The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam War

"Science," the Greek word for knowledge, when appended to the word "political," creates what seems like an oxymoron. For who could claim to know politics? More complicated than any game, most people who play it become addicts and die without understanding what they were addicted to. The rest of us suffer under their malpractice as our "leaders." A truer case of the blind leading the blind could not be found. Plumb the depths of confusion here.

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 6:49 pm

PART 3 OF 6

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 1873-New York Times Company, Petitioner,

v.

United States.

No. 1885-United States, Petitioner,

v.

The Washington Post Company, et al.

Oral Argument

June 26, 1971

Proceedings


Mr. Chief Justice Burger: We will hear arguments in Nos. 1873 and 1885, The New York Times against the United States, and United States against Washington Post Company.

Mr. Solicitor General, the Government's motion to conduct part of the oral arguments involving security matters in camera, as has been done in the District Courts in New York and Washington, and in the Courts of Appeals in the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit is denied by the court. Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Blackmun and I would grant a limited in camera argument, as has been done in all of the hearings in these cases until now.

Under the order granting the writ yesterday, counsel may, if they wish, submit arguments in writing under seal in lieu of the in camera oral argument.

Mr. Solicitor General, you may proceed.

Oral Argument by the Solicitor General on Behalf of Petitioner (The United States Government)

The Solicitor General: Mr. Chief Justice, may 1 say in respect of the announcement just made that all three parties have filed a closed brief as well as the open brief, and in addition, I have filed just within minutes two statements, one prepared by the State Department and one prepared by the Department of Defense, giving more detail about some of the items which are discussed in my closed brief. I believe that those will all be before the Court.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Are you suggesting that these matters last filed are security matters, or they merely supplement?

A. The only ones that are security matters that I have filed are all marked "Top Secret."

Q. Thank you very much. I just wanted to be sure as to these last documents.

A. The items filed by The Post and The Times I do not believe are marked "Top Secret," but they are marked "In Camera" in the caption of the items. I repeat, all three have also filed regular briefs, except not printed. Only the American Civil Liberties Union seemed to have the resources to produce the printed brief for this occasion.

I am told that the law students of today are indignantly opposed to final examinations because they say that no lawyer ever has to work under such pressure that he has to get things out in three or four hours. I can only say that I think it is perhaps fortunate that Mr. Glendon and Mr. Bickel and I went to law school under an earlier dispensation.

It is important, I think, to get this case in perspective. The case of course raises important and difficult problems about the Constitutional right of free speech and of the free press. We have heard much about that from the press in the last two weeks. But it also raises important questions of the equally fundamental and important right of the Government to function. Great emphasis has been put on the First Amendment, and rightly so, but there is also involved here a fundamental question of separation of powers in the sense of the power and authority which the Constitution allocates to the President as chief executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

Involved in that there is also the question of the integrity of the institution of the Presidency, whether that institution, one of the three great powers under the separation of powers, can function effectively.

The problem lies on a wide spectrum, and like all questions of Constitutional law involves the resolution of competing principles. In the first place, it seems to me that it will be helpful to make some preliminary observations. If we start out with the assumption that never under any circumstances can the press be subjected to prior restraint, never under any circumstances can the press be enjoined from publication, of course we come out with the conclusion that there can be no injunction here. But I suggest, not as necessarily conclusive in this case, but I suggest that there is no such Constitutional rule, and never has been such a Constitutional rule.

We have, for example, the copyright laws. My son was in Toronto earlier this week and he sent me copies of The Globe and Mail of Toronto, ten series of the story the Pentagon is trying to kill, each one headed "Copyright New York Times Service." I have no objection to that, but these stories which have been published have been copyrighted by The New York Times and I believe by The Washington Post, and I have no doubt that perhaps in other cases, because these have already attracted much attention, The New York Times and The Washington Post would seek to enforce their copyright. I suppose it is very likely that in one form or another they have obtained royalties because of their copyright on this matter.

But let us also consider other fields of the law. There is a well known branch of the law that goes under the heading of literary property. In the Court of Appeals I gave the example of a manuscript written by Ernest Hemingway, let us assume while he was still living, unpublished, perhaps incomplete, subject to revision. In some way the press gets hold of it. Perhaps it is stolen. Perhaps it is bought from a secretary through breach of fiduciary responsibility, or perhaps it is found on the sidewalk. If The New York Times sought to print that, I have no doubt that Mr. Hemingway or now his heirs, next of kin, could obtain from the courts an injunction against the press printing it. Only this morning I see in the paper that a New York publisher is bringing a suit against Newsday, a New York newspaper, because Newsday has violated what the New York publisher considers to be its copyright in the forthcoming memoirs of President Johnson.

Next, we have a whole series of law, a traditional branch of equity, involving participation in a breach of trust. There cannot be the slightest doubt, it seems to me, no matter what the motive, no matter what the justification, that both The New York Times and The Washington Post are here consciously and intentionally participating in a breach of trust. They know that this material is not theirs. They do not own it. I am not talking about the pieces of paper which they may have acquired. I am talking about the literary property, the concatenation of words, which is protected by the law of literary property. Again I say I don't regard this as controlling or conclusive in this case. I am simply trying to advance the proposition that there are many factors and many facets here, and that there is no Constitutional rule that there can never be prior restraint on the press or on free speech.

Now, in our main brief in this case which I may say was largely prepared by my associate, Mr. Friedman, last evening and last night, we have cited one case which comes very close to being an injunction by this Court against publications in the press. That is The Associated Press case in I believe 215 United States. The Associated Press is a cooperative of newspapers, and there The Associated Press sought and obtained an injunction against the 'dissemination of news by its competitor International Press, and that was granted on copyright and related grounds.

But we have other areas in the law where this court has approved against specific First Amendment claims injunctions in advance forbidding speech. One area of this is the labor law field, where as recently as 395 U.S. in Sinclair against the National Labor Relations Board, the Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of ttte Court of Appeals enforcing the board's order, which included a provision requiring Sinclair to cease and desist from threatening the employees with the possible closing of the plant or the transfer of the weaving production with the attendant loss of employment, or with any other economic reprisals if they were to select the above named or any other labor organization.

In 393 U.S., a case involving the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Trade Commission against the Texaco, Inc., involving orders with respect to TBC, tires, batteries and accessories, the Court approved the order of the Federal Trade Commission which restrained Texaco from using or attempting to use any device such as, but not limited to, dealer discussions. They were ordered not to speak to dealers about this subject, and the First Amendment was specifically referred to in the brief for the respondent, and was not mentioned in this Court's opinion.

Justice Stewart:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, of course, The Times in this case, and there are no doubt others, I did not understand your brother counsel on the other side really questioned any of this. I thought at least for purposes of this case they conceded that an injunction would be not violative of the First Amendment, or put it this way, that despite the First Amendment, an injunction would be permissible in this case if the disclosure of this material would in fact pose a grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States, that is, for purposes of this case they conceded that, but they have said that in fact disclosure of this material would not pose any such grave and immediate danger.

A. Mr. Justice, if they have conceded it, I am glad to proceed on that basis.

Q. I am not conceding it for them, but that has been my understanding of what the issue is.

A. I may say that their briefs were served on me within the last hour, which was entirely in accordance with this Court's order, but I have not seen their briefs. I do not know what is in their briefs.

Q. In other words, I had thought in my analysis and I have not had the benefit of much more time than you have had, that this basically came down to a fact case, that the issues here are factual issues.

A. And that, Mr. Justice, is extremely difficult to --

Q. To argue here in this Court, I understand.

A. In open court.

Justice Harlan:

Q. I was going to say, qualifying that, except as to the scope of the judicial review of the executive determination, which I thought you presented.

A. Mr. Justice, it was the latter point for which I was seeking to get this, because our contention, particularly with respect to The Washington Post case is that the wrong standard has been used.

Now, with respect to the actual factual situations, the only thing I can do is point to the close brief, which I have filed, in which there are 10 specific items referred to. When I say specific items, I must make myself very clear. Some of those are collective. I have brought here, and perhaps you cannot see them, the 47 volumes that are supposed to be the background of this. They are included in the record of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which has been filed with the Court. Let me say when we move onto this next item that it was inevitable that I delegate the question of preparing the supplemental statement which was covered by this Court's order yesterday. This Court, as did the Second Circuit, referred to the materials specified in the special appendix in the Second Circuit, and to such additional items as might be included on a supplemental statement filed at 5 P.M. yesterday. I had nothing to do with preparing that supplemental statement. I had able and conscientious associates who did work on it. However, when I had a chance to see it last evening, particularly after the State Department called me at 8 or 9 o'clock at night and said they had four additional items, I said that the Court's deadline was 5 P.M. and that I could not add any additional items, then I examined it. Here is a copy of it. I find it much too broad. In particular it has at the end a statement in view of the uncertainties as to the precise documents in defendants' custody, and I say that has been an extreme difficulty in this matter -- we do not know now, and never have known what the papers are.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. I thought The New York Times was required to and did give you a list of what they had.

A. They prepared an inventory, but from it, it is not possible to tell whether they are the same papers that we have. Part of the problem here is that a great mass of this material is not included in the 47 volumes. It is background material, earlier drafts of some papers which are materially different from what is included in the 47 volumes, and as a result we cannot tell from the inventory what is included. For example, one of the items already published, which has caused a certain amount of controversy publicly and internationally, is a telegram to the Canadian Government. That is not in the 47 volumes and is not referred to in the 47 volumes. Where they got it, how they got it, what it is, I do not know. But in this supplemental memorandum, it is stated under my signature that the petitioner specifies in addition to the foregoing any information relating to the following, and then there are listed 13 items. Frankly I regard that as much too broad.

Therefore, I am saying here that we rely with respect to his factual question only on the items specified in the supplemental appendix filed in the Second Circuit and on such additional items as are covered in my closed brief in this case.

Justice White:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, does your closed brief cover all of the items on the special appendix and any that you think should be added to it?

A. No, Mr. Justice, it does not refer to all of them. What I tried to do in my closed brief, I spent all of yesterday afternoon in constant successive conversations with the individuals from the State Department, the Defense Department, the National Security Agency, and I said, "Look, tell me what are the worst, tell me what are the things that really make trouble." They told me and I made longhand notes of what they told me. From that I prepared the closed brief.

Q. Well, Mr. Solicitor General, if we disagreed with you on those that you have covered, the remainder of the items need not be looked at?

A. Mr. Justice, I think that the odds are strong that that is an accurate statement. I must say that I have not examined everyone of the remainder of the items.

Q. Are you making an argument that even if those 10 that you have covered do not move us very far that nevertheless the cumulative impact of all of the others might tip the scale?

A. And that there ought to be an opportunity for a full and free judicial consideration of each of the items covered in the supplemental appendix. It is perfectly true that there was a trial before Judge Gesell in the District Court of the United States. I referred to it in my closed brief as "hastily conducted" and have said that there was no trace of criticism in that. Judge Gesell started the trial at 8 o'clock last Monday morning, and was under orders from the Court of Appeals to have his decision made by 5 P.M., and there are 47 volumes of material, and millions of words. There are people in various agencies of the Government who have to be consulted, and Mr. Glendon quite appropriately conducted cross examination which took time. Much of the material had to be presented by affidavits, and there simply has not been a full careful consideration of this material. To the best of my knowledge, based on what was told me yesterday afternoon by the concerned persons, the 10 items in my closed brief are the ones on which we most rely, but I have not seen a great many of the other items in the special appendix simply for sheer lack of time.

Whitney North Seymour, United States Attorney:

Q. What was the length of the trial before Judge Gurfein in New York?

A. Mr. Seymour?

A. The in camera proceedings, your honor, were approximately four hours, including cross examination and argument.

Justice Harlan:

Q. What was the length of the hearing in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit?

A. The total argument there, public and in camera, was just over three hours. The in camera portion I would guess was about an hour.

Q. Decisions were rendered in the New York case by the District Court within two days afterwards.

A. Within less than 24 hours after, your honor. The hearing finally finished at 10:45 P.M., on Friday night. Decision was rendered at 2:25 P.M., Saturday afternoon.

Q. What was the time interval in the decision by the Court of Appeals?

A. I believe it went one full day, that is, the decision was rendered late on the day of the 23d. The argument was finished shortly after five on the 22d.

Q. And in the District of Columbia proceedings, of course you do not know, but perhaps the Solicitor General does.

A. The trial in the District of Columbia occurred between 8 A.M. and 5 P.M., including the decision last Monday. I participated in the oral argument in the Court of Appeals, and it occupied two hours and a half, two hours and 45 minutes. It started at about 2: 15 and was over I think just before 5.

That is the entire amount of judicial time which has been devoted to millions of words.

Justice White:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, I don't want to bring in a red herring in this case, or what might be, but do you also say that the 10 items you have talked about fully justify the classification that has been given them and which still remains on them?

A. Mr. Justice, I am not sure whether this case turns on classification. Justice White:

Q. I agree it probably does not.

A. No judicial proceeding has been brought under the Freedom of Information Act by either newspaper. There is provision there for starting a proceeding in court in case materials are wrongly determined. No judicial determination has been made that any classification was arbitrary or capricious. There is a complication here which people who live with become familiar with, which is that any compilation takes the classification of the highest classified item.

Justice White:

Q. I understand that, but on those 10 documents I won't press you any more. You think it perhaps need not be answered in this case, and is perhaps irrelevant, is that correct?

A. I think it need not be answered, but my position would be that as to those 10 items, it is more than 10 documents, as to those 10 items, that they are properly classified "Top Secret." One of the items, I should make plain, is four volumes of the 47 volumes, four related volumes, all dealing with one specific subject, the broaching of which to the entire world at this time would be of extraordinary seriousness to the security of the United States. As I say, that is covered in my closed brief, and I am not free to say more about it.

Justice Stewart:

Q. As I understand it, Mr. Solicitor General, and you tell me, please, if I misunderstand it, your case does not really depend upon the classification of this material, whether it is .classified or how it is classified. In other words, if The New York Times and The Washington Post had this material as a result of the indiscretion or irresponsibility of an Under Secretary of Defense who took it upon himself to declassify all of this material and give it to the paper, you would still be here.

A. I would still be here. It will be one string off my bow.

Q. I did not understand it was a real string on your bow. That is why I am asking you the question.

A. Maybe it is not, but there are those who think it is, and I must be careful not to concede away in this court grounds which some responsible officers of the Government think are important.

Q. Secondly, I understand, and tell me if I am wrong again, that your case really does not depend upon any assertion of property rights, by analogy to the copyright law. Your case would be the same if The New York Times had acquired this information by sending one of its employees to steal it, as it would if it had been presented to The New York Times on a silver platter by an agent of the Government. Am I correct?

A. Yes, Mr. Justice, but I don't think that literary property is wholly irrelevant here. But my case does not depend upon it.

Q. Your case depends upon the claim, as I understand it, that the disclosure of this information would result in an immediate grave threat to the security of the United States of America.

A. Yes, Mr. Justice.

Q. However it was acquired, and however it was classified.

A. Yes, Mr. Justice, but I think the fact that it was obviously acquired improperly is not irrelevant in the consideration of that question. I repeat, obviously acquired improperly.

Justice Brennan:

Q. May I ask, Mr. Solicitor General, am I correct that the injunction so far granted against The Times and The Post have not stopped other newspapers from publishing materials based on this study or kindred paper?

A. It is my understanding, Mr. Justice, though I have not had an opportunity to read everything that has been published in other newspapers, it my understanding that except with respect to the items in The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Boston Globe, there has not been published anything else which is not covered by material already published either in this series, or elsewhere. It would appear to us that other papers sought to get into the act, and they have assigned their writers to write what they can, but we have not been able to find new disclosures of previously unpublished material in these other articles.

Q. Then are you suggesting that these other newspapers do not in fact have either this study or access to the study or parts of it?

A. Mr. Justice, I do not know. I have no information whatever.

Q. But you are not telling us that they do not.

A. No.

Q. There is the possibility that they do have either the study, the same thing The Post and Times have.

A. There is the possibility that anybody has it.

Q. But if that were the fact, I have always thought the rule was that equity has to be rather careful not to issue ineffective injunctions. Isn't that a factor to be considered in these cases?

A. No, I appreciate that. I am trying to say that on the basis of the information now known, this is not that situation. I repeat, I have not read these other articles. I am advised by people who have that they do not contain new disclosures, that they are -- it has now become fashionable and popular, and you are not a good newspaper unless you have got some of this stuff, and they have put out articles with all kinds of window-dressing, probably very well written, but not containing new disclosures. I am not able to testify to that, and I cannot point to anything in the record which supports that. Certainly we are concerned about the problem of the effectiveness of any order which might be issued here.

Q. I gather you do agree that the ordinary equitable principle is not to issue useless injunctions, is it not?

A. Not to issue a useless injunction, and it is our position that there is nothing in this record or known outside the record which would indicate that this injunction would be useless.

Justice Blackmun:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, one detail in that connection. Is there anything in the record, or any intimation anywhere, that the possession by the other newspapers is attributable to The New York Times or to The Washington Post?

A. No, Mr. Justice. We do not know what they have or how they got it. That is equally true with The New York Times and The Washington Post.

Justice Blackmun:

Q. Have either of these newspapers denied it?

A. Denied that --

Q. That the possession on the part of the other newspapers is not attributable to them?

A. I don't know. I don't believe that has been an issue in The Washington Post case. Mr. Seymour advises me there was nothing like that in The New York Times case.

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, in terms of equity on an injunction, however, to the extent anything has been published and has already been revealed, the United States is not seeking an injunction against further publication of that particular item.

A. No, Mr. Justice, I think at that point we would agree that it becomes futile. It is useless.

Q. Would that mean, Mr. Solicitor General, that if the Government were to prevail here, and that at some time some document within the scope of the injunction that the Government got was published in some other newspaper, that then either The Times or The Post could run it and to that extent then get the injunction modified?

A. I would think so, Mr. Justice.

Q. But that is the only thing they could do, is that it?

A. I would think so, yes. I may say that it was stated in both lower courts, in New York by Mr. Seymour and here by me, that the President last January directed a complete review of classification of all materials. Several Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized us then to say that they are prepared to appoint immediately a joint task force to conduct an exhaustive declassification study of the 47 volumes, that they will conduct the study on an expedited basis, and will complete it within any reasonable time that the court may choose. They suggest a minimum of 15 days. Upon completion of the study, the Government will withdraw its objection to the publication of any documents which it has found no longer are relevant to the national security.

Justice Brennan:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, is the United States pressing separately your request of your cause of action for the return of the materials, wholly aside from injunction against publication?

A. It is not involved in this case in this court at this time.

Q. It is not?

A. No.

Q. But is the Government trying to get these materials back from The Times or The Post?

A. I can certainly say the Government would like to get them back.

Q. That was not my question. My question is is the Government attempting to?

A. The Government is not at this time seeking an order for their return.

Q. I thought that was part of your lawsuit, part of your request for relief.

A. I believe it was, but we did not appeal with respect to that, nor is it covered in our petition for certiorari. Is that not right?

Q. That is correct.

Justice Marshall:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, on this 45-day study, does that depend on how we rule in this case, or is the Government going to do it anyhow?

A. Mr. Justice, I will urge the Government to do it anyhow.

Q. Well, are they?

A. First, if this Court does not allow any injunction, it will be futile, because the material will be published, and there will not be any particular advantage to have a post mortem to say, "Oh, well, it was all right anyhow."

Q. Suppose the Court decides the other way. Will the study be made?

A. The study is going to be made. I will do my best to see that the study is made, and I believe I have the full support of the entire Administration with respect to that.

Q. Would it not be important without this case that the Government has a right to find out what is available to be published? Is that not part of their job?

A. It is a massive operation. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that there has been as long as I can remember, which is quite a while, massive overclassification of materials, and there has been much too slow review to provide declassification. The Government is in the process of taking steps to try to find a way to work that problem out.

Q. But if this Court would by chance rule against you, then the Government would surely do it, wouldn't they?

A. If the Court should rule against us here, then it seems to me that it becomes moot with respect to these items. They can be published, and whether we classify them or declassify them is an academic question.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. The Court would then have done the job for you, is that not correct?

A Yes, the Court will in effect have declassified the materials.

Justice White:

Q. I had thought the standard that you were operating under here in terms of a prior restraint was not necessarily equivalent to the standard that might be operative in a criminal proceeding. Whether or not a newspaper may be enjoined from publishing classified information does not necessarily determine some criminal proceeding.

A. You are certainly right, Mr. Justice, if I may say so, in terms of an examination question. I find it exceedingly difficult to think that any jury would convict or that an appellate court would affirm a conviction of a criminal offense for the publication of materials which this Court has said could be published. Simply as a practical matter whether it was a crime or not, these are the same materials that were involved in The New York Times case. All we did was publish them. I find it difficult to think that such a case should be prosecuted or could effectively be prosecuted.

Q. But the standard concededly is not the same.

A It is not the same issue, and I repeat, I think it would technically be a crime if the materials remained classified. Now, if I may get on --

Justice Stewart:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, just before you do, this brings me back to my original question of a few moments ago as to what the real, basic issue in this case is. As I understand it, you are not claiming that you are entitled to an injunction simply or solely because this is classified material.

A No.

Q. Nor do I understand it that you are claiming that you are entitled to an injunction because it was stolen from you, that it is your property. You are claiming rather and basically that whether or not it is classified or however it is classified, and however it was acquired by these newspapers, the public disclosure of this material would pose a grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States of America, period.

A. Yes, Mr. Justice.

Q. Now, isn't that correct?

A. Yes, Mr. Justice.

Justice Stewart:

Q. So declassification vel non does not have much to do with the basic issue, does it?

A. I agree with you, except that it is part of the setting. If this material had never been classified, I think we would have a considerably greater difficulty in coming in and saying -- for example, suppose the material had been included in a public speech made by the President of the United States.

Q. Then it would be in the public domain already. That is something else.

A. All right. We come in and say, "You can't print this because it will gravely affect the security of the United States." I think we would plainly be out.

Q. You would have a very shaky case on the facts. This, therefore, is a fact case, is it not? Until we can decide this case, we have to look at the facts, the evidence in this case that has been submitted under seal.

A. In large part, yes, Mr. Justice, but I am still trying to get some help from the background and the setting which I repeat, it is not irrelevant, that the concatenation of words here is the property of the United States, that this has been classified under executive orders approved by Congress, and that it obviously has been improperly acquired.

Q. That may have a great deal to do on the question of whether or not somebody is guilty of a criminal offense, but I submit it has very little to do with the basic First Amendment issue before this Court in this case.

A. All right, Mr. Justice, I repeat, unless we can show that this will have grave, and I think I would like to amend it-I know the Court's order has said "immediate," but I think it really ought to be "irreparable harm to the security of the United States."

Justice Harlan:

Q. I would think with all due respect to my colleague that the question of classification would have an important bearing on the question of the scope of judicial review of an executive classification.

A. I think, Mr. Justice, that is true, but I also think the heart of our case is that the publication of the materials specified in my closed brief will, as I have tried to argue here, materially affect the security of the United States. It will affect lives. It will affect the process of the termination of the war. It will affect the process of recovering prisoners of war. I cannot say that the termination of the war or recovering prisoners of war is something which has an immediate effect on the security of the United States. I say that it has such an effect on the security of the United States that it ought to be the basis of an injunction in this case.

I would like to get to the question of the standard which was used by the District judge in this case. I think it is relevant to point out that on Page 267 of the transcript in the District Court before Judge Gesell, he said, "The court further finds that publication of the documents in the large may interfere with the ability of the Department of State in the conduct of delicate negotiations now in process -- not in the past -- now in process, or contemplated for the future whether these negotiations involve Southeast Asia or other areas of the world. This is not so much because of anything in the documents themselves, but rather results from the fact that it will appear to foreign governments that this Government is unable to prevent publication of actual Government communications when a leak such as the present one occurs."

Thus the judge rejected as a standard in this matter the whole question of the ability of the Department of State, and that means the President, to whom the foreign relations are conferred by the Constitution, to conduct delicate negotiations now in process or contemplated for the future. I suggest to the Court that it is perfectly obvious that the conduct of delicate negotiations now in process or contemplated for the future has an impact on the security of the United States.

Now, the standard which the judge did apply is one which, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, I would have written differently. Executive Order 10501 provides the basis for security classification issued by President Eisenhower in 1953, after a comprehensive study by a commission on these matters. The definition of top secret in Section 1(A) of Executive Order 10501 is, "Top-Secret shall be authorized by appropriate authority only for defense information or material which requires the highest degree of protection. The Top-Secret classification shall be applied only to that information or material that the defense aspect of which is paramount and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation, such as" -- this was not intended to be all-inclusive, but illustrative -- "such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war or the compromise of military or defense plans or intelligence operations or scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense."

Judge Gesell has used that as the standard. He made no reference whatever to the succeeding classification, which is Secret, and there is also a classification which is Confidential. But Judge Gesell has used as the basis of his decision, and I suggest this was fundamental error, that there is no proof -- this is on Page 269 of the transcript of the hearing before Judge Gesell -- there is no proof that there will be an armed attack on the United States, that there will be an armed attack on an ally, that there will be a war, that there will be a compromise of military or defense plans -- in my closed brief I contend that he was wrong on that -- a compromise of intelligence operations, and in my closed brief I contend that he was plainly wrong on that, or a compromise of scientific and technological materials.

If the standard is that we cannot prevent the publication of improperly acquired material unless we can show in substance an effect, because that is what he really meant, that there will be a break in diplomatic relations or that there will be an armed attack on the United States, I suggest that the standard which Judge Gesell used is far too narrow. Perhaps it lies in between. My own thought would be that in the present parlous state of the world, considering negotiations in the Middle East, considering the SALT talks now going on -- it is perhaps not inappropriate to remember that SALT is Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the consequences of which obviously have in all likelihood not the prevention of a nuclear attack tomorrow, maybe not next week, but only by success in this kind of negotiations can we have any hope that our children and our children's children will have a world to live in.

I suggest that when it is found by the District Court that the publication of the documents in the large may interfere with, the ability of the Department of State in the conduct of delicate negotiations now in process or contemplated for the future, that should be enough by itself to warrant restraint on the publication of the now quite narrowly selected group of materials covered in the special appendix and dealt with in some detail in my closed brief, and the related papers which have been filed with the court this morning.

Justice Harlan:

Q. Could I ask you a question before you sit down? I had understood from your papers and the brief that you filed this morning that the only specific relief at this stage, this juncture of the proceedings you are asking for is (A) that the Court of Appeals decision in The Times case should be affirmed, namely, that the further hearing before the District Court ordered by the Court of Appeals should go forward to a conclusion, and as regards The Washington Post case, that you are asking only that the proceedings thereby conformed to the proceedings in the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit, and that therefore these broader questions that you have been talking about are not before the court at the moment, in your judgment.

A. No, Mr. Justice, I think I cannot agree with that. It is our position that Judge Gesell used the wrong standard, as I have just said, and it is our view that the judgment of the Second Circuit should be affirmed, and the case remanded to Judge Gurfein for further hearing under a proper standard which I hope this court will develop and announce, and that the decision of the Court of Appeals would be reversed and the case remanded to Judge Gesell for further hearing and the application of the proper standard which this court has decided, because it is our view, as I have endeavored to contend, that in rational terms in the modern world, the standard that Judge Gesell applied is just too narrow, and as I have said, the standard should be great and irreparable harm to the security of the United States. In the whole diplomatic area, the things don't happen at 8:15 tomorrow morning. It may be weeks or months, people tell me that already channels of communication on which great hope had been placed have dried up. I haven't the slightest doubt myself that the material which has already been published and the publication of the other material affects American lives and is a thoroughly serious matter. I think to say that it can only be enjoined if there will be a war tomorrow morning, when there is a war now going on, is much too narrow.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger:

Thank you, Mr. Solicitor General, Mr. Bickel.

Oral Argument by Alexander M. Bickel, Esq., on Behalf of Petitioner (The New York Times)

Mr. Bickel:

Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the court, we began publishing on June 13. We published on the 14th and the 15th, with no move from the Government until the evening of the 14th, despite what is now said to be the gravest kind of danger which one would have supposed would have been more obvious than it turned out to be.

Chief Justice Burger:

Mr. Bickel, aren't you going to allow some time for somebody to really see what this means before they act and some pleadings drawn, and get lawyers into the courts?

A. I plan to return briefly to this point. I point out now only that as was evident to us at the hearings when we cross-examined some of the Government witnesses, high-ranking people in the Government quite evidently read these things on Sunday morning, the following day, and no great alarm sounded.

We were then enjoined, under prior restraint, on the 15th, and we have been under injunction ever since. This is the 11th day, I guess, under the order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. We would remain under injunction presumably until the 3d of July, with the distinct possibility of more time added after that if appellate proceedings are required.

Now a word simply on what was had before the hearing that was held before Judge Gurfein. It took place on Friday last, I believe. It started first thing in the morning with open hearings. We went in camera, as Mr. Seymour said, for something upward of four hours. I do not know the exact time. The record will clearly show that the judge's sole purpose, in camera, and continuously expressed intent was to provoke from the Government witnesses something specific, to achieve from them the degree of guidance that he felt he needed in order to penetrate this enormous record.

It is our judgment, and it was his, that he got very little, perhaps almost nothing. The point, however, that I want to leave with you is that at no time in the course of these hearings did the Government object to their, what is now called the speed or rapidity of them; at no point was more time asked for. Of course, we all labored, as I think is only proper under the knowledge that a great newspaper was being restrained from publishing, and that expedition was desirable. But there is no evidence that I know of that Judge Gurfein rushed the proceedings, or would have rushed them, if the Government had asked for more time. I think the Government gave Judge Gurfein all it had.

Now the Government based its complaint against us, framed in very general terms, on a statute, first, one section of it and finally section 793 (E) of the statute. We have a substantial portion of our brief that is still devoted to arguing that the statute is inapplicable. Judge Gurfein so held it to be, and I take it that the order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is at least open to the interpretation that that holding of Judge Gurfein's is, if not affirmed, at any rate, accepted.

If I may, at this point, take up Mr. Justice Stewart's question to the Solicitor General, referring to our position, we concede, and we have all along in this case conceded for purposes of the argument, that the prohibition against prior restraint, like so much else in the Constitution, is not an absolute. But beyond that. Mr. Justice, our position is a little more complicated than that, nor do we really think that the case, even with the statute out of it, is a simple -- presents indeed a simple question of fact. Rather, our position is twofold. First, on principles, as we view them, of the separation of powers, which we believe deny the existence of inherent Presidential authority on which an injunction can be based.

First on those, and secondly, on First Amendment principles, which are interconnected, and which involve the question of a standard before one reaches the facts, a standard on which we differ greatly from the Solicitor General. On both these grounds, we believe that the only proper resolution of the case is a dismissal of the complaint.

Q. What was the first ground?

A. The first ground, which I am about to enter upon, is the question of the separation of powers, with the statute out of this case.

Q. Yes?

A. As I conceive it, Mr. Justice, the only basis on which the injunction can issue is a theory, which I take it the Solicitor General holds, of an inherent Presidential power.

Now an inherent --

Q. Based upon --

A. His constitutional --

Q. -- The power of the executive in the area of international relationships and in the area of the defense of the nation?

A. I so assume.

Q. Under the Constitution of the United States?

A. I so assume. The reason for that being that a court has to find its law somewhere. As Holmes would have said, I suppose, some legislative "will" must be present from which the court draws the law that it then applies, and that legislative will has to be the President's, if there is no statute.

I do not for a moment argue that the President does not have full inherent power to establish a system of classification, that he does not have the fullest inherent power to administer that system and its procedures within the executive branch. He has his means of guarding security at the source. In some measure he is aided by the criminal sanction. But in any event, he has full inherent power, and the scope of judicial review of the exercise of that power will presumably vary with the case in which it comes up, but I am prepared to concede the decision in the Epstein case, for example, which is cited, I think, in both briefs, that under the Freedom of Information Act, the scope of review is limited, limited to examining whether it is proper.

Nor are we arguing that the President does not have standing -- in the sense in which Baker and Carr distinguishes between standing and just his ability -- standing to come into court, which is I think the burden of most of the cases that the Government cites. The question that I do argue is whether there is inherent Presidential power to make substantive law, not for the internal management of the Government, but outgoing, outlooking substantive law, which can form the basis for a judicially issued injunction, imposing a prior restraint on speech.

The decisive issue that ties in this point and our ultimate First Amendment point is, of course, the exception carved out by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, for that narrow area in which he accepted that a prior restraint on speech might be applied. This is an exception that is made to a rule more solidly entrenched in the First Amendment than any other aspect of it, a rule that is deeply part of the formative experience out of which the First Amendment came, a rule against prior restraint, based on the experience that prior restraints fall on speech with a special brutality and finality and procedural ease all their own, which distinguishes them from other regulations of speech. If the criminal statute "chills" speech, prior restraint "freezes" it.

It is within that well established doctrine that the exception arises. As Chief Justice Hughes formulated it, it referred to -- actually, it said -- we would all assume that a prior restraint might be possible, to prevent actual obstruction of the recruiting service, and this is the Chief Justice's language, or the publication of sailing dates of transports, or the number and location of troops. I suppose that under the present law, the "recruiting service" part of that exception is problematic, but on the sailing dates of ships and the location of troops, there is a very specific statute. It is 18 U.S.C. 794, which has not been cited against us, which is inapplicable, which is why it has not been cited against us, because that is not what we report. That is not in our paper.

That being the case, there is no applicable statute under which we are covered. The question arises, as a matter of inherent Presidential authority, what kind of feared event would give rise to an independent power on the part of the President? It is a question, in a sense, that was saved in Hiribayashi v. the United States, the first of the Japanese exclusion cases. It is a question which, in its own context, of course, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer answered in the negative.

My suggestion would be that whatever that case, that extremity, that absolute other extremity in which action for the public safety is required, whatever that case may be in which, under this Constitution, under its rules of separation of powers, when the President has independent, inherent authority to act domestically against citizens, let alone to impose a prior restraint, whatever that case may be, it cannot be this case. Whatever that case may be, it surely is of a magnitude and of an obviousness that would leap to the eye, and that is why, in part, Mr. Chief Justice, I mentioned at the beginning, the period of time that has passed. I would suppose that, stretching our imaginations, and trying to envisage that case, the one characteristic of it suggested by the example that Chief Justice Hughes recited, suggested by the phrase that the Second Circuit used, which is probably why the Solicitor General resists the word "immediate," the single characteristic that we can immediately see of such an imagined event would be that it is obvious that the public safety is an issue, that time is of the essence. I submit that that cannot be this case. It cannot be that it has to take the Government which has been reviewing these documents for many months, not just in connection with this case, but in reply to an inquiry made by Senator Fulbright, as the record of our hearings in New York shows, it cannot be that a Government, consisting, after all, of more than just the five witnesses we heard in New York, or the ones that were heard here, over this length of time, has an unfamiliarity with these documents, substantial as they might be, which is so great that, when news of their publication comes up, nobody in the Government knows that somewhere in those documents is one which presents a mortal danger to the security of the United States.

I would submit, secondly, that while error is always possible, Judge Gurfein and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed him on the record that he had before him, and Judge Gesell, in the Court of Appeals here, all of those judges cannot have been that wrong.

Justice Blackmun:

Q. Professor Bickel, this is not your case, but reading from Judge Wilkey's dissent, "When I say 'harm' I mean the death of soldiers, the destruction of al1iances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate, as honest brokers, between would-be belligerents." I take it that you disagree fundamental1y with that statement?

A. Not entirely, Mr. Justice Blackmun. For example, the death of soldiers -- I would disagree that impairment of diplomatic relations can be a case for prior restraint, I would say, even under a statute.

I would not disagree that the death of soldiers, as in the troop ship, or as in the example that Chief Justice Hughes gave. The difficulty I would have would be that nothing that any of these judges, including Judge Wilkey, because he, I suppose, is talking about what might yet be shown by the Government, nothing that any of these judges have seen is related by a direct, causal chain, to the death of soldiers or anything grave of that sort. I have heard it, and everything that I have read -- what characterizes every instance in which the Government tries to make its case factually is a chain of causation, whose links are surmise and speculation, all going toward some distant event, itself not of the gravity that I would suggest.

Q. You know these records better than I do, but then going back to Judge Wilkey, he says, "But on careful, detailed study of the affidavits and evidence, I find the number of examples of documents which, if in possession of The Post," and I repeat, this is The Post case, "and if published would clearly result in great harm to the nation."

Now I repeat my question. You, therefore, disagree fundamentally with what he seems to say?

A. I beg your pardon, Mr. Justice. I am not as familiar as I should be with The Washington Post case. I have thought that Judge Wilkey dissented on the ground that he would like more evidence to come in. If this is a statement about the evidence that he heard, or that was heard before Judge Gesell, then, depending on what the standard is that he has in mind, I would think that that language does not quite communicate to me what the standard is, and I doubt that it is the narrow standard that I would contend for.

Depending on the standard that he has in mind, he is either wrong about his standard, or seven judges disagreed with him. I am sorry. I am not sufficiently familiar with The Washington Post case.

Justice White:

Q. Professor, your standard that you are contending for is grave and immediate, or not? Is that too general for you?

A. The standard that I would contend for, and the difficulties of words are simply enormous -- one has to bring into one's mind and image of some event and try to describe it. The standard that I would contend for would have two parts to it. Let me also say that I would differentiate between a standard applicable to the President, acting on his own, the President acting in the case that was saved in Hiribayashi, for example, and a prior restraint being imposed pursuant to a well-drawn statute, which defines the standard and the case. I would demand less of the statute than I would demand of the President.

But the standard, in general, that I would have in mind, would, at one end, have a grave event -- danger to the nation. Some of the things described in the description of top-secret classification in the Executive Order that the Solicitor General read off, I think, would fit that end of the standard.

At the other end would be the fact of publication, and I would demand, and this would be my second element, that the link between the fact of publication and the feared danger, the feared event, be direct and immediate and visible.

Justice White:

Q. I take it then that you could easily concede that there may be documents in these 47 volumes which would satisfy the definition of "Top-Secret" in the executive order, and nevertheless, would not satisfy your standards?

A. That would be chiefly for the reason that, as is notorious, classifications are imposed --

Q. No, my question was this. Let us concede, for the moment, that there are some documents that are properly classified Top Secret. You should say that does not necessarily mean that your standard is satisfied?

A. That is correct, Mr. Justice. I would say that --

Q. I have not read anything in any of your documents or in any of these cases which the newspapers suggest for a moment that there is no document in these 47 volumes which satisfies properly the definition of top secret.

A. I don't know about that.

Q. You do not deny that, do you?

A. I have no knowledge. I have never been near the documents, Mr. Justice.

Q. But your position must be then that even if there is a document or so, none of them satisfies your standard.

A. I would say that today. If asked that question on the day I appeared before Judge Gurfein, on a temporary restraining order, my answer would have been I expect not, I trust the people at The Times. I am fairly certain by now, Mr. Justice, after all of this time, having read the submissions of the Government, although I was hit with another one this morning, not a separate submission, but an explication of earlier ones that I have not had a chance to glance at yet. This literature, like some scholarly literature, tends to get ahead of us. Having read the submissions of the Government, I am flatly persuaded that there is nothing in there that would meet my standards for a statute or independent executive action, because if there were, it surely should have turned up by now. It cannot be after, I gather the Solicitor General had the same experience yesterday afternoon, that I saw Judge Gurfein having. Please show me. Now, which are the three, which are the five, which are the ten? Which is the most important to these? All that one ever got, all that I have ever heard have been statements of the feared event in terms of an effect on diplomatic relations. If it is a military matter, then it was in terms of the addition of a possible cause to a train of causal factors, to train of events that is well on the rails as is, and propelled by sufficient other facts. That sort of statement is the only thing we have heard, and I would submit that that does not meet any possible First Amendment standard. It does not meet it either in the statement of the seriousness of the event that is feared, or what is more important and more obvious in this case, in the drawing of the link between the act of publication as the cause of that event and the event that is feared. That link is always, I suggest, speculative, full of surmises, and a chain of causation that after its first one or two links gets involved with other causes operating in the same area, so that what finally causes the ultimate event becomes impossible to say which the effective cause was. The standard I would propose under the First Amendment would not be satisfied by such things.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 6:51 pm

PART 4 OF 6

Justice Stewart:

Q. Your standard is that it has to be an extremely grave event to the nation and it has to be directly proximately caused by the publication.

A. That is exactly correct.

Q. I gather then that your basic argument with the statutory or regulatory definition of "top-secret" is with the word "could," because that definition says "unauthorized disclosure of which could result in" and so forth.

A. Yes, I was addressing myself only to the events.

Q. You would insist that it would probably result?

A. I would insist that for purposes certainly of any action in the President's inherent power, which is the case before us.

Q. Mr. Bickel, it is understandably and inevitably true that in a case like this, particularly when so many of the facts are under seal, it is necessary to speak in abstract terms, but let me give you a hypothetical case. Let us assume that when the members of the Court go back and open up this sealed record we find something there that absolutely convinces us that its disclosure would result in the sentencing to death of 100 young men whose only offense had been that they were 19 years old and had low draft numbers. What should we do?

A. Mr. Justice, I wish there were a statute that covered it.

Q. Well there is not. We agree, or you submit, and I am asking in this case what should we do.

A. I am addressing a case of which I am as confident as I can be of anything that Your Honor will not find that when you get back to your chambers. It is a hard case. I think it would make bad separation of powers law. But it is almost impossible to resist the inclination not to let the information be published, of course.

Q. As you know, and I am sure you do know, the concern that this Court has term after term with people who have been convicted and sentenced to death, convicted of extremely serious crimes in capital cases, and I am posing you a case where the disclosure of something in these files would result in the deaths of people who are guilty of nothing.

A. You are posing me a case, of course, Mr. Justice, in which that element of my attempted definition which refers to the chain of causation --

Q. I suppose in a great big global picture this is not a national threat. There are at least 25 Americans killed in Vietnam every week these days.

A. No, sir, but I meant it is a case in which the chain of causation between the act of publication and the feared event, the death of these 100 young men, is obvious, direct, immediate.

Q. That is what I am assuming in my hypothetical case.

A. I would only say as to that that it is a case in which in the absence of a statute, I suppose most of us would say --

Q. You would say the Constitution requires that it be published, and that these men die, is that it?

A. No, I am afraid that my inclinations to humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract devotion to the First Amendment in a case of that sort. I would wish that Congress took a look to the seldom used and not in very good shape espionage acts, and cleaned them up some so that we could have statutes that are clearly applicable, within vagueness rules, and what not, so that we do not have to rely on Presidential powers. But the burden of the question is do I assume that the event has to be of cosmic nature.

Q. That is the question.

A. No, sir. The examples given by Chief Justice Hughes himself are not. A troop ship is in a sense that 100 men or the location of a platoon is in a sense that 100 men. I don't assume that. I do honestly think that that hard case would make very bad separation of powers law.

Q. Let me alter the illustration a little bit in the hypothetical case. Suppose the information was sufficient that judges could be satisfied that the disclosure of the link the identity of a person engaged in delicate negotiations having to do with the possible release of prisoners of war, that the disclosure of this would delay the release of those prisoners for a substantial period of time. I am posing that so that it is not immediate. Is that or is that not in your view a matter that should stop the publication and therefore avoid the delay in the release of the prisoners?

A. On that question, which is of course a good deal nearer to what is bruited about, anyway, in the record of this case, I can only say that unless -- which I cannot imagine can be possible -- the link of causation is made direct and immediate, even though the event might be somewhat distant, but unless it can be demonstrated that it is really true if you publish this, that will happen, or there is a high probability, rather than as is typical of those events, there are 17 causes feeding into them. Anyone of those other than the publication is entirely capable of being the single effective cause, and the real argument is, well, you add publication to that, and it makes it a little more difficult. I think, Mr. Justice, that is a risk that the First Amendment signifies that this society is willing to take. That is part of the risk of freedom that I would certainly take.

Q. I get a feeling from what you have said, although you have not addressed yourself directly to it, that you do not weigh heavily or think that the courts should weigh heavily the impairment of sources of information, either diplomatic or military intelligence sources. I get the impression that you would not consider that enough to warrant an injunction.

A. In the circumstances of this case, Mr. Justice, I think, or I am perfectly clear in my mind, that the President, without statutory authority, no statutory basis, goes into court, asks an injunction on that basis, that if Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer means anything, he does not get it. Under a statute, we don't face it in this case, and I don't really know. I would have to face that if I saw it. If I saw the statute, if I saw how definite it was --

Justice Douglas:

Q. Why would the statute make a difference, because the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of the press. Do you read that to mean that Congress could make some laws abridging freedom of the press?

A. No, sir. Only in that I have conceded, for purposes of this argument, that some limitations, some impairment of the absoluteness of that prohibition is possible, and I argue that, whatever that may be, it is surely at its very least when the President acts without statutory authority because that inserts into it, as well --

Q. That is a very strange argument for The Times to be making. The Congress can make all this illegal by passing laws.

A. I did not really argue that, Mr. Justice.

Q. That was the strong impression that was left in my mind.

A. I replied to the Chief Justice on a case that arose without a statute, and tried to distinguish, because it is crucial for purposes of this case to distinguish between the authority which is here claimed of the President to act independently without a statute, and the possibly greater authority of the whole Government through the machinery of legislation to act in similar premises of which I concede nothing that I don't have to, Mr. Justice.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. I have one question which is prompted by this exchange. Generally speaking, there are, as I understand it, no statutes granting immunity to newspaper reporters from disclosing their sources, but there is a firm claim made by newspapers, by reporters, and there have been a number of cases on that. If I read the briefs and the accounts of those other cases in California and several other places, the claim of the newspaper is that the First Amendment protects them from revealing their sources even to a grand jury in the investigation of criminal matters, because otherwise the newspapers' sources would dry up. That is generally the thesis of the press, is it not?

A. There are some cases that are on the Court's docket, as you know, Mr. Justice, for next fall. One of them with which I am most familiar is the Caldwell case from California, in which there was a refusal to reveal sources upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, even to the point of not requiring an appearance before the grand jury. But the claim is very substantially qualified. That is to say, Caldwell holds -- one does not know how far that might be taken and perhaps some of the other cases will require the argument to take it somewhat farther -- but Caldwell on its own holds that in circumstances where the Government, as indeed Attorney General Mitchell's regulations themselves provide, which were issued after the Caldwell case started, in cases where the Government has not shown that it is inescapably central to the proof of whatever crime it is that the grand jury is investigating, that in those circumstances where the claim of confidential communications is made by the reporter, there is a sufficient First Amendment interest to protect that claim on the theory that if confidential sources dry up, and the theory runs they would dry up if there were no protection of confidentiality, there would be a diminished flow of news.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Yes, but the thing is that the newspapers and newspaper reporters claim for themselves the right which this argument now would deny to the Government.

A. Mr. Justice, I know there is an appearance of unfairness of unevenness about it, but I think the answer that a reporter would make, and an answer that I find wholly persuasive, is that neither in this case nor in a case like Caldwell does The New York Times nor does the reporter claim something for himself, but rather the claim is made in order to vindicate the First Amendment and those interests which that great document serves. Thank you.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Glendon.

Oral Argument by William R. Glendon, Esq., on Behalf of Respondent (The Washington Post)

Mr. Glendon: Mr. Chief Justice, Your Honors, General Griswold, Mr. Bickel, I think it might be helpful if I address my attention to the facts which lie behind these cases, or this case, The Washington Post case, as it comes before Your Honors, because I think we have heard here a familiar plea, familiar to us who have been involved in this case over the last intense week, that some more time is needed while the First Amendment is suspended. We first faced this question, Judge Gesell did, some week ago, and after a hearing on the temporary restraining order, unconvinced by the generality and lack of specificity, he denied the temporary restraining order.

The Government, of course, as was its right, promptly went up to the Court of Appeals, and in an extraordinary late session -- everything has been late, I may say in this case, late hours, anyway -- the Court of Appeals, 2 to 1, Judges Robb and Robinson, granted a temporary restraining order to the Government to give them some time, and thus for the second time in two weeks, and the second time in 200 years, the United States succeeded in obtaining a prior restraint against the press.

Now, the Court of Appeals stated in its order that it would send it back, send it to the District Court, and the District Court would try it to determine whether the granting of an injunction for the publication of the material would so prejudice the defense interests of the United States or result in such irreparable injury to the United States as to justify the extraordinary relief that was asked, to wit, a prior restraint.

Justice Stewart:

Q. Before you proceed, Mr. Glendon, do you raise that as the proper test?

A. I think that is the proper test, Your Honor, yes. That is the test that we tried the case on, sir, and I think the implications of the words may require some development, and I am sure there will be arguments as to exactly what those words mean, but that is the test we tried the case on.

Q. Then would you repeat the words so that I will have them in mind?

A. So prejudice the defense interest of the United States, or result in such irreparable injury to the United States as would justify restraining the publication.

Q. Then that would not cover the simple deaths, say, of a hundred or two young men.

A. Your Honor, that is a hard case you put, obviously. I think, we all have to measure this case in the light of what we have before us, and what we know we have before us.

Q. We have a lot of things under seal that I for one have not seen. I have seen some of it, but I have not seen all of it.

A. I am going to address myself to those, Your Honor, and I am going to point out as best I can within the limits here, as did other courts, and the Government has not yet brought anything like that case to Your Honors, nothing like that. What we have heard, your honor, is much more in the nature of conjecture and surmise.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Can anyone know in any certain sense the consequences of disclosure of sources of information, for example, the upsetting of negotiations, if that were hypothetically true, in Paris, or possible negotiations that we don't know anything about in the release of war prisoners, and that sort of thing? How does a government meet the burden of proof in the sense that Judge Gesell laid it down? That does not bring any battleships to the outer limits of New York harbor, or set off any missiles, but would you say that it is not a very grave matter?

A. Your Honor, I think if we are to place possibilities or conjecture against suspension or abridgement of the First Amendment, the answer is obvious. The fact, the possibility, the conjecture or the hypothesis that diplomatic negotiations would be made more difficult or embarrassed does not justify, and this is what we have in this case, I think, and is all we have does not justify suspending the First Amendment. Yet this is what has happened here. Conjecture can be piled upon surmise. Judge Gurfein used the words up in New York, and I am sure used it respectfully, but he said when there is a security breach, people get the jitters. I think maybe the Government has a case of the jitters here. But that, I submit, does not warrant the stopping the press on this matter, in the absence of a showing.

I would like to turn to that, because this matter, as I don't have to say, does not come undeveloped before Your Honors. Two fine District Court judges, two fine Courts of Appeals have considered this, and in each I think it is fair to say even in the New York case, the Government did not meet its burden. So it says to us, but one more time, just one more time. This is where I was a moment ago when I said that Judge Robb and Judge Robinson agreed to give them a chance.

Now, we had a hearing in the District of Columbia, and I would like if I may to comment upon what the Government said, and it said it twice, about that hearing, because really Your Honors are being asked to, on a representation, and I know it is a sincere representation by General Griswold, but on a representation that if we are given some more time, maybe we can find something. Here is what the Government said in its brief, and it said it again yesterday. They said in New York the Government was not able to present to the court all of the evidence relating to the impact of the disclosure of this material upon foreign relations and national defense that it was able to present to the district court in The Washington Post case.

The Government was accorded the fullest hearing that it wanted. We started at the unusual hour of 8 o'clock in the morning. The Government's case proceeded through the luncheon hour. We cross-examined as we felt was necessary. The Court had plenty of time to consider the matter. He delivered, I think you will agree, whether you agree with his result, a finely reasoned opinion, so there was no rush and no pressure. Then the matter went up to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals had a session of some three hours the next day. I might say, too, and I think this is perhaps important, there has been no restriction on the Government's latitude, because they did have these in camera hearings which frankly were very difficult from our point of view to deal with, but they did have them, and they had an in camera hearing in the Court of Appeals. So to say now that we need more time, I think, does not measure up to the other side of the equation which you are being asked to consider, and that is to restrain two newspapers while others are publishing from giving their readers the news. It is, of course, their readers that we feel, and I think properly, whose rights are involved, too, their right to know. In talking about currency and immediacy, there is now involved in this country -- the country is engaged in an intense national debate. Things are happening this week on that score. These lawsuits undoubtedly precipitated the executive to turn over these documents to the Congress.

Senator Fulbright, as I am sure you are all aware, has been trying for some two years, I understand, to get these documents. I think it is of interest here, because we are dealing with this case and these documents. I think classification is important here in your consideration of these cases, because these documents were classified Top-Secret. They were classified Top-Secret because some unknown individual who is not presented to the court, whose subjective judgment could not be explored, despite the district judge asking that he be brought in -- perhaps there was a good reason, we don't know -- decided that they were Top Secret. They were all Top-Secret because one was Top-Secret. There had been no review of these documents except for one individual who said that he had been reviewing them for some two years for sensitivity, and the sensitivity arose from Senator Fulbright's frequent requests to get these documents so that Congress could make the laws, and perhaps the public would be informed.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Does the record tell how long The Post has had these documents in its possession?

A. It does not show, Your Honor.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Does it show, if you know, how long The New York Times had the documents in their possession before The Post got them?

A. The record in our case does not show that, Your Honor, but I have read, and perhaps these gentlemen could answer better than I, I understood they had them in their possession for some months, a month or two.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. I heard it mentioned somewhere three or four months.

A. Yes. It is not in the record, but that is my best answer.

After this proceeding was brought, and I think again it is part of the significance of this proceeding, and during the course of it, although starting out as a point that these documents were top secret and none could be disclosed, the Government has offered to review them, and perhaps some of them, they say, will be declassified, which I suppose is some sort of admission that the original classification and the original attitude towards them was wrong.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. It could be that something classified in 1965 properly would no longer be subject to classification, or even 1969 or 1970.

A. That is correct, Your Honor, and furthermore some of these documents which were classified go back of course to 1945. The documents are that ancient. The document itself is entitled "The History." It is called a history, and from what I have seen of it, that is what it is.

The Court in our case had before it, and Your Honors will see the evidence of which I am aware, and there apparently has been today additional references made to the documents, but it is a fact, and I think it is a significant fact that the judge there asked the Government to show him a document. These extravagant claims were made, and I say this respectfully, but this has been a case of broad claims and narrow proof. Substantial claims have been made. If you accept them, they would be worried, but we are talking here about proof.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Was there an order at any time to produce all of the documents in the possession of either of the newspapers for examination?

A. There was not, Your Honor.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Was there a request for such an order?

A. The Government made such a request; and because of the concern that the newspaper has as to the protection of its source, the documents we were advised would indicate the source, the documents that we had would indicate the source.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. Who denied that request, the district judge?

A. Yes, and here is how he resolved it.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. He let that override the Federal rules of civil procedure on discovery? A. Here is how he resolved it, Your Honor. I think he did it very fairly. He said if you are not willing to produce the documents -- we do not have all of the documents -- but if you will not produce all of the documents because of your claim of First Amendment source protection, then I will assume that you have all of the documents, and therefore the Government can show me any document, and I will accept that as being in your possession for the purposes of the case. I think that under the circumstances that was a very fair way to do it. I, no more than any other lawyer, like to be in that position, but I have to respect my client's assertion, which is a substantial and I think a valid assertion that a newspaper is entitled to protect its source. So that is the way it was, Your Honor.

Chief Justice Burger:

Mr. Glendon, I recall an ancient doctrine of equity about people who come into equity with certain burdens on them. Doesn't it strike you as rather extraordinary that in a case which largely centers on protection of sources the newspapers are refusing to reveal documents on the grounds that they must refuse in order to protect their sources?

A. Your Honor, I don't understand that that is the issue here.

Chief Justice Burger:

I don't know about the issue. It is in and there are certain standards about this case. This is an equity proceeding, people coming into equity with clean hands, which is one of them, and prepared to do equity.

A. We did not come into equity. The Government came into equity.

Chief Justice Burger:

You were brought in.

A. We were brought in kicking and screaming, I guess.

Chief Justice Burger:

Q. You are now in the position of making demands on the First Amendment. You say the newspaper has a right to protect its sources, but the Government does not.

A. I see no conflict, Your Honor. I see no conflict at all. We are in the position of asking that there not be a prior restraint in violation of the Constitution imposed on us, and that equity should not do that. We are also in the position of saying that under the First Amendment we are entitled to protect our sources, and frankly, I just do not find any conflict bearing on it.

The record shows, and I think this is important in Your Honor's consideration, too, we are, as I said, talking about allegedly top-secret documents, and the record shows that these nomers of secret and top secret are honored perhaps in the breach in Washington, in the way the Government does business, and in the way it perhaps has to do business. But it is certainly true that there is massive overclassification of documents in Washington. We have in the record instances where one Government official or another has quite clearly indicated that while everything on his desk may be classified in one fashion or another, in fact, perhaps 1 per cent or 2 per cent or 5 per cent of it really is classified. I think that is a realistic fact of life here.

We also have clearly in the record that the Government and the press who have some mutual perhaps antagonism is not quite the word, but they are naturally in opposite corners -- the press is trying to get as much news as it can and the Government, particularly where it may be embarrassing or where it may be overly concerned or may feel it is embarrassing or may, in Judge Gurfein's words, have the jitters, is trying to prevent that sometimes. On other occasions, the Government engages itself in leaks, because some official will feel that in the public interest it is well for the public to know, and that overrides any particular judgment of security or classification.

The record, Your Honors will find, is replete with instances where leaks of confidential, secret and top-secret material have been given to the press, or the press has found them out and published them, and of course nothing has happened. I think that is significant because here this is the sort of thing we feel we are talking about. As far as classification itself is concerned, and you will remember the documents that we are talking about are a mixed bag.

Justice White:

Q. Mr. Glendon, wouldn't you be making the same argument if your client had stolen the papers?

A. I don't think the source of how we obtained them features in this case.

Justice White:

Q. Then it would not make any difference? The leak aspect has no relevance to the case, either.

A. I think it is relevant as background.

Justice White:

Q. Then it would be relevant if you stole them? Then you would be making the same argument if your client sent an agent into the Government and stole these papers, and then the Government attempted to restrain your publication of them.

A. I do not think that the manner --

Justice White:

Q. Then one is an irrelevant as the other?

Q. It is not customary in the Government to leak 47 volumes at a time, is it?

A. Your Honor, that is certainly true. It is certainly not customary. The size here is different, but I think you will find, Your Honors, in the affidavit that we have attached, and the exhibits that we have attached to our affidavits, indicating secret stories, or allegedly secret stories, based on secret information, that there is probably more secret information there than you will find in these documents, if you examine them.

Q. What basis did it have on this case?

A. I think it is simply a matter of background, Your Honor, an atmosphere to show that this is not an untoward or unknown situation. When we hear about how our foreign allies or our foreign friends will be shocked or appalled or anything else, it is simply not so. This happens. This is one of the facts of life.

I was starting to refer to a district judge telling the Government to show, which was what he was supposed to do, and that is what the Court of Appeals sent it back for, and he requested to show these documents, these top secret documents. They were in the courtroom, and the Government was invited and it has been invited to show -- let us look at what we are talking about, instead of dealing just with abstractions and conjectures. This was on the so-called secret transcript, and I am not going to avert to it, other than to say that the one document that the Government produced in response to this invitation set forth certain options with reference to the war, and I will not go any further than that, which I think any high school boy would have no difficulty in either putting together, himself or readily understanding. All of them are on the public press.

Now this is the sort of proof that we have been faced with, and this is the will 'o the wisp that we have been chasing.

Justice Blackmun:

Q. Then Mr. Glendon, I come back to you with the same inquiry I made of Professor Bickel. At least it was close enough to persuade one judge of the Court of Appeals to disagree with what you have just said.

A. Your Honor, that is true. I would like to revert to a fact that the other members of the Court of Appeals felt constrained, after they read that particular dissent to just yesterday issue an amendment to their opinion in which they reiterated that they disagreed with Judge Wilkey, which to me was some indication of the strength and depth of their feeling. But Your Honor is right. Judge Wilkey felt, and I say to Your Honor, respectfully, that is not based on the record. There is nothing in the record that I know of, and I think I know the record as far as it has been disclosed to me, and perhaps there was some new material this morning that was not, but as far as the record has been disclosed to me, there is absolutely nothing to justify that statement, and I say the Court of Appeals felt strongly enough about it to issue another statement, to issue an amendment in which they specifically said they disagreed.

Justice Stewart:

Q. The issues in this case then really are factual issues, are they not? As I understand it, and this was my understanding initially- -- have not heard anything really to modify my understanding -- you agreed that an injunction could issue despite the First Amendment if it was shown by the Government that there was something here the disclosure of which would directly cause a grave, irreparable and immediate danger to the country. You agreed that an injunction could issue. You just simply say they have shown nothing of the kind. Isn't that right?

A. They have shown nothing of that kind, or by any other measurable standard that I understand could possibly be involved in this case.

Q. So it is a matter of fact.

A. Take the top-secret definition or anything else. But there is something behind this, too, which I think perhaps is a legal issue, and that is the scope of the review here.

Q. The scope of the review of what?

A. Review of the findings of the district --

Q. Of fact, the findings of fact under rule 52 (A), isn't it?

A. That is right.

Q. These are factual issues.

A. There is one legal question perhaps I will come to later, and that is the utility of an injunction here.

Justice White:

Q. I take it then you do assert that there is not a single document in the 47 volumes which is now entitled to a top-secret classification as defined in the executive order?

A. No.

Q. You said as tested by the top secret standard, or any other, there has been no showing made?

A. Any other standard, I am talking about. I think that the standard is reasonably clear here, but whether you use words such as "gravely prejudicial" to the United States, or "irreparably injure the defense" of the United States, whatever the standard may be.

Q. Assume the standard, as made more specific by the tests of the top secret classification -- assume that was the standard. You would say that it has not been satisfied in this case?

A. Clearly.

Q. By any document?

A. By anything the Government has brought forward.

Q. By any document in these papers, on the specified list?

A. Your Honor, the Government came into court. They suspended the First Amendment; they stopped us from printing, and they said they were going to prove this. This is an injunction proceeding. Now it may be that the Government would see that the courts should become the Defense Department's security officer, and that the courts should delve into this pile of paper, 47 volumes, on its own, from time to time. Whenever the Government is so moved, that the courts should work for them. I say, Your Honor, in our system, as I understand it, when you bring a case, you are supposed to prove it, and when you come in claiming irreparable injury, particularly in this area of the First Amendment, you have a very, very heavy burden.

Q. Do you agree that Judge Gesell applied the Top Secret definitions as his guide?

A. Yes, I think that would appear so.

Q. That is the way he measured the case?

A. He looked at it that way, from his opinion. Yes, Your Honor, as far as I can determine.

Q. Would you accept that standard?

A. Yes, I think that fits in clearly to what we are talking about under the doctrine of Near vs. Minnesota. Yes, sir.

Q. If the trial judge uses clearly erroneous standards, then the case is not simply controlled by facts, is it?

A. I am sorry?

Q. If a trial judge, in these circumstances, used a standard to judge the facts, and the standard was clearly erroneous, then this is not just a fact case, is it?

A. I think, as I understand it, the "clearly erroneous" rule would apply to the facts, what facts he found.

Q. But if he used the wrong standards, then it ceases to be just a fact case?

A. I feel that he used the right standard. Your Honors will determine that here, and I think that as far as the law is concerned, that that is substantially the standard. You can, perhaps, use alternative words, but the thing is, I think, is immediacy and currency, current injury to the United States, as this Court -- has been so substantial, that it justifies what has been done here. It is not just that the United States has been injured. Judge Gesell made a point, which I think is a very good one, that I think perhaps the Government may forget that the interests of the United States are the people's interests. You are weighing here, and this is why I suppose we are here, but you are weighing here an abridgement of the First Amendment, the people's right to know. That may be an abstraction, but it is one that has made this country great for some 200 years. You are being asked to approve something that the Government has never done before. We were told by the Attorney General to stop publishing this news. We did not obey that order, and we were brought into court. We ended up being enjoined.

I do think that when you come to that balance, in face of the proof that exists here, that the decision is quite clear that the First Amendment must survive, because they have not made a case.

Q. Do you think that Judge Gurfein and Judge Gesell used the same standard of review?

A. I think essentially they did, Mr. Justice.

Q. They did not consider it a matter of review, did they? They considered it a matter of their original findings.

A. Yes.

Q. They were not reviewing any classification?

A. No, they were not reviewing. They were making an original determination. Under the circumstances and the proof before them, it was not the kind of irreparable injury --

Q. It was a de novo hearing on whether or not the publication would --

A. Yes.

Q. It was not reviewing any classification by the executive department was it? They did not consider that that was what they were doing?

A. No, that is featured in the evidence, Your Honor, as to how the classification got put on there. That, of course, is --

Q. That is basically irrelevant, is it not?

A. No. Because the Government says, and you must listen, they say, it is top secret, and that is it.

Q. No, I have not heard the Solicitor General say that here today at all.

A. That is my understanding of their whole --

Justice Stewart:

I asked him that question, and he said that there were those in the Government who would like that argument, but he was not pressing it.

A. Well, it is the argument that we have heard along. You see, having classified it Top Secret, they move from there to show no proof.

Q. No, the Government has not, in this court, made the argument that simply because it is Top Secret, they are entitled to an injunction. They have not made that argument.

A. I was trying to say that, having classified the document Top Secret, that is the premise of their case. They have not yet come into this court and proven they are Top Secret, and yet they say that we cannot publish them because they are Top Secret.

Justice Stewart:

I have not heard that argument made, with all respect.

Justice Black:

As I understand the argument of both of the lawyers, it seems to me that they have argued it on the premise that the First Amendment, freedom of speech, can be abridged by Congress if it desires to do so.

A. I did not make that argument.

Justice Black: I understood you to. I did not understand you to make any other argument, or your colleague. You were talking about standards. I am not talking about standards. Under the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of the press. I understand you to say that Congress can make a law.

A. No, Your Honor, I do not say that.

Justice Black: You do not say that?

A. Never. I do not say that. No, Sir. I am sorry, Your Honor. I say that we stand squarely and exclusively on the First Amendment.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Glendon.

Chief Justice Burger: Mr. Solicitor General, you have about 12 minutes or thereabouts left.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 6:57 pm

PART 5 OF 6

Oral Argument in Rebuttal by the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court, I should like to make it plain that we are not at all concerned with past events in this case. We are not interested in protecting anybody. That should be obvious enough simply from the date of the materials which are involved. We are concerned with the present and future impact of the publication of some of this material. When I say "future," I do not mean in the 21st century, but I also do not mean to limit it to tomorrow, because in this area, events of great consequence to the United States happen over periods of six months, a year, perhaps two or three years.

What we are concerned with is the impact on the present and the reasonably near future of the publication of these materials.

Now it is perfectly true that prior restraint cases with respect to the press are rare, or conceivably nonexistent. I am not ready to concede that they are nonexistent, but I cannot point to one now. I have not had time to make a really thorough research. I did point out that there are prior restraint cases as recently as last term, with respect to freedom of speech, which is the First Amendment in exactly the same terms as the freedom of the press.

There is the Associated Press case, which comes about as close to being a prior restraint on the press case as you can get without perhaps being technically a prior restraint. The reason, of course, that there are not prior restraint cases with respect to the press is that ordinarily, you do not find out about it until it has been published.

Reference has been made to the fact that, oh, there are leaks all the time. There are a great many leaks, but I would point out that there is also a very wide respect of the security classification system and its potentiality on the security of the United States. Senator Fulbright did not publish this material. He requested of the Secretary of Defense what use he could make of it, and I have seen on the television other members of Congress who said that they had some of the material but felt it not appropriate to use it, because it was classified top secret.

Justice Marshall:

Q. Mr. Solicitor General, what particularly worries me at this point is that I assume that if there are studies not now being made, in the future there will be studies made about Cambodia, Laos, you name it. If you prevail in this case, then in any instance that anybody comes by any of those studies, a temporary restraining order will automatically be issued. Am I correct?

A. It is hard for me to answer the question in such broad terms. I think if properly classified materials are improperly acquired, and that it can be shown that they do have an immediate or current impact on the security of the United States, that there ought to be an injunction.

I think it is relevant, at this point --

Justice Marshall:

Wouldn't we then -- the Federal courts -- be a censorship board, as to whether this does --

A. That is a pejorative way to put it, Mr. Justice. I do not know what the alternative is.

Justice Marshall:

The First Amendment might be.

A. Yes, Me. Justice, and we are, of course, fully supporting the First Amendment. We do not claim or suggest any exception to the First Amendment. We do not agree with Mr. Glendon when he says that we have set aside the First Amendment, or that Judge Gesell or the two courts of appeal in this case, have set aside the First Amendment by issuing the injunction, which they have. The problem in this case is the construction of the First Amendment.

[To Justice Black] Now Me. Justice, your construction of that is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say that "no law" means "no law," and that should be obvious. I can only say, Me. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that "no law" does not mean "no law," and J would seek to persuade the Court that that is true.

As Chief Justice Marshall said, so long ago, it is a Constitution we are interpreting, and all we ask for here is the construction of the Constitution, in the light of the fact that it is a part of the Constitution, and there are other parts of the Constitution that grant powers and responsibilities to the executive, and that the First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the executive to function or to protect the security of the United States.

It has been suggested that the Government moved very slowly in this matter. The Times started publishing on Sunday. Well, actually, it was on Monday, which is pretty fast as the Government operates, in terms of the consultations that have to be made, the policy decisions that have to be made. On Monday, the Attorney General sent a telegram to The New York Times, asking them to stop and to return the documents. The New York Times refused. On Tuesday, the United States started this suit.

It suggested that there have been full hearings, everything has been carefully and thoroughly considered, but there is clear evidence of haste in both records. This is apparent from the times which have been stated, and I would like to point out that even now, at this point, the hearing is on the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. The only hearings that have been held in any courts are to whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. They were not intended to be full, plenary trials, but merely sufficient to show the probability of possible success. There simply was not time to prepare a comprehensive listing or a comprehensive array of expert witnesses. The Government relied on the fact that the district judge would examine the study, and on the record, he concededly refused to do so. This was at the heart of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its decision to remand for a full week of hearings on the merits.

Q. I am not sure that I understand what you said. The Court of Appeals relied on the assumption that the district judge would examine the evidence, and the district judge refused to do so?

A. No. That there had not been a full hearing with respect to this.

Q. Which case are we talking about now?

A. I am talking about The New York Times case in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit sent it back to the judge for a hearing --

Justice Stewart:

As I understood it, there was no claim that Judge Gurfein did not consider everything that was then before him, but that new matter was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit?

A. On the contrary, Mr. Justice, the full 47 volumes were offered to Judge Gurfein, and he refused to examine them.

Justice Stewart:

He did not. He did not refuse to, he failed to.

A. No, Mr. Justice, he said that he would not examine them.

Justice Stewart:

He said that he did not have time to, but he did ask the Government to please bring forward the worst.

A. No. I think that really came at a later stage.

Justice Stewart:

Then a new matter was brought to the attention of the Second Circuit --

A. Brought to the attention of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and they sent it back not for an instant hearing, but for one limited, and properly so.

Everything about this case has been frantic. That seems to me to be most unfortunate. I would like to point out that The New York Times --

Justice Stewart:

No. The reason is, of course, as you know, Mr. Solicitor General, that unless the Constitutional law, as it now exists, is changed, a prior restraint of publication by a newspaper is presumptively unconstitutional.

A. It is a very serious matter. There is no doubt about it, and so is the security of the United States a very serious matter. We have two important Constitutional objectives here which have to be weighted and balanced and made as harmonious as they can be. But it is well known that The Times had this material for three months. It is only after The Times has had an opportunity to digest it, and it took them three months to digest it, that it suddenly becomes necessary to be frantic about it. It was not so terribly important to get it out and get it to the public while The Times was working over it, but after that now The Times finds it extremely difficult to accept an opportunity for the courts to have an adequate chance first to resolve the extremely difficult question of the proper construction of the First Amendment in this situation, and I concede that is an extremely difficult question. If the proper construction is the one which Mr. Justice Black has taken for a long time and is well known, of course, there is nothing more to be said. But our contention is that that is not the proper construction.

Justice Stewart:

And the counsel on the other side do not disagree with you, Mr. Solicitor General. They do not take Mr. Justice Black's position, at least for purposes of argument in this case.

A. Very reluctantly they were pushed into conceding that there might be some cases where there could be those suggested --

Q. Mr. Glendon said that he thought Judge Gesell's standard was the correct one. Mr. Bickel said that he was making no claim that there is an absolute prohibition of a prior restraint.

A. Frankly, I do not think it is much of a limitation to say that it can be enjoined if it will result in a break of diplomatic relations or a war tomorrow. As I have already said, we think the standard used by Judge Gesell is wrong.

Q. Do you think they differ from the standards of Judge Gurfein?

A. I am sorry?

Q. I said, do you think that the standards that Judge Gesell used were different from those which Judge Gurfein used?

A. I am not sure what standard Judge Gurfein used, because much of this material Judge Gurfein did not have specifically called to his attention. The standard which Judge Gesell used is to say that unless it comes within that illustrative language, and the definition of top secret, that it does not meet the requirement, and that is wrong. I believe, and have sought to show in the closed brief which is filed here, that there are materials, or there are items in this material which will affect the problem of the termination of the war in Vietnam, which will affect negotiations such as the SALT talks, which affect the security of the United States vitally over a long period, and which will affect the problem of the return of prisoners of war. I suggest that however it is formulated, the standard ought to be one which will make it possible to prevent the publication of materials which will have those consequences.

Q. I still am not clear as to the basis for your view that the case, the District of Columbia case, should be remanded. I got it originally, from your papers, that you thought that it should be remanded in order to have the fuller hearing that the court of appeals may have been lacking before Judge Gurfein. This morning you said that you thought it should be remanded because the standard used by Judge Gesell was erroneous.

A. Essentially, in the Court of Appeals, there has been a hearing, though it lasted only one long day. However, our basic claim there would be that it ought to be remanded for hearing, and I would be content to have it for hearing on this record, but for determination on the right standard. In the Second Circuit case, from Judge Gurfein, there has not yet been the kind of hearing that we think there ought to be. We think there ought to be such a hearing, and that Judge Gurfein should have the benefit of this Court's views as to what the proper standard is, in coming to his conclusion, as a result of that hearing.

Q. I understand, also, that you do claim that there are materials in this record which do satisfy those categories of top secret?

A. Yes, Mr. Justice. I do not think that is essential, but I think there are some.

Q. I know, but if Judge Gesell used those standards, the top secret standard, for judgment, he was wrong in saying that none of the material --

A. Yes, Mr. Justice, because there is reference in there, among other things, to communications, and I think that is established in this record.

Chief Justice Burger:

Thank you, Mr. Solicitor General. The case is submitted.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 1873 and No. 1885

Decision


June 30, 1971

PER CURIAM.

We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." -- U.S. -- (1971).

"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v Sullivan, 372 V. S. 58, 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, -- U. S. -- (1971). The District Court for the Southern District of New York in the New York Times case and the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met that burden. We agree.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The judgments shall issue forthwith.

So ordered.

Concurring Opinions

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLASjoins, concurring.

I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, after oral arguments, I agree completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons stated by my Brothers DOUGLAS and BRENNAN. In my view it is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the First Amendment.

Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adoption of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, followed in 1791. Now, for the first time in the 182 years since the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of current news of vital importance to the people of this country.

In seeking injunctions against these newspapers and in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment. When the Constitution was adopted, many people strongly opposed it because the document contained no Bill of Rights to safeguard certain basic freedoms. [1] They especially feared that the new powers granted to a central government might be interpreted to permit the government to curtail freedom of religion, press, assembly, and speech. In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall he inviolable." [2] The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the Solicitor General argues and some members of the Court appear to agree that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of the press .... " Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.

In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Viet Nam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.

The Government's case here is based on premises entirely different from those that guided the Framers of the First Amendment. The Solicitor General has carefully and emphatically stated:

"Now, Mr. Justice [BLACK], your construction of .. [the First Amendment] is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr[.] Justice that to me it is equally obvious that 'no law' does not mean 'no law', and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true. . . . [T]here are other parts of the Constitution that grant power and responsibilities to the Executive and ... the First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States." [3]


And the Government argues in its brief that in spite of the First Amendment, "[t]he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in- Chief." [4]

In other words, we are asked to hold that despite the First Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security." The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon themselves to "make" a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law. [5] See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, post, at ---. To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure." No one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.

The word "security" is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged. This thought was eloquently expressed in 1937 by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes -- great man and great Chief Justice that he was -- when the Court held a man could not be punished for attending a meeting run by Communists.

"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." [6]


MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court I believe it necessary to express my views more fully.

It should be noted at the ou[t]set that the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press. [1]

There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the press of the material which the Times and Post seek to use. 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e) provides that "whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, ... or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, wilfully communicates ... the same to any person not entitled to receive it . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both."

The Government suggests that the word "communicates" is broad enough to encompass publication.

There are eight sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship, §§ 792-799. In three of those eight "publish" is specifically mentioned: § 794 (b) provides "Whoever in time of war, with the intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects records, publishes, or communicates ... [the disposition of armed forces]."

Section 797 prohibits "reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away" photos of defense installations.

Section 798 relating to cryptography prohibits: "communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available ... or publishes." [2]

Thus it is apparent that Congress was capable of and did distinguish between publishing and communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act.

The other evidence that § 793 does not apply to the press is a rejected version of § 793. That version read: "During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the U. S. is a party or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense, which in his judgment is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy." During the debates in the Senate the First Amendment was specifically cited and that provision was defeated. 55 Cong Rec. 2166.

Judge Gurfein's holding in the Times case that this Act does not apply to this case was therefore pre-eminently sound. Moreover, the Act of September 23, 1950, in amending 18 U. S. C. § 793 states in § 1 (b) that:

"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall be promulgated hereunder having that effect." 64 Stat. 987.


Thus Congress has been faithful to the command of the First Amendment in this area.

So any power that the Government possesses must come from its "inherent power."

The power to wage war is "the power to wage war successfully." See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 93. But the war power stems from a declaration of war. The Constitution by Article I, § 8, gives Congress, not the President, power "to declare war." Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have.

These disclosures [3] may have a serious impact. But that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on the press. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 719-720:

"... While reckless assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring obloquy upon those who are endeavoring faithfully to discharge official duties, exert a baleful influence and deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, it cannot be said that this abuse is greater, and it is believed to be less, than that which characterized the period in which our institutions took shape. Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct."


As we stated only the other day in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, -- U. S. --, "any prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity."

The Government says that it has inherent powers to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect that national interest, which in this case is alleged to be national security.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, repudiated that expansive doctrine in no uncertain terms.

The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embar[r]assing to the powers-that-be. See Emerson, The System of Free Expressions, c. V (1970); Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, c. XIII (1941). The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle. A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. That debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress.

Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions there should be "open and robust debate." New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269-270.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Post case, vacate the stay of the Court of Appeals in the Times case and direct that it affirm the District Court.

The stays in these cases that have been in effect for more than a week constitute a flouting of the principles of the First Amendment as interpreted in Near v. Minnesota.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

I

I write separately in these cases only to emphasize what should be apparent: that our judgment in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government. So far as I can determine, never before has the United States sought to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information in its possession. The relative novelty of the questions presented, the necessary haste with which decisions were reached, the magnitude of the interests asserted, and the fact that all the parties have concentrated their arguments upon the question whether permanent restraints were proper may have justified at least some of the restraints heretofore imposed in these cases. Certainly it is difficult to fault the several courts below for seeking to as[s]ure that the issues here involved were preserved for ultimate review by this Court. But even if it be assumed that some of the interim restraints were proper in the two cases before us, that assumption has no bearing upon the propriety of similar judicial action in the future. To begin with, there has now been ample time for reflection and judgment; whatever values there may be in the preservation of novel questions for appellate review may not support any restraints in the future. More important, the First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these cases.

II

The error which has pervaded these cases from the outset was the granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise. The entire thrust of the Government's claim throughout these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined "could," or "might," or "may" prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. [i] Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overrid[d]en. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation "is at war," Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919), during which times "no one would question but that a Government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,716 (1931). Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature. "The chief purpose of [the First Amendment's] guarantee [is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v. Minnesota, supra, at 713. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient: for if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. And therefore, every restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment-and none the less so because that restraint was justified as necessary to afford the court an opportunity to examine the claim more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may issue.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring.

In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative [1] and Judicial [2] branches, has been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age. For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States possesses vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a prime minister of a country with a parliamentary form of government.

In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry -- in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.

Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept. And within our own executive departments, the development of considered and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.

I think there can be but one answer to this dilemma, if dilemma it be. The responsibility must be where the power is. [3] If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power successfully. It is an awesome responsibility, requiring judgment and wisdom of a high order. I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained. But be that as it may, it is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive -- is a matter of sovereign p[r]erogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law -- through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.

This is not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play. Undoubtedly Congress has the power to enact specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets. Congress has passed such laws, and several of them are of very colorable relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases. And if a criminal prosecution is instituted, it will be the responsibility of the courts to decide the applicability of the criminal law under which the charge is brought. Moreover, if Congress should pass a specific law authorizing civil proceedings in this field, the courts would likewise have the duty to decide the constitutionality of such a law as well as its applicability to the facts proved.

But in the cases before us we are asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. I join the judgments of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring.

I concur in today's judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system. I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations. [1] Nor, after examining the materials the Government characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents will do substantial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden which it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.

The Government's position is simply stated: The responsibility of the Executive for the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of the Nation is so basic that the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a newspaper story whenever he can convince a court that the information to be revealed threatens "grave and irreparable" injury to the public interest; [2] and the injunction should issue whether or not the material to be published is classified, whether or not publication would be lawful under relevant criminal statutes enacted by Congress and regardless of the circumstances by which the newspaper came into possession of the information.

At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press. Much of the difficulty inheres in the "grave and irreparable danger" standard suggested by the United States. If the United States were to have judgment under such a standard in these cases, our decision would be of little guidance to other courts in other cases, for the material at issue here would not be available from the Court's opinion or from public records, nor would it be published by the press. Indeed, even today where we hold that the United States has not met its burden, the material remains sealed in court records and it is properly not discussed in today's opinions. Moreover, because the material poses substantial dangers to national interests and because of the hazards of criminal sanctions, a responsible press may choose never to publish the more sensitive materials. To sustain the Government in these cases would start the courts down a long and hazardous road that I am not willing to travel at least without congressional guidance and direction.

It is not easy to reject the proposition urged by the United States and to deny relief on its good-faith claims in these cases that publication will work serious damage to the country. But that discomfiture is considerably dispelled by the infrequency of prior restraint cases. Normally, publication will occur and the damage be done before the Government has either opportunity or grounds for suppression. So here, publication has already begun and a substantial part of the threatened damage has already occurred. The fact of a massive breakdown in security is known, access to the documents by many unauthorized people is undeniable and the efficacy of equitable relief against these or other newspapers to avert anticipated damage is doubtful at best.

What is more, terminating the ban on publication of the relatively few sensitive documents the Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the law either requires or invites newspapers or others to publish them or that they will be immune from criminal action if they do. Prior restraints require an unusually heavy justification under the First Amendment; but failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication. That the Government mistakenly chose to proceed by injunction does not mean that it could not successfully proceed in another way.

When the Espionage Act was under consideration in 1917, Congress eliminated from the bill a provision that would have given the President broad powers in time of war to proscribe, under threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various categories of information related to the national defense. [3] Congress at that time was unwilling to clothe the President with such far-reaching powers to monitor the press, and those opposed to this part of the legislation assumed that a necessary concomitant of such power was the power to "filter out the news to the people through some man." 55 Congo Rec. 2008 (1917) (remarks of Senator Ashurst). However, these same members of Congress appeared to have little doubt that newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed. Senator Ashurst, for example, was quite sure that the editor of such a newspaper "should be punished if he did publish information as to the movements of the fleet, the troops, the aircraft, the location of powder factories, the location of defense works, and all that sort of thing." 55 Congo Rec. 2009 (1917). [4]

The criminal code contains numerous provisions potentially relevant to these cases. Section 797 ~ makes it a crime to publish certain photographs or drawings of military installations. Section 798, [6] also in precise language, proscribes knowing and willful publications of any classified information concerning the cryptographic systems or communication intelligence activities of the United States as well as any information obtained from communication intelligence operations. [7] If any of the material here at issue is of this nature, the newspapers are presumably now on full notice of the position of the United States and must face the consequences if they publish. I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.

The same would be true under those sections of the criminal code casting a wider net to protect the national defense. Section 793 (e) [8] makes it a criminal act for any unauthorized possessor of a document "relating to national defense" either (1) willfully to communicate or cause to be communicated that document to any person not entitled to receive it or (2) willfully to retain the document and fail to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled to receive it. The subsection was added in 1950 because pre-existing law provided no penalty for the unauthorized possessor unless demand for the documents was made. [9] "The dangers surrounding the unauthorized possession of such items are self-evident, and it is deemed advisable to require their surrender in such a case, regardless of demand, especially since their unauthorized possession may be unknown to the authorities who would otherwise make the demand." S. Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950). Of course, in the cases before us, the unpublished documents have been demanded by the United States and their import has been made known at least to counsel for the newspapers involved. In Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 28 (1941), the words "national defense" as used in a predecessor of § 793 were held by a unanimous court to have "a well understood connotation" -- a "generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness" -- and to be "sufficiently definite to apprise the public of prohibited activities" and to be consonant with due process. 312 U. S., at 28. Also, as construed by the Court in Gorin, information "connected with the national defense" is obviously not limited to that threatening "grave and irreparable" injury to the United States. [10]

It is thus clear that Congress has addressed itself to the problems of protecting the security of the country and the national defense from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-586 (1952); see also id., at 593-628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It has not, however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication. It has apparently been satisfied to rely on criminal sanctions and their deterrent effect on the responsible as well as the irresponsible press. I am not, of course, saying that either of these newspapers has yet committed a crime or that either would commit a crime if they published all the material now in their possession. That matter must await resolution in the context of a criminal proceeding if one is instituted by the United States. In that event, the issue of guilt or innocence would be determined by procedures and standards quite different from those that have purported to govern these injunctive proceedings.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

The Government contends that the only issue in this case is whether in a suit by the United States, "the First Amendment bars a court from prohibiting a newspaper from publishing material whose disclosure would pose a grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States." Brief of the Government, at 6. With al1 due respect, I believe the ultimate issue in this case is even more basic than the one posed by the Solicitor General. The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has the power to make law.

In this case there is no problem concerning the President's power to classify information as "secret" or "top secret." Congress has specifical1y recognized Presidential authority, which has been formally exercised in Executive Order 10501, to classify documents and information. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798; 50 U. S. C. § 783. [1] Nor is there any issue here regarding the President's power as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief to protect national security by disciplining employees who disclose information and by taking precautions to prevent leaks.

The problem here is whether in this particular case the Executive Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts to protect what it believes to be the national interest. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 584 (1895). The Government argues that in addition to the inherent power of any government to protect itself, the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander-in-Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. Of course, it is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander-in-Chief. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 93 (1943); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). [2] And in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander-in-Chief there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to "national security," however that term may be defined.

It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of power for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar damage to the basic concept of these coequal branches of Government if when the Executive has adequate authority granted by Congress to protect "national security" it can choose instead to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President execute laws, and courts interpret law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). It did not provide for government by injunction in which the courts and the Executive can "make law" without regard to the action of Congress. It may be more convenient for the Executive if it need only convince a judge to prohibit conduct rather than to ask the Congress to pass a law and it may be more convenient to enforce a contempt order than seek a criminal conviction in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered politically wise to get a court to share the responsibility for arresting those who the Executive has probable cause to believe are violating the law. But convenience and political considerations of the moment do not justify a basic departure from the principles of our system of government.

In this case we are not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to provide the Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from disclosure of damaging state secrets. Congress has on several occasions given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and information. The bulk of these statutes are found to chapter 37 of U. S. c., Title 18, entitled Espionage and Censorship. [3] In that chapter, Congress has provided penalties ranging from a $10,000 fine to death for violating the various statutes.

Thus it would seem that in order for this Court to issue an injunction it would require a showing that such an injunction would enhance the already existing power of the Government to act. See Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. 2d 439 (1938). It is a traditional axiom of equity that a court of equity will not do a useless thing just as it is a traditional axiom that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime. See Z. Chaffe & E. Re, Equity 935-954 (5th ed. 1967); 1 H. Joyce, Injunctions §§ 58-60a (1909). Here there has been no attempt to make such a showing. The Solicitor General does not even mention in his brief whether the Government considers there to be probable cause to believe a crime has been committed or whether there is a conspiracy to commit future crimes.

If the Government had attempted to show that there was no effective remedy under traditional criminal law, it would have had to show that there is no arguably applicable statute. Of course, at this stage this Court could not and cannot determine whether there has been a violation of a particular statute nor decide the constitutionality of any statute. Whether a good-faith prosecution could have been instituted under any statute could, however, be determined.

At least one of the many statutes in this area seems relevant to this case. Congress has provided in 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e) that whoever "having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book ... or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits ... the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e). Congress has also made it a crime to conspire to commit any of the offenses listed in 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e).

It is true that Judge Gurfein found that Congress had not made it a crime to publish the items and material specified in § 793 (e): He found that the words "communicates, delivers, transmits ... " did not refer to publication of newspaper stories. And that view has some support in the legislative history and conforms with the past practice of using the statute only to prosecute those charged with ordinary espionage. But see 103 Congo Rec. 10449 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Judge Gurfein's view of the statute is not, however, the only plausible construction that could be given. See my Brother WHITE'S concurring opinion.

Even if it is determined that the Government could not in good faith bring criminal prosecutions against the New York Times and the Washington Post, it is clear that Congress has specifically rejected passing legislation that would have clearly given the President the power he seeks here and made the current activity of the newspapers unlawful. When Congress specifically declines to make conduct unlawful it is not for this Court to redecide those issues -- to overrule Congress. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 345 U. S. 579 (1952).

On at least two occasions Congress has refused to enact legislation that would have made the conduct engaged in here unlawful and given the President the power that he seeks in this case. In 1917 during the debate over the original Espionage Act, still the basic provisions of § 793, Congress rejected a proposal to give the President in time of war or threat of war authority to directly prohibit by proclamation the publication of information relating to national defense that might be useful to the enemy. The proposal provided that:

"During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy. Whoever violates any such prohibition shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the Government or its representatives or the publication of the same." 55 Congo Rec.1763.


Congress rejected this proposal after war against Germany had been declared even though many believed that there was a grave national emergency and that the threat of security leaks and espionage were serious. The Executive has not gone to Congress and requested that the decision to provide such power be reconsidered. Instead, the Executive comes to this Court and asks that it be granted the power Congress refused to give.

In 1957 the United States Commission on Government Security found that "[a]irplane journals, scientific periodicals, and even the daily newspaper have featured articles containing information and other data which should have been deleted in whole or in part for security reasons." In response to this problem the Commission, which was chaired by Senator Cotton, proposed that "Congress enact legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to disclose without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, information classified 'secret' or 'top secret,' knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to have been so classified." Report of Commission on Government Security 619- 620 (1957). After substantial floor discussion on the proposal, it was rejected. See 103 Congo Rec. 10447-10450. If the proposal that Senator Cotton championed on the floor had been enacted, the publication of the documents involved here would certainly have been a crime. Congress refused, however, to make it a crime. The Government is here asking this Court to remake that decision. This Court has no such power.

Either the Government has the power under statutory grant to use traditional criminal law to protect the country or, if there is no basis for arguing that Congress has made the activity a crime, it is plain that Congress has specifically refused to grant the authority the Government seeks from this Court. In either case this Court does not have authority to grant the requested relief. It is not for this Court to fling itself into every breach perceived by some Government official nor is it for this Court to take on itself the burden of enacting law, especially law that Congress has refused to pass.

I believe that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should be affirmed and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be reversed insofar as it remands the case for further hearings.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 6:57 pm

PART 6 OF 6

Dissenting Opinions

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

So clear are the constitutional limitations on prior restraint against expression, that from the time of Near V. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), until recently in Organization for a Better Austin V. Keefe, -- U.S. -- (1971), we have had little occasion to be concerned with cases involving prior restraints against news reporting on matters of public interest. There is, therefore, little variation among the members of the Court in terms of resistance to prior restraints against publication. Adherence to this basic constitutional principle, however, does not make this case a simple one. In this case, the imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive. Only those who view the First Amendment as an absolute in all circumstances -- a view I respect, but reject -- can find such a case as this to be simple or easy.

This case is not simple for another and more immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the case. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all the facts. No member of this Court knows all the facts.

Why are we in this posture, in which only those judges to whom the First Amendment is absolute and permits of no restraint in any circumstances or for any reason, are really in a position to act?

I suggest we are in this posture because these cases have been conducted in unseemly haste. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN covers the chronology of events demonstrating the hectic pressures under which these cases have been processed and I need not restate them. The prompt setting of these cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action does not mean unjudicial haste.

Here, moreover, the frenetic haste is due in large part to the manner in which the Times proceeded from the date it obtained the purloined documents. It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these cases and was not warranted. The precipitous action of this Court aborting a trial not yet completed is not the kind of judicial conduct which ought to attend the disposition of a great issue.

The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the public right-to-know; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteeship of that right by virtue of its journalist "scoop." The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout of fire in a crowded theater. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota. There are no doubt other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and would have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures. A great issue of this kind should be tried in a judicial atmosphere conducive to thoughtful, reflective deliberation, especially when haste, in terms of hours, is unwarranted in light of the long period the Times, by its own choice, deferred publication.

It is not disputed that the Times has had unauthorized possession of the documents for three to four months, during which it has had its expert analysts studying them, presumably digesting them and preparing the material for publication. During all of this time, the Times, presumably in its capacity as trustee of the public's "right to know," has held up publication for purposes it considered proper and thus public knowledge was delayed. No doubt this was for a good reason; the analysis of 7,000 pages of complex material drawn from a vastly greater volume of material would inevitably take time and the writing of good news stories takes time. But why should the United States Government, from whom this information was illegally acquired by someone, along with all the counsel, trial judges, and appellate judges be placed under needless pressure? After these months of deferral, the acknowledged right-to-know has somehow and suddenly become a right that must be vindicated instanter.

Would it have been unreasonable, since the newspaper could anticipate the government's objections to release of secret material, to give the government an opportunity to review the entire collection and determine whether agreement could be reached on publication? Stolen or not, if security was not in fact jeopardized, much of the material could no doubt have been declassified, since it spans a period ending in 1968. With such an approach -- one that great newspapers have in the past practiced and stated editorially to be the duty of an honorable press -- the newspapers and government might well have narrowed the area of disagreement as to what was and was not publishable, leaving the remainder to be resolved in orderly litigation if necessary. To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret government documents. That duty, I had thought -- perhaps naively -- was to report forthwith, to responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers, Justices and the New York Times. The course followed by the Times, whether so calculated or not, removed any possibility of orderly litigation of the issues. If the action of the judges up to now has been correct, that result is sheer happenstance. [1]

Our grant of the writ before final judgment in the Times case aborted the trial in the District Court before it had made a complete record pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

The consequence of all this melancholy series of events is that we literally do not know what we are acting on. As I see it we have been forced to deal with litigation concerning rights of great magnitude without an adequate record, and surely without time for adequate treatment either in the prior proceedings or in this Court. It is interesting to note that counsel in oral argument before this Court were frequently unable to respond to questions on factual points. Not surprisingly they pointed out that they had been working literally "around the clock" and simply were unable to review the documents that give rise to these cases and were not familiar with them. This Court is in no better posture. I agree with MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN but I am not prepared to reach the merits. [2]

I would affirm the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and allow the District Court to complete the trial aborted by our grant of certiorari meanwhile preserving the status quo in the Post case. I would direct that the District Court on remand give priority to the Times case to the exclusion of all other business of that court but I would not set arbitrary deadlines.

I should add that I am in general agreement with much of what MR. JUSTICE WHITE has expressed with respect to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or information relating to the national defense.

We all crave speedier judicial processes but when judges are pressured as in these cases the result is a parody of the judicial process.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

These cases forcefully call to mind the wise admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197,400-401 (1904):

"Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend."


With all respect, I consider that the Court has been almost irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases.

Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered judgment on June 23. The New York Times' petition for certiorari, its motion for accelerated consideration thereof, and its application for interim relief were filed in this Court on June 24 at about 11 a. m. The application of the United States for interim relief in the Post case was also filed here on June 24, at about 7: 15 p. m. This Court's order setting a hearing before us on June 26 at 11 a. m., a course which I joined only to avoid the possibility of even more peremptory action by the Court, was issued Jess than 24 hours before. The record in the Post case was filed with the Clerk shortly before I p. m. on June 25; the record in the Times case did not arrive until 7 or 8 o'clock that same night. The briefs of the parties were received less than two hours before argument on June 26.

This frenzied train of events took place in the name of the presumption against prior restraints created by the First Amendment. Due regard for the extraordinarily important and difficult questions involved in these litigations should have led the Court to shun such a precipitate timetable. In order to decide the merits of these cases properly, some or all of the following questions should have been faced:

1. Whether the Attorney General is authorized to bring these suits in the name of the United States. Compare In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). This question involves as well the construction and validity of a singularly opaque statute -- the Espionage Act, 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e).

2. Whether the First Amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of stories which would present a serious threat to national security. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum).

3. Whether the threat to publish highly secret documents is of itself a sufficient implication of national security to justify an injunction on the theory that regardless of the contents of the documents harm enough results simply from the demonstration of such a breach of secrecy.

4. Whether the unauthorized disclosure of any of these particular documents would seriously impair the national security.

5. What weight should be given to the opinion of high officers in the Executive Branch of the Government with respect to questions 3 and 4.

6. Whether the newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the Government's possession and that the newspapers received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired. Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F. 2d 489 (CADC 1968).

7. Whether the threatened harm to the national security or the Government's possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance of an injunction against publication in light of --

a. The strong First Amendment policy against prior restraints on publication;

b. The doctrine against enjoining conduct in violation of criminal statutes; and

c. The extent to which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise disseminated.

These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts, [i] and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the judicial process that these great issues -- as important as any that have arisen during my time on the Court -- should have been decided under the pressures engendered by the torrent of publicity that has attended these litigations from their inception.

Forced as I am to reach the merits of these cases, I dissent from the opinion and judgments of the Court. Within the severe limitations imposed by the time constraints under which I have· been required to operate, I can only state my reasons in telescoped form, even though in different circumstances I would have felt constrained to deal with the cases in the fuller sweep indicated above.

It is a sufficient basis for affirming the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Times litigation to observe that its order must rest on the conclusion that because of the time elements the Government had not been given an adequate opportunity to present its case to the District Court. At the least this conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

In the Post litigation the Government had more time to prepare; this was apparently the basis for the refusal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on rehearing to conform its judgment to that of the Second Circuit. But I think there is another and more fundamental reason why this judgment cannot stand -- a reason which also furnishes an additional ground for not reinstating the judgment of the District Court in the Times litigation, set aside by the Court of Appeals. It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dictated by the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitutional system rests.

In a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice John Marshall, then a member of that body, stated:

"The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613 (1800).


From that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-321 (1936), collecting authorities.

From this constitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs, it seems to me that certain conclusions necessarily follow. Some of these were stated concisely by President Washington, declining the request of the House of Representatives for the papers leading up to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty:

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers." [1] J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194-195 (1899).


The power to evaluate the "pernicious influence" of premature disclosure is not, however, lodged in the Executive alone. I agree that, in performance of its duty to protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures, the judiciary must review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power. Constitutional considerations forbid "a complete abandonment of judicial control." Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 8 (1953). Moreover, the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned-here the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense- after actual personal consideration by that officer. This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state. See United States v. Reynolds, supra, at 8 and n. 20; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A. C. 624, 638 (House of Lords).

But in my judgment the judiciary may not properly go beyond these two inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.

"[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J.).


Even if there is some room for the judiciary to override the executive determination, it is plain that the scope of review must be exceedingly narrow. I can see no indication in the opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in the Post litigation that the conclusions of the Executive were given even the deference owing to an administrative agency, much less that owing to a co-equal branch of the Government operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative.

Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on this ground and remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. Before the commencement of such further proceedings, due opportunity should be afforded the Government for procuring from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or both an expression of their views on the issue of national security. The ensuing review by the District Court should be in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. And for the reasons stated above 1 would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Pending further hearings in each case conducted under the appropriate ground rules, I would continue the restraints on publication. I cannot believe that the doctrine prohibiting prior restraints reaches to the point of preventing courts from maintaining the status quo long enough to act responsibly in matters of such national importance as those involved here.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN.

I join MR. JUSTICE HARLAN in his dissent. I also am in substantial accord with much that MR. JUSTICE WHITE says, by way of admonition, in the latter part of his opinion.

At this point the focus is on only the comparatively few documents specified by the Government as critical. So far as the other material -- vast in amount -- is concerned, let it be published and published forthwith if the newspapers, once the strain is gone and the sensationalism is eased, still feel the urge so to do.

But we are concerned here with the few documents specified from the 47 volumes. Almost 70 years ago Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in a celebrated case, observed:

"Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure .... " Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400-401 (1904) .


The present cases, if not great, are at least unusual in their posture and implications, and the Holmes observation certainly has pertinent application.

The New York Times clandestinely devoted a period of three months examining the 47 volumes that came into its unauthorized possession. Once it had begun publication of material from those volumes, the New York case now before us emerged. It immediately assumed, and ever since has maintained, a frenetic pace and character. Seemingly, once publication started, the material could not be made public fast enough. Seemingly, from then on, every deferral or delay, by restraint or otherwise, was abhorrent and was to be deemed violative of the First Amendment and of the public's "right immediately to know." Yet that newspaper stood before us at oral argument and professed criticism of the Government for not lodging its protest earlier than by a Monday telegram following the initial Sunday publication.

The District of Columbia case is much the same.

Two federal district courts, two United States courts of appeals, and this Court -- within a period of less than three weeks from inception until today -- have been pressed into hurried decision of profound constitutional issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts without the careful deliberation that, hopefully, should characterize the American judicial process. There has been much writing about the law and little knowledge and less digestion of the facts. In the New York case the judges, both trial and appellate, had not yet examined the basic material when the case was brought here. In the District of Columbia case, little more was done, and what was accomplished in this respect was only on required remand, with the Washington Post, on the excuse that it was trying to protect its source of information, initially refusing to reveal what material it actually possessed, and with the district court forced to make assumptions as to that possession.

With such respect as may be due to the contrary view, this, in my opinion, is not the way to try a law suit of this magnitude and asserted importance. It is not the way for federal courts to adjudicate, and to be required to adjudicate, issues that allegedly concern the Nation's vital welfare. The country would be none the worse off were the cases tried quickly, to be sure, but in the customary and properly deliberative manner. The most recent of the material, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already about three years ago, and the Times itself took three months to formulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its public for that period.

The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution. Article II of the great document vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in that branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety. Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court. See, tor example, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 708 (1931), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to prevent. Such standards are not yet developed. The parties here are in disagreement as to what those standards should be. But even the newspapers concede that there are situations where restraint is in order and is constitutional. Mr. Justice Holmes gave us a suggestion when he said in Schenck,

"It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." 249 U. S., at 52.


I therefore would remand these cases to be developed expeditiously, of course, but on a schedule permitting the orderly presentation of evidence from both sides, with the use of discovery, if necessary, as authorized by the rules, and with the preparation of briefs, oral argument and court opinions of a quality better than has been seen to this point. In making this last statement, I criticize no lawyer or judge. I know from past personal experience the agony of time pressure in the preparation of litigation. But these cases and the issues involved and the courts, including this one, deserve better than has been produced thus far.

It may well be that if these cases were allowed to develop as they should be developed, and to be tried as lawyers should try them and as courts should hear them, free of pressure and panic and sensationalism, other light would be shed on the situation and contrary considerations, for me, might prevail. But that is not the present posture of the litigation.

The Court, however, decides the cases today the other way. I therefore add one final comment. I strongly urge, and sincerely hope, that these two newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the United States of America. Judge Wilkey, dissenting in the District of Columbia case, after a review of only the affidavits before his court (the basic papers had not then been made available by either party), concluded that there were a number of examples of documents that, if in the possession of the Post, and if published, "could clearly result in great harm to the nation," and he defined "harm" to mean "the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate .... " I, for one, have now been able to give at least some cursory study not only to the affidavits, but to the material itself. I regret to say that from this examination I fear that Judge Wilkey's statements have possible foundation. I therefore share his concern. I hope that damage already has not been done. If, however, damage has been done, and if, with the Court's action today, these newspapers proceed to publish the critical documents and there results therefrom "the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate," to which list I might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners, then the Nation's people will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences rests.

_______________

Notes:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, et al, Defendants. Decision of U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 71 Civ. 2662, June 19, 1971

i. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Decision of U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Docket No. 71-1478, June 23, 1971

1. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).

2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

3. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,282 (1941).

4. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1930).

Supreme Court of the United States, No. 1873 and No. 1885 Decision, June 30, 1971

1. In introducing the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison said: "[But I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed [the Constitution]' disliked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against the encroachments on particular rights .... " 1 Annals of Congress 433 (1834). Congressman Goodhue added: "[I]t is the wish of many of our constituents, that something should be added to the Constitution, to secure in a stronger manner their liberties from the inroads of power." Id., at 426.

2. The other parts were:

"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.

"The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances." 1 Annals of Congress 434 (1834). (Emphasis added.)

3. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 76.

4. Brief for United States, at 12.

5 Compare the views of the Solicitor General with those of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment. When speaking of the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison said: "If they [the first ten amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1834).

6. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937).

1. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 267 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK), 284 (my dissenting opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (my dissenting opinion which MR. JUSTICE BLACK joined); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 339 (separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK which 1 joined); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 293 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK which I joined); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 80 (my concurring opinion which MR. JUSTICE BLACK joined).

2. These papers contain data concerning the communications system of the United States, the publication of which is made a crime. But the criminal sanction is not urged by the United States as the basis of equity power.

3. There are numerous sets of this material in existence and they apparently are not under any controlled custody. Moreover, the President has sent a set to the Congress. We start then with a case where there already is rather wide distribution of the material that is destined for publicity, not secrecy. I have gone over the material listed in the in camera brief of the United States. It is all history, not future events. None of it is more recent than 1968.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

i. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), and similar cases regarding temporary restraints of allegedly obscene materials are not in point. For those cases rest upon the proposition that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957). Here there is no question but that the material sought to be suppressed is within the protection of the First Amendment; the only question is whether, notwithstanding that fact, its publication may be enjoined for a time because of the presence of an overwhelming national interest. Similarly, copyright cases have no pertinence here: the Government is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen in the documents, but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed therein. And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of expression and not the ideas expressed.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring.

1. The President's power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors is of course limited by the requirement of Article II, § 1, of the Constitution that he obtain the advice and consent of the Senate, Article I, § 8, empowers Congress to "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." And, of course, Congress alone can declare war. This power was last exercised almost 30 years ago at the inception of World War II. Since the end of that war in 1945, the Armed Forces of the United States have suffered approximately half a million casualties in various parts of the world.

2. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304; cf. Mora v. McNamara, cert. denied 389 U. S. 934.

3. "It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results. Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first President refused to accede to a request to lay before the House of Representatives the instructions, correspondence and documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty-a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted. "United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, at 320.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring.

1. The Congress has authorized a strain of prior restraints against private parties in certain instances. The National Labor Relations Board routinely issues cease-and-desist orders against employers whom it finds have threatened or coerced employees in the exercise of protected rights. See 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to impose cease-and-desist orders against unfair methods of competition. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b). Such orders can, and quite often do, restrict what may be spoken or written under certain circumstances. See, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 616-620 (1969). Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure the "exclusive right" of authors to their writings, and no one denies that a newspaper can properly be enjoined from publishing the copyrighted works of another. See Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919). Newspapers do themselves rely from time to time on the copyright as a means of protecting their accounts of important events. However, those enjoined under the statutes relating to the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission are private parties, not the press; and when the press is enjoined under the copyright laws the complainant is a private copyright holder enforcing a private right. These situations are quite distinct from the Government's request for an injunction against publishing information about the affairs of government, a request admittedly not based on any statute.

2. The "grave and irreparable danger" standard is that asserted by the Government in this Court. In remanding to Judge Gurfein for further hearings in the Times litigation, five members of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed him to determine whether disclosure of certain items specified with particularity by the Government would "pose such grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States as to warrant their publication being enjoined."

3. "Whoever, in time of war, in violation of reasonable regulations to be prescribed by the President, which he is hereby authorized to make and promulgate, shall publish any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense calculated to be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by a fine ... or by imprisonment .... " 55 Congo Rec. 2100 (1917).

4. Senator Ashurst also urged that " ... 'freedom of the press' means freedom from the restraints of a censor, means the absolute liberty and right to publish whatever you wish; but you take your chances of punishment in the courts of your country for the violation of the laws of libel, slander and treason." 55 Congo Rec. 2005 (1917).

5. Section 797, 18 U. S. C., provides:

"On and after thirty days from the date upon which the President defines any vital military or naval installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under section 795 of this title, whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of the vital military or naval installations or equipment so defined, without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority, unless such photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation has clearly indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper military or naval authority, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."

6. In relevant part 18 U. S. C. § 798 provides:

"(a) Whoever 'knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information --

"(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or

"(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or

"(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or

"(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes --

"Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."

7. The purport of 18 U. S. C. § 798 is clear. Both the House and Senate Reports on the bill, in identical terms, speak of furthering the security of the United States by preventing disclosure of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communication intelligence systems of the United States, and explaining that "[t]his bill makes it a crime to reveal the methods, techniques, and materiel used in the transmission by this Nation of enciphered or coded messages .... Further, it makes it a crime to reveal methods used by this Nation in breaking the secret codes of a foreign nation. It also prohibits under certain penalties the divulging of any information which may have come into this Government's hands as a result of such a code-breaking." H. R. Rep. No. 1895, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1950). The narrow reach of the statute was explained as covering "only a small category of classified matter, a category which is both vital and vulnerable to an almost unique degree." Id., at 2. Existing legislation was deemed inadequate.

"At present two other acts protect this information, but only in a limited way. These are the Espionage Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 217) and the act of June 10, 1933 (48 Stat. 122). Under the first, unauthorized revelation of information of this kind can be penalized only if it can be proved that the person making the revelation did so with an intent to injure the United States. Under the second, only diplomatic codes and messages transmitted in diplomatic codes are protected. The present bill is designed to protect against knowing and willful publication or any other revelation of all important information affecting the United States communication intelligence operations and all direct information about all United States codes and ciphers." Ibid.

Section 798 obviously was intended to cover publications by non-employees of the Government and to ease the Government's burden in obtaining convictions. See H. R. Rep. No. 1895, supra, at 2-5. The identical Senate Report, not cited in parallel in the text of this footnote, is S. Rep. No. Ill, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).

8. Section 793(e) of 18 U. S. C. provides that:

"(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it;" is guilty of an offense punishable by 10 years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both. It should also be noted that 18 U. S. C. § 793 (g), added in 1950, see 64 Stat. 1004-1005 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950), provides that "[i]f two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy."

9. The amendment of § 793 that added subsection (e) was part of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which was in turn Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950. See 64 Stat. 987 (1950). The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee best explains the purposes of the amendment:

"Section 18 of the bill amends section 793 of title 18 of the United States Code (espionage statute). The several paragraphs of section 793 of title 18 are designated as subsections (a) through (g) for purposes of convenient reference. The significant changes which would be made in section 793 of title 18 are as follows:

"(1) Amends the fourth paragraph of section 793, title 18 (subsec. (d) ), to cover the unlawful dissemination of 'information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.' The phrase 'which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation' would modify only 'information relating to the national defense' and not the other items enumerated in the subsection. The fourth paragraph of section 793 is also amended to provide that only those with lawful possession of the items relating to national defense enumerated therein may retain them subject to demand therefor. Those who have unauthorized possession of such items are treated in a separate subsection.

"(2) Amends section 793, title 18 (subsec. (e)), to provide that unauthorized possessors of items enumerated in paragraph 4 of section 793 must surrender possession thereof to the proper authorities without demand. Existing law provides no penalty for the unauthorized possession of such items unless a demand for them is made by the person entitled to receive them. The dangers surrounding the unauthorized possession of such items are self-evident, and it is deemed advisable to require their surrender in such a case, regardless of demand, especially since their unauthorized possession may be unknown to the authorities who would otherwise make the demand. The only difference between subsection (d) and subsection (e) of section 793 is that a demand by the person entitled to receive the items would be a necessary element of an offense under subsection (d) where the possession is lawful, whereas such a demand would not be a necessary element of an offense under subsection (e) where the possession is unauthorized." S. Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 8-9 (1950) (emphasis added).

It seems clear from the foregoing, contrary to the intimations of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in this case, that in prosecuting for communicating or withholding a "document" as contrasted with similar action with respect to "information" the Government need not prove an intent to injure the United States or to benefit a foreign nation but only willful and knowing conduct. The District Court relied on Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941). But that case arose under other parts of the predecessor to § 793, see 312 U.S., at 21-22-parts that imposed different intent standards not repeated in § 793(d) or § 793(e). Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a), (b), and (c). Also, from the fact of subsection (e) and from the context of the act of which it was a part, it seems undeniable that a newspaper, as well as others unconnected with the Government, are vulnerable to prosecution under § 793 (e) if they communicate or withhold the materials covered by that section. The District Court ruled that "communication" did not reach publication by a newspaper of documents relating to the national defense. I intimate no views on the correctness of that conclusion. But neither communication nor publication is necessary to violate the subsection.

10. Also relevant is 18 U.S.C. § 794. Subsection (b) thereof forbids in time of war the collection or publication, with intent that it shall be communicated to the enemy, any information with respect to the movements of military forces, "or with respect to the plans or conduct ... of any naval or military operations ... or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy ...."

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

1. See n. 3, infra.

2. But see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

3. There are several other statutory provisions prohibiting and punishing the dissemination of information, the disclosure of which Congress thought sufficiently imperiled national security to warrant that result. These include 42 U. S. C. §§ 2161 through 2166 relating to the authority of the Atomic Energy Commission to classify and declassify "Restricted Data" ["Restricted Data" is a term of art employed uniquely by the Atomic Energy Act]. Specifically, 42 U. S. C. § 2162 authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to classify certain information. 42 U. S. C. § 2274, subsection (a) provides penalties for a person who "communicates, transmits, or discloses ... with intent to injure the United States or an intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation .... " "Restricted Data." Subsection (b) of § 2274 provides lesser penalties for one who "communicates, transmits, or discloses" such information "with reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation .... " Other sections of Title 42 of the U. S. C. dealing with atomic energy prohibit and punish acquisition, removal, concealment, tampering with, alteration, mutilation, or destruction of documents incorporating "Restricted Data" and provide penalties for employees and former employees of the Atomic Energy Commission, the armed services, contractors and licensees of the Atomic Energy Commission. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2276,2277. Title 50 U. S. C. Appendix § 781 (part of the National Defense Act of 1941, as amended, 55 Stat. 236) prohibits the making of any sketch or other representation of military installations or any military equipment located on any military installation, as specified; and indeed Congress in the National Defense Act conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts over civil actions "to enjoin any violation" thereof. 50 U. S. C. App. § 1152. 50 U. S. C. § 783 (b) makes it unlawful for any officers or employees of the United States or any corporation which is owned by the United States to communicate material which has been "classified" by the President to any person whom that governmental employee knows or has reason to believe is an agent or representative of any foreign government or any Communist organization.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

1. Interestingly the Times explained its refusal to allow the government to examine its own purloined documents by saying in substance this might compromise their sources and informants! The Times thus asserts a right to guard the secrecy of its sources while denying that the Government of the United States has that power.

2. With respect to the question of inherent power of the Executive to classify papers, records and documents as secret, or otherwise unavailable for public exposure, and to secure aid of the courts for enforcement, there may be an analogy with respect to this Court. No statute gives this Court express power to establish and enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be required.

i. The hearing in the Post case before Judge Gesell began at 8 a. m. on June 21, and his decision was rendered, under the hammer of a deadline imposed by the Court of Appeals, shortly before 5 p. In. on the same day. The hearing in the Times case before Judge Gurfein was held on June 18 and his decision was rendered on June 19. The Government's appeals in the two cases were heard by the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Second Circuits, each court sitting en bane, on June 22. Each court rendered its decision on the following afternoon.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 6:59 pm

Appendix 3: Biographies of Key Figures

Biographies of Key Figures in the Vietnam Study

McGEORGE BUNDY


Special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for national security affairs, 1961-66 . . . since 1966, president of the Ford Foundation. Born Boston March 30, 1919 ... graduated from Yale, 1940, majoring in classics and mathematics ran as a Republican for seat on Boston City Council, 1941 served as aide to Adm. Alan G. Kirk, World War II ... foreign-policy adviser to Thomas E. Dewey, Republican Presidential candidate, 1948 ... joined Harvard faculty, 1949 ... became dean of Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1953 . . . named by President Kennedy to White House post . . . often described as principal architect of U.S. Vietnam policy . . . was recalled briefly by President Johnson during the Arab-Israeli crisis in summer of 1967 . . . often seen as a potential secretary of State . . . just as visible -- and controversial -- as foundation head as when directing foreign policy from White House basement office . . . now lives in New York.

WILLIAM PUTNAM BUNDY

From 1951 to end of Johnson Administration, "the other Bundy" held sensitive positions in government departments, from the Central Intelligence Agency to State Department . . . now a senior research associate at Center for International Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and will assume editorship of Foreign Affairs, the quarterly, after October, 1972. Born in Washington, Sept. 24, 1917 . . . earned, bachelor's degree from Yale, 1939; master's from Harvard, 1940; law degree from Harvard, 1947 . . . married to a daughter of Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State ... practiced law, Washington, 1947-51 ... a Democrat ... with the C.I.A., 1951-61 ... served consecutively as Assistant and Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961-64 ... Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1964-69 ... always, compared with younger brother McGeorge, an anonymous figure . . . lives in Cambridge, Mass.

NGO DINH DIEM

Premier, South Vietnam, 1954-55; President, 1955-63; until death during overthrow Nov. 1, 1963. Born Quangbinh, near Hue, Jan. 3, 1901 ... graduated from School of Administration, Hue ... entered civil service . . . rose to district administrator . . . Minister of Interior in Cabinet of Emperor Bao Dai, 1933 ... resigned on learning Government was controlled by French . . . declared subversive by French in 1942, he fled to Saigon, 1944 ... refused Japanese offer to head puppet government, March, 1945 ... refused offer to work with Hanoi regime, 1945 ... began seeking some autonomy for Vietnam ... fled country, 1950 ... during exile, 1951-52, lived at Maryknoll Seminary, Lakewood, N. J., 1951-52 returned Saigon as Premier in Bao Dai Government, 1954 elected President in referendum making Vietnam a republic, 1955 ... won second five-year term 1961 ... survived several coup attempts . . . shot to death after accepting safe-conduct offer.

PHAM VAN DONG

Led Vietminh delegation to Geneva, 1954; in North Vietnam hierarchy thereafter and Premier since 1955 ... born Quangngai, coastal region in South, 1906 ... entered University of Hanoi, 1925 ... led student strike, fled to China ... joined Vietnamese political emigres, including Ho Chi Minh, in Canton . . . sent back to Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh on secret mission arrested, imprisoned on island of Poulo Condore, 1929-36 worked to establish Communist movement in North and South fled to south China, 1939 ... with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, founded Vietminh, 1941; finance minister, 1945, in first Ho Chi Minh government . . . named chief negotiator with French at Fontainebleau, 1946 premier, 1949 ... guerrilla commander in Quangngai, 1951 chief Geneva negotiator, 1954 ... regarded as "the best nephew" of "Uncle" Ho Chi Minh, called "my other self" by Ho ... formulator of North Vietnam's "four points" for peace ... sophisticated, articulate, a skilled diplomat.

LE DUAN

Vietcong organizer, nineteen-fifties; Secretary, Lao Dong (Communist) party Central Committee for the Southern Region, 1956; Secretary General Lao Dong party, 1959; since 1960, First Secretary of party ... born into peasant family, Quangtri province in central Vietnam, 1908 ... worked as secretary with railways, Hanoi ... given 20-year prison term for subversive activities, 1930 . . . released 1936, resumed political work for Indochinese Communist Party ... given 10-year sentence, 1940 ... released on Vietminh take-over 1945 ... led guerrillas against French in South starting 1946 commissioner at Vietminh's military headquarters in South, 1952 rose in party, named First Secretary, September, 1960 ... led Hanoi delegation to 1967 50th-anniversary celebrations in Moscow ... since Ho Chi Minh's death, has emerged as "first among equals" in collective leadership . . . has sponsored popular economic reforms ... advocates "protracted war" strategy ... said to be self-effacing, pragmatic ...

MICHAEL VINCENT FORRESTAL

White House specialist on Vietnam 1962-65 ... in private law practice New York now ... newly elected chairman of board, Metropolitan Opera Guild. Born Nov. 26, 1927, in New York ... graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy ... studies at Princeton interrupted to serve on staff of W. Averell Harriman at Paris headquarters of Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-50 ... his father, late James V. Forrestal, was the first Secretary of Defense ... received law degree from Harvard, 1953 and practiced in New York till 1960 ... returned to firm of Shearman & Sterling, where he is partner, in 1965 ... as Kennedy and Johnson aide, served on National Security Council ... in July, 1964, appointed chairman White House interdepartmental Vietnam coordinating committee ... accompanied Mrs. John F. Kennedy on 1967 visit to Cambodia ... early supporter of the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's Presidential bid . . . member Council on Foreign Relations ... lives in New York.

PAUL DONAL HARKINS

United States commander, Vietnam, 1962-64; now adviser to American Security Council, private "research" group, Boston. Born Boston, May 15, 1904 ... graduated U.S. Military Academy, 1929 ... deputy chief of staff, Western Task Force, North African invasion, 1942 ... deputy chief of staff, Third Army then 15th Army ... a protege of Gen. George S. Patton Jr .... commandant of cadets, West Point, 1948-51 ... chief of staff, Eighth Army, Korea, 1951-53 ... commander, 45th and 24th Infantry Divisions, Korea, December, 1953-54 ... Pentagon service, 1954-57 ... deputy commander, chief of staff U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 1960- 62 ... first commander, Military Assistance Command, Saigon, 1962-64 . . . consistently optimistic in his assessment of war ... strong support of Ngo Dinh Diem ... has said "biggest" U.S. mistake in Vietnam "was when we stopped backing Diem" . . . during his tenure, had sharp differences with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge ... retired 1964 ... moved to Dallas, 1965.

ROGER HILSMAN JR.

Director of State Department bureau of intelligence and research, 1961-63, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1963-64; ... since 1964, professor of government, Columbia University. Born Waco, Tex., Nov. 23, 1919 ... graduated U.S. Military Academy, 1943 ... master's degree, Yale, 1950 ... Ph.D., Yale, 1951 ... served with Merrill's Marauders, Burma, 1944 ... commanded O.S.S. guerilla group, Burma, 1944- 45 ... assistant chief Far East Intelligence, O.S.S., Washington, 1945-46 . . . assistant to executive officer, C.I.A., 1946-47 . . . State Department, NATO affairs, 1950-53 ... Center for International Studies, Princeton, 1953-55 ... deputy director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, 1956- 58 ... research associate, Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, international-affairs lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1957-61 ... director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1961-63 Assistant Secretary of State, 1963-64 ... resigned, 1964 author of "To Move a Nation," 1967, others ... said after resignation he thought U.S. could not win "a total victory" in South Vietnam ... now lives New York City, and Lyme, Conn.

NGUYEN KHANH

South Vietnam's Premier -- on and off -- from February, 1964, through Mid-February, 1965 ... since 1968 in exile in Paris. Born in Travinh, South Vietnam, Nov. 8, 1927 ... educated military academy at Dalat, 1950, also in France, at U.S. Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. . . . fought as guerrilla against French sent to Saigon on mission ... joined French colonial forces paratrooper, reached rank of major ... helped foil 1960 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem ... stayed on sidelines during 1963 coup ... ousted Gen. Duong Van Minh Jan. 30, 1964 ... in August, assumed dictatorial powers ... forced out ... remained Army chief . . . led coup against incumbent . . . survived coup attempt February . . . deposed as commander in chief by military . . . sent abroad as roving ambassador . . . a Buddhist, but not popular with Buddhists ... short, jaunty, goateed ... liked to wear paratrooper's red beret ... fond of saying; "I am a fighter."

VICTOR HAROLD KRULAK

Pentagon counterinsurgency expert, 1961-64; since July, 1968, president of Copley News Service, San Diego, Calif. . .. born Denver, Jan. 7, 1913 ... graduate of Annapolis, 1934 ... nicknamed "the Brute" because of short stature, unbrutish appearance ... served with Fleet Marine Corps, 1935-39 ... battalion and regimental commander, World War II . . . chief of staff, First Marine Division, Korean conflict commanding general, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego special assistant to director, Joint Staff Counterinsurgency and Special Activities Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1961-64 ... commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 1964 till May, 1968, when he retired as lieutenant general . . . known as corps theoretician and leading strategic planner, had been considered prime contender for commandant in late 1967 ... awarded Navy Cross, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Vietnam's Medal of Merit and Cross of Gallantry, among others ... living in San Diego.

EDWARD LANSDALE

United States Air Force officer, 1947-63; political adviser, South Vietnam, 1954-56; special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, 1965-68. Born Detroit, Feb. 6, 1908 ... studied at University of California, Los Angeles ... in late nineteen-forties, was adviser to President Ramon Magsaysay of Philippines . . . helped put down Communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion there . . . developed basic concept that Communist revolution best opposed by democratic revolution ... went to South Vietnam, as Central Intelligence Agency operative, 1954 ... helped establish Ngo Dinh Diem regime ... believed to be model for "Colonel Hillandale" in the novel "The Ugly American" and for "Pyle" in "The Quiet American" ... urged creation of Vietnam counterinsurgency force instead of conventional army . . . reassigned to Pentagon, 1956 ... reportedly helped develop Special Forces ... retired 1963 with rank of major general ... returned Saigon, 1965, as special assistant for pacification under Mr. Lodge . . . his known activities included supervising "rural reconstruction" ... serving as liaison between embassy and Vietnamese . . . well known but mysterious . . . described as irreplaceable . . . reticent about his own role ... returned United States 1968 . . . in private life, still does magazine writing on Vietnam and counterinsurgency . lives in Alexandria, Va.

HENRY CABOT LODGE

Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1963-64 and 1965-67 ... now, since June, 1970, President Nixon's special envoy to the Vatican ... born July 5, 1902, Nahant, Mass .... graduated from Harvard, 1924 ... worked for The Boston Transcript and The New York Herald Tribune ... two terms in Massachusetts Legislature, 1933-36 ... defeated James M. Curley for Senate seat, 1936 . took leave of absence to serve in Army during World War II . won re-election, then resigned from Senate to return to Army duty ... won Bronze Star, Croix de Guerre, others ... elected to Senate again, 1946 ... influential in persuading Eisenhower to seek Presidency and served as his campaign manager . . . lost Senate seat, 1952, to John F. Kennedy ... appointed U.S. representative at the U.N., 1953 ... G.O.P. vice-presidential candidate, 1960 ... U.S. Ambassador, Saigon, August, 1963-July 1964, August, 1965-67 . .. Ambassador at Large, 1967-68 ... Ambassador to Germany. 1968-69 ... chief U.S. negotiator, Paris peace talks, January-December, 1969.

JOHN T. McNAUGHTON

Mr. McNaughton a close and trusted associate of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara from 1961 to 1967, and his wife and their younger son died in plane collision near Asheville, N.C., July 19, 1967, a week before he was to be sworn in as Secretary of Navy. Born Nov. 21, 1921, in Bicknell, Ind .... graduated from DePauw University, 1942 ... served four years in Navy during World War II ... graduated from Harvard Law School, 1948 . . . studied at Oxford as Rhodes scholar, working with European Cooperation Administration in Paris during vacations . . . also wrote for Pekin (Ill.) Times, owned by father . . . two years as editor of that paper ... returned to Harvard as assistant professor, 1953, professor, 1956 ... chosen by Mr. McNamara in 1961 to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs ... general counsel to Defense Department, 1962 ... Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964-67, heading Pentagon's foreign-affairs planning staff.

NGO DINH NHU

Headed secret apparatus of Ngo Dinb Diem Government, 1954- 63 until his death during overthrow of Diem, his brother, on Nov. 1. Born about 1911 near Hue into distinguished Roman Catholic family ... one of five brothers in Ngo family ... was chief archivist; Indochina library, early forties ... married, 1943 ... separated from family during war . . . he and wife organized support for return from exile of Ngo Dinh Diem ... Nhu ran a newspaper, developed philosophy of "personalism" -- blend of religions and autocracy -- that was said to be pervasive influence on Diem's rule . . . when Diem assumed power, Nhu became known as an "Oriental Richelieu" ... controlled secret police ... he and wife were said to be strong anti-Buddhist influence on Diem ... Mr. Nhu was quiet, persuasive ... Nhus prime target for discontent that led to overthrow of Diem regime ... Mr. Nhu shot to death with brother as they were leaving the country under safe-conduct.

TRAN LE XUAN NHU

Sister-in-law of President Diem and, with her husband, in charge of secret police . . . was considered one of most powerful figures in South Vietnam during '50s and until husband and brother-in-law were killed in November, 1963 has since lived in enforced exile, first in Rome, now in Paris grants occasional interviews for which current rates are $3,000 for first 30 minutes and $2,000 for each succeeding half hour ... born "about" 46 years ago into wealthy, aristocratic Buddhist family ... name means "tears of spring" ... educated at Lycee Marie Curie in Saigon and Albert Sarraut Lycee in Hanoi ... married Ngo Dinh Nhu at 18 and converted to Catholicism and her husband's militant anti- Communism . . . when Diem, a bachelor, became President in 1954, she became official first lady . . . also was elected to Constituent Assembly ... was responsible for legislation abolishing polygamy, concubinage, divorce . . . founded and led Vietnamese Women's Solidarity Movement, a women's paramilitary force ... said after self-immolation of several Buddhist monks: "I would clap hands at seeing another monk barbecue show ... " was noted for her beauty, imperiousness and fierce intolerance of dissent, nicknamed the "Dragon Lady" by some, compared to Joan of Arc -- or Lucretia Borgia -- by others ... after coup lived in villa outside Rome for several years with her four children ... eldest daughter was killed in automobile crash in 1967.

JAMES BLAIR SEABORN

Served as secret envoy to Hanoi for United States Government in 1964 while Canada's representative on International Control Commission; now Assistant Deputy Minister in Canadian Consumer Affairs Department. Born 1924 ... received bachelor's and master's degrees in political economics from University of Toronto ... served in Canadian Embassy in The Hague, then as First Secretary at Paris embassy, 1957-59 ... as Counselor in Moscow embassy, 1959-62 . . . in 1962-64 in Ottawa as the head of Eastern European section of Department of External Affairs . . . Canadian Commissioner, International Commission for Supervision and Control, Vietnam, 1964-65 ... returned to Department of External Affairs as head of Eastern European section, 1966-67, then as head Far Eastern section, 1967-70 ... lived in Ottawa.

WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW

As President Johnson's national security adviser, was ardent supporter -- some say master planner -- of Administration's Vietnam policy ... since spring of 1969 has been professor of economics and history at University of Texas ... born Oct., 1916, graduated from Yale and spent two years at Oxford on Rhodes scholarship, getting Yale doctorate in 1940 ... began teaching career as economics instructor at Columbia . . . during World War II, served in Office of Strategic Services; post-war, taught history at Oxford and Cambridge and was professor of economic history at M.I.T., 1950-1960 ... became deputy special assistant to President Kennedy for national security affairs in 1961; counselor to State Department's Policy Planning Council, 1961-66, President Johnson's special assistant for national security, 1966-69 ... now lives in Austin, Tex.

ULYSSES S. GRANT SHARP JR.

Commander in chief, Pacific forces, 1964-68; since 1968, business consultant. Born Fort Benton, Mont., April 2, 1906 ... graduated from United States Naval Academy, 1927 ... destroyer commander, Casablanca landings and Pacific, World War II ... fleet planning officer for Inchon invasion, Korean war ... promoted to admiral, 1963 ... succeeded Adm. Harry D. Felt as commander in chief, all U.S. forces, Pacific, 1964 ... urged U.S. to "increase our pressures" on North Vietnam, 1967 ... said bombing limitation "would just prolong the war," 1968 . retired July, 1968 ... succeeded by Adm. John S. McCain . awarded two Silver Stars, two Bronze Stars among others . . . a Rotarian, eager golfer ... lives in San Diego.

MAXWELL DAVENPORT TAYLOR

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64; United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-65; special consultant to the President, 1965-69 ... now on the board of the Institute for Defense Analyses, chairman of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Born Keytesville, Mo., Aug. 26, 1901 ... graduated from United States Military Academy, 1922 ... Command and General Staff School, 1933 ... Army War College, 1940 ... taught French, Spanish, at West Point . . . assistant military attache, Pekin, 1937 ... commander 101st Airborne Division, World War II ... took part invasions Normandy, Holland ... Superintendent United States Military Academy, 1945-49 ... United States Commander, Berlin, 1950 ... Commander of Eighth Army, Korea, 1953 ... Army Chief of Staff, 1955 ... resigned 1959 in "limited war" strategy dispute . . . recalled as adviser by President Kennedy, 1961 was influential in both Kennedy, Johnson Administrations scholarly, much-decorated . . . now living in Chevy Chase, Md.

NGUYEN VAN THANH (HO CHI MINH)

Leader of long struggle against French colonialism, was President of North Vietnam from 1945 until his death of heart attack in September, 1969 ... born May 19, 1890, in Kimlien, in central Vietnam, son of an ardent nationalist . . . attended high school at Lycee Quoc-Hoc in Hue, leaving without diploma in 1910 . . . sailed for Europe as galley boy on French ship, visiting various ports ... worked at Carlton Hotel in London ... during World War I, visited U.S., then returned to France, emerging as self-appointed spokesman for Vietnam at 1919 Versailles peace conference . . . founding member of French Communist party, visited Moscow in 1922 ... active in underground activities in Southeast Asia, and was sentenced to death in absentia by the French in 1930 ... returned to Vietnam in 1940 and organized Vietminh, then a coalition of anti-Japanese forces, both Communists and nationalists, that carried on guerrilla war against the Japanese .... at end of war, proclaimed Vietnam's independence, but battled nine more years for this to become a fact. . . . under Geneva accords, became president and premier of that part of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel . . . lived modestly and was known as Uncle Ho ... wrote poetry and described as courtly, sophisticated and gentle in manner . . . in one poem, written in jail, he said: "The rice grain suffers under the blows of the pestle;/ But admire its whiteness once the ordeal is over!/ Thus it is with men in the world we live in;/ To be a man, one must suffer the blows of misfortune."

WILLIAM CHILDS WESTMORELAND

U.S. military commander, Vietnam, 1964-68; since then, Army Chief of Staff. Born Spartanburg County, S. c., March 26, 1914 . . . studied at The Citadel, South Carolina military college . . . graduated from U.S. Military Academy, 1936 Harvard University Advanced Management Program, 1954 first combat experience leading artillery battalion, Casablanca landing, 1942 ... saw action in Tunisia and Sicily ... landed on Utah Beach, Normandy, D-Day, with Ninth Infantry Division ... commander, Sixth Infantry Regiment, Germany, 1945 ... chief of staff, 82d Airborne Division, 1947-50 ... instructor, Command and General Staff College and Army War College, 1950-52 ... commanded 187th Airborne combat team, South Korea 1956, promoted to major general, youngest in the Army commander, 101st Airborne Division, 1958-60 . . . superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, 1960-63 ... once said: "Command is getting people to go the way you want them to go -- enthusiastically" ... succeeded Gen. Paul D. Harkins as head of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, June 20, 1964 replaced on July 2, 1968, by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr. considered a consistent optimist about progress in Vietnam occasionally rumored under consideration as political candidate . . . a former Eagle Scout, enthusiastic about Boy Scouts, a member-at-large of group's national council . . . decorations include Distinguished Service Medal, Bronze Star, Thailand's Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant, Vietnam's Chuong My medal ... starts day at Pentagon at 8 A.M. precisely.

EARLE GILMORE WHEELER

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1964-70; since 1970, retired to his West Virginia farm. Born Jan. 13, 1908, Washington ... graduated U.S. Military Academy, 1932 . . . joined National Guard at new division in U.S. ... director, joint staff, 1960-62 ... assigned to brief John Kennedy weekly on military matters during 1960 Presidential campaign ... Protege of Maxwell D. Taylor, whom he succeeded as Chairman of J.C.S., 1964 ... sole service chief to support McNamara endorsement of test-ban treaty, 1963 ... on Vietnam war, once told interviewer "If we just keep up the pressure those little guys will crack" . . . held top post longer than anyone else, under two Presidents, three Defense Secretaries ... retired with disability because of heart ailment ... now living on 180-acre farm, Martinsburg, W. Va.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 7:00 pm

Index of Key Documents

Chapter 1. The Truman and Eisenhower Years: 1945·1960


#1 Report of Ho's Appeals to U.S. in '46 to Support Independence, page 27

#2 1952 Policy Statement by U.S. on Goals in Southeast Asia, page 28

#3 Eisenhower Committee's Memo on French Requests for Aid, page 33

#4 '54 Report by Special Committee on the Threat of Communism, page 36

#5 Dillon Cable to Dulles on Appeal for Air Support at Dienbienphu, page 39

#6 Dulles Cable Barring Intervention, page 40

#7 Dillon Reply on French Reaction, page 41

#8 Memo of Eisenhower-Dulles Talk on the French Cease-Fire Plan, page 41

#9 Eisenhower's Instructions to U.S. Envoy at Geneva Talks, page 43

#10 1954 Study by the Joint Chiefs on Possible U.S. Intervention, page 45

#11 Cable by Dulles on Negotiations at Geneva on Vietnam Elections, page 47

#12 Chinese Communists' Position on a Neutralized Indochina, page 48

#13 Details on Chinese Informant, page 50

#14 "Final Declaration" at Geneva Conference and U.S. Statement Renouncing Use of Force, page 50

#15 Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in '54 and '55, page 54

Chapter 3. The Kennedy Years: 1961-1963

#16 U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis of Threats to Saigon Regime, page 120

# 17 Memo from Rostow to Kennedy with Nine Proposals for Action, page 123

# 18 Vietnam "Program of Action" by Kennedy's Task Force, page 124

#19 '61 Memo from the Joint Chiefs on Commitment of U.S. Forces, page 130

#20 U.S. Approval, in 1961, of Steps to Strengthen South Vietnam, page 131

#21 Report by Vice President Johnson on His Visit to Asian Countries, page 132

#22 Lansdale Memo for Taylor on Unconventional Warfare, page 135

#23 Cable on Diem's Treaty Request, page 143

#24 Note on a Plan for Intervention, page 144

#25 1961 Request by South Vietnam for U.S. Combat Forces, page 145

#26 Cable from Taylor to Kennedy on Introduction of U.S. Troops, page 146

#27 Taylor's Summary of Findings on His Mission to South Vietnam, page 149

#28 Evaluation and Conclusions of Taylor's Report on Vietnam, page 151

#29 Conclusions of McNamara on Report by General Taylor, page 153

#30 1961 Rusk-McNamara Report to Kennedy on South Vietnam, page 155

#31 Memo from Joint Chiefs Urging a Greater Role in South Vietnam, page 158

#32 State Department Study in Late '62 on Prospects in South Vietnam, page 160

Chapter 4. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem: May-November, 1963

#33 Notes on Kennedy Meeting on Diem Regime in July, 1963, page 197

#34 Intelligence Estimate on '63 Unrest, page 199

#35 Washington Message to Lodge on Need to Remove Nhus, page 200

#36 Lodge's Reply to Washington, page 201

#37 C.I.A. Aide's Cable to Chief on Contact with Saigon Generals, page 201

#38 C.I.A. Station Chief's Cable on Coup Prospects in Saigon, page 202

#39 Lodge Cable to Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward a Coup, page 203

#40 Rusk Cable to Lodge on Views of National Security Council, page 204

#41 Further Rusk Cable to Lodge on Diem-Nhu Relationship, page 205

#42 Lodge's Response to Rusk on Diem's Closeness to Brother, page 207

#43 Cable by U.S. General in Saigon to Taylor on End of August Plot, page 208

#44 Memo on Washington Meeting in Aftermath of August Plot, page 208

#45 White House Cable to Lodge on Pressure for Saigon Reforms, page 212

#46 Lodge Cable to Kennedy on Means of Bringing Reforms, page 214

#47 McNamara-Taylor Report on Mission to South Vietnam, page 217

#48 Lodge Message on Meeting of C.I.A. Agent with Gen. Minh, page 219

#49 Further Lodge Comments to Rusk, page 221

#50 Kennedy Position on Coup Plots, page 221

#51 White House Cable for Lodge on Response to Gen. Minh, page 222

#52 Lodge Message to Bundy on Dealings with Generals, page 223

#53 Bundy's Reply on Coup Hazards, page 225

#54 Harkins Message to Taylor Voicing Doubts on Plot, page 225

#55 Further Harkins Comments to General Taylor, page 227

#56 Bundy Cable to Lodge Voicing White House Concern, page 230

#57 Lodge Response to Bundy on Letting Coup Plan Proceed, page 232

#58 Further Bundy Instructions to Lodge on Contingency Plans, page 236

#59 Lodge's Last Talk with Diem, page 238

#60 Order by Johnson Reaffirming Kennedy's Policy on Vietnam, page 238

Chapter 5. The Covert War and Tonkin Gulf: February-August, 1964

#61 McNamara Report to Johnson on the Situation in Saigon in '63, page 279

#62 '64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff Discussing Widening of the War, page 282

#63 '64 McNamara Report on Steps to Change the Trend of the War, page 285

#64 U.S. Order for Preparations for Some Retaliatory Action, page 291

#65 Cable from President to Lodge on Escalation Contingencies, page 293

#66 Draft Resolution for Congress on Actions in Southeast Asia, page 294

#67 Cable from Taylor Warning on the "March North" Campaign, page 296

#68 U.S. Note to Canada on Points for Envoy to Relay to Hanoi, page 297

#69 Summary of Taylor's Report Sent to McNamara by Joint Chiefs, page 299

#70 William Bundy Memo on Actions Available to U.S. after Tonkin, page 302

#71 Pacific Commander's Evaluation of Washington's Action Scenario, page 306

#72 Memo from the Joint Chiefs on September's Covert Raids, page 308

#73 State Department Aide's Report on Actions Taken after Tonkin, page 310

Chapter 6. The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam: August, 1964-February, 1965

#74 Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy on Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire, page 354

#75 Saigon Embassy's Response on Drawbacks in Laos Talks, page 355

#76 U.S. Mission's Recommendations on Further Military Steps, page 358

#77 Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos on Search and Rescue Flights, page 362

#78 Joint Chiefs' Recommendations on Military Courses of Action, page 363

#79 Plan of Action Attributed to McNaughton at Pentagon, page 364

#80 Top Aides' Proposal to Johnson on Military Steps in Late '64, page 366

#81 Memo on Johnson's Approval of Renewed Naval Operations, page 368

#82 Report of Meeting of U.S. Envoys to Review Operations in Laos, page 369

#83 Cable Authorizing Air Strikes on Laos Infiltration Routes, page 371

#84 William Bundy Draft on Handling World and Public Opinion, page 372

#85 McNaughton's November Draft on Vietnam Aims and Choices, page 374

#86 View of Chiefs' Representative on Options Band C, page 377

#87 Taylor's Briefing of Key Officials on Situation in November '64, page 379

# 88 Final Draft Position Paper Produced by Working Group, page 382

#89 Account of Taylor's Meeting with Saigon Generals on Unrest, page 388

Chapter 7. The Launching of the Ground War: March-July, 1965

#90 Letter from Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S., page 428

#91 Memo from Rostow Advocating Ground Troops and Air Attacks, page 429

#92 McGeorge Bundy Memo to Johnson on "Sustained Reprisal" Policy, page 433

#93 White House Cable to Taylor on the Rolling Thunder Decision, page 438

#94 Draft by William Bundy on Results of Policy in '65, page 439

#95 Cable to U.S. Envoys in Asia Announcing Sustained Bombing, page 441

#96 McNaughton Draft for McNamara on "Proposed Course of Action", page 442

#97 McCone Memo to Top Officials on Effectiveness of Air War, page 450

#98 April, '65, Order Increasing Ground Force and Shifting Mission, page 452

#99 Taylor Cable to Washington on Step-Up in Ground Forces, page 453

#100 Johnson's Message to Taylor on the May 10 Halt in Bombing, page 456

#101 Rostow Memorandum on "Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars", page 457

#102 Prime Minister Wilson's Warning to Johnson on Petroleum Raids, page 458

#103 George Ball Memo for Johnson on "A Compromise Solution", page 459

#104 McNaughton Memo to Goodpaster on "Forces Required to Win", page 465

#105 McNamara's Memo on July 20, 1965, on Increasing Allied Ground Force, page 466

Chapter 8. The Buildup: July, 1965, September, 1966

#106 State Department Memorandum in November on Bombing Pause, page 497

#107 Notes on McNamara Memorandum for Johnson after Vietnam Visit, page 498

#108 Notes from McNamara Memo on Course of War in 1966, page 500

#109 Further McNaughton Memo on Factors in Bombing Decision, page 502

#110 McNaughton Memo for McNamara on Anti-Infiltration Barrier Plan, page 504

#111 Johnson's Remarks to Officials of U.S. and Saigon at Honolulu, page 506

#112 Memo on Pentagon Meeting Following up Honolulu Session, page 507

#113 Rostow's Memo on Bombing of Hanoi's Petroleum Facilities, page 510

#114 Joint Chiefs' Order to Begin Bombing of Hanoi's Oil Facilities, page 510

# 115 August McNamara Memo to Chiefs Challenging Troop Request, page 511

#116 Cable from Westmoreland in August on Manpower Needs, page 512

# 117 Vietnam Bombing Evaluation by Institute for Defense Analyses, page 513

Chapter 9. Secretary McNamara's Disenchantment, October, 1966-May, 1967

#118 McNamara Memo of Oct. 14, 1966, Opposing Increase in War Effort, page 554

#119 Joint Chiefs' Memo Disputing McNamara View on Bombing, page 564

#120 McNamara Draft Memorandum for Johnson in November, '66, page 565

#121 Komer Report to Johnson after February Trip to Vietnam, page 567

#122 Westmoreland's March 18 Memo on Increase in Forces, page 568

#123 March 28 Westmoreland Cable to Joint Chiefs on Troop Needs, page 572

#124 Joint Chiefs' April 20 Report to McNamara on Troop Needs, page 577

#125 Notes on Johnson Discussion with Wheeler and Westmoreland, page 579

#126 McGeorge Bundy's Memorandum to Johnson in May on Bombing, page 581

#127 May 4 Memo on Force Levels by Systems-Analysis Chief, page 584

#128 Rostow Memorandum of May 6 on the Bombing Program, page 585

#129 Secretary McNamara's Position of May 19 on Bombing and Troops, page 589

#130 William Bundy's May 30 Memo on Reasons for U.S. Involvement, page 598

Chapter 10. The Tet Offensive and the Turnaround

# 131 Adm. Sharp's Progress Report on War at End of 1967, page 626

# 132 Wheeler's '68 Report to Johnson after the Tet Offensive, page 628

# 133 Orientation Memo for Clifford Telling How Targets Are Chosen, page 634

# 134 Cable to Envoys in Asia on Day of Johnson's De-escalation Speech, page 635
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 7:00 pm

Glossary

AA: Air America; or antiaircraft
AAA: antiaircraft artillery
ABM: antiballistic missile
AFB: Air Force Base
AID: Agency for International
Development
Airops: air operations
AMB: ambassador
ARVN: Army of the Republic of
(South) Vietnam
ASA: (U.S.) Army Security
Agency
ASAP: as soon as possible
ASW: antisubmarine warfare

Ball: George W. Ball, Under
Secretary of State, 1961-66
Bao Dai: Emperor of Vietnam, use
1932-55
BAR: Browning automatic rifle
Barrel Roll: Code name for operation,
U.S. air strikes against
Laotian infiltration routes and
facilities
B-57: name of U.S. bomber
Bidault: Georges Bidault, French
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
1953-54
Bienhoa: airfield near Saigon, at-
tacked by Vietcong October 31,
1964
black radio: in psychological
warfare, broadcasts by one side
that are disguised as broadcasts
for the other
BLT: battalion landing team
Blue Springs: apparently a covert
operation not further identified
in study of the documents
Bohlen: Charles E. Bohlen, Am-
bassador to France, 1962-68
Bonnet: Henri Bonnet, French
Ambassador to U.S., 1944-55
bonze: Buddhist monk
Box Top: apparently a code
name for a covert operation not
further identified in the documents
BPP: Border Patrol Police
Bundy, McGeorge: (See biography)
Bundy, William P.: (See biography)
Buu: Tran Quoc Buu, leader of
Vietnamese Confederation of
Labor under Diem

Can: Ngo Dinh Can, brother of
Ngo Dinh Diem
Can Lao: semisecret South Vietnamese
party organized by Ngo
Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can
CAP: combat air patrol; prefix
used to designate White House
cablegrams sent through CIA
channel
CAS: code name for Central In-
telligence Agency; not otherwise
explained in the documents
CAT: Civil Air Transport, air-
line based on Taiwan
CHICOM: Chinese Communist
CHINAT: Chinese Nationalist
CHMAAG: Chief, Military As-
sistance Advisory Group
CI: counterinsurgency
CIAP: Inter-American Commit-
tee for the Alliance for Progress
CINCPAC: Commander in
Chief, Pacific
CIO: Central Intelligence Orga-
nizations (South Vietnam)
CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Collins: General J. Lawton Col-
lins, Presidential representative
in South Vietnam, 1954-55
COMUSMACV: Commander,
U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam
COS: chief of station, CIA
country team: council of senior
U.S. officials in South Vietnam,
including ambassador, commander
of American forces,
CIA chief, and others
CTZ: corps tactical zone
CY: calendar year

Deptel: (State) Department telegram
DePuy: Lieutenant General William
E. DePuy, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam,
1964-66
De Soto patrols: U.S. destroyer
patrols in Tonkin Gulf
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency
Diem, Ngo Dinh: (See biography)
Dinh: Major General Ton That
Dinh, military governor of Saigon,
1963
DMZ: Demilitarized Zone
Dobrynin: Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
USSR Ambassador to the U.S.,
1961-
Doc: document
DaD: Department of Defense
Don: Major General Tran Van
Don, Chief of Staff, South Vietnamese
armed forces, 1963; Defense
Minister 1963-64; Deputy
Commander in Chief, 1964
Dong, Ph am Van: (See biography)
DPM: draft presidential memo
DRV: Democratic Republic of
(North) Vietnam
Duan, Le: (See biography)
Dulles: Allen W. Dulles, director
of Central Intelligence, 1953-61;
or John Foster Dulles, Secretary
of State, 1952-59
Durbrow: Elbridge Durbrow,
U.S. Ambassador to Saigon,
1957-61

E and E: escape and evasion
ECM: electronic countermeasures
EDC: European Defense Community
Eden: Anthony Eden, Earl of
Avon, Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, UK, 1951-55;
Prime Minister, 1955-57
Ely: General Paul Ely, French
commander in Indochina, 1954-
55
Embtel: U.S. embassy telegram
EPTEL: apparently a typographical
error for Deptel or Septe1,
q.v.

FAL: Lao armed forces
FAR: Royal Armed Forces (of
Laos)
Farmgate: clandestine U.S. Air
Force strike unit in Vietnam
(1964)
FEC: French Expeditionary
Corps
Felt: Admiral Harry D. Felt,
Commander in Chief, Pacific,
1958-64
Flaming Dart: code name of operations,
reprisals for attacks on
U.S. installations
FOA: Foreign Operations Administration
Forrestal, Michael V.: (See biography)
Fulbright: J. W. Fulbright, chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee; U.S. Senator (D.-
Ark.), 1945-
FWMA: Free World Military
Assistance
FWMAF: Free World Military
Assistance Force
FY: fiscal year
FYI: for your information

Gardner: John W. Gardner, Secretary
of Health, Education and
Welfare, 1965-68
Giap: General Vo Nguyen Giap,
Commander in Chief of Vietminh
Army at time of defeat of
French at Dienbienphu (1954)
Gilpatric: Roswell L. Gilpatric,
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
1961-64
GNP: gross national product
G-3: U.S. Army General Staff
branch handling plans and operations
GVN: Government of (South)
Vietnam

Hardnose: code name, apparently
for covert project, not otherwise
identified in the documents
Harkins, Paul D.: (See biography)
Harriman: W. Averell Harriman,
Assistant, then Under Secretary
of State, 1961-65; Ambassador
at Large, 1965-68
Heath: Donald R. Heath, U.S.
Ambassador to Cambodia and
Vietnam, 1952
Heinz: Vice Admiral Luther C.
Heinz, director Far East region,
office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense, 1960-63
Hieu: Ngo Trang Hieu, Minister
of Civic Action, South Vietnam,
1963
Hilsman, Roger: (See biography)
Hinh: Major General Nguyen
Van Hinh, chief of staff, South
Vietnamese Army; unsuccessful
rebel against Diem, 1954
HNC: High National Council
Ho: Ho Chi Minh, head of government,
North Vietnam, 1954-
69 Hop Tac plan: operation planned
to clear Saigon and its surroundings
Huong: Tran Van Huong, head
of government, South Vietnam,
1964-65

ICA: International Cooperation
Administration
ICC: International Control Commission
for Vietnam
I Corps: military region, five
northern provinces of South
Vietnam
IDA: Institute for Defense
Analyses
II Corps: military region in South
Vietnam, Central Highlands and
Central Coastal area
III Corps: military region in
South Vietnam, provinces surrounding
Saigon
in ref.: in reference to
ISA: International Security
Agency
IV Corps: military region, southern
Vietnam

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM: Joint Chiefs of Staff
memorandum
Johnson: U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Under Secretary of
State, 1961-64, 1965-66; deputy
to Ambassador Maxwell D.
Taylor, 1964-65
Joint Chiefs: Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Jorden Report: internal State
Department paper by William J.
Jorden, 1964
Jungle Jim: aerial commando
operations

Katzenbach: Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Under Secretary of
State, 1966-68
Khanh, Nguyen: (See biography)
Khiem: General Tran Thien
Khiem, executive officer, South
Vietnamese Joint General Staff,
1963; Defense Minister and
Commander in Chief, 1964
KIA: killed in action
Kim: Major General Le Van
Kim, leading figure in post-Diem
government in South Vietnam
Krulak, Victor H.: (See biography)
Ky: Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky,
head of government, South Vietnam,
1965-67; Vice-President,
1967-
Kyes: Roger M. Kyes, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, 1953-54

Laniel: Joseph Laniel, Premier of
France, 1953-54
Lansdale, Edward G.: (See biography)
Lao Dong: Communist party in
North Vietnam
Leaping Lena: code name for an
allied operation not further identified
in the documents
Liberation Front: National Liberation
Front
Lippmann: Walter Lippmann,
newspaper columnist
LOC: lines of communication
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.: (See
biography)
Lucky Dragon: code Lame, apparently,
for a covert allied operation
in Vietnam, not otherwise
identified

MAAG: Military Assistance Advisory
Group
MAC: Military Assistance Command
MacArthur: Douglas MacArthur
II, counselor, State Department,
1953-56
MACV: Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
Mansfield: Senator Mike Mansfield
(D.-Mont.)
MAP: Military Assistance Program
Marops: maritime operations
Mau: Vu Van Mau, Foreign
Minister, South Vietnam till fall
of Diem (1963)
McCone: John A. McCone, director
of Central Intelligence,
1961-65
McNamara: Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense,
1961-68
McNaughton, John T.: (See
biography)
MDAP: Mutual Defense Assistance
Program
Mecklin: John M. Mecklin, public
affairs officer, U.S. Embassy,
Saigon, 1962-64
MEF: Marine Expeditionary
Force
Mendes: Pierre Mendes-France,
Premier of France, 1954-55
Minh: General Duong Van Minh
("Big Minh"), head of government,
South Vietnam, 1963-64
Molotov: V. M. Molotov, Soviet
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
1953-56
Morgan: Thomas E. Morgan,
chairman, House Foreign Affairs
Committee, 1954-

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Navarre: General Henri Navarre,
Commander in Chief, French
forces in Indochina, 1953-54
NFLSV: National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam
Ngo family: family of Ngo Dinh
Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu
Nhu, Madame: wife of Ngo
Dinh Nhu
Nhu, Ngo Dinh: (See biography)
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate
Nitze: Paul H. Nitze, Secretary
of the Navy, Deputy Secretary
of Defense
NLF: National Liberation Front
Nolting: Frederick E. ("Fritz")
Nolting, U.S. Ambassador in
Saigon, 1961-63
Norstad: General Lauris Norstad,
air deputy, SHAPE, 1953-56;
commander, SHAPE, 1956-63
NSA: National Security Agency
NSAM: National Security Agency
memorandum
NSC: National Security Council
NVA: North Vietnamese Army
NVN: North Vietnam

OB: Operation Brotherhood
OEEC: Organization for European
Economic Cooperation
Opcon: Operations Control
Oplan: operation plan
ops: operations
OSD: Office of the Secretary of
Defense

PACOM: Pacific Command
Para: paragraph
PARU: Police Aerial Resupply
Unit
PAVN: People's Army of
(North) Vietnam
PB: Planning Board
PBR: river patrol boat
PDJ: Plaine des Jarres
PF: Popular Forces
PI: Philippine Islands
Pierce Arrow: code name for
U.S. reprisal bombing of North
Vietnam after the Tonkin Gulf
incidents
PL: Pathet Lao
Pleven: Rene Pleven, French
Minister of National Defense,
1953, 1954
POL: petroleum, oil, lubricants
POLAD: political adviser (to
Commander in Chief, Pacific)
Porter: William J. Porter, U.S.
Deputy Ambassador (with rank
of Ambassador) in Saigon,
1965-67
psyops: psychological operations
PTF: fast patrol boat

Quang: Trich Tri Quang, South
Vietnamese Buddhist leader
Quat: Phan Huy Quat, head of
government, South Vietnam,
1965
Queen Bee: code name for an
allied operation not otherwise
identified in the documents
QTE: quote

Radford: Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1953-57
RAS: river assault squadron
RD: Revolutionary Development;
or Rural Development
RECCE: reconnaissance
REF: reference, meaning "the
document referred to"
Reftel: in reference to your telegram,
or telegram referred to
Resor: Stanley R. Resor, Secretary
of the Army, 1965-
RF: Regional Forces
Rice: Edward E. Rice, U.S. Consul
General in Hong Kong,
1963-67
RLAF: Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG: Royal Laotian Government
RLT: regimental landing team
ROK: Republic of (South)
Korea
Rolling Thunder: code name of
operation, sustained bombing of
North Vietnam
Rostow: Walt W. Rostow, Presidential
assistant for national security,
1961; chairman, State
Department Policy Planning
Council, 1961-66
rpt: repeat
RSM: Robert S. McNamara
RSSZ: Rungsat Special Zone
RTA: Royal Thai Army
RT-28: name of U.S. aircraft
Rusk: Dean Rusk, Secretary of
State, 1961-69
RVN: Republic of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF: Republic of (South)
Vietnam Air Force or armed
forces
RVNF: Republic of (South)
Vietnam forces

SAC: Strategic Air Command
SAM: surface-to-air missile
SAR: search and rescue
Sarit: Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat,
Prime Minister of Thailand,
1958-63
SEA: Southeast Asia
Seaborn, J. Blair: (See biography)
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization
Sec Def: Secretary of Defense
Septel: separate telegram
Sharp, U. S. Grant: (See biography)
Sihanouk: Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
head of state, Cambodia,
1960-70
SMM: Saigon Military Mission
SNIE: Special National Intelligence
Estimate
Souvanna: Prince Souvanna
Phouma, Prime Minister of
Laos, 1951-
Stassen: Harold Stassen, Governor
of Minnesota, 1938-45; director,
Foreign Operations Administration,
1953-55
State: State Department
STC: Security Training Center
Stilwell: Lieutenant General
Richard G. Stilwell, assistant to
Chief of Staff, Operations, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam,
1963-64
SVN: South Vietnam
SVNese: South Vietnamese

TAOR: tactical area of responsibility
Taylor, Maxwell D.: (See biography)
TERM: Temporary Equipment
Recovery Mission
Tet: lunar new year; 1968 offensive
during Tet
TF: task force
Thang: General Nguyen Ngoc
Thang, director, Revolutionary
Development, South Vietnam
Thao: Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao
(executed 1965 for part in attempted
South Vietnamese
coups, 1964-65)
Thieu: Lieutenant General Nguyen
Van Thieu, President of
South Vietnam. 1967-
34-A: operation plan, 1964, covering
covert ground, air and sea
raids against North Vietnam
Tho: Nguyen Ngoc Tho, head
of government, South Vietnam,
1963-64
Thuan: Nguyen Dinh Thuan,
holder of high positions in Diem
government, South Vietnam
TO&E: table of organization and
equipment
Triangle: code name for an allied
operation not otherwise identified
in the documents
TRIM: Training Relations and
Instruction Mission
Trueheart: William C. Trueheart,
deputy to Ambassador Nolting,
1961-63
T-28: name of U.S. fighterbomber

UK: United Kingdom
Unger: Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador
to Laos, 1962-64;
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, 1965-67
UNO: United Nations Organization
UNQTE: unquote
USAF: United States Air Force
USG: United States Government
USIA: United States Information
Agency
USIB: United States Intelligence
Board
USIS: United States Information
Service
USOM: United States Operations
Mission (U.S. economic
aid apparatus in Saigon)
UW: unconventional warfare

Vance: Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, 1964-67;
troubleshooter for President
Johnson, 1967-69
VC: Vietcong
VM: Vietminh
VN: Vietnam
VNAF: (South) Vietnamese Air
Force or armed forces
VNese: Vietnamese
VNSF: (South) Vietnamese Special
Forces
VOA: Voice of America

Westmoreland, William C.: (See
biography)
Westy: see Westmoreland
Wheeler, Earle G.: (See biography)
white radio: in psychological
warfare, broadcasts openly attributed
to the side transmitting
them
Williams: Lieutenant General
Samuel T. Williams, U.S. military
adviser in South Vietnam,
1955-60
Wilson: Charles E. Wilson, Secretary
of Defense, 1953-57
W/T: walkie-talkie

Yankee Team: phase of the Indochina
bombing operation
YT: see Yankee Team
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 7:01 pm

PART 1 OF 2

Index

Abel, Elie, 607
Abrams, Creighton W., 622
Acheson, Dean G., 10, 622
Advisers, American, in S. Vietnam,
4, 13, 86, 88, 100, 113, 115,
157, 170, 320, 327, 371, 419,
460, 529, 542
Africa, 263, 283
Communist propaganda in, 464
Sino-Soviet bloc in, 159
Air America Pilots, 247, 362
Air Force, U.S., 19, 34, 65, 66,
247, 491-92
Combat air patrols, 330
In Laos, 261, 375, 386
Morale, 560, 591
Secretary of, 536, 551, 619
Seventh (Saigon), 490-91
See also Air Operations; Armed
Forces, U.S.; Bombing;
Specific Operation Plan
Air Operations
Aerial reconnaissance, 255, 325,
330, 369, 375, 382, 385,
386, 387, 444, 479, 483,
566, 590
B52 sorties, 534
Covert
Bombing DRV villages, 245,
314
Laos operations, 247, 261
See also Operation 34A
Estimates (to 1961), 46, 47, 87,
89-90, 101, 108, 128, 129,
148, 150
Farmgate commando raids, 251
Helicopters, 100, 105, 114, 115,
150, 152, 452, 508
Base attacked, 352
Pilots for, 145
Tactical, 100, 105, 110, 114,
115, 116, 152, 329-30
Targets of opportunity, 345
U-2 overflights, 246, 281, 288,
291, 305, 326, 359, 365,
386, 445, 505
Yankee team, 247, 310, 312-13,
327, 328, 343, 348, 370,
371-72
See also Bombing; Air Force,
U.S.; Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Vietnam, North; Specific
Country, Operation Plan; U.S. Administration
Airborne Brigade, 173rd, 413-15,
421, 422, 425, 454, 460
Aircraft, U.S. (types), 247, 272,
313, 329, 352, 360, 403, 534
Albert, Carl, 372
Alden, Colonel, 36
Allen, Fred, 58, 60, 62, 66
Alsop, Joseph, 62
America, Voice of, 173, 174, 200,
211, 235
American Military Advisory Mission,
105-06, 109, 110, 117-
18
American Voters, 533, 620
Anderson, Capt., 41
Andrews, Lt., 60, 62
An Giang (Province), 229
An Hoa (Industrial Complex), 575
ANKE, 576
Annamese Independence, 27-28
Anthis, Rollen H., 246, 275-76,
308
Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA), 490,
511
Anti-poverty Program, 448
An Xuygen (Province), 287
Arab-Israeli War, 551
Arellano, Oscar, 56, 57, 142
Arends, Leslie C., 372
Armed Forces, U.S.
Combat trainer units, 145, 320
Extended tours of duty, 465
Graduated overt military pressure,
251, 288, 290, 291,
292, 293
In Southeast Asia, 307
In Vietnam, 146-60, 282, 323,
351, 361, 365, 567
Build-up, 87-88, 417-18, 425,
452-53, 465-66, 473, 475
Military costs, 11, 19-20, 24,
60, 66, 100, 128, 129-30,
132, 134, 148, 218, 220,
403, 613
Security of men and equipment,
307-08, 329-30,
411
Strength, 287, 426
Taylor report, 146-55
Withdrawal, 117, 118, 180,
181, 182, 210-11, 217,
239, 332, 397, 424, 447-
48, 459-64, 533
Military objectives, 8, 14, 29,
37-39, 115, 154-55
Participation in SAR operations,
313
Reserve units, 259, 426, 465,
508-09, 525, 528, 529,
540, 541, 542, 546, 549,
550, 580, 596, 604, 608,
609, 610, 616, 620-21, 635
See also Air Force, U.S.; Army,
U.S.; Marine Corps, U.S.;
Navy, U.S.
For additional troop requests, B
See Westmoreland, William
C.
Army Security Agency (ASA), 128,
129, 130
Army, U.S., 260, 422
Air mobile division, 418, 422,
425, 426, 571
Antiaircraft missile units, 321
Rifle companies, 573
Secretary of, 509, 620
1st Cavalry Division, 476
5th Mechanized Division, 633-34
9th Division, 571, 572, 576, 577,
581
82nd Airborne Division, 607,
608, 609
173rd Airborne Brigade, 413-15,
421, 42~ 425, 454, 460
See also Armed Forces, U.S.;
Ground War; Specific Operation
Plan
Arundel, Capt., 60, 61, 62, 65
ARVN
See Vietnam, South, Armed
Forces
Associated Press, 47, 48
Associated States, 30, 31, 32, 37,
42
JCS intervention memo, 45-47
Athens, 457
Atomic Weapons, 46, 47, 445, 549,
588
Attrition, War of, 534, 579-80,
584-85, 591, 613, 615
Aurell, Mr., 36
Australia, 41, 42, 256, 286, 292,
343, 442, 448, 464
And U.S. policy, 30, 159, 344,
373, 385, 597
Troops to Vietnam, 417, 421,
422, 452, 454, 455, 466,
467, 623
U.S. Ambassador in, 623, 635

Bagia, 419, 421
Baguio (Philippines), 107, 146, 149
Bain, Edward, 59
Ball, George W., 164, 174, 175,
197, 339, 468, 485, 622, 623
Administration dissenter, 334,
335, 396, 397, 424, 459-64
Baltimore, Md., 398, 459
Bangkok, 145, 190, 226, 327
Ban Kien (Gan Khen), 313, 314,
329
Banthay (Laos), 329
Bao Dai, 2, 6, 7, 10, 22, 48, 60
Barrel Roll
See Operation Barrel Roll
Barrier, Electronic, 473, 494, 496,
505-06, 518-20, 530, 556
Bay of Pigs, 93, 168
Ben Cat, 220
Berlin, 98-99, 100, 102, 113, 119,
144, 153, 156, 159, 431, 445,
463, 541, 586, 588, 593
Berlin Agreement (1954), 44
Bidault, Georges, 39-40, 41, 42, 43
Bien Hoa, 24, 80, 308, 312, 329,
331, 333, 338, 372, 374, 379,
407, 409, 413, 414, 429, 446,
454, 571
Bigart, Homer, 63-64
Binh (Vietnamese Agents), 19, 60,
61, 63, 65-66
Binh Dinh (Province), 379, 571,
575, 576, 581
Binh Duong (Province), 229, 287
Binhgia, 349
Binh Thuan (Province), 5-11
Binh Xuyen (Gangsters), 20, 21-22,
73 Bin Tuy, 571
Biographies, Key Figures, 758-66
Blockade, 30, 33, 46, 375-76, 384,
429, 431, 433, 444, 445, 446,
453, 487, 532, 586
"Blue Springs" Intelligence Operation,
314
Bohanan, Charles T., 57, 63
Bohlen, Charles E., 293, 294
Bolton, Mrs., 372
Bombing
Administration interest in, 250,
318
Ball on, 461
Bundy on, 582-83
C.I.A. appraisal (1966), 562
Clifford group on, 616
Costs of, 534, 566-67
Cutback in, 398, 456, 481-82,
497, 500, 537, 544, 547,
549, 560, 591, 604, 616,
624
Effectiveness of, 394, 399-400,
408-09, 417, 450-51, 472,
480-81, 505, 589-90
Escalation, 360, 453, 525, 552
Fuel depots, 458-59, 472-73,
486-92, 510-11
Halt, preconditions for, 481-82,
537, 553
Infiltration routes, 281, 306,
336, 337, 445, 504, 530,
560, 566, 582, 586, 590,
594
Intelligence estimates, 110, 250,
340-41
Options, 375-77, 577-79, 542
Rostow on, 586-89
Working group, 333-34, 336,
337-38
Public dissent over, 534-36, 582
Seminar (1966), 473, 494-96,
513-20, 562-63
Sustained, 441-42, 444-46, 478-
79
Target list, 245, 259, 270, 327-
28, 634-35
Taylor on, 321, 613
Threats, 108, 109, 110, 156,
244, 249
See also Air Operations; Joint
Chiefs of Staff; Vietnam,
North; Specific Country,
Operations Plan
Bonesteel, Charles H., 3rd, 17, 33,
36
Bonnet, Henry, 13, 14, 43
"Box Top" Intelligence Operation,
314
Bradley, Omar N., 622
Braggs, William C., 535
Brinks (Officers' Billet), 347
Brown, Harold, 536, 551, 619
Brownfield, A. R., 299
Buddha's Birthday, 456
Buddhists, 443, 485
Buddhist/Catholic friction, 301,
456
Protests, 169, 171-72, 174, 183,
186, 189, 197-98, 199, 200,
202, 209, 213, 336, 345,
484
Buffer Zone, 552, 616, 635
Bundy, McGeorge, 131, 167, 187,
197, 208, 210, 223, 225, 230,
232, 257, 263, 265, 270, 324,
325, 334, 337-38, 345, 368,
399-400, 401, 402, 410-11,
415, 416, 433-37, 450, 452,
453, 485, 508, 538-39, 581,
622
Biography, 758
Bundy, William P., 84, 103, 242,
246-47, 250, 252, 253, 255,
257, 258, 259, 260, 265, 269,
276, 293, 308, 310, 323, 324,
325, 326, 327, 331, 333, 334,
335, 336, 342, 344, 349, 366,
377, 382, 385, 415, 430, 439,
485-86, 489, 542-43, 545,
585, 611
Biography, 758
Joint Congressional resolution,
243, 272
On escalation, 242, 278, 302-06,
536, 543
Position on ground war, 424-25
Reasons for U.S. involvement,
598-600
Working group, 331-34, 337-38,
340, 372-73, 382-87
Burchett-Kosygin Initiatives, 589
Burdick, Eugene, 17
Burma, 28, 283, 286, 292, 463,
599
And U.S. withdrawal, 462
Army liaison with Thais, 139
Communist threat to, 7, 29, 376
Butterfield, Fox, 4, 472
Buu, Tran Quoc, 225
Byrd, Senator Harry F., Jr., 552

Cabell, C.P., 36, 136
Camau, 62
Cambodia, 13, 49, 51-54, 132, 209,
283, 286, 291, 292, 350, 476,
519
And U.S. withdrawal, 462
C.I.A. analysis, 262
Guerrilla haven, 251, 286, 363,
539, 570, 592, 630
"Hot pursuit" into, 363
Infiltration routes in, 281, 286,
363, 540, 570, 571, 576,
592
Invasion contemplated, 525, 541,
542, 549, 550, 580, 590
Neutralization of, 281
Waterways in, 363
Cam Ranh Bay, 572
Canada, 24, 343, 441
And U.S. policy, 344, 385, 598
Embassy in Washington, 297
Emissaries to DRV, 244, 254,
256, 258, 264, 276~7,
297-99, 404-05, 489
Canberra, 442
Cang, Admiral, 388-90
Can Lao Party, 73, 122, 213
Can, Ngo Dinh, 183, 220
Cannon, Senator Howard, 552
Can Thon (KEP), 532, 538, 565
Cao Dai (Armed Sect), 20, 21, 60,
73, 281, 301
Cao, General, 202
CAP Aircraft, 35, 312
Carbonel, Jean, 56
Career Compensation Act (1949),
296
Carter, Marshall S., 209
Carver, George, 485
C.A.S. (C.I.A.), 167
Castro, Fidel, 431
Casualties, 311, 475, 485, 534,
591, 592, 615
ARVN, 419, 608
Civilian, 459, 511, 527, 535,
549, 619
North Vietnamese, 476, 527,
535, 555, 591, 592, 619,
627
U.S., 114, 115, 320, 329, 347,
348, 352, 420, 460, 476,
477, 490, 500, 549, 591,
592, 614
Pilots and aircraft, 566, 588,
592, 594
VC/NVA, 118, 379, 534, 543,
555, 609-10, 614, 629, 630,
631
Catbi Airfield, 330
Central Highlands, 74, 79, 104,
145, 352, 407, 409, 476, 540
Central Intelligence Agency
See C.I.A.
Ceylon, 29
Chan, Le Ngoc, 57, 59
Chennault, Claire, 19
Chiang Kai-shek, 10, 146
China, (Nationalist) Republic of,
(Taiwan), 47, 56, 104, 128,
142, 145-46, 159, 283
And U.S. plans, 344
And U.S. withdrawal, 462
Clandestine operations, 19, 57-
58, 66, 142, 286, 292
China, People's Republic of, 6, 7,
10, 29, 113, 148, 154, 156,
256, 257, 259, 262, 263, 286,
290, 307, 350, 358, 382, 385,
395, 405, 429, 430, 437, 448,
451, 457, 461, 463, 479, 505,
589, 594
Aid to Vietcong, 465
And DRV, 444-46, 460, 480,
527, 542-43, 545, 563
Economic aid, 513-15, 586,
628
Berlin Agreement, 44
Buffer zone, 552, 616, 635
Geneva Conference, I 5, 44, 51-
53 Guerrillas in Thailand, 139
Indochina, 39-40, 48-50















JCS studies, 45-47, 284
Laos Conference (1964), 356
Political turmoil (1967), 543,
587
Possible intervention in Vietnam,
376, 446, 484, 501,
542-43, 549, 583, 592
Possible responses to U.S. action,
440, 446, 530, 557,
587, 593
Possible talks with, 449
Rostow on, 428-33, 586-87
Sino-Soviet dispute, 253, 284,
293, 441, 593
South border of, 509, 530, 560
Soviet aircraft, 444-45, 593
U.S. intelligence estimate, 110,
340-41, 501
U.S. policy, 28-33, 442, 578,
595
Naval blockade, 30, 33, 46
Chinese Railroad, 444, 550, 586
Cholon, 194, 218, 576, 577
Chou En-Iai, 48
Chu Lai, 422, 570, 575
Chuong Thien (Province), 229
Chu Pong, 542 .
Church, Senator Frank, 274
C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency),
5, 7, 16-19, 55, 65, 124-
25, 136, 157, 209, 246, 257,
280, 397, 452, 495, 543
And Clifford group, 612-13
And L.B.J., 605
CAP pilots, 35
Captured documents, 76, 79
Communications channel, 201-
03, 221
In Bundy's working group, 340
In Japan, 5, 17, 61
In Saigon, 17, 127, 128, 167,
218, 245-46, 247, 467, 472,
485
Infiltration information, 79-80
On air war, 396, 450-51, 487-
88, 489, 547, 562
On civilian casualties, 527
On Diem, 72, 166-96, 201-03,
208, 222-23
On domino theory, 262
On "Rolling Thunder", 562-63
On Vietcong and DRV, 419, 436
Recommendations, 38-39
Sabotage in Hanoi, 5, 18
Training agents, 19, 60, 87, 129,
136-43
Vietnamese agents, 19, 60, 87
See also Clandestine Warfare;
Office of Strategic Services;
Intelligence; Saigon Military
Mission
CINCPAC (Commander in Chief,
Pacific), 126, 131, 139, 143,
145-46, 147-48, 151, 153,
154, 156, 225, 226, 232, 255,
256, 269, 313, 354, 355, 362,
369, 371, 401, 412, 414, 454,
487, 504, 511-12, 568, 573,
579, 626
Civil Air Transport (CAT), 19, 57-
58, 66, 142
Civilian Air Crews, 96, 128, 145,
247
Civilian Casualties, 459, 511, 527,
535, 549, 619
Clandestine Warfare, 5, 16-20, 54-
67, 87, 96, 97-98, 136-43,
150, 152, 172, 177, 184, 195-
96, 200, 213, 239, 244-66
Astrology, 18, 65
Destroyer patrols, 247-48, 267-
68, 305, 307, 310, 314,
322, 324, 367, 368, 387
In Laos, 247
Instructors, 97
Kennedy recommendations,
127-28, 128-30
L.B.J. Administration, 246-47,
275-76
Leaflet campaigns, 60, 61, 62,
304
Lines of communications, 87
Rumor campaigns, 56, 60, 61
See also Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Operation 34A
Clark AFB, 63
Clifford, Clark M., 611, 618, 619
Clifford group, 611-17, 620,
623, 625, 634
Cochin China, 27
Code Names
See Blue Springs; Boxtop; Lucky
Dragon; Operation Anniversary
Victory No.2; Operation
Barrel Roll; Operation
Brotherhood; Operation
Cricket; Operation
Farmgate; Operation Flaming
Dart; Operation Hardnose;
Operation Jungle Jim;
Operation Leaping Lena;
Operation Masher; Operation
Pierce Arrow; Operation
Plan 34A; Operation
Plan 37-64; Operation RoIling
Thunder; Operation
Triangle; Operation Victorious
Arrow; Operation Yankee
Team; Queen Bee; Sea
Dragon
Colby, William E., 209
Collins, J. Lawton, 20-21, 62, 64,
65
Committee of National Salvation
(SVN), 389
Communism, Committee on Threat
of, 36-39
Communist Expansion, Prevention
of, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 28-33, 36,
219, 282-85, 595
COMUSMACV
See Military Assistance Command
Vietnam
Conein, Lucien, 19, 56, 58, 60, 66,
167, 175, 177, 183, 185, 186,
187, 189, 190, 202, 219-21,
223-24, 226, 230, 231, 233,
236, 237
Congress, U.S., 6, 11, 13-14, 203,
319, 338, 372, 433
Attitude to intervention, 12
Authority of, 13, 14, 40, 42, 43,
276, 372
Eisenhower Administration, 26,
31
Fulbright Committee Hearings,
509
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
272, 273
House resolution for policy review,
621
Information given to, 26, 273-
74, 275, 597
Information withheld from, 244,
249
Johnson Administration
Consultations with, 253, 271,
343, 372, 384
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
244, 271, 272-73, 275,
276, 277, 294-96, 299,
343-44
Implications of, 276
Military reserves, 259, 528,
543, 549, 596
On troop increases, 620
Vietnam debate, 347-48
War appropriation request,
425-26
Joint resolutions, 253, 256, 257,
258, 259, 264-65, 270,
271, 272-73, 275, 294-96,
299
Kennedy Administration, 113,
214
Senate Armed Services Committee,
605
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26, 272, 273, 620
Senate Preparedness Subcommittee,
537, 552
Support for military, 537
Constellation, USS, 267, 270, 271
Contingency Planning, 14, 32-33,
113, 147, 151, 152-53, 232
Johnson Administration, 249,
252, 277-78, 293, 302
Westmoreland, 541-42
Cooper, Chester L., 347, 384
COPROR Committee, 229
Coral Sea, USS, 352
Cottrell, Sterling J., 107, 108, 109,
132
Counterinsurgency, 92, 93, 114,
128, 161-62, 199, 219, 308,
335, 379, 432
Country Team, U.S., 127, 132,
134, 142, 200-01, 229-30,
231, 236, 237, 279-80, 508
Court Proceedings
Court of Appeals
New York, 673
D.C., 675-80, 683-86
District Court
New York, 665-72
D.C., 674-75, 680-83
Summary, 664
Supreme Court
Argument, 687-724
Decision, 725-56
Covert Actions
See Clandestine Warfare
Craig, USS, 248
Credibility Gap, 420-21
C. Turner Joy, USS, 267-68, 269
Cuba, 93, 119, 168, 259, 431,
593
Cutler, Robert, 13, 41-42
Cyprus, 377-445

Dabney, General, 36
Dai Vets, Northern, 60
DakTo, 630
Dalat, 187, 570
Danang, 94, 115, 312, 321, 329,
360, 365, 396 409, 412, 413
418, 421, 422, 445, 446, 448,
454, 460, 478, 484, 508, 570,
572, 575, 588, 629, 630
As U.S. Base, 308, 394, 404,
410-11
DARLAC, 446
Davis, Admiral, 36
Dean, Arthur H., 622
Defense Department, U.S., 280,
369, 371, 413, 495, 507-08,
598
International Security Affairs,
611, 635
On winning the war, 475
Secret seminar (1966), 473, 494-
96, 513-20, 562-63
Secret study (1966), 524-38
Southeast Asia Program Office,
508
Systems Analysis Section
And L.B.J., 605
Force levels, 584-85
On pacification program, 613
On strategy of attrition, 613-
14
On Westmoreland-Wheeler,
543
Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group, 266
See also specific Secretary of
Defense
Delta S
See Mecong River Delta
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 408,
518, 530, 539, 556, 566, 574,
575, 579, 581, 592, 593, 608,
624, 627, 629, 630, 632, 633
Democratic Republic of Viet Minh
See Vietminh
DePuy, William E., 584
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 4, 6, 7, 15, 16,
18, 20, 21, 22, 57, 59, 60,
62, 65, 72, 113-14, 119, 134,
154, 160, 197, 202, 206, 207,
217, 218, 220, 228, 232
Accomplishments, 73
And ARVN, 170
And Buddhists, 198, 199, 200
And Kennedy Administration,
88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 98,
99, 100, 104, 105, 112,
198, 200, 213
And Lodge, 181, 188-89, 193-
94, 212-13, 214, 215, 216,
238
And Vietcong, 101, 160
Asks U.S. aid, 145-46
Biography, 759
Cause of war, 71, 72
Coups forestalled, 170, 171
Danger to regime, 120-21
Defense treaty, 100-01, 105,
132, 143-44, 145
Elections, 22-23, 75
Estimates of regime, 7, 15, 16,
20-21, 24, 25, 26, 71, 72,
88-89, 91, 102, 103, 107,
109, 118, 123, 149, 158,
161-62, 219
Failures, 73-75
Overthrow of, 166-96, 197-239
Administration feud over,
168-69, 176, 178
And State Department, 174
And SVN military leaders,
200, 201, 202, 203-04,
206, 207, 223-25, 226-
27
NSC support of, 164, 176,
178, 180, 204-05
Pressure for, 182, 184
Sanction for coup, 174, 203
State of emergency, 105
U.S. aid cut-off, 165, 174,
177, 178, 182, 200, 205,
212, 215
Strategic hamlet program, 116,
160
Dienbienphu, 11, 12, 13, 35, 39-
40, 41, 55, 142, 525
Dillon, Douglas, 12, 13, 39-41, 622
Dinh, Ton That, 188, 189, 193,
202, 220
Dinh, Trieu, 60, 65
Dinh Tuong (Province), 287
Diplomatic Missions, 403, 404,
405, 535-36, 537-38, 553
Dirksen, Senator Everett, 372
"Disillusioned Doves"
See Doves
DMZ
See Demilitarized Zone
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 373
Documents
Captured, 76, 77, 78, 79, 145,
381
See also Key Documents
Domino Theory, 7-8, 28, 111, 158-
59, 262, 282-83, 286, 292,
374, 584
Dong Hoi, 311, 352
Dong, Pham Van, 81, 244, 254,
264, 276-77, 405, 589
Biography, 759
Dongxoai, 419, 421
Don, Tran Van, 167, 173, 176,
183, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 191, 202, 220, 223-25,
226, 228, 230, 231, 232,
233, 235, 279
"Doves, Disillusioned", 525, 536,
547, 582
Draft Presidential Memorandum
(DPM), 544, 547-49, 550,
589-97
Dragon Lady, The, 65
Duan, Le, 78, 79
Biography, 759-60
Dulles, Allen W., 18, 35, 36, 136
Dulles, John Foster, II, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 39-41, 42,
43, 47, 48, 50
On Geneva accords, 23-24
Durbrow, Elbridge, 26, 91, 120
Durdin, Peg, 63-64
Durdin, Till, 63-64

Eden, Anthony, 41-43, 49
Edwards, USS, 325
Eisenhower Administration, 4, 5,
11, 26, 31
Clandestine warfare, 5, 16-20,
54-67
Committee on the Threat of
Communism, 36-39
"Contingency planning", 14, 32-
33
French cease-rITe proposal, 42-
43
Geneva Conference, 43-45, 48-
50, 53-54
Intelligence reports to, 5, 7, 15,
16
National Security Council, 4, 6,
7, 8, 11-12, 20, 23, 28-33,
37-39
Policy formulations, 5, 6, 7, 11-
12, 16, 20, 28-33
Relations with France, 6, 11, 12,
30-33, 42-43, 47-48
Support for Diem, 6, 16, 20, 62
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 6, 8, 11,
20, 41-42, 123, 494
Drafts Congressional resolution,
6, 11
Mandate for Change, 11
On intervention, 12-13, 42
On SEA, 42-43

Elections, U.S., 583, 589, 620
Elections, Vietnam, 4, 15, 22, 63,
75, 76, 213, 224, 390, 526,
543, 555, 596
Geneva accord on, 51, 52, 53,
54
U.S. involvement in, 23, 47-48
Ely, Paul, 33-34, 39, 40, 64
Embassies, U.S.
Bangkok, 145, 354, 355, 370,
371, 384-85, 623, 635
Saigon, 20, 21, 55, 57, 59, 60,
62, 72, 75, 79, 80, 88, 95,
96, 100-01, 104, 107, 112,
132, 134, 143, 145, 167,
171, 172, 174, 218, 266,
299, 302, 346, 354, 355,
369, 371, 435
Blown up by Vietcong, 410
Protests troop buildup, 424
Recommendations (1960),
121-23
Taipei, 145
Vientiane, 302, 354, 355, 362,
370, 371, 384-85, 623, 635
Enthoven, Alain C., 508, 543, 584-
85, 613
Erhard, Ludwig, 463
Erichsen-Brown, Commissioner, 81
Erskine, General, 36
Escalation, 245, 249, 278, 302-06,
312, 320, 322-23, 339, 346,
358, 362, 364-65, 367-68,
372, 374-77, 381-82, 383-84,
428-29, 442-50, 459-64, 473,
483, 499-500, 503, 525, 534,
538, 540, 550, 552, 581, 584
Escalating military stalemate,
483, 503, 524, 528, 554,
612, 613
See also Westmoreland, William:
troops requested
European Security, 28, 587-88
Falaise, Cape, 310
Fall, Bernard, 97
FAR-Meo, 313
"Farmgate" Commando Squadron,
251, 288, 360, 370
Felt, Harry D., 94, 101, 143, 170,
193, 228, 255, 258, 259, 269
Fisher, Roger, 494, 504, 505
Five-Power Staff Agency, 41-43
"Flaming Dart" Reprisals, 352,
398, 399, 410, 438
Flood Relief
See Mekong River Delta
Ford Foundation, 622
Ford, Gerald, 372
Ford, Harold, 332
Foreign Assistance Act (1961),
295-96
Foreign Operations Administration
(FOA), 38-39
Foreign Service Act (1946), 296
Formosa, 429
Forrestal, Michael V., 118, 174,
197, 198, 332, 349, 383
Biography, 760
Fortas, Abe, 622
Fort Bragg, N.C., 140, 249, 609
Fort McKinley (Manila), 142
Fowler, Henry H., 611
France, 179, 347, 373, 385, 404,
438, 443, 448, 449, 525, 583
And SEATO, 101, 133, 143
Asks U.S. air strike, 12, 14, 39-
40
Asks U.S. military aid, 6, 10, 13,
33-35, 39-41
Berlin Agreement, 44
Cease-fire proposal, 42-43
French Cabinet, 14, 37, 42
Geneva accords, 15, 48, 50-53
Relations with U.S., 6, 7, 8-9,
10-11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 30-
33, 37, 43, 64
Freedom Company, 62, 63
French Communist Party, 587
French Expeditionary Corps (FEC),
56, 57
French Indochina
See Indochina
French Union Forces, 46, 47
FROGs, 445
Fukien, 440
Fulbright, Senator J. W., 272, 275,
372, 584
Committee hearings, 509

Gardner, John W., 507
Gaulle, Charles de, 252, 293, 356,
464, 488
Gavin Thesis, 509
Geneva Agreement (1954), 4, 5, 11,
12, 13, 14, 16, 40, 144, 158,
298, 314, 428-29, 439, 449,
598, 600
Breakdown of, 4
China on partition, 48-49
Elections, 22, 47-48, 52
Final declaration, 50-53
Foreign military bases, 51
French cease-fire proposal, 42
Hampers Saigon military mission,
54, 55, 58, 61
International Supervisory Commission,
52, 53
Kennedy and, 86, 87, 94, 95,
101, 112, 113
National Security Council and,
12, 15, 37-39
Prohibition of foreign troops, 51
Protest by Hanoi, 98
Provisional boundary in Vietnam,
58
Reprisals against collaborators,
52
Role of France, 52-53
U.S. and, 4, 5, 13-14, 24, 37-39,
155, 157
U.S. envoy's instructions, 43-45
U.S. statement, 53-54
Geneva Agreement (1962), 117,
133, 348, 383, 428-29, 449
Rostow on, 428, 429, 430, 431,
432
Georges-Picot, M., 81
Germany, 489, 510
See also Berlin
Ghana, 488
Giai, Capt., 59, 62
Gialam Airfield, 330
Giap, Vo Nguyen, 39-40
Gilpatric, Roswell W., 93, 94, 95,
96, 110, 135, 153, 174-75,
208
Glassboro, N.J., 551
Glossary, 773-78
Godel, Mr., 36
Goldberg, Arthur J., 621-22, 623
Goldwater, Barry, 318, 319
Goodpaster, Andrew J., 465
Goulding, Phil G., 615
Gravel Mines, 519
Great Britain, 11, 12, 13, 27, 30,
32, 33, 42, 48, 113, 158-59,
256, 283, 373, 404, 449, 458,
488
Berlin agreement, 44
Geneva agreement, 15, 51
Co-chairman, 98, 334, 403,
439, 440, 441
Laos conference, 357
Participation in Indochina, 41
SEATO, 101, 133, 143
U.S. briefings, 344, 373, 385,
597
Wilson on bombing, 458-59
Greece, 432, 457-58
Green, Marshall, 269, 310, 332
Greene, Graham, 18
Grose Estimates, 373
Ground War, 394-96, 407, 408,
409, 416, 428, 430, 431, 439,
443, 445, 446-47, 448, 450-
51, 459-64, 478
Administration conflict on, 396-
97, 424, 477, 525, 53942
Costs of, 508, 532, 613
Cross-border operations, 304-05,
310, 314, 371, 372, 525,
541, 542, 549, 550, 580
Deployment Issue Papers, 512
Draft Presidential Memo (1967),
54749, 589-91
First major action, 421, 476
McNamara's program, 530
Manpower limits, 473-74, 581
Military-civil affairs personnel,
414-15
Minimum essential force, 571,
573, 574, 576, 577
Objectives, 426-27, 474-75
Optimum force, 570, 574, 577
Political aspects, 532, 533
Probable effect in U.S., 485,
509
Rostow's approval of, 428-33
Stalemate, 482, 503, 527, 528,
554, 612
Strategies, 411, 412, 413, 414,
415, 417, 474
Attrition, 534, 579, 584-85,
613
Enclave strategy, 412-13, 415-
18, 422, 474, 615
50-mile limit, 412
Population security, 615
Search and destroy, 413, 421,
423, 467-68, 473-75,
576, 584
TIllrd-country forces, 410, 417-
18, 446, 454-55, 465-66,
467, 474, 569
Troop debate, 532-34, 539-40,
54546, 583, 616, 619
Troops for, 394-96, 407, 410,
411, 412, 416-17, 425,
426, 465-66, 472, 477,
478, 492, 493, 500, 511-
12, 527, 539, 550, 568,
569-70, 572-77, 581, 604,
624, 635
Westmoreland's contingency
plans, 54142
See also Armed Forces, U.S.;
Johnson, Lyndon B.
Gruening, Senator Ernest L., 273
Guam, 143, 262, 330
Guerrilla wars, 457-58

Habib, Philip C., 611
Hai Gia (Hagia), 532, 565
See also Phuc Yen
Hainan Island, 46
Haiphong, 19, 57, 58, 60, 65-66,
305, 306, 330, 407, 458, 530,
532, 538, 544, 549, 551, 552,
560, 565, 582, 615, 616, 618,
634
Bottleneck (1967), 626-27
Cement plant bombed, 628
Mining harbors, 514, 543, 550,
616, 619
Petroleum depot, 487, 490,
510-11, 532
Port bombing, 490, 532, 542,
550, 563, 565, 581, 583,
606, 619
Halperin, Morton H., 611
Hamlet Militia, 217, 287
Hancock, USS, 352
Hanoi, 19, 56, 57, 58, 60, 244,
330, 407, 444, 458, 461, 488,
530, 532, 535, 536, 538, 544,
545, 549, 551, 552, 560, 565,
587, 588, 606, 612, 613, 615,
616, 618, 634
Bombing cutback, 623, 624,
635, 636
Bombing halt, 456, 481-82, 553,
591
Civilian casualties, 527
Communist center, 9, 75, 146,
154, 179, 239, 245, 248,
254, 264, 276-77, 286,
298, 305, 307, 336, 344,
350, 360, 405, 430, 451,
455, 458, 463, 467, 472,
473, 476, 480, 481, 486,
492, 497, 501-02, 512,
513-20, 527, 530, 545,
562, 583, 584, 587, 590,
591, 592, 593, 594, 595,
597, 598, 599, 606, 614,
621, 627
Negotiations with, 333, 397-98,
441, 447-48, 482, 488,
489, 498, 560, 584, 589,
624
Peace feeler from, 535-38
Petroleum storage, 487, 491,
510
Power station, 538-39, 545,
565, 587, 588, 628
Sabotage in, 5, 18, 61
San Antonio formula, 553, 613,
619, 623
Secret agreement with, 538
U.S. communications with, 305,
376, 385, 404-05, 429,
433, 437, 449, 461, 468,
561
Hanoi-Haiphong Area, 461, 479,
488, 498, 500, 545, 549, 586,
587, 588
Hanoi-Vinh Railroad, 310, 311
Hao Group (Agents), 19, 60, 62-63,
65-66
Harbors
See Ports
Harkins, Paul D., 168, 169, 175,
176, 177, 178, 179, 184, 185,
186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193,
200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206,
208, 209, 217, 218, 221, 223,
225-30, 231, 232, 233, 234,
235, 236, 237, 247, 258, 280,
282
Biography, 760
Harriman, W. Averell, 174, 197,
506
Harvard Law School, 494, 504
Hau Nghia (Province), 229, 287
"Hawks", 536-37, 560, 582, 623
Heath, Donald R., 55, 57, 59, 60
Heinz, Luther C., 146
Helicopters
See Air Operations
Hellyer, George, 56, 57
Helms, Richard, 209, 585, 611
Herter, Christian A., 120
Hieu, Ngo Trong, 220
High National Council (HNC), 345,
388-90
High Plateau, 145, 147-48
Highlights, 2-3, 70, 84-85, 164-65,
242-43, 316-17, 392-93, 470-
71, 522-23, 602-03
Highway # 1
See Route # 1
Hilsman, Roger, 160, 174, 175,
176, 180, 197-98, 199, 201,
209, 210
Biography, 760-61
Hinh, Nguyen Van, 18, 21, 59, 60,
62
Hoa Hao (Armed Sect), 20, 73,
281, 301
Ho Chi Minh, 5-6, 9, 10, 23, 47,
48, 75, 210, 249, 429, 488,
563, 582
Biography, 765
Letters to Truman Administration,
5-6, 9, 27-28
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 72, 251, 344,
505, 530, 592
Hoi An, 630
Holloway, Camp, 352
Hongay, 270
Hong Kong, 29, 33, 267, 271, 312,
591
U.S. mission, 354
Hon Matt, 310, 311
Hon Me, 267, 273-75, 297-98,
310, 311
Hon Ne, 311
Hon Ngu (Hon Nieu), 267, 273-75,
297-98, 309, 311
Honolulu, 255, 269, 270, 278,
281, 347, 406, 412, 418
Conferences, 117, 173, 195,
258-60, 277, 414, 415,
416, 417, 506-07, 508
Hop Tac Plan, 302, 359, 363, 379,
442
House of Representatives, U.S.
See Congress, U.S.
Huang Hua, 50
Hue, 171, 413, 484, 570, 575,
621, 629, 630
Tet offensive, 605, 629
Hukbalahap Insurgents, 17
Humphrey, Hubert H., 385, 531
Huong, Tran Van, 342, 344, 346,
380, 388, 389, 390, 401

Ia Drang River Valley, 476, 499
ICA
See International Cooperation
Administration
ICC
See International Control Commission
India, 24, 29, 67, 133, 159, 350,
385, 438, 448, 595, 597, 599
Domino theory, 8, 28, 283, 286,
292
Policing forces, 441
Possible talks, 449
Indochina, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 27-
28, 29, 30-33, 44, 45-47, 473,
525, 541
Neutralizing of, 48-50, 445
Indonesia, 28, 111, 154, 155, 159,
197, 283, 286, 292, 377, 595,
599
And U.S. withdrawal, 462-63
Infiltration, 79, 80, 99, 101, 112,
145, 254, 274-75, 308, 367,
444, 573, 574, 576
Bombing costs, 566-67
Bombing halt preconditions,
537
By road, 313, 566
By sea, 281, 367, 368, 627
By waterway, 281
"Ceiling" on, 591-92
Electronic barrier, 473, 494,
496, 505-06, 518-20, 530,
556
Increase (1964), 347-49
Increase (1966), 493, 533, 566
Intelligence on, 347, 373
McNaughton on, 483, 484, 502
Publicizing of, 347-49, 367, 368,
373, 387, 441, 479-80
Routes, 281, 306, 594
Bombing of, 336, 337, 445,
504, 530, 560, 566, 582,
586, 590, 594
Westmoreland on, 512
Zones I & 2, 530, 560
See also Cambodia; Laos
Information Agency, U.S. (USIA),
38-39, 125, 208, 218, 373,
452
Information Service, U.S. (USIS),
56, 127, 134
Information, U.S. Public
See Public Information, U.S.
Institute for Defense Analyses,
494-95, 513, 562, 605
Intelligence, 7, 71, 152, 245, 248,
250
Bundy's working group, 340-41
Collection action, 309
Estimates, 25, 91, 103-04, 110,
144, 170, 171, 199, 430,
431
Soviet counteraction, 543
Intelligence Evaluation Center,
Saigon, 152
On bombing DRV, 480, 486,
535, 589
On infiltration, 347, 373
Operation names, 314
Pentagon, 7, 340, 480, 491
Secret seminar, 562
State Department, 7, 9, 160,
186, 340
U.S. network in Vietnam, 25,
73, 77, 103, 117, 152, 281,
290, 301, 476
See also C.I.A.; Information
Agency, U.S.; Information
Service, U.S.; Intelligence
Board, U.S.
Intelligence Board, U.S. (USIB),
15, 16, 128
Interagency Vietnam Coordination
Committee, 254, 265, 332,
485
International Control Commission
(ICC), 24, 67, 81, 87, 98,
145-46, 254, 264, 269, 297,
314, 327, 345, 404, 535
International Cooperation Administration
(lCA), 124, 125,
126, 139, 140, 141
Intervention, 6, 8, 10-11, 12, 13,
14, 35, 144-45
JCS memo, 45-47
Possible Communist, 102
Preconditions for, 13, 42-43
Pressure for, 102-103, 104, 107,
246
See also Infiltration; specific administration,
country
Iran, 144, 593
Irish Rebellion, 457
Iron Triangle, 77, 576

Jackson, Senator Henry M., 552
Japan, 8, 29, 30, 46, 106, 133, 159,
262, 282, 286, 292, 329, 350,
595
And U.S. withdrawal, 462, 463,
464
C.I.A. team in, 5, 17, 58
Domino theory, 8
French relations with, 27
Johns Hopkins University, 398,
459
Johnson Administration, 119
Air war
Allied support, 343
Bombing halts, 456, 481-82,
537
Bombing options, 332-34,
336, 337-38, 375-77,
377-79
Consensus on bombing, 318-
53
Controversy, 525, 534-36,
564, 584-89
Escalation, 321-23, 536, 586-
89
Failure predicted, 396
Focus on N. Vietnam, 250-51
Planning, 245, 251, 255, 260
Scenario (May 23, 1964),
255-57, 276, 352
Public case for bombing, 347-
49 Retaliatory air strikes, 245,
331
And Communist China, 263
Anti-war opinions, 397, 459-64,
482-86, 513-18
Civilian/military conflict, 472-
73, 624-25
Clifford group, 611-17, 620
Confidence in, 264, 473
Covert action, 244, 245, 249,
302-06
De-escalation, 530
Diplomatic activity, 537
"Disillusioned doves", 525, 536,
547, 611
Domino theory, 262, 286, 292
Draft Presidential Memo, 544.
547-49, 550, 589-97
Electronic barrier, 473, 494,
496, 505-06, 518-20, 530,
556
Enclave strategy, 412-13, 415-
18, 422
"Escalating military stalemate",
483, 503, 527, 528, 554,
612, 613
Fuel depot issue, 458-59, 472-
73, 486-92
Geneva Conference reactivation,
403
Ground war, 396, 428-29, 442-
50
Cross-border operations, 304-
05, 310, 314, 371, 372
"Hawks", 536-37, 623
Intelligence findings, 341, 472
Internal debates, 244-45, 250,
333-35, 396-97, 420, 422,
459-64, 484-86, 486-92,
524-25, 527, 538, 539-46,
550-51, 604
Intervention pressure, 246
National Security Action Memoranda,
238-39, 282-83,
318, 324-25, 328, 332,
368-69, 394, 410-11, 412,
414-15, 416, 420, 452-53,
548, 596
National Security Council, 251,
255, 257-58, 266, 270,
331, 332, 333, 345, 411,
413-14
Negotiations, 319, 326, 333,
337, 350, 356-57, 360,
376, 397-98, 404-05, 437,
438, 440-41, 442, 443,
447-48, 488
McNamara's plan, 530, 560-
61
Neutralization unacceptable,
251-52, 293-94, 333
Objectives in S. Vietnam, 351,
426-27, 517-18
On infiltration, 254, 281, 287,
476
On withdrawal, 397, 459-64
Operation Plan 37-64, 255, 259,
270, 271, 272
Operation Rolling Thunder, 319,
352, 399-400, 407, 408,
428, 441-42, 479, 480-81,
491, 494-96, 535
Policy options, 485-86, 533,
542
Provocation strategy, 321-22,
363-65, 368
Public relations, 259, 260, 265,
277
Reasons for action, 249, 319,
323
San Antonio formula, 553, 613,
619, 623
Search and destroy strategy,
413, 467-68
Two China policy in U.N., 432
Underestimation of N. Vietnam,
338, 479-81
U.S. commitment, 248, 261
U.S. position, 263, 322, 349-50
Vietcong, 250, 280, 530-31
"Vietnam principals", 481, 482,
489
Wars of liberation, 263
Westmoreland's "44-battalion
request", 396, 420, 422-
24, 426, 465-66
Westmoreland-Wheeler strategy,
541-42
Wheeler-Westmoreland Report,
609-11
See also Bombing; Joint Chiefs
of Staff; Tonkin Gulf; Vietnam,
South; Specific Operation
Plan
Johnson City, Tex., 533
Johnson, Harold K., 407, 408, 409,
416, 452, 509
Johnson, Lyndon B.
Air war expansion, 536, 538,
552, 623
And Abrams, 622
And Clifford, 611, 616, 617
And Congress, 271, 343, 425-26
And intelligence, 250, 261-62,
263, 472, 605
And McNamara, 477, 524-25,
528, 531, 549-50
And public, 253, 256, 257, 258,
261, 265, 272, 294, 320,
336-37, 394-96, 398, 399,
410, 429, 472, 553, 605,
617-18, 621
And South Vietnam, 88, 109,
118, 195-96, 346, 398, 473
And Westmoreland, 527, 532,
540-42, 579-81, 617, 620
And Wilson, 458-59, 537-38
As President, 246, 253, 258,
260, 261, 272, 279, 319,
320, 323, 324, 331, 338-
39, 341-42, 345, 347, 366,
385, 386, 397, 398, 401,
407, 414-15, 429, 431, 433,
792
456, 458, 459, 466, 481-
82, 488-89, 492, 498, 500,
524, 532, 544, 554, 565,
567, 581, 582, 597, 609,
621, 623, 628, 635
As Vice-President, 86, 88, 95,
98, 99, 119, 124, 126, 132,
132-35, 180, 208, 211
Bombing cutback, 544-45, 618
Bombing halt preconditions,
481-82, 537, 553
Bombing of DRV, 319
Bombing targets, 259, 407, 408,
488-91, 536, 635
Change of mission of Marines,
394, 478
Clandestine warfare on DRV,
88, 196, 245
Conflict of advice, 472-73, 482,
536, 538-39
"Credibility gap", 420-21
Defensive to offensive war, 394,
478
Dilemma of, 550
Draft Presidential Memo, 548,
549-50, 589
Election campaign, 318-20
Escalation, 293-94, 526
44-battalion request, 420, 422-
24, 426, 473, 474
Ground troops, 394-96, 407,
410, 426
Troop buildup, 394, 396, 411,
412, 425, 426, 527, 533-
34, 620-21
Ground war, 426-27, 473, 527
Limits U.S. operation, 604
Manila communique, 533
N.H. primary, 620
Napalm approved, 404, 406
On neutralization, 252, 293-94
On overt action, 252-53
On television, 272, 623, 624
Orders Operation Plan 34A, 245
Refuses reelection, 605, 624
Reserve units call-up, 620-21
San Antonio formula, 553, 613,
619, 623
Search and destroy strategy, 473
Tet offensive, 605, 607, 609,
611, 616, 622, 624
Tonkin Gulf incident, 267-72
U.S. commitment in Vietnam,
473
U.S. objectives in S. Vietnam,
195-96, 473
U.S. policy in Vietnam, 320,
617, 618, 622, 623
Wise Men (Senior Informal Advisory
Group), 622, 623
Johnson, Robert, 332, 346
Johnson, U. Alexis, 102, 144, 321,
388, 457, 467, 468, 497
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16, 41, 94,
110, 111, 126, 148, 153,
156, 190, 248, 253, 255, 281,
306, 338, 406, 419-20, 454,
465, 473, 480, 492, 493, 500,
501, 509, 511, 526, 548, 553,
562, 572, 622, 626
Air war, 406-07, 486-87, 501,
525, 532, 534, 542, 551,
560, 578, 626-28
Bombing halts, 482
Bornbing policy, 617
Bombing targets, 259, 270,
339, 486, 487, 510-11
Deployment of forces, 245,
270, 271
Escalation, 339, 532, 536-37,
564-65, 580
And CINCPAC, 573
Bienhoa attack, 329
Commitment to military victory,
540, 578
Domino theory, 262, 282-83
"Hawks", 536-37
McNamara/Taylor recommendations,
184, 216-19
Memos, 14, 15-16, 45-47, 130-
31, 158-60, 282-85, 308-
10, 321, 363, 577
Military aid increases, 85, 90,
100, 102
Military estimates, 90, 144, 153-
54, 628-32
Military objectives, Indochina,
14
Military training aid, 15-16
On combat troops, 409, 412,
577
On escalation, 248-49, 255, 322-
23, 347, 418, 423, 525,
532, 533, 539-40, 550,
577, 578, 580, 590
On mobilization, 529, 604, 608,
609, 610, 613
On Options Band C, 377-79
On possible intervention, 45-47
173rd Airborne Brigade, 413-15
Operation 34A report, 267, 275
Provocation strategy, 321-22,
363-64
Rebuttal of McNamara papers,
531-32, 548, 550-51
Search and destroy strategy, 413
Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency
and Special Activities,
246, 299
Tet offensive, 604, 606, 607,
608, 624
Vietnam and Southeast Asia,
282-85, 363-64
Warfare mode, 159
Westmoreland's "44-battalion
request", 423-24, 426
See also Laos; Operation Plan
37-64; Operation Rolling
Thunder; Specific Chairman
of J.C.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairmen of
See Lemnitzer, Lyman L.; Radford,
Arthur W.; Taylor,
Maxwell; Wheeler, Earle G.
Joint General Staff (JGS), 194, 218
Jordan, 445
Jorden, William J., 107, 109, 255
Jorden report, 109, 157-58, 256,
373, 432, 433
Journalists, 11, 12, 48, 63-64, 373
See also News Media
Jungle Jim (Commando Unit), 115
Junior Chamber International, 56,
57, 142
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam W

Postby admin » Sun Jul 26, 2015 7:02 pm

PART 2 OF 2

Kalb, Marvin, 607
Kashmir, 445
Kattenburg, Paul M., 180, 206-11
Katzenbach, Nicholas, 531, 542,
551, 562, 585, 611, 619
Kaysen, Carl, 494
Kennedy Administration, 71
Advisers' estimates, 89, 102-03,
106-07, 118, 130-31, 154,
168, 181, 210-11, 217-19
And Diem regime, 88-89, 93-94,
95, 98, 99, 100-01, 107,
112, 113, 114, 118, 132
Overthrow of Diem, 166-
239
Conflict of information, 103-
104, 107, 118, 166-67,
176, 181, 195-96, 198,
211, 226-27
Counterinsurgency, 92, 93, 114,
128, 199, 219
Disengagement, 166, 180, 181,
210-11
Economic aid to S. Vietnam,
126-27, 132
Joint Chiefs' memo on commitment,
130-31
National Security Council, 102,
113, 131
Pressure for intervention, 102-
103, 104, 107
Psychological assistance to S.
Vietnam, 127, 132
State Department, 93, 95, 178,
200-201
Opposition to Taylor proposals,
106-107, 176
Vietnam report (1962), 160-
62 Vietnam policy, 93, 111, 131-
32, 155, 219, 548
Vietnam Task Force, 124-25,
132
Kennedy, John F., 5, 26, 71, 174,
179, 181, 197, 198, 208, 214,
216, 228, 238, 411, 494
And Geneva accords, 86, 87,
112, 113
And Khrushchev, 92, 98-99
And public information, 86, 94,
96, 104, 114, 115
Clandestine warfare, 87, 96, 97-
98, 127-28, 128-30, 132
Kennedy-Diem letters, 114-158
Military aid to S. Vietnam, 86,
87, 88, 98-99, 110, 113,
114, 115, 125-26, 132
Military combat-support roles,
88, 95, 98, 99-100, 108,
111-12, 113, 114, 118, 119
National Security Action Memoranda
#52: 95-96, 131-32
#111:112
Priorities, 89, 114
Vietnam a "broad commitment"
86, 88
Vietnam strategy flawed, 90,
109, 114, 166-67
Kennedy, Robert F., 181, 531,
621
Kep (Can Thon) Airfield, 532,
538, 565
Key Documents
Index, 767-72
References to, 5, 6, 12, 13, 17,
87, 90, 91, 93, 97, 99, 104,
106, 111, 167, 168, 169,
171, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 180, 182, 184, 185,
188, 191, 192, 196, 246,
247, 248, 252, 263, 269,
277, 278, 322, 324, 328,
331, 337, 339, 346, 395,
396, 397, 399, 400, 401,
408, 414, 424, 473, 477,
482, 483, 490, 493, 494,
527, 528, 531, 534, 539,
541, 543, 545, 547, 610,
623
Key Figures, Biographies of, 758-66
Kha, 314
Khanh, Nguyen, 119, 176, 195,
202, 208, 249, 251, 252, 254,
256-57, 258, 265-66, 277,
287-88, 289, 290, 292, 293,
294, 297, 300-02, 312, 319,
321, 323, 324, 329, 342, 344,
345, 356-57, 360, 361, 367,
380, 388, 389, 390, 401, 402,
403
Biography, 761
Khe Sanh, 618, 619, 621, 630, 632
Khiem, Tran Thien, 176, 202, 208,
209, 220
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 92, 431
Kien Hoa (Province), 229, 287
Kien Phong (Province), 229
Kien Tuong (Province), 287
Kim, Le Van, 173, 176, 220, 279
Kistiakowsky, George B., 494
Komer, Robert W., 534, 567
Kontum, 446, 558, 576
Area, 103, 153, 571
Province, 419, 446, 570
Korat, 260, 261
Korea, 12, 17, 45, 46, 58, 113,
144, 147, 159, 210, 283, 286,
292, 541, 581, 593, 595, 622
And U.S. withdrawal, 462, 463,
464
Berlin agreement, 44
Forces in SVN, 409, 417, 418,
423, 446, 447, 452, 454,
455, 466, 634
U.S. Ambassador in, 623, 635
U.S. briefing, 344, 597
Korean War, 443, 486, 563, 588
Kosygin, Aleksei N., 537, 538, 551,
589
Kraslow, David, 535
Kremlin, 9
Krulak, Victor H., 181, 198, 208-
11, 246, 281
Biography, 761
Kuala Lumpur, 457
Ky, Nguyen Cao, 266, 342, 345-
46, 388-90, 401, 423, 484,
485, 499, 502, 555, 561-62,
590
Kyes, Roger M., 33-36

"Labor Government, The, 1964-
70" 537
Lan, Lt. Col., 59, 62
Landon, Mr., 27
Laniel, Joseph, 13, 39-40, 41
Lansdale, Edward G., 5, 16-20,
21-22, 36, 54, 55, 64, 93,
96-97, 135-43, 151
Biography, 761-62
Lao Dong (Party), 72, 79, 80
Laos, 13, 49, 51-54, 119, 135,
138, 143-44, 148, 153, 154,
197, 244, 262, 266, 282, 283,
285, 286, 292, 306, 307, 318,
319, 326-28, 329, 330, 334,
344, 367, 376, 385, 457, 530,
587, 597, 606
American advisers in, 371
And U.S. withdrawal, 462
Barrel Roll operations, 444
Cease fire, 94-95, 326-27, 335,
356
Clandestine warfare in, 87-88,
97, 129, 139-40, 239, 313
Conference proposed (1964),
303, 326, 355, 357
Counterinsurgency, 281, 592
Eisenhower support, 92
Geneva treaty, 117, 286, 348,
371, 383
Government weak, 249, 254,
350, 355
"Hot pursuit" into, 290, 291,
592
Importance of, 92, 94-95, 98-99,
101, 102, 111-12, 113
Infiltration barriers, 518-20
Infiltration routes, 25 I, 286,
303, 322, 359, 363, 371,
385, 446, 540, 556, 560,
566, 570, 576, 592
Air strikes at, 247, 344, 348,
359, 375, 592, 627, 636
Infiltration sanctuaries, 539,
566, 570, 630
Intelligence estimate, 103-04
Interdiction and verification
zone, 505-06
Invasion possibility, 525, 541,
542, 549, 550, 580, 590
JCS view, 130, 282-83
Lao Corridor operations, 370-
71, 382, 430, 431
Operation Sea Dragon, 627
Operation 34A, 247, 261, 310,
362
Panhandle, 304, 305, 307, 310,
312, 327, 328, 343, 362,
363, 371, 376, 385, 453,
518, 530, 566, 616, 619
Pathet Lao, 245, 254, 258, 310,
313, 314, 354, 445, 519
PAVN forces in, 465
RLAF, 247, 254, 261, 313-14,
365, 386, 444
SAR operations, 313, 362, 371
T-28 operations, 247, 254-55,
261, 269, 310, 327, 328,
345, 355, 362, 367, 369,
370, 371, 375, 444
US/SVN Special Forces in, 592
Working with US/GVN, 310,
325, 345, 367, 369
See also Operation Barrel Roll;
Operation 34A; T-28 Operations
Laotian Border Region, 408
Latin America, 263, 283
Leaflet Operations, 304, 309, 312,
313, 367, 453
Leddy, John 126
Lederer, William J., 18
Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 113
Le Van Duyet, 219
Lieberman, Hank 63-64
Lien Minh (Guerrillas), 60
Life Magazine, 63, 537
Lima, 430
Lippman, Walter, 281, 294, 583
Loc, Buu, 56
Lochau, 270
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 167, 168,
169, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183,
184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 191, 192, 193-94, 195,
198, 200-01, 203-07, 209,
210, 211, 212, 214-16, 219-
27, 228, 229, 230, 232, 238,
252, 253, 254, 258-59, 264,
265, 266, 280, 282, 293, 467,
468, 499, 500, 506, 559, 622
Biography, 762
London, 354, 537
Long An (Province), 229, 287
Long Uanh (Province), 571
Longthanh, Camp, 177, 220
Loory, Stuart H., 535, 623
Lopburi, 138
Los Angeles Times, The, 535, 623
"Lucky Dragon" Intelligence
Operation, 314
Lunar New Year
See Tet
Ly, Chen-hou, 40

Macapagal, President, 385
MacArthur, Douglas, II, 41, 546
McCarthy, Senator Eugene J., 620
McClintock, Rob, 54
McCloskey, Robert, 421
McCloy, John J., 623
McCone, John A., 168, 170, 181,
195, 196, 237, 249, 250, 251,
252, 262, 272, 279, 323, 334,
452
Effectiveness of air war, 396,
450-51
McConnell, John P., 406-07
McCormack, John W., 372
McGarr, Lionel c., 106, 124, 143,
146
McGovern, Senator George S., 275
McNamara, Robert S., 5, 90, 110,
111, 130, 135, 144, 176, 190,
195, 208, 214, 245, 246, 248,
250, 254, 257, 258, 259, 260,
263, 265, 266, 267, 269-70,
271, 272, 273-75, 279-82,
285-91, 293, 299, 319, 321,
322, 323, 325, 329, 334, 336,
337, 342, 345, 351, 352, 363,
367, 368, 403-04, 406, 407,
408, 409, 412, 415, 425, 427,
428, 442, 450, 452, 456, 458,
465, 466-68, 474, 479, 480,
481-82, 486, 488, 489-90,
493, 497, 498-500, 504, 507,
508, 509, 510, 511-12, 564,
577, 584, 605, 606, 608, 609,
611, 618, 620
And McNaughton, 543-44, 546,
548, 549, 551
Attempted assassination, 528
Doubts on Vietnam, 175, 190,
467, 473, 475, 477, 482,
484, 491-92, 494-96, 524
Draft Presidential Memorandum,
543-44, 547-50, 589-
97 McNamara/Taylor recommendations,
184, 216-19
McNamara-Westmoreland compromise,
551
Military reinforcements, 493,
511-12, 528, 532
News conferences, 533
On Taylor report, 153-55
Pentagon study, 473, 524
Reduction of air war, 524, 525,
530, 554-58, 560, 562-63
Rusk-McNamara report, 155-58
U.S. commitments in Vietnam,
526, 530, 555, 558-59
War program, 530, 554-62
Withdrawal plans, 117, 118
McNaughton, John T., 238-39,
240, 247, 255, 258, 268, 269,
302, 308-09, 319-20, 332,
333, 334, 335, 342, 351, 364,
383, 399, 408, 412, 414-15,
465-66, 475, 481-82, 485,
494, 497, 502-04, 528, 532,
533, 536, 540-41, 543, 544,
548, 549, 551, 552, 585
"A Barrier Strategy", 504-06
Biography, 762-63
Draft Presidential Memo, 544,
545, 546,
Observations about bombing,
482-84
On escalation, 322, 339, 364-65,
374-77, 442-50, 543
War philosophy, 546
McPherson, Harry c., 623
Maddox, USS, 267-68, 269, 273,
274, 298
Magsaysay, Ramon, 17, 21, 62, 65,
141
Mai Van Bo, 461
Malaya, 28, 29, 41, 283, 457, 458
Malaysia, 262, 283, 286, 292, 377,
385, 448, 463, 464
Mandate for Change, 11
Manila, 142, 457, 532, 533, 565
Mansfield, Senator Mike, 26, 293,
372
Mao Tse-tung, 10, 263, 429, 457
Marianas Islands, 143
Marigold Maneuver, 535
Marine Corps, U.S., 420, 421, 452,
454, 581
Chulai, 422
Danang, 321, 329, 396, 404,
410, 413, 418, 454, 478
Enclave strategy, 412-13
5th Marine Division, 634
Ground war, 394-95, 410, 411,
420, 452, 478
Hue-Phubai, 413, 416, 454
Khesanh, 619
Quang Tri, 575
Security, 528, 555
Tet offensive, 607, 608, 609
Third Marine Expeditionary
Force, 418, 446, 448
Maritime Operations U.S./G.V.N.,
304, 309-10, 311, 312
See also Operation Plan 34A
Marks, Leonard, 506
Marshall, George C., 8
Marshall Plan, 215
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
494
Mau, Vu Van, 173
Mecklin, John, 63-64, 201
Mekong Plain, 510, 519
Mekong River Delta, 105, 116,
147-48, 227, 239, 280, 281,
285, 505, 519, 572, 581, 596
Development program, 398, 432
Flood task force, 147-48, 149-
50, 152, 154, 158
Loyal to Diem, 176, 229
Military campaigns in 217, 239,
571
Mobile riverine force, 571, 572
Provinces in, 229, 633
Vietcong control in, 250, 419,
442, 499
Mekong Towns, 447
Mekong Valley, 463
Mendenhall, Joseph A., 181
Mendes-France, Pierre, 49, 50, 583
Menon, Krishna, 49
Meo Guerrillas, 138
Middle East, 28, 593
MIGs, 304, 328, 360, 364, 440,
444, 451, 453, 593
Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG), 17, 24, 34,
35, 36, 56, 57, 58, 93, 124,
125-26, 129, 131, 134, 135,
136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 148,
150, 152, 157
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(MACV), 218, 226, 231,
234, 247, 258, 308, 312, 321,
360, 371, 440, 446, 478, 504,
559, 568-69, 572-73, 574,
576, 577, 580, 584, 585, 628,
629, 630
Strategy after Tet, 623-33
Military Assistance Program
(MAP), 125, 128, 136, 138,
141, 218
Military-Civil Affairs Personnel,
414-15
Military Training (SVN), 116, 133,
145, 152, 217-18, 287
Miller, Senator William, 552
Mine-laying, 337, 375, 384, 446,
453, 487, 538, 590, 592, 619
Minh, Duong Van, 170, 176, 177,
178, 179, 183, 184, 185, 191,
194, 195, 208, 215, 219-21,
222, 226, 231, 233, 248, 279,
281, 282, 388
Minh, Lt., 59
Minimum Essential Force, 571,
573, 574, 576, 577
Minnesota, 620, 621
Mo Due, 575
Molotov, V. M., 49-50
Montagnard Tribesmen, 74, 79-80,
97, 137
Moody, Alfred J. F., 299
Morgan, Thomas E., 272, 372
Morris, Mr., 508, 509
Morse, Senator Wayne, 273, 348
Morton, USS, 325
Moscow, 461, 464, 515, 545, 587,
588, 589, 594, 597
Bombing halt, 456
Dialogue with, 468
Mining DRV harbors, 593
Negotiators in, 488
U.S. mission in, 354
See also Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Mugia Pass, 269, 314, 327, 328,
371, 530, 560
Mui Dao, Cape, 309, 311, 326
Mui Ron, Cape, 310, 311
Muong Sai, 313
Muong Sen, 518
Muong Suoi, 261
Murphy, Robert D., 623
Murrow, Edward R., 208, 210
Mustin, Lloyd M., 332, 333, 377
Mutual Defense Assistance Program
(MDAP), 36, 45

Nam Bo Regional Committee, 78
Nam Dinh (Province), 57, 535
Nam Me Thout, 571
Napalm, 404, 406
Nape, 329
National Farmers' Union, 621
National Guard, 151, 154, 156
National Intelligence Board
See Intelligence Board, U.S.
National Liberation Front, 81, 300,
348, 350, 447, 449, 461, 526,
561, 598
See also Vietcong; Vietnam,
South
National Security Action Memoranda
#52: 95-96, 130-32
#111: 112
#273: 238-39, 282-83
#288: 291, 332, 548, 596
#314: 324, 328, 368-69
#328: 394, 410-11, 412, 414-
15, 416, 420, 421, 452-53
National Security Action (Pacification),
63, 64, 280
National Security Council
Eisenhower Administration, 4,
6, 11, 12-13, 15
On Diem, 6, 23
On negotiated settlement, 6,
11-12
On Vietnam elections, 23
Policy review, 25, 28-33
Pre-Geneva decisions, 37-39
Pressure on France, 6, 12,
20, 37
Recommends direct aid to S.
Vietnam, 6, 7, 16
Johnson Administration
American public and SVN,
346-47
Escalation plans, 25 I, 255
Offensive war, 411 , 413
On 1964 scenario, 257-58
Operation Barrel Roll, 345
Options, 331-34
Reprisals after Tonkin, 270
Kennedy Administration, 94,
95, 102, 131, 190
Recommends increased military
aid, 102, 125-26
Supports Diem coup, 176,
178, 180, 204-05
Truman Administration
Domino theory, 7
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), 34, 373, 463,
477
Navarre, Henri, 35, 36, 39
Navy, U.S., 60, 62-63, 66, I SO,
152, 157, 445, 491-92
Aware of coup, 191
Coastline duty, 115, 538, 565,
592, 616
Cutback in attacks, 624
Mine Division, 73, 115
Mobile riverine force, 571, 572
Seventh Fleet, 115, 269, 325,
352
See also DeSoto Patrols; Tonkin,
Gulf of
Negotiations, 319, 326, 333, 335,
337, 350, 356-57, 360, 376,
382, 395, 397-98, 405, 437,
438, 440-41, 442, 443, 447-
48, 449-50, 482, 489, 498,
584
Ball's plan, 459-64
Diplomatic missions, 403, 404,
405, 441, 468, 488, 589,
618
Hanoi accepts, 624
Hanoi peace feeler, 535
McNamara's plan, 530, 560-61
Preconditions for, 468
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 258
Nes, David, 280
Neutralization Formula, 25 I-52,
281-82, 292, 293, 333
New Delhi, 258, 354
New York Times, The, 98, 105,
168, 175, 244, 255, 260,
261, 266, 273, 281, 319,
373, 395, 473, 477, 535,
538
Dispatches on troop increases,
620, 621
Editorials, 653-61
New Zealand, 41, 42, 256, 286,
292, 343, 442
And U.S. policy, 30, 159, 344,
373, 385, 452, 454, 455,
464, 597
U.S. ambassador in, 623, 635
News Media, U.S., 63-64, 98, 105,
114, 115, 116, 210, 260-61, .
272, 281, 308, 331, 343-44,
347, 348, 373, 384, 420-21,
451, 457, 477
And L.B.J., 261, 337, 410, 426,
478, 605, 620, 621-22, 624
Press conferences, 115, 533
Press dispatches, 527, 535
Press speculation, 477, 492, 581
Television, 348, 411, 476, 620
News Media, Vietnam, 184, 197,
213, 234, 266, 308, 344, 347,
384, 420
Ngo Family
See Can, Ngo Dinh; Diem, Ngo
Dinh; Nhu, Ngo Dinh; Nhu,
Tran Le Xuan
Nhatrang, 96, 97, 126, 183, 402,
409, 446
Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 73, 121-22, 167,
168, 170, 171, 172-73, 174,
175, 177, 178, 179, 180,
181, 182, 183, 184, 187,
188, 189, 193, 194, 197-98,
200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208, 209, 210, 212,
213-14, 215, 216, 217, 220,
224, 227
Biography, 763
Nhu, Tran Le Xuan, 121, 164,
167, 171, 172, 173, 174,
181, 182, 197-98, 200, 202,
205, 206, 208, 209, 213-14
Biography, 763
Nightingale Island, 311
Nineteenth Parallel, 329, 336, 337,
384, 387, 404, 405, 438, 439,
592, 617, 618
Ninhbinh, 97
Nitze, Paul H., 551, 611, 619
Nixon, Richard M., 71
Nkrumah, Kwame, 488
Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 88, 95,
96, 100-101, 104, 112, 113-
14, 124, 126-27, 132, 143,
145-46, 171, 172, 176, 198-
99, 209, 210, 211, 226
Norstad, Lauris, 40
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
See NATO
Nuclear Weapons
See Atomic Weapons

O'Daniel, John W., 17, 34, 35, 36,
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64
Office of Strategic Services, 9, 167,
489
Office of the President, 125, 212,
221-23
Office of the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities, 246, 299
Okinawa, 17, 46, 58, 65, 139, 159,
262, 413
Army forward depot, 260, 329
CIA support base, 143-43
Operation Anniversary Victory #2,
313
Operation Barrel Roll, 343, 344-
45, 348, 444
Operation Brotherhood, 56, 57,
127, 140-42
Operation Cricket, 518
Operation Farmgate, 251, 288,
360, 370
Operation Flaming Dart, 352, 398,
399, 410, 438
Operation Hardnose, 281, 314
Operation Jungle Jim, 115
Operation Leaping Lena, 314, 328-
29
Operation Masher, 507
Operation Pierce Arrow, 270, 307,
363
Operation Plan 34A, 245, 246,
247, 270, 304, 307, 308, 310-
14, 324-25, 359, 361, 363,
367, 368-69, 382
Air drop operations, 304, 310,
311, 326, 367
Air reconnaissance, 309, 312,
326
Coastal raids, 248, 266, 268,
322, 326, 367
Leaflet operations, 304, 309,
312, 313, 367
Marine operations, 304, 309-10,
311, 322, 359, 367
Monthly schedules, 247, 275-76,
308-10, 325
Operation Plan 37-64, 255, 259,
270, 271, 272
Operation Rolling Thunder, 319,
352, 395, 399, 402, 403, 404,
405-06, 417, 438-39, 450-
51, 452, 453, 456, 478-81,
482, 490, 491, 494-96, 497-
98, 511, 513-20, 529, 544,
552, 555-57, 565, 590, 627,
628, 634-35
Attack Sorties, 627
Changes in purpose, 407, 408,
479, 530
CIA appraisal, 562-63
Costs of, 535, 557
Draft Presidential Memo, 544
Effects of, 480-81, 535
52 program, 565
56 program, 590
57 program, 552
Oil storage raids, 491, 511
Political aspects, 441-42, 479,
491
Secret Seminar on, 494-96, 513-
20, 562-63
Target list, 628, 634-35
Operation Triangle, 307, 354, 357
Operation Victorious Arrow, 313
Operation Yankee Team, 247, 310,
312-13, 327, 328, 343, 348,
370, 371-72
Optimum Force, 570, 574, 577
Options, 332-34, 336, 337-38, 375-
77, 377-79, 533, 542, 586-89
Ottawa, 254, 354, 489
Overseas Differentials and Allowances
Act, 296

Pacification
See Vietnam, South
Pakistan, 28, 133, 256, 595
Pan American Airways, 234
Panhandle (Laos), 304, 305, 307,
310, 312, 327, 328, 343, 362,
363, 371, 376, 385, 453, 518,
530, 566, 616, 619
"Paper Tiger", 298, 356
Paris, 293, 294
DRV representative in, 461
Laotian cease fire talks, 326-27
U.S. mission in, 354
Vietnam peace talks, 553
Pathet Lao, 245, 248, 258, 298-
99, 310, 519
Air attacks, 247, 261
Appeal to ICC, 314
Defections from, 313
Plaine des Jarres, 254, 354
Possible actions of, 445
U.S. reconnaissance flights, 255
Patti Mission, 56
Patton, George S., 169
Peace Corps, 127
Peace Talks
See Negotiations
Peiping (Peking), 10, 154, 286,
303, 307, 350, 385, 429, 430,
431, 435, 437, 460, 461, 462,
463, 501, 515, 516, 587, 588,
593
Pentagon
See Defense Department, U.S.
Phat Diem (Province), 57
Philippines, 9, 17, 21, 27, 30, 37,
41, 42, 47, 55, 57, 59, 65, 66,
107, 133, 146, 159, 256, 262,
283, 286, 292, 329, 343, 373,
385, 448, 457, 458
And U.S. withdrawal, 462
Eastern Construction Co., 140-
41
On U.S. plans, 344, 597
Operation Brotherhood, 141-42
Saigon Military Mission, 21, 62,
63
Security Training Center, 142
Troops to SVN, 455
U.S. Ambassador in, 623, 635
Phillips, Lt., 65
Phompenh, 354
Phong Dinh (Province), 229
Phou Kout, 307
Phu Bai, 409, 413, 422, 454, 570,
575
Phu Cat, 572
Phuc Loi, 270, 311
Phuc Yen Airfield, 330, 333, 387,
444, 445, 448, 449, 532, 545,
565
Phuoc Long, 419, 571, 576
Phuoc Thanh, 101
Phuoc Tuy (Province), 287, 571
Phugui, 406
Pierce Arrow
See Operation Pierce Arrow
Plaine des Jarres, 254, 307, 327,
354, 372
Pleiku, 153, 352, 398, 399, 410,
434, 437, 446, 448, 570, 571,
576
Pleven, Rene, 40
POLAD, 232
Poland, 24, 61, 67, 179, 299, 355
Attempts peace talks, 535-36
589
Laos crisis initiative, 258
Population Security, 615
Porter, William J., 559
Ports
Bombing of, 490, 532, 542, 545,
580, 586, 590, 606, 619
Mining of, 514, 532, 540, 545,
586, 593, 616, 619
Power Plants, 532, 538-39, 545,
563, 565, 583, 587, 628
Practice Nine, 576
Presidential Advisers
See White House Office
Presidential Statements, 373, 426,
506-07, 553, 621, 623, 624
Presidential Special Committee on
Indochina, 17, 33
Program Five, 633-34
Program Four, 568, 570, 573, 574
Program Four-plus, 596
Project 22, 447
Propaganda, 106, 158, 309, 312,
447, 464, 595
Provocation Strategy, 321-22, 363-
64-368
Public Information, U.S., 112, 118,
173, 178, 181, 188, 203, 225,
255, 264, 272, 302, 304, 344,
373, 376, 384, 397, 411, 438,
446, 448, 453, 552
Accurate, 114, 171, 172-73, 174,
182, 260-61, 268, 347, 551
Inaccurate, 11, 26, 104, 105,
158, 168, 170, 172, 345,
410, 426, 438, 533
Manila communique, 533
On sustained bombing, 441-42
On troop increases, 478
Withheld or misunderstood, 5,
6, 86, 94, 96, 169, 178-79,
184, 185, 214, 222-23,
224, 244, 249, 261, 274-
75, 304, 327-28, 330, 343-
44, 345, 347, 348, 385,
394-95, 396, 398, 399,
401-402, 407, 442, 472,
527, 544
See also Credibility Gap; News
Media
Public Opinion, U.S., 117, 154,
155, 171, 203, 206, 209, 210,
212, 259, 277, 278, 320, 322-
23, 338, 350, 366, 372-73,
374, 378-79, 411, 451, 456,
561, 590
Dissatisfaction with war, 546-47,
549, 550, 590, 604, 605,
614, 617-18, 620
On air war, 459, 491, 534-36,
592
On bombing pause, 456, 497,
499
On escalation, 468, 475, 509,
543, 582
On Westmoreland's troop request,
620

Quangkhe, 270, 403
Quangngai, 379, 418, 419, 570,
571, 572, 575, 576, 581
Quangtri, 80, 570, 572, 575, 608,
630
Quat, Pham Huy, 412, 414, 443,
454, 455, 456, 457
"Queen Bee" Intelligence Operation,
314
Quiet American, The, 18
Quinhon, 352, 398, 409, 410, 446



Rabon, William F., Jr., 397, 398
Radar Installations, 125, 268, 308,
309, 311, 516
Radford, Arthur W., 12, 13, 14,
33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41,
42, 45
Radio, Black, 309, 311-12
Radio, White, 309, 311-12
Railroads, 310, 311, 444, 453,
479, 483, 532, 550, 552, 563,
565, 570, 571, 575, 586, 626,
627
Rand Corporation, 72, 76, 80, 432,
502
Red River, 14, 66, 429, 544, 591,
594
Bridge, 545
Reprisal Action, 364, 375, 382,
386, 398-99, 433-37, 441-42
Resor, Stanley R., 509, 620-621
Revolutionary Development Pro-
gram
See Vietnam, South: Pacifica-
tion
Rhon River, 268
Rice, Edward E., 591
Richardson, John H., 175, 176,
177, 179, 183, 201-02, 208,
226
Ridgway, Matthew B., 12, 623
Rivers, Mendell, 372
Robertson, Walter, 20, 36
Roderick, John, 63-64
Rogers, Col., 458, 459
Rolling Thunder
See Operation Rolling Thunder
Ronning, Chester A., 489-90
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 8
Roots of Involvement, 607
Rosson, William, 56, 62
Rostow, Walt W., 90, 93, 100, 102,
103, 107, 108, 109, 123-24,
249, 253, 254, 261, 262, 264,
340, 401, 428-29, 429-33,
457-58, 485, 488-89, 510,
534, 537, 545, 585-89, 611,
619
Biography, 764
Route #1, 309, 311, 379, 570,
571, 575, 629
Route #4, 313
Route #7, 313, 314, 329, 372
Route #9, 370-71, 505, 575
Route #20, 570
Rowan, Mr., 452
Rungsat Special Zone (RSSZ), 571,
577
Rusk, Dean, 106-07, 109, Ill, 112,
113, 136, 144, 160, 174, 179,
180, 184, 194, 201, 203-07,
208, 211, 221, 246, 247, 249,
250, 253, 254, 255, 258, 259,
260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 270,
273, 274, 276, 280, 323, 325,
334, 335, 337, 345, 346-47,
349, 351, 352, 354, 362, 366,
368, 373, 382-83, 397, 403,
429, 450, 452, 453, 457, 482,
489, 497-98, 510, 542, 562,
585, 617
Bombing cutback proposal, 618,
619, 623
On television, 348, 411, 620
Rusk-McNamara Report, 155-58
Russell, Senator Richard, 372

Sabin, Admiral, 60
Sadeyes, 519
Saigon, 20, 24, 65-66, 120, 153,
167, 184, 218, 220, 224, 229,
246, 253, 265, 292, 294, 321,
329, 352, 360, 379, 380, 386,
420, 442, 458, 461, 463, 474,
524, 528, 529, 537, 551, 555,
571, 576, 577, 581, 596, 605,
610, 630, 632, 633
Base for C.I.A., 17, 21, 55
Loyal to Diem, 176
Military governor of, 188
Trade Fair (1962), 127
U.S. Embassy
See Embassies, U.S.: Saigon
U.S. Mission, 358
Saigon Military Mission (SMM), 5,
17-19, 21, 54-67
Saigon River, 305
Saipan (Marianas), 143, 192, 234
Saleumsay, 313
Salisbury, Harrison E., 535
Saltonstall, Senator Leverett, 372
Salvation, Committee of National,
389
Sam Neva, (Province), 313
Sam Son, 309, 311
SAM (Surface to Air Missile), 445,
490, 511, 516, 532, 565
San Antonio Formula, 553, 613,
619, 623
San Juan, "Frisco" Johnny, 141
Sarit Thanarat, Marshal, 135, 138,
282
SAR (Search and Rescue), 313,
362, 371
Seaborn, J. Blair, 244, 254, 264,
276-77, 297-99, 373, 376,
404-05
Biography, 763-64
Sea Dragon Operations, 627
Search and Destroy Operations,
413, 421, 423, 426-27, 467-
68, 473-74, 576, 584, 614
See also Strategies
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization), 49, 101, 102,
103, 111, 131, 133, 143-44,
147, 148, 151, 155, 156, 157,
373, 407-08
Secret Search for Peace, The, 535
Secretaries of Defense
See Clifford, Clark; McNamara,
Robert S.; Wilson, Charles
E.
Secretaries of State
See Acheson, Dean G.; Dulles,
John Foster; Herter, Christian
A.; Marshall, George
V.; Rusk, Dean
Seminar, Secret, 473, 494-96, 513-
20, 562-63
Senate, U.S.
See Congress, U.S.
Senior Informal Advisory Group,
622
Seventeenth Parallel, 54, 76, 97,
104, 145-46, 275, 298, 352,
431, 444, 505, 544, 556, 591,
594
Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant, 269, 270,
271, 272, 278, 306-08, 347,
401, 406-07, 408, 410, 413,
415, 423, 467, 477, 487, 489,
490, 491, 493, 499-500, 506,
507, 510-11, 512, 528, 532,
534, 556, 626-28
Biography, 764
Sheehan, Neil, 244, 318, 394
Sihanouk, Norodom, 123, 286, 304
Siho, Lt. Col., 140
Singapore, 113, 159
Sino-Soviet Dispute, 253, 284, 293,
441, 593
Smith, General, 34, 35, 36, 41-43,
232, 236, 237
Smith, Hedrick, 86, 166, 524
Smith, Richard, 59
Smith, Senator Margaret Chase,
552
Smith, Walter Bedell, 23, 43, 47,
48, 50
Sone Sai, 3 13
Songbe, 419
Sontay, 80
South Asia, 30
South China Sea, 579
Southeast Asia, 7, 8, 28-33, 111,
130, 147, 262, 306, 326, 430,
449, 464, 587, 613
And U.S. withdrawal, 462-63
Battle against Communism, 37,
133, 135, 153-54, 155, 282-
85, 286, 292, 350
Confrontation in, 593
Economic assistance for, 134,
Economic value, 28-29
Five-Power Staff Agency, 41, 43
Proposed coalition, 38, 40, 41
U.S. interests in, 158-59, 191,
262, 282-85, 321, 350,
363, 459-464
U.S. troop training, 133
Southeast Asia Program Office, 508
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
See SEATO
Southeast Asia Working Group
See Bundy, William: working
group
Souvanna Phouma, 254, 291, 325,
326-28, 344, 354-55, 356,
359, 362, 367, 370, 386
Special Forces, 86, 87, 96, 97, 124,
126, 139, 140, 254, 365, 592
Stalin, Joseph, 432
Starbird, Alfred D., 496
Stassen, Harold, 43
State Department, U.S., 369, 371,
401, 402, 412, 420-21, 438-
39, 441-42, 489, 495, 497,
533, 598, 635
Marigold, 535
On bombing cutback, 623, 635-
36
On wider war, 525
Sanction for ground war, 421-22
See also specific Secretary of
State
Steadman, Richard C., 507, 611
Stennis, Senator John C., 537, 552
Stevenson, Adlai E., 356
Stillwell, Richard G., 228, 231, 233
Stonewall, Tex., 320, 321
Strategic Hamlet Program, 116-17,
118, 160, 195, 217, 279, 280
Strategies, U.S., 321-22, 363-64,
410, 414-15, 417, 472-73,
474, 486-92, 500, 516-18,
624-25
Attrition, 534, 579, 584-85, 591,
613, 615
Base security, 411, 412, 415,
474
Enclave strategy, 412-13, 415-
18, 422, 474, 615
For final defeat of enemy, 427,
474, 624-25
Population security, 615
Search and destroy strategy,
413, 421, 423, 467-68,
473-75, 576, 584
Strategy Conferences, 117, 173,
195, 253, 258, 277, 414, 415,
416, 417
Student Protests, Vietnamese, 209,
213, 336, 345, 484
Sullivan, William H., 254, 255,
258, 344, 345, 349, 539
Supreme Court
See Court Proceedings
Suu, Chief of State, 389-90
Symington, Senator Stuart, 552

Tam Ky, 575
Tan Son Nhut, 308, 329, 446
Taylor, Maxwell D.,
Advisor to Johnson, 611, 612,
613
Advisor to Kennedy, 89-90, 104,
105, 109, 135, 145-46,
151-53, 155
Ambassador to SVN, 266, 277,
278, 296, 299-302, 314,
321, 323, 327, 328, 330,
335-36, 337, 342, 343,
344, 345-46, 347, 351,
352, 355-57, 366, 368,
369, 379-82, 383, 384,
388-90, 400, 40 I, 402,
403, 404, 405, 409-10,
411-12, 414, 415, 416-17,
422, 423, 438, 450, 452,
453-56, 467, 468
Biography, 764-65
Chairman, JCS, 169, 175, 176,
181, 186-87, 190, 208,
210, 211, 214, 221, 225,
227, 262, 248, 258, 259,
260, 282-85
Recommendations, 106, 108,
110, 146-51
Tayninh, 60, 79, 229
Tchepone, 313, 329, 518
Temporary Equipment Recovery
Mission, 24
Territorial Waters, 298, 324, 361,
367, 368
Tet (Lunar New Year), 537
Offensive, 604-09, 610, 612,
614, 623, 624, 625, 628,
629, 630, 631, 632
Thailand, 28, 42, 47, 134, 144,
256, 260, 261, 332, 344, 370,
373, 446, 448, 449, 579, 587,
597, 599
Air Forces in, 115, 330, 511
And U.S. withdrawal 462, 463
Communist threat to, 7, 29,
282-83, 286, 292, 350
Estimated support cost, 135
Five-Power Staff Agency, 41
Guerrilla deterrence, 100
Importance of, 99, 100, 102
JCS view, 130
Operation Hardnose, 281, 314
Police Aerial Resupply Unit
(PARU), 138, 139
Project 22, 447
Royal Thai Army Ranger Bat.,
137-38
Thai Border Patrol (BPP), 138-
39
Thai pilots used, 245, 247, 261,
304, 314, 362, 385
U.S. personnel in, 139
U.S. position in, 349
Thainguyen Steel Plant, 532, 538,
628
Thakhek, 313, 519
Thant, U, 449, 488
Thao, Pham Ngoc, 208, 216, 402
Tha Thorn, 313
The, Trinh Minh, 21, 60, 63
Thi, Nguyen Chanh, 388-90, 484
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 176, 345,
388-90, 423, 561-62
Third Country Forces, 410, 417-
18, 446, 454-55, 465-66, 467,
474, 569, 597
Tho, Nguyen Thoc, 121, 189, 192,
229, 279
Thompson, Llewellyn A., 325
Thompson, Robert, 591
Thon San Lam, 575
Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, 104, 121,
124, 143, 145-46, 173, 215,
218
Thuathien, 80, 608
Thurmond, Senator Strom, 552
Tibet, 142
Ticonderoga, USS, 267, 270, 271
Tiger Island, 309, 311, 406, 445
Timor, 377
Tit-for-tat Action, 271-72, 288,
305, 325, 352, 360, 367, 429
Tito, Josip, 432
To Move a Nation, 174, 176
Tonkin, 57, 58
Annamese government in, 27-28
Defense of, 29, 31, 32
Industrial/population targets,
444
Paramilitary group for, 60
Tonkinese people, 18, 56
Tonkin Gulf, 244, 255, 267, 310-
11, 322, 324, 325, 331, 363,
364, 368, 372, 387, 429, 437,
579
Congressional resolution on,
244, 271, 272-73, 275,
276, 277, 294-96, 299,
343-44
Incidents, 248, 253, 266, 325,
356-57, 385
Operation Plan 37-64, 272
Prelude to, 195, 244, 256-57
S. Vietnamese raids, 267, 273-
75, 297-98, 322
Topping (A. P.), 48, 50
Touby Lyfoung, 139
Training Relations and Instruction
Mission (TRIM), 64
Tran Van Do, 599
Trapnell, General, 36
Tri Quang, 225, 235
Truehart, William C., 171-72, 201,
231, 236-37
Truman Administration
Indochina policy, 8
Letters from Ho Chi Minh, 9,
27-28
National Security Council, 7, 10
Policy formulations, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11
Relations with France, 8-9, 10,
11
State Dep't., 8-9, 10, 27-28
Truman, Harry S., 486, 546, 622
T-28 Operations, 247, 254-55, 261,
269, 307, 310, 327, 328, 345,
355, 362, 365, 370, 371, 375,
444
Tung, Le Quang, 177, 200, 202,
212, 218, 220
Turkey, 28, 377, 431, 593
Tuy Hoa, 572
Tuyen, Tran Kim, 122
Twentieth Parallel, 406, 407, 525,
538, 542, 544, 545, 547, 549,
553, 590-91, 592, 594, 596,
604, 616, 617, 618, 624, 635,
636
Twenty-third Parallel, 544
Two Vietnams, The, 97

Ugly American, The, 18
Unger, Leonard, 247, 278, 313,
327, 328, 349, 399, 485
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.), 9, 10, 27, 33, 78,
154, 159, 257, 262, 385, 437,
438, 446, 453, 541, 545, 592
Aid to Communist forces, 104,
376, 395, 440, 45 I, 460,
465, 480, 513-15, 586, 589,
628
Aid to DRV
Antiaircraft equipment, 341
Economic, 513-16, 563
Petroleum, 487, 513
Pilots, 588, 593
Weapons, 445, 588, 593
Berlin agreement, 44
Confrontation potential, 113,
498, 543, 583, 587
Dispute with China, 253, 284,
293, 441, 593
Geneva accords, 15, 44, 5 I, 61
Geneva conference co-chairman,
334, 403, 439, 441, 449,
497
Protest from Hanoi, 98
Kosygin-Wilson talks, 537-38
On national liberation, 92
Possible talks with, 449, 450
Relations with U.S., 545, 593
U.S./DRV go-between, 544, 561,
594
U.S. intelligence estimates, 110,
341
United Kingdom
See Great Britain
United Nations, 9, 27-28, 32, 38,
42, 47, 53, 257, 303, 357,
385, 438, 451, 488, 597
And Communist China, 432
Hanoi aggression, 438-39, 440
Membership proposed for N. and
S. Vietnam, 78
U.S. mission, 354, 373, 385
U.S. representative, 621, 622-23
United Press International, 348
United States of America
Country Team, 127, 132, 134,
142, 200-01, 229-30, 231,
236, 237, 279-80, 508
Disaffection for war, 546-47,
549, 550, 590, 604, 605,
614, 617-18, 620, 621,
624
Justification for actions, 106,
112, 157-58, 178, 206,
212, 249, 255, 259, 265,
277, 288, 293, 294-95, 303,
304, 306, 319-20, 321-22,
325, 331, 338, 346, 365,
367, 368, 373, 399-400,
433, 434-35, 437, 596
Objectives in SVN, 96, 111,
131-32, 286, 289, 291-92,
351, 358, 374, 383, 439,
465, 483, 502-03, 517-18,
547-49, 550
Polarization in, 547
Policy, 8, 10, 12, 25-26, 158-
59, 251, 530
De-escalation, 624
Deployment of ground troops,
394-95
Fuel depot bombing, 458-59,
472-73, 486-92
Public knowledge of, 5, 6, 8,
11, 26, 94, 96, 158
See also Public Information,
U.S.
Search and destroy, 41 3
Sustained bombing of DRV,
319
Position in Vietnam, 249, 251,
348, 361, 499
Position in world, 263, 432, 442,
445, 448, 462-64, 483, 503,
526, 592, 595, 597, 613
Relations with France, 6, 7, 8-9,
10-11, 12, 20, 30-33, 42-
43, 64
Security interests of, 28, 219,
230-31, 232, 351, 442, 595
United States Operations Mission
(USOM), 57, 127, 141, 218,
280

Valeriano, Napoleon, 65
Valluy, General, 33, 34
Vance, Cyrus R., 299, 325, 412,
425, 508, 509, 551, 585, 591,
623
Vanq Pao, 140
Venezuela, 431
Veng Phou Kha, 313
Vientiane, 139-40, 278, 327, 349,
370-71, 429
Vietcong, 25, 101, 106, 108, 127,
147, 148, 149, 155-57, 170,
179, 186, 206, 208, 219, 233,
235, 400, 419, 437, 450, 457,
459, 460, 475, 524, 599
Activity after coup, 195, 196,
249
Activity after 1959, 72, 74, 75,
91, 103
Aided by villagers, 460
And Allied escalation, 501, 502,
541, 543, 570, 579-80
And Hanoi, 239, 245, 248, 256,
264, 286, 290, 292, 358,
375, 497, 530, 561
Attacks on US/GVN bases, 329,
347, 352, 398, 399, 410,
445
Bases, air strikes on, 444
Cadres
1954-57: 75-78
1963: 273, 281
1964: 288, 290
Coalition government, 300, 374,
561, 596, 613, 632
Defeat necessary, 286, 287, 292,
578-79
Escalation, 329, 363, 380-81
Growth, 120, 280, 287, 379,
472, 476, 477, 478, 483,
502, 537, 539, 555
McNamara on, 280-81, 287, 288
Nam Bo Regional Committee,
78
NSC proposal to defeat, 102
Possible dialogue with, 468
Recruiting, 74, 118, 381, 499
Status of, 300, 321, 349, 364,
374, 409, 413, 416, 442,
449, 529, 558, 567
Strength, estimates of, 160-62,
284, 465
Strength, indigenous, 250, 381
Supplies for, 103, 239, 249, 254,
381, 480-81, 537, 556-57
Taylor on, 149-50, 300, 321, 379
Terrorist activities, 25, 78, 80,
101, 112, 161, 363-64,
379, 399, 433-37
Use of Cambodia and Laos, 286,
358, 363
Vietcong threat, 91, 101, 103,
160-62, 177, 202-03, 212,
215, 217, 220, 229, 250,
258, 265, 287, 339, 358,
364, 374
See also Infiltration; National
Liberation Front; Vietnam,
South
Vietminh, 6, 8-9, 10, 16, 18, 24,
26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 39-40, 45,
48, 50-53, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61,
63, 66-67, 106, 145, 310, 347,
448
Attempted subversion of army,
64
In Eastern Thailand, 139
In Laos, 431
Relations with population, 64
Take Haiphong, 66
Vietnam, 13, 57, 63
Partitioning of, 48-49
Refugee problem, 5, 7, 58, 61
The Lessons of, 638-52
See also Barrier, Electronic; Indochina;
Vietnam, North;
Vietnam, South
Vietnam Interdepartmental Working
Group, 180, 209
Vietnam, North, (Democratic Republic
of Vietnam), 4, 5, 10,
51, 56, 153, 156, 257, 259,
266, 290, 307, 358, 457, 487
Border control and retaliatory
actions, 251, 290, 291
Economic losses (1967), 628
Guerrilla bases ordered, 79
Infiltration with SVN, 71, 72,
79-80, 281, 287, 476, 488,
493, 499, 537, 540, 545,
556, 562, 574, 591
Insurgency control, 72, 298,
300, 361, 451, 460, 578,
606
Internal development (to 1958),
72, 75, 76-77, 78
Lines of communication, 406,
407, 408, 453, 483, 532,
544, 551, 557, 565, 566,
578, 590, 592, 626-27
McNaughton's options, 375-77
MIGs used, 304, 328, 364
Military units in Tet, 630-31
Morale high, 554-55
Petroleum storage, 339, 458-59,
472-73, 486-92, 494, 510-
11, 532, 565
Population of, 624, 627
Possible allied invasion, 525,
541, 542, 549, 550, 580,
590, 592
Protest to UK/USSR, 98
Protests to ICC, 87, 269, 345
Supplies for VC/PAVN, 480-81,
537, 556-57, 562, 578
325th PAVN in Kontum, 419
U.N. membership proposed, 78
See also Air Operations; Bombing;
Casualties; Clandestine
Warfare; Ground War; Hanoi;
Johnson Administration;
Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Negotiations; Operation
Rolling Thunder; T-28 Operations;
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Vietnam, South (Republic of Vietnam),
4, 6, 7, 16, 26, 51-54,
59, 134, 197, 244, 257, 262,
291, 301, 453, 499, 597
Air Force operations, 251, 291,
304, 322, 360, 361, 370,
403, 433, 438, 439, 441,
444-46
And France, 15, 20
Armed forces, 24, 56, 64, 109,
136, 145, 170, 173, 215,
217, 220-21, 290, 379,
412, 418-19, 423, 443,
446, 449, 455, 458, 466,
467, 483, 502, 542-43,
569, 571, 581, 614, 629,
635, 636
And Vietcong, 228, 287, 349,
364, 374, 446, 455
Generals and coup, 177, 178,
200, 201, 202, 203-04,
205, 206, 207, 210, 219-
21, 223-25, 230-31, 233,
234, 235, 236
Guerrilla warfare training, 63,
291
Joint US/GVN action, 304,
386, 438, 529, 575
I Corps, 217, 484, 570, 574,
575, 576, 577, 578, 579,
621, 629, 630, 631, 633
II Corps, 217, 570, 571, 576,
578, 630-31
III Corps, 217, 570, 571, 576,
577, 578, 631
IV Corps, 217, 571, 572, 576,
579, 631
Border control, 251, 290, 291
Civic action teams, 74, 127
Civil Administrative Corps, 290
Civil Guard, 125, 150, 152
Civil servants' pay raise, 325,
368, 369
Communists in, 22, 72, 76, 101,
121, 199, 246, 250, 251,
287, 288, 340, 374, 431,
432, 440, 458, 467
Economy of, 483, 502
Government, 279, 342, 344,
345-46, 348, 349-50, 440-
41, 443, 524, 596, 598,
614, 629, 631, 632, 635
Huong's cabinet, 342, 345,
346, 380, 382, 401
Khanh government, 246, 251,
254, 256, 277, 287, 288,
289, 300, 302, 312, 319,
321, 323, 324, 329, 336,
342, 356, 358, 359, 380
Ky government, 484, 485,
499, 502, 504, 555, 561-
62, 590
Power struggles after coup,
195, 224
Thieu government, 423, 561-
62
High National Council, 345, 388-
90 Insurgency in, 71, 146, 239,
250, 280-81, 287, 300,
308, 379, 459, 467, 472-
73
Lines of communication, 571,
572, 575
"March North" campaign, 265-
66, 296-97, 300, 380
Military program in, 217, 219,
227, 228-29
Military Revolutionary Committee,
389
Ministry of Social Welfare, 632
Morale factor, 357, 358, 361,
364, 366, 368, 374, 380,
385, 435-36, 442, 446,
582, 591, 631
National Assembly of, 122, 123,
213
National mobilization, 290, 540
Naval operations, 46, 125, 267,
273-75, 375-76, 384, 429,
441, 444
Neutralization, 252, 281-82,
292, 293, 348
Pacification, 63, 64, 160, 280,
289, 290, 292, 297, 302,
321, 323, 324, 358, 359,
360, 363, 364, 367, 374,
379, 438, 439, 441, 483,
484, 499, 502, 508, 529,
530, 555, 556-59, 561-62,
570, 571, 574, 575, 576,
577, 578, 579, 581, 596
Partition of, 447, 449
Police, 213, 336, 558, 569
Political conditions, 7, 15-16,
20, 21-23, 24, 56, 59, 102,
118, 217, 281, 287, 300-
01, 321, 336, 351, 442-
44, 483, 484, 526, 531,
543
Population, 210, 211, 212, 213,
215, 217, 220, 287, 301,
302, 364, 374, 375, 380,
460, 502, 558, 579
Refugees, 442, 507, 632
Security, 308, 312, 528, 555
Self Defense Corps, 125, 150,
152, 280, 281, 287
Self-determination, 548, 596
U.N. membership proposed, 78
U.S. commitment, 503-04
U.S. dependants, evacuation of,
292, 305, 352, 361, 386,
387, 437, 450
US/GVN relations, 230, 286-87,
292, 349-51, 356, 361,
376-77, 437, 438, 447,
455, 498, 548
U.S. military and economic aid,
4, 6, 10-11, 15-16, 24-25,
32, 134, 143, 165, 174,
177, 178, 182, 196, 200,
205, 212, 215, 220, 291,
325, 368, 369, 374, 595
U.S. nationals in, 224, 232, 257,
330
VC/PAVN sanctuaries in, 539,
540, 570, 575
See also Clandestine Warfare;
Counterinsurgency; Cross-
Border Operations; Ground
War; Infiltration; Johnson
Administration; Tet Offensive; Vietcong
Vietnam Veterans, 607, 609
Vinh, 270, 310, 311, 440, 618
Vinhlinh, 401
Vinhson, 268, 311, 326
Vinh Sor, 311
Vinson, Frederick, 372
Vitthulu Barracks, 330
Voice of America, 173, 174, 200,
211, 235
Voters, American, 533, 620
Vungtau, 409, 413, 414, 422, 454
Vy, Nguyen Van, 56-57, 60

Wachtel, John C., 63
Warnke, Paul C., 607, 611, 615,
634-35
Wars of Liberation, 263, 283, 286,
292, 503
Wa~aw, 376, 405, 429, 536
Wellesley, Mass., 494
Wellington, 442
Western Highlands, 630, 631
Westmoreland, William C., 258,
267, 268, 321, 346, 388, 396,
397, 404, 411, 413-14, 415,
417, 418, 421-24, 425, 426,
461, 466, 467, 474, 477, 478,
482, 489, 493, 494, 499, 527,
541, 542, 556, 581, 583, 584,
594, 604, 605, 606, 622
And Gifford group 615, 616,
617
And L.B.J., 527, 532, 540-41,
579-81, 617, 622
And Tet offensive, 605, 606,
607-08, 609, 630
Attrition strategy, 534, 613, 615
Biography, 765-66
Bombing program, 560, 580, 591
Congressional support, 537
Freehand, 423-24, 512-13, 533-
34
"Meatgrinder" strategy, 529,
580
Minimum essential force, 571,
573, 574, 576, 577
On VC/GVN ratio, 419-20, 477
Optimum force, 570, 574, 577
Pacification program, 559, 566,
574, 575, 576, 577
Program 4, 568, 570, 573, 574
Relieved of command, 604, 622
Situation estimate, 408-09, 413
Supports wider war, 525, 532-33
Troop cutback, 547, 549, 596
Troops requested, 472, 474, 475,
476-77, 478, 492, 493,
496, 508, 511-12, 512-13,
527, 528, 532, 539, 568,
569-70, 572-77, 589, 610,
613, 614, 625
44-battalion request, 420,
422-24, 426, 465-66,
473-74, 545-46
Marines, 396, 409, 411
Wheeler, Earle G., 253, 299, 323,
334, 335, 338, 367, 403-04,
412, 415, 423, 451, 465, 467,
475, 490, 493, 499-500, 506-
07, 512, 525, 527, 538, 540,
541, 542, 564, 579-81, 590,
607, 608, 609-10, 615, 616,
618, 628, 634
Biography, 766
Wheeler-Westmoreland Report,
609-11
Wheeler-Westmoreland strategy,
541-42
White House Office, 13, 41, 93,
123, 131, 149, 187, 197, 230,
241, 325, 338, 368, 411, 433,
485, 494, 495, 510, 534, 613,
616
Expanded air operations, 538-
39, 545, 585-89
On Vietnam war, 525, 567
White Papers, 112, 157, 255, 373,
437, 476
Wiesner, Jerome, 494
Williams College, 261
Williams, Edward, 58
Williams, Samuel T., 24, 26
Wilson, Charles E., 13, 14, 15, 16,
41-42, 45
Wilson, Harold, 344, 385, 458-59,
488, 537-38
Wise Men, The, 622, 623
Wittmayer, Raymond, 58
Wood, Chalmers B., 132
World Bank, 524
World War II, 159, 169, 489, 495,
510, 622

Xieng Khouang (Province), 313
Xombang, 403
Xuanmai, 80

Yankee Team
See Operation Yankee Team
YenPhu, 311
Young Turks, 345-46, 388-90, 401,
402
Yugoslavia, 299, 432

Zacharias, Jerrold R., 494
Zones
1, 2, 6A, 6B: 530, 560
C: 576
D: 571, 576
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 28074
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Previous

Return to Political Science

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 2 guests