Part 5 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[English Version by Google Translate]
2.a Whatever God does, not of himself, independently, before the will, the determination of the first being, is good: therefore God works because he so wills; and from this alone what he does is good; not because he chooses something that is good in itself.
These two propositions at first sight of the essence of the goodness of things [Bayle; Rep. or quest etc. T. 2, ch. 89, p. 202-207.] can be seen as adversaries in themselves: when carefully considered, they supply the foundation, whatever they would decry against the Creator of creatures, likening them to philosophers, on whom the truth and only goodness of things rests. The supreme being and the truth, the essential goodness, are one and the same: God is not distinguished by his attributes; and nothing, neither of time nor of nature, can be supposed to have priority before him. The will of God and the essence of things are interchangeable. He therefore wills what is essentially good, and that essentially because he wills; it is good. No external matter, reason outside itself, can be brought to action; since he is and ought to be said to be whole in himself, perfect, absolute, whole, deficient in nothing. Man, being a partial being, consults, follows, and is guided in his actions by the external, proposed norm, idea, rule of truth and equity offered to him [Guill, King feels otherwise: lib. city subsection 5, p. 167, 168, etc.]. That particular idea is the essential part of the idea which God, looking at himself, looks at.
Therefore things are true and good, because God knows them, and wills them to be good; but God does not know or will them to be true and good, because in themselves, when they are nothing in themselves, and they are true and good first from the action of God.
At the same time, it must be admitted that, having penetrated more deeply into the matter, we are properly dealing here with a pure question of words: when on both sides the absolute operation of God, and independent of any external being, is recognized. A difference arises from the natural to the human mind and its mode of action with reason, respect, careless consideration. We openly confess that God is superior to all, willing to be assigned to none; the fact, however, that we should not tacitly measure its operations from our intelligence, and imagine it from our nature, does not prevent it.
This consideration is to be applied to the opinions of the author, according to which man is to share in the principle of this choice that pleases him, that is, to bring about conformity and goodness in things by willing [Lib. city subsection 5, p. 167-184]; happiness is shown to be in elections [Id. Sect. 2, p. 185-190.]: how evil choices are reconciled with divine power and goodness 3 [Id. Sect. 5, p. 198.]: why did God create free agents... without free agents the whole world would have been a mere machine... nothing powerful in itself... the entire work of God could not have elicited a single action from itself, but all in itself stupid and the brute....how much the world constructed in this way would fail from the present, (he says) it is not necessary to say, nor how foolish and unworthy of God....natural evils are greater than natural....it is better for some to sin sometimes, and to suffer trouble from the consciousness of sin, which all in all things fear, waver, and be anxious, nay, generally cease from all action4 [King; book city chap. 5, sect. 5, subsection 3, p. 202, 203, 207, 216.]: why does not God interpose his omnipotence and, when necessary, check the will from wrong choice (namely, more and more serious evils will befall the universe of things from such an interposition than from the abuse of free will); But the difficulty of how the contingency of things agrees with divine foreknowledge does not lead to the authorship of this passage; for, he says, he would demand a complete bill [King; book city Sect. 5, subsection 1, 2, p. 198-217; subsection 3, p. 217-238.]: why does God not transfer a man to another place, where he would encounter nothing to tempt him to do evil2 [Id. subsection 5, p. 239, 240.]: To always choose God the least of the evils3 [Id. subsection 7, p. 256, 257]; It is permitted to men to use their free will badly: and it is necessary; that God might endure that, or a greater inconvenience; and whatever is said about inflicting punishments4 [Id. appendix on divine laws, sect. 1-3, p. 261-281.].
There is nothing in the thoughts, expositions, or answers of the bishop of Derenis, except in a human way, the action of a rational creature consistent with death, taken from accidents, from contingencies. The matter, the question of the origin of evil, the reconciliation of the attributes of God with the free will of man, and the just retribution of reward or punishment; not in itself, independent of its consequences, it is treated, elucidated.
But in order that the author's method of reasoning may be known, I would like to add the following.
"As he says, 5 [Lib. cit. ch. 5, sect. 5, subsect. 7, No. X, p. 257, 258.] I feel I should say, boldly but with reverence, that God is not infinitely powerful , nor would it have been GOOD if nothing that we call evil had been possible. For there are some possible things which do not at all stand together, nay, oppose and destroy each other, that is, they are evil to each other; if God could do none of these things, how infinitely would he be powerful, since he could not do all possible things? , besides God
Rectd at all. But why is punishment inflicted if it cannot be done otherwise? If, therefore, the divine goodness had denied that created things were HIS (man's free will even with abuse) because of evil attachments, he would have been truly envious, since he had indulged no one but himself.
What a repulsive and irreverent manner of speaking of God!
And while he willed no evil, he would reject all good.
Let him who can see the consequence, at least the necessary one.
This argument of Herculean, on which the Epicureans relied to lift up the god, and the Manichaeans posited the evil, vanishes.
It was more fitting for a learned and prudent bishop to worship the god in silence, than to provide a defense with the paradoxical arguments of his operations, exposed to the usual and new difficulties.
I will put an end to this discussion of the origin of evil, by the opinion of Arnald, the greatest man with every exception, interspersed with the opinions of some other famous [Arnauld.] philosophers, and adding opinions.
Portus Regius is recalled to memory by the name of this supreme theologian as well as philosopher, the support given by divine providence to the religion which was flourishing in Gaul.
There, scorning the world's allurements, riches, honours, even [Port Royal.] wit, gifted with fame, hard and continuous, in diet, clothing, bed, sleep, silence, under a director marked by piety and knowledge of the human heart, Mr. Singlin, penitence habit, constant reading of divine books, Fathers of the Church, councils, and meditation on spiritual matters, care for the poor, even the education of the young, the life of the early days of the Church, free movement of mind, bound by no vows, they offered, individually, collectively, for by the kind of office, the inhabitants, from whatever, even the most eminent, the most noble conditions, the estates of the origin of the Solitary.
There, with perpetual adoration of the Supreme Being, devoted both to the education of girls and the relief of the poor, praising God with an angelic and perpetual concert of voices, with a humble, pure, penitent heart and body, with burning vows, prayers, giving thanks to heaven on earth, having mercy on the world, asking God for forgiveness consecrated virgins
There were distinguished men of heavenly learning and piety, and no less learned men of the world's sciences (Arnauld, Nicole, Lemaitre de Sacy, Lancelot, Tillemont, le Tourneux, Pascal), under the first leader of the famous Abbot St. Cyran, who were all famous for marching against the teaching of morals. with the excessive help of the Society and its followers, they would eradicate errors, and with the precious grace that was effective in itself, the gratuitous predestination, the gratuitous help of God necessary for the good work, the sovereign love of God to obtain the forgiveness of sins required, finally, the supreme and absolute Creator's dominion over the creature, the dogmas, the audacity of the new Pelagians attacked . , they say.].
Among whom, as in St. Benedict's learned, erudite, pious family; Mabillonius and Montefalconius, Arnaldus and Nicolius hold the first, two olive trees and two candlesticks standing in front of the Lord on earth2[x]. Revelation 11:4] and above all the great Arnaldus, for three and fifty years with untiring labor and invincible spirit, defeating a group powerful, learned, gifted with talent, and not only necessarily endowed with the love of truth [Leibnitz; Theodicy T. 1, Pref. p. 40], as well as rebellious sects against the Church, and the pernicious opinions of men otherwise sublime, but deviating from the right path.
Of this kind was Mallebranchius, a high philosopher but not a theologian, by any means learned, a new system of nature and grace: the basis of which is, 1. the general action of God; 2,° optimism in itself, 3.° and above all as to the media2 [Oeuvr. of M. Arnauld, T. 39 (1781); Reflex philosophic and theologians sur le nouv. system de la nat. and of grace; liv. 1, ch. 1, p. 179, 181, 182.].
On the other hand, the perfection of the work, the greater means, the ways, the greater simplicity, in the judgment of all, Arnaldus considered preferable3 [Ibid. p. 182.]: moreover, 1. It is false that God, in the order of nature, does not act except as a universal cause; 2. In the creation of the world, God worked, not by simpler means, but by infinite power through particular wills, without any occasional causes terminating his general wills. 3.® in the preservation of the corporeal world f by particular, as well as general, wills to act; 4. In the order of nature, God, in things which are determined by free wills, uses particular wills4 [Id. p. 185.]: which he affirms to be asserted with scripture, and with human reason.
Now that it may be known what a profound as well as a wise philosopher thinks of the aid of reason in this matter, let us quote his words.
"If we had, says ARNALDUS5 [Ibid. ch. 11, p. 264.], no other light to judge the conduct of God in the world than the weakness of our reason, each would have more right of figure it as he would like, according to his imaginations and his thoughts. But God knows himself infinitely better than we can know him, and he has condescended to speak to men, as much through the ancient traditions as through the divine scriptures. it is therefore from him that we must learn how he governs what he has created....
And below:
"1 [Reflex. philosophiq. et theologiq. etc. liv. 1, ch. 15, p. 303, 304.] infinitely wise, who not only created the universe, but is also its sovereign administrator, that the manner in which he uses for the execution of his purposes all that is done in the world, even by free agents : but also nothing is more difficult to conceive, and it is the difficulty of granting this part of providence with the freedom of intelligent creatures, which causes it to be rejected by the impious, at the same time as all reasonable people recognize that we must believe and adore her, although we cannot understand her.
"M. Descartes, addit Arnaldus, gave us a fine example. Knowing, on the one hand, he says2 [And the very text of the distinguished philosopher, which Arnaldus summarizes: "But because what we have since known of God assures us that his power is so great that we would commit a crime to think that we had ever been able to do anything that he had not previously commanded, we could easily embarrass ourselves in very great difficulties if we undertook to accord the freedom of our will with its ordinances, and if we tried to understand, that is to say, to embrace, and as to limit with our understanding, the whole extent of our free will and the order of eternal providence. Whereas we will have no difficulty at all in freeing ourselves from it if we notice that our thought is finite, and that the omnipotence of God, by which he has not only known from all eternity what is or what which can be, but he also wanted it, is infinite. This means that we have enough intelligence to know clearly and distinctly that this power is in God, but that we do not have enough to understand its extent so much that we can know how it leaves the actions of men entirely free and indeterminate: and that on the other hand we are also so sure of the freedom and indifference that is within us, that there is nothing we know more clearly, so that the omnipotence of God does not owe us not prevent you from believing it; for we would be wrong to doubt what we perceive internally and which we know by experience to be in us, because we do not really understand something else which we know to be incomprehensible in its nature. The principles of philosophy, written in Latin by Rene Descartes, and translated into French by one of his friends (1647). go. 1, Nos. 40, 41, p. 27, 28."], that we are free, by the interior feeling which we have of our freedom; and not being able to doubt, on the other, when one knows God, that nothing is done in the world except he has not ordained, we would embarrass ourselves in insurmountable difficulties, if we undertook to accord the freedom of our will with his ordinances; because it would be necessary for that, that we could understand, that is to say, embrace and limit with our understanding, the extent of our freedom and that of the order of eternal providence, which, being infinite, could not be understood by a finite intelligence.
To this, and no wonder, the paraphrase is in harmony, so referring to it Leibnitzius calls [Theodic. T. 2, 3.e part. p. 169.], of the doctrine of Descartes, which he provides celeb. Cartesian King.
"Most philosophers, inquit2 [King; system of philosophers (1690) T. 1, metaphys. liv. 2, part. 2. ch. 22, p. 248. These words most... impiety... in the text, they end the quoted place.], have fallen into error, in that some, unable to understand the relationship between free actions and the providence of God, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of the actions of the free will, which is sacrilege; and others, not being able to conceive the relation which is between the efficacy of God and free actions, have denied that man was endowed with freedom, which is ungodliness. that we find between these two extremities, is to say that, if we could not understand all the relations which exist between freedom and the providence of God, we would not fail to be obliged to recognize that we are free and dependent of God; because these two truths are equally known, one by experience and the other by reason, and because prudence does not want us to abandon truths of which we are assured, because we cannot conceive of all the relationships they have with other known truths.
"M. Bayle, addit Leibnitzius, remarks very well in the margin that these expressions of M. Regis do not indicate that we know of the relations between the actions of man and the providence of God, which appear to us to be incompatible with freedom. He adds that these are careful expressions, which weaken the state of the question. The authors suppose (he says) that the difficulty comes only from the fact that we lack lights, instead that they should say that it comes mainly from the lights we have, and which we cannot grant1 [See the whole article of the Paulicians, in Bayli's dictionary. history critical (1730), T. 3, especially, p. 634 and M.] [ to the sentiment of M. Bayle] with our mysteries.
The greatest philosophers, therefore, agree on this, although they disagree on the consequences, so that they openly declare that human freedom cannot be reconciled with the supreme dominion of God, the omnipotent action, in the light of reason.
Back to Arnald. That great philosopher, because he simply willed God outside [Arnauld.] himself, not so that honor would come to him from it, proves invincibly that he worked absolutely sufficient for himself alone [Oper. T. 39, Reflex. children and theologian etc. book 2, ch. 2, 3, p. 428-440].
The same opinion of Mallebranchius, the great philosopher, but, as already observed, neither theologians nor scholars, who also contradicted himself at other times [Id. Ch. 8, p. 468-489], who recklessly supposes, in the distribution of the grace necessary for salvation, that the general will of God, of Christ, which, as man is not intent on all things, cannot know all things, is determined by particular wills; predestination arising simply from them, not from the particular wills of God himself3 [Id ch. 14, p. 507-715.], and from this rise salvation or damnation (it is indeed strange that in this case punishments can take place!): he seals this opinion as shameless, rejected as well as contrary to reason, as assigning the partition of graces to fate rather than to counsel; and he relates this order and its effect, with the Apostle and the Fathers, to original sin: where the wise man is to see the philosopher only by supernatural light, and not by the force of reason, expressly declaring that the difficulties besetting that question can be solved.
"St. Augustine,"
says Arnaldus, disputing against Mallebranchius [Id lib. 2, ch. 11, p. 493],
"was far from having believed that the judgments of God are impenetrable only insofar as we cannot know the detail of them. For what is meant by this detail? Has it ever been questioned? "Certainly not. This Saint never thought of restricting to this detail the impenetrability of the judgments of God; but he expressly declares that they are impenetrable, because they are none the less just for us to be unknown: because it is a deep abyss, which one cannot fathom without putting oneself at the risk of falling into the precipice: because one cannot without timidity want to explain what God wanted to keep hidden; and that he enough that we know that his will can only be just: because one must not ask reason for a thing for which one cannot find a reason: because, the wise knowing that it is a deep and hidden mystery , the ignorance of the imprudent consists in the fact that he does not know only that he is deep, and that it is what has been the cause that many, having wanted to account for this incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vain imaginations. , and in opinions full of error and bewilderment"
[Bayle.] Baylius [Rep. or quest, etc. T. 3 (1706), p. 996, 997]:
"Here, in truth, where end, like so many lines; all the points of Mr. Bayle's dispute on the origin of evil, or on what followed the fall of the first man. All that God has allowed or decreed in this respect, is in conformity with all its infinite perfections: but, the reason being hidden in the impenetrable depths of the sovereignly perfect Being, all could not discover it. The (ad paginam 682 revocat) reason, philosophy show us after that by their most obvious axioms, that we could not hold a fairer conduct than to acquiesce, without understanding them, to the mysteries that God has revealed to us. This is what M. Bayle exposes, declares and repeats on a hundred occasions: and, if you pay attention to it, you will easily see that there is more dispute of words than real dispute between M. Jaquelot and him; best answer that Jaquelot made, was to say that we are too ignorant to judge the conduct of God.
Pergit ARNALDUS.1 [Reflex. etc. lib. 2, c. 22, p. 564, III Remark.]
"But, disturbed, what I find most dangerous in this article (P. Mallebranchii), is the opposition that is made between those who surrender to reason and to writing, and those who submit to the authority of a Father, that is to say, S. Augustine (on predestination, grace). There is [Arnauld.] neither justice nor truth in this opposition. Those who submit by the authority of St. Augustine, then by the approval given to him by the Church, submit themselves none the less to scripture and to reason enlightened by faith: for, for corrupt reason, and abandoned to the darkness that sin has spread in our souls with regard to the things of God, they do very well to refuse her as judge in these matters, which are not within her jurisdiction.
"2 [Id. VI Remarq. p. 567.] What temerity it is to want to reform by reason alone, in a matter so elevated above reason that is the conduct of God in the order of the grace, what the greatest men, the most spiritual and the most pious, have thought of it for so many centuries!"....
"3 [Id. ch. 26, p. 597.] It would be dangerous to establish this false rule, that a conduct or a way of acting could not have been that of God, because human reason judges that 'another is more worthy of the wisdom of God.'
Infra1 [Reflex, etc. book 3, ch. 2, p. 666.], speaking of the real power of Christ's humanity,
“Will it always be necessary, worried, to warn men, who are only darkness and blindness with regard to divine things, that it is not up to their ignorant to set limits to the omnipotence of God? let us just reason about what does not pass the capacity of our mind."
And finally, a deep, accurate work, based on immediate reasoning, in which the ill-conceived and ill-conceived system of Mallebranchius on nature and grace, he exhausts, reduces to nothing, concluding,
"Here, said the great theologian2 [Id. lib. 2, ch. 20, p. 843, 844.], all I had to say for the 2nd part of this 3rd book, in which I I was engaged to show that all that the author says to solve the difficulties which are found in the distribution of grace, which he imagines to be insurmountable, unless one does not recognize | that J. C. is the occasional cause is only contradiction and error.
"Has he (Mallebranchius) not reason to fear, that it is a punishment for the temerity he had to claim that he could silence the libertines, by undertaking to penetrate by his feeble reason the impenetrable judgments of God, of which St. Paul wanted us to adore the incomprehensible depth? This is what has happened and will always happen to those who have had, or who will have in the future, a similar said S. Augustine will always be true: 3 [St. Augustine Op. Seeking that depth, to give an account, they went into fables of vanity, There are many people who have tried to explain the depth of God's judgments: why grace is given to one and not to another; of two children God causes one to be baptized and lets the other die without baptism: why he gives perseverance to such and such of the righteous, and does not give it to others; Why are there still so many people to whom the gospel has not been preached? But all they have gained by their presumptuous researches has been to wander into vain and extravagant fables.
"The author of the system is a great example of this, and never man deserved better to have addressed to him what the same saint says, in another place, to seekers of reason, who imagine they can understand what S. Paul assures us that we cannot be understood.1 You ask the reason, I am afraid of the height. You reason, I wonder. You argue, I believe. I see the depth, I do not reach the depth. frightened her himself. So I leave you to reason; but for me I believe. I see a deep abyss; but I cannot see the bottom of it.) Shall I add what this Father adds, which is even more terrible: If you have come to investigate the unsearchable, and to investigate the searchable, believe, for you have perished.
(If you set out to penetrate the impenetrable and understand the incomprehensible, stop and just believe; otherwise you are lost.)"
In another work, on the attempt to reconcile mysteries with natural ideas:
"Nothing is more dangerous, worried ARNALDOS1 [Arnauld; Apologie pour les Catholiq. 2.e part. (1682), ch. 5, p. 56, 57.], than this presumption, and that is what has makes the heretics with regard to all the truths of the faith, which are above reason: and nothing, on the contrary, is more sure, to be unshakeably attached to the faith of the Church, with regard to the mysteries the most difficult to believe, than to stick solely to the revelation of God, proposed by the Church, without worrying if this can be reconciled with the knowledge that we have of natural things.
Thus a sublime genius, firm and truly analytic, could scrutinize and comprehend the arduous and profound mysteries, if it fell upon a man, strong enough to reason, left to himself, that the danger of using them simply to the divine, weakness, is clearly revealed.
Even the most obscure, such is the weakness of the human mind, whatever it may be! where liberty and merit, with the ever and invincibly efficacious gift and influence of grace, connected with action2 [Oeuvres d'Arnauld; T. 39, letter 7, or P. Malebr. p. 101-115.], and the nature of God's immensity, to explain, to explain3 [Id. letter 8, 9, p. 119- 150- 151.] relies on, not solving the problems, only determining what is to be felt, what is to be believed, the incoherence of contrary opinion, shown by falsity.
In this dregs of times, where the ancient philosophers, in order to gain the authority of the new ones, preachers of doctrine leading to true happiness, human reason commends it: where acknowledging God is considered a great thing: where the Christian religion is attacked not with arguments, which is difficult, but with tasteless dictations by ignorant, idiotic detractors ; and its defenders, with one hand endeavoring to restore the temple of the Supreme Being, leveled with the ground; the great Arnaldi, no less a learned and profound philosopher, than a high and accurate theologian, should read with attentiveness an excellent work, which is inscribed: had the knowledge of a God, and who lived morally well, could have been saved without faith in J.C. (1701.)
Dionis. Petavius, learned, erudite, although sometimes less sure [Petaw.] of judgment, and where the orders of the General did not constrain the pen, is sufficient for an accurate theologian, two questions; the first [Dion. Petavius, from S. J. theologicon. dogmas T. 1 (1644), lib. 4, chap. 7, p. 271-277.]: How the freedom of man is consistent with the foreknowledge of future contingencies; the other, from evil by God's supremely good permission2 [Id. book 6, chap. 6, No. 5, 11, p. 424, 428.], baud of a sharp mind, but like most of the old philosophers and SS. He had treated his father with authority; acting on the gift of perseverance, of which, he says [Id. book 9, chap. 7, p. 602, No. 6.] (quoted by the words of St. Augustine), the difference between the two gifts of perseverance is made, that it is a tribute to Adam, by which his will, or possibility, was aided, so that if he wished, he could persevere; but as he wished, it was not given. This is the very act of constantly and indomitably willing his free will, which he was strong and healthy, permitted. But the gift which is given through the merits of Christ does not only give the ability if they will; but also to will what they can: and it is such that, given it, they are only persevering: that is, that they persevere with certainty, and, as is commonly said in the schools, infallibly persevere. , if they wish. The synod of Trent knows that, although they do not wish to disagree, it is accomplished by the same gift of perseverance.
What Petavius gathers from Augustine about the second gift of perseverance is the sense of the old doctor, the true faith and doctrine of the Church; but impervious to human reason.
Similarly, whoever has carefully read the excellent treatise on liberty by D. Petitpied [Petittied; Treatise on Liberty, in which, after having examined the nature of liberty and the characteristics proper to it according to the different states of free beings, Jansenius is justified on this matter, and we advise, according to the principles of this author, the freedom of man in the present state with the grace of J. C. necessary for all actions of Christian piety (1753), part, l, art. 27, p. 69, 71; share 3, art. 3-4, p. 302, 316.], he will find the same doctrine learnedly and solidly established and expounded there, but there is nothing which shows that the freedom of man in himself accords with action, with the attributes of God, which is to merit, especially punishment, in which the real difficulty lies. Rightly, therefore, the excellent, pious and prudent theologian, having discussed the question: how, by virtue of nothing, a deficiency (of evil), the cause of which is not efficient, can the will be guilty;
"but why, worried2 [Id. p. 71.], this grace of love which justifies, which fills this nothingness of the will, in which I have shown, after S. Augustine, that the power to sin consists why, say I, is this grace not given to all? why is it given to some and not to others? That is the mystery of predestination and of grace. We do not We can fathom its depths, but let us be convinced that it is due to no one, that it is granted by a gratuitous mercy to those to whom it is granted, and refused by a very secret and very just judgment. "
The most secret and most just judgment is followed by punishment, although it is harmful to fill the void without the will's gratitude.
"to those to whom it is refused. No one comes except by drawing, says St. Augustine [St. Augustine; Op. T. 3, part. 2 (1780), in Joann, evangeli, ch. 6, fractal. 26, col 494, 2.]. Whom he draws, and whom he does not draw, why he draws him, and why he does not draw him, do not want to judge, if you do not want to err."
By the same token, Boursier, a keen philosopher and a studious and diligent theologian, after having cleverly [Boursier; On the action of God on creatures: a treatise in which physical promotion is proved by reasoning, and in which several questions are examined which relate to the nature of spirits and to grace, T. 2 (1713), 7 sect. the first part. ch. 18, No. III, p. 257, 258.], He put forward various and, as it seemed to him, solid reasons why a bad man, that is, a being who does nothing (property, not acting), deserves punishments; since he has nothing in himself except what God gives him, and God does not give him what he would render an action without failure.
"after all, worried3 [Id. N.° VII, p. 264, 265.], that we find as much difficulty as we want in this matter; but that we examine if this difficulty does not come from this that man measures the justice of God by an entirely human justice, and that he imagines that God is obliged to treat with the creature, as one creature must treat with another.... One can, sapienter addit, to allege as a solution the incomprehensibility of matter, and as a defense the limited extent of our mind.
Approaching the question of man's guilt, guilt (human wrong and injustice), he had said:4 [Id. Ch. 18, No. 1, p. 255, 256, No. 11.]
"This difficulty, I admit, disturbs and terrifies me, and it seems to me that I would succumb under its weight, if I did not consider, 1. that it directly attacks the celestial doctrine which is revealed to us in the saints scriptures, and which St. Paul relates to us in these terms: You will perhaps say to me afterwards, why does God complain of him who sins? for who is it that resists his will? to respect it, this difficulty, and to surrender to it, rejects it and condemns it with all the force and the authority which the spirit of God gives it...... 2.° That the more I pass and the proofs of physical promotion, the more I find them solid, strong and demonstrative: yet would this not be lacking in fidelity to the sovereign reason which enlightens all minds, and which will demand of them one day an account of the use they have made of these lights, than to sacrifice evident proofs to obscure difficulties?
It cannot be called an obscure difficulty, which presents a contradiction to human reason, in its very terms,
"and cowardly abandon a present light to the uncertainties and darkness of a weak and languid reason?"
Very well. But the same reasoning, weak and weak in arguments and proofs, is used elsewhere as strong, vigorous, lively, and demonstrative.
"Let us therefore hold these two truths, and that God promotes the man who sins, and that the man who sins, is truly wrong."
I gladly acknowledge those two truths, guided by faith; by reason, naturally innate in man, by no means: they offer the contrary to a weak intellect.
"As there are immeasurable magnitudes in mathematics, that is to say, whose extent one cannot exactly match, nor find the common measure; there are also truths, especially those which regard such different terms than are God and our soul, which are immeasurable in relation to us, because God has hidden from us the common measure which would reveal to us the proportion and the relation. to penetrate all into these deep matters, nor to reject all that we do not penetrate: on the contrary, to find impenetrable difficulties in which Scripture and the Fathers have recognized them, is one of the most obvious characteristics of truth.1 [Boursier of the action of God etc. N.° VII, p. 265.] These reflections reassure me, and I could remain there."
The work of the most learned author would make me smile more if he really went further.
However, let us try to reason again about the difficulty proposed, with the intention, not of disentangling all the detours, but at least of breaking the effort, and of persuading myself that, if I cannot sound the depths of in which I walk, at least I can walk there in safety, without fear of distractions and precipices.
To reason about a matter which far surpasses the grasp of reason is to ascend to a higher place, a ladder having no proportion to this place: recklessness brings about an accident. But if a man remains in the road without exploring the bend of difficulty, neither his effort, his strength, breaks down, nor, leading by a false light, safely, securely, without any error, shrinking from haste, can he proceed.
"The merit of a good action, worried author2 [Id. N.° III, p. 257, 258.], is a being, it is good, it is the goodness of the action and its perfection. One is therefore right to recognize that our merits come from God, since he is the first source of all good things: whereas the fault of an action, its defect, its demerit, is formally a privation, a nothingness. must therefore not be made to fall on God, who is not its author."
Nor, therefore, can an agent have a cause in man, since he has no cause: to act and not to act are conflicting.
"In fact, we trace back to God the merit of the creature, because, if we ask the reason why the creature has such merit, we must in truth answer that it is that it has operated it. But if we ask for a still higher reason, we must answer that it is that God gave her the grace to do it, and wrought it in her.
"Instead, if one asks why the creature has such a defective action,
That which fails in action has no cause, since there is no cause of nothing.
"one must answer that it is that she operated it thus: but one cannot add that it is because God did not give him what would have filled this defect."
Nor on this account, as a moving cause, can it be said to be active and worked, but as if deficient, if, apart from God, it was absolutely unable to fill the empty void from itself.
"Because as non-being has no reason, and it would be wrong to say, such a creature does not exist, because God did not give it existence, but it must be recognized that it does not exist, because it does not exist [which has been explained elsewhere];"
A cause which can act, or ought to act, and does not act, is a true cause of non-existence, but a deficient, negative cause.
“Likewise defect and depravity in nature has no reason beyond the creature;
Reason, a positive cause;
and it must be said, this created will did not want an act which had such perfection, because it did not want an act which had such perfection...."
But if, deprived of the divine motion, the will could not will otherwise, of itself, the lack of action, the void, nothingness, to the deprivation of that motion, as a negative cause, can and must be rightly attributed.
"But, to return, the punishment that one deserves by sinning, one deserves it because of the malice of sin. As therefore the malice of sin consists in deprivation and in defect, "
Deprivation, nothing, does not exist: therefore malice is not, much less worthy of punishment.
and that the will is the first and sovereign cause in this kind;
No, it has often been said, for nothing. Therefore, in this class, the will, the positive faculty, cannot be the first and supreme cause.
"it follows that it is on the will alone that this punishment should fall,"
It follows the will of nothing, that is, no cause, no punishment can be affected.
"and that, being unable to blame on others but herself the reason for the fault that lies within her, she must also bear the penalty alone."
The defect which is found in the will, arising out of the nature of his being, cannot be attributed to him, since it is not the cause of his own nature, since he received that nature from elsewhere, and therefore cannot deserve punishment.
From these few observations it is to be observed how lacking, how urgent, where the question of the reason of the creature to the Creator, the force of reason, the perspicacity of man, the skill.