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FIGURE 13. THE MUSIC OF THE SPHERES

THE FRAGMENTS OF PHILOLAUS

PHILOLAUS OF TARENTUM (latter half of fifth century B.C.E.) was educated by Lysis, one of the two Pythagoreans who escaped the persecution of the school at Croton. He was the first member of the school to record Pythagorean teachings in writing and it appears that these writings influenced the thought of Plato. Moreover, Plato's nephew Speusippus who took over the leadership of the Academy, drew on the work of Philolaus in compiling his treatise On Pythagorean Numbers, which dealt primarily with the properties of the Decad.

The fragments of Philolaus assembled here deal with the Pythagorean theory of the Limited and Unlimited, the principle of Harmonia through which they are conjoined, and the primacy of Number in the nature of Harmonia, and also the importance of Number in the pursuit of knowledge.

The Philolaic fragments are generally accepted as being authentic and their significance is not to be underestimated. This is because of all surviving Pythagorean writings the fragments of Philolaus are the earliest and most faithfully reflect the teachings of the original Pythagorean school.

For a good discussion of Philolaus see section 44 in Kathleen Freeman's Companion to the Presocratic Philosophers. The numbers following the fragments (e.g., DK 1) refer to the numeration in Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratieker, and are translated in Kathleen Freeman's Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers.

THE LIFE OF PHILOLAUS

FROM DIOGENES LAERTIUS

PHILOLAUS OF CROTON, a Pythagorean, was he from whom Plato, in some of his Letters, begged Dion to purchase Pythagorean books. He (Dion) died under the accusation of having had designs on the tyranny. I have made about him the following epigram: "I advise everybody to take good care to avoid suspicion; even if you are not guilty but seem so, you are ruined. That is why Croton, the homeland of Philolaus, destroyed him, because he was suspected of wishing to establish autocracy."

Philolaus teaches that all things are produced by necessity and harmony, and he is the first who said that the earth has a circular movement; others, however, insist this was due to Hicetas of Syracuse. He had written a single book which the philosopher Plato, visiting Dionysius in Sicily, bought, according to Hermippus, from Philolaus' parents, for the sum of 40 Alexandrian minae, whence he drew his Timaeus. Others state that he received them as a present for having obtained the liberty of one Philolaus' disciples, whom Dionysius had imprisoned. In his Homonyms, Demetrius claims that he is the first of the Pythagorean philosophers who made a work On Nature public property. This book begins as follows: "The world's being is the harmonious compound of Unlimited and Limiting principles; such is the totality of the world and all it contains."

THE FRAGMENTS OF PHILOLAUS

1. (Stobaeus, 21. 7; Diogenes Laertius, 8. 85) The world's nature is a harmonious compound of Limited and Unlimited elements; similar is the totality of the world in itself, and of all it contains (DK 1).

B. All beings are necessarily Limited or Unlimited, or simultaneously Limited and Unlimited; but they could not all be Unlimited only.

2. Now, since it is clear that the beings cannot be formed either of elements that are all Unlimited, it is evident that the world in its totality, and its included beings are a harmonious compound of Limited and Unlimited elements. That can be seen in existing things. Those that are composed of Limiting elements, are Limited themselves; those that are composed of both Limiting and Unlimited elements, are both Limited and Unlimited; and those composed of Unlimited elements are Unlimited (DK 2).

B. All things, at least those we know, contain Number; for it is evident that nothing whatever can either be thought or known, without Number (DK 4). Number has two distinct kinds: the odd, and the even, and a third, derived from a mingling of the other two kinds, the even-odd. Each of its subspecies is susceptible of many very numerous varieties, which each manifests individually (DK 5).

3. (Nicomachus, Arith. Intr., 2. 509) Harmony is generally the result of contraries; for it is the unity of multiplicity, and the agreement of discordances (DK 10).

4. This is the state of affairs concerning Nature and Harmony. The Being of things is eternal; it is a unique and divine nature, the knowledge of which does not belong to man. Still it would not be possible that any of the things that exist, and that are known by us, should arrive to our knowledge if this Being was not the internal foundation of principles of which the world was founded-that is, of the Limited and Unlimited elements. Now since these principles are not mutually similar, nor of similar nature, it would be impossible that the order of the world should have been formed by them in any manner whatever unless harmony had intervened. Of course, the things that were similar, and of similar nature, did not need harmony; but the dissimilar things, which have neither a similar nature, nor an equivalent function, must be organized by the harmony, if they are to take their place in the connected totality of the world.

5. The extent of the Harmony [octave] is a fourth, plus a fifth. The fifth is greater than the fourth by 8:9; for from the lowest string to the second lowest there is a fourth; and from this to the higher a fifth; but from this to the next, or third string, a fourth; and from this third string to the lowest, a fifth. The interval between the second lowest and the third [from the bottom] is 8:9 [a tone]; the interval of the fourth is 3:4; that of the fifth, 2:3; that of the octave, 1:2. Thus the Harmony contains five whole tones plus two semitones; the fifth, three tones, plus one semitone; the fourth, two whole tones, plus one semitone (DK 6).

6. (Boethius, De. Inst. Mus., 3. 5). Nevertheless the Pythagorean Philolaus has tried to divide the tone otherwise; his tone's starting-point is the first uneven number which forms a cube, and you know that the first uneven number was an object of veneration among these Pythagoreans. Now the first odd number is three; thrice three is nine, and nine times three is 27, which differs from the number 24 by the interval of one tone, and differs from it by this very number 3. Indeed, 3 is one eight of 24, and this eighth part of 24, added to 24 itself, produces 27, the cube of 3. Philolaus divides this number 27 in two parts, the one greater than half, which he calls apotome the other one smaller than half he calls sharp, but which latterly has become known as minor half-tone. He supposes that this sharp contains thirteen unities, because 13 is the difference between 256 and 243, and that this same number is the sum of 9, 3, and unity, in which the unity plays the part of the point, 3 of the first odd line, and 9 of the first odd square. After having, for these reasons, expressed by 13 the sharp, which is called a semitone, out of 14 unities he forms the other part of the number 27, which he calls apotome, and as the difference between 13 and 14 is the unity, he insists that the unity forms the comma, and that 27 unities form an entire tone, because 27 is the difference between 216 and 243, which are distant by one tone. [1]

7. (Boethius, De. Inst. Mus., 3. 8). These are the definitions that Philolaus has given of these intervals, and of still smaller intervals. The comma, says he, is the interval whose eight-ninths relation exceeds the sum of two sharps, namely, the sum of two minor semitones. The schisma is half the comma, the diaschisma is half the sharp, namely, of the minor semitone.

8. (Claudianus Mamertus, De Statu Animae, 2. 3). Before treating of the substance of the soul, Philolaus, according to geometrical principles, treats of music, arithmetic, measures, weights, and numbers, insisting that these are the principles which support the existence of the universe.

9. (Nicomachus, Arithm. Intr., 2. p. 72). Some, in this following Philolaus, think that this kind of a proportion is called harmonic, because it has the greatest analogy with what is called geometrical harmony; which is the cube, because all its dimensions are mutually equal, and consequently in perfect harmony. Indeed this proportion is revealed in all kinds of cubes which always have 12 sides, 8 angles, and 6 surfaces. [2]

B. (Cassiodorus, Exp. in Ps., 9, p. 36). The number 8, which the arithmeticians call the first actual cube, has been given by the Pythagorean Philolaus the name of geometrical harmony, because he thinks he recognizes in it all the harmonic relations.

10 A. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 15.7. p. 360). The world is single and it came into being from the center outwards. Starting from this center, the top is entirely identical to the base; still you might say that what is above the center is opposed to what is below it; for the base, lowest point would be the center, as for the top, the highest point would still be the center; and likewise for the other parts; in fact, in respect to the center, each one of the opposite points is identical, unless the whole be moved (DK 17).

B. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 21. 1. p. 468). The prime composite, the One placed in the center of the sphere, is called Hestia (DK 7).

11. A. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 22. 1. p. 488). Philolaus has located the fire in the middle, the center; he calls it Hestia, of the All, the Guardpost of Zeus, the Mother of the Gods, the Altar, the Link, and the Measure of Nature. Besides, he locates a second fire, quite at the top, surrounding the world. The center, says he, is by its nature the first; around it, the ten different bodies carry out their choral dance. These are: the heaven, the planets, lower the sun, and below it the moon; lower the earth, and beneath this, the counter-earth, then beneath these bodies the fire of Hestia, in the center, where it maintains order. The highest part of the Covering, in which he asserts that the elements exist in a perfectly pure condition, is called Olympus; the space beneath the revolution-circle of Olympus, and where in order are disposed the five planets, the sun and moon, forms the Cosmos; finally, beneath the latter is the sublunar region, which surrounds the earth, where are the generative things, susceptible to change. All that is the heaven. The order which manifests in the celestial phenomena is the object of science; the disorder which manifests in the things of becoming, is the object of virtue; the former is perfect, the latter is imperfect.

B. (ps.-Plutarch, Plac. Phil., 3. 11). The Pythagorean Philolaus locates the fire in the center -- it is the Hearth (Hestia) of the All -- then the counter-earth, then the earth we inhabit, placed opposite the other, and moving circularly, which is the reason that its inhabitants are not visible to ours.

C. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 21. 6. p. 452). The directing fire, says Philolaus, is in the entirely central fire, which the Demiurge has placed as a sort of keel to serve as foundation to the sphere of the All.

12. (ps.-Plutarch, Plac. Phil., 2. 5). Philolaus explains destruction by two causes: one is the fire which descends from heaven, the other is the water of the moon, which is driven away therefrom by the circulation of the air; the exhalations of these two stars nourish the world.

13. A. (Diogenes Laertius, 8.85). Philolaus was the first who said that the world moves in a circle; others attribute it to Hicetas of Syracuse.

B. (ps.-Plutarch, Plac. Phil., 3. 7). Some insist that the earth is immovable; but the Pythagorean Philolaus says that it moves circularly around the central fire, in an oblique circle like the sun and moon.

14. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 25. 3. p. 530). The Pythagorean Philolaus says that the sun is a vitrescent body which receives the light reflected by the fire of the Cosmos, and sends it back to us, having filtered them, light and heat; so that you might say that there are two suns, the body of the fire which is in the heaven, and the igneous light which emanates therefrom, and reflects itself in a kind of mirror. Perhaps we might consider as a third light that which, from the mirror in which it is reflected, falls back on us in dispersed rays.

15. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 26. 1. p. 562). Some Pythagoreans, among whom is Philolaus, suggest that the moon's resemblance to the earth consists in its surface being inhabited, like our earth, but by animals and vegetation larger and more beautiful. For the lunar animals are fifteen times larger than ours, and do not evacuate excreta. The day is also fifteen times as long. Others say that the apparent form of the moon is only the reflection of the sea, which we inhabit and which passes beyond the circle of fire.

16. (Censorinus, De Die Natali, 18). According to the Pythagorean Philolaus there is a year composed of 59 years and 21 intercalary months; he considers that the natural year has 364 and a half days.

17. (Iamblichus, In. Nicom., 11). Philolaus says that Number is the sovereign and autogenic force which maintains the eternal permanence of cosmic things (DK 23).

18. A. (Stobaeus, 1. 3. 8). The power, efficacy and essence of Number is seen in the Decad; it is great, it realizes all its purposes, and it is the cause of all effects. The power of the Decad is the principle and guide of all life, divine, celestial, or human into which it is insinuated; without it everything is unlimited, obscure, and furtive. Indeed, it is the nature of Number which teaches us comprehension, which serves us as guide, and teaches us all things which would otherwise remain impenetrable and unknown to every man. For there is nobody who could get a clear notion about things in themselves, nor in their relations, if there was no Number or Number-essence. By means of sensation. Number instills a certain proportion. and thereby establishes among all things harmonic relations, analogous to the nature of the geometric figure called the gnomon; it incorporates intelligible reasons of things, separates them, individualizes them. both in limited and unlimited things. And it is not only in matters pertaining to daimons or Gods that you may see the force manifested by the nature and power of Number, but it is in all its works, in all human thoughts, everywhere indeed, and even in the productions of arts and music. The nature of Number and Harmony are numberless, for what is false has no part in their essence and the principle of error and envy is thoughtless, irrational, indefinite nature. Never could error slip into Number, for its nature is hostile thereto. Truth is the proper, innate character of Number (DK 11).

B. (ps.-Iamblichus, Theologumena Arithmeticae, 61). The Decad is also named Faith, because, according to Philolaus, it is by the Decad and its elements, if utilized energetically and without negligence, that we arrive at a solidly grounded faith about beings. It is also the source of memory, and that is why the Monad has been called Mnemosyne.

C. (Theon of Smyrna, Plat. Math., p. 49). The Decad determines every number, including the nature of everything, of the even and the odd, of the mobile and immobile, of good and evil. It has been the subject of long discussions by Archytas, and of Philolaus in his work On Nature.

D. (Lucian, Pro Lapsu Inter Salutandum, 5). Some called the Tetraktys the great oath of the Pythagoreans, because they considered it the perfect number, or even because it is the principle of Health; among them is Philolaus.

19. A. (Theon of Smyrna, Plat. Math., 4). Archytas and Philolaus use the terms Monad and Unity interchangeably.

B. (Syrianus, sub. init., Comment. in Arist. Met., 1. xiv). You must not suppose that the philosophers begin by principles supposed to be opposite; they know the principle above these two elements, as Philolaus acknowledges when saying that it is God who hypostasizes the Limited and Unlimited. He shows that it is by Limit that every coordinate series of things further approaches Unity, and that it is by the Unlimited that the lower series is produced. Thus even above these two principles they posited the unique and separate cause distinguished by all of its excellence. This is the cause which Archinetus called the cause before the cause, and which Philolaus vehemently insists is the principle of all, and of which Brontinus says that in power and dignity it surpasses all reason and essence.

C. (Iamblichus, In. Nicom., p. 109). In the formation of square numbers by addition, unity is as it were the starting-post from which one begins, and also the end whither one returns; for if one places the numbers in the form of a double procession, and you see them grow from unity to the root of the square, then the root is like the turning-point where the horses tum to go back through similar numbers to unity, as in the square of 5. For example:



It is not the same with rectangular numbers. If, just as in the gnomon, one adds to any number the sum of the even, then the number two will alone seem to receive and stand addition, and without the number two it will not be possible to produce rectangular numbers. Ifyou set out the naturally increasing series of numbers in the order of the double race-track, then unity, being the principle of everything, according to Philo1aus (for it is he who said, "unity, the principle of everything"), will indeed present itself as the barrier, the starting point which produces the rectangular numbers, but it will not be the goal or limit where the series returns and comes back; it is not unity, but the number 2, which will fulfill this function. Thus, 6 x 4:



D. (Philo, Mund. Opif., 24). Philolaus confirms what I have just said by the following words; "He who commands and governs everything is a God who is single, eternally existing, immutable, self-identical, and different from other things."

E. (Athenagoras, Legat. Pro Christ., 6). Philolaus says that all things are by God kept as in captivity, and thereby implies the he is single and superior to matter to matter.

20. (Proclus, In Eucl., I. 36). Even among the Pythagoreans we find different angles consecrated to the different divinities, as did Philolaus, who attributed to some the angle of the triangle, to others the angle of the rectangle, to others other angles, and sometimes the same to several.

The Pythagoreans say that the triangle is the absolute principle of generation of begotten things, and of their form; that is why Timaeus says that the reasons of physical being, and of the regular formation of the elements are triangular; indeed, they have the three dimensions, in unity they gather the elements which in themselves are absolutely divided and changing; they are filled with the infinity characteristic of matter, and above the material beings they form bonds that indeed are frail. That is why triangles are bounded by straight lines, and have angles which unite the lines, and are their bonds. Philo1aus was therefore right in devoting the angle of the triangle to four divinities, Kronos, Hades, Mars, and Bacchus, under these four names combining the fourfold disposition of the elements, which refers to the superior part of the universe, starting from the sky, or sections of the zodiac. Indeed, Kronos presides over everything humid and cold in essence; Mars, over everything fiery; Hades contains everything terrestrial, and Dionysius directs the generation of wet and warm things, represented by wine, which is liquid and warm. These four divinities divide their secondary operations, but they remain united; that is why Philolaus, by attributing to them one angle only, wished to express this power of unification.

The Pythagoreans also claim that, in preference to the quadrilateral, the tetragon bears the divine impress, and by it they express perfect order. For the property of being straight imitates the power of immutability, and equality represents that of permanence; for motion is the result of inequality, and rest, that of equality. Those are the causes of the organization of the being that is solid in its totality, and of its pure and immovable essences. They were therefore right to express it symbolically by the figure of the tetragon. Besides, Philolaus, with another stroke of genius, calls the angle of the tetragon that of Rhea, of Demeter, and of Hestia.... For considering the earth as a tetragon, and noting that this element possesses the property of continuousness, as we learned from Timaeus, and that the earth receives all that drips from the divinities, and also the generative powers that they contain, he was right in consecrating the angle of the tetragon to these divinities which procreate life. Indeed, some of them call the earth Hestia and Demeter, and claim that it partakes of Rhea, in its entirety, and that Rhea contains all the begotten cause. That is why, in obscure language, he says that the angle of the tetragon contains the single power which produces the unity of these divine creations.

And we must not forget that Philolaus assigns the angle of the triangle to four divinities, and the angle of the tetragon to three, thereby indicating their penetrative faculty, whereby they influence each other mutually, and showing how all things participate in all things, the odd things in the even and the even in the odd. The triad and the tetrad, participating in the generative and creative beings, contain the whole regular organization of begotten things. Their product is the dodecad, which ends in the single monad, the sovereign principle of Zeus, for Philolaus says that the angle of the dodecagon belongs to Zeus, because in unity Zeus contains the entire number of the dodecad.

21 A. (ps.-Iamblichus, Theologumena Arithmeticae, p. 56). After the mathematical magnitude which by its three dimensions or intervals realizes the number Four, Philolaus shows us the being manifesting in number Five quality and color; in the number Six, the soul and life; in the number Seven, reason, health, and what he calls light; then he adds that love, friendship, prudence and reflection are communicated to beings by the number Eight.

B. (ps.-Iamblichus, Theologumena Arithmeticae, p. 22). There are four principles of the reasonable animal, as Philolaus says in his work On Nature: the skull, the heart, the navel, and the sexual organs. The head is the seat of reason; the heart, that of the soul or life, and sensation; the navel, the principle of the faculty of striking roots and reproducing the first being; the sexual organs, of the faculty of projecting the sperma, and procreating. The skull contains the principle of man, the heart that of the animal, the navel that of the plant, the sexual organs that of all living beings, for these grow and produce offspring (DK 13).

C. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 2. 3. p. 10). There are five bodies in the sphere: fire, water, earth, air, and the circle of the sphere which makes the fifth (DK 12). [3]

22. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic., 1. 20. 2. p. 418). This is from the Pythagorean Philolaus, drawn from his book On the Soul. He insists that the world is indestructible. Here is what he says in his book On the Soul:

That is why the world remains eternally, because it cannot be destroyed by any other, nor spontaneously destroy itself. Neither within it, nor without it can be found a force greater than itself, able to destroy it. The world has existed from all eternity, and will remain eternally, because it is One, governed by a principle whose nature is similar to its own, and whose force is omnipotent and sovereign. Besides, the single world is continuous, and endowed with a natural respiration, moving eternally in a circle, having the principle of motion and change; one of its parts is immovable, the other is changing. The immovable part extends from the soul, that embraces everything, to the moon; and the changing part from the moon to the earth; or, since the Mover has been acting since eternity, and continues his action eternally, and since the changeable part receives its manner of being from the Mover who acts thereon, it necessarily results thence that one of the parts of the world ever impresses motion, and that the other ever receives it passively. The one is entirely the domain of Mind and Soul, the other of Generation and Change; the one is anterior in power, and superior, the other is posterior and subordinate. The composite of these two things, the divine eternally in motion, and of generation ever changing, is the World. That is why one is right in saying that the world is the eternal energy of God, and of becoming which obeys the laws of changing nature. The one remains eternally in the same state, self-identical; the remainder constitutes the domain of plurality, which is born and perishes. But nevertheless, the things that perish transmit their essence and form, thanks to generation, which reproduces the identical form of the father who has begotten and fashioned them (DK 21).

23 A. (Claudianus Mamertus, De Statu Animae, 2. p. 7). The soul is introduced and associated with the body by Number, and by a harmony simultaneously immortal and incorporeal....the soul cherishes its body, because without it the soul cannot feel; but when death has separated the soul therefrom, the soul lives an incorporeal existence in the cosmos (DK 22).

B. (Macrobius, Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis, 1. 14). Plato says that the soul is a self-moving essence; Xenocrates defines the soul as a self-moving number; Aristotle called it an entelechy; and Pythagoras and Philolaus, a harmony.

C. (Olympiodorus, In. Plat. Phaed., p. 150). Philolaus opposed suicide because it was a Pythagorean precept not to lay down the burden, but to help others carry theirs; namely, that you must assist, and not hinder it.

D. (Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 3. p. 433). It will help us to remember the Pythagorean Philolaus' utterance that the ancient theologians and divines claimed that the soul is bound to the body as a punishment, and is buried in it as in a tomb (DK 14).

24. A. (Aristotle, Eth. Eud., 2. 9). As Philolaus has said, there are some reasons (logoi) stronger than us (DK 16).

B. (Iamblichus, In Nicom., 1. 25). I shall later have a better opportunity to consider how, in raising a number to its square, by the position of the simple component unities, we arrive at very evident propositions, naturally, and not by any law, as says Philolaus.

25. (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, 7. 92. p. 388). Anaxagoras has said how reason in general is the faculty of discerning and judging; the Pythagoreans also agree that it is Reason, not reason in general, but the Reason that develops in men by the study of mathematics, as Philolaus used to say, and they insist that if this Reason is capable of understanding All, it is only because its essence is kindred with this nature, for it is in the nature of things that the similar be understood by the similar.

26 A. (Laurentius Lydus, De Mens., p. 16; Cedrenus, 1. 169b). Philolaus was therefore right in calling it a Decad, because it receives (dechomai) the Infinite, and Orpheus was right in calling it the Branch, because it is the branch from which issue all the numbers, as so many branches.

B. (Cedrenus, 1. p. 72). Philolaus was therefore right to say that the number seven was motherless (DK 20).

C. (Cedrenus, 1. p. 208). Philolaus was therefore right to call the Dyad the spouse of Kronos (DK 20A).

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Notes:

1. This fragment concerns itself with musical intervals smaller than a whole tone. For a good discussion, which also relates to the next fragment, see McClain, The Pythagorean Plato. 159-62.

2. 8 is the harmonic mean between 6 and 12.

3. There is reason to believe that the "five bodies" referred to in this fragment are the so-called regular polyhedra or "Platonic solids" which are described for the first time in Plato's Timaeus. It is quite likely that the earlier Pythagoreans were aware of the regular solids. If this fragment is genuine, Plato followed their lead in associating these "molecular" forms with the "elements" of Greek physics, the latter of which actually represent slates of matter rather than specific substances.

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PART 1 OF 2

THE FRAGMENTS OF ARCHYTAS

ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM (first half of the fourth century B.C.E.) was a student of Philolaus and a personal friend of Plato, who came to visit him in 388 B.C.E. He made a major contribution to harmonic theory, was engaged in mathematical studies, and was the first to solve the geometrical problem of doubling the volume of the cube.

Like Pythagoras himself, Archytas was also involved in political affairs; he was quite well liked in this capacity, being elected chief magistrate of Tarentum for seven terms though the law, which was waived in his favor, allowed for a maximum of one term. Archytas also seems to have had a knack for practical inventions: he is said to have created a mechanical pigeon, made of wood, which flew, and Aristotle refers to another well-known invention, Archytas' rattle, "which they give to children so that by using it they may refrain from breaking things about the house; for young things cannot keep still."

With the exception of the mathematical fragments and a few others, the fragments of Archytas are not considered genuine. For example, "The Ten Categories of Archytas" are obviously indebted to Aristotelian thought rather than vice versa. Nonetheless, even though not written by Archytas himself, some of the other fragments are quite valuable, especially the ethical ones. The correspondence between Plato and Archytas, reproduced below in the biography from Diogenes Laertius, is thought to be spurious.

For more on Archytas see Freeman's Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, section 47, and Guthrie's History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, 333 ff.

THE LIFE OF ARCHYTAS
FROM DIOGENES LAERTIUS

ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM, son of Mnesagoras, or of Hestius, according to Aristoxenus, also was a Pythagorean. It was he who, by a letter, saved Plato from the death threatened by Dionysius. He possessed all the virtues, so that, being the admiration of the crowd, he was seven times named general, in spite of the law which prohibited reelection after one year. Plato wrote him two letters, in response to this one of Archytas:

"Greetings. It is fortunate for you that you have recovered from your illness, for I have heard of it not only from you, but also from Lamiscus. I have busied myself about those notes, and took a trip into Lucania, where I met descendants of Ocellus. I have in my possession the treatises On Law and On Kingship, On Sanctity, and On the Origin of All Things, and I am sending them to you. The others could not be discovered. Should they be found, they will be sent to you."

Plato answered:

"Greetings. I am delighted to have received the works which you have sent me, and I acknowledge a great admiration for him who wrote them. He seems to be worthy of his ancient and glorious ancestors, who are said to be from Myra, and among the number of those Trojans who emigrated under the leadership of Laomedon, all worthy people, as the legend proves. Those works of mine about which you wrote me are not in a sufficient state of perfection, but I send them such as they are. Both of us are in perfect agreement on the subject of protecting them. No use to renew the request. May your health improve!"

Such are these two letters.

There were four Archytases: the first, of whom we have just spoken; the second, from Mytilene, was a musician; the third wrote On Agriculture; the fourth is an author of epigrams. Some mention a fifth, an architect, who left a treatise On Mechanics, beginning as follows: "This book contains what I have been taught by Teucer of Carthage. " The musician is said to have made this joke: on being reproached for not advertising himself more, he said "It is my instrument which speaks for me."

Aristoxenus claims that the philosopher Archytas was never defeated during his command. Once, overcome by envy, he had been obliged to resign his command, and his fellow-citizens were immediately conquered. He was the first who methodically applied the principles of mathematics to mechanics; who imparted an organic motion to a geometric figure, by the section of the semi-cylinder seeking two means that would be proportional, in order to double the cube. [1] He also first, by geometry, discovered the properties of the cube, as Plato records in the Republic (528 B).

THE FRAGMENTS OF ARCHYTAS

1. Metaphysical Fragments

1. There are necessarily two principles of beings: the one contains the series of beings organized, and finished; the other, contains unordered and unfinished beings. That one which is susceptible of being expressed, by speech, and which can be explained, embraces both beings, and determines and organizes the nonbeing.

For every time that it approaches the things of becoming, it orders them, and measures them, and makes them participate in the essence and form of the universal. On the contrary, the series of beings which escapes speech and reason, injures ordered things, and destroys those which aspire to essence and being; whenever it approaches them, it assimilates them to its own nature.

But since there are two principles of things of an opposite character, the one the principle of good, and the other the principle of evil, there are therefore also two reasons, the one of beneficent nature, the other of maleficent nature.

That is why the things that owe their existence to art, and also those which owe it to nature, must above all participate in these two principles: form and substance.

The form is the cause of essence; substance is the substrate which receives the form. Neither can substance alone participate in form, by itself; nor can form by itself apply itself to substance; there must therefore exist another cause which moves the substance of things, and forms them. This cause is primary, as regards substance, and the most excellent of all. Its most suitable name is God.

There are therefore three principles: God, the substance of things, and form. God is the artist, the mover; the substance is the matter, the moved; the essence is what you might call the art, and that to which the substance is brought by the mover. But since the mover contains forces which are self- contrary, those of simple bodies, and as the contraries are in need of a principle harmonizing and unifying them, it must necessarily receive its efficacious virtues and proportions from numbers, and all that is manifested in numbers and geometric forms, virtues and proportions capable of binding and uniting into form the contraries that exist in the substance of things. For, by itself, substance is formless; only after having been moved towards form does it become formed and receive the rational relations of order. Likewise, if movement exists, besides the thing moved, there must exist a prime mover; there must therefore be three principles: the substance of things, the form, and the principle that moves itself, and which by its power is the first; not only must this principle be an intelligence, it must be above intelligence, and we call it God.

Evidently the relation of equality applies to the being which can be defined by language and reason. The relation of inequality applies to the irrational being, and cannot be fixed by language; it is substance, and that is why all begetting and destruction take place in substance and do not occur without it.

2. In short, the philosophers began only by so to speak contrary principles; but above these elements they knew another superior one, as is testified to by Philolaus, who says that God has produced, and realized the Limited and Unlimited, and shown that at the Limit is attached the whole series which has a greater affinity with the One, and to the Unlimited, the series that is below. Thus, above these two principles they have posited a unifying cause, superior to everything; which, according to Archenetus, is the cause before the cause, and, according to Philolaus, the universal principle.

3. A. Which One are you referring to? The supreme One, or the infinitely small One that you can find in the parts? The Pythagoreans distinguish between the One and the Monad, as says Archytas: the One and the Monad have a natural affinity, yet they differ.

B. Archytas and Philolaus indiscriminately call the One a Monad, and Monad a One. The majority, however, add to the name Monad, the distinction of first Monad, for there is a Monad which is not the first, and which is posterior to the Monad in itself, and to the One.

C. Pythagoras said that the human soul was a tetragon with right angles. Archytas, on the contrary, instead of defining the soul by the tetragon, did so by a circle, because the soul is a self-mover, and consequently, the prime mover, and this is a circle or a sphere.

D. Plato and Archytas and the other Pythagoreans claim that there are three parts in the soul: reason, courage and desire.

4. The beginning of knowledge of beings is in the things that produce themselves. Of these some are intelligible, and others sensible; the former are immovable, the latter are moved. The criterion of intelligible things is the world; that of sensible things is sensation.

Of the things that do not manifest in things themselves, some are science, the others, opinion; science is immovable, opinion is movable.

We must, besides, admit these three things: the subject that judges, the object that is judged, and the rule by which that object is judged. What judges is the mind, or sensation; what is judged is the logos, or rational essence; the rule of judgement is the act itself which occurs in the being, whether intelligible or sensible. The mind is the judge of essence, whether it tends towards an intelligible being or a sensible one. When reason seeks intelligible things, it tends towards an intelligible element; when it seeks things of sense, it tends towards their element. Hence come those false graphic representations in figures and numbers seen in geometry, those researches in causes and probable ends, whose object are beings subject to becoming, and moral acts, in physiology or politics. It is while tending toward the intelligible element that reason recognizes that harmony is in the double relation [the octave] but sensation alone attests that this double relation is concordant. In mechanics, the object of science is figures, numbers, proportions -- namely, rational proportions; the effects are perceived by sensation, for you can neither study nor know them outside of the matter or movement. In short, it is impossible to know the reason of an individual thing, unless you have preliminarily by the mind grasped the essence of the individual thing; the knowledge of the existence, and of quality, belongs to reason and sensation: to reason, whenever we effect a thing's demonstration by a syllogism whose conclusion is inevitable; to sensation, when the latter is the criterion of a thing's essence.

5. Sensation occurs in the body, reason in the soul. The former is the principle of sensible things, the latter, of intelligible ones. Popular measures are number, length, the foot, weight, equilibrium, and the scales, while the rule and the measure of straightness in both vertical and longitudinal directions is the right angle.

Thus sensation is the principle and measure of the bodies; reason is the principle and measure of intelligible things. The latter is the principle of beings that are intelligible and naturally primary; the former is the principle of sense-objects, and is naturally secondary. Reason is the principle of our soul; sensation is the principle of our body. The mind is the judge of the noblest things; sensation is the judge of the most useful. Sensation was created in view of our bodies, and to serve them; reason was created in view of the soul, and to initiate wisdom therein. Reason is the principle of science; sensation is that of opinion. The latter derives its activity from sensible things; the former, from intelligible forms. Sensible objects participate in movement and change; intelligible objects participate in immutability and eternity. There is analogy between sensation and reason; for sensation's object is the sensible, which moves, changes, and never remains self-identical; therefore, as you can see, it improves or deteriorates. Reason's object is the intelligible, whose essence is immobility; wherefore in the intelligible we cannot conceive of either more or less, better or worse; and just as reason sees the primary being, and the [cosmic] model, so sensation sees the image, and the copied. Reason sees man in himself; sensation sees in them the circle of the sun, and the forms of artificial objects. Reason is perfectly simple and indivisible, as unity, and the point; it is the same with intelligible beings.

The idea is neither the limit nor the frontier of the body; it is only the figure of being, that by which the being exists, while sensation has parts, and is divisible.

Some beings are perceived by sensation, others by opinion, others by science, and others by reason.

The bodies that offer resistance are sensible; opinion knows those that participate in the ideas, and are its images, so to speak. Thus some particular man participates in the idea of man, and this triangle, in the triangle-idea. The objects of science are the necessary accidents of ideas; thus the object of geometry is the properties of the figures; reason knows the ideas themselves, and the principles of the sciences and of their objects, for example, the circle, the triangle, and the pure sphere in itself. Likewise, in us, in our souls, there are four kinds of knowledge: pure thought, science, opinion and sensation; two are principles of knowledge [thought and sensation], two are its purpose, science and opinion.

It is always the similar which is capable of knowing the similar: reason knows intelligible things; science understands knowable things; opinion knows conjecturable things; sensation knows sensible things.

That is why thought must rise from things that are sensible, to the conjecturable, and from these to the knowable, and on to the intelligible; and he who wishes to know the truth about these objects, must in a harmonious grouping combine all these means and objects of knowledge. This being established, you might represent them under the image of a line divided into two equal parts, each of which would be similarly divided; if we separate the sensible, dividing it into two parts, in the same proportion, the one will be clearer, the other obscurer. One of the sections of the sensible contains images of things, such as you see reflected in water, or mirrors; the second represents the plants and animals of which the former are images. Similarly dividing the intelligible, the different kinds of sciences will represent the images; for the students of geometry begin by establishing by hypothesis the odd and the even, figures, three kinds of angles, and from these hypotheses deduce their science. As to the things themselves, they leave them aside, as if they knew them, though they cannot account for them to themselves or to others; they employ sensible things as images, but these things are neither the object nor the end proposed in their researches and reasonings, which pursue only things in themselves, such as the diameter, or square. The second section is that of the intelligible, the object of dialectics. It really makes no hypotheses, positing principles whence it rises to arrive at the unconditioned, universal principle; then, by an inverse movement, grasping that principle, it descends to the end of the reasoning, without employing any sensible object, exclusively using pure ideas. By these four divisions, you can also analyze the soul-states, and give the highest the name of thought, reasoning to the second, faith to the third, and imagination to the fourth.

6. Archytas, at the beginning of his book On Wisdom gives this advice: in all human things, wisdom is as superior as sight is to all the other senses of the body, as mind is superior to soul, as the sun is superior to the stars. Of all the senses, sight is the one that extends furthest in its sphere of action, and gives us the most ideas. Mind, being supreme, accomplishes its legitimate operation by reason and reasoning; it is like sight, and is the power of the noblest objects. The sun is the eye and soul of natural things, for it is through it that they are all seen, begotten, and thought; through it the plants produced by root or seed are fed, developed, and endowed with sensation.

Of all beings, man is the wisest by far. For he is able to contemplate beings, and to acquire knowledge and understanding of all. That is why divinity has engraved in him, and has revealed to him the system of speech, which extends to everything, a system in which are classified all the beings, kinds of beings, and the meanings of nouns and verbs. For the specialized seats of the voice are the pharynx, the mouth and the nose. As man is naturally organized to produced sounds, through which nouns and verbs are expressed and formed, likewise he is naturally destined to contemplate the notions contained in visible objects. Such, in my view, is the purpose for which man has been created, and was born, and for which he received from God his organs and faculties.

Man is born and was created to know the essence of universal nature; and precisely the function of wisdom is to possess and contemplate the intelligence manifested in [all] beings.

The object of wisdom is no particular being, but all the beings, absolutely; and it should not begin to seek the principles of an individual being, but the principles common to all. The object of wisdom is all the beings, as the object of sight is all visible things. The function of wisdom is to see all the beings in their totality, and to know their universal attributes, and that is how wisdom discovers the principles of all beings.

He who is capable of analyzing all the species, and tracing and grouping them, by an inverse operation, into one single principle, seems to me the wisest, and the closest to the truth; he seems to have found that sublime observatory from the peak of which he may observe God, and all the things that belong to the series and order of divine things. Being master of this royal road, his mind will be able to rush forwards, and arrive at the end of the career, uniting principles to the purposes of things, and knowing that God is the principle, the middle and the end of all things made according to the rules of justice and right reason.

2. Physical and Mathematical Fragments

7. As Eudemus reports, Archytas used to ask this question: "If I was situated at the extreme and immovable limit of the world, could I, or could I not, extend a wand outside of it?" To say I could not, is absurd; but if I can, there must be something outside of the world, be it body or space; and in whatever manner we reason, by the same reasoning we will ever return to this limit. I will still place myself there, and ask, "Is there anything else on which I may place my wand?" Therefore, the Unlimited exists; if it is a body, our proposition is demonstrated; if it is space, place is that in which a body could be; and if it exists potentially, we will have to place it and classify it among the eternal things, and the Unlimited will then be a body and a place.

8. The essence of place is that all other things are in it, while itself is not in anything. For if it was in a place, there would be a place in a place, and that would continue to infinity. All other beings must therefore be in place, and place in nothing. Its relation to things is the same as Limit to limited things; for the place of the entire world is the Limit of all things.

9 A. Some say that time is the sphere of the world; such was the sentiment of the Pythagoreans, according to those who had heard Archytas give this general definition of time: "Time is the interval of the nature of all."

B. The divine Iamblichus, in the first book of his Commentaries on the Categories, said that Archytas thus defined time: "It is the number of movement, or in general the interval of the nature of all."

C. We must combine these two definitions, and recognize time as both continuous and discrete, though it is properly continuous. Iamblichus claims that Archytas taught the distinction of physical time, and psychic time. So at least Iamblichus interpreted Archytas, but we must recognize that there, and often elsewhere, he adds his own commentaries to explain matters.

10. The general proper essence of "when-ness" and time is to be indivisible and unsubstantial. For, being indivisible, the present time has passed, while expressing it and thinking of it; nothing remains of it, and so becoming continuously the same it never subsists numerically, but only specifically. In fact. the actually present time and the future are not identical with former time. For the one has past, and is no more; the other one passes while being produced and thought. Thus the present is never but a bond; it perpetually becomes, changes, and perishes, but nevertheless it remains identical in its own kind.

In fact, every present is without parts, and indivisible; it is the term of past time, the beginning of time to come; just as in a broken line, the point where the break occurs becomes the beginning of a line, and the end of the other. Time is continuous, and not discrete as are number, speech and harmony.

In speech, the syllables are parts, and distinct parts; in harmony, they are the sounds; in number, the unities. The line, place and space are continuous; if they are divided, their parts form common sections. For the line divides into points, the surface into lines, the solid into surfaces. Therefore time is continuous. In fact there was no time when time was not; and there was no moment when the present was not. But the present has always been, it will always be, and will never fail; it changes perpetually, and becomes another according to the number, but remains the same according to kind. The line differs from the other continua, in that if you divide the line, place, and space, its parts will subsist; but in time, the past has perished, and the future will. That is why either time does absolutely not exist, or it hardly exists, and has but an insensible existence. For of its parts one, the past, is no more, and the future is not yet; how then could the present, without parts and indivisible, possess true reality?

11. Plato says that the movement is the great and small, the non-being, the unusual, and all that reduces to these; like Archytas, we had better say that it is a cause.

12. Why do all natural bodies take the spherical form? Is it, as said Archytas, because in the natural movement is the proportion of equality? For everything moves in proportion; and this proportion of equality is the only one which, when it occurs, produces circles and spheres, because it returns on itself.

13. He who knows must have learned from another, or have found his knowledge by himself. The science that you learn from another, is as you might say, exterior; what you find by yourself, belongs to ourselves individually. To find without seeking is something difficult and rare; to find what one is seeking is commodious and easy; to ignore, and seek what you ignore, is impossible (DK 3).

14. The Pythagorean opinion about sciences to me seems correct, and they seem to show an exact judgment about each of them. Having known how to form a just idea of the nature of a ball, they should have likewise seen the essential nature of the parts. They have left us certain and evident theories about arithmetic, geometry and spherics, also about music, for all these sciences seem to be kindred. In fact, the first two kinds of being are indistinguishable.

15. A. First they have seen that it was not possible that noise should exist unless there was a shock of one body against another; they said there is a shock when moving bodies meet and strike each other. The bodies moved in the air in an opposite direction and those that are moved with an unequal swiftness-in the same direction-the first, when overtaken, makes a noise, because struck. Many of these noises are not susceptible of being perceived by our organs; some because of the slightness of the shock, the others because of their too great distance from us, some even because of the very excess of their intensity, for noises too great do not enter into our ears, as we cannot introduce anything into jars with too narrow an opening when one pours in too much at a time.

Of the sounds that fall within the range of our senses, some -- those that come quickly from the bodies struck -- seem shrill; those that arrive slowly and feebly, seem of low pitch. In fact, when one agitates some object slowly and feebly, the shock produces a low pitch; if the waving is done quickly, and with energy, the sound is shrill. This is not the only proof of the fact, which we can prove when we speak or sing; when we wish to speak loud and high, we use a great force of breath. So also with something thrown; if you throw them hard, they go far; if you throw them without energy, they fall near, for the air yields more to bodies moved with much force, than to those thrown with little. This phenomenon is also reproduced in the sound of the voice, for the sounds produced by an energetic breath are shrill, while those produced by a feeble breath are weak and low in pitch. This same observation can be seen in the force of a signal given from any place: if you pronounce it loud, it can be heard far; if you pronounce the same signal low, we do not hear it even when near. So also in flutes, the breath emitted by the mouth and which presents itself to the holes nearest the mouthpiece, produces a shriller sound, because the impulsive force is greater; farther [down], they are of lower pitch. It is therefore evident that the swiftness of the movement produces shrillness, and slowness, lower pitch. The same thing is seen in the bull roarers which are spun in the Mysteries; those that move slowly produce a low pitch, while those that move quickly with force make a shrill noise. Let us yet adduce the reed: if you close the lower opening, and blow into it, it will produce a certain sound; and if you stop it in the center, or in the front, the sound will be shrill. For the same breath traversing a long space weakens, while traversing a shorter, it remains of the same power. After having developed this opinion that the movement of the voice is measured by intervals, he resumes his discussion, saying, that the shrill sounds are the result of a swifter movement, the lower sounds, of a slower movement. This is a fact which numerous experiments demonstrate clearly.

B. Eudoxus and Archytas believed that the reasons of the agreement of the sounds was in the numbers; they agree in thinking that these reasons consist in the movements, the shrill movement being quick, because the agitation of the air is continuous, and the vibration more rapid; the low pitch movement being slow, because it is calmer.

16. Explaining himself about the means; Archytas writes: In music there are three means: the first is the arithmetical mean, the second is the geometrical, the third is the subcontrary mean, which is called harmonic. The mean is arithmetical, when the three terms are in a relation of analogical excess, that is to say, when the difference between the first and second is the same as between second and third; in this proportion, the relation of the greater terms is smaller, and the relation of the smaller is greater. The geometric mean exists when the first term is to the second as the second is to the third; here the relation of the greater is identical with the relation of the smaller terms. The subcontrary mean, which we call harmonic, exists when the first term exceeds the second by a fraction of itself, identically with the fraction [of the third] by which the second exceeds the third; in this proportion the relation of the greater terms is greater, and that of the smaller, smaller.

3. Ethical Fragments

17. A. We must first know that the good man is not thereby necessarily happy, but that the happy man is necessarily good; for the happy man is he who deserves praise and congratulations; the good man deserves only praise.

We praise a man because of his virtue, we congratulate him because of his success. The good man is such because of the goods that proceed from virtue; the happy man is such because of the goods that come from fortune. From the good man you cannot take his virtue; sometimes the happy man loses his good fortune. The power of virtue depends on nobody; that of happiness, on the contrary, is dependent. Long diseases, the loss of our senses, cause to fade the flower of our happiness.

B. God differs from the good man in that God not only possesses a perfect virtue, purified from all mortal affection, but enjoys a virtue whose power is faultless and independent, as suits the majesty and magnificence of his works.

Man, on the contrary, not only possesses an inferior virtue, because of the mortal constitution of his nature, but even sometimes by the very abundance of his goods, now by the force of habit, by the vice of nature, or from other causes, he is incapable of attaining the perfection of the good.

C. The good man, in my opinion, is he who knows how to act properly in serious circumstances and occasions. He will therefore know how to support good and bad fortune; in a brilliant and glorious condition, he will show himself worthy of it, and if fortune happens to change, he will know how to accept properly his actual fate. In short, the good man is he who, in every occasion, and according to the circumstances, well plays his part, and knows how to fit to it not only himself, but also those who have confidence in him, and are associated with his fortunes.

D. Since amidst the goods, some are desirable for themselves, and not for anything else, and others are desirable for something else, and not for themselves, there must necessarily exist a third kind of goods, which are desirable both for themselves and for other things. Which are the goods naturally desirable for themselves, and not for anything else? Evidently they include happiness, for it is the end on account of which we seek everything else, while we seek it only for itself, and not in view of anything else. Secondly, which are the goods chosen for something else, and not for themselves? Evidently those that are useful, and which are the means of procuring the real goods, which thus become the causes of the goods desirable for themselves; for instance: the bodily fatigues, the exercises, the tests which procure health; reading, meditation, the studies which procure virtues, and the quality of honesty. Finally, which are those goods which are both desirable for themselves, and for something else? The virtues, and the habitual possession of virtues, the resolutions of the soul, the actions, and in short anything pertaining to the possession of the beautiful. That which is to be considered for itself, and not for anything else, that is the only good.

Now what we seek for itself and for something else is divided into three classes: the one whose object is the soul, the body, and external goods. The first contains the virtues of the soul; the second contains the advantages of the body; the third consists in friends, glory, honor and wealth. Likewise with the goods that are desirable only for something else: one part of them procures goods for the soul, the other which regards the body, procures goods for it; the external goods furnish wealth, glory, honor and friendship.

We can prove that it is the characteristic of virtue to be desirable for itself, as follows: in fact, if the naturally inferior goods, I mean those of the body, are by us sought for themselves, and if the soul is better than the body, it is evident that we like the goods of the soul for themselves, and not for the result that they might produce.

E. In human life there are three circumstances: prosperity, adversity, and intermediary comfort. Since the good man who possesses virtue and practices it, practices it in these three circumstances -- either in adversity, or prosperity, or comfort, since besides in adversity he is unhappy, in prosperity he is happy, and in comfort he is not happy -- it is evident that happiness is nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity. I speak here of human happiness. Man is not only a soul, he is also a body. The living being is a composite of both, and man also; for if the body is an instrument of the soul, it is as much a part of the man as the soul. That is why, among the goods, some belong to the man, and others belong to his component parts. The good of man is happiness amidst its integral parts. The soul's goods are prudence, courage, justice, and temperance; the body's are beauty, health, good disposition of its members, and the perfect condition of its senses. The external goods -- wealth, glory, honor, nobility -- are naturally superfluous advantages of man, and are naturally subordinate to the superior goods.

The inferior goods serve as satellites to the superior goods. Friendship, glory, and wealth are the satellites of the body and soul. Health, strength and sense-perfection are satellites of the body. Prudence, courage, justice and temperance are the satellites of the reason of the soul. Reason is the satellite of God; he is omnipotent, the supreme master. It is for these goods that the others must exist; for the army obeys the general, the sailors heed the pilot, the world obeys God, the soul heeds reason, the happy life is contingent on prudence. For prudence is nothing more than the science of the happy life, or the science of the goods which belong to human nature.

F. To God belongs happiness and the happy life; man cannot possess but a grouping of science, virtue and prosperity forming a single body. I call wisdom the science of the Gods and geniuses, and term prudence the science of human things, the science of life. For science should be the name of virtues which rest upon reasons and demonstrations, and moral virtue, the excellent habit of the irrational part of the soul, which makes you give the name of certain qualities corresponding to our habits, namely the names of liberal, just and temperate people. And I call prosperity this affluence of goods which we receive without reason being their cause. Then since virtue and science depend on us, and prosperity does not depend thereon, since happiness consists in the contemplation and practice of good things, and since contemplation and action when they meet obstacles, lend us a necessary support, when they go by an easy road, they bring us distraction and happiness. Since after all it is prosperity that gives us these benefits, it is evident that happiness is nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity.

G. Man's relations with prosperity resemble a healthy and vigorous human body; he also can stand heat and cold, can raise a great burden, and can easily bear many other miseries.

H. Since happiness is the use of virtue in prosperity, let us speak of virtue and prosperity, the former first. Some goods, such as virtue, are not subject to excess; for excess is impossible in virtue, for one can never be too decent a man. Indeed, virtue's measure is duty, and is the habit of duty in practical life. But prosperity is subject to excess and lack, which excesses produce certain evils, disturbing man from his usual mood, so as to oppose him to virtue; this is not only the case with prosperity, but other more numerous causes also produce this effect. You need not be surprised at seeing in the hall certain impudent artists, who neglect true art, misleading the ignorant by a false picture; but do you suppose that this race does not exist as regards virtue? On the contrary, the greater and more beautiful virtue is, the more do people feign to adorn themselves with it. There are indeed many things which dishonor the appearance of virtue: first are the deceivers who simulate it, others are the natural passions which accompany it, and sometimes twist the dispositions of the soul into a contrary direction. Others are the bad habits which the body has rooted in us, or which have been ingrained in us by youth, age, prosperity, adversity, or by a thousand other circumstances. Wherefore we must not at all be surprised at entirely wrong judgments, because the true nature of our soul has been falsified within us. Just as we see an artist who is excellent make errors in works we are examining -- or the general, the pilot or the painter and like may make errors without our detracting from their talent -- so we must not call unworthy him who has had a moment of weakness, nor among the worthy a man who has done no more than a single action; but in respect to the evil, we must consider chance, and for the good, error, and to make an equitable and just judgment, and not regard a single circumstance, or a single period of time, but the whole life.

Just as the body suffers from both excess and lack, but as nevertheless the excess and so-called superfluities naturally produce the greatest diseases, so the soul suffers from both prosperity and adversity when they arrive at wrong times, and yet the greatest evils come from so-called absolute prosperity -- which is absolute because like wine it intoxicates the reason of the worthy.

I. That is why it is not adversity but prosperity which is the hardest to stand properly. All men, when they are in adversity, at least the greater part of them, seem moderate and modest; but in good fortune, ambitious, vain and proud. For adversity is apt to moderate the soul, and concentrate it, while on the contrary prosperity excites it and puffs it up. That is why wretches are docile to advice, and prudent in conduct, while the happy are bold and venturesome.

J. Thus there is a measure and limit of prosperity that the worthy man should desire to have as auxiliary in the accomplishment of his actions, just as there is a measure in the size of the ship, and in the length of the tiller, which permits the experienced pilot to traverse an immense extent of sea, and to carry through a great voyage.

The result of excess of prosperity, even among worthy people, is that the soul loses leadership to prosperity; just as too bright a light dazzles the eyes so too great a prosperity dazzles the reason of the soul. Enough about prosperity.

18. I insist that virtue is sufficient to preclude unhappiness, that badness precludes happiness, if we know how properly to judge of the genuine condition of the soul in these two conditions. For the evil reason is necessarily always unhappy, whether in abundance -- which he does not know how properly to judge or use -- or in poverty, just as a blind man is always wondering whether he is in brilliant light, or in darkness. But the worthy man is not always happy, for happiness does not consist in the possession of virtue, but in its use, just as a man who sees does not see all the time will not see without light.

Life is as it were divided into two roads: the rougher one, followed by patient Ulysses, and the more agreeable one followed by Nestor. I mean that virtue desires the one, but can also follow the other. But nature cries aloud that happiness is life desirable in itself, whose state is assured, because one can realize one's purposes in it, so that if life is traversed by things one has not desired, one is not happy, without however being absolutely unhappy. Therefore be not so bold as to insist that the worthy man is exempt from sickness, and suffering; dare not to say that he does not know pain, for if the body is allow some causes of pain, the soul should also be allowed some. The griefs of the insane lack reason and measure, while those of the wise are contained within the measure which reason gives to everything. But this so advertised insensitivity to sorrow enervates the character of generosity of virtue, when it stands trials, great sorrows, when it is exposed to death, suffering, and poverty, for it is easy to support small sorrows. You must therefore practice metriopathy or sorrow -- standardization so as to avoid the insensitivity just as much as the over-sensibility of pain, and not in words to boast about our strength above the measure of our human nature.

19. We might define philosophy as the desire of knowing and understanding things in themselves, joined with practical virtue, inspired and realized by the love of science. The beginning of philosophy is the science of nature, the middle, practical life, and the end, science itself. It is fortunate to have been well born, to have received a good education, to have been accustomed to obey a just rule, and to have habits conformable to nature. One must also have been exercised in virtue, and have been educated by wise parents, governors and masters. It is fine to impose the rule of duty on oneself, to have no need of constraint, to be docile to those who give us good advice about life and science. For a fortunate disposition of nature, and a good education are often more powerful than lessons to bring us to the good; its only lack would be the efficacious light of reason, which science gives us. Two rival directions of life contend for mastery, these being practical and philosophical life. By far the most perfect life unites them both, and in each different path adapts itself to circumstances. We are born for rational activity, which we call practical. Practical reason leads us to politics; the theoretical reason, to the contemplation of the universality of things. Mind itself, which is universal, embraces these two powers necessary to happiness, which we define as the activity of virtue in prosperity; it is not exclusively either a practical life which would exclude science, nor a speculative life which would exclude the practical. Perfect reason inclines towards these two omnipotent principles for which man is born, the principles of society and science. For if these opposite principles seem mutually to interfere in their development, the political principles turning us away from speculation, and the speculative principles turning us from politics, to persuade us to live at rest, nevertheless nature, uniting the ends of these two movements, shows them fused; for virtues are not contradictory and mutually antipathetic. Indeed, no harmony is more constant than the harmony of virtues. If from his youth man has subjected himself to the principles of virtues, and to the divine law of the world harmony, he will lead an easy life; and if, by his own inclination, he inclines towards evil and has the luck of meeting better guides, he will, by rectifying his course, arrive at happiness, like passengers favored by chance, finishing a fortunate sea-passage -- thanks to the pilot -- and the fortunate passage of life is happiness. But if by himself he cannot know his real interests, and if he does not have the luck of meeting prudent directors, what benefit would it be if he did have immense treasures? For the fool, even if he had for himself all the other elements of luck, is eternally unhappy. And since, in everything, you must first consider the end -- for that is what is done by the pilots ever meditating over the harbor whither they are to land the ship, by the drivers who keep their eye on the goal of their trip, and by the archers and slingers who consider their objective, for it is the objective towards which all their efforts must tend-virtue must necessarily undertake an objective, which should become the art of living, and that is the name I give it in both directions it can take. For practical life this objective is improvement; for the philosophical life, the perfect good, which, in their human affairs the sages call happiness. Those who are in misery are not capable of judging of happiness according to exact ideas, and those who do not see it clearly would not know how to choose it. Those who consider that pleasure is the sovereign good are punished therefore by foolishness; those who above all seek the absence of pain, also receive their punishment. In summary: to define life-happiness as the enjoyment of the body, in an unreflective state of soul, is to expose oneself to all the whirlwinds of the tempest. Those who suppress moral beauty, by avoiding all discussion, all reflection about the matter, and seeking pleasure, absence of pain, simple and primitive physical enjoyments, and the irreflective inclinations of body and soul, are not more fortunate, for they commit a double fault by reducing the good of the soul and its superior functions to the level of that of the body, and in raising the good of the body to the high level due to the good of the soul. For an exact discernment of these goods, we should outline its proper part for the divine element, and for nature; yet some do not observe this relation of dignity from the better to the worse. But we do so when we say that if the body is the organ of the soul, then reason is the guide of the entire soul, the mistress of the body, this tent of the soul, and that all the other physical advantages should serve only as instruments to the intellectual activity, if you wish it to be perfect in power, duration and wealth.

20. These are the most important conditions to become a sage: first, you must have received from fate a mind endowed with facility to understand, memory, and industry. You must then from youth on exercise your intelligence by the practice of argumentation, by mathematical studies, and by the exact sciences. Then you must study healthful philosophy, after which you may undertake the knowledge of the Gods, of laws, and of human life. For there are two means of arriving at this state known as wisdom. The first is to acquire the habit of work that is intellectual, and the taste for knowledge; the other is to seek to see many things, to undertake business frequently, and to know them, either directly at first hand, or indirectly. For he who from youth on has exercised reason by dialectic reasonings, mathematical studies, and exact sciences, is not yet ready for wisdom, any more than he who has neglected these labors, and has only listened to others, and has immersed himself in business. The one has become blind, when the business is to judge particular facts; the other, when he is to judge of general deductions. Just as in calculations you obtain the total by combining the parts, so also, in business practice, reason can vaguely sketch the general formula, but experience alone can enable us to grasp the details and individual facts.

21. Age is in the same relation to youth. Youth makes men energetic, age makes them prudent. Never by imprudence does it let a thought escape. It reflects on what it has done, it considers maturely what it ought to do, in order that this comparison of the future with the present, and of the present with the future lead it to good conduct. To the past it applies memory, to the present, sensation, and to the future, foresight; for our memory has always as object the past, foresight the future, and sensation the present. He who therefore wishes to lead an honest and beautiful life must not only have senses and memory, but foresight.

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PART 2 OF 2

4. Political Fragments

22 A. The laws of the wicked and atheists are opposed by the unwritten laws of the Gods, who inflict evils and terrible punishments on the disobedient. It is these divine laws which have developed and directed the laws and written maxims given to men.

B. The relation of law to the soul and human life is identical to that of harmony to the sense of hearing, and the voice; for the law instructs the soul, and thereby, the life, as harmony regulates the voice through education of the ear. In my opinion, every society is composed of the commander, the commanded, and the laws. Among the latter, one is living, namely the king, and the other is inanimate, this being the written letter. The law is therefore the most essential; only through it is the king legitimate, the magistrate regularly instituted, the commanded free, and the whole community happy. When it is violated, the king is no more than a tyrant, the magistrate is illegitimate, the commanded becomes a slave, and the whole community becomes unhappy. Human acts are like a mingled tissue, formed of command, duty, obedience, and force sufficient to overcome resistance. Essentially, the command belongs to the better, being commanded to the inferior, and force belongs to both. For the reasonable part of the soul commands, and the irrational part is commanded. Both have the force to conquer the passions. Virtue is born from the harmonious cooperation of both and leads the soul to rest and indifference by turning it away from pleasures and sorrows.

C. Law must conform to nature, and exercise an efficient power over things, and be useful to the social community; for if it lacks one, two, or all of these characteristics, it is no longer a law, or at least it is no longer a perfect law. It conforms to nature if it is the image of natural right, which fits itself, and distributes to each according to his deserts. It prevails if it harmonizes with the men who are to be subject thereto; for there are many people who are not apt to receive what by nature is the first of goods, and who are fitted to practice only the good which is in relation with them, and possible for them, for that is how the sick and the suffering have to be nursed. Law is useful to the political society if it is not monarchical, if it does not constitute privileged classes, if it is made in the interest of all, and is equally imposed on all. Law must also regard the country and the lands, for not all soils can yield the same returns, neither all human souls the same virtues. That is why some establish the aristocratic constitution, While others prefer the democratic or oligarchic. The aristocratic constitution is founded on the subcontrary proportion, [2] and is the most just, for this proportion attributes the greatest results to the greatest terms, and the smallest to the smallest. The democratic constitution is founded on the geometrical proportion, in which the results of the great and small are equal [in ratio]. The oligarchic and tyrannic constitutions are founded on the arithmetical proportion, which, being the opposite of the subcontrary, attributes to the smallest terms the greatest results, and vice versa.

Such are the kinds of proportions, and you can observe their image in families and political constitutions; for either the honors, punishments and virtues are equally attributed to the great and small, or they are so attributed unequally, according to superiority, in virtue, wealth or power. Equal distribution is the characteristic of democracy; and the unequal, that of aristocracy and oligarchy.

D. The best law and constitution must be a composite of all other constitutions, and contain something democratic, oligarchic, monarchic and aristocratic, as in Lacedaemon; for in it the kings formed the monarchic element, the elders the aristocracy, the magistrates the oligarchy, while the cavalry generals and the youths formed the democracy. Law must therefore not only be beautiful and good, but its different parts must mutually compensate. This will give it power and durability, and by this mutual opposition I mean that the same magistracy command and be commanded, as in the wise laws of Lacedaemon. For the power of its kings is balanced by the magistrates, this by the elders, and between these two powers are the cavalry generals and the youths, who, as soon as they see anyone party acquire the preponderance, throw themselves on the other side.

The law's first duty is to decide about the Gods, the geniuses, the parents -- in short, on all that is estimable and worthy -- and later decide about utility. It is proper that the secondary regulations should follow the best, and that the laws be inscribed, not on the houses and doors, but in the depths of the souls of the citizens. Even in Lacedaemon, which has excellent laws, the State is not administered by manifold written ordinances. Law is useful to the political community, if it is not monarchical, and does not serve private interests, if it is useful to all, if it extends its obligation to all, and if it aims its punishments to shame the guilty, and to brand him with infamy, rather than to deprive him of his wealth. If, indeed, you are seeking to punish the guilty by ignominy, the citizens will try to lead a wiser and more honest life, so as to avoid the law's punishment; if it is only by money fines, they will rate above everything wealth, understanding that it is their best means to repair their faults. The best would be that the State should be organized in a manner such that it would need nothing from strangers, neither for virtue, power, or anything else. In the same way the right constitution of a body, a house, or an army is to contain, and not to depend on outside sources for the principle of its safety; for in that way the body is more vigorous, the house better ordered, and the anny will be neither mercenary nor badly drilled.

Beings that are thus organized are superior to others; they are free and liberated from servitude unless, for their conservation, they need many things, but have only few needs easily satisfied. In that way the vigorous man becomes able to bear heavy burdens, and the athlete, to resist cold, for men are exercised by events and misfortunes. The temperate man, who has tested his body and soul, finds any food, drink, even a bed of leaves, delectable. He who has preferred to live like a Sybarite among delights, would finally scorn and reject the magnificence of the great [Persian] king. Law must therefore deeply penetrate into the souls and habits of the citizens; it will make them satisfied with their fate, and distribute to each his deserts. Thus the sun, in traversing the zodiac, distributes to everything on the earth growth, food, life, in the proper measure, and institutes this wise legislation which regulates the succession of the seasons. That is why we call Zeus nomios, law-giver, from Nomeios, and we call nomeus he who distributes their food to the sheep; that is why we call the verses sung by the lyre players nomoi, [3] for these verses impart order to the soul because they are sung according to the laws of harmony, rhythm, and measure.

23. The true chief must not only possess the science and power of commanding well, but he must also love men; for it is absurd that a shepherd should hate his flock, and feel hostile towards those he is educating. Besides, he must be legitimate; only thus can he sustain a chiefs dignity. His science will permit him to discern well, his power to punish, his kindness to be beneficent, and the law to do everything according to reason. The best chief would be he who would closest approach the law, for he would never act in his own interest, and always in that of others, since the law does not exist for itself, but for its subjects.

24. See 21 A.

25. When the art of reflection was discovered, dissension diminished and concord increased; those who possess it feel the pride of predominance yielding to the sentiment of equality. It is by reflection that we succeed in adjusting our affairs in a friendly fashion; through it the poor receive riches, and the rich give to the poor, each possessing the confidence that he possesses the equality of rights.

26. Reflection is like a rule which hinders and turns aside the people who know how to reflect from committing injustices, for it convinces them that they cannot remain hidden if they carry out their purposes, and the punishment which has overtaken those who have not known how to abstain makes them reflect and not become back-sliders.

5. Logical Fragments

27. Logic, compared with the other sciences, is by far the most successful and succeeds in demonstrating its objectives even better than geometry. Where geometric demonstration fails, logic succeeds; and logic deals not only with general classes, but also with their exceptions.

28. In my opinion it is a complete error to insist that about every subject there are two contrary opinions which are equally true. To begin with, I consider it impossible that, if both opinions are true, they should contradict each other, and that beauty should contradict beauty, and whiteness whiteness. It cannot be so, for beauty and ugliness, whiteness and blackness are contraries. Likewise, the true is contrary to the false, and you cannot produce two contrary opinions either true or false; the one must be true, at the expense of the falseness of the other. For instance, he who praises the soul of man and accuses his body is not speaking of the same object, unless you claim that speaking exclusively of the heaven you are speaking exclusively of the earth. Why no -- they are not one, but two propositions. What am I trying to demonstrate? That he who says that the Athenians are skillful and witty and he who says they are not grateful, are not supporting contradictory propositions, for contradictories are opposed to each other on the same points, and here the two points are different.

29. Archytas' Ten Universal Categories. First, all kinds of arts deal with five things: the matter, the instrument, the part, the definition, the end. The first notion, the substance, is something self-existent and self-subsistent. It needs nothing else for its essence, though it is subject to growth if it happens to be something that is born, for only the divine is uncreated, and veritably self-subsistent. The other notions are considered in relation to substance when the latter by opposition to them is termed self- subsisting, but such is not the case in relation to the divine. The nine notions appear and disappear without implying the ruin of the subject, the substrate, and that is what is called the universal accident. For the same subject does not lose its identity by being increased or diminished in quantity. Thus, excessive feeding creates excessive size and stoutness; sobriety and abstinence make men lean, but it is always the same body, the same substrate. Thus also human beings passing from childhood to youth remain the same substance, differing only in quantity. Without changing essence, the identical object may become white or black, changing only as regards quality. Again, without changing essence, the identical man may change disposition and relation, as he is friend or enemy, but being today in Thebes, and tomorrow in Athens changes nothing in his substantial nature. Without changing essence, we remain the same today that we were yesterday; the change affected only time. The man standing is the same as the man sitting; he has changed only in situation. Being armed or unarmed is a difference only of possession; the striker and the cutter are the same man in essence, though not in action. He who is cut or struck -- which belongs to the category of suffering -- still retains his essence.

The differences of the other categories are clearer. Those of quality, possession, and suffering present some difficulties in the differences, for we hesitate about the question of knowing if having fever, shivering or rejoicing belong to the category of quality, possession or suffering. We must distinguish: if we say it is fever, it is shivering, it is joy, it is quality; if we say he has fever, he shivers, he rejoices, it is possession. Possession again differs from suffering, in that the latter can be conceived without the agent. Suffering is a relation to the agent, and is understood only by him who produces it. If we say he is cut, he is beaten, we express the patient; if we say he suffers, we express possession.

We say that Archytas has ten, and no more universal notions, of which we may convince ourselves by the following division: the being is in a subject [a substance], or is not in a subject. That which is not in a subject, forms the substance. That which is in a subject is conceived by itself, or is not conceived by itself. That which is not conceived by itself constitutes relation, for relative beings, which are not conceived by themselves, but which forcibly import the idea of another being, are what is called scheseis, conditions; thus the term son is associated with the term father, that of slave, master. Thus all relative beings are conceived in a necessary bond together with something else, and not by themselves. The self-conceivable being is either divisible -- when it is quantity -- or indivisible, when it constitutes quality. The six other notions are produced by combination of the former. Substance mingled with quantity, if seen in space, constitutes the category of where; if seen in time, constitutes that of when. Mingled with quality, substance is either active, and forms the category of action, or when passive, forms that of suffering or passivity. Combined with relation, it is either posited in another, and that is what is called situation, or it is attributed to somebody else, and then it is possession.

As to the order of the categories, quantity follows substance and precedes quality because, by a natural law, everything that receives quality also receives mass, and that it is only by means of something so determinate that quality can be so affirmed and expressed. Again, quality precedes relation, because the former is self-sufficient, and the latter [subsists] through a relation; we first have to conceive and express something by itself before in a relation.

After these universal categories follow the others. Action precedes passivity, because its force is greater; the category of situation precedes that of possession, because being situated is something simpler than being possessed, and you cannot conceive something attributed to another, without conceiving the former as situated somewhere. That which is situated is also in a position, such as standing, seated, or lying. The characteristic of substance is more-or-lessness; for we say that a man is no more of an animal than a horse, by substance, and do not admit the contraries. The characteristic of quality is to admit more or less; for we say, more or less white, or black. The characteristic of quantity is to admit equality or inequality; for a square foot is not equal to an acre, and 144 square inches equals a square foot; five is not equal to ten, and twice five is equal to ten. The characteristic of relation is to join contraries; for if there is a father, there is a son, and if there is a master, there is a slave. The characteristic of whereness is to include, and of whenness not to remain, of situation to be located, and of possession to be attributed. The composite of substance and quantity is anterior to the composite of quality; the composite of substance and quality in its turn precedes that of substance and relation. Whereness precedes whenness because whereness presupposes the place that is fixed and permanent; whenness relates to time, and time, ever in movement, has no fixity, and rest is anterior to movement. Action is anterior to passivity, and situation to possession.

A. Category of Substance. Substance is divided into corporeal and incorporeal; the corporeal may be divided into bodies animate and inanimate. Animated bodies are divisible into those endowed with sensation, and without sensation. Sense-bodies can be divided into animals and zoophytes, which do not further divide into opposite distinctions. The animal is divided into rational and irrational; the rational is divisible into mortal and immortal; the mortal can be divided into differences of genus, such as man, ox, horse, and the rest. The species are divided into individuals who have no abiding value. Each of the sections that we obtained above by opposite divisions is susceptible of being in turn divided equally, until we arrive at the indivisible individuals who are of no value.

B. Category of Quantity. This is divided into seven parts: the line, surface, the body, the place, the time, the number, and language. Quantity is either continuous or discrete: of continuous quantities there are five; of the discrete, number and language. In quantity, you may distinguish that which is composed of parts having position relative to each other, such as line, surface, body, and space; and of those whose parts have no position, such as number, language, and time. For although time is a continuous quantity, nevertheless its parts have no position because it is not permanent, and that which has no permanence could not have any position. Quantity has produced four sciences: immovable continuous quantity, geometry; movable continuous quantity, astronomy; immovable discrete quantity, arithmetic; and the movable discrete, music.

C. Category of Quality. This is divided into hexis, or habit, and diathesis, or affection, passive quality and passivity, power and impotence, figure and form. Habit is affection in a state of energetic tension. It is the permanence and fixity derived from continuity and the energy of affection; it is affection become [second] nature, a second enriched nature. Another explanation of habit is the qualities given us by nature, and which are derived neither from affection, nor from the natural progress of the being; as sight and the other senses; both passive quality and passivity are increase, intensity, and weakening. To both of these are attributed anger, hate, intemperance, the other vicious passions, the affections of sickness, heat and cold; but these are classified at will under habit and affection, or under passive quality and passivity. You might say that so far as affection is communicable it might be called habit; so far as it causes a passion, it might be called a passive quality, which refers both to its permanence and fixity. For a modification contained in the measure is called passion. Thus from the one to whom it is communicated, heat may be called a habit. From the cause which produces the modification, we may say that it is either the passive quality, or the power of the passion; as when we say of a child that he is potentially a runner or a philosopher, and, in short, when at a given moment the being does not have the power to act, but it is possible that after the lapse of a certain period of time this power may belong to him. Impotence is when nature refuses itself to the possibility of accomplishing certain actions, as when the man is impotent to fly, the horse to speak, the eagle to live in water, and all the natural impossibilities.

Figure is a conformation of a determined character. Form is the quality showing itself exteriorly by color, or beauty or ugliness showing itself on the surface by color, and in short any form that is apparent, determinate, and striking. Some limit figure to inanimate things reserving form to living beings. Some say that the word figure gives the idea of the dimension of depth, and that the word form is applied only to the superficial appearance; but you have been taught all of that.

D. Category of Relation. Generally the relatives are divided into four classes: nature, art, chance and will. The relation of father to son is natural; that of master to disciple, that of art; that of master to slave, that of chance; and that of friend to friend, and enemy to enemy, that of will, although you might say that these are all natural relations.

E. Category of Whereness. The simplest division is into six: up, down, forwards, backwards, right and left. Each of these subdivisions contains varieties. There are many differences in upness: in the air, in the stars, to the pole, or beyond the pole, and such differences are repeated below. The infinitely divided spaces themselves are further subject to an infinity of differences, but this very ambiguous point will be explained later.

F. Category of Whenness. This is divided into present, past and future. The present is indivisible, the past is divided into nine subdivisions, the future into five. We have already spoken of them.

G. Category of Action. This is divided into action, discourse and thought. Action is in work of the hands, with tools, and with the feet, and each of these divisions is subdivided into technical divisions which also have their parts. Language is divided into Greek or barbarian, and each of these divisions has its varieties, namely, its dialects. Thought is divided into an infinite world of thoughts, whose objects are the world, other people, and the hypercosmic. Language and thought really belong to action, for they are acts of the reasonable nature; in fact, if we are asked, "What is Mr. X doing?" we answer that he is chatting, conversing, thinking, reflecting, and so on.

H. Category of Passivity. Passivity is divided into suffering of the soul and of the body. Each of these is subdivided into passions which result from actions of somebody else, as for instance, when somebody is struck, and passions which arise without the active intervention of someone else which occur in a thousand different forms.

I. Category of Situation. This is divided into three: standing, sitting, and lying, and each of these is subdivided by differences of location. We may stand on our feet, or on the tips of our fingers, with the leg unflexed, or the knee bent. Further differences are equal or unequal steps or walking on one or two feet. Being seated has the same differences: one may be straight, bent, reversed; the knees may form an acute or obtuse angle; the feet may be placed over each other, or in some other way. Likewise with lying down prone or head forwards, or to the side, the body extended, in a circle, or angularly. Far from uniform are these divisions; they are quite various. Position is also subject to other divisions: for instance, an object may be spread out like corn, sand, oil, and like all the other solids that are susceptible to position, and like all the liquids that we know. Nevertheless, being extended belongs to position, as with cloth and nets.

J. Category of Possession. "Having" signifies things that we put on, such as shoes, arms, coverings; things which are put on others, such as a basket, a bottle, and other vases, for we say that the basket has oats, that the bottle has wine. The same is true also of wealth and estates; we say, he has a fortune, fields, cattle, and other similar things.

30. The order of the categories is the following: in the first rank is substance, because it alone serves as substrate to all the others. We can conceive it alone, and by itself, but the others cannot be conceived without it, for all attributes' subjects reside therein, or are affirmed thereof. The second is quality, for it is impossible for a thing to have a quality without an essence.

31. Every naturally physical and sensible substance must, to be conceived by man, be either classified within the categories, or be determined by them, and cannot be conceived without them.

32. Substance has three differences: the one consists in matter, the other in form, and the third in the mixture of both.

33. These notions, these categories, have characteristics that are common and individual. I say that they are characteristics common to substance, not to receive more-or-lessness; for it is not possible to be more or less man, God, or plant. The characteristics have no contraries, for man is not the contrary of man, neither God of a God; neither is it contrary to other substances, to exist by oneself, and not to be in another, as green or blue color is the characteristic of the eye, since all substance depends on itself. All the things that belong to it intimately, or the accidents in it, cannot exist without it; quality is suited by several characteristics of substance, for example, not to be subject to more-or-lessness.

34. It is the property to remain self-identical, one in number, and to be susceptible of the contraries. Waking is the contrary of sleep; slowness is contrary to swiftness, sickness to health, and the same man is susceptible of all these differences. For he awakes, sleeps, moves slowly or quickly, is well or sick, and in short is able to receive all similar contraries, so long as they be not simultaneous.

35. Quantity has three differences: one consists in weight, like bullion; the other in size, as the yard; the other in multitude, as ten.

36. Including its accidents, substance is necessarily primary; that is how they [the categories] are in relation to something else. After the substance come the relations of accidental qualities.

37. A common property which must be added to quality is to admit certain contraries and privation. The relation is subject to more-or-lessness. For though a being remains ever the same, to be greater or smaller than anything else is moreness. But all the relations are not susceptible thereto, for you cannot be more or less father, brother, or son. I do not mean to express the sentiments of both parents, nor the degree of tenderness held mutually by beings of the same blood, and the sons of the same parents; I only mean the tenderness which is in the nature of these relations.

38. Quality has certain common characteristics: for example, of receiving the contraries and privation, which more or less affect the passions. That is why the passions are marked by the characteristics of indetermination, because they are in a greater or less indeterminate measure.

39. Relation is susceptible to conversion, and this conversion is founded either on resemblance, as the equal, and the brother, or on lack of resemblance, the large and the small. There are relatives which are not converted, for instance, science and sensation; for we may speak of the science of the intelligible, and of the sensation of the sensible, and the reason is that the intelligible and the sensible can exist independently of science and sensation while science and sensation cannot exist without the intelligible and the sensible [...] The characteristic of relatives is to exist simultaneously in each other, for if we grant the existence of doubleness, the half must necessarily exist; and if the half exists necessarily must the double exist, as it is the cause of the half, as the half is the cause of the double.

40. Since every moved thing moves in a place, since action and passivity are actualized movements, it is clear that there must be a primary space in which exist the acting and the passive objects.

41. The characteristic of the agent is to contain the cause of the motion, while the characteristic of the thing done, which is passive, is to have it in some other. For the sculptor contains the cause of the making of the statue, the bronze possesses the cause of the modification it undergoes, both in itself and in the sculptor. So also with the passions of the soul, for it is in the nature of anger to be aroused as the result of something else -- that it be excited by some other external thing, as for example by scorn, dishonor, and outrage -- and he who acts thus towards another, contains the cause of his action.

42. The highest degree of the action is the act which contains three differences: it may be accomplished in the contemplation of the stars, or in doing, such as healing or constructing, or in action, as in commanding an army, or administering the affairs of state. An act may occur even without reasoning, as in irrational animals. Those are the most general contraries.

43. Passion differs from the passive state, for passion is accompanied by sensation, like anger, pleasure and fear, while one can undergo something without sensation, such as the wax that melts, or the mud that dries. Then also the deed done differs also from the passive state, for the deed done has undergone a certain action, while everything that has undergone a certain action is not a deed done; for a thing may be in a passive state as a result of lack or privation.

44. On one side there is the agent, on the other the patient; for example, in nature, God is the being who acts, matter the being which undergoes, and the elements are neither the one nor the other.

45. The characteristic of possession is to be something adventitious, something corporeal, separated from essence. Thus a veil or shoes are distinct from the possessor; they are not natural characteristics, nor essential accidents, like the blue color of the eyes, and rarefaction. The latter are two incorporeal characteristics while possession relates to something corporeal and adventitious.

46. Since the signs and the things signified have a purpose, and because man uses these signs and signified things is to fulfill the perfect function of speech, let us finish what we have said by proving that the harmonious grouping of all these categories does not belong to man in general, but to a certain definite individual. Necessarily it must be a definite man existing somewhere who possesses quality, quantity, relation, action, passivity, location and possession, who is in a place and time. The man in himself receives only the first of these expressions, I mean essence and form. But he has no quality, no age, he is not old, neither does he suffer anything, he has no location, he possesses nothing, he exists neither in place nor time. All those are only accidents of the physical and corporeal being, but not of the intelligible, immovable, and indivisible being.

47. Among contraries, some are said to be mutually opposed by convention and nature, as good to evil, the sick to the well man, truth to error; the others, as possession is opposed to privation, such as life and death, sight and blindness, science and ignorance; others as relatives, as the double and the half, the commander and the commanded, the master and the slave; others, like affirmation and negation, as being man and not a man, being honest and not.

48. The relatives arise and disappear necessarily simultaneously; the existence of the double is impossible without implying that of the half and vice versa. If something becomes double, the half must arise, and if the double is destroyed, the half passes away with it.

49. Of the relatives, some respond to each other in two senses, as the greater, the smaller, the brother, the relative. Others again respond, but not in the two senses, for we say equally, the science of the intelligible, and the science of the sensible, but we do not say the reciprocal, the intelligible of science, and the sensible of sensation. The reason is that the object of judgment can exist independently of him who judges, for instance, the sensible can exist without sensation, and the intelligible without science, while it is not possible that the subject which bears a judgment exists without the object which he judges. For example, there can be no sensation without sensible object, nor science without intelligible object. Relatives which respond reciprocally are of two kinds: these are those that respond indifferently, as the relative, the brother, the equal, for they are mutually similar and equal. Some respond reciprocally, but not indifferently, for this one is greater than that one, and that one is smaller than this one, and this one is the father of that one, and that one the son of this one.

50. These opposites divide into kinds which band together; for of the contraries some are without a middle term and the others have one. There is no middle term between sickness and health, rest and movement, waking and sleep, straightness and curvedness, and other such contraries. But between the much and the little, there is a just medium; between the shrill and the low, there is the unison; between the rapid and slow, there is the equality of movement; between the greatest and the smallest, the equality of measure. Of universal contraries there must be one that belongs to what receives them, for they do not admit any medium term. Thus there is no medium term between health and sickness, for every living being is necessarily sick or well; neither between waking and sleeping, for every living being is either awake or asleep; nor between rest and movement, for every human being is either at rest or moving. [Concerning the opposites of which neither belong to the subject which may receive them,] between black and white there is the fawn, and it is not necessary that an animal be black or white. Between the great and the small there is the equal, and it is not necessary that a living being be either great or small; between the rough and soft there is the gentle, and it is not necessary that a living being be either rough or soft. In the opposites there are three differences: some are opposed, as the good is to evil, for instance, or health to sickness; the others, like evil to evil, as for instance, avarice to lechery; the others, as being neither the one or the other, for instance, as white is opposed to black, and the heavy to the light. Of the opposites, some occur in genus or genera, for the good is opposed to evil, and the good is the genus of virtues, and evil that of the evils. Other occur in the genera of species; virtue is the opposite of vice, and virtue is the genus of prudence and temperance, and vice is the genus of foolishness and debauch. Others occur in the species: courage is opposed to cowardliness, justice to injustice, and justice and excellence are species of virtue, injustice and debauch species of vice. The primary genera, which we call genera of genera, can be divided; the last species, which are the immediate nearest to the object, that is sensible, could no longer be genera, and are only species. For the triangle is the genus of the rectangle, of the equilateral and of the scalene [...] the species of good [...]

51. The opposites differ from each other in that for some -- the contraries -- it is not necessary that they arise at the same time, and disappear simultaneously. For health is the contrary of sickness, and rest that of movement; nevertheless neither of them arises or perishes at the same time as its opposite. Possession and privation of production differ in this, that it is in the nature of contraries that one passes from one to the other, for instance, from sickness to health and vice versa. It is not so with possession and privation; you do indeed pass from possession to privation, but the privation does not return to possession: the living die, but the dead never return to life. In short, possession is the persistence of what is according to nature, while privation is its lack and decay. Relatives necessarily arise and disappear simultaneously; for it is impossible for the double to exist without half, or vice versa. If some double happens to arise, it is impossible that the half should not arise, or if some double be destroyed, that the half be not destroyed. Affirmation and negation are forms of proposition, and they eminently express the true and the false. Being a man is a true proposition, if the thing exists, and false if it does not exist. You could say as much of negation: it is true or false according to the thing expressed.

Moreover, between good and evil there is a medium which is neither good nor evil; between much and little, the just measure; between the slow and the fast, the equality of speed; between possession and privation there is no medium. For there is nothing between life and death, and sight and blindness, unless indeed you say that the living who is not yet born, but who is being born, is between life and death, and that the puppy who does not yet see is between blindness and sight. In such an expression we are using an accidental medium and not one according to the true and proper definition of contraries.

Relatives have middle terms, for between the master and the slave there is the free man, and between the greatest and the smallest there is equality; between the wide and the narrow there is the proper width. One might likewise find between the other contraries a medium, whether or not it has a name.

Between affirmation [and negation] there are no contraries, for instance, between being a man and not being a man, being a musician and not being a musician. In short, we have to affirm or deny. Affirming is showing of something that it is a man, for instance, or a horse, or an attribute of these beings, as of the man that he is a musician, and of the horse that he is warlike. We call it denying when we show of something that it is not something, not man, not horse, or that it lacks an attribute of these beings, for instance, that the man is not a musician and that the horse is not warlike; and between this affirmation and this negation there is nothing.

52. Privation and being deprived is taken in three senses: one does not at all have the thing, as the blind man does not have sight, the mute does not have voice, and the ignorant does not have science; or that one does not have it but partially, as the man hard of hearing has hearing, and that the man with sore eyes has sight; or one can say that partially he does not have it, as one says that a man whose legs are [so] crooked that he has no legs, and of a man who has [such] a bad voice that he has no voice.

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Notes:

1. See Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, vol. 1. 246-49.

2. I.e., the harmonic mean.

2. Nomoi, in addition to meaning "laws," is also the term used for the various modes of Greek music. Each Greek mode or "scale" was associated with a distinctive style of playing and affect.

[admin]

COCELLUS LUCANUS:

ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

OCELLUS LUCANUS was an early Pythagorean as were other members of his family. This writing seems to be post-Aristotelian. As Holger Thesleff observes in his Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period, the work seems to be influenced by Peripatetic conceptions and demonstrations concerning the nature of generation and destruction; and the ending. on the generation of good offspring. may derive from Aristoxenus.

ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

1. On the Eternity and Indestructibility of the Universe

OCELLUS LUCANUS HAS WRITTEN what follows concerning the nature of the universe, having learnt some things through clear arguments from Nature herself, but others from opinion in conjunction with reason, it being his intention [here] to derive what is probable from intellectual perception.

Therefore it appears to me that the universe is indestructible and unbegotten, since it always was and always will be; for if it had a temporal beginning, it would not always have existed. Thus therefore the universe is unbegotten and indestructible. For if some one should claim that it was once generated, he would not be able to find anything into which it can be corrupted and dissolved, since that from which it was generated would be the first part of the universe; and again, that into which it would be dissolved would be the last part of it.

But if the universe was generated, it was generated together with all things; and if it should be corrupted, it would be corrupted together with all things. This however is impossible. This universe is therefore without a beginning, and without an end; nor is it possible that it can have any other mode of subsistence.

It may be added that everything which has received a beginning of generation, and which ought also to participate in dissolution, receives two mutations. The first, indeed, proceeds from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; and that from which it begins to change is denominated generation, but that which at length it arrives is called climax. The other mutation, however, proceeds from the great to the less, and from the better to the worse; but the end of this mutation is called corruption and dissolution.

If therefore the whole and the universe were generated, and are corruptible, they must, when generated, have been changed from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; but when corrupted, they must be changed from the greater to the less, and from the better to the worse. Hence, if the world was generated, it would receive increase, and would arrive at its consummation; and again, it would afterwards decrease and end. For every thing which has a progression possesses three boundaries and two intervals: the three boundaries are generation, consummation and end, and the intervals are progression from generation to consummation, and from consummation to end.

The whole, however, and the universe affords as from itself no indication of anything of this kind; for neither do we perceive it rising into existence, or becoming to be, nor changing to the better and the greater, nor changing to worse or less, but it always continues to subsist in the identical manner, and perpetually remains self-identical.

Clear signs and indications of this are the orders of things, their symmetry, figurations, positions, intervals, powers, swiftness and slowness in respect to each other; and besides these, their numbers and temporal periods are clear signs and indications. For all such things as these change and diminish conformably to the course of generation; for things that are greater and better tend towards consummation through power, but those that are less and worse decay through the inherent weakness of nature.

The whole world is what I call the whole universe; for this word "cosmos" was given it as a result of its being adorned with all things. From itself it is a consummate and perfect system of all things, for there is nothing external to the universe, since whatever exists is contained in the universe, and the universe subsists together with this, comprehending in itself all things, both parts and superfluities.

The things contained in the world are naturally congruous with it; but the world harmonizes with nothing else, symphonizing with itself. Other things do not possess self-subsistence, but require adjustment with their environment. Thus animals require conjunction with air for the purpose of respiration, and with light in order to see, and similarly the other senses with other environments to function satisfactorily. A conjunction with earth is necessary for the germination of plants. The sun, moon, planets and fixed stars likewise integrate with the world, as part of its general arrangement. The world, however, has no conjunction with anything outside of itself.

The above is supported by the following. Fire which imparts heat to others is self-hot; honey which is sweet to the taste is self-sweet. The principles of demonstrations, which conclude to things unapparent, are self-evident. Therefore the cause of the perfection of other things is itself perfect. That which preserves and renders permanent other things must itself be preserved and permanent. What harmonizes must itself be self-harmonic. Now as the world is the cause of the existence, preservation and perfection of other things, the world must itself be perpetual and perfect; and because its duration is everlasting, it becomes the cause of the permanence of all other things.

In short, if the universe should be dissolved, it would be dissolved either into the existent or non-existent. It could not be dissolved into existence, for in this case the dissolution would not be a corruption, as being either the universe or some part of it. Nor can it be dissolved into non-entity, since being cannot possibly arise from non-being, or be dissolved into non-entity. Therefore the universe is incorruptible and never can be destroyed.

If, however, somebody should think that it can be corrupted, it must be corrupted either from something external to or contained in the universe; but it cannot be corrupted by anything external to it, for nothing such exists, since all other things are comprehended in the universe, and the world is the whole and the all. Nor can it be corrupted by the things it contains, which would imply their greater power. This however is impossible, for all things are led and governed by the universe, and thereby are preserved and adjusted, possessing life and soul. But if the universe can neither be corrupted by anything external to it, nor by anything contained within it, the world must therefore be incorruptible and indestructible, for we consider the world identical with the universe.

Further, the whole of nature surveyed through its own totality, will be found to derive continuity from the first and most honorable bodies, proportionally attenuating this continuity, introducing it to everything mortal, and receiving the progression of its peculiar subsistence; for the first (and most honorable) bodies in the universe revolve according to the Same, [1] and similarly. The progression of the whole of nature, however, is not successive and continuous, nor yet local, but is subject to mutation.

When condensed, fire generates air, air water, and water earth. A return circuit of transformation extends backward from earth to fire, whence it originated. Likewise, fruits and most rooted plants, originate from seeds. When however they fruit and mature, they are again resolved into seed, nature producing a complete circular progression.

In a subordinate manner men and other animals change the universal boundary of nature, for in these there is no periodical return to the first age; nor is there a transfusion, such as between fire and air, and water and earth, but the mutations of their ages being accomplished in a four-cycled circle, they are dissolved and reformed.

These therefore are the signs and indications that the universe which comprehends [all things) will always endure and be preserved, but that its parts and its nonessential additions are corrupted and dissolved.

Further, it is credible that the universe is without a beginning, and without end, from its figure, motion, time and essence; and therefore it may be concluded that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible, for its figure is circular, and as a circular figure is similar and equal on all sides, it is therefore without a beginning or end. Circular is also the motion of the universe, but this motion is stable and without transition. Time, likewise, in which motion exists, is infinite, for neither had this a beginning, nor will it have an end of its revolution. The universe's essence also does not waste elsewhere, and is immutable, because it is not naturally adapted to change, either from worse to better, or from better to worse. From all these arguments, therefore, it is obviously credible that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible. So much about the world and the universe.

2. Creation of the Elements

SINCE, HOWEVER, IN THE UNIVERSE there is a difference between generation and the generated, and since generation occurs where there is a mutation and egress from things which rank as subjects, then must the cause of generation subsist as long as the generated matter. The cause of generation must be both efficient and motive, while the recipient must be passive and moved.

The Fates themselves distinguish and separate the impassive part of the world from that which is perpetually in motion. For the course of the moon is the meeting-line of generation and immortality. The region above the moon, as well as the lunar domain, is the residence of divinities, while the sublunar regions are the abodes of strife and nature, for in this place there is a mutation of things that are generated and a regeneration of things which have perished.

In that part of the world, however, in which nature and generation predominate, it is necessary that the three following things be present. In the first place, there is the body which yields to the touch, and which is the subject of all generated natures. But this will be an universal recipient, and a characteristic of generation itself, having the same relation to the things that are generated from it, as water to taste, silence to sound, darkness to light, and the matter of artificial forms to the forms themselves. For water is tasteless and devoid of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet and the bitter, the tart and the salty. Air also, which is formless as regards sound, is the recipient of words and melody. Darkness, which is without color, and without form, becomes the recipient of splendor, and of the yellow color, and the white; but white pertains to the statuary's art and to the wax-sculptor's art. Matter's relation, however, is different from the sculptor's art, for in matter, prior to generation, all things exist in potential, but they exist in perfection when they are generated, and receive their proper nature. Hence matter [or universal recipient] is necessary to the existence of generation.

The second necessity is the existence of contrarieties, in order to effect mutations and changes in quality, matter for this purpose receiving passive qualities and an aptitude to the participations of form. Contrariety is also necessary in order that powers which are naturally mutually repugnant may not finally conquer or vanquish each other. These powers are hot and cold, dryness and moistness.

In the third place rank essences, and these are fire and water, air and earth, of which heat and cold, dryness and moistness, are powers. Yet essences differ from powers, for essences are locally corrupted by each power, but powers are neither corrupted nor generated, as their reasons [or forms] are incorporeal.

Of these four powers, however, heat and cold subsist as causes and things of an effective nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter and things that are passive, though matter is the first recipient of things, for it is that which is spread under all things in common. Hence the body, whose capacity is the object of sense, and ranks as a principle, is the first thing; while contraries, such as heat and cold, moistness and dryness, rank as primary differences, and heaviness and lightness, density and rarity, are related as things produced from primary differences. All of them, however, amount to sixteen: heat and cold, moistness and dryness, heaviness and lightness, rarity and density, smoothness and roughness, hardness and softness, thinness and thickness, acuteness and obtuseness. Knowledge of all of these is had by touch, which forms a judgement; hence also any body whatever which contains capacity for these can be apprehended by touch.

Heat and dryness, rarity and sharpness are the powers of fire; coldness and moistness, density and obtuseness are those of water; those of air are softness, smoothness, light, and the quality of being attenuated; while those of earth are hardness and roughness, heaviness and thickness.

Of these four bodies, however, fire and earth are the intensities of contraries. Fire is the intensity of heat, as ice is of cold; and if ice is a concretion of moisture and frigidity, fire will be the fervor of dryness and heat. That is why neither fire nor ice generate anything.

Fire and earth, therefore, are the extremities of the elements, while water and air are the media, for they have a mixed corporeal nature. Nor is it possible that there could be only one of the extremes, a contrary thereto being necessary. Nor could there only be two, for it is necessary to have a medium, as media oppose extremes.

Fire therefore is hot and dry, but air is hot and moist; water is moist and cold, and earth is cold and dry. Hence heat is common to air and fire; cold is common to water and earth; dryness to earth and fire, and moisture to water and air. But with respect to the peculiarities of each, heat is the peculiarity of fire, dryness of earth, moisture of air, and frigidity of water. These essences remain permanent, through the possession of common properties, but they change through such as are peculiar, when one contrary overcomes another.

Hence, when the moisture in air overcomes the dryness in fire, or when water's frigidity overcomes air's heat, and earth's dryness overcomes water's moistness, and vice versa, then are effected the mutual mutations and generations of the elements.

The body, however, which is the subject and recipient of mutations, is a universal receptacle, and is in capacity the first tangible substance.

But the mutations of the elements are effected either from a change of earth into fire, or from fire into air, or from air into water, or from water into earth. Mutation is also effected in the third place, when each element's contrariness is corrupted, simultaneously with the preservation of everything kindred and coeval. Generation therefore is effected when one contrary quality is corrupted. For fire, indeed, is hot and dry, but air is hot and moist, and heat is common to both; and the peculiarity of fire is dryness, and of air, moisture. Hence when the moisture in air overcomes the dryness in fire, then fire is changed into air.

Again, since water is moist and cold, but air is moist and hot, moisture is common to both. Water's peculiarity is coldness, and that of air, heat. When therefore the coldness in water overcomes the heat in air, air is altered into water.

Further, earth is cold and dry, and water cold and moist, coldness being common to both. But earth's peculiarity is dryness, and water's moisture. When therefore earth's dryness overcome water's moisture, water is altered into earth.

Earth's mutation in the ascending alteration occurs in a contrary way. One alternate mutation is effected when one whole vanquishes another, and two contrary powers are corrupted, nothing being common to them, at the same time. For since fire is hot and dry, while water is cold and moist, when the moisture in water overcomes the dryness in fire, and water's coldness overcomes fire's heat, then fire is altered into water.

Again, earth is cold and dry, while air is hot and moist. When therefore earth's coldness overcomes air's heat, and earth's dryness overcomes air's moisture, then air is altered into earth.

When air's moisture corrupts fire's heat, then from both of them will be generated fire; for air's heat, and fire's dryness will remain, fire being hot and dry.

When earth's coldness is corrupted, and also water's moisture, then from both of them will be generated earth. For earth's dryness and water's coldness will be left, as earth is cold and dry.

But when air's heat and fire's heat are corrupted, no element will be generated; for in both of these will remain contraries, air's moisture and fire's dryness. Moisture is however contrary to dryness.

Again, when earth's coldness, and that of water are corrupted, neither thus will any generation occur, for earth's dryness, and water's moisture will remain. But dryness is contrary to moisture.

Thus we have briefly discussed the generation of the first bodies, and how and from what subjects it is effected.

Since, however, the world is indestructible and unbegotten, and neither had a beginning of generation, nor will have an end, it is necessary that the nature which produces generation in another thing, and also that which generates in itself, should be simultaneously present. That which produces generation in another thing is the whole superlunary region, though the more proximate cause is the sun, who by his comings and goings continually changes the air, from hot to cold, which again changes the earth, and alters all its contents.

The obliquity of the zodiac, also, is well placed in respect to the sun's motion, for it likewise is the cause of generation. This is universally accomplished by the universe's proper order, wherein some things are active, and others passive. Different therefore is the generator, which is superlunary, while that which is generated is sublunary; and that which consists of both of these -- namely, an ever- running body, and an ever-mutable generated nature -- is the world itself.

3. The Perpetuity of the World

MAN'S GENERATION did not originate from the earth, other animals, or plants, but the world's proper order being perpetual, the aptly arranged natures it contains should share with it never-failing subsistence. As primarily the world existed always, its parts must coexist with it, and by these I mean the heavens, the earth, and what is contained between them, and that which is on high and is called aerial, for the world does not exist without these, but with and from these.

As the world's parts are co-subsistent, their comprehended natures must coexist with them; with the heavens, indeed, the sun, moon, fixed stars and planets; with the earth, animals and plants, gold and silver; with the aerial region, pneumatic substances and wind, heating and cooling; for it is the property of the heavens to subsist in conjunction with the natures which it comprehends, of the earth to support its native plants and animals, and of the aerial regions to be co-subsistent with the natures it has generated.

Since therefore in each division of the world there is arranged a certain genus of animals which surpasses its fellows, the heavens are the habitat of the Gods, on the earth men, and in the space between, the geniuses. Therefore the race of men must be perpetual, since reason convinces us that not only are the world's parts co-subsistent with it, but so also are their comprehended natures.

Sudden destruction and mutations, however, take place in the parts of the earth; the sea overflows on to the land, or the earth shakes and splits through the unobserved entrance of wind or water. But an entire destruction of the earth's whole arrangement never took place nor ever will.

Hence the story that Grecian history began with Inachus of Argos is false, if understood to be a first principle, but true as some mutation of Greek politics; for Greece has frequently been and will again be barbarous, not only from the influx of foreigners, but from Nature herself, which, although she does not become greater or less, yet is always younger, and has a beginning in reference to us.

So much about the whole, and the universe, the generation and corruption of natures generated in it, of how they subsist, and forever, one part of the universe consisting of a nature which is perpetually moved, and another part being passive; and of how the former governs and how the latter is ever governed.

4. The Generation of Men

LAW, TEMPERANCE AND PIETY conspire in explaining as follows the generation of men from each other, after what manner, from what particulars, and how it is effected. The first postulate is that sexual association should occur never for pleasure, but only for procreation of children.

Those powers and instruments and appetites ministering to copulation were implanted in men by divinity, not for the sake of voluptuousness, but for the perpetuation of the race. Since it was impossible that man, who is born mortal, should participate in a divine life were his race not immortal, divinity operated this immortality through individuals, and lent continuity to mankind's generation. This is the first essential, that cohabitation should not be effected for mere pleasure.

Next, man should be considered in connection with the social organism, a house or city, and especially that each human progeny should work at the completion of the world, unless he plans to be a deserter of either the domestic, political or divine Vestal hearth.

For those who are not entirely connected with each other for the sake of begetting children injure the most honorable system of convention. But if persons of this description procreate with libidinous insolence and intemperance, their offspring will be miserable and flagitious, and will be execrated by God and divinities, by men, families and cities.

Those therefore who deliberately consider these things ought not, in a way similar to irrational animals, to engage in venereal connection, but should think copulation a necessary good. For it is the opinion of worthy men that it is necessary and beautiful not only to fill houses with large families, and also the greater part of the earth, for man is the most mild and the best of all animals, and it is a thing of the greatest consequence to cause them to abound with the most excellent men.

For on this account men inhabit cities governed by the best laws, rightly manage their domestic affairs, and if they are able, impart to their friends such political employments as are conformable to the polities in which they live, since they not only provide for the multitude at large, but especially for worthy men.

Hence many men err who enter into the connubial state without regarding the magnitude of the power of fortune, or of public utility, but direct their attention to wealth, or to dignity of birth. For in consequence of this, instead of uniting with females who are young and in the flower of their age, they become connected with extremely old women; and instead of having wives with a disposition according with, and most similar to their own, they marry those who are of an illustrious family, or are extremely rich. On this account they procure for themselves discord instead of concord; and instead of unanimity, dissension, contending with each other for the mastery. For the wife who surpasses her husband in wealth, in birth, or in friends, is desirous of ruling over him, contrary to the law of nature. But the husband justly resisting this desire of superiority in his wife, and wishing not to be the second, but the first in domestic sway, is unable in the management of his family to take the lead.

This being the case, it happens that not only families, but cities become miserable. For families are parts of cities, while the composition of the whole and the universe derives its subsistence from its parts. It is therefore reasonable to admit that such as are the parts, such likewise will be the whole and the all which consists of things of this kind.

As in fabrics of a primary nature the first structures cooperate greatly to the good or bad completion of the whole work-as for instance the manner in which the foundation is laid in house-building, the structure of a keel in ship-building, and the utterance and closing of the voice in musical modulation-so the concordant condition of families greatly contributes to the well or ill establishment of a polity.

Those therefore who direct their attention to the propagation of the human species ought to guard against everything which is dissimilar and imperfect; for neither plants nor animals when imperfect are prolific, but their fructification demands a certain amount of time, so that when the bodies are strong and perfect they may produce seeds and fruits.

Hence it is necessary that boys and girls while they are virgin should be trained up in exercises and proper endurance, and that they be nourished with that kind of food which is adapted to a laborious, temperate and patient life.

Moreover, in human life there are many things of such a kind that it is better for the knowledge of them to be deferred for a certain time. Hence a boy should be so tutored as not to seek after venereal pleasures before he is twenty years of age, and then should rarely engage in them. This however will take place if he conceives that a good habit of body and continence are beautiful and honorable.

The following laws should be taught in Grecian cities: that connection with a mother, or a daughter, or a sister should not be permitted Whether in temples or in a public place, for it would be well to employ numerous impediments to this energy.

All unnatural connections should be prevented, especially those attended with wanton insolence. But such as harmonize with nature should be encouraged, such as are effected with temperance for the purpose of producing a temperate and legitimate offspring.

Again, those who intend to beget children should providentially attend to the welfare of their future offspring. A temperate and salutary diet therefore is the first and greatest thing to be considered by the would-be begetter, so that he should neither be filled with unseasonable food, nor become intoxicated, nor subject himself to any other perturbation which may injure the body-habits. But above all things he should be careful that the mind, in the act of copulation, should remain in a tranquil state, for bad seed is produced from depraved, discordant and turbulent habits.

With all possible earnestness and attention we should endeavor that children be born elegant and graceful, and that when born they should be well educated. For it is foolish that those who rear horses, birds or dogs should with the utmost diligence render the breed perfect, doing what is proper when it is proper, and likewise consider how they ought to be disposed when they copulate with each other, that the offspring be not the result of chance-while men are inattentive to their progeny, begetting them by chance; and having begotten offspring, should neglect both their food and education. It is the disregard of these things that causes all vice and depravity, since those born will resemble cattle, and will be ignoble and vile.

A FRAGMENT ON LAWS

AS LIFE CONTAINS BODIES, whose cause is the soul, so harmony, connectedly, comprehends the world, whose cause is God. Likewise concord unites families, whose cause is the law. Therefore there is a certain cause and nature which perpetually adapts to each other the parts of the world, hindering their being disordered and unconnected. However, cities and families continue only for a short time, as the formers' constituent matter, and the latters' progeny -- being causes of dissolution-derive their subsistence from a mutable and perpetually passive nature. For the destruction of things which are generated is the salvation of the matter from which they are generated. That nature, however, which is perpetually moved [the celestial region] governs, while that which is always passive [the sublunary region] is governed, the capacity of the former being prior, and of the latter posterior. The former is divine, possessing reason and intellect, the latter being generated, irrational and mutable.

_______________

Notes:

1. The Same and the Other are Platonic terms for Limit and Unlimited.

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CHIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN:

ON FELICITY AND ON A REPUBLIC

ON FELICITY

OF ANIMALS some are capable of felicity while others are incapable. Felicity cannot subsist without virtue, and this is impossible to any lacking reason, so that those animals are incapable of felicity who are destitute of reason. The blind cannot exercise or practice sight, nor can the irrational attain to the work and virtue dependent on reason. To that which possesses reason, felicity is a work, and virtue an art. Of rational animals, some are self-perfect, in need of nothing external, either for their existence or artistic achievement. Such indeed is God. On the contrary, those animals are not self-perfect whose perfection is not due to themselves, or who are in need of anything external. Such an animal is man. Of not self-perfect animals some are perfect and others are not. The former derive their subsistence from both their own proper causes, and from the external. They derive it indeed from their own causes, because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature, and deliberate choice; but also from external causes, because they receive from thence equitable legislation, and good rulers. The animals which are not perfect are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some one of these, or whose souls are entirely depraved. Such will be the man who is of a description different from the above.

Moreover, of perfect men there are two kinds. Some of them are naturally perfect, while others are perfect only in relation to their lives. Only the good are naturally perfect, and these possess virtue. For the virtue of the nature of anything is a consummation and perfection. Thus the virtue of the eye is the eye's nature's consummation and perfection. So man's virtue is man's nature's consummation and perfection.

Those also are perfect according to life who are not only good but happy. For indeed felicity is the perfection of human life. But human life is a system of actions, and felicity completes actions. Virtue and fortune also complete life, but only partially: virtue, according to use, and good fortune according to prosperity. God, therefore, is neither good through learning virtue from anyone, nor is he happy through being attended by good fortune. For he is good and happy by nature, and always was, is and never will cease to be, since he is incorruptible and naturally good. But man is neither happy nor good by nature, requiring discipline and providential care. To become good he requires virtue, but to become happy, good fortune. On this account, human felicity may be summarily said to consist of these two things: praise, and being called happy. Praise, indeed, because of virtue; but being called happy from prosperity. Therefore it possesses virtue through a divine destiny, but prosperity through a mortal allotment. But moral concerns depend on divine ones, and terrestrial on celestial. Likewise, subordinate things depend on the more excellent. That is why the good man who follows the Gods is happy, but he who follows mortal nature is unhappy. For to him who possesses wisdom, prosperity is good and useful, being good through his knowledge of the use of it; but it is useful through his cooperating with actions. It is beautiful therefore when prosperity is present with intellect, and when, as if we were sailing with a prosperous wind, actions are performed that tend towards virtue, just as a pilot watches the stars. Thus he who does this will not only follow God, but will also harmonize human good with the divine.

This also is evident, that human life becomes different from disposition and action. But it is necessary that the disposition should be either worthy or depraved, and that action should be attended with either felicity or misery. A worthy disposition indeed participates of virtue, while a bad one of vice. With respect to actions, also, those that are prosperous are attended with felicity [for they derive their completion from looking to reason], but those that are unfortunate are attended with misery, for they are disappointed of their end. Hence it is not only necessary to learn virtue, but also to possess and use it: either for security, or growth [of property when it is too small], or for the improvement of families and cities, which is the greatest thing of all. For it is necessary not only to have the possession of beautiful things, but also their use. All these things, however, will take place when a man lives in a city that enjoys equitable laws. This is what is signified by the horn of Amalthea, for all things are contained in equitable legislation. Without this, the greatest good of human nature can neither be effected, nor, when effected, be increased and become permanent. For this contains both virtue and [the] tendency towards it, because excellent natures are generated according to it. Likewise manners, studies and laws through this subsist in the most excellent condition; and besides these, rightly-deciding reason, and piety and sanctity toward the most honorable natures. Therefore he who wishes to be happy, and whose life is to be prosperous, should live and die in a country governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all lawlessness. All the above is necessary, for man is a part of society, and according to the same reasoning will become entire and perfect, if he associates with others, but that in a becoming manner. For some things are naturally adapted to subsist in many things, and not in one thing; others in one thing and not in many; others both in many and in one, and on this account in one thing because in many. For indeed harmony, symphony and number are naturally adapted to be infused into many things. Nothing which makes a whole from these parts is sufficient in itself. But acuteness of seeing and hearing, and swiftness of feet, subsist in one thing alone. Felicity, however, and virtue of soul, subsist in one thing and in many things, in a whole, and in the universe. On this account they subsist in one thing, because they also subsist in many; and they subsist in many because they inhere in the whole and the universe. For the orderly distribution of the whole nature of things methodically arranges each particular. The orderly distribution of particulars gives completion to the whole of things, and to the universe. But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the whole. For if the Cosmos was not, neither the sun nor the moon would exist, nor the planets, nor the fixed stars. But the universe existing, each of these also exists.

The truth of this may also be seen in the nature itself of animals. For if the animal had no existence, there would be neither eye, mouth, nor ear. But the animal existing, each of these likewise exists. However, as the whole is to the part, so is the virtue of the whole to that of the part. For if harmony did not exist, nor a divine inspection of human affairs, things adorned with order would no longer remain in good condition. Were there no equitable legislation in a city, the citizen would be neither good nor happy. Did the animal lack health, neither foot nor hand could be in health. The world's virtue is harmony, the city's virtue is equitable legislation, and the body's virtue is health and strength. Likewise, each of the parts is adjusted to the whole and the universe. For the eye sees on account of the whole body, and the other parts and members are adjusted for the sake of the whole [body] and the universe.

ON A REPUBLIC

I SAY THAT THE WHOLE OF A POLITY is divided into three parts: the good men who manage public affairs, those who are powerful, and those who are employed in supplying and procuring the necessities of life. The first group is that of the counselors, the second the auxiliaries, and third that which pertains to the mechanical and sordid arts. The first two groups belong to the liberal condition of life; the third, of those who labor to procure subsistence. Of these the council is best, the laborers the worst, and the auxiliaries, a medium between the two. The council should govern, and the laborers should be governed, and the auxiliaries should both govern and be governed. For that which consults for the general good previously deliberates what ought to be done; while that which is of an auxiliary nature, so far as it is belligerent, rules over the whole mechanical tribe, but is itself governed in so far as it has previously received advice from others.

Of these parts, however, each again receives a triple division. For of that which consults, one part presides, another governs, and another counsels for the general good. With respect to the presiding part, it is that which plans, contrives and deliberates about what pertains to the community, prior to the other parts, and afterwards refers its counsels to the senate. But the governing part is either that which now rules [for the first time], or which has before performed that office. With respect to the third part, which consults for the general good, this receives the advice of the earlier parts, and by its suffrages and authority confirms whatever is referred to its decision. In short, those who preside should refer the community's affairs to that part which consults for the general good, while the latter part should refer these affairs through the presiding officers to the convention.

Likewise, of that part which is auxiliary, powerful and efficacious: one part is of a governing nature, another part is defensive, and the remaining, and greater part, is private and military. It is the governing part, therefore, from which the leaders of the armies, the officers of bands, the bands of soldiers, and the vanguard are derived, and universally all those who rank as leaders. The vanguard consists of the bravest, the most impetuous, and the most daring, the remaining military and multitude being gregarious.

Of the third part engaged in sordid occupations, and in laboring to procure the necessities of life: one part consists of husbandmen, and those employed in the cultivation of land; another are artisans, making such instruments and machines as are required by the occasions of life; and another part travels and bargains, exporting to foreign regions such things as are superabundant in the city, and importing into it other things from foreign countries. The systems of political society are organized in many such parts.

Next we must study their adaption and union. Since, however, the whole of political society may well be compared to a lyre, as it requires apparatus and mutual adjustment, and also because it must be touched and used musically; this being the case, I have sufficiently spoken above about the apparatus of a polity, and shown from what and from how many particulars it is constituted. I shall now, therefore, endeavor to speak of the organization and union of these. Political society is organized by disciplines, the study of customs, and laws; through these three man is educated and improved.

Disciplines are the source of erudition, and lead the desires toward virtue. The laws, both repelling man [from the commissions of crimes] and alluring them by honors and gifts, excite them [to virtue]. Manners and studies fashion the soul like wax, and through their continued energy impress thereon propensities that become second nature. These three [parts of society] should however cooperate with the beautiful, the useful and the just; each of these three should if possible aim at all these three, but if not all of them, it should at least have two or one of them as the goal, so that discipline, manners and laws may be beautiful, just and advantageous. In the first place, the beautiful in conduct should be preferred; in the second place the just, and in the third place the useful. Universally the endeavor should be that through these the city may become, in the most eminent degree, unanimous and concordant with its parts, and may be free from sedition, and hostile contention. This will happen if the passions in the youths' souls are disciplined, and in things pleasing and painful are led to moderation, and if the possessions of men are not superfluous, and they derive their subsistence from the cultivation of the earth. This will also be accomplished if good men rule over those that are in want of virtue, skillful men over those that are wanting in skill, and right men over those things that require a certain amount of generosity and expenditure, and also if appropriate honors are distributed to those who govern in all these in a becoming manner. But there are three causes which are incitements to virtue-fear, desire and shame. Law can produce fear, but custom shame; for those that are accustomed to act well will be ashamed to do anything that is base. Desire is produced by disciplines, for they simultaneously assign the causes of things, and attract the soul, and especially so when accompanied by exhortation. Hence the souls of young men should be sufficiently instructed in what pertains to senates, fellowship and association, both military and political. Moreover, the tribe of elderly men should be trained to things of this kind, since young men indeed require correction and instruction, but elderly men need benevolent associations and a mode of living unattended by pain.

Since therefore we have said that the worthy man is perfect through three things -- customs, laws and disciplines -- we must consider how customs or manners are corrupted usually, and how they grow permanent. We shall then find that customs are corrupted in two ways: through ourselves, or through foreigners. This occurs through ourselves, indeed, due to our flying from pain, whereby we fail to endure labor, or through the pursuit of pleasure, whereby we reject the good. For labors procure good, but pleasures evil. Hence through pleasure, becoming incontinent and remiss, men are rendered effeminate in their souls, and more prodigal in their expenses. Customs and manners are corrupted through foreigners when their numbers swamp the natives, and boast of the success of their mercantile employments, or when those who dwell in the suburbs, becoming lovers of pleasures and luxury, spread their manners to the simple neighbors. Therefore the legislators, officers and mass of the people should diligently take notice whether the customs of the city are being carefully preserved, and that throughout the whole people. Moreover, they should observe whether the genuine and indigenous multitude, of which the polity consists, remains pure and unmingled with any other nation, and whether the magnitude of possessions remains in the same state, and does not become excessive. For the possession of superfluities is accompanied by the desire of still more of the superfluous. In such ways the customs should be preserved.

With respect to disciplines, however, the same legislators and officers should diligently inspect and examine the sophists, whether they are teaching what is useful to the laws, to the established political principles, and to the local economy of life. For sophistic doctrines may infect men with no passing, but [with the) greatest infelicity when they dare make innovations in anything pertaining to human or divine affairs, contrary to the popular views. In this regard, nothing can be more pernicious either with respect to truth, security or renown. In addition to this, they introduce into the minds of the general people obscurity and confusion. Of this kind are all doctrines that teach either that there is no God, or if there is, that he is not affected towards the human race so as to regard it with providential care, but despises and deserts it. In men such doctrines produce folly and injustice to a degree that is inexpressible. Any anarchist who has dismissed fear of disobedience to the laws violates them with wanton boasts. Hence the necessity of political and traditionally venerable principles, adapted to the speakers' disposition, free from any insincerity. Thus what is said exhibits the speakers' manners. The laws will inevitably introduce security if the polity is organized on lines of natural laws and not on the unnatural. From a tyranny cities derive no advantage, and very little from an oligarchy. The first need, therefore, is a kingdom, and the second is an aristocracy.

For a kingdom, indeed, is as it were an image of God, and which is with difficulty preserved and defended by the human soul. For it rapidly degenerates into luxury and insolence. Hence it is not proper to employ a kingdom universally, but only so far as it may be useful to the state, and an aristocracy should be liberally mingled with it, as this consists of many rulers who emulate each other and often govern alternately. There must also be democratic elements, for as a citizen is part of the whole state he should receive a reward from it. Yet he must be sufficiently restrained, for the common people are bold and rash.

***

By a necessity of nature, everything mortal is subject to changes, some improving, others growing worse. Things born increase until they arrive at their consummation, whereafter they age and perish. Things that grow of themselves by the same nature decay into the hidden beyond and then return to mortality through transformation of growth; then, by repeated decay, retrograde into another cycle. Sometimes, when houses or cities have attained the peak of supreme happiness, in exuberant wealth, they have, through a welling up of insolent self-satisfaction, through human folly, perished together with their vaunted possessions.

Thus every human empire has shown three distinct stages of growth, fruition and destruction. For in the beginning, being destitute of goods, empires are engrossed in acquisition, but after they become wealthy they perish. Such things, therefore, as are under the dominion of the Gods, being incorruptible, are preserved through the whole of time by incorruptible natures; but such things as are under the government of men, being mortal, from mortals receive perpetual disturbance. The end of self-satisfaction and insolence is destruction, but poverty and narrow circumstances often result in a strenuous and worthy life. Not poverty alone, but many other things bring human life to an end.

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DIOTOGENES:

ON SANCTITY AND CONCERNING A KINGDOM

ON SANCTITY

IT IS NECESSARY that the laws should not be enclosed in houses, or by gates, but in the manners of the citizens. What, therefore, is the basic principle of any state? The education of the youth. For vines will never bear useful fruit unless they are well cultivated; nor will horses ever excel, unless they are properly trained. Recently ripened fruit grows similar to its surroundings. With utmost prudence do men study how to prune and tend the vines, but to things pertaining to the education of their species they behave rashly and negligently, though neither vines nor wine govern men, but man and the soul of man. The nurture of a plant, indeed, we commit to an expert who is supposed to deserve no less then two minae a day, but the education of our youth we commit to some Illyrian or Thracian who is worthless. As the earliest legislators could not render the middle class of society stable, they prescribed [in the curriculum] dancing and rhythm, which instills motion and order, and besides these they added sports, some of which induced fellowship, but others truth and mental keenness. For those who through intoxication or guzzling had committed any crime, they prescribed the pipe and harmony, which by maturing and refining the manners so shaped the mind that it became capable of being adorned.

***

It is well to invoke God at the beginning and end both of supper and dinner, not because he is in want of anything of the kind, but in order that the soul may be transfigured by the recollection of divinity. For since we proceed from him, and participate in a divine nature, we should honor him. Since also God is just, we should act justly in all things.

In the next place, there are four causes which terminate all things and bring them to an end -- namely nature, law, art and fortune. Nature is admittedly the principle of all things. Law is the inspective guardian and creator of all things that change manners into political concord. Art is justly said to be the mother and guide of things consummated through human prudence. But of things which accidentally happen to the worthy and unworthy, the cause is ascribed to fortune, which does not produce anything orderly, prudent, moderate or controlled.

CONCERNING A KINGDOM

A KING SHOULD BE ONE who is most just; and he will be most just who most closely attends to the laws. Without justice it is impossible to be a king, and without law there can be no justice. For justice is such only through law, justice's effective cause. A king is either animated by law, or a legal ruler, when he will be most just and observant of the laws. There are however three peculiar employments of a king: leading an army, administering justice, and worshipping the Gods. He will be able to lead an army properly only if he knows how to carry on war properly. He will be skilled in administering justice and in governing all his subjects, only if he has well learned the nature of justice and law. He will worship the Gods in a pious and holy manner only if he has diligently considered the nature and virtue of God. So a good king must necessarily be a good general, judge and priest, which things are inseparable from the goodness and virtue of a king. It is the pilot's business to preserve the ship, the charioteer's to preserve the chariot, and the physician's to save the sick; but it is a king's or a general's business to save those who are in danger in battle. For a leader must also be a provident inspector and preserver. While judicial affairs are in general everybody's interest, this is the special work of a king who, like a God, is a world-leader and protector. While the whole state should be generally organized in a unitary manner, under unitary leadership, individual parts should accord with the same harmony and be submissive to the supreme domination. Besides-though the king should oblige and benefit his subjects, this should not be in contempt of justice and law. The third characteristic of a king' s dignity is the worship of the Gods. The most excellent should be worshipped by the most excellent, and the leader and ruler by that which leads and rules. Of naturally most honorable things, God is the best, but of things on the earth and human, a king is the supreme. As God is to the world, so is a king to his kingdom; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God. For a city, indeed, being organized from things many and various, imitates the organization of the world and its harmony; but a king whose rule is beneficent, and who himself is animated by law, exhibits the form of God among men.

***

It is hence necessary that a king should not be overcome by pleasure, but that he should overcome it; that he should not resemble, but excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the achievement of character. Likewise, he who rules others should be able first to govern his own passions.

As to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed that a king ought to be wealthy so as to benefit his friends, relieve those in want, and justly punish his enemies. Most delightful is the enjoyment of wealth in conjunction with virtue. So also concerning the preeminence of a king, for since he always surpasses others in virtue, a judgment of his empire might be formed with reference to virtue, and not to riches, power, or military strength. Riches he possesses in common with anyone of his subjects; power, in common with animals; and military strength in common with tyrants. But virtue is the prerogative of good men; hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and sagacious in government, he will in reality be a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire to accumulate the superfluous subsists with the irrational part of the soul, for desire is not rational. But ambition and ferocity cling to the irascible part, for this is the spirited and strenuous part of the soul. The love of pleasure clings to the passionate part, which is effeminate and yielding. Injustice, however, which is the supreme vice, is composite, and clings to the whole soul. The king should therefore organize the well- legislated city like a lyre, first in himself establishing the justest boundary and order of law, knowing that the people's proper arrangement should be organized according to this interior boundary, the divinity having given him dominion over them. The good king should also establish proper positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, behaving in a cultured manner, seriously and earnestly, lest he seem either rough or abject to the multitude, but showing agreeable and easy manners. These things he will obtain if in the first place his aspect and discourse are worthy of respect, and if he appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses; in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign in behavior to those he may meet, from his countenance and beneficence; and in the third place, if his hatred of depravity is formidable, by the punishment he inflicts thereon, from his quickness in inflicting it, and in short from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being something which imitates divinity, is capable of winning for him the admiration and honor of the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. His formidableness will frighten his enemies and save him from being conquered, and make him magnanimous and confident to his friends.

His gravity, however, should have no abject or vulgar element; it should be admirable, and worthy of the dignity of rule and sceptre. He should never contend with his inferiors or equals, but with those greater than himself; and, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, he should count those pleasures greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications, separating himself indeed from human passions and approximating the Gods -- not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and the invincible preeminence of virtue. Hence he should invest his aspect and reasonings with such a gracefulness and majesty, and also in his mental conceptions and soul-manners, in his actions, and body motions and gestures, that those who observe him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a dignified disposition. A good king should be able to charm those who behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract those that hear them. Enough about the venerable gravity of a king.

I must now mention his benignity. Generally, any king who is just, equitable and beneficent will be benign. Justice is a connective and collective communion, and is that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those near us. As rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so justice is to diplomacy, since it is the governors' and the governed's common good, harmonizing political society. But justice has two fell administrators, equity and benignity, the former softening severity of punishment, the latter extending pardon to the less guilty offenders. A good king must extend assistance to those in need of it and be beneficent, and this assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible manner. Besides, this beneficence should not be hypocritical regarding the honor to be derived therefrom, but come from the deliberate choice of the giver. Towards all men a king should conduct himself so as to avoid being troublesome to them, especially to men of inferior rank and of slender fortune, for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to the Gods, especially resembling Zeus, the universal ruler, who is venerable and honorable through the magnanimous preeminence of virtue. He is benign because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; hence, by the Ionic poet [Homer], he is said to be father of men and Gods. He is also eminently terrible, punishing the unjust, reigning and ruling over all things. In his hand he carries thunder, as a symbol of his formidable excellence.

All these particulars remind us that a kingdom is something resembling the divine.

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THEAGES:

ON THE VIRTUES

THE SOUL is divided into reasoning power, anger and desire. Reasoning power rules knowledge, anger deals with impulse, and desire bravely rules the soul's affections. When these three parts unite into one action, exhibiting a composite energy, then in the soul results concord and virtue. When sedition divides them, then discord and vice appear. [1] Virtue therefore contains three elements: reason, power, and deliberate choice. The soul's reasoning power's virtue is wisdom, which is a habit of contemplating and judging. The irascible part's virtue is courage, which is a habit of enduring dreadful things, and resisting them. The appetitive part's virtue is temperance, which is a moderation and detention of the pleasures which arise from the body. The whole soul's virtue is justice, for men indeed become bad either through vice, or through incontinence, or through a natural ferocity. They injure each other either through gain, pleasure or ambition. More appropriately therefore does vice belong to the soul's reasoning part. While prudence is similar to good art, vice resembles bad art, inventing contrivances to act unjustly. Incontinence pertains to the soul's appetitive part, as continence consists in subduing, and incontinence in failure to subdue, pleasures. Ferocity belongs to the soul's irascible part, for when someone activated by evil desires is gratified not as man should be, but as a beast would be, then this is called ferocity.

The effects of these dispositions also result from the things for the sake of which they are performed. Vice, hailing from the soul's reasoning part, ends in covetousness; the irascible part's fault is ambition, which results in ferocity; and as the appetitive part ends in pleasure, this generates incontinence. As unjust actions are the results of so many causes, so also are just deeds; for virtue is as naturally beneficent and profitable as vice is maleficent and harmful.

Since, however, one part of the soul leads while the others follow, and since the virtues and vices subsist about these and in these, it is evident that with respect to the virtues also, some are leaders and others followers, while others are compounds of these. The leaders are such as wisdom, the followers being courage and temperance, and their composites include justice. Now the virtues subsist in and about the passions, so we may call the latter the matter of the former. Of the passions, one is voluntary, and the other involuntary, pleasure being the voluntary, and pain the involuntary. Men who have the political virtues increase and decrease these, organizing the other parts of the soul to that which possesses reason. The desirable point of this adaptation is that intellect should not be prevented from accomplishing its proper work, either by lack or by excess. We adapt the less good to that which is more so, and in the world every part that is always passive subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. In the conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male, for the latter sows, generating a soul, while the former also imparts matter to that which is generated. In the soul, the irrational subsists for the sake of the rational part. Anger and desire are organized in dependence on the first part of the soul; the former as a satellite and guardian of the body, the latter as a dispenser and provider of necessary wants. Intellect, being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent, investigates the wisdom of real beings. This indeed is its natural function, to investigate and obtain possession of the truth, and to follow those beings which are more excellent and honorable than itself. For the knowledge of things divine and most honorable is the principle, cause and rule of human blessedness.

***

The principles of all virtue are three: knowledge, power and deliberate choice. Knowledge indeed is that by which we contemplate and form a judgment of things; power is a certain strength of nature from which we derive our subsistence, and which gives stability to our actions; and deliberate choice is, as it were, the hand of the soul by which we are impelled to, and lay hold on, the objects of our choice.

The soul is divided into reasoning power, anger and desire. Reasoning power rules knowledge, anger deals with impulse, and desire bravely rules the soul's affections. When these three parts unite into one action, exhibiting a composite energy, then concord and virtue result in the soul. When sedition divides them, then discord and vice appear.

When the reasoning power prevails over the irrational part of the soul, then endurance and continence are produced; endurance indeed in the retention of pains, but continence in the absence of pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul prevail over the reasoning part of the soul, then are produced effeminacy in flying from pain, and incontinence in being vanquished by the pleasures. When however the better part of the soul prevails, the less excellent part is governed; the former leads, and the latter follows, and both consent and agree, and then in the whole soul is generated virtue and all the goods. Again, when the appetitive part of the soul follows the reasoning, then is produced temperance; when this is the case with the irascible, courage appears; and when it takes place in all the parts of the soul, then the result is justice. Justice is that which separates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each other. Justice is an established order and organization of the parts of the soul, and the perfect and supreme virtue; in this every good is contained, while the other goods of the soul cannot subsist without it. Hence Justice possesses great influence both among Gods and men. It contains the bond by which the whole and the universe are held together, and also that by which the Gods and men are connected. [2] Among the celestials it is called Themis, and among the terrestrials it is called Dike, while among men it is called the Law. These are but symbols indicative that justice is the supreme virtue: Virtue, therefore, when it consists in contemplating and judging, is called wisdom; when in sustaining dreadful things, is called courage; when in restraining pleasure, it is called temperance; and when in abstaining from injuring our neighbors, justice.

Obedience to virtue according to, and transgression thereof contrary to right reason, tends toward decorousness, and its opposite. Propriety is that which ought to be. This requires neither addition nor detraction, being what it should be. The improper is of two kinds: excess and defect. The excess is over-scrupulousness, and its deficiency, laxity. Virtue however is a habit of propriety. Hence it is both a climax and a medium of which are proper things. They are media because they fall between excess and deficiency; they are climaxes because they endure neither increase nor decrease, being just what they ought to be.

***

Since however the virtue of manners consists in dealing the the passions, over which pleasure and pain are supreme, virtue evidently does not consist in extirpating the passions of the soul, pleasure and pain, but in regulating them. So too health, which is an adjustment of the bodily powers, does not consist in expelling the cold and the hot, the moist and the dry, but in adjusting them suitably and symmetrically. Likewise in music, concord does not consist in expelling the sharp and the flat, but in exterminating dissonance by concord arising from their adjustment. Therefore it is the harmonious adjustment of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, which produces health and destroys disease. Thus by the mutual adjustment of anger and desire the vices and other passions are extirpated, while virtues and good manners are induced. Now the greatest peculiarity of the virtue of manners in beauty of conduct is deliberate choice. Reasoning and power may be used without virtue, but deliberate choice cannot be used without it, for deliberate choice inspires dignity of manners.

When the reasoning power by force subdues anger and desire it produces continence and endurance. Again, when the reasoning force is dethroned violently by the irrational parts, then result incontinence and effeminacy. Such dispositions of the soul as these are half-perfect virtues and vices. For [according to its nature] the reasoning power of the soul induces health, while the irrational induces disease. So far as anger and desire are governed and led by the soul's rational part, continence and endurance become virtues; but in so far as this is affected by violence, involuntarily, thus become vices. For virtue must carry out what is proper not with pain but pleasure. So far as anger and desire rule the reasoning power, there is produced effeminacy and incontinence, which are vices; but in so far as they gratify the passions with pain, knowing that they are erroneous, in consequence of the eye of the soul being healthy-so far as this is the case, they are not vices. Hence it is evident that virtue must voluntarily do what is proper, as the involuntary implies pain and fear, while the voluntary implies pleasure and delight.

This may be corroborated by division. Knowledge and perception of things are the province of the rational part of the soul, while power pertains to the irrational part whose peculiarity is inability to resist pain or to vanquish pleasure. In both of these, the rational and the irrational, subsists deliberate choice, which consists of intention and appetite, intention pertaining to the rational part, and appetite to the irrational. Hence every virtue consists in a mutual adaptation of the soul's parts, while both will and deliberate choice subsist entirely in virtue.

***

In general, therefore, virtue is a mutual adaptation of the irrational part of the soul to the rational. Virtue, however, is produced through pleasure and pain, receiving the boundary of that which is fit. For true virtue is nothing else than the habit of that which is fit. But the fit, or the decorous, is that which ought to be, and the unfit, or the indecorous, it that which ought not to be. Of the indecorous, however, there are two species, excess and defect. And excess, indeed, is more than is fit, but defect is less than is fit. But since the fit is that which ought to be, it is both a summit and a middle. It is a summit, indeed, because it neither requires ablation nor addition; but it is a middle because it subsists between excess and defect. The fit and the unfit are to each other as the equal and the unequal, as the ordered and the disordered, of which the two former are limited, and the two later unlimited. On this account the parts of the unequal are referred to the middle, but not to each other. An angle greater than a right angle is called obtuse, the acute one being less than it. [In a circle] also, the right line is greater than the radius drawn from the center. Any day beyond the equinox is greater than it. Too much heat or cold produce diseases. Overheatedness exceeds the mean, which frigidity does not attain.

This same analogy holds good in connection with the soul. Audacity is an excess of propriety in the endurance of things of a dreadful nature, while timidity is a deficiency. Prodigality is an excess of proper expenditure of money, while illiberality is its deficiency. Rage is an excess of the proper use of the soul's irascible part, while insensibility is the corresponding deficiency. The same reasoning applies to the opposition of the other dispositions of the soul.

Since however virtue is a habit of propriety, and a medium of the passions, it should be neither wholly impassive, nor immoderately passive. Impassivity causes unimpelledness of the soul and lack of enthusiasm for the beautiful in conduct, while immoderate passivity perturbs the soul, and makes it inconsiderate. We should then, in virtue, see passion as shadow and outline in a picture which depends on animation and delicacy, imitating the truth, in conjunction with goodness of coloring. The soul's passions are animated by the natural incitation and enthusiasm of virtue, which is generated from the passions, and subsisting with them. Similarly, harmony includes the sharp and the flat, and mixtures consist of heat and cold, and equilibrium results from weight and lightness. Therefore, neither would it be necessary nor profitable to remove the passions of the soul; but they must be mutually adjusted to the rational part, under the direction of propriety and moderation.

_______________

Notes:

1. These initial lines are repeated at the beginning of the next fragment.

2. Cf. Plato, Gorgias 507E.

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THE PREFACE TO THE LAWS OF ZALEUCUS THE LOCRIAN

ALL INHABITANTS OF CITY OR COUNTRY should in the first place be firmly persuaded of the existence of divinities as result of their observation of the heavens and the world, and the orderly arrangement of the beings contained therein. These are not the productions of chance or of men. We should reverence and honor them as causes of every reasonable good. We should therefore prepare our souls so they may be free from vice, for the Gods are not honored by the worship of a bad man, nor through sumptuosity of offerings, nor with the tragic expense of a depraved man, but by virtue and the deliberate choice of good and beautiful deeds. All of us, therefore, should be as good as possible, both in actions and deliberate choice, if we wish to be dear to divinity. We should not fear the loss of money more than that of renown; such people should be considered the better citizens.

Those who do not easily feel so impelled, and whose soul is easily excited to injustice, are invited to consider the following. They and their fellow-residents of a house should remember that there are Gods who punish the unjust, and should remember that no one escapes the final liberation from life. For in the supreme moment they will repent, from remembering their unjust deeds, and wishing that their deeds had been just. Every one in every action should be mindful of this time as if it were present, which is a powerful incentive to honesty and justice.

Should anyone feel the presence of an evil spirit, tempting him to injustice, he should go into a temple, remain at the altar, or into sacred groves, flying from injustice as from an impious and harmful mistress, supplicating the divinities to cooperate with him in turning it away from himself. He should also seek the company of men known for their virtue, in order to hear them discourse about a blessed life and the punishment of bad men, that he may be deterred from bad deeds, dreading none but the avenging divinities.

Citizens should honor all the Gods according to the particular country's legal rites, which should be considered as the most beautiful of all. Citizens should, besides obeying the laws, show their respect for the rulers by rising before them and obeying their instructions. Men who are intelligent and wish to be saved should, after the Gods, divinities and heroes, most honor parents, laws and rulers.

Let none love his city better than his country, the indignation of whose Gods he would thus be exciting; for such conduct is the beginning of treachery. For a man to leave his country and reside in a foreign land is something most afflicting and unbearable; for nothing is more kindred to us than our native land. Nor let anyone consider a naturalized citizen an implacable enemy; for a person who thinks thus can neither judge nor govern properly, for his anger predominates over his reason. Likewise, let no one speak ill either of the whole city or of a private citizen.

Let the guardians of the laws keep a watchful eye over offenders, first by admonishing them, and if that is not sufficient, by punishment. Should any established law seem unsatisfactory, let it be changed into a better one; but whichever remain should be universally obeyed, for the breaking of established laws is neither beautiful nor beneficial, though it is both beautiful and beneficial to be restrained by a more excellent law, as if vanquished thereby.

Transgressors of established laws should however be punished, as promoting anarchy, which is the greatest evil. The magistrates should neither be arrogant, nor judge insultingly, nor in passing sentence regard friendship or hate, being partial, thus deciding more justly and being worthy of the magistracy. Slaves should do what is just through fear, but free men through shame, and for the sake of beauty in conduct. Governors should be men of this kind to arouse reverence.

Anyone who wishes to change anyone of the established laws, or to introduce another law, should put a halter around his neck and address the people. And if from the suffrages it should appear that the established law should be dissolved, or that a new law should be introduced, let him not be punished. But if it should appear that the preexisting law is better, or that the new proposition is unjust, let him who wishes to change an old or introduce a new law be executed by the halter.

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THE PREFACE TO THE LAWS OF CHARONDAS THE CATANEAN

FROM THE GODS should begin any deliberation or performance, for according to the old proverb, "God should be the cause of all our deliberation and works." Further, we should abstain from base actions, especially if we desire to consult with the Gods, for there is no communication between God and the unjust.

Next, everyone should help himself, inciting himself to the undertaking and performance of such things as are conformable to his abilities, for it seems sordid and illiberal for a man to extend himself similarly to small and great undertakings. You should carefully avoid rushing into things too extensive, or of too great an importance. In every undertaking you should measure your own desert and power, so as to succeed and gain credit.

A man or woman condemned by the city should not be assisted by anybody; anyone who should associate with him should be disgraced, as similar to the condemned. But it is well to love men who have been voted approved, and to associate with them to imitate and acquire similar virtue and honor, thus being initiated in the greatest and most perfect of the mysteries, for no man is perfect without virtue.

Assistance should be given to an injured citizen whether he is in his own or in a foreign country. But let every stranger who was venerated in his own country, and conformably to the proper laws of that country, be received or dismissed with auspicious cordiality, calling to mind hospitable Zeus as a God who is established by all nations in common, and who is the inspective guardian of hospitality and inhospitality.

Let the older men preside over the younger so that the latter may be deterred from, and be ashamed of vice, through reverence and fear of the former. For where the elders are shameless, so also are their children and grandchildren. Shamelessness and impudence result in insolence and injustice, and of this the end is death.

Let none be impudent, but rather modest and temperate; for he will thus earn the propitiousness of the Gods, and for himself achieve salvation. But no vicious man is dear to divinity. Let everyone honor probity and truth, hating what is base and false. These are the indications of virtue and vice. From their very youth children should therefore be accustomed [to worthy manners] by punishing those who love falsehood and delighting those who love the truth, so as to implant in each what is most beautiful, and most prolific of virtue.

Each citizen should be more anxious for a reputation for temperance than for wisdom, the pretense of which often indicates ignorance of probity and is also a sign of cowardliness. The pretense to temperance should lead to a possession of it; for no one should feign with his tongue that he performs beautiful deeds when destitute of worthiness and good intentions.

Men should preserve kindness towards their rulers, obeying and venerating them as if they were parents; for whoever cannot see the propriety of this will suffer the punishment of bad counsels from the divinities who are the inspective guardians of the seat of the empire. Rulers are the guardians of the city, and of the safety of the citizens.

Governors must preside justly over their subjects in a manner similar to that over their own children, in passing sentences on others, and in propitiating hatred and anger.

Praise and renown is due the rich who have assisted the indigent; they should be considered saviors of the children and defenders of their country. The wants of those who are poor through bad fortune should be relieved, but not the wants resulting from indolence or intemperance. While fortune is common to all men, indolence and intemperance is peculiar to bad men.

Let it be considered as a worthy deed to point out anyone who has acted unjustly, in order that the state may be saved, having many guardians of its proprieties. Let the informer be considered a pious man, though his information affect his most familiar acquaintance; for nothing is more intimate or kindred to a man than his country. However let not the information regard things done through involuntary ignorance, but of such crimes as have been committed from a previous knowledge of their enormity. A criminal who shows enmity to the informer should be generally despised, that he may suffer the punishment of ingratitude, through which he deprives himself of being cured of the greatest of diseases, namely injustice.

Further, let contempt of the Gods be considered as the greatest of iniquities, including voluntary injury to parents, neglecting of rulers and laws, and voluntary dishonoring of justice. Let him be considered as a most just and holy citizen who honors these things, and indicates to the rulers and the citizens those that despise them.

Let it be esteemed more honorable for a man to die for his country than, through a desire of life, to desert it, along with honor; for it is better to die well than to live basely and disgracefully.

We should honor each of the dead not with tears or lamentations, but with good remembrance, and with an oblation of annual fruits. For when we grieve immoderately for the dead we are ungrateful to the terrestrial divinities.

Let no one curse him by whom he has been injured; praise is more divine than defamation.

He who is superior to anger should be considered a better citizen than he who thereby offends.

Not praiseworthy, but shameful is it to surpass temples and palaces in the sumptuousness of one's expense. Nothing private should be more magnificent and venerable than things of a public nature.

Let him who is a slave to wealth and money be despised as cowardly and illiberal, being impressed by sumptuous possessions yet leading a tragic and vile life. The magnanimous man foresees all human concerns and is not disturbed by any accident of fortune.

Let no one speak obscenely, lest his thoughts lead him to base deeds and defile his soul with impudence. Proper and lovely things it is well and legal to advertise, but such things are honored by being kept silent. It is base even to mention something disgraceful.

Let everyone dearly love his lawful wife and beget children by her. But let none shed the seed due his children into any other person, and let him not disgrace that which is honorable by both nature and law. For nature produced the seed for the sake of producing children, and not for the sake of lust.

A wife should be chaste and refuse impious connection with other men, for otherwise she will subject herself to the vengeance of the daimons, whose office it is to expel those to whom they are hostile from their houses, and to produce hatred.

He who gives a step-mother to his children should not be praised, but disgraced as the cause of domestic dissension.

As it is proper to observe these mandates, let him who transgresses them be subjected to political execration.

The law also orders that these introductory suggestions be known by all the citizens, and should be read in the festivals after the hymns to Apollo called paeons, by him who is appointed for this purpose by the master of the feast, so that the precepts may germinate in the minds of all who hear them.

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CALLICRATIDAS:

ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES

THE UNIVERSE MUST BE CONSIDERED as a system of kindred communion or association. But every system consists of certain dissimilar contraries, and is organized with reference to one particular thing, which is the most excellent, and also with a view to benefit the majority. What we call a choir is a system of musical communion in view of one common thing, a concert of voices. Further, a ship's construction plan contains many dissimilar contrary things which are arranged with reference to one thing which is best-the pilot, and the common advantage of a prosperous voyage.

Now a family is also a system of kindred communion, consisting of dissimilar proper parts organized in view of the best thing, the father of the family, the common advantage being unanimity. In the same manner as a zither, every family requires three things: apparatus, organization, and a certain manner of practice or musical use. An apparatus -- being the composition of all its parts -- is that from which the whole, and the whole system of kindred communion, derives its consummation. A family is divided into two divisions, man and the possessions, which latter is the thing governed which affords utility. Thus also, an animal's first and greatest parts are soul and body: soul being that which governs and uses, the body being that which is governed and affords utility. Possessions indeed are the advantageous instruments of human life, while the body is a tool born along with the soul, and kindred to it. Of the persons that complete a family, some are relatives and others only attracted acquaintances. The former are born from the same blood or race, but the latter are of an accidental alliance commencing with the communion of wedlock. These are either fathers or brothers, or maternal and paternal grandfathers, or other relatives by marriage. But if the good arising from friendship is also to be referred to a family -- for thus it will become greater and more magnificent, not only through an abundance of wealth and many relations, but also through numerous friends -- in this case it is evident that the family will thus become more ample, and that friendship is a social relation essential to a family. Possessions are either necessary or desirable. The necessary subserve the wants of life; the desirable produce an elegant and well-ordered life. However, whatever exceeds what is not needed for an elegant and well-ordered life are the roots of wantonness, insolence and destruction. Great possessions swell out with pride and this leads to arrogance and fastidiousness, conceiving that their kindred, nation and tribe do not equal them. Fastidiousness leads to insolence, whose end is destruction. Wherever then in family or city there is a superfluity of possessions, the legislator must cut off and amputate the superfluities, as a good husbandman prunes luxurious leafage.

In the family's domestic part there are three divisions: the governor (the husband), the governed (the wife), and the auxiliary (the offspring).

***

With respect to practical and rational domination, one kind is despotic, another protective, and another political. The despotic is that which governs with a view to the advantage of the governor, and not of the governed, as a master rules his slaves or a tyrant his subjects. But the guardian domination subsists for the sake of the governed and not the governor, as the masseurs rule the athletes, physicians rule over the sick, and instructors rule over their pupils. Their labors are not directed to their own advantage but to the benefit of those they govern: those of the physician being undertaken for the sake of the sick, that of the masseurs for the sake of exercising somebody else's body, and those of the erudite for the ignorant. Political domination, however, aims at the common benefit of both governors and governed. For in human affairs, according to this domination, are organized both a family and a city: just as the world and divine affairs are in correspondence, a family and a city stand in relation analogous to the government of the world. Divinity indeed is the principle of nature, and his attention is directed neither to his own advantage, nor to private good, but to that of the public. That is why the world is called cosmos, from the orderly disposition of all things, which are mutually organized with reference to the most excellent thing -- God -- who, according to our notions of him, is a celestial living being, incorruptible, and the principle and cause of the orderly disposition of wholes.

Since therefore the husband rules over the wife, he rules with a power either despotic, protective, or political. Despotic power is out of the question, as he diligently attends to her welfare; nor is it protective entirely, for he has to consider himself also. It remains therefore that he rules over her with a political power, according to which both the governor and the governed seek the common advantage. Hence wedlock is established with a view to the communion of life. Those husbands that govern their wives despotically are by them hated; those that govern them protectively are despised, being as it were mere appendages and flatterers of their wives. But those that govern them politically are both admired and beloved. Both these will be effected if he who governs exercises his power so that it may be mingled with pleasure and veneration: pleasure being produced from his fondness, but veneration from his doing nothing vile or abject.

***

He who wishes to marry ought to take for a wife one whose fortune is conformable to his own, neither above nor beneath, but of equal property. Those who marry a woman above their condition have to contend for the mastership; for the wife, surpassing her husband in wealth and lineage, wishes to rule over him, but he considers it to be unworthy of him and unnatural to submit to his wife. But those who marry a wife beneath their condition subvert the dignity and reputation of their family. One should imitate the musician who, having learned the proper tone of his voice, moderates it so as to be neither sharp nor flat, nor broken, nor strident. So wedlock should be adjusted to the tone of the soul, so that the husband and wife may accord, not only in prosperity, but also in adversity. The husband should be his wife's regulator, master and preceptor: regulator, in paying diligent attention to his wife's affairs; master, in governing and exercising authority over her; and preceptor in teaching her such things as are fitting for her to know. This will be specially effected by him who, directing his attention to worthy parents, from their family marries a virgin in the flower of her youth. Such virgins are easily fashioned and docile, and are naturally well disposed to be instructed by, and to fear and love their husbands.