yet be of a finite magnitude, it is not ubiquitary and eternal.'
The doctrine of atoms, which the Jainas have in common with the Bauddhas and the Vaiseshicas (followers of Canade) is controverted by the Vedantins. [ Ibid. 2. 2. § 2. and § 3. (S. 11-17.)] The train of reasoning is to the following effect: 'Inherent qualities of the cause,' the Vaiseshicas and the rest argue, 'give origin to the like qualities in the effect, as white yarn makes white cloth: were a thinking being the world's cause, it would be endued with thought.' The answer is, that according to CANADE himself, substances great and long result from atoms minute and short: like qualities then are not always found in the cause and in the effect.
'The whole world, with its mountains, seas, &c., consists of substances composed of parts disposed to union: as cloth is wove of a multitude of threads. The utmost sub-division of compound substances, pursued to the last degree, arrives at the atom, which is eternal, being simple: and such atoms, which are the elements, earth, water, fire, and air, become the world's cause, according to CANADE: for there can be no effect without a cause. When they are actually and universally separated, dissolution of the world has taken place. At its renovation, atoms concur by an unseen virtue, which occasions action: and they form double atoms, and so on, to constitute air; then fire; next water; and afterwards earth; subsequently body with its organs; and ultimately this whole world. The concurrence of atoms arises from action (whether of one or both) which must have a cause: that cause, alleged to be an unseen virtue, cannot be insensible; for an insensible cause cannot incite action: nor can it be design, for a being capable of design is not yet existent, coming later in the progress of creation. Either way, then, no action can be; consequently no union or disunion of atoms; and these, therefore, are not the cause of the world's formation or dissolution.
'Eternal atoms and transitory double atoms differ utterly; and union of discordant principles cannot take place. If aggregation be assumed as a reason of their union, still the aggregate and its integrants are utterly different; and an intimate relation is further to be sought, as a reason for the aggregation. Even this assumption therefore fails.
'Atoms must be essentially active or inactive: were they essentially active, creation would be perpetual; if essentially inactive, dissolution would be constant.'
'Eternity of causeless atoms is incompatible with properties ascribed to them; colour, taste, smell, and tactility: for things possessing such qualities are seen to be coarse and transient. Earth, endued with those four properties, is gross; water, possessing three, is less so; fire, having two, is still less; and air, with one, is fine. Whether the same be admitted or denied in respect of atoms, the argument is either way confuted: earthy particles, coarser than aerial, would not be minute in the utmost degree; or atoms possessing but a single property, would not be like their effects possessing several.
'The doctrine of atoms is to be utterly rejected, having been by no venerable persons received, as the Sanc'hya doctrine of matter, a plastic principle, has been, in part, by Menu and other sages.' [Sanc, &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 3. (S. 17.)]
Points, on which the sectaries differ from the orthodox, rather than those on which they conform, are the subjects of the present treatise. On one point of conformity, however, it may be right to offer a brief remark, as it is one on which the Jainas appear to lay particular stress. It concerns the transmigration of the soul, whose destiny is especially governed by the dying thoughts, or fancies entertaining at the moment of dissolution. [See Transact, of the Roy. Asiat. Soc, vol. i. p. 437.] The Vedas, [Br. Sutr. 1. 2. 1.] in like manner, teach that the thoughts, inclinations, and resolves of man, and such peculiarly as predominate in his dying moments, determine the future character, and regulate the subsequent place, in transmigration. As was his thought in one body, such he becomes in another, into which he accordingly passes.
SECT OP BUDDHA.
The Bauddhas or Sangatas, followers of Buddha or Sugata (terms of the same import, and corresponding to Jina or Arhat) are also called Mucta-cachha, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked. They are not unfrequently cited by their adversaries as (Nasticas) atheists, or rather, disowners of another world.
BUDDHA MUNI, so he is reverently named by the opponents of his religious system, is the reputed author of sutras, [Quotations from them in the Sanscrit language occur in commentaries on the Vedanta: (the Bhamati on Br. Sutr. 2, 2. 19.)] constituting a body of doctrine termed agama or sastra, words which convey a notion of authority and holiness. The Buddha here intended, is no doubt the last, who is distinguished by the names of Gautama and Sacya, among other appellations.
Either from diversity of instruction delivered by him to his disciples at various times, or rather from different constructions of the same text, more or less literal, and varying with the degree of sagacity of the disciple, have arisen no less than four sects among the followers of Buddha. Commentators of the Vedanta, giving an account of this schism of the Bauddhas, do not agree in applying the scale of intellect to these divisions of the entire sect, some attributing to acuteness or superior intelligence, that which others ascribe to simplicity or inferior understanding.
Without regarding, therefore, that scale, the distinguishing tenets of each branch of the sect may be thus stated. Some maintain that all is void, (sarva sunya) following, as it seems, a literal interpretation of Buddha's sutras. To these the designation of Madhyamica is assigned by several of the commentators of the Vedanta: and in the marginal notes of one commentary, they are identified with the Charvacas: but that is an error.
Other disciples of Buddha except internal sensation or intelligence (vijnyana) and acknowledge all else to be void. They maintain the eternal existence of conscious sense alone. These are called Yogacharas.
Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects, no less than of internal sensations: considering external as perceived by senses; and internal as inferred by reasoning.
Some of them recognise the immediate perception of exterior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them, through images, or resembling forms, presented to the intellect: objects they insist are inferred, but not actually perceived. Hence two branches of the sect of Buddha: one denominated Sautrantica: the other Vaibhashica.
As these, however, have many tenets in common, they may be conveniently considered together; and are so treated of by the scholiasts of Vyasa's Brahme-sutras: understanding one adhicarana (the 4th of the 2d chapter in the 2d lecture) to be directed against these two sects of Buddhists: and the next the following one (2. 2. 5.) to be addressed to the Yogacharas; serving, however, likewise for the confutation of the advocates of an universal void. [This schism among the Bauddhas, splitting into four sects, is anterior to the age of Sancara Acharya, who expressly notices all the four. It had commenced before the composition of the Brahme-sutras, and consequently before the days of Sabara Swami and Cumarila Bhatta; since two, at the least, of those sects, are separately confuted. All of them appear to have been indiscriminately persecuted, when the Bauddhas of every denomination were expelled from Hindust'han and the peninsula. Whether the same sects yet subsist among the Bauddhas of Ceylon, Thibet, and the trans-gangetic India, and in China, deserves inquiry.]
The Sautrantica and Vaibhashica sects, admitting then external (bahya) and internal (abhyantara) objects, distinguish, under the first head, elements (bhuta) and that which appertains thereto (bhahtica), namely, organs and sensible qualities; and under the second head, intelligence (chitta), and that which unto it belongs (chaitta).
The elements (bhuta or mahabhuta) which they reckon four, not acknowledging a fifth, consist of atoms. The Bauddhas do not, with the followers of Canade, affirm double atoms, triple, quadruple, &c. as the early gradations of composition; but maintain indefinite atomic aggregation, deeming compound substances to be conjoint primary atoms.
Earth, they say, has the nature or peculiar character of hardness; water, that of fluidity; fire, that of heat; and air, that of mobility. Terrene atoms are hard; aqueous, liquid; igneous, hot; aerial, mobile. Aggregates of these atoms partake of those distinct characters. One authority, however, states, that they attribute to terrene atoms the characters of colour, savour, odour, and tactility; to aqueous, colour, savour, and tactility; to igneous, both colour and tactilit; to aerial, tactility only. [BAHANUJA on Br. Sutr.]
The Bauddhas do not recognise a fifth element, acasa, nor any substance so designated; nor soul (Jiva or atman) distinct from intelligence (chitta); nor any thing irreducible to the four categories above-mentioned.
Bodies, which are objects of sense, are aggregates of atoms, being composed of earth and other elements. Intelligence, dwelling within body, and possessing individual consciousness, apprehends objects, and subsists as self; and, in that view only, is (atman) self or soul.
Things appertaining to the elements, (bhautica,) the second of the predicaments, are organs of sense, together with their objects, as rivers, mountains, &c. They are composed of atoms. This world, every thing which is therein, all which consists of component parts, must be atomical aggregations. They are external; and are perceived by means of organs, the eye, the ear, &c., which likewise are atomical conjuncts.
Images or representations of exterior objects are produced; and by perception of such images or representations, objects are apprehended. Such is the doctrine of the Sautranticas upon this point. But the Vaibhashicas acknowledge the direct perception of exterior objects. Both think, that objects cease to exist when no longer perceived: they have but a brief duration, like a flash of lightning, lasting no longer than the perception of them. Their identity, then, is but momentary; the atoms or component parts are scattered; and the aggregation or concourse was but instantaneous.
Hence these Buddhists are by their adversaries, the orthodox Hindus, designated as Purna — or Sarva-vainasicas, 'arguing total perishableness; ' while the followers of Canade, who acknowledge some of their categories to be eternal and invariable, and reckon only others transitory and changeable; and who insist that identity ceases with any variation in the composition of a body, and that a corporeal frame, receiving nutriment and discharging excretions, undergoes continual change, and consequent early loss of identity, are for that particular opinion, called Ardha-vainasicas, 'arguing half-perishableness.'