The Open Society and Its Enemies, by Karl R. Popper

[admin]

Part 1 of 2

Addenda to Volume I

I. Plato and Geometry (1957)

In the second edition of this book, I made a lengthy addition to note 9 to chapter 6 (pp. 248 to 253). The historical hypothesis propounded in this note was later amplified in my paper 'The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science' (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3, 1952, pp. 124 ff.; now also in my Conjectures and Refutations). It may be restated as follows: (1) the discovery of the irrationality of the square root of two which led to the breakdown of the Pythagorean programme of reducing geometry and cosmology (and presumably all knowledge) to arithmetic, produced a crisis in Greek mathematics; (2) Euclid's Elements are not a textbook of geometry, but rather the final attempt of the Platonic School to resolve this crisis by reconstructing the whole of mathematics and cosmology on a geometrical basis, in order to deal with the problem of irrationality systematically rather than ad hoc, thus inverting the Pythagorean programme of arithmetization; (3) it was Plato who first conceived the programme later carried out by Euclid: it was Plato who first recognized the need for a reconstruction; who chose geometry as the new basis, and the geometrical method of proportion as the new method; who drew up the programme for a geometrization of mathematics, including arithmetic, astronomy, and cosmology; and who became the founder of the geometrical picture of the world, and thereby also the founder of modern science — of the science of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton.

I suggested that the famous inscription over the door of Plato's Academy (p. 248, (2)) alluded to this programme of geometrization. (That it was intended to announce an inversion of the Pythagorean programme seems likely in view of Archytas, fragment A, Diels-Kranz.)

In the middle of the last paragraph on p. 249 I suggested 'that Plato was one of the first to develop a specifically geometrical method aiming at rescuing what could be rescued ... from the breakdown of Pythagoreanism'; and I described this suggestion as 'a highly uncertain historical hypothesis'. I no longer think that the hypothesis is so very uncertain. On the contrary, I now feel that a re-reading of Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, and Proclus, in the light of this hypothesis, would produce as much corroborating evidence as one could expect. In addition to the confirming evidence referred to in the paragraph quoted, I now wish to add that already the Gorgias (451a/b; c; 453e) takes the discussion of 'odd' and 'even' as characteristic of arithmetic, thereby, clearly identifying arithmetic with Pythagorean number theory, while characterizing the geometer as the man who adopts the method of proportions (465b/c). Moreover, in the passage from the Gorgias (508a) Plato speaks not only of geometrical equality (cp. note 48 to chapter 8) but he also states implicitly the principle which he was later to develop fully in the Timaeus: that the cosmic order is a geometrical order. Incidentally, the Gorgias also proves that the word 'alogos' was not associated in Plato's mind with irrational numbers, since 465a says that even a technique, or art, must not be alogos; which would hold a fortiori for a science such as geometry. I think we may simply translate 'alogos' as 'alogical'. (Cp. also Gorgias 496a/b; and 522e.) The point is important for the interpretation of the title of Democritus's lost book, mentioned earlier on p. 249.

My paper on 'The Nature of Philosophical Problems' (see above) contains some further suggestions concerning Plato's geometrization of arithmetic and of cosmology in general (his inversion of the Pythagorean programme), and his theory of forms.

Added in 1961

Since this addendum was first published in 1957, in the third edition of this book, I have found, almost by accident, some interesting corroboration of the historical hypothesis formulated above, in the first paragraph under (2). It is a passage in Proclus' commentaries to the First Book of Euclid's Elements (ed. Friedlein, 1873, Prologus ii, p. 71, 2-5) from which it becomes clear that there existed a tradition according to which Euclid's elements were a Platonic cosmology, a treatment of the problems of the Timaeus.

II. The Dating of the Theaetetus (1961)

There is a hint in note 50 (6), to chapter 8, p. 281, that 'the Theaetetus is perhaps (as against the usual assumption) earlier than the Republic'. This suggestion was made to me by the late Dr. Robert Eisler in a conversation not long before his death in 1949. But since he did not tell me any more about his conjecture than that it was partly based on Theaetetus 174e, f. — the crucial passage whose post-Republican dating did not seem to me to fit into my theory — I felt that there was not sufficient evidence for it, and that it was too ad hoc to justify me in publicly saddling Eisler with the responsibility for it.

However, I have since found quite a number of independent arguments in favour of an earlier dating of the Theaetetus, and I therefore wish now to acknowledge Eisler's original suggestion.

Since Eva Sachs (cp. Socrates, 5, 1917, 531 f.) established that the proem of the Theaetetus, as we know it, was written after 369, the conjecture of a Socratic core and an early dating involves another — ^that of an earlier lost edition, revised by Plato after Theaetetus' death. The latter conjecture was proposed independently by various scholars, even before the discovery of a papyrus (ed. by Diels, Berlin, Klassikerhefte, 2, 1905) that contains part of a Commentary to the Theaetetus and refers to two distinct editions. The following arguments seem to support both conjectures.

(1) Certain passages in Aristotle seem to allude to the Theaetetus: they fit the text of the Theaetetus perfectly, and they claim, at the same time, that the ideas there expressed belong to Socrates rather than to Plato. The passages I have in mind are the ascription to Socrates of the invention of induction (Metaphysics 1078b 17-33; cp. 987b1 and 1086b3) which, I think, is an allusion to Socrates' maieutic (developed at length in the Theaetetus), his method of helping the pupil to perceive the true essence of a thing through purging his mind of his false prejudices; and the further ascription to Socrates of the attitude so strongly expressed again and again in the Theaetetus: 'Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them; for he used to confess that he did not know' (Soph. EL 183b7). (These passages are discussed, in a different context, in my lecture On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance, Proceedings of the British Academy, 46, 1960 (see especially p. 50) which is also separately published by Oxford University Press and is now included in my Conjectures and Refutations.)

(2) The Theaetetus has a surprisingly inconclusive ending, even though it turns out that it was so planned and prepared almost from the beginning. (In fact, as an attempt to solve the problem of knowledge which it ostensibly tries to do, this beautiful dialogue is a complete failure.) But endings of a similarly inconclusive nature are known to be characteristic of a number of early dialogues.

(3) 'Know thyself is interpreted, as in the Apology, as 'Know how little you know'. In his final speech Socrates says 'After this, Theaetetus . . . you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think that you know what you do not know. So much my art [of maieutic] can accomplish; nor do I know any of the things that are known by others . . . '

(4) That ours is a second edition, revised by Plato, seems likely, especially in view of the fact that the Introduction to the dialogue (142a to the end of 143c) which might well have been added as a memorial to a great man, actually contradicts a passage which may have survived the revision of the earlier edition of this dialogue; I mean its very end which, like a number of other early dialogues, alludes to Socrates' trial as imminent. The contradiction consists in the fact that Euclid, who appears as a character in the Introduction and who narrates how the dialogue came to be written down, tells us (142c/d, 143a) that he went repeatedly to Athens (from Megara, presumably), using every time the opportunity of checking his notes with Socrates, and making 'corrections' here and there. This is told in a way which makes it quite clear that the dialogue itself must have taken place at least several months before Socrates' trial and death; but this is inconsistent with the ending of the dialogue. (I have not seen any reference to this point, but I cannot imagine that it has not been discussed by some Platonist.) It may even be that the reference to 'corrections', in 143a, and also the much discussed description of the 'new style' in 143b-c (see for example C. Ritter's Plato, vol. I, 1910, pp. 220 f.) were introduced in order to explain some deviations of the revised edition from the original edition. (This would make it possible to place the revised edition even after the Sophist.)

III. Reply to a Critic (1961)

I have been asked to say something in reply to the critics of this volume. But before doing so, I should like to thank again those whose criticism has helped me to improve the book in various ways.

Of the others — those I have come across — I feel reluctant to say much. In attacking Plato I have, as I now realize, offended and hurt many Platonists, and I am sorry for this. Still, I have been surprised by the violence of some of the reactions.

I think most of the defenders of Plato have denied facts which, it seems to me, cannot be seriously denied. This is true even of the best of them: Professor Ronald B. Levinson in his monumental book (645 closely printed pages) In Defense of Plato.

In trying to answer Professor Levinson I have before me two tasks of very unequal importance. The less important task — defending myself against a number of accusations — ^will be tackled first (in section A), so that the more important task — replying to Professor Levinson's defence of Plato (in section B) — will not be too much obscured by my personal defence.

A

The portrait of myself painted by Professor Levinson has caused me to doubt the truth of my own portrait of Plato; for if it is possible to derive from a living author's book so distorted an image of his doctrines and intentions, what hope can there be of producing anything like a true portrait of an author born almost twenty-four centuries ago?

Yet how can I defend myself against being identified with the supposed original of the portrait painted by Professor Levinson? All I can do is to show that some at least of the mistranslations, misrepresentations, and distortions of Plato with which Professor Levinson charges me are really non-existent. And even this I can only do by analysing two or three representative samples, taken at random from hundreds: there seem to be more such charges in the book than there are pages. Thus all I can do is to prove that some at least of the most violent accusations levelled against me are baseless.

I should have liked to do this without raising any counter-accusation of misquotation, etc.; but as this has turned out to be impossible, I wish to make it quite clear that I now see that Professor Levinson, like other Platonists, must have found my book not only exasperating, but almost sacrilegious. And since I am that man by whom the offence cometh, I must not complain if I am bitterly denounced.

So let us examine a few of the relevant passages. Professor Levinson writes (p. 273, note 72) of me: 'As with others of whom he disapproves, so here with Critias, Popper has further blackened his character by exaggeration. For the verses cited represent religion, though a fabrication, as being aimed at the general good of society, not at the selfish benefit of the cunning fabricator himself.

Now if this means anything, it must mean that I have asserted, or at least hinted, in the passages quoted by Professor Levinson (that is, pp. 179 and 140 of A, which corresponds to pp. 183-184, and pp. 142-143 of E[1]) that Critias' verses which I have quoted represent religion not only as a fabrication, but as a fabrication 'aimed ... at the selfish benefit of the cunning fabricator himself.'

I deny that I either asserted, or even hinted at, anything of the kind. On the contrary, my concern has been to point out that the 'general good of society' is one of the dominant preoccupations of Plato, and that his attitude in this respect 'is practically identical with that of Critias'. The basis of my criticism is clearly announced at the beginning of chapter 8 (second paragraph) where I write: '"For the benefit of the city", says Plato. Again we find that the appeal to the principle of collective utility is the ultimate ethical consideration. '

What I assert is that this moral principle which posits 'the general good of society' as a moral aim, is not good enough as a basis of ethics; for example, that it leads to lying — 'for the general good of society' or 'for the benefit of the city'. In other words, I try to show that ethical collectivism is mischievous, and that it corrupts. But I nowhere interpret Critias' quoted verses in the sense alleged by Professor Levinson. I should be inclined to ask 'Who blackens whose character by exaggeration?', were it not for the fact that I recognize that the severity of my attack was a provocation which excuses Professor Levinson's charges. But it does not make them true.

A second example is this. Professor Levinson writes (pp. 354 f.): 'One of Popper's most extravagant assertions is that Plato had viewed as a "favourable circumstance" the presence in Athens of Spartan troops, summoned to assist the Thirty in maintaining themselves and their iniquitous regime and had felt no other emotion than approval at the thought of Athens beneath the Spartan yoke; he would have been prepared, we are led to suppose, to summon them again, if their presence could aid him in achieving his neooligarchical revolution. There is no text which Popper can cite in support of such a charge; it arises solely from his picture of Plato as a third head upon the double-headed monster he has created, called "the Old Oligarch and Critias"; it is guilt by association, the very ultimate example of the witch-hunt technique.'

To this my reply is: if this is one of my 'most extravagant assertions', then I cannot have made any extravagant assertions. For this assertion was never made by me; nor does it fit into the picture which I have of Plato, and which I have tried — not wholly successfully, it seems — to convey.

I do believe that Plato was led, by his distrust of the common man, and by his ethical collectivism, to approve of violence; but I simply never have made any assertion about Plato even faintly similar to the one which Professor Levinson here asserts, somewhat extravagantly, that I have made. There is therefore no text which Professor Levinson can cite in support of his charge that I have made this assertion: it arises solely from his picture of Popper as a third head upon the double-headed monster of Otto Neurath and J. A. Lauwerys which Professor Levinson has created; and as to 'guilt by association', I can only refer to Professor Levinson's p. 441. There he is 'helped towards answering this question' — the question of 'the predisposing cause that leads Popper chronically to indulge these sinister imaginings' — by associating me with 'an older compatriot of Popper's, the late versatile Austrian philosopher and sociologist, Otto Neurath'. (In fact neither Neurath nor I had any sympathy for the other's philosophy, as emerges only too clearly from Neurath's and my own writings; Neurath, for example, defended Hegel, and attacked both Kantianism and my own praise of Kant. Of Neurath's attack on Plato I heard for the first time when I read about it in Professor Levinson's book; and I have not yet seen Neurath's relevant papers.)

But to return to my alleged 'extravagant assertion': what I actually said (p. 195E = 190A) about Plato's feelings is almost the opposite of what Professor Levinson (p. 354) reports. I did not at all suggest that Plato viewed as a 'favourable circumstance' the presence in Athens of Spartan troops, or that he 'felt no other emotion than approval at the thought of Athens beneath the Spartan yoke'. What I tried to convey, and what I said, was that the Thirty Tyrants had failed 'in spite of favourable circumstances in the shape of powerful support from victorious Sparta'; and I suggested that Plato saw the cause of their failure — just as I do — in the moral failure of the Thirty. I wrote: 'Plato felt that a complete reconstruction of the programme was needed. The Thirty had been beaten in the realm of power politics largely because they had offended the citizens' sense of justice. The defeat had been largely a moral defeat.'

This is all I say here of Plato's feelings. (I say twice 'Plato felt'.) I suggest that the failure of the Thirty induced a partial moral conversion in Plato — though not a sufficiently far-reaching one. There is no suggestion here of those feelings which Professor Levinson makes me attribute to Plato; and I would never have dreamt that anybody could read this into my text.

I certainly do attribute to Plato a measure of sympathy with the Thirty Tyrants and especially with their pro- Spartan aims. But this is of course something completely different from the 'extravagant assertions' which Professor Levinson attributes to me. I can only say that I did suggest that he admired his uncle Critias, the leader of the Thirty. I did suggest that he was in sympathy with some of Critias' aims and views. But I also said that he considered the oligarchy of the Thirty as a moral failure, and that this led him to reconstruct his collectivist morality.

It will be seen that my answer to two of Professor Levinson' s charges has taken up almost as much space as the charges themselves. This is unavoidable; and I must therefore confine myself to only two further examples (out of hundreds), both connected with my alleged mistranslations of Plato's text.

The first is Professor Levinson's allegation that I worsen, or exaggerate, Plato's text. 'Popper, however, as before, employs the unfavourable word "deport" in his translation, in place of "send out",' writes Professor Levinson on p. 349, note 244. But this is simply a mistake — Professor Levinson's mistake. If he looks at the passage again, he will find that I employ the word 'deport' where his translation — or rather Fowler's — uses 'banish'. (The part of the passage in which Fowler's translation uses 'send out' simply does not occur in my quotation but is replaced by dots.)

As a consequence of this mistake, it turns out that, in this context. Professor Levinson's remark 'as before' is highly appropriate. For before the passage just discussed he writes of me (p. 348, note 243): 'Popper reenforces his interpretation [p. 166E = p. 162A] of the Platonic passage [Rep. 540e/541a] by slight inaccuracies in the translation, tending to give the impression of greater scorn or violence in Plato's attitude. Thus he translates "send away" (apopempo) as "expel and deport" . . . ' Now first of all, there is another of Professor Levinson's slips here (which makes two in two consecutive footnotes); for Plato does not use here the word 'apopempo', but the word 'ekpempo'. This certainly does not make much difference; yet 'ekpempo' has, at any rate, the 'ex' of ' expel'; and one of its dictionary meanings is 'to drive away' and another 'to send away in disgrace' (or 'to send away with the collateral notion of disgrace' as my edition of Liddell and Scott has it). The word is a somewhat stronger form of 'pempo' — 'to send off, 'to dispatch' — which, if used in connection with Hades ('to send to Hades') 'commonly means to send a living man to Hades, i.e. to kill him'. (I am quoting Liddell and Scott. Nowadays some people might even 'commonly' say 'to dispatch him'. Closely related is the meaning intended when Phaedrus tells us in Plato's Symposium 179e — a passage referred to by Professor Levinson on p. 348 — that the gods, redeeming and honouring Achilles for his valour and his love of Patroclus, 'sent him to the Islands of the Blessed' — while Homer sent him to Hades.) It seems obvious that neither of the translations 'expel' or 'deport' is open to criticism here on scholarly grounds. Yet Professor Levinson is open to criticism when he quotes me as writing 'expel and deport' for I do not use the words in this way. (He would have been at least technically correct had he quoted me 'must be expelled ... and deported': the three dots make some difference here, for to write 'expel and deport' could be an attempt to exaggerate, by way of 're- enforcing' the one expression with the other. Thus this slight inaccuracy tends to re-enforce my alleged misdeed — my alleged re-enforcing of my interpretation of this Platonic passage by slight inaccuracies in my translation.)

But anyhow, this case amounts to nothing. For take the passage in Shorey's translation. (Shorey is, rightly, accepted as an authority by Professor Levinson.) 'All inhabitants above the age of ten', Shorey translates, 'they [the 'philosophers' who have become 'masters of the state'] will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children, remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described.' Now does this not say exactly what I said (though perhaps not quite as clearly as I did on my p. 166E = 162A)? For who can believe that the 'sending out' of 'all the inhabitants above the age of ten' can be anything but a violent expulsion and deportation? Would they just meekly go, leaving their children behind, when 'sent out', if they were not threatened, and compelled, by the 'philosophers' who have become 'masters of the state'? (Professor Levinson's suggestion, p. 349, that they are sent to 'their . . . country estates, outside the city proper' is supported by him, ironically enough, with a reference to the Symposium 179e and the 'Islands of the Blessed', the place to which Achilles was sent by the gods — or more precisely by Apollo's or Paris 's arrow. Gorgias, 526c, would have been a more appropriate reference.) In all this, there is an important principle involved. I mean the principle that there is no such thing as a literal translation', that all translations are interpretations; and that we always have to take the context into account, and even parallel passages.

That the passages with which (on p. 166E = p. 162A) I have associated the one just quoted may indeed be so associated is confirmed by Shorey's own footnotes: he refers, especially, to the passage which I have called the 'canvas-cleaning' passage, and to the 'kill-and-banish' passage from the Statesman, 293 c-e. 'Whether they happen to rule by law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects; ... and whether they purge the state for its good, by killing or by deporting [or, as Professor Levinson translates with Fowler, 'by killing or banishing'; see above] some of its citizens . . . this form of government must be declared to be the only one that is right.' (See my text, p. 166E = p. 162A.)

Professor Levinson quotes (p. 349) part of this passage more fully than I do. Yet he omits to quote that part which I quoted as its commencement, 'Whether they happen to rule by law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects'. The point is interesting, because it fits Professor Levinson's attempt to make the kill-and-banish passage appear in an almost innocent light. Immediately after quoting the passage. Professor Levinson writes: 'Fair interpretation of this stated principle [I do not see any 'principle' here stated, unless it is that all is permitted if it is done for the benefit of the state] requires at least a brief indication of the general pattern of the dialogue.' In the course of this 'brief indication' of Plato's aims and tendencies, we hear — without a direct quotation from Plato — that 'Other traditional and currently accepted criteria, such as whether rule be exercised ... over willing or unwilling subjects, or in accord or not in accord with law, are rejected as irrelevant or non-essential'. The words from Professor Levinson's passage which I have here italicized will be seen to be a near-quotation of the commencement (not quoted by Professor Levinson) of my own quotation from Plato's kill-and-banish passage. Yet this commencement appears now in a very harmless light: no longer are the rulers told to kill and banish 'with or without law,' as I indicated; and Professor Levinson's readers get the impression that this question is here merely dismissed as a side issue — as 'irrelevant' to the problem in hand.

But Plato's readers, and even the participants in his dialogue, get a different impression. Even the 'Younger Socrates', who intervened just before (after the commencement of the passage as quoted by me) with the one exclamation 'Excellent!' is shocked by the lawlessness of the proposed killing; for immediately after the enunciation of the kill-and-banish principle (perhaps it really is a 'principle', after all) he says, in Fowler's translation (the italics are of course mine): 'Everything else that you have said seems reasonable; but that government [and such hard measures, too, it is implied] should be carried out without laws is a hard saying.'

I think that this remark proves that the commencement of my quotation — 'by law or without law' — is really meant by Plato to be part of his kill-and-banish principle; that I was right in commencing the quotation where I did; and that Professor Levinson is simply mistaken when he suggests that 'with or without law' is here merely intended to mean that this is a question which is here 'rejected as irrelevant' to the essence of the problem in hand.

In interpreting the kill-and-banish passage, Professor Levinson is clearly deeply disturbed; yet at the end of his elaborate attempt to defend Plato by comparing his practices with our own he arrives at the following view of the passage: 'Looked at in this context, Plato's statesman, with his apparent readiness to kill, banish, and enslave, where we should prescribe either the penitentiary, at one end, or psychiatric social service, at the other, loses much of his sanguinary coloration.'

Now I do not doubt that Professor Levinson is a genuine humanitarian — a democrat and a liberal. But is it not perturbing to see that a genuine humanitarian, in his eagerness to defend Plato, can be led to compare in this fashion our admittedly very faulty penal practices and our no less faulty social services with the avowedly lawless killing and banishing (and enslaving) of citizens by the 'true statesman' — a good and wise man — 'for the benefit of the city'? Is this not a frightening example of the spell which Plato casts over many of his readers, and of the danger of Platonism?

There is too much of this — all mixed with accusations against a largely imaginary Popper — for me to deal with. But I wish to say that I regard Professor Levinson's book not only as a very sincere attempt to defend Plato, but also as an attempt to see Plato in a new light. And though I have found only one passage — and quite an unimportant one — which has led me to think that, in this place, I interpreted Plato's text (though not his meaning) somewhat too freely, I do not wish to create the impression that Professor Levinson's is not a very good and interesting book — especially if we forget all about the scores of places where 'Popper' is quoted, or (as I have shown) slightly misquoted, and very often radically misunderstood.

But more important than these personal questions is the question: how far does Professor Levinson's defence of Plato succeed?

B

I have learnt that when faced with a new attack on my book by a defender of Plato it is best to disregard the smaller points and to look for answers to the following five cardinal points.

(1) How is my assertion met that the Republic and the Laws condemn the Socrates of the Apology (as pointed out in chapter 10, second paragraph of section vi)? As explained in a note (note 55 to chapter 10) the assertion was in effect made by Grote, and supported by Taylor. If it is fair — and I think it is — then it supports also my assertion mentioned in my next point, (2).

(2) How is my assertion met that Plato's anti-liberal and anti-humanitarian attitude cannot possibly be explained by the alleged fact that better ideas were not known to him, or that he was, for those days, comparatively liberal and humanitarian?

(3) How is my assertion met that Plato (for example in the canvas-cleaning passage of the Republic and in the kill-and-banish passage of the Statesman) encouraged his rulers to use ruthless violence 'for the benefit of the state'?

(4) How is my assertion met that Plato established for his philosopher kings the duty and privilege of using lies and deceit for the benefit of the city, especially in connection with racial breeding, and that he was one of the founding fathers of racialism?

(5) What is said in answer to my quotation of the passage from the Laws used as a motto for The Spell of Plato on p. 7 (and, as announced at the beginning of the Notes on p. 203, 'discussed in some detail in notes 33 and 34 to chapter 6')?

I often tell my students that what I say about Plato is — necessarily — merely an interpretation, and that I should not be surprised if Plato (should I ever meet his shade) were to tell me, and to establish to my satisfaction, that it is a misrepresentation; but I usually add that he would have quite a task to explain away a number of the things he had said.

Has Professor Levinson succeeded on Plato's behalf in this task, regarding any of the five points mentioned above?

I really do not think he has.

[admin]

Part 2 of 2

(1') As to the first point, I ask anybody in doubt to read carefully the text of the last speech made by the Athenian Stranger in book X of the Laws (907d down to, say, 909d). The legislation there discussed is concerned with the type of crime of which Socrates was accused. My contention is that, while Socrates had a way out (most critics think, in view of the evidence of the Apology, that he would probably have escaped death had he been willing to accept banishment), Plato's Laws do not make any such provision. I shall quote from a passage in Bury's translation (which seems to be acceptable to Levinson) of this very long speech. After classifying his 'criminals' (that is, those guilty of 'impiety' or 'the disease of atheism': the translation is Bury's; cp. 908c), the Athenian Stranger discusses first 'those who, though they utterly disbelieve the existence of gods, possess by nature a just character ... and ... are incapable of being induced to commit unjust actions'. (908b-c; this is almost a portrait — of course an unconscious one — of Socrates, apart from the important fact that he does not seem to have been an atheist, though accused of impiety and unorthodoxy.) About these Plato says:

' . . . those criminals . . . being devoid of evil disposition and character, shall be placed by the judge according to law in the reformatory for a period of not less than five years, during which time no other of the citizens shall hold intercourse with them save only those who take part in the nocturnal assembly, and they shall company with them [I should translate 'they shall attend to them'] to minister to their soul's salvation by admonition ...' Thus the 'good' among the impious men get a minimum of five years of solitary confinement, only relieved by 'attention' to their sick souls from the members of the Nocturnal Council. ' . . . and when the period of their incarceration has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall dwell with those who are reformed, but if not, and if he be convicted again on a like charge, he shall be punished by death. ' I have nothing to add to this.

(2') The second point is perhaps the most important from Professor Levinson's point of view: it is one of his main claims that I am mistaken in my assertion that there were humanitarians — better ones than Plato — among those whom I have called the 'Great Generation'.

He asserts, in particular, that my picture of Socrates as a man very different from Plato in this respect is quite fictitious.

Now I have devoted a very long footnote (note 56 to chapter 10), in fact quite an essay, to this problem — the Socratic Problems and I do not see any reason to change my views on it. But I wish to say here that I have received support in this historical conjecture of mine about the Socratic Problem, from a Platonic scholar of the eminence of Richard Robinson; support which is the more significant as Robinson castigates me severely (and perhaps justly) for the tone of my attack on Plato. Nobody who reads his review of my book (Philosophical Review, 60, 1951) can accuse him of undue partiality for me; and Professor Levinson quotes him approvingly (p. 20) for speaking of my 'rage to blame' Plato. But although Professor Levinson (in a footnote on p. 20) refers to Richard Robinson as 'mingling praise and blame in his extensive review of the Open Society', and although (in another footnote, on p. 61) he rightly refers to Robinson as an authority about 'the growth of Plato's logic from its Socratic beginnings through its middle period'. Professor Levinson never tells his readers that Robinson agrees not only with my main accusations against Plato, but also, more especially, with my conjectural solution of the Socratic Problem. (Incidentally, Robinson also agrees that my quotation mentioned here in point (5) is correct; see below.) Since Robinson, as we have heard, 'mingles praise and blame', some of his readers (anxious to find confirmation for their 'rage to blame' me) may have overlooked the praise contained in the surprising last sentence of the following forceful passage from his review (p. 494):

'Dr. Popper holds that Plato perverted the teaching of Socrates ... To him Plato is a very harmful force in politics but Socrates a very beneficial one. Socrates died for the right to talk freely to the young; but in the Republic Plato makes him take up an attitude of condescension and distrust towards them. Socrates died for truth and free speech; but in the Republic "Socrates" advocates lying. Socrates was intellectually modest; but in the Republic he is a dogmatist. Socrates was an individualist; but in the Republic he is a radical collectivist. And so on.

'What is Dr. Popper's evidence for the views of the real Socrates? It is drawn exclusively from Plato himself, from the early dialogues, and primarily from the Apology. Thus the angel of light with whom he contrasts the demon Plato is known to us only from the demon's own account! Is this absurd? 'It is not absurd, in my opinion, but entirely correct.'

This passage shows that at least one scholar, admitted by Professor Levinson to be an authority on Plato, has found that my view on the Socratic Problem is not absurd.

But even if my conjectural solution of the Socratic Problem should be mistaken, there is plenty of evidence left for the existence of humanitarian tendencies in this period.

Concerning the speech of Hippias, to be found in Plato's Protagoras, 337e (see above p. 70; Professor Levinson seems for once not to object to my translation; see his p. 144), Professor Levinson writes (p. 147): 'We must begin by assuming that Plato is here reflecting faithfully a well-known sentiment of Hippias.' So far Professor Levinson and I agree. But we disagree completely about the relevance of Hippias' speech. On this I have now even stronger views than those I expressed in the text of this volume. (Incidentally, I don't think I ever asserted that there was evidence that Hippias was an opponent of slavery; what I said of him was that 'this spirit was bound up with the Athenian movement against slavery'; thus Professor Levinson's elaborate argument that I am not justified 'in including him [Hippias] among the opponents of slavery' is pointless.)

I now see Hippias' speech as a manifesto — the first perhaps — of a humanitarian faith which inspired the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution: that all men are brothers, and that it is conventional, man-made, law and custom which divide them and which are the source of much avoidable unhappiness; so that it is not impossible for men to make things better by a change in the laws — ^by legal reform. These ideas also inspired Kant. And Schiller speaks of conventional law as 'the fashion' which sternly ('streng') — Beethoven says 'insolently' ('frech') — divides mankind.

As to slavery, my main contention is that the Republic contains evidence of the existence of tendencies in Athens which may be described as opposition to slavery. Thus the 'Socrates' of the Republic (563b) says, in a speech satirizing Athenian democracy (I quoted it in chapter 4, ii, p. 43E = p. 44 A; but I am here using Shorey's translation): 'And the climax of popular liberty ... is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them.'

Shorey has a number of cross-references to this passage (see footnote below); but the passage speaks for itself. Levinson says of this passage elsewhere (p. 176): 'Let us contribute the just-quoted passage to help fill the modest inventory of Plato's social sins', and on the next page he refers to it when he speaks of 'Another instance of Platonic hauteur'. But this is no answer to my contention that, taken together with a second passage from the Republic quoted in my text (p. 43E = p. 44A), this first passage supplies evidence of an anti-slavery movement. The second passage (which follows in Plato immediately after an elaboration of the first, here quoted at the end of the preceding paragraph) reads in Shorey's translation (Republic 563d; the previous passage was Republic 563b): 'And do you know that the sum total of all these items ... is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude [I translated 'slavery'] and will not endure it?'

How does Professor Levinson deal with this evidence? First, by separating the two passages: the first he does not discuss until p. 176, long after he has smashed to bits (on p. 153) my alleged evidence concerning an anti-slavery movement. The second he dismisses on p. 153 as a grotesque mistranslation of mine; for he writes there: 'Yet it is all a mistake; though Plato uses the word douleia (slavery or servitude), it bears only a figurative allusion [my italics] to slavery in the usual sense.'

This may sound plausible when the passage is divorced from its immediate predecessor (only mentioned by Professor Levinson more than twenty pages later, where he explains it by Plato's hauteur); but in its context — in connection with Plato's complaint about the licentious behaviour of slaves (and even of animals) — ^there can be no doubt whatever that, in addition to the meaning which Professor Levinson correctly ascribes to the passage, the passage also bears a second meaning which takes 'douleia' quite literally; for it says, and it means, that the free democratic citizens cannot stand slavery in any form — not only do they not submit themselves to any suggestion of servitude (not even to laws, as Plato goes on to say), but they have become so tender-hearted that they cannot bear 'even the slightest suggestion of servitude' — such as the slavery of 'purchased slaves, male or female'.

Professor Levinson (p. 153, after discussing Plato's second passage) asks: 'in the light of the evidence ... what, then, can fairly be said to remain standing in Popper's case ...? The simplest answer is "Nothing," if words are taken in anything like their literal sense.' Yet his own case rests upon taking 'douleia', in a context which clearly refers to slavery, not in its literal sense but as 'only a figurative allusion', as he himself has put it a few lines earlier.2

And yet, he says of the grotesque 'mistake' I made in translating 'douleia' literally: 'This misreading has borne fruit in the preface to Sherwood Anderson's play Barefoot in Athens . . . where the unsuspecting playwright, following Popper' (Professor Levinson asserts on p. 24 that 'the Andersonian version of Plato plainly bespeaks a close and docile reading of Popper', but he gives no evidence for this strange accusation) 'passes on to his readers in turn the allusion, and declares flatly ... as on Plato's own authority, that the Athenians ... "advocate[d] the manumission of all slaves" . . . '

Now this remark of Maxwell (not Sherwood) Anderson's may well be an exaggeration. But where have I said anything similar to this? And what is the worth of a case if, in its defence, the defender has to exaggerate the views of his opponent, or blacken them by associating them with the (alleged) guilt of some 'docile' reader? (See also the Index to this volume, under 'Slavery'.)

(3') My contention that Plato encouraged his rulers to use ruthless and lawless violence, though it is combated by Professor Levinson, is nowhere really denied by him, as will be seen from his discussion of the 'kill-and-banish' passage of the Statesman mentioned in this Addendum towards the end of section A. All he denies is that a number of other passages in the Republic — the canvas-cleaning passages — are similar, as both Shorey and I think. Apart from this, he tries to derive comfort and moral support from some of our modern violent practices — a comfort which, I fear, will be diminished if he re-reads the passage of the Statesman together with its commencement, quoted by me, but first omitted by Professor Levinson, and later dismissed as irrelevant.

(4') As to Plato's racialism, and his injunction to his rulers to use lies and deceit for the benefit of the state, I wish to remind my readers, before entering into any discussion with Professor Levinson, of Kant's saying (see p. 139E = p. 137A) that though 'truthfulness is the best policy' might be questionable, 'truthfulness is better than policy' is beyond dispute.

Professor Levinson writes (p. 434, referring to my pp. 138 ff. E = pp. 136 ff. A, and especially to p. 150E = p. 148A) very fairly: 'First of all, we must agree that the use of lies in certain circumstances is advocated [my italics] in the Republic for purposes of government This, after all, is my main point. No attempt to play it down or to diminish its significance — and no counterattack on my alleged exaggerations — should be allowed to obscure this admission.

Professor Levinson also admits, in the same place, that 'there can be no doubt that some use of the persuasive art of speech would be required to make the auxiliaries "blame chance and not the rulers" when they are told [see my p. 150E = p. 148 A] that the fall of the lot has determined their marriages, whereas really these are engineered by the rulers for eugenic reasons'.

This was my second main point.

Professor Levinson continues (pp. 434 f.; my italics): 'In this instance we have the only sanctioning by Plato of an outright practical lie,3 to be told, to be sure, for benevolent reasons (and only for such purposes does Plato sanction the telling), but a lie and nothing more. We, like Popper, find this policy distasteful. This lie, then, and any others like it which Plato's rather general permission might justify, constitute such basis as exists for Popper's charge that Plato proposes to use "lying propaganda" in his city.'

Is this not enough? Let us assume that I was wrong in my other points (which, of course, I deny), does not all this at least excuse my suspicion that Plato would not have scrupled to make some further use of his 'rather general permission' of 'the use of lies' — especially in view of the fact that he actually 'advocated' the 'use of lies' as Professor Levinson has it?

Moreover, the lying is here used in connection with 'eugenics', or more precisely, with the breeding of the master race — the race of the guardians.

In defending Plato against my accusation that he was a racialist Professor Levinson tries to compare him favourably with some 'notorious' modem totalitarian racialists whose names I have tried to keep out of my book. (And I shall continue to do so.) He says of these (p. 541; my italics) that their 'breeding schedule' 'was primarily intended to preserve the purity of the master race, din aim which we have been at some pains to show Plato did not share.'

Did he not? Was my quotation from one of the main eugenic discussions of the Republic (460c) perhaps a mistranslation? I wrote (p. 51E = p. 52A); I am here introducing new italics):

'''The race of the guardians must be kept pure," says Plato (in defence of infanticide) when developing the racialist argument that we breed animals with great care while neglecting our own race, an argument which has been repeated ever since.'

Is my translation wrong? Or my assertion that this has been, ever since Plato, the main argument of racialists and breeders of the master race? Or are the guardians not the masters of Plato's best city?

As to my translation, Shorey puts it a little differently; I shall quote from his translation (the italics are mine) also the preceding sentence (referring to infanticide): the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they [the rulers] will properly dispose of in secret, so that no one will know what has become of them. "That is the condition," he said, "of preserving the purity of the guardian's breed .'"

It will be seen that Shorey 's last sentence is slightly weaker than mine. But the difference is trifling, and does not affect my thesis. And at any rate, I stick to my translation. 'At all events the breed of the guardians must be preserved pure' or 'If at all events [as we agree] the purity of the breed of the guardians must be preserved' would be a translation which, using some of Shorey's words, brings out precisely the same meaning as my translation in the body of the book (p. 5 IE = p. 52A) and here repeated.

I cannot see, therefore, what the difference is between Professor Levinson's formulation of that 'notorious ... breeding schedule' of the totalitarians, and Plato's formulation of his own breeding aims. Whatever minor difference there may be is irrelevant to the central question.

As to the problem whether Plato allowed — very exceptionally — a mingling of his races (which would be the consequence of promoting a member of the lower race), opinions may differ. I still believe that what I said is true. But I cannot see that it would make any difference if exceptions were permitted. (Even those modern totalitarians to whom Professor Levinson alludes permitted exceptions.)

(5') I have been repeatedly and severely attacked for quoting — or rather misquoting — a passage from the Laws which I have taken as one of the two mottos of The Spell of Plato (the other and contrasting passage is from Pericles' funeral oration). These mottos were printed by my American publishers on the jacket of the American edition; the English editions have no such advertisement. As is usual with jackets, I was not consulted by the publishers about them. (But I certainly have no objection to my American publishers' choice: why should they not print my mottos — or anything else I wrote in the book — on their jackets?)

My translation and interpretation of this passage has been pronounced to be correct by Richard Robinson, as mentioned above; but others went so far as to ask me whether I had not consciously tried to hide its identity, in order to make it impossible for my readers to check the text! And this although I have taken more trouble, I think, than most authors to make it possible for my readers to check any passage quoted or referred to. Thus I have a reference to my mottos at the beginning of my notes — although it is somewhat unusual to make references to one's mottos.

The main accusation against me for using this passage is that I do not say, or do not emphasize sufficiently, that it refers to military matters. But here I have testimony in my favour from Professor Levinson himself who writes (p. 531, footnote; my italics): 'Popper, in citing this passage in his text, p. 102 [= p. 103E] duly emphasizes its reference to military matters.'

Thus this charge is answered. However, Professor Levinson continues: but [Popper] protests simultaneously that Plato means the same "militarist principles" to be adhered to in peace as well as in war, and that they are to be applied to every area of peaceful existence rather than simply to the program of military training. He then quotes the passage with perverse mistranslations which tend to obscure its military reference . . . ' and so on.

Now the first charge here is that I 'protest simultaneously' that Plato means these militarist principles to be adhered to in peace as well as in war. Indeed I have said so — quoting Plato: it is Plato who says so. Should I have suppressed it? Plato says, in Bury's translation of which Professor Levinson approves (though I prefer mine: I ask my readers whether there is any difference of meaning between them, as distinct from one of clarity; see p. 103E = p. 102A): nor should anyone, whether at work or in play, grow habituated in mind to acting alone and on his own initiative, but he should live always both in war and peace, with his eyes fixed constantly on his commander . . . ' (Laws, Loeb Library, vol. ii, p. 477; my italics).

And later (p. 479): 'This task of ruling, and of being ruled by, others must be practised in peace from earliest childhood . . . '

As to mistranslation, I can only say that there is practically no difference between my translation and Bury's — except that I have broken up Plato's two very long sentences which, as they stand, are not quite easy to follow. Professor Levinson says (p. 531) that I have 'made great and illegitimate use' of this passage; and he continues: 'His journalistic misapplication of a selection from it on the dust cover' [the publishers' advertisement; see above] 'and on the title page of Part I of his book will be dissected in our note, where we also print the passage in full.'

The dissection of my 'journalistic misapplication' in this note consists, apart from some alleged 'corrections' of my translation which I do not accept, mainly of the same charge — that I have printed the passage on the jacket and in other important places. For Professor Levinson writes (p. 532; italics mine):

'This small unfairness is entirely eclipsed, however, by what Popper has done with the passage elsewhere. On the title page of Part I of his book, and also on the dust jacket' [who is unfair to whom?] 'he prints a, carefully chosen selection drawn from it, and beside it prints, as its very antithesis, a sentence drawn from Pericles' funeral oration ... This is to print in parallel a political ideal and a proposed military regulation ; yet Popper has not only failed to apprise the reader of this selection of its military reference, but employing the same mistranslations, has deleted absolutely all those parts of the passage which would reveal the fact.' *

My answer to this is very simple, {a) The mistranslations are non-existent, {b) I have tried to show at length that the passage, in spite of its military reference, formulates, like the Pericles passage (which incidentally also has some, though less, military reference), a political ideal — that is, Plato's political ideal.

I have seen no valid reason to change my belief that I am right in holding that this passage — like so many similar passages in the Laws — formulates Plato's political ideal. But whether this belief of mine is true or not, I have certainly given strong reasons for it (reasons which Professor Levinson fails to undermine). And since I have done so, and since Professor Levinson does not at all question the fact that I believe that I have done so, it constitutes neither a 'small unfairness' nor a great one if I try to present the passage as what I believe it to be: Plato's own description of his political ideal — of his totalitarian and militaristic ideal state.

As to my mistranslations, I shall confine myself to the one which Professor Levinson finds important enough to discuss in his text (as distinct from his footnote). He writes, on p. 533:

'A further objection concerns Popper's use of the word "leader." Plato uses "archon," the same word he employs for officials of the state and for military commanders; it is clearly the latter, or the directors of the athletic contests, whom he has here in mind. '

Clearly, there is no case for me to answer. (Should I have perhaps translated 'director'?) Anybody who consults a Greek dictionary can ascertain that 'archon," in its most basic meaning, is properly and precisely rendered by the English word 'leader' (or the Latin ' dux' or the Italian 'il duce'). The word is described, by Liddell and Scott, as a participle of the verb 'archon' whose fundamental meaning, according to these authorities, is 'to be first', either 'in point of Time', or 'in point of Place or Station'. In this second sense the first meanings given are: 'to lead, rule, govern, command, be leader or commander'. Accordingly we find, under archon, 'a ruler, commander, captain ; also, with respect to Athens, the chief magistrates at Athens, nine in number.' This should suffice to show that 'leader' is not a mistranslation, provided it fits the text. That it does can be seen from Bury's own version in which, it will be remembered, the passage is rendered as follows: 'but he should live always, both in war and peace, with his eyes fixed constantly on his commander and following his lead' . In fact, 'leader' fits the text only too well: it is the horrifying fittingness of the word which has produced Professor Levinson's protest. Since he is unable to see Plato as an advocate of totalitarian leadership, he feels that it must be my 'perverse mistranslations' (p. 531) which are to be blamed for the horrifying associations which this passage evokes.

But I assert that it is Plato's text, and Plato's thought, which is horrifying. I am, as is Professor Levinson, shocked by the 'leader', and all that this term connotes. Yet these connotations must not be played down if we wish to understand the appalling implications of the Platonic ideal state. These I set out to bring home, as well as I could.

It is perfectly true that in my comments I have stressed the fact that, although the passage refers to military expeditions, Plato leaves no doubt that its principles are to apply to the whole life of his soldier-citizens. It is no answer to say that a Greek citizen was, and had to be, a soldier; for this is true of Pericles and the time of his funeral oration (for soldiers fallen in battle) at least as much as of Plato and the time of his Laws.

This is the point which my mottos were meant to bring out as clearly as possible. This made it necessary to cut out one clause from this unwieldy passage, thereby omitting (as indicated by the insertion of dots) some of those references to military matters which would have obscured my main point: I mean the fact that the passage has a general application, to war and to peace, and that many Platonists have misread it, and missed its point, because of its length and obscure formulation, and because of their anxiety to idealize Plato. This is how the case stands. Yet I am accused in this context by Professor Levinson (p. 532) of using 'tactics' which 'make it necessary to check in merciless detail every one of Popper's citations from the Platonic text', in order to 'reveal how far from the path of objectivity and fairness Popper has been swept'. Faced with these accusations and allegations, and with suspicions cast upon me, I can only try to defend myself. But I am conscious of the principle that no man ought to be judge in his own cause. It is for this reason that I wish here to quote what Richard Robinson says (on p. 491 of The Philosophical Review, 60) about this Platonic passage, and about my translation of it. It should be remembered that Robinson is 'mingling praise with blame' in his review of my book, and that part of the blame consists in the assertion that my translations of Plato are biased. Yet he writes:

'Biased though they are, they should certainly not be disregarded. They draw attention to real and important features of Plato's thought that are usually overlooked. In particular. Dr. Popper's show piece, the horrible passage from Laws 942 about never acting on one's own, is correctly translated. (It might be urged that Plato intended this to apply only to the military life of his citizens, and it is true that the passage begins as a prescription for army discipline; but by the end Plato is clearly wishing to extend it to all life; cf. "the anarchy must be removed from all the life of all the men" [Laws, 942d 1]).'

I feel that I should add nothing to Robinson's statement.

To sum up. I cannot possibly attempt to answer even a fraction of the charges Professor Levinson has brought against me. I have tried to answer only a few of them, bearing in mind, as well as I could, that more important than the problem of who is unfair to whom is the question whether or not my assertions about Plato have been refuted. I have tried to give reasons for my belief that they have not been refuted. But I repeat that no man ought to be judge in his own cause: I must leave it to my readers to decide.

Yet I do not wish to end this long discussion without reaffirming my conviction of Plato's overwhelming intellectual achievement. My opinion that he was the greatest of all philosophers has not changed. Even his moral and political philosophy is, as an intellectual achievement, without parallel, though I find it morally repulsive, and indeed horrifying. As to his physical cosmology, I have changed my mind between the first and second edition (more precisely, between the first English edition and the first American edition) of this book; and I have tried to give reasons why I now think that he is the founder of the geometrical theory of the world', a theory whose importance has continuously increased down the ages. His literary powers I should think it presumptuous to praise. What my critics have shown is, I believe, that Plato's greatness makes it all the more important to fight his moral and political philosophy, and to warn those who may fall under his magic spell.

IV (1965)

In note 3 1 to Chapter 3 I mentioned a number of works which seemed to me to anticipate my views of Plato's politics. Since writing this note I have read Diana Spearman's great attack, of 1939, on appeasers and dictators. Modern Dictatorship. Her chapter, 'The Theory of Autocracy', contains one of the deepest and most penetrating, and at the same time one of the briefest analyses of Plato's political theory that I have seen.

________________

Notes

1 'A' stands in this Addendum for the American editions of 1950 and 1956; 'E' for the present edition and for the English editions from 1932 on.

2 Added in 1965. That the word ' douleia' in the passage in question (Republic 563d) bears this literal meaning (in addition to the figurative meaning which Professor Levinson correctly attributes to it) is confirmed by Shorey, the great Platonist and open enemy of democracy, whom Professor Levinson considers an authority on Plato's text. (I can often agree with Shorey's interpretation of Plato because he rarely tries to humanize or liberalize Plato's text.) For in a footnote which Shorey attaches to the word 'servitude' (douleid) in his translation of Republic 563d, he refers to two parallel passages: Gorgias 491e, and Laws 890a. The first of these reads in W. R. M. Lamb's translation (Loeb Edition): 'For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anybody at all?' Here the phrase 'to be a slave' has, like the one in the Republic, not only the figurative meaning 'to submit oneself but also the literal meaning; indeed, the whole point is the merging of the two meanings. The passage from the Laws 890a (an elaborate attack on certain Sophists of the Great Generation) reads in Bury's translation (Loeb Edition) as follows: 'these teachers [who corrupt the young men] attract them towards the life . . . "according to nature" which consists in being master over the rest, in reality [ale-theia], instead of being a slave to others, according to legal convention.' Plato clearly alludes here among others to those Sophists (p. TOE = p. 70A and note 13 to chapter 5) who taught that men cannot be slaves 'by nature' or 'in truth', but only 'by legal convention' (by legal fiction). Thus Shorey connects the crucial passage of the Republic by this reference at least indirectly to the great classical discussion of the theory of slavery ('slavery' in the literal sense).

3 It is by no means the only instance, as may be seen from my chapter 8. The passage quoted in the text to note 2, for example (Rep., 389b), is a different instance from the passage {Rep., 460a) which Professor Levinson has in mind. There are several other passages. See Rep., 415d and especially Tim., 18e, which prove that Plato finds his instruction to lie of sufficient importance to be included in the very brief summary of the Republic. (See also Laws, 663d down to 664b.)  

[admin]

Part 1 of 2

Addenda to Volume II

I. Facts, Standards, and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism (1961)

The main philosophical malady of our time is an intellectual and moral relativism, the latter being at least in part based upon the former. By relativism — or, if you like, scepticism — I mean here, briefly, the theory that the choice between competing theories is arbitrary; since either, there is no such thing as objective truth; or, if there is, no such thing as a theory which is true or at any rate (though perhaps not true) nearer to the truth than another theory; or, if there are two or more theories, no ways or means of deciding whether one of them is better than another.

In this addendum1 I shall first suggest that a dose of Tarski's theory of truth (see also the references to A. Tarski in the Index of this book), stiffened perhaps by my own theory of getting nearer to the truth, may go a long way towards curing this malady, though I admit that some other remedies might also be required, such as the non- authoritarian theory of knowledge which I have developed elsewhere.2 1 shall also try to show (in sections 12 ff. below) that the situation in the realm of standards — especially in the moral and political field — is somewhat analogous to that obtaining in the realm of facts.

1. Truth

Certain arguments in support of relativism arise from the question, asked in the tone of the assured sceptic who knows for certain that there is no answer: 'What is truth?' But Pilate's question can be answered in a simple and reasonable way — ^though hardly in a way that would have satisfied him — as follows: an assertion, proposition, statement, or belief, is true if, and only if, it corresponds to the facts.

Yet what do we mean by saying that a statement corresponds to the facts? Though to our sceptic or relativist this second question may seem just as unanswerable as the first, it actually can be equally readily answered. The answer is not difficult — as one might expect if one reflects upon the fact that every judge assumes that the witness knows what truth (in the sense of correspondence with the facts) means. Indeed, the answer turns out to be almost trivial.

In a way it is trivial — that is, once we have learnt from Tarski that the problem is one in which we refer to or speak about statements and facts and some relationship of correspondence holding between statement and facts; and that, therefore, the solution must also be one that refers to or speaks about statements and facts, and some relation between them. Consider the following:

The statement 'Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15' corresponds to the facts if and only if Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15.

When we read this italicized paragraph, what is likely to strike us first is its triviality. But never mind its triviality: if we look at it again, and more carefully, we see (1) that it refers to a statement, and (2) to some facts; and (3) that it can therefore state the very obvious conditions which we should expect to hold whenever we wish to say that the statement referred to corresponds to the facts referred to.

Those who think that this italicized paragraph is too trivial or too simple to contain anything interesting should be reminded of the fact, already referred to, that since everybody knows what truth, or correspondence with the facts, means (as long as he does not allow himself to speculate about it) this must be, in a sense, a trivial matter.

That the idea formulated in the italicized paragraph is correct, may be brought out by the following second italicized paragraph.

The assertion made by the witness, 'Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15 is true if and only if Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15.

It is clear that this second italicized paragraph is again very trivial. Nevertheless, it states in full the conditions for applying the predicate 'is true' to any statement made by a witness.  

Some people might think that a better way to formulate the paragraph would be the following:

The assertion made by the witness 7 saw that Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15' is true if and only if the witness saw that Smith entered the pawnshop shortly after 10.15.

Comparing this third italicized paragraph with the second we see that while the second gives the conditions for the truth of a statement about Smith and what he did, the third gives the conditions for the truth of a statement about the witness and what he did (or saw). But this is the only difference between the two paragraphs: both state the full conditions for the truth of the two different statements which are quoted in them.

It is a rule of giving evidence that eye-witnesses should confine themselves to stating what they actually saw. Compliance with this rule may sometimes make it easier for the judge to distinguish between true evidence and false evidence. Thus the third italicized paragraph may perhaps be said to have some advantages over the second, if regarded from the point of view of truth-seeking and truth-finding.

But it is essential for our present purpose not to mix up questions of actual truth-seeking or truth-finding (i.e. epistemological or methodological questions) with the question of what we mean, or what we intend to say, when we speak of truth, or of correspondence with the facts (the logical or ontological question of truth). Now from the latter point of view, the third italicized paragraph has no advantage whatever over the second. Each of them states to the full the conditions for the truth of the statement to which it refers.

Each, therefore, answers the question — 'What is truth?' in precisely the same way; though each does it only indirectly, by giving the conditions for the truth for a certain statement -- and each for a different statement.

2. Criteria

It is decisive to realize that knowing what truth means, or under what conditions a statement is called true, is not the same as, and must be clearly distinguished from, possessing a means of deciding — a criterion for deciding — whether a given statement is true or false.

The distinction I am referring to is a very general one, and it is of considerable importance for an assessment of relativism, as we shall see.

We may know, for example, what we mean by 'good meat' and by 'meat gone bad'; but we may not know how to tell the one from the other, at least in some cases: it is this we have in mind when we say that we have no criterion of the 'goodness' of good meat. Similarly, every doctor knows, more or less, what he means by 'tuberculosis'; but he may not always recognize it. And even though there may be (by now) batteries of tests which amount almost to a decision method, — that is to say, to a criterion -- sixty years ago there certainly were no such batteries of tests at the disposal of doctors, and no criterion. But doctors knew then very well what they meant — a lung infection due to a certain kind of microbe.

Admittedly, a criterion — a definite method of decision — if we could obtain one, might make everything clearer and more definite and more precise. It is therefore understandable that some people, hankering after precision, demand criteria. And if we can get them, the demand may be reasonable.

But it would be a mistake to believe that, before we have a criterion for deciding whether or not a man is suffering from tuberculosis, the phrase 'X is suffering from tuberculosis' is meaningless; or that, before we have a criterion of the goodness or badness of meat, there is no point in considering whether or not a piece of meat has gone bad; or that, before we have a reliable lie-detector, we do not know what we mean when we say that X is deliberately lying, and should therefore not even consider this 'possibility', since it is no possibility at all, but meaningless; or that, before we have a criterion of truth, we do not know what we mean when we say of a statement that it is true.

Thus those who insist that, without a criterion — a reliable test — for tuberculosis, or lying, or truth, we cannot mean anything by the words 'tuberculosis' or 'lying' or 'true', are certainly mistaken. In fact, construction of a battery of tests for tuberculosis, or for lying, comes after we have established — perhaps only roughly — what we mean by 'tuberculosis' or by 'lying'.

It is clear that in the course of developing tests for tuberculosis, we may learn a lot more about this illness; so much, perhaps, that we may say that the very meaning of the term 'tuberculosis' has changed under the influence of our new knowledge, and that after the establishment of the criterion the meaning of the term is no longer the same as before. Some, perhaps, may even say that 'tuberculosis' can now be defined in terms of the criterion. But this does not alter the fact that we meant something before — though we may, of course, have known less about the thing. Nor does it alter the fact that there are few diseases (if any) for which we have either a criterion or a clear definition, and that few criteria (if any) are reliable. (But if they are not reliable, we had better not call them 'criteria'.) There may be no criterion which helps us to establish whether a pound note is, or is not, genuine. But should we find two pound notes with the same serial number, we should have good reasons to assert, even in the absence of a criterion, that one of them at least is a forgery; and this assertion would clearly not be made meaningless by the absence of a criterion of genuineness.

To sum up, the theory that in order to determine what a word means we must establish a criterion for its correct use, or for its correct application, is mistaken: we practically never have such a criterion.

3. Criterion philosophies

The view just rejected — the view that we must have criteria in order to know what we are talking about, whether it is tuberculosis, lying, or existence, or meaning, or truth — is the overt or implicit basis of many philosophies. A philosophy of this kind may be called a 'criterion philosophy'.

Since the basic demand of a criterion philosophy cannot as a rule be met, it is clear that the adoption of a criterion-philosophy will, in many cases, lead to disappointment, and to relativism or scepticism.

I believe that it is the demand for a criterion of truth which has made so many people feel that the question 'What is truth?' is unanswerable. But the absence of a criterion of truth does not render the notion of truth non- significant any more than the absence of a criterion of health renders the notion of health non-significant. A sick man may seek health even though he has no criterion for it. An erring man may seek truth even though he has no criterion for it.

And both may simply seek health, or truth, without much bothering about the meanings of these terms which they (and others) understand well enough for their purposes.

One immediate result of Tarski's work on truth is the following theorem of logic: there can be no general criterion of truth (except with respect to certain artificial language systems of a somewhat impoverished kind).

This result can be exactly established; and its establishment makes use of the notion of truth as correspondence with the facts.

We have here an interesting and philosophically very important result (important especially in connection with the problem of an authoritarian theory of knowledge3). But this result has been established with the help of a notion — in this case the notion of truth — for which we have no criterion. The unreasonable demand of the criterion-philosophies that we should not take a notion seriously before a criterion has been established would therefore, if adhered to in this case, have for ever prevented us from attaining a logical result of great philosophical interest.

Incidentally, the result that there can be no general criterion of truth is a direct consequence of the still more important result (which Tarski obtained by combining Godel's undecidability theorem with his own theory of truth) that there can be no general criterion of truth even for the comparatively narrow field of number theory, or for any science which makes full use of arithmetic. It applies a fortiori to truth in any extra- mathematical field in which unrestricted use is made of arithmetic.

4. Fallibilism

All this shows not only that some still fashionable forms of scepticism and relativism are mistaken, but also that they are obsolete; that they are based on a logical confusion — between the meaning of a term and the criterion of its proper application — although the means for clearing up this confusion have been readily available for some thirty years.

It must be admitted, however, that there is a kernel of truth in both scepticism and relativism. The kernel of truth is just that there exists no general criterion of truth. But this does not warrant the conclusion that the choice between competing theories is arbitrary. It merely means, quite simply, that we can always err in our choice — that we can always miss the truth, or fall short of the truth; that certainty is not for us (nor even knowledge that is highly probable, as I have shown in various places, for example in chapter 10 of Conjectures and Refutations)', that we are fallible. This, for all we know, is no more than the plain truth. There are few fields of human endeavour, if any, which seem to be exempt from human fallibility. What we once thought to be well-established, or even certain, may later turn out to be not quite correct (but this means false), and in need of correction. A particularly impressive example of this is the discovery of heavy water, and of heavy hydrogen (deuterium, first separated by Harold C. Urey in 1931). Prior to this discovery, nothing more certain and more settled could be imagined in the field of chemistry than our knowledge of water (H2O) and of the chemical elements of which it is composed. Water was even used for the 'operational' definition of the gramme, the unit standard of mass of the 'absolute' metric system; it thus formed one of the basic units of experimental physical measurements. This illustrates the fact that our knowledge of water was believed to be so well established that it could be used as the firm basis of all other physical measurements. But after the discovery of heavy water, it was realized that what had been believed to be a chemically pure compound was actually a mixture of chemically indistinguishable but physically very different compounds, with very different densities, boiling points, and freezing points — though for the definitions of all these points, 'water' had been used as a standard base.

This historical incident is typical; and we may learn from it that we cannot foresee which parts of our scientific knowledge may come to grief one day. Thus the belief in scientific certainty and in the authority of science is just wishful thinking: science is fallible, because science is human.

But the fallibility of our knowledge — or the thesis that all knowledge is guesswork, though some consists of guesses which have been most severely tested — must not be cited in support of scepticism or relativism. From the fact that we can err, and that a criterion of truth which might save us from error does not exist, it does not follow that the choice between theories is arbitrary, or non-rational: that we cannot learn, or get nearer to the truth: that our knowledge cannot grow.

5. Fallibilism and the growth of knowledge

By 'fallibilism' I mean here the view, or the acceptance of the fact, that we may err, and that the quest for certainty (or even the quest for high probability) is a mistaken quest. But this does not imply that the quest for truth is mistaken. On the contrary, the idea of error implies that of truth as the standard of which we may fall short. It implies that, though we may seek for truth, and though we may even find truth (as I believe we do in very many cases), we can never be quite certain that we have found it. There is always a possibility of error; though in the case of some logical and mathematical proofs, this possibility may be considered slight.

But fallibilism need in no way give rise to any sceptical or relativist conclusions. This will become clear if we consider that all the known historical examples of human fallibility — including all the known examples of miscarriage of justice — are examples of the advance of our knowledge. Every discovery of a mistake constitutes a real advance in our knowledge. As Roger Martin du Gard says in Jean Barois, 'it is something if we know where truth is not to be found'.

For example, although the discovery of heavy water showed that we were badly mistaken, this was not only an advance in our knowledge, but it was in its turn connected with other advances, and it produced many further advances. Thus we can learn from our mistakes.

This fundamental insight is, indeed, the basis of all epistemology and methodology; for it gives us a hint how to learn more systematically, how to advance more quickly (not necessarily in the interests of technology: for each individual seeker after truth, the problem of how to hasten one's advance is most urgent). This hint, very simply, is that we must search for our mistakes -- or in other words, that we must try to criticize our theories.

Criticism, it seems, is the only way we have of detecting our mistakes, and of learning from them in a systematic way.

6. Getting nearer to the truth

In all this, the idea of the growth of knowledge — of getting nearer to the truth — is decisive. Intuitively, this idea is as clear as the idea of truth itself. A statement is true if it corresponds to the facts. It is nearer to the truth than another statement if it corresponds to the facts more closely than the other statement.

But though this idea is intuitively clear enough, and its legitimacy is hardly questioned by ordinary people or by scientists, it has, like the idea of truth, been attacked as illegitimate by some philosophers (for example quite recently by W. V. Quine4). It may therefore be mentioned here that, combining two analyses of Tarski, I have recently been able to give a 'definition' of the idea of approaching truth in the purely logical terms of Tarski 's theory. (I simply combined the ideas of truth and of content, obtaining the idea of the truth-content of a statement a, i.e. the class of all true statements following from a, and its falsity content, which can be defined, roughly, as its content minus its truth content. We can then say that a statement a gets nearer to the truth than a statement b if and only if its truth content has increased without an increase in its falsity content; see chapter 10 of my Conjectures and Refutations.) There is therefore no reason whatever to be sceptical about the notion of getting nearer to the truth, or of the advancement of knowledge. And though we may always err, we have in many cases (especially in cases of crucial tests deciding between two theories) a fair idea of whether or not we have in fact got nearer to the truth.

It should be very clearly understood that the idea of one statement a getting nearer to the truth than another statement b in no way interferes with the idea that every statement is either true or false, and that there is no third possibility. It only takes account of the fact that there may be a lot of truth in a false statement. If I say 'It is half past three — too late to catch the 3.35' then my statement might be false because it was not too late for the 3.35 (since the 3.35 happened to be four minutes late). But there was still a lot of truth — of true information — in my statement; and though I might have added 'unless indeed the 3.35 is late (which it rarely is)', and thereby added to its truth-content, this additional remark might well have been taken as understood. (My statement might also have been false because it was only 3.28 not 3.30, when I made it. But even then there was a lot of truth in it.)

A theory like Kepler's which describes the track of the planets with remarkable accuracy may be said to contain a lot of true information, even though it is a false theory because deviations from Kepler's ellipses do occur. And Newton's theory (even though we may assume here that it is false) contains, for all we know, a staggering amount of true information — much more than Kepler's theory. Thus Newton's theory is a better approximation than Kepler's — it gets nearer to the truth. But this does not make it true: it can be nearer to the truth and it can, at the same time, be a false theory.

7. Absolutism

The idea of a philosophical absolutism is rightly repugnant to many people since it is, as a rule, combined with a dogmatic and authoritarian claim to possess the truth, or a criterion of truth.

But there is another form of absolutism — a fallibilistic absolutism — which indeed rejects all this: it merely asserts that our mistakes, at least, are absolute mistakes, in the sense that if a theory deviates from the truth, it is simply false, even if the mistake made was less glaring than that in another theory. Thus the notions of truth, and of falling short of the truth, can represent absolute standards for the fallibilist. This kind of absolutism is completely free from any taint of authoritarianism. And it is a great help in serious critical discussions. Of course, it can be criticized in its turn, in accordance with the principle that nothing is exempt from criticism. But at least at the moment it seems to me unlikely that criticism of the (logical) theory of truth and the theory of getting nearer to the truth will succeed.

8. Sources of knowledge

The principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this principle itself is not exempt) leads to a simple solution of the problem of the sources of knowledge, as I have tried to show elsewhere (see the Introduction to my Conjectures and Refutations). It is this: every 'source' — tradition, reason, imagination, observation, or what not — is admissible and may be used, but none has any authority.

This denial of authority to the sources of knowledge attributes to them a role very different from that which they were supposed to play in past and present epistemologies. But it is part of our critical and fallibilist approach: every source is welcome, but no statement is immune from criticism, whatever its 'source' may be. Tradition, more especially, which both the intellectualists (Descartes) and the empiricists (Bacon) tended to reject, can be admitted by us as one of the most important 'sources', since almost all that we learn (from our elders, in school, from books) stems from it. I therefore hold that anti-traditionalism must be rejected as futile. Yet traditionalism — which stresses the authority of traditions — must be rejected too; not as futile, but as mistaken — just as mistaken as any other epistemology which accepts some source of knowledge (intellectual intuition, say, or sense intuition) as an authority, or a guarantee, or a criterion, of truth.

9. Is a critical method possible?

But if we really reject any claim to authority, of any particular source of knowledge, how can we then criticize any theory? Does not all criticism proceed from some assumptions? Does not the validity of any criticism, therefore, depend upon the truth of these assumptions? And what is the good of criticizing a theory if the criticism should turn out to be invalid? Yet in order to show that it is valid, must we not establish, or justify, its assumptions? And is not the establishment or the justification of any assumption just the thing which everybody attempts (though often in vain) and which I here declare to be impossible? But if it is impossible, is not then (valid) criticism impossible too?

I believe that it is this series of questions or objections which has largely barred the way to a (tentative) acceptance of the point of view here advocated: as these questions show, one may easily be led to believe that the critical method is, logically considered, in the same boat with all other methods: since it cannot work without making assumptions, it would have to establish or justify those assumptions; yet the whole point of our argument was that we cannot establish or justify anything as certain, or even as probable, but have to content ourselves with theories which withstand criticism.

Obviously, these objections are very serious. They bring out the importance of our principle that nothing is exempt from criticism, or should be held to be exempt from criticism — not even this principle of the critical method itself.

Thus these objections constitute an interesting and important criticism of my position. But this criticism can in its turn be criticized; and it can be refuted.

First of all, even if we were to admit that all criticism starts from certain assumptions, this would not necessarily mean that, for it to be valid criticism, these assumptions must be established and justified. For the assumptions may, for example, be part of the theory against which the criticism is directed. (In this case we speak of 'immanent criticism'.) Or they may be assumptions which would be generally found acceptable, even though they do not form part of the theory criticized. In this case the criticism would amount to pointing out that the theory criticized contradicts (unknown to its defenders) some generally accepted views. This kind of criticism may be very valuable even when it is unsuccessful; for it may lead the defenders of the criticized theory to question those generally accepted views, and this may lead to important discoveries. (An interesting example is the history of Dirac's theory of anti-particles.)

Or they may be assumptions which are of the nature of a competing theory (in which case the criticism may be called 'transcendent criticism', in contradistinction to 'immanent criticism'): the assumptions may be, for example, hypotheses, or guesses, which can be independently criticized and tested. In this case the criticism offered would amount to a challenge to carry out certain crucial tests in order to decide between two competing theories.

These examples show that the important objections raised here against my theory of criticism are based upon the untenable dogma that criticism, in order to be 'valid', must proceed from assumptions which are established or justified.

Moreover, criticism may be important, enlightening, and even fruitful, without being valid: the arguments used in order to reject some invalid criticism may throw a lot of new light upon a theory, and can be used as a (tentative) argument in its favour; and of a theory which can thus defend itself against criticism we may well say that it is supported by critical arguments.

Quite generally, we may say that valid criticism of a theory consists in pointing out that a theory does not succeed in solving the problems which it was supposed to solve; and if we look at criticism in this light then it certainly need not be dependent on any particular set of assumptions (that is, it can be 'immanent'), even though it may well be that some assumptions which were foreign to the theory under discussion (that is, some 'transcendent' assumptions) inspired it to start with.

10. Decisions

From the point of view here developed, theories are not, in general, capable of being established or justified; and although they may be supported by critical arguments, this support is never conclusive. Accordingly, we shall frequently have to make up our minds whether or not these critical arguments are strong enough to justify the tentative acceptance of the theory — or in other words, whether the theory seems preferable, in the light of the critical discussion, to the competing theories.

In this sense, decisions enter into the critical method. But it is always a tentative decision, and a decision subject to criticism.

As such it should be contrasted with what has been called 'decision' or 'leap in the dark' by some irrationalist or anti-rationalist or existentialist philosophers. These philosophers, probably under the impact of the argument (rejected in the preceding section) of the impossibility of criticism without presuppositions, developed the theory that all our tenets must be based on some fundamental decision — on some leap in the dark. It must be a decision, a leap, which we take with closed eyes, as it were; for as we cannot 'know' without assumptions, without already having taken up a fundamental position, this fundamental position cannot be taken up on the basis of knowledge. It is, rather, a choice — ^but a kind of fateful and almost irrevocable choice, one which we take blindly, or by instinct, or by chance, or by the grace of God.

Our rejection of the objections presented in the preceding section shows that the irrationalist view of decisions is an exaggeration as well as an over-dramatization. Admittedly, we must decide. But unless we decide against listening to argument and reason, against learning from our mistakes, and against listening to others who may have objections to our views, our decisions need not be final; not even the decision to consider criticism. (It is only in its decision not to take an irrevocable leap into the darkness of irrationality that rationalism may be said not to be self- contained, in the sense of chapter 24.)

I believe that the critical theory of knowledge here sketched throws some light upon the great problems of all theories of knowledge: how it is that we know so much and so little; and how it is that we can lift ourselves slowly out of the swamp of ignorance — by our own bootstraps, as it were. We do so by working with guesses, and by improving upon our guesses, through criticism.

11. Social and political problems

The theory of knowledge sketched in the preceding sections of this addendum seems to me to have important consequences for the evaluation of the social situation of our time, a situation influenced to a large extent by the decline of authoritarian religion. This decline has led to a widespread relativism and nihilism: to the decline of all beliefs, even the belief in human reason, and thus in ourselves.

But the argument here developed shows that there are no grounds whatever for drawing such desperate conclusions. The relativistic and the nihilistic (and even the 'existentialistic') arguments are all based on faulty reasoning. In this they show, incidentally, that these philosophies actually do accept reason, but are unable to use it properly; in their own terminology we might say that they fail to understand 'the human situation', and especially man's ability to grow, intellectually and morally.

As a striking illustration of this misunderstanding — of desperate consequences drawn from an insufficient understanding of the epistemological situation — I will quote a passage from one of Nietzsche's Tracts Against the Times (from section 3 of his essay on Schopenhauer).

This was the first danger in whose shadow Schopenhauer grew up: isolation. The second was: despair of finding the truth. This latter danger is the constant companion of every thinker who sets out from Kant's philosophy; that is if he is a real man, a living human being, able to suffer and yearn, and not a mere rattling automaton, a mere thinking and calculating machine ... Though I am reading everywhere that [owing to Kant] ... a revolution has started in all fields of thought, I cannot believe that this is so as yet . . . But should Kant one day begin to exert a more general influence, then we shall find that this will take the form of a creeping and destructive scepticism and relativism; and only the most active and the most noble of minds . . . will instead experience that deep emotional shock, and that despair of truth, which was felt for example by Heinrich von Kleist ...

'Recently', he wrote, in his moving way, 'I have become acquainted with the philosophy of Kant; and I must tell you of a thought of which I need not be afraid that it will shake you as deeply and as painfully as it shook me: — ^It is impossible for us to decide whether that to which we appeal as truth is in truth the truth, or whether it merely seems to us so. If it is the latter, then all that truth to which we may attain here will be as nothing after our death, and all our efforts to produce and acquire something that might survive us must be in vain. — If the sharp point of this thought does not pierce your heart, do not smile at one who feels wounded by it in the holiest depth of his soul. My highest, my only aim has fallen to the ground, and I have none left.'

I agree with Nietzsche that Kleist's words are moving; and I agree that Kleist 's reading of Kant's doctrine that it is impossible to attain any knowledge of things in themselves is straightforward enough, even though it conflicts with Kant's own intentions; for Kant believed in the possibility of science, and of finding the truth. (It was only the need to explain the paradox of the existence of a priori science of nature which led him to adopt that subjectivism which Kleist rightly found shocking.) Moreover, Kleist's despair is at least partly the result of disappointment — of seeing the downfall of an over-optimistic belief in a simple criterion of truth (such as self-evidence). Yet whatever may be the history of this philosophic despair, it is not called for. Though truth is not self-revealing (as Cartesians and Baconians thought), though certainty may be unattainable, the human situation with respect to knowledge is far from desperate. On the contrary, it is exhilarating: here we are, with the immensely difficult task before us of getting to know the beautiful world we live in, and ourselves; and fallible though we are we nevertheless find that our powers of understanding, surprisingly, are almost adequate for the task — more so than we ever dreamt in our wildest dreams. We really do learn from our mistakes, by trial and error. And at the same time we learn how little we know — as when, in climbing a mountain; every step upwards opens some new vista into the unknown, and new worlds unfold themselves of whose existence we knew nothing when we began our climb.

Thus we can learn, we can grow in knowledge, even if we can never know -- that is, know for certain. Since we can learn, there is no reason for despair of reason; and since we can never know, there are no grounds here for smugness, or for conceit over the growth of our knowledge.

It may be said that this new way of knowing is too abstract and too sophisticated to replace the loss of authoritarian religion. This may be true. But we must not underrate the power of the intellect and the intellectuals. It was the intellectuals — ^he 'second-hand dealers in ideas', as F. A. Hayek calls them — who spread relativism, nihilism, and intellectual despair. There is no reason why some intellectuals — some more enlightened intellectuals — should not eventually succeed in spreading the good news that the nihilist ado was indeed about nothing.

12. Dualism of facts and standards

In the body of this book I spoke about the dualism of facts and decisions, and I pointed out, following L. J. Russell (see note 5 (3) to chapter 5, vol. i, p. 234), that this dualism may be described as one of propositions and proposals. The latter terminology has the advantage of reminding us that both propositions, which state facts, and proposals, which propose policies, including principles or standards of policy, are open to rational discussion. Moreover, a decision — one, say, concerning the adoption of a principle of conduct — reached after the discussion of a proposal, may well be tentative, and it may be in many respects very similar to a decision to adopt (also tentatively), as the best available hypothesis, a proposition which states a fact.

There is, however, an important difference here. For the proposal to adopt a policy or a standard, its discussion, and the decision to adopt it, may be said to create this policy or this standard. On the other hand, the proposal of a hypothesis, its discussion, and the decision to adopt it — or to accept a proposition — does not, in the same sense, create a fact. This, I suppose, was the reason why I thought that the term 'decision' would be able to express the contrast between the acceptance of policies or standards, and the acceptance of facts. Yet there is no doubt that it would have been clearer had I spoken of a dualism of facts and policies, or of a dualism of facts and standards, rather than of a dualism of facts and decisions.

Terminology apart, the important thing is the irreducible dualism itself: whatever the facts may be, and whatever the standards may be (for example, the principles of our policies), the first thing is to distinguish the two, and to see clearly why standards cannot be reduced to facts.

13. Proposals and propositions

There is, then, a decisive asymmetry between standards and facts: through the decision to accept a proposal (at least tentatively) we create the corresponding standard (at least tentatively); yet through the decision to accept a proposition we do not create the corresponding fact.

Another asymmetry is that standards always pertain to facts, and that facts are evaluated by standards; these are relations which cannot be simply turned round.

Whenever we are faced with a fact — and more especially, with a fact which we may be able to change — we can ask whether or not it complies with certain standards. It is important to realize that this is very far from being the same as asking whether we like it; for although we may often adopt standards which correspond to our likes or dislikes, and although our likes and dislikes may play an important role in inducing us to adopt or reject some proposed standard, there will as a rule be many other possible standards which we have not adopted; and it will be possible to judge, or evaluate, the facts by any of them. This shows that the relationship of evaluation (of some questionable fact by some adopted or rejected standard) is, logically considered, totally different from a person's psychological relation (which is not a standard but a fact), of like or dislike, to the fact in question, or to the standard in question. Moreover, our likes and dislikes are facts which can be evaluated like any other facts.

Similarly, the fact that a certain standard has been adopted or rejected by some person or by some society must, as a fact, be distinguished from any standard, including the adopted or rejected standard. And since it is a fact (and an alterable fact) it may be judged or evaluated by some (other) standards.

These are a few reasons why standards and facts, and therefore proposals and propositions, should be clearly and decisively distinguished. Yet once they have been distinguished, we may look not only at the dissimilarities of facts and standards but also at their similarities.

First, both proposals and propositions are alike in that we can discuss them, criticize them, and come to some decision about them. Secondly, there is some kind of regulative idea about both. In the realm of facts it is the idea of correspondence between a statement or a proposition and a fact; that is to say, the idea of truth. In the realm of standards, or of proposals, the regulative idea may be described in many ways, and called by many terms, for example, by the terms 'right' or 'good'. We may say of a proposal that it is right (or wrong) or perhaps good (or bad); and by this we may mean, perhaps, that it corresponds (or does not correspond) to certain standards which we have decided to adopt. But we may also say of a standard that it is right or wrong, or good or bad, or valid or invalid, or high or low; and by this we may mean, perhaps, that the corresponding proposal should or should not be accepted. It must therefore be admitted that the logical situation of the regulative ideas, of 'right', say, or 'good', is far less clear than that of the idea of correspondence to the facts.

As pointed out in the book, this difficulty is a logical one and cannot be got over by the introduction of a religious system of standards. The fact that God, or any other authority, commands me to do a certain thing is no guarantee that the command is right. It is I who must decide whether to accept the standards of any authority as (morally) good or bad. God is good only if His commandments are good; it would be a grave mistake — in fact an immoral adoption of authoritarianism — ^to say that His commandments are good simply because they are His, unless we have first decided (at our own risk) that He can only demand good or right things of us.

This is Kant's idea of autonomy, as opposed to heteronomy.

Thus no appeal to authority, not even to religious authority, can get us out of the difficulty that the regulative idea of absolute 'rightness' or 'goodness' differs in its logical status from that of absolute truth; and we have to admit the difference. This difference is responsible for the fact, alluded to above, that in a sense we create our standards by proposing, discussing, and adopting them.

All this must be admitted; nevertheless we may take the idea of absolute truth — of correspondence to the facts — as a kind of model for the realm of standards, in order to make it clear to ourselves that, just as we may seek for absolutely true propositions in the realm of facts or at least for propositions which come nearer to the truth, so we may seek for absolutely right or valid proposals in the realm of standards — or at least for better, or more valid, proposals.

However, it would be a mistake, in my opinion, to extend this attitude beyond the seeking to the finding. For though we should seek for absolutely right or valid proposals, we should never persuade ourselves that we have definitely found them; for clearly, there cannot be a criterion of absolute rightness -- even less than a criterion of absolute truth. The maximization of happiness may have been intended as a criterion. On the other hand I certainly never recommended that we adopt the minimization of misery as a criterion, though I think that it is an improvement on some of the ideas of utilitarianism. I also suggested that the reduction of avoidable misery belongs to the agenda of public policy (which does not mean that any question of public policy is to be decided by a calculus of minimizing misery) while the maximization of one's happiness should be left to one's private endeavour. (I quite agree with those critics of mine who have shown that if used as a criterion, the minimum misery principle would have absurd consequences; and I expect that the same may be said about any other moral criterion.)

But although we have no criterion of absolute rightness, we certainly can make progress in this realm. As in the realm of facts, we can make discoveries. That cruelty is always 'bad'; that it should always be avoided where possible; that the golden rule is a good standard which can perhaps even be improved by doing unto others, wherever possible, as they want to be done by: these are elementary and extremely important examples of discoveries in the realm of standards.

These discoveries create standards, we might say, out of nothing: as in the field of factual discovery, we have to lift ourselves by our own bootstraps. This is the incredible fact: that we can learn; by our mistakes, and by criticism; and that we can learn in the realm of standards just as well as in the realm of facts.

14. Two wrongs do not make two rights

Once we have accepted the absolute theory of truth it is possible to answer an old and serious yet deceptive argument in favour of relativism, of both the intellectual and the evaluative kind, by making use of the analogy between true facts and valid standards. The deceptive argument I have in mind appeals to the discovery that other people have ideas and beliefs which differ widely from ours. Who are we to insist that ours are the right ones? Already Xenophanes sang, 2500 years ago (Diels-Kranz, B, 16, 15):

The Ethiops say that their gods are flat-nosed and black, While the Thracians say that theirs have blue eyes and red hair. Yet if cattle or horses or lions had hands and could draw, And could sculpture like men, then the horses would draw their gods Like horses, and cattle like cattle; and each they would shape Bodies of gods in the likeness, each kind, of their own.

So each of us sees his gods, and his world, from his own point of view, according to his tradition and his upbringing; and none of us is exempt from this subjective bias.

This argument has been developed in various ways; and it has been argued that our race, or our nationality, or our historical background, or our historical period, or our class interest, or our social habitat, or our language, or our personal background knowledge, is an insurmountable, or an almost insurmountable, barrier to objectivity.

The facts on which this argument is based must be admitted; and indeed, we can never rid ourselves of bias. There is, however, no need to accept the argument itself, or its relativistic conclusions. For first of all, we can, in stages, get rid of some of this bias, by means of critical thinking and especially of listening to criticism. For example, Xenophanes doubtless was helped, by his own discovery, to see things in a less biased way. Secondly, it is a fact that people with the most divergent cultural backgrounds can enter into fruitful discussion, provided they are interested in getting nearer to the truth, and are ready to listen to each other, and to learn from each other. This shows that, though there are cultural and linguistic barriers, they are not insurmountable.

Thus it is of the utmost importance to profit from Xenophanes' discovery in every field; to give up cocksureness, and become open to criticism. Yet it is also of the greatest importance not to mistake this discovery, this step towards criticism, for a step towards relativism. If two parties disagree, this may mean that one is wrong, or the other, or both: this is the view of the criticist. It does not mean, as the relativist will have it, that both may be equally right. They may be equally wrong, no doubt, though they need not be. But anybody who says that to be equally wrong means to be equally right is merely playing with words, or with metaphors.

It is a great step forward to learn to be self-critical; to learn to think that the other fellow may be right — more right than we ourselves. But there is a great danger involved in this: we may think that both, the other fellow and we ourselves, may be right. But this attitude, modest and self- critical as it may appear to us, is neither as modest nor as self-critical as we may be inclined to think; for it is more likely that both, we ourselves and the other fellow, are wrong. Thus self-criticism should not be an excuse for laziness and for the adoption of relativism. And as two wrongs do not make a right, two wrong parties to a dispute do not make two right parties.

[admin]

Part 2 of 2

15. 'Experience' and 'intuition' as sources of knowledge

The fact that we can learn from our mistakes, and through criticism, in the realm of standards as well as in the realm of facts, is of fundamental importance. But is the appeal to criticism sufficient? Do we not have to appeal to the authority of experience or (especially in the realm of standards) of intuition?

In the realm of facts, we do not merely criticize our theories, we criticize them by an appeal to experimental and observational experience. It is a serious mistake, however, to believe that we can appeal to anything like an authority of experience, though philosophers, particularly empiricist philosophers, have depicted sense perception, and especially sight, as a source of knowledge which furnishes us with definite 'data' out of which our experience is composed. I believe that this picture is totally mistaken. For even our experimental and observational experience does not consist of 'data'. Rather, it consists of a web of guesses — of conjectures, expectations, hypotheses, with which there are interwoven accepted, traditional, scientific, and unscientific, lore and prejudice. There simply is no such thing as pure experimental and observational experience — experience untainted by expectation and theory. There are no pure 'data', no empirically given 'sources of knowledge' to which we can appeal, in our criticism. 'Experience', whether ordinary or scientific experience, is much more like what Oscar Wilde had in mind in Lady Windermere 's Fan, Act iii:

Dumby: Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes.

Cecil Graham: One shouldn't commit any.

Dumby: Life would be very dull without them.

Learning from our mistakes — without which life would indeed be dull — is also the meaning of 'experience' which is implied in Dr. Johnson's famous joke about 'the triumph of hope over experience'; or in C. C. King's remark (in his Story of the British Army, 1897, p. 112): 'But the British leaders were to learn ... in the "only school fools learn in, that of experience".'

It seems, then, that at least some of the ordinary uses of 'experience' agree much more closely with what I believe to be the character of both 'scientific experience' and 'ordinary empirical knowledge' than with the traditional analyses of the philosophers of the empiricist schools. And all this seems to agree also with the original meaning of 'empeiria' (from 'peirao' — to try, to test, to examine) and thus of 'experientia' and ' experimentum.' Yet it must not be held to constitute an argument; neither one from ordinary usage nor one from origin. It is intended only to illustrate my logical analysis of the structure of experience. According to this analysis, experience, and more especially scientific experience, is the result of usually mistaken guesses, of testing them, and of learning from our mistakes. Experience (in this sense) is not a 'source of knowledge'; nor does it carry any authority.

Thus criticism which appeals to experience is not of an authoritative character. It does not consist in contrasting dubious results with established ones, or with 'the evidence of our senses' (or with 'the given'). It consists, rather, in comparing some dubious results with others, often equally dubious, which may, however, be taken as unproblematic for the moment, although they may at any time be challenged as new doubts arise, or else because of some inkling or conjecture; an inkling or a conjecture, for example, that a certain experiment may lead to a new discovery.

Now the situation in acquiring knowledge about standards seems to me altogether analogous.

Here, too, philosophers have looked for the authoritative sources of this knowledge, and they found, in the main, two: feelings of pleasure and pain, or a moral sense or a moral intuition for what is right or wrong (analogous to perception in the epistemology of factual knowledge), or, alternatively, a source called 'practical reason' (analogous to 'pure reason', or to a faculty of 'intellectual intuition', in the epistemology of factual knowledge). And quarrels continually raged over the question whether all, or only some, of these authoritative sources of moral knowledge existed.  

I think that this problem is a pseudo-problem. The main point is not the question of the 'existence' of any of these faculties — a very vague and dubious psychological question — but whether these may be authoritative 'sources of knowledge' providing us with 'data' or other definite starting- points for our constructions or, at least, with a definite frame of reference for our criticism. I deny that we have any authoritative sources of this kind, either in the epistemology of factual knowledge or in the epistemology of the knowledge of standards. And I deny that we need any such definite frame of reference for our criticism.

How do we learn about standards? How, in this realm, do we learn from our mistakes? First we learn to imitate others (incidentally, we do so by trial and error), and so learn to look upon standards of behaviour as if they consisted of fixed, 'given' rules. Later we find (also by trial and error) that we are making mistakes — for example, that we may hurt people. We may thus learn the golden rule; but soon we find that we may misjudge a man's attitude, his background knowledge, his aims, his standards; and we may learn from our mistakes to take care even beyond the golden rule.

Admittedly, such things as sympathy and imagination may play an important role in this development; but they are not authoritative sources of knowledge — ^no more than any of our sources in the realm of the knowledge of facts. And though something like an intuition of what is right and what is wrong may also play an important role in this development, it is, again, not an authoritative source of knowledge. For we may see to-day very clearly that we are right, and yet learn to-morrow that we made a mistake.

'Intuitionism' is the name of a philosophical school which teaches that we have some faculty or capacity of intellectual intuition allowing us to 'see' the truth; so that what we have seen to be true must indeed be true. It is thus a theory of some authoritative source of knowledge. Anti- intuitionists have usually denied the existence of this source of knowledge while asserting, as a rule, the existence of some other source such as sense-perception. My view is that both parties are mistaken, for two reasons. First, I assert that there exists something like an intellectual intuition which makes us feel, most convincingly, that we see the truth (a point denied by the opponents of intuitionism). Secondly, I assert that this intellectual intuition, though in a way indispensable, often leads us astray in the most dangerous manner. Thus we do not, in general, see the truth when we are most convinced that we see it; and we have to learn, through mistakes, to distrust these intuitions.

What, then, are we to trust? What are we to accept? The answer is: whatever we accept we should trust only tentatively, always remembering that we are in possession, at best, of partial truth (or rightness), and that we are bound to make at least some mistake or misjudgement somewhere — not only with respect to facts but also with respect to the adopted standards; secondly, we should trust (even tentatively) our intuition only if it has been arrived at as the result of many attempts to use our imagination; of many mistakes, of many tests, of many doubts, and of searching criticism.

It will be seen that this form of anti-intuitionism (or some may say, perhaps, of intuitionism) is radically different from the older forms of anti-intuitionism. And it will be seen that there is one essential ingredient in this theory: the idea that we may fall short — perhaps always — of some standard of absolute truth, or of absolute rightness, in our opinions as well as in our actions.

It may be objected to all this that, whether or not my views on the nature of ethical knowledge and ethical experience are acceptable, they are still 'relativist' or 'subjectivist'. For they do not establish any absolute moral standards: at best they show that the idea of an absolute standard is a regulative idea, of use to those who are already converted — who are already eager to learn about, and search for, true or valid or good moral standards. My reply is that even the 'establishment' — say, by means of pure logic — of an absolute standard, or a system of ethical norms, would make no difference in this respect. For assuming we have succeeded in logically proving the validity of an absolute standard, or a system of ethical norms, so that we could logically prove to somebody how he ought to act: even then he might take no notice; or else he might reply: 'I am not in the least interested in your "ought", or in your moral rules — no more so than in your logical proofs, or, say, in your higher mathematics.' Thus even a logical proof cannot alter the fundamental situation that only he who is prepared to take these things seriously and to learn about them will be impressed by ethical (or any other) arguments. You cannot force anybody by arguments to take arguments seriously, or to respect his own reason.

16. The dualism of facts and standards and the idea of liberalism

The dualism of facts and standards is, I contend, one of the bases of the liberal tradition. For an essential part of this tradition is the recognition of the injustice that does exist in this world, and the resolve to try to help those who are its victims. This means that there is, or that there may be, a conflict, or at least a gap, between facts and standards: facts may fall short of right (or valid or true) standards — especially those social or political facts which consist in the actual acceptance and enforcement of some code of justice.

To put it in another way, liberalism is based upon the dualism of facts and standards in the sense that it believes in searching for ever better standards, especially in the field of politics and of legislation.

But this dualism of facts and standards has been rejected by some relativists who have opposed it with arguments like the following:

(1) The acceptance of a proposal — and thus of a standard — is a social or political or historical fact.

(2) If an accepted standard is judged by another, not yet accepted standard, and found wanting, then this judgement (whoever may have made it) is also a social or political or historical fact.

(3) If a judgement of this kind becomes the basis of a social or political movement, then this is also a historical fact.

(4) If this movement is successful, and if in consequence the old standards are reformed or replaced by new standards, then this is also a historical fact.

(5) Thus — so argues the relativist or moral positivist — we never have to transcend the realm of facts, if only we include in it social or political or historical facts: there is no dualism of facts and standards.

I consider this conclusion (5) to be mistaken. It does not follow from the premises (1) to (4) whose truth I admit. The reason for rejecting (5) is very simple: we can always ask whether a development as here described — a social movement based upon the acceptance of a programme for the reform of certain standards — was 'good' or 'bad'. In raising this question, we re-open the gulf between standards and facts which the monistic argument (1) to (5) attempts to close.

From what I have just said, it may be rightly inferred that the monistic position — the philosophy of the identity of facts and standards -- is dangerous; for even where it does not identify standards with existing facts — even where it does not identify present might and right — it leads necessarily to the identification of future might and right. Since the question whether a certain movement for reform is right or wrong (or good or bad) cannot be raised, according to the monist, except in terms of another movement with opposite tendencies, nothing can be asked except the question which of these opposite movements succeeded, in the end, in establishing its standards as a matter of social or political or historical fact.

In other words, the philosophy here described — the attempt to 'transcend' the dualism of facts and standards and to erect a monistic system, a world of facts only — leads to the identification of standards either with established might or with future might: it leads to a moral positivism, or to a moral historicism, as described and discussed in chapter 22 of this book.

17. Hegel again

My chapter on Hegel has been much criticized. Most of the criticism I cannot accept, because it fails to answer my main objections against Hegel — that his philosophy exemplifies, if compared with that of Kant (I still find it almost sacrilegious to put these two names side by side), a terrible decline in intellectual sincerity and intellectual honesty; that his philosophical arguments are not to be taken seriously; and that his philosophy was a major factor in bringing about the 'age of intellectual dishonesty', as Konrad Heiden called it, and in preparing for that contemporary trahison des clercs (I am alluding to Julien Benda's great book) which has helped to produce two world wars so far.

It should not be forgotten that I looked upon my book as my war effort: believing as I did in the responsibility of Hegel and the Hegelians for much of what happened in Germany, I felt that it was my task, as a philosopher, to show that this philosophy was a pseudo-philosophy.

The time at which the book was written may perhaps also explain my optimistic assumption (which I could attribute to Schopenhauer) that the stark realities of the war would show up the playthings of the intellectuals, such as relativism, as what they were, and that this verbal spook would disappear.

I certainly was too optimistic. Indeed, it seems that most of my critics took some form of relativism so much for granted that they were quite unable to believe that I was really in earnest in rejecting it.

I admit that I made some factual mistakes: Mr. H. N. Rodman, of Harvard University, has told me that I was mistaken in writing 'two years' in the third line from the bottom of p. 266, and that I ought to have written 'four years'. He also told me that there are, in his opinion, a number of more serious — if less clear-cut — historical errors in the chapter, and that some of my attributions of ulterior motives to Hegel are, in his opinion, historically unjustified.

Such things are very much to be regretted, although they have happened to better historians than I. But the question of real importance is this: do these mistakes affect my assessment of Hegel's philosophy, and of its disastrous influence?

My own answer to the question is: 'No.' It is his philosophy which has led me to look upon Hegel as I do, not his biography. In fact, I am still surprised that serious philosophers were offended by my admittedly partly playful attack upon a philosophy which I am still unable to take seriously. I tried to express this by the scherzo-style of my Hegel chapter, hoping to expose the ridiculous in this philosophy which I can only regard with a mixture of contempt and horror.

All this was clearly indicated in my book; also the fact that I neither could5 nor wished to spend unlimited time upon deep researches into the history of a philosopher whose work I abhor. As it was, I wrote about Hegel in a manner which assumed that few would take him seriously. And although this manner was lost upon my Hegelian critics, who were decidedly not amused, I still hope that some of my readers got the joke.

But all this is comparatively unimportant. What may be important is the question whether my attitude towards Hegel's philosophy was justified. It is a contribution towards an answer to this question which I wish to make here.

I think most Hegelians will admit that one of the fundamental motives and intentions of Hegel's philosophy is precisely to replace and 'transcend' the dualistic view of facts and standards which had been presented by Kant, and which was the philosophical basis of the idea of liberalism and of social reform.

To transcend this dualism of facts and standards is the decisive aim of Hegel's philosophy of identity -- the identity of the ideal and the real, of right and might. All standards are historical: they are historical facts, stages in the development of reason, which is the same as the development of the ideal and of the real. There is nothing but fact; and some of the social or historical facts are, at the same time, standards.

Now Hegel's argument was, fundamentally, the one I stated (and criticized) here in the preceding section — although Hegel presented it in a surpassingly vague, unclear, and specious form. Moreover, I contend that this identity philosophy (despite some 'progressivist' suggestions, and some mild expressions of sympathy with various 'progressive' movements which it contained) played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany; a movement which, under the influence of Kant's philosophy, had produced such important liberal thinkers as Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and such important works as Humboldt's Essay towards the Determination of the Limits of the Powers of the State.

This is my first and fundamental accusation. My second accusation, closely connected with the first, is that Hegel's identity philosophy, by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian modes of thought.

My third accusation is that Hegel's argument (which admittedly required of him a certain degree of subtlety, though not more than a great philosopher might be expected to possess) was full of logical mistakes and of tricks, presented with pretentious impressiveness. This undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty. It also contributed to the rise of totalitarian philosophizing and, even more serious, to the lack of any determined intellectual resistance to it.

These are my principal objections to Hegel stated, I believe, fairly clearly in chapter 12. But I certainly did not analyse the fundamental issue — the philosophy of identity of facts and standards — quite as clearly as I ought to have done. So I hope I have made amends in this addendum — not to Hegel, but to those who may have been harmed by him.

18. Conclusion

In ending my book once again, I am as conscious as ever of its imperfections. In part, these imperfections are a consequence of its scope, which transcends what I should consider as my more professional interests. In part they are simply a consequence of my personal fallibility: it is not for nothing that I am a fallibilist. But though I am very conscious of my personal fallibility, even as it affects what I am going to say now, I do believe that a fallibilist approach has much to offer to the social philosopher. By recognizing the essentially critical and therefore revolutionary character of all human thought — of the fact that we learn from our mistakes, rather than by the accumulation of data — and by recognizing on the other hand that almost all the problems as well as the (non-authoritative) sources of our thought are rooted in traditions, and that it is almost always traditions which we criticize, a critical (and progressive) fallibilism may provide us with a much-needed perspective for the evaluation of both, tradition and revolutionary thought. Even more important, it can show us that the role of thought is to carry out revolutions by means of critical debates rather than by means of violence and of warfare; that it is the great tradition of Western rationalism to fight our battles with words rather than with swords. This is why our Western civilization is an essentially pluralistic one, and why monolithic social ends would mean the death of freedom: of the freedom of thought, of the free search for truth, and with it, of the rationality and the dignity of man.

II. Note on Schwarzschild's Book on Marx (1965)

Some years after I wrote this book, Leopold Schwarzschild's book on Marx, The Red Prussian (translated by Margaret Wing: London 1948) became known to me. There is no doubt in my mind that Schwarzschild looks at Marx with unsympathetic and even hostile eyes, and that he often paints him in the darkest possible colours. But even though the book may be not always fair, it contains documentary evidence, especially from the Marx-Engels correspondence, which shows that Marx was less of a humanitarian, and less of a lover of freedom, than he is made to appear in my book. Schwarzschild describes him as a man who saw in 'the proletariat' mainly an instrument for his own personal ambition. Though this may put the matter more harshly than the evidence warrants, it must be admitted that the evidence itself is shattering.

_______________

Notes

1 I am deeply indebted to Dr. William W. Bartley's incisive criticism which not only helped me to improve chapter 24 of this book (especially page 231) but also induced me to make important changes in the present addendum.

2 See for example 'On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance', now the Introduction to my Conjectures and Refutations and, more especially. Chapter 10 of that book; also, of course, my The Logic of Scientific Discovery.

3 For a description and criticism of authoritarian (or non-fallibilist) theories of knowledge see especially sections v, vi, and x. ff.. of the Introduction to my Conjectures and Refutations.

4 See W. V. Quine, Word and Object, 1959, p. 23.  

5 See my Introduction and my Preface to the Second Edition.  

 

[admin]

Index Of Names

Achilles, i, 327 f.
Acton, Lord, i, 137; ii, 302 f., 364.
Adam, J., i, 42, 83, 97, 141, 149, 206, 209, 212-14, 220 f., 223-5, 228 f., 236, 240, 242-6, 254, 257, 262 f., 273, 275 f., 282 f., 299, 301, 315; ii, 283.
Adeimantus, i, 258, 262 f.
Adler, A., ii, 100, 325, 352.
Aeschines, i, 304.
Agassi, J., i, page x.
Agrippa, Mencnius, i, 294; ii, 305.
Alcibiades, i, 154, 191-3, 281 f., 296, 303.
Alcidamas, i, 70, 95, 114, 152, 185, 236, 261, 278, 294; ii, 282.
Alcmaeon, i, 79, 173, 242, 254, 294.
Alexander, S., ii, 305.
Alexander the Great, i, 236, 278 f.; ii, 2, 22, 50.
AI-Gazzali, ii, 363.
Anaximander, i, 189, 204-6, 211, 300f.
Ancillon, ii, 43.
Anderson, E. N., ii, 53-5, 306, 309, 312-14
Anderson, Maxwell, i, 336.
Angleus Silesius, see Scheffler, 1.
Antiphon the Orator, of Rhamnus, i, 256, 296.
Antiphon the Sophist, of Athens, i, 69, 74, 95, 233, 236, 240, 256, 278, 294, 299.
Antisthenes, i, 95, 129, 152-4, 185, 194, 237, 241, 276-9, 282, 298, 311; ii, 21, 283, 292, 299-301.
Anytus, i, 192-4, 268.
Apollo, i, 328.
Aquinas, see Thomas.
Archelaus, i, 233.
Archimedes, i, 167; ii, 283.
Archytas, i, 196, 319.
Aristophanes, i, 182, 185, 218, 256, 307 f., 310.
Aristotle, i, 10, 12, 16, 26, 28-31, 33, 38, 43, 70, 91 f., 96, 102, 112, 114, 180, 205, 207-9, 211-19, 222, 228 f., 231, 235-7, 240
f., 248 f., 253, 255 f., 258, 260 f., 268, 273 f., 277 f., 280, 283, 294-6, 299 f., 308, 311, 314, 320 f.; ii, 1-18, 21, 26 f., 30, 36, 40, 50, 69, 75, 221, 281, 283-9, 292, 294 f., 299-303, 305, 309, 311, 316, 324, 359.
Aristoxenus, i, 300.
Armstrong, H. E., ii, 304.
Arndt, E. M., ii, 312.
Aspasia, i, 255.
'Athenian Stranger', The, i, 331.
Augustine, Saint, i, 221.
Augustus, Emperor, i, 298; ii, 353.

Bacon, Francis, ii, 16, 248, 297, 362, 37.8.
Badian, E., i, 237, 279.
Bakunin, M. A., ii, 328.
Banse, E., ii, 70, 316.
Barker, Sir Ernest, i, 104, 114 f., 236, 240, 246 f., 259, 261-3, 273, 282.
Earth, K., i, 235; ii, 272 f., 360, 365.
Bartley, W. W., i, page x; ii, 369.
Bavink, B., ii, 304.
Beethoven, L. van, i, 334; ii, 210 f.
Bellamy, A., ii, 337.
Benda, 1., ii, 393.
Bentham, J., ii, 237
Bergson, H., i, 202, 294, 314; ii, 62, 229, 258, 305, 307, 315 f., 361.
Berkeley, G., ii, 301, 363.
Bernard ofClairvaux, ii, 353.
Bernays, P., ii, 290.
Bernstein, A., ii, 339.
Best, W., ii, 75, 316.
Bevan, E., ii, 303.
Bias, i, 13; ii, 306.
Bismarck, 0., von, ii, 58.
Blanc, L., i, 241; ii, 321.
Bluehcr, H., ii, 359.
Bodin, Jean, i, 121.
Boehme, J., ii, 353.
Bohr, N., ii, 357.
Borel, E., i, 252.
Bosanquet, B., ii, 79.
Bowra, Sir C. M., i, 216.
Bradford, the Bishop of, i, 203, 292.
Bradley, F. H., i, 232.
Broadhead, H. D., i, 279.
Bruno, Giordano, ii, 42.
Bryson, i, 252.
Buckle, H. T., ii, 364.
Burke, E., i, Motto, 112, 260; ii, 35, 60, 136, 226, 305, 308 f., 333.
Burnet, 1., i, 66, 190, 204-7, 210, 214-16, 233, 235, 240, 267, 273, 294, 300 f., 304-9, 311-13.
Bums, E., i, 220, 241; ii, 318, 332.
Bury, R. G., i, 218, 331, 339, 341.
Butler, Samuel, i, Motto, 136, 268, 317.
Bywater, Ingram, i, 206, 301.

Caesar, ii, 128, 265.
Caird, E., ii, 8, 286, 306, 316.
Callicles, i, 116-18, 184, 262, 303.
Callippus, i, 136, 268.
Campbell Smith, M., see Smith.
Capek, K., ii, 312.
Carlyle, ii, 329.
Carnap, i, 216, 234, 274; ii, 290 f., 294-6, 308, 316, 352, 357, 359, 362.
Carneades, i, 118, 263, 315.
Carruthers, J., i, 291; ii, 321.
Carus, P., ii, 326, 359.
Cassirer, E., i, 270, 276; ii, 309, 312, 359 f.
Catlin, G. E. G., i, 30, 238 f., 256 f., 292, 316.
Charephon, i, 193, 304, 310.
Chairon, i, 268.
Chaplin, Charlie, ii, 308.
Charicles, i, 268.
Charles, V., ii, 128.
Charrnides, i, 19, 191-3, 303, 310.
Cherniss, H., i, 222, 268.
Chiapelli, A., i, 321.
Chion, i, 136.
Christ, Jesus, i, 88, 104, 117; ii, 24, 257, 272 f., 360, 365.
Cicero, i, 263, 278 f., 300.
Clausewitz, K.., von, ii, 67.
Clearchus, i, 136.
Clenias, i, 224.
Codrus, i, 19, 153, 208, 282.
Cohen, M. R., ii, 293, 295.
Cole, G. D. H., ii, 325, 329, 345 f.
Comte, A., i, 35, 40, 207 f., 220 f.; ii, 87, 144, 197, 212, 298.
Constantine, Emperor, ii, 24, 302 f.
Cope, G., i, 203, 292.
Copernicus, N., i, 319.
Coriscus, i, 268.
Cornford, F. M., i, 210, 212 f., 215, 223 f., 240 f., 250 f., 253, 270
f., 279; ii, 283.
Costelloe, B. F. C., ii, 281.
Grantor, i, 224; ii, 319.
Critias, i, 19, 142, 184, 187, 191-3, 195, 208, 259, 268, 272 f., 294, 299 f; 303 f., 310 f., 317, 324-6; ii, 24, 302, 318.
Grossman, R. H. S., i, 87, 130 f., 133, 139, 169, 216, 246 f., 267, 270, 304) 313, 315; ii, 16, 292 f., 295.
Cyrus the Younger, i, 226, 305.

Dalziel, Margaret, i, page x.
Damon, i, 229 f.
Daniel (Prophet), i, 272.
Darwin, Charles, i, 314, 317; ii, 40, 212, 244.
Davies, J. L., i, 247, 258, 271, 313.
Democritus, i, 12, 185 f., 206, 233, 276, 278 f., 294, 299, 320; ii, 22, 26 f., 54, 299, 304.
Demos, i, 3 11.
Demosthenes, ii, 281.
Descartes, R., ii, 54, 301, 362, 378.
Dickens, C., i, 100 f., 258, 268; ii, 341, Diels, H., i, 204, 206 f., 213, 230, 233, 235, 254, 259, 273, 279, 294, 299-301, 303, 319, 321; ii, 387.
Dilthey, W., ii, 358.
Dio, i, 136, 154, 200, 282, 316 f.
Diogenes, the Cynic, i, 241, 278 f., 282; ii, 299.
Diogenes Laertius, i, 241, 279.
Dionysius (the Elder), i, 18, 43, 283, 297, 304, 311.
Dionysius (the Younger), i, 44, 136, 283, 303, 316.
Dirac, P. A. M., ii, 379.
Djilas, ii, 334.
Dudley, D. R., i, 277.
Duemm1er, F., i, 277.
Duhem, P., ii, 361, 364.
Duns Scotus, ii, 353.
Durkheim, E., i, 175.

Eastman, M., i, 210, 284; ii, 320.
Eckhart, Master, ii, 353.
Eddington, A. S., i, 237; ii, 244, 259, 361, 364.
Einstein, A., ii, 20, 27, 165, 220 f., 266, 289, 325, 360, 364.
Eisler, R., i, 204, an, 227, 233, 242, 254, 256, 272, 282, 321; ii, 365.
Empedocles, i, 208 f., 214, 217 f.; ii, 285.
Empiricus, Sextus, see Sextus.
Engels, F., i, 220; ii, 83, 100, 102, 105, in, 118, 120, 154, 159-62, 164, 171 f., 187 f., 202 f., 205, 223, 318, 320 f., 325, 327-9, 332, 338 f., 341 f., 346, 349 f., 360, 396.
England, E. B., i, 104, 216, 222 f., 259.
Epictetus, i, 279; ii, 301.
Epicurus, ii, 304.
Epimenides, the Cretan, ii, 354.
Estabrooks, G. H., i, 317.
Euclid, i, 249, 251, 267, 319 f., 322.
Euken, W., ii, 346.
Euphacus, i, 268.
Eurastus, i, 268.
Euripides, i, 70, 95, 185, 236, 259, 278 f., 299.
Euthyphro, i, 197, 315.
Ewer, T. K., i, page x.
Ewing, A. C., i, 246.

Falkenberg, R., ii, 304.
Faraday, M., ii, 244.
Farber, M., ii, 298.
Farrington, B., i, 217.
Ferdinand of Austria, ii, 309.
Feuerbach, A., ii, 201, 313, 321 f.
Fichte, I. H., ii, 316.
Fichte, J. G., i, 247, 280; ii, 21, 53-5, 58, 70 f., 81, 305, 307, 312 f., 316, 318, 353.
Field, G. C., i, 88, 208, 210, 214 f., 236, 247, 260, 273, 277, 281, 307, 311, 313; ii, 281, 300.
Findlay, J. N., ii, 356.
Fisher, H. A. L., ii, 197, 350, 366 f.
File, W., i, 217, 313.
Fitzgerald, E., ii, 339.
Ford, H., ii, 341.
Foster, M. B., ii, 311, 365.
Fourier, C., ii, 194, 350.
Fowler, H., i, 326, 328.
Francis I of Austria, ii, 309.
Frederick II of Prussia, i, 276, 304.
Frederick William III of Prussia, ii, 31 f., 34 f., 41, 43, 49, 55, 58, 306 f., 312.
Freud, S., i, 295, 313; ii, 100, 299, 352.
Freyer, A., ii, 64-6, 70, 315 f.
Fried, M., ii, 308.
Friedlein, G., i, 320.
Fries, 1. F., ii, 27, 308.
Fritz, Kurt von, i, 277.

Galiani, Abbe, ii, 350 f.
Galileo, i, 319; ii, 42, 252.
Gandhi, ii, 272.
Gans, E., ii, 304.
Card, Roger Martin du, i, 157, 164, 284; ii, 376.
Gassendi, P., ii, 304.
Gauss, C. F., ii, 16.
Gazzali, AI-, see AI-Gazzali.
Gedye, G. E. R., ii, 337.
Geffken, J., ii, 302.
Gilbert, Sir W. S., ii, 265.
Ginsberg, M., ii, 323.
Glaucon, i, 97-9, 116-18, 150 f., 166, 228, 241, 254, 258, 262 f., 272, 313, 315.
Glockner, H. von, ii, 304.
Gobineau, Count 1. A., i, 9, 203.
Goedel, K., ii, 355 f., 374.
Goethe, ii, 307, 312 f.
Gogarten, F., ii, 76.
Gombrich, E. H., i, page x, 253; ii, 311, 325.
Gomperz, H., ii, 287, 362, 364.
Gomperz, T., i, 88, 187, 214, 224, 228, 236, 246, 257, 259, 276, 299, 301 f., 304 f.; ii, 2, 4, 281, 284-6.
Gorgias, i, 70, 114, 152, 185, 261, 276, 278.
Green, T. H., i, 260; ii, 79.
Greenidge, ii, 283.
Grenfell, B. P., and Hunt, A. S., i, 229.
Grote, G., i, 80, 88, 204, 208, 211, 216, 226, 242, 246 f., 255, 268, 273, 275, 297, 303, 305, 315, 330; ii, 281-3, 288, 300 f.

Haeckel, E., ii, 61, 314.
Haiser, F., ii, 67 f., 315 f.
Haldane, Elizabeth S., ii, 301.
Harris, W. T., ii, 286.
Harvey, W., ii, 252.
Hastie, W., i, 247.
Hatfield, H.
Stafford, ii, 304.
Hayek, F. A. von, i, page x, 207 f., 285 f., 315; ii, 298, 315, 323, 331, 336, 348, 383.
Heath, T., i, 249, 251 f.
Hecker, 1. F., ii, 325, 333.
Hegel, F., i, 10, 17, 40, 107, 121, 144, 161, 203, 207, 221, 232, 238
f., 246 f., 297, 314, 325; ii, 1, 7-9, 16, 21 f., 27-82, 87, 91, 99, 102-4, 107, 111, 115, 133, 197 f., 206, 211 f., 214, 216, 221, 223-6, 247, 249, 257, 271, 274 f., 286 f., 304-320, 325, 327, 330, 336, 339 f., 350, 352 f., 359, 365 f., 393-5.
Hegemann, W., i, 298, 304; ii, 312 f., 317.
Heidegger, M., ii, 76-8, 297, 316 f.
Heiden. K., ii, 28, 393.
Heine, H., ii, 109, 326, 332.
Hempel, C. G., ii, 364.
Heraclidcs, i, 136, 316.
Heraclitus, i, 10-21, 24, 28, 38 f., 42, 55 f., 60, 73, 80, 83, 124, 148, 172 f., 189, 203-9, 214, 216, 232 f., 294 f., 30 I, 312 f.; ii, 27, 30, 36 f., 40, 47, 67, 102, 212, 275 f., 305 f., 325, 353.
Herder, J. G. i, 232, 247, 293; ii, 52, 305, 312.
Hermias, i, 268.
Hermocrates, i, 31 1.
Hermodorus, i, 13.
Herodotus, i, 95, 1 73, 1 85, 222, 233, 255, 294, 299.
Hesiod, i, ii f., 15, 37 f., 55, 153, 188, 204, 209, 211, 218 f., 228, 235, 254, 271, 295.
Hilbert, D., ii, 290.
Hippias, i, 70, 95, 233, 236, 278, 294, 333.
Hippodamus, i, 173, 211, 294 f.
Hobbes, T., i, 1 18, 142, 315; ii, 287, 289, 291, 301.
Hobhouse, L. T., ii, 79.
Homer, i, ii, 204, 226, 228 f., 280, 295, 312, 327; ii, 272, 275.
Hook, S., ii, 339.
Humboldt, W., von, ii, 54, 395.
Hume, D., i, 230, 261; ii, 38, 54, 213, 248, 295, 297, 363.
Hunt, A. S., see Grenfell, 8. P.
Husserl, E., i, 216; ii, 16, 76, 292, 309, 316, 323, 354, 362.
Hutton, H. D., ii, 298.
Huxley, A., i, 121; ii, 357 f.
Huxley, T. H., ii, 284, 322.
Hyndman, H. H., ii, 341.

Inge, W. R., i, 316; ii, 351.
Isocratcs, i, 136, 153 f., 224; ii, 281, 299.

Jamblichus, ii, 302.
Jaspers, K., ii, 76, 78, 317.
Jeans, 1., ii, 244, 358, 364.
Jesus, see Christ.
Joad, C. E. M., i, 87, 246.
John, Saint (the Evangelist), ii, 301.
Johnson, S., ii, 389.
Jowett, 8., i, 261, 295.
Julian the Apostate, ii, 23, 302.
Jung, E., ii, 70, 316.
Justinian, Emperor, ii, 24, 302.

Kafka, F., ii, 245, 359.
Kant, L, i, 1, 73, 102, 139, 152, 202, 232, 237, 246 f., 256 f., 270, 276, 284, 293, 325, 334, 336; ii, 15, 21, 33, 38-41, 44 f., 52-4, 65, 78, 107, 213 f., 224, 229, 238, 247-50, 297, 299, 307-9, 312-14, 332, 352 f., 357, 359 f., 362, 382, 385, 393-5.
Kapp, von, ii, 163.
Katz, D., ii, 323.
Kaufmann, E., ii, 70, 316.
Kautsky, K., i, 230; ii, 323, 341.
Keeling, S. V., i, 314.
Keller, A., ii, 241, 358.
Kelsen, H., i, 217, 284, 313.
Kepler, J., i, 319; ii, 27, 377.
Kierkegaard, S., ii, 200 f., 273, 275, 306, 350 f., 365 f.
King, C. C., ii, 389.
Kirchhoff, i, 299.
Kirk, G. S., i, 312.
Kleist, H. von, ii, 382.
Kolnai, A., i, 230; ii, 71 f., 78, 315-17, 359.
Kraft, J., i, 269; ii, 292, 316, 336.
Kraus, K., ii, 334, 337.
Krieck, E., ii, 72, 316, Krohn, A., i, 257.
Kuratowski, K., i, 232.

Lagarde, P. de (Boetticher), ii, 76.
Laird, 1., ii, 354.
Lakatos, I., ii, 294.
Lamarck, J. B., ii, 212.
Lamb, W. R. M., i, 335.
Langford, E. H., ii, 354.
Larsen, H., i, page x.
Lassalle, F. von, i, 203, 208.
Laurat, L., ii, 332, 339-42, 351.
Lauwerys, J. A., i, 325.
Lenin, V. I., i, 160, 167; ii, 83, 102, 108 f., 118, 166, 179, 188, 318, 320 f., 325, 328, 338, 341, 343 f., 350, 360.
Lenz, F., ii, 70, 316.
Leptines, i, 136.
Lessing, G. E., ii, 312.
Leucippus, i, 206.
Levinson, R. 8., i, 323-42.
Lewis, Sinclair, i, 316.
Liddell, H. G., and Scott, R., i, 327, 341.
Lindsay, A. D. (Lord), i, 221, 271, 275-7, 288.
Lippmann, W., i, 203; ii, Motto, 81, 128, 330.
Livy, i, 294.
Locke, J., ii, 54, 287, 295, 301, 304, 362.
Loewe, A., ii, 351.
Loewenberg, 1., ii, 286, 304 f., 307.
Loyola, I, Saint, ii, 257, 361.
Lucian, i, 205.
Lucretius, ii, 304.
Ludendorff, General von, ii, 70, 316.
Lummer, 0., ii, 364.
Luther, Martin, ii, 201, 351.
Lutoslawski, W., i, 312.
Lybyer, A. H., i, 227.
Lycophron, i, 70, 76, 95, 114-17, 152, 185, 236, 241, 261 f., 273, 278, 294, 315; ii, 282, 309.
Lycurgus, i, 256.
Lysander, i, 184, 304.
Lysias, i, 296.

Mabbott, J. D., i, page x, 211.
Macaulay, T. B. (Lord), i, 264.
Machiavelli, N., i, 221, 230; ii, 322, 324.
Maclver, R. M., i, 216.
Macleod, W. C., i, 230.
Macmurray, 1., ii, 243 f., 269, 273, 358, 365.
MacTaggart, John MacT. E., i, 314; ii, 29, 358.
Magee, B., i, page x, 210, 286; ii, 321, 334.
Malebranche, ii, 299.
Malinowski, ii, 321.
Malthus, T. R., i, 314.
Mannheim, H., i, 288.
Mannheim, K., ii, 213, 336, 351 f.
Marinelli, W., i, 252.
Martensen, Bishop, ii, 365.
Martin du Card, R., see Gard.
Marx, K., i, pages viii, ix, 9 f., 38-40, 164, 203, 216, 220 f., 241; ii.
i, 61, 81-9, 93 f., 98-128, 130, 133-136, 138-50, 152-5, 159, 164, 166, 190, 193 f., 196-205, 207 f., 211 f., 214, 224, 241, 252-5, 274, 315, 317-20, 321-3, 325-51, 360, 396.
Masaryk, T. G., ii, 51, 312, 318
Matthew, Saint, ii, 358.
Meltetus, i, 268.
Mendelssohn, M., ii, 307, 360.
Menger, A., ii, 321.
Monger, K., i, 234; ii, 290, 324.
Metz, R., ii, 79.
Meyer, E., i, 180 f., 207 f., 214, 255, 265, 268, 283, 295-301, 303
f., 316; ii, 68, 316, 364.
Miksch, L., ii, 346 f.
Milford, P., i, 298.
Mill, James, i, 264; ii, 348.
Mill, 1. S., i, 29, 35, 40, 216, 221, 246, 263 f., 316; ii, 54, 87-9, 91-
3, 97, 99, 101, 104, 106, 197, 212, 298, 320, 322-4.
Miller, D. W., i, page x.
Mitchell, A., ii, 307.
Moeller van den Bruck, A., ii, 76.
Mohammed, ii, 256 f.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, ii, 305.
Moore, G. E., ii, 295.
Morgenthau, H. J., i, 260 f.
Morrow, G. R., i, 225, 247.
Mueller, A., ii, 54, 79.
Muirhead, J. H., ii, 281.
Mure, G. R. G., ii, 289.

Nagel, E., ii, 293, 295.
Napoleon I, i, 63 f.; ii, 51, 54, 58, 312.
Napoleon III, ii, 206.
Nelson, Leonard, i, 232, 265, 269.
Nestle, W., i, 205.
Neurath, O., i, 325.
Newton, Isaac, i, 319; ii, 27, 252, 266, 362 f., 377.
Nicolovius, ii, 313.
Nietzsche, F. von, i, 230, 284; ii, 381 f.
North (translator of Plutarch's Lives), ii, 283.

Oedipus, i, 22.
Offenbach. 1., ii, 32.
Ogden, C. K., ii, 364.
Old Oligarch, i, 187, 195, 198, 222, 278, 294, 299, 304, 325; ii, 50.
Oppenheimer, F., i, 230.
Osborn, H. F., ii, 285.

Paine, Thomas, i, 73.
Pareto, V., i, 38, 199, 223, 315 f.; ii, 23, 56, 58, 138, 278, 302, 313, 315, 324.
Paris, i, 326.
Parkes, H. B., ii, 158, 183, 186, 339, 341, 344, 348-51.
Parmenides, i, 12, 14, 21, 28 f., 21 i f., 214, 236, 275 f., 301, 312, 314; ii, 287, 353.
Pascal, B., ii, 54.
Pasteur, L., ii, 252.
Patroclus, i, 327.
Paul, C., and Paul, E., ii, 318.
Paul, Saint, ii, 301.
Perdiccas III, i, 268.
Pericles, i, 7, 42, 95 f., 102, 105, 181, 185-7, 189, 197, 199, 203, 221, 228, 230, 255, 258, 299, 339-41; ii, 22.
Phaedrus, i, 327.
Phaleas of Chalcedon, i, 173, 294.
Philip II of Macedonia, ii, 2.
Philo Judaeus, i, 205.
Philodemus, i, 278.
Pilate (Pontius), ii, 272, 369.
Pindar, i, 69, 77, 233, 236, 241, 262.
Plato, i, pages viii, ix, x, 7, 10-12, 14, 16-22, 24-57, 59, 67-70, 72-
84, 86-109, 115-21, 123, 125-8, 130-157, 161, 164-7, 169-71, 180, 184, 186 f., 191 f., 194-200, 202-31, 233, 235 f., 240-59, 261-3, 265-284, 292 f., 295 f, 298-317, 319-343; ii, 1-7, 9-13, 15, 21, 23 f., 26 f., 30 f., 35-7, 40 f., 44-6, 50-52, 61, 66, 69, 81
f., 92, 116, 118, 133, 162, 197, 211 f., 227, 229, 236, 245, 249
f., 267, 277, 281-9, 299-302, 305 f., 310, 312 f., 318 f., 322, 324, 326-8, 334, 353, 357, 359-61.
Plutarch, i, 243, 248, 250, 254, 296; ii, 283.
Poincare, H., i, 237; ii, 361.
Polanyi, K., i, 216; ii, 323.
Polybius, ii, 302.
Popper, K. R., i, 3, 205, 210 f., 216, 227, 232, 234, 237, 264, 266, 274, 285 f., 291, 293, 300, 319-21, 323-43, 330-5; ii, 212, 260, 262, 289, 291, 295-8, 308, 320 f., 323 f., 326 f., 335 f., 351 f., 358, 361-4, 369, 373 f., 376, 378, 394.
Popper-Lynkeus, J., i, 294; ii, 321.
Pound, Roscoe, i, 210, 284, 286.
Pringsheim, E., ii, 364.
Proclus, i, 249, 320
Prodicus, i, 228.
Protagoras, i, 57, 61, 65-7, 76 f., 142, 185, 189 f., 228, 233, 235, 241, 255, 262, 294.
Proudhon, ii, 123.
Pseudo-Plutarch, i, 236.
Pseudo-Xenophon, see Old Oligarch.
Pyrilampes, i, 311.
Pythagoras, i, 15, 129, 188, 248 f., 301; ii, 353, 360.

Quetelet, I. AJ., ii, 345.
Quine, W. van 0., i, 232; ii, 376.

Rader, M. M., i, 300; ii, 316.
Ramsey, F. P., ii, 9.
Raven, J. E., ii, 312.
Rayleigh, Lord, ii, 364.
Renan, E., i, 230; ii, 314.
Ricardo, D., ii, 170-2, 344, 346, 349.
Richards, 1. A., ii, 364.
Rickert, H., ii, 364.
Ritter, C., i, 322.
Robespierre, M., ii, 109.
Robinson, R., i, -page x, 332, 339, 342, 345.
Rodman, H. M., ii, 394.
Rogers, A. K., i, 210, 307.
Rosenberg, A., ii, 71, 73, 316.
Rosenkranz, K. von, ii, 304.
Ross, W. D., ii, 282, 288, 292, 301.
Rousseau, 1. J., i, 40, 121, 221, 223, 246, 257, 293; ii, 37, 40, 44 f., 52, 55, 74, 81, 91, 109, 305, 309, 312.
Russell, B. (Lord), i, 131, 233, 274; ii, 55, 128, 212, 247, 293, 297, 304, 330 f., 355, 359.
Russell, L. J., i, 234 f.; ii, 328, 357, 383.
Rustow, A., i, 204.
Ryazanow, D., ii, 318.

Sachs, E., i, 321.
Salomon, E. von, ii, 317, 359.
Sanazzaro, Jacob, i, 221, 246.
Sandys, J. E., i, 300.
Santayana, G., i, 316.
Schallmeyer, W., i, 317; ii, 61, 315.
Scheffler, 1. (Angelus Silesius), ii, 359.
Scheler, M., ii, 70, 76, 213, 316
Schelling, F. W., ii, 21, 28, 53, 305, 353.
Schiller, F. C. S., i, 334, ii, 305, 313, 395.
Schlegel, F., ii, 305.
Schleiermacher, F. E. D., ii, 305.
Schlick, M., ii, 294, 298.
Schneeberger, G., ii, 316.
Schopenhauer, A., ii, 21, 27 f, 32-5, 38, 41, 54, 61, 63, 70, 77, 79
f., 82, 261, 275, 299, 304, 306-8, 313, 315, 31?, 362, 365 f., 381, 393.
Schwarzschild, L., ii, 396.
Schwegler, F. C. A., ii, 33 f., 306.
Scott, R., see Liddell, H. G.
Scott, R. F., Capt., ii, 74.
Sextus Empiricus, ii, 363.
Shakespeare, W., i, 246, 294; ii, 32, 283.
Shaw, G. B., i, 246, 294; ii, 62, 232 f., SIS.
Shelley, P. B., i, 153.
Sherrington, C., i, 233, 258 f.
Shorey, P., i, 327, 334-6, 338.
Sibree, 1., ii, 286, 311.
Sidgwick, H., ii, 361.
Simkhovitch, V. G., i, 298.
Simkin, C. G. F., i, page x, 211, 285; ii, 348, 350.
Simmel, G., i, 216.
Simplicius, i, 214, 247; ii, 299.
Smith, A., ii, 170, 187, 346, 349.
Smith, J., ii, 305.
Smith, M. Campbell, i, 270, 276.
Socrates, i, 18, 29 f., 34, 42, 52, 61, 66 f., 69, 72, 76, 95, 97-9, 104-
106, 109, 116 f., 128-34, 137-9, 143 f., 150-2, 154-6, 166, 185, 188-97, 199 f., 210, 214 f., 221 f., 229, 233, 235, 237, 241, 254-6, 259, 262 f., 266-8, 272 f., 277-9, 282 f., 296, 299, 300-
14, 317, 321 f., 330-2; ii, 21-3, 42, 224, 227, 236, 244, 276, 283, 301, 303, 313, 353, 361.
Solon, i, 19, 60, 208.
Sophocles, i, 185, 299.
Spearman, D., i, 343.
Spencer, H., i, 35.
Spengler, 0., i, 55, 231 f., 280; ii, 71, 76, 197, 316 f.
Speusippus, i, 217, 235; ii, 5, 36, 285.
Spinoza, B. de, i, 260; ii, 54, 305, 307, 353
Stafford Hatfield, H., see Hatfield.
Stapel, W., ii, 72, 76, 316.
Stebbing, L. S., ii, 358.
Stem, G. B., i, 284.
Stevenson, C. L., i, 247.
Stewart, J. A., i, 292.
Stirling, 1. H., ii, 27, 29, 33 f., 306.
Strabo, i, 268; ii, 302.

Tam, W. W., i, 224, 236, 278 f., 281, 299.
Tarski, A., i, 216, 234, 273 f.; ii, 290, 294, 356, 362, 369 f., 373 f., 376.
Taylor, A. E., i, 153, 204, 210, 215, 224 f., 244 f., 262, 282, 284, 303-8, 311 f., 330; ii, 283.
Teutames, i, 13.
Thales, i, 204.
Theaetetus, i, 321 f.
Theages, i, 154.
Themis, i, 253 f.
Themistocles, i, 178.
Theophrastus, i, 212, 214; ii, 299.
Theopompus, ii, 299, 301.
Theramenes, i, 303.
Thomas Aquinas, i, 237, 316; ii, 237.
Thrasybulus, i, 192.
Thrasymaehus, i, 69, 105 f., 116-18, 184, 262 f., 303.
Thucydides, i, 95, 178-81, 183-5, 187, 192, 221, 228, 255 f., 283, 295 f., 299.
Timoehares, i, 254.
Toequeville, A. de, i, 159, 286.
Townsend, 1., ii, 200, 300.
Toynbee, A. 1., i, 221, 226 f., 230-2, 268, 294 f., 298; ii, 23, 251-8, 301-3, 358, 360 f., 366 f.
Treitsehke, H. von, ii, 65, 76, 315.
Twain, M., i, 270.

Ueberweg, F., i, 205, 321.
Urey, H. c., ii, 374.

Vaughan, C. E., i, 247, 258, 271, 313; ii, 311.
Veblen, T., i, 231.
Vieo, G., i, 221; ii, 306.
Vierkandt, A., i, 216.
Viner, J., i, page x, 314; ii, 321, 344, 347 f.
Voltaire, i, 293, 304; ii, 205.

Wagner, Richard, i, 230; ii, 32, an.
Waismann, F., ii, 299.
Wallace, W., ii, 304.
Wallas, G., i, 203.
Webb, L., ii, 358.
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, i, 210; ii, 320.
Weber, Alfred, ii, 351.
Weber, Max, i, 216; ii, 97, 292, 324, 364.
Weber (translator of Vico), ii, 300.
Wells, H. G., i, 258; ii, 351, 357.
White, Morton, G., ii, 364.
Whitehead, A. N., ii, 231, 247-50, 305, 506, 359.
Wiener, N., i, 232.
Wilde, O..ii, 388.
Wilson, Woodrow, ii, 50 f., 318.
Winckelmann. 1. J., ii, 312.
Wing, M., ii, 396.
Winspear, A. D., i, 217, 267, 315.
Wisdom, 1., ii, 351.
Wittgenstein, L., i, 205, 234; ii, 9, id, 20, 246, 287, 293 f., 296-9, 316, 351, 353, 355 f., 358 f., 366.

Xenocrates, i, 268.
Xenophanes, i, 15, 189, 214, 235, 295, 312; ii, 285, 387.
Xenophon (for Pseudo-Xenophon, see Old Oligarch), i, 241, 273, 277, 283, 303, 305-7, 311; ii, 283.

'Younger Socrates', The, i, 329.

Zeller, E., i, 204 f., 217; ii, 7, 281 f., 284-6.
Zeno, i, 276.
Ziegler, H. O., ii, 79, 317.
Zimmern, Sir Arthur, ii, 62, 312, 314-16, 318.
Zinovief. G. c., ii, 331.
Zinsser, H., i, 298; ii, 25, 270, 304

[admin]

Index Of Subjects

Italicized page-numbers indicate that the reference is of special importance. The letter t, which stands for ‘term’, placed after a page number, indicates that the meaning of the term in question is discussed. There is an Index of Platonic Passages at the end of the first volume.

Abolitionism, evidence for its existence in Plato’s time, see
slavery.
absolutism, ii, 377, 385, 391.
Abstract society, i, 174t, 175, 176;
(see also concrete group).
abstraction, ii, 245-6.
Academy, Plato’s, i, 18, 42, 136, 235, 248, 253, 268, 316-17.
Aestheticism, i, 165t, 167, 292, ii, 302;
of Plato, i, 78, 145, 165;
(see also ‘canvas-cleaning’).
aesthetics, i, 230, 292, ii, 210, 211, 302, 365-6;
and ethics, i, 65, 165, 2 f)2, ii, 210, 557;
and mysticism, ii, 243, 246.
alogos, i, 320.
altruism, i, 100-2, ii, 275, 277;
(see also individualism; egoism).
anamnesis, i, 219t.
anarchism, ii, 328, 334.
antinomies, Kant’s, ii, 38-9, 308;
(see also paradox).
archaism, ii, 251t, 360, 361.
arguing, argument, ii, 13, 16-17, 225, 238, 242, 247, 249, 252, 289.
aristocracy, Plato on, i, 222, 283.
Aristotle, ii, 1-7, ch. 11 (I), 281, 284-285, 301;
critic of Plato, ii, 2, 3, 281;
cynicism of, i, 273, 296;
influence of, i, 236, ii, 4, 7, 27, 283;
Plato’s influence on, i, 217, ii, 11, 282, 285.
arithmetic, see number; irrational numbers; geometry; Plato, the
mathematician.
arrest of change, see change, Plato’s theory of arrest of.
arrested societies, i, 55, 224, 232, 268;
(see also Sparta).
astrology, i, 210, 244 (cp. ii, 279).
atheism, Plato on, i, 331.
Athens, i, 46, 177-83, ch. 10(II), 228, 256, 325 f., 334;
bias against, i, 228, 296-7, ch. 10, 11, 15;
School of Hellas, i, 181, 186;
Athenian movement against slavery, see slavery;
Society of Friends of Laconia, i, 179, 180, 183, 187.
atomism, atoms, i, 250, 251, ii, 324;
and hedonism, ii, 304;
and individualism, ii, 314, 315.
autarky, see self-sufficiency.
authoritarian theory of knowledge, ii, 373, 377-8.
authoritarianism, i, 66, 71, 72, 129, 159, ii, 284;
medieval, ii, 25, 30;
of Plato, i, 134, 136;
Socrates on, i, 129-30.
autochthonous, see myth of the earthborn.
Babbitt (S. Lewis), i, 316.
biological theory of the state, see organic.
Black Death, ii, 25.
Brave New World (A. Huxley), i, 121, ii, 357 (cp. ii, 227).
breakdown of societies, see closed society.
breeding, Plato’s theory of, i, 51-3, 82-3, 228, 245, 276, 281, 283,
331, 336-8.
(see also class mixture; racialism). ‘bucket theory of mind’, ii,
214t, 260, 361.
(see also ‘searchlight theory of science’).
budgeting, i, 285, ii, 132.
‘canvas-cleaning’, i, 166t-167, 200, 292, 328, 336; ii, 94.
capitalism, i, 287; ii, 111t-115, 120, 135, 153-4, 183, 186, 191,
330, 335;
state capitalism, ii, 334, 335t;
unrestrained capitalism, ii, 117t, 122, 124, 169, 327t, 335;
disappearance of, ii, 125, 140-1, 335, 339.
Carthage, i, 297-8.
categorical apparatus, ii, 214t, 220.
categorical imperative, see golden rule.
causal explanation, see explanation.
causality, ii, 262-3, 363;
(see also explanation).
certainty, quest for, ii, 375.
change, i, 314, ii, 212;
Heraclitus’ theory of, i, 12, 14, 204, 205;
(see also flux);
arrest of, Plato’s theory of, i, 21, ch. 3(III), 37, 38, 86, 146,
218, ch. 4, n. 3, 268, 318;
and rest, Plato on, 36, 37, ch. 4 (I), 276, 317;
(see also decay; flux);
problem of start of, i, 39, 81, 219, 220;
Aristotle on, ii, 4, 5, 7, 285, 286;
Hegel on, i, 314-15;
(see also dialectics, Hegel).
checks and balances, theory of, i, 122t, 263-4, ii, 162;
(see also democratic control).
Chosen People, doctrine of the, i, 8-9, 203, 300, ii, 22, 252-3;
(see also tribalism, Jewish; historicism, Jewish).
Christ, ii, 272-3, 357;
interpretation of His own teaching, ii, 24;
and worldly success, ii, 257, 272-3.
Christianity, i, 65, 102, 104, 117, 235, ii, 243, 251, 256, 357, 361;
history of, ii, 21-6, ch. 11 (III), 301-4;
humanitarian, see ethics, Christian;
totalitarian and tribal, ii, 76, 242, 300, 303, 310;
vs. historicism, ii, 272-3, 279;
vs. slavery and private property, i, 241, ii, 254, 301;
Marx’s influence on modern Christianity, ii, 201, 255.
Christians in the Class Struggle (G. Cope), i, 203, 292, ch. 9, n.
12;
(see also liquidation).
civilization, i, page v, i, 317, ii, 194;
(see also western civilization);
the cross of civilization, ii, 245;
(see also strain of civilization).
clarity, ii, 218, 239, 296, 307, 357;
(see also language).
class, classes, historicist theory of society, i, 38-41;
Aristotle on, ii, 282-4.—Marx on, i, 40, ii, 111;
class consciousness, ii, 112, ch. 16(I), 115-16;
class dictatorship, ii, 120, 122, 157, 162, 328;
(see also capitalism);
class interests, ii, 112, 114;
class struggle, ii, 111-13, ch. 16(II), 116, 120;
middle class, ii, 146-7;
Plato’s theory of, i, 46-7, 87, 106, 258;
class distinction, i, 46, 49, 90, 148, 225;
mixture of classes, i, 49, 82, 141, 225, 272;
(see also breeding);
class privileges, i, 51, 86, 90, 119, 227, 259, 267;
(see also Sparta);
ruling class, i, 49, 54, ch. 4 (IV).
class war, i, 38, ii, 116;
(see also human cattle; human watch-dog; working
class; slavery).
classless society, i, 46, ii, 137-9, 333-4, ch. 18 (II), n. 4.
closed society, the, i, I, 57t, 108, 173, 190, 195, 200, 202t, 232,
294, 295, ii, 22, 75, 94;
(see also arrested societies);
breakdown of, i, 177, 198, 232, 294t, 295.
‘clue to history’, the, ii, 269, 274, ch. 25 (IV);
(see also philosophy of history).
collectivism, i, 9t, 100-1, 203, 258t, ii, 57, 81, 226, 246, 322, 326;
(see also egoism; holism; utilitarianism, collectivist);
Hegel, ii, 45, 57, 69-70, 99, 310, 315;
Mannheim, ii, 336;
Marx, ii, 99, 319;
Plato, i, 80, 102-3, 106, 108, 324 f.
collectivist morality, i, 107-8;
(see also ethics, totalitarian).
collectivist planning, i, 2, 285, ii, 357.
commerce, i, 176, 177, 295; (cp. i, 184, 187, 283).
common meals, i, 48, 259.
communism, Athenian, i, 315;
early Christian, i, 241, ii, 254, 301;
Marx, i, 241, ii, 254, 321;
Plato, i, 48, 102, 104, 221, 259, 315;
(see however plutocracy);
Pythagorean maxim, i, 104, 241, 259;
Russian, ii, 83, 360.
communists, communist parties, ii, 144, 152, 158, 164-5, 190-2,
339, 340, 341.
community, ii, 98;
(see also collectivism; communism; concrete group).
competition, ii, 330;
under capitalism, see economics.
compromise, i, 159, ii, 143, 155, 163, 191, 236.
concrete group, i, 175;
(see also abstract society). ‘conspiracy theory of society’, ii,
94t, 95, 101, 133, 330.
Constitution of Athens (‘ Old Oligarch’), i, 187, 322.
contradictions, i, 205, ii, 39, 249-50;
(see also antinomies; logic; paradox).
control, see democratic control; institutions; checks and balances.
conventionalism, critical or ethical, see dualism of facts and
decisions;
naive, i, 14-15, 60t;
religious, of Plato, i, 77-8, 141-2;
in science, i, 237t, ii, 259, 260, 364.
correspondence with the facts, ii, 369-95.
corruption, cosmic law of, i, 19, 20, 35, 40, 209, 210, 217, 218,
222-3;
(see also decay).
cosmology, Ionian, i, 204;
Heraclitus, i, 12-13, 204-5;
Plato, i, 19-20, 26-8, 211-13;
(see also i, 248-53, ch. 6, n. 9; ideas; geometry).
cosmopolitanism in Greece, i, 185, 236, 216, 278, 279, 281, 299;
(see also unity of mankind).
credit, see money.
Credo (K. Earth), i, 235, ii, 272.
Crete, i, 228.
criterion, criteria, ii, 371-5, 382.
critical conventionalism or critical dualism, see dualism of facts
and decisions.
critical rationalism, see rationalism, criticism, critical method,
critical discussion, i, page v, 129, 186, 222, ii, 238, 239, 360,
376, 378-81, 386-7, 390;
(see also arguing; rationalism);
and education, i, 130, 135, ii, 209, 284;
Plato on, i, 53, 86, 229, 267, 268, 270, 275, 276-7, 298, ii,
310;
Socrates on, i, 129, 130;
and politics, see politics;
rational and scientific, ii, 218, 221, 222, 238, 284, 322;
rational tradition of, i, 188, 300.
crucial experiment, ii, 12, 266, 364.
Crusoe, see Robinson.
Cultural frontiers of Western Europe, ii, 353.
cynics, i, 236, 277, 279, 282, n. 22.
dark ages, i, 200, ii, 303.
Darwinism, i, 317, ii, 61.
decay, Plato’s theory of, i, 19, 20, 36, 37, 55, 76, 217;
(see also change; corruption; cosmology);
arrest of, i, 20-1, ch. 3 (II), 37.
decisions, moral, i, 61, 62, 64, ii, 232-234, 240, 380-1, 383;
(see also dualism of facts and decisions; responsibility).
Decline of the West (O. Spengler), i, 55, 231-2, ch. 4, n. 45.
definition, i, 31-4, ch. 3 (VI), ii, 10, 11, 16, 21;
(see also methodological essentialism);
implicit, ii, 296t.
demand, political, see language, of political demands and
proposals.
demarcation between metaphysics and science, problem of, ii, 293,
297t-8 (cp. ii, 260; see also refutability).
democracies, smaller, see smaller democracies.
democracy, i, 4, 124-51, 127, 189, ii, 151-2, 160-11, ch. 19 (V);
Athenian, i, 178-83;
Marx and Marxists on, ii, 120, 122, 157-9, 161, 163, 164,
341, 343;
‘Old Oligarch’ on, i, 187-8;
Pericles on, i, 42, 95, 186;
Plato on, i, 40-3, 123, 221, 254-6, ch. 6, n. 14;
Socrates on, i, 305.
and critical rationalism, i, 130;
and party politics, ii, 162-3;
and scientific development, ii, 322.
democratic control, i, 123-5, ch. 7 (II), 127, ii, 127, 129, 131, 132,
139, 143, 151, 331;
(see also checks and balances; interventionism).
description, scientific and historical, ii, 261, ch. 25 (I).
despair of reason, ii, 231, 256, 279.
determinism, ii, 85, 210, 305, 321;
sociological and historical, ii, 87, 101, 208, 211;
(see also sociologism; historicism).
dialectics;
of Hegel, ii, 28, 371-39, 42, 309, 340;
Jewish, ii, 301;
Marx, ii, 88, 102, 138, 319, 320, 334, 340;
Plato, i, 133, 274-5, ii, 11.
dictator, theory of the benevolent, i, 159-60, 264, 316, ch. 10, n. 69
(cp. i. 123).
dictatorship, see tyranny.
Dike, i, 254.
division of labour, i, 173;
Marx on, ii, 319;
Plato on, i, 78, 90, 226, ii, 319;
modern opposition to, ii, 241, 358.
dogmatism, ii, 239, 249;
reinforced, ii, 40, 215t-216, 241, 297, 298.
domination and submission, Hegel’s theory of, ii, 8t, 276, 286-7.
Dorian conquest, the, see nomads.
dualism in Plato’s philosophy, ch. 5 (IX), 84-5, 103-4, 279.
dualism of body and mind, ii, 102-3, 107-10, 333-4.
dualism of facts and decisions or critical dualism, i, 60t-1, 73, 211,
234-5, ch. 5 (III), n. 5, 239, 334; ii, 233, 278-9, 383-5, 391-3,
394-5 (cp. ii, 209).
economics, i, 173, ii, 29, 96, 97, 174-5, 196, 335, 339, 348;
(see also money);
capital, accumulation, concentration, centralization of, ii, 106,
136, 146, 147, 153, 166-8, ch. 20 (I), 180, 183, 185-6,
194, 329, 338t;
competition, ii, 140, 146-7, 166, 167, 169, 174, 175, 183,
330, 346;
falling rates of profits, ii, 183-5, ch. 20 (V), 196, 349, 350;
human metabolism, ii, 103-4, 106, 107, 112, 133, 137 (cp. ii,
333-4);
industrial reserve army, ii, 168, 175, 180, 186, 330;
law of increase of misery and wealth, ii, 123, 136, 146, 148,
155, 156, 159, 168, 169, 178, 179, 189, 190, 330;
means of production, ii, 135, 326;
production relations and conditions, ii, 106, 113, 194, 326, ch.
15, n. 13, 329, 330, 333;
surplus population and wages, ii, 176, 179, ch. 20 (III), 346;
theory of value, ii, 170-7, ch. 20 (II), 329, 335, 344-5 n. 10;
trade cycles, ii, 166, 168, 179-82, ch. 20 (IV), 194-6, 330,
348;
two kinds of capital, ii, 184, 348-9, ch. 20, n. 33;
(see also money; division of labour; capitalism; Marx).
economism, ii, 104t, 107.
education, i, 135, ii, 209, 275-8, 283-284, ch. 11, n. 6;
new principle of, ii, 276;
new principle of liberal education in universities, ii, 284;
Aristotle’s influence on, ii, 283;
Aristotle on, ii, 3, 4;
Frederick William III on, ii, 34-5;
English, i, 316, ii, 284;
Greek, i, 53, 130-1;
Marx on, ii, 141;
Plato’s influence on, i, 54, 148 (cp. i, 227);
Plato on, i, 47, 49, 51-2, 133-4, ch. 7 (V), 142, 147, 221, 227,
228, 258, 267-269, 328 f.; ii, 227;
Socrates on, i, 129-30, 133;
state control of, i, 103, 111, 130-1;
totalitarian, i, 54, 103.
egoism, i, 100, 101, 104;
(see also collectivism; utilitarianism, collectivist).
Egypt, i, 224, 231, 275, ii, 319, 325.
elections, general, i, 124-5, ii, 129, 151, 160, 331;
(see also paradox, of democracy; of sovereignty).
empiricism, ii, 213-14, 224, 352, 362, 378.
ends and means, i, 161, 286-7, ch. 9, n. 6.
Engels, change of front and new tactics, ii, 159, 160, 162, 188;
dogmatism of, ii, 327, 332, 342;
on man’s emancipation, ii, 105.
engineering, i, 68, 163, ii, 85, 222, 263, 324;
social, see social engineering.
England, ii, 140, 182, 331;
(see also education);
Haeckel on, ii, 314;
Hegel on, ii, 57, 64, 313, 314, 330 (cp. ii, 34);
Marx, Engels and Lenin on, ii, 135-6, 154-5, 187-8, 328, 338,
340, 341.
Enlightenment, the, i, 333 f.; ii, 303.
entelechy, ii, 6t, 286.
equalitarianism, i, 69, 70, 95, ch. 6 (IV), 235, ch. 5, n. 6, 284, ch. 9,
n. 2;
in Greece, i, 46, 69, 70, 95, 186, 236, 261, 278, 299;
(see also slavery, Athenian movement for abolition of);
Plato’s standard objection to and Rousseau’s reply, i, 256-7,
ch. 6, n. 20 (cp. ii, 44);
Kant’s, i, 256;
and rationalism, ii, 234-6.
equality, ii, 234, 278, 357;
arithmetical and geometrical, i, 248, 250, 262;
before the law, i, 89, 96, 254, 255, ii. 234.
Eros, i, 211, 218.
escapism, i, 238, 314, ii, 139, 243, 256-7, 360, 361.
esotericism, ii, 241, 299.
essence, i, 29, 31, ii, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13;
(see also essentialism; definition, methodological
essentialism);
Aristotle, ii, 6, 9-12, 288, 289, 362;
Hegel, ii, 36;
Heidegger, ii, 77;
Marx, ii, 107, 177, 319, 326, 328, 329, 346, 347;
Plato, i, 28-30, 74, 75, 200;
Socrates, i, 29-30;
(see however ii, 301).
essentialism, ii, 9-21;
(see also methodological essentialism).
ethics, morals, morality, equalitarian, humanitarian and Christian,
i, 65, 66, 73, 335, ch. 5, n. 6, 257, 263, ii, 151, 200;
totalitarian collectivist and tribalist, i, 101-3, 107-8, 112-113,
139, 256, 258, 325, 331, 339 f.; ii, 44, 52, 65-76, 310,
314;
historicist, ii, 202t, 205-6, 255;
(see also historicism, and ethics);
and aesthetics, i, 65, 165, 292, ii, 210, 357;
and politics, i, 113, 139, 260;
and religion, see religion;
and science, ii, 233, 238, 243-4;
‘scientific’, i, 237, ch. 5, n. 18;
see also dualism of facts and decisions; naturalism;
positivism; relativism; futurism; utilitarianism; ends and
means; pain and pleasure.
evolutionism, i, 40, ii, 322 (cp. i, 314; see also progressivism);
fascist, ii, 61-2;
of Hegel, i, 314, ii, 36-7;
of Speusippus and Aristotle, ii, 5, 285, ch. 11, n. 11.
existentialism, ii, 76-7, 380-1.
exogamy, rules of, ii, 89t.
experiment, ii, 218, 220, 233, 238;
crucial, ii, 12, 266, 364;
social, i, 162, 163, 167;
(see also planning; social engineering; social science).
explanation, ii, 210 f., 362-4, ch. 25, n. 7;
causal, i, 210 f., ii, 262-3, 362-4;
historical, ii, 263t, 266, 364.
exploitation, ii, 122-4, 168, 173, 178, 184, 329;
colonial, Marxist hypothesis of, ii, 187-9, ch. 20 (VI), 336,
338.
faith in reason, i, 185, ii, 231t, 233, 243, 246, 258.
fallibilism, ii, 374, 375, 377.
falsifiability, see refutability.
fame and fate, Heraclitean and Hegelian philosophy of, i, 171, ii,
8t, 71-2, 276-7.
fascism, ii, 30-1, 60-78;
(see also nationalism; racialism);
attitude of Marxist parties towards, 162-4, ch. 19 (VI), 336-7,
343-4.
feudalism (used in the metaphorical sense of landed
proprietorship), ii, 3, 30, 113, 135, 345.
Fichte, the father of German nationalism, ii, 53-4, 71;
and Kant, ii, 54, 313, ch. 12, n. 58.
fire, Heraclitus’ theory of, i, 14, 15, 73, 206-7, ch. 2, n. 7, 212.
flux, Heraclitus’ theory of, i, 12, 189, 204-7, ch. 2, n. 2, 208, 211,
214, 217, 300, 301, 314, ii, 36, 249.
forms, see ideas.
freedom, ii, 126-9, ch. 17 (V);
limitations of, i, 110-11, 247, 131, ii, 44, 331;
(see also paradox of freedom);
Hegel on, ii, 56, 72;
Marx on, ii, 101, 103, 105, 207;
(see also freedom, merely formal);
Spinoza on, ii, 305;
merely formal, ii, 57, 124t, 127, 173, 199, 314, ch. 12, n. 62,
330, 341, 346 (cp. ii, 207);
of criticism, ii, 238 (cp. ii, 220, 222);
of thought and speech, Plato against, i, 267, 268, 270, 275;
(see also state, state censorship; education);
Hegel on, ii, 42-3, 305, 310.
French Revolution, the, i, 17, 203, 208, 294, 334; ii, 30, 52, 53, 55,
87, 207;
Heine on, ii, 109.
funeral oration of Pericles, i, 186, 255, ch. 6, n. 16.
futurism, moral; ii, 206t-208, 271, 274;
aesthetic, i, 230.
general will, ii, 52, 81.
geometrical theory of the world, i, 248-53, 320, 343.
geometry, Plato’s, i, 248-53, ch. 6, n. 9, 267, 319-20;
vs. arithmetic, i, 248.
German idealism, ii, 28, 32, 134, 353;
inferiority feelings, ii, 64, 312, 313, ch, 12, n. 57;
nationalism, ii, 49-58, ch. 12(III), 311, 314;
(see also imperialism);
nihilism, ii, 78;
romanticism, ii, 21, 60, 302, 317.
Germany, the other, ii, 78, 307.
‘Glauconic edict’, the, i, 150t, 151.
God,
(see monotheism);
Antisthenes on, i, 276, 278;
Aristotle on, ii, 285;
Plato on, i, 213, 276, ii, 283;
will of, and historicism, i, 8, 24.
Golden Age, i, 11, 19, 21, 25, 43, 204, 209, 210, 218.
‘golden rule’, Kant’s, i, 102, 256;
justification of, ii, 238, 386.
good, the, i, 237-8, ii, 296;
Aristotle on, ii, 5, 285;
Moore on, ii, 295-6 , 410;
Plato’s idea of, i, 145-6, ch. 8 (IV), 217, 274-5, ch. 8, n. 32, ii,
357;
Whitehead on, ii, 248.
Gorgias, see Plato, Republic, compared with Gorgias.
government, i, 124;
(see also state);
Marx on, ii, 120;
Plato on, i, 222, 261.
Great Generation, the, i, 70, 185t, 189, 194, 196, 199, 278, 299,
332; ii, 22, 26, 30.
great men, genius, i, 17, 231, ii, 32, 67-8, 73, 228, 276 (cp. i, page
v).
Great Year or Great Cycle, i, 19, 206t, 207, 208-19, ch. 3, n.6, 219,
220.
Greeks, i, 171-2, 294, 341.
growth of knowledge, ii, 375, 376, 377, 383.
happiness, ii, 237;
Hegel on, ii, 73;
Plato on, i, 74, 169, 240.
harmony, i, 108, 197, 313.
‘hauteur’, Platonic, i, 334.
Heaven on earth, i, 165, ii, 237, 333, 358.
heavy water, ii, 374-5.
hedonism, see utilitarianism.
Hegel, ii, 28, 38, 42, 54, 59-60, 79, 307;
cynicism of, ii, 306, 310 (cp. ii, 56, 72);
‘dialectical twists’, ii, 401, 42, 44, 49, 74, 310;
style, ii, 28, 32, 44, 287;
on Kant, ii, 38, 44-5, 309;
on Plato, ii, 31, 310;
philosophy of identity, ii, 40t, 308-9, 393, 395;
of nature, ii, 27-8;
policies of, ii, 32-5;
The Secret of Hegel (J. H. Stirling), ii, 29;
father of New Tribalism, 30-4, 56, 61-78, ch. 12 (V), 311,
314;
influenced by Aristotle, ii, 7-8, 36, 286, 309;
by Burke, ii, 60, ch. 12 (IV), 308, 309;
by Heraclitus, i, 17, 203, ii, 36, 49;
other influences, ii, 305-6, ch. 12, n. 11.
Hegel’s influence, i, 238, 297, ii, 29-31, 79, 215, 247, 249, 307,
311, 314;
(see also Hegelianism; Marx);
Foster on, ii, 365-6, ch. 25, n. 19;
Kierkegaard on, ii, 275;
Schopenhauer on, ii, 32-3, 54, 63, 77-80;
(see also dialectics; truth; philosophy of history).
Hegelianism, ii, 29, 30, 31, 78-9, ch. 12 (VI), 208, 223, 226, 275,
356.
Heraclitus, i, 12, 189;
cosmology, 12-13, 204-5;
influence, i, 12, 203;
(see also Hegel);
natural philosophy, i, 14, 60, 206, ch. 2, n. 7.
Heredity, Plato’s theory of, see breeding, hero worship, heroism, ii,
67-70, 73-5, 270, 271, 276.
historical materialism, i, 38, ii, 105-6, ch. 15 (II).
historical prophecy, ii, 85, 87, 139, 141-2, 256, 260, 273, 361;
Marx’s, ii, 133, 136-7, ch. 18 (I), 329;
evaluation of, ii, 193-4, 197-8;
refutations of, ii, 109, 140, 154, 159, 183, 186, 191, 329, 336.
historicism, i, 2, 31-8, 21, 114-15, 260, ii, 125, 193, 322, 393, 395;
author’s attitude towards, i, 34;
and change, i, 14, 21 (cp. i, 314);
and determinism, ii, 32, 85;
and essentialism, i, 28, 216;
and ethics, ii, 279, 366-7;
(see also ethics, historicist);
as an outcome of oppression, i, i, 17, 203, 207, 300, ii, 122,
329;
and peace, i, 260, 290-1;
and psychologism, ii, 92;
and religion, i, 300, ii, 279;
and astrology, i, 210, 244;
and scientism, i, 286;
Aristotle, ii, 7;
Hegel, ii, 7, 37-8, ch. 12 (II), 47-8;
Heraclitus, i, 14-16;
Hesiod, i, 11;
Jaspers, ii, 78;
Lenin, ii, 320;
Mannheim, ii, 352;
Marx, i, 164, ii, 86, 106, 193, 202, 319, 322, 337;
Mill, ii, 87, 92, 322;
Morgenthau, i, 260;
Plato, i, 19, ai, 24-5, 55, 75, 78, 84;
Jewish, i, 17, 203, 207, 300;
(see also Chosen People);
Theistic, i, 8, ii, 271;
other modern forms, i, 221, ii, 241, 273-4, ch. 15, n. 4, p. 325
(Hecker).
historicist methodology, i, 21, 75.
historism, ii, 208t, 255-8, 361.
history, ii, 261, 264, 263, 270, 364;
of philosophy, ii, 54-5;
of political power, ii, 270, 278;
of science, ii, 107, 260, 262-3, 325, 362-3.
holism, i, 80t, 100;
(see also individuals and society; mysticism; intuitionism);
Hegel, ii, 69, 310, 315;
Heraclitus, i, 16;
Marx, ii, 130, 133;
Parmenides, i, 301, 314;
Plato, i, 48, 80-1, 100, 242t, 274-5, 279, 314;
Toynbee, ii, 258;
Wittgenstein, ii, 246, 359.
human cattle, i, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 154, 226, 227t, 228.
human watchdog, i, 46, 51, 52, 149, 226, 227t, 241, 254.
humanism, ii, 258;
(see also faith in reason).
humanitarianism, i, 263, 329 f., 332 f.; ii, 198, 205-6, 234, 238,
258;
and rationalism, ii, 238-40.
hypothesis, i, 58, 239, ii, 12, 13, 221, 260, 262, 264, 284, 289, 299,
324, 363;
working, ii, 260;
auxiliary, ii, 266;
Marx’s auxiliary hypothesis of colonial exploitation, see
exploitation.
idealism, ii, 291, 325, 326, 352, 353, 366.
ideas, Plato’s, as fathers of sensible things, i, 211-15, ch. 3, n. 15,
219-220, 274;
(see also space, as mother of sensible things);
Platonic, non-Socratic, origin of Plato’s theory of, i, 21 o,
215;
(see also Pythagorean Table of Opposites; Socratic Problem);
‘problem of the third man’, i, 220;
stages in development of, i, 214-15, ch. 3, n. 26, 219-20;
as triangles, i, 253, 319 f.
(see also aesthetics);
Antisthenes’ attack on Plato’s theory, ii, 299;
Aristotle’s modification of Plato’s theory, ii, 5, 6, 286, 301;
Hegel’s distortion of Plato’s theory, ii, 40-1, 325.
identity, philosophy of, see Hegel.
identity of opposites, see unity of opposites.
ideology, ii, 134;
Marx on, ii, 108, 142, ch. 18 (IV), 254, 326;
total, ii, 213t, 216, 217.
imagination, ii, 233, 239-40, 246, 357.
impartiality, ii, 234-6, 238.
imperialism, i, 181, 182;
Athenian, 176-83, 278;
German, ii, 56, 65-6, 311, 314;
Roman, 181-2, 297;
of Alexander, ii, 50;
(see also i, 236, 278);
of Napoleon, ii, 55;
Plato against, i, 283, 302-3;
Marx and Marxists on, ii, 187-9, 336, 338.
increasing misery, law of, 166, 168, 178-90.
individualism, i, 100-2, ch. 6 (V), 190, 268, ch. 7, n. 23, ii, 91, 226,
245-6, 275;
(see also altruism).
individuals and society, i, 30, ii, 275-276;
Hegel on, ii, 43, 56, 72, 310, 315;
Kant on, ii, 357;
Mannheim on, ii, 213, 215;
Plato on, i, 76, 78-9, 102, 107-8, 139, 228, 279-80 (cp. i, 239,
ii, 210).
inductivism, ii, 291, 295;
Aristotle, i, 321, ii, 288-9;
Bacon, ii, 248;
Comte, ii, 298;
Mill, i, 264, ch. 7, n. 2.
Industrial Revolution, i, 17, ii, 121, 326.
infanticide, Plato’s defence of, i, 51, 228, 245, 295, 315, 338.
infinite regress, ii, 10, 17, 288.
Inquisition, the, i, 104, 200, ii, 24, 273;
Plato’s recommendation of, i, 195.
institutionalism, ii, 90t, 131, 132, 160-2;
and individualism, i, 268.
institutions, ii, 90;
international, i, 288-9;
political, i, 109, 121, 123, 125, ii, 130;
social, i, 23, 67, 125, ch. 7 (III), 759, 172, 173, 294, ii, 85, 50,
93, 94, 280, 322-4;
improvement and planning of social, i, 127, 163, ii, 143, 278;
for economic control, ii, 131, 193, 195;
for freedom of criticism, ii, 227, 238;
for scientific objectivity, ii, 218.
intellectual honesty, Socratic, i, 129, 190, 222, ii, 244, 283-4.
intellectualism, ii, 224t, 229, 352t.
international relations, international crime and peace, i, 107, 113,
161, 260, 288-91, ch. 9, n. 7, ii, 8, 258, 270-2, 278.
interpersonalism, ii, 226, 227;
(see also intersubjectivity).
interpretations, general, ii, 266t;
of history, i, 171, ii, 266, 267-8, ch. 25 (III), 303, 336, 337;
specific, ii, 266-71;
of the Russian Revolution, ii, 336;
of Heraclitus’ teaching, i, 204;
of Marx’s ‘social revolution’, ii, 152-6, ch. 19 (III), 339-41;
of Parmenides’ teaching, i, 214;
of Plato’s teaching, i, 54, 170-1, 246, 308, 331, ii, 267.
intersubjectivity, ii, 217t, 221;
(see also interpersonalism;
language).
interventionisrn, ii, 125t, ch. 17 (III), 130, 140, 143, 178-9, 182,
193, 330, 335;
two kinds of, ii, 131-2.
intuition, intuitionism, ii, 15-16, 288-289, 291, ch. 11, n. 44, 361;
(see also mysticism);
Aristotle, i, 314, ii, 10, 11, 289;
Bergson, ii, 361 (cp. ii, 307);
Hegel, ii, 309;
Heraclitus, i, 15;
Husserl, ii, 292;
Plato, i, 145, 274, ii, 11;
Spinoza, ii, 353.
Ionian school, the, see tradition, rational.
irrational, the, ii, 245, 357.
irrational numbers, i, 212, 248-53, 318, 319.
irrationalism, ii, 224, 227-9, 249;
author’s counter-attack on, 240-6, ch. 24 (IV);
as despair of reason, ii, 231, 256, 279;
two examples of, ii, 247-58, ch. 24 (V);
and idea of unity of mankind, see unity of mankind;
and love, ii, 235-7;
and mysticism, ii, 242;
and personalism, ii, 133;
and science, ii, 247;
of Toynbce, ii, 251-8, 360-1, 366;
of Whitehead, ii, 247-50, 359.
irrefutability, ii, 366;
(see also metaphysical).
Islands of the Blessed, i, 324.
isonomy, see equality, before the law.
Jesuitism, ii, 257.
Jews, historicism of, see historicism, Jewish;
intellectualism of, ii, 22, 301;
tribalism of, i, 17, 203, 279, ii, 22-3, 301;
(see also Chosen People).
justice, i, 89, ch. 6 (I), 113, 247, 256, 326;
Anaximander on, i, 301;
Aristotle on, i, 256;
Greek outlook, i, 91-8, ch. 6 (II), 254;
Hegel on, ii, 43;
humanitarian, i, 89, 91, 94;
(see also ethics; equality);
Kant on, i, 247, ch. 6, n. 4;
Marx on, ii, 123, 202;
Plato on, i, 89, 60, 94, 96, 37, 106, 107, 119, 221, 235, 248,
256, 263, ii, 5;
Plato on the power of faith in, i, 92-3;
Socrates on, i, 105, 117;
two sorts of, i, 91-2;
(see also ethics);
totalitarian, i, 90, 94, 107-8, 119.
‘kill and banish’ (Plato), i, 166, 326, 331, 336.
knowledge, see science; hypothesis; explanation;
and opinion, i, 82, 214, 236, ii, 12, 13, 287, 289, 305;
social aspects of, ii, 217-18;
sociology of, see sociologism;
theory of, ii, 213-14, 260, 262-3, 361-3.
know thyself: Socrates’ doctrine, ch. 7, n. 26; i, 228-30, 266, 269
(cp. i, 129, 146, 287);
Plato’s perversion, i, 132, 137;
see also sophocracy.
labour, ii, 131, 331;
(see also workers).
laissez fairs, see non-interventionism; in education, i, 130-1;
in ethics, ii, 237.
language, i, 32, 65, ii, 53, 235, 239, 307-8, 324, 361, 366;
(see also clarity);
of political demands or proposals, i, 109t, 112, 234-51, ii,
328, 357;
rationalization of, ii, 278, 357 (cp. ii, 361.
law, legislation, i, 110-11, ii, 121, 125, 170;
Hegel’s philosophy of, ii, 43, 45-6, 66-7, 309, 310;
Marx’s philosophy of, ii, 118, 123, 173, 329-32;
(see also legislation).
law, rule of, i, 166, 325.
laws, i, 57-9, ch. 5 (1), 233;
‘historical’, ii, 264, 268, 322;
natural, i, 57-9;
normative, i, 57-9, 61, 62, 65, 239;
sociological, i, 22, 62, 67, ch. 5 (IV), 236, ii, 93, 322, 323;
universal, ii, 262-5, 369.
leadership, see sovereignty; dictator; rulers;
Hegel on, ii, 73, 275;
(see also domination and submission; great men);
Plato’s ‘greatest principle’, i, 7, 103;
Plato’s theory of, i, 126-7, 135, 169, 269, 340 f.
League of Nations, i, 288.
‘Learned Elders of Zion’, ii, 95.
learning from our mistakes, ii, 376, 390.
legal framework, i, 286, ii, 131-3, ch. 17 (VII), 162, 331;
and economics, ii, 121.
legal system, ii, 118, 121.
legislation, see law;
interventionism; two types of, ii, 331.
liberalism, i, III, ii, 88, 284, 392-5;
(see also freedom);
Hegel’s attack on, ii, 309, 314;
Kant’s, i, 102, ii, 309;
Marx’s attitude towards, ii, 112, 319.
See also education.
‘liquidation’, Plato on, i, 166;
modern sense of, i, 292.
logic, i, 232, ii, 221, 291, 294, 301;
(see semantics, contradictions; paradoxes);
of class situation, ii, 113, 114, 117;
of freedom, i, 315t;
of norms, i, 234t;
(see also language, of political demands);
of the situation, ii, 571, 265t;
of power, i, 1, 237, 315t, 317, ii, 97.
‘lordly lie’, the, i, 138-40, ch. 8 (I), 150, 270-2, ii, 68.
love, ii, 235-7, 240, 244;
Jaspers on, ii, 317.
lying, i, 142-3, 183-4, 331, 336 f.
magic, i, 15, 57, 60, 148, 172, 206;
(see also taboos; numbers, Platonic).
maieutic, i, 322.
managerialism, i, 4;
(see also technocracy).
Maoris, i, 171.
Marx, i, page vi, ii, 81-8;
the economist, ii, 123, 173, 193, 323, 347;
the humanitarian, ii, 82, 207, 319;
the moralist, ii, 199, 211;
(see also historicist ethics; cp. i, 315, ii, 152);
the philosopher, ii, 133-4, ch. 17 (VIII);
the sociologist, ii, 82, 107, 193;
on bourgeois economists, 136, 332 (cp. ii, 173);
Capital, ii, 135-6, 166, 169, 253, 323, 332, ch. 18, n. 3;
10 Points programme, ii, 140-1, ch. 18 (III);
central idea of, 104, ch. 15 (I), 124;
collectivism, ii, 99, 200, 319;
utopianism, i, 164, ii, 333;
on criticism of his own work, ii, 327, 332;
rationalism, ii, 824, 252, 303;
irrationalism, ii, 143, 333;
naivete, ii, 321, 338;
prophecies, ii, 133, 135-7, ch. 18 (I), 329;
evaluation of prophecies, ii, 193-4, 197-8;
refutations and prophecies, ii, 109, 140, 154, 159, .183,
186, 191, 329, 336;
Hegel, disagreement with, ii, 99, 102, in, 325;
influenced by, ii, 82, 99, 103, 124, 128, 211, 314, 319,
327, 340, 350;
compared with Hegel, ii, 81, 224;
with Mill, ii, 87-8;
with Plato, i, 38, 40, 78, 168, ii, 118, 177;
influenced by French materialists, ii, 85, 102;
by French Revolution, ii, 87, 207;
by Vico, ii, 221;
influence on modern Christianity, ii, 200, 201.
Marxism, ii, 82-3;
as a method, ii, 84, 331;
as a religion, ii, 198, 255, 337;
revisionist, ii, 339;
tactics of, ii, 116, 144-5, ch. 18 (V), 158, 163-165, 189-92,
ch. 20 (VII) (cp. ii, 350);
two wings of, ii, 152-3 (cp. ii, 158-9);
‘Vulgar’, ii, 100t, 101, 111, 215, 325, 329, 330.
Marxists, ii, 141, 142, 342;
dogmatism of, ii, 182, 192, 216, 332;
irresponsibility of their leaders, ii, 145, 366.
materialism, ii, 229;
vs. idealism, ii, 326;
of Antiphon, i, 240;
French, ii, 85, 102;
Marxist, ii, 102, 326.
meaning, theory of, see positivism.
meaning of history, ii, 278-80, 364, 366.
medicine, principle of, ii, 276;
Plato on, i, 139, 270, 316, ii, 357.
medievalism, ii, 25, 241, 302, 303, 360-1.
meta-biology, i, 83, 246, ii, 62t, 315.
metabolism, human, see economics, metaphysical (non-scientific),
ii, 38, 108, 174, 177, 293, 297-9, 326.
metaphysics, ii, 38, 247-8, 290, 299.
methodological collectivism, ii, 323t;
essentialism, i, 31-21, ii, 17, 299-301, ch. 11, n. 54;
(see also essentialism);
individualism, ii, 91t, 324;
nominalism, i, 321, 109, 216, ii, 13-15, 18, 290, 291.
Middle Ages, i, 293, ii, 24-5, 116, 229, 241, 302;
two interpretations of, ii, 303, ch. 11, n. 6;
(see also medievalism).
misanthropy and misology, i, 283, 299, ii, 236.
misery, see increasing.
monarchy, ii, 2;
Hegel on, ii, 45-7, 311;
Plato on, i, 222, 283.
money, i, 316, ch. 10, n. 67, ii, 166, 181, 196, 345-7, 384.
monism, i, 731, ii, 366;
(see also naive monism);
Catlin’s, i, 237-9, ch. 5, n. 18.
monopoly, ii, 153, 172, 175, 178, 339.
monotheism, i, 276, 278, 279, ii, 22.
moral positivism, ii, 392, 393.
morals, morality, see ethics.
music, i, 230, ii, 210-11, 337;
anonymous Greek writer on, i, 229-30;
Plato on, i, 52-4, 229.
mysticism, i, 84, 202, 314, ch. 10, n. 59;
Greek, i, 314, ii, 353;
(see Pythagorean sect; Orphic sects);
medieval, ii, 229, 241, 353;
modern, ii, 241-2;
and art, ii, 243;
and historicism, ii, 279;
and science, 244-5;
Aristotle, i, 314, ii, 11, 289;
Bergson, i, 202, 314 (cp. ii, 361);
Hegel, ii, 309;
Heraclitus, i, 15, 205;
Marx, ii, 333;
Parmenides, i, 301, 314;
Plato, i, 56, 84, 314, ii, 353;
Wittgenstein, ii, 246, 359, 366.
Myth, ii, 245;
Empedocles’ myth of the Great Year, i, 208-9, ch. 3, n. 6;
(see also Great Year);
Great Myth of Sparta, i, 411;
Hesiod’s myth of chaos, i, 211;
of decay, i, 11, 188;
of metals in man, i, 219;
Plato’s myth of beast in men, i, 242, 313;
of blood and soil, i, 139-41, ch. 8 (II), ii, 61-2;
of decline and fall, i, 55-6, 232-3, ch. 4 (V), 244;
of earth born, i, 50, 140t, 209, 226, 270, 272, ii, 61;
of fall of man, i, 36, 37, 39, 81-3, ch. 5 (VIII), 141, 151-3,
198, 209, 219, 281, 315, ii, 282;
of metals in man, i, 83, 140, 209, 225, 212;
(see however i, 281; also racialism, of Plato);
of numbers, i, 82, 141, 148-53, 198, 209, 242-4, ch. 5, n. 39,
272, 281-2;
origin of species by degeneration, i, 37, 210, ii, 284-5;
Plato’s attitude towards his myths, i, 142-3, 272, 273;
interpretations of Plato’s myths, i, 54.
Myth of the Twentieth Century (A. Rosenberg), ii, 101.
naive monism, i, 591, 73, 172.
national state and national self-determination, principles of, i, 288,
ii, 50, 51, 318.
nationalism, i, 288, ii, 55, 63, 244, 306, 314, 361;
(see also Germans);
Fichte, ii, 53;
Hegel, ii, 58, 63-4, 69;
Herder, ii, 52.
naturalism, i, 68t, ch. 5 (V), 69-73, 95, 237-8, 299, 317, ii, 297;
barrenness of, i, 70, 78-9, 241, 262;
naive, i, 60t;
nationalist, ii, 51;
Aristotle, ii, 2, 282;
Kant, i, 73, 237;
(see however ii, 238, 353);
Marx, i, 241, ii, 325;
Plato, i, 70, ch. 5 (VI), 73, 74-8, 96;
Socrates on, i, 117, 262.
neo-Platonism, i, 210, 314, ii, 23, 301, 302, 353;
(see also Platonism).
New Deal, ii, 335.
‘New Economic Policy’, i, 166-7, ch. 13, n. 7, ii, 83, 320.
nihilism, i, 721, 184;
(see also positivism);
of Critias, i, 142, 303;
in Germany, ii, 78, 317;
in Greece, i, 184;
Plato on, i, 116, 118, 262.
‘noble lie’, i, 270;
see also ‘lordly lie’.
Nocturnal Council, i, 143, 195, 332.
nomads, hill shepherds (and Plato on the Dorian conquest), i, 50,
220, 225-7, ch. 4, n. 32, 230-1, 246, 293, 11, 283.
nominalism, ii, 290.
non-authoritarian theory of knowledge, ii, 369-96.
non-interventionism, ii, 88, 140, 146, 253, 327, 367;
(see also capitalism, unrestrained).
norms, normative laws, see laws; logic, of norms.
numbers, see irrational numbers; myth of numbers; geometry, vs.
arithmetic.
objectivity, ii, 217-18, 221, 238, 261, 268.
Oedipus, complex, i, 313;
fate a result of the prophecy (called ‘Oedipus effect’ in The
Poverty of Historicism’), i, 22 (cp. ii, 198).
oligarchy, Greek, i, 177-8, 187;
Plato on, i, 40t, 41, 222;
(see also i, 302-3; aristocracy; plutocracy);
Aristotle on, i, 296.
open society, the, i, 7, 173t, 174, 183, 189, 191, 197, 207, ch. 10
(VIII), 202t, 232, 294t, 303, ii, 22, 23, 30, 32, 49, 82, 94, 125,
162, 198, 200, 243, 361;
the rise of the, i, 174-5, ch. 10 (I).
operationalism, ii, 296.
oracular philosophy, ii, 21, 53, 229, 233, 243, 299t.
organic theory of society and state, i, 173-4, 294-5, 316;
oriental origin of, i, 242;
Plato, i, 22, 40-1, 56, 77, 79-81, ch. 5 (VII), 108, 138-9, 220,
242;
Hegel, ii, 31, 43, 45, 64;
Popper-Lynkeus’ attack on, i, 294, ch. 10, n. 7;
Renan, ii, 314;
Rousseau, ii, 52;
(see also national state).
oriental influences, i, 11, 204, 231, 233, 242, 272, 300, ii, 22.
origin of state, i, 115, 230-1.
Orphic sects, i, 188, 300-1, 313, ii, 285.
pain and pleasure, asymmetry of, i, 158, 235, 284-5, ch. 9, n. 2, ii,
237, 304.
paradoxes, ii, 354;
of democracy, i, 17, 121, 124, 125, 265;
of freedom, i, 123t-124, 265-6, ch. 7 (1), ns. 4, 6, ii, 131, 353;
Heraclitus on, i, 13;
Hegel on, ii, 44, 309, 310;
Kant on, ii, 44, 309;
(see also antinomies);
Marx on, ii, 124;
Plato on, i, 265;
Rousseau on, ii, 309;
of the liar, ii, 230, 353, ch. 24, n. 7;
forms of, ii, 3544, 355, ch. 24, n. 8;
of philosophy without presuppositions, ii, 230, 309;
of relativism, ii, 256, 351;
of sovereignty, i, 123-4, 266, ch. 7, n. 6;
of state planning, ii, 130;
of tolerance, i, 265-6;
of economic freedom, ii, 124, 179, 348.
paternal state, patriotism, i, 184t, ch. 10 (III), 272, 282, 299.
peace, see international relations.
Peloponnesian war, i, 178-80, 183, 192-3, 296.
personalism, i, 126, 268, ii, 132-3;
(see also institutionalism).
persuasion and force, Plato’s demand and Pareto’s advice, i, 118,
119, 140, 142, 195, 199, 263, 270-2, ch. 8, n. 10, 273, 316, ii,
23, 56, 58, 81, 138, 302, 318, ch. 13, n. 1.
pessimism, fascist, ii, 76-8;
of Hegel, ii, 75;
of Hesiod, i, 37-8, 188, 235;
of Schopenhauer, ii, 79.
Pharisaism, 491, 237, ii, 82.
phenomenology, i, 216, ii, 16, 292.
philosopher king, i, 132, 138-56, ch. 8 (V), 328, 331;
Kant on, i, 152;
Mill on, i, 263-4;
Plato’s self-portrait, 153-6, 282-4, ch. 8 (VIII).
philosopher’s stone, ii, 303, 334.
philosophy of history, Hegel, ii, 47-9, 69;
Herder, ii, 52;
Marx, ii, 101, 112;
Plato, i, 83, 209.
planning, ii, 130, ch. 17 (VI), 143, 194, 238;
(see also social engineering);
large scale, ii, 162, 212;
Hayek on, ii, 336.
Plato, i, page vi, 34, 155, 198-9;
aristocratic origin, i, 19, 27, 153, 208, 282;
youth and historical background, i, 18, 19, ch. 3 (I), 84, 171
ff.;
conversion by Socrates, i, 109, 191-2, 303;
founder of the Academy, i, 136-55, 300;
political activity, i, 18, 43-5, 136, 153, 282;
internal conflict, i, 109, 196-7, 199, 313, ch. 10 (VI), n. 59
(1);
advocates violence (‘ canvas cleaning’), 166, 195, 200, 327,
331 f., 336;
distorts Socrates’ teaching, i, 194-5, 305, ch. 10, ns. 55, 56;
as artist, i, 42, 165;
as mathematician, i, 248, 267, 319, 343;
as philosopher, i, 98, 246, 343, ch. 5, n. 45;
as social scientist, i, 35, 38, 54, 56, 70, 84, 101, 171, 198;
as teacher, i, 43, 268, 269;
Plato’s authoritarianism, i, 103, 134, 136;
hauteur, i, 328;
intuitionism, 145, 274, ii, 11, 227, 288-9;
irrationalism, i, 84, 141, ii, 236, 238;
misanthropy, i, 283, 299 (cp. i, 51, 139, 228, ii, 357);
mysticism, i, 314;
romanticism, i, 84, 165, 218;
self-portrait, see philosopher king;
the idealization of Plato, i, 87-8, 104, 141, 152, 223, 229, 244,
247, 271, 275, 276, 299, 323-43, ii, 26, 312;
his pupils becoming tyrants, i, 136-7, 268, 316-17;
influenced by Anaximander, i, 301;
by Herodotus, i, 222, 255;
by Hesiod, i, 11, 211, 218, 219;
by Heraclitus, i, 11, 16, 205, 208;
(see also flux);
by ‘Old Oligarch’, i, 300;
by Parmenides, i, 21, 28-9, 212, 301;
by Pythagorean sect, i, 83, 148, 196, 211-12, 246, 301, 319;
by Socrates, i, 29, 72, 109, 144, 197, 221, 240, 317;
compared with Socrates, i, 42, 128, 138, 143, 146, 154, 195,
268, 269, 301-2, 305, 313, ii, 313;
(see also self-sufficiency, Socratic vs. Platonic theory of;
Socratic problem);
on Antisthenes, i, 276-7, ch. 8, n. 47;
on Homer, i, 228-9, 280;
on Socrates, i, 222, 267, 273, 313;
and the Great Generation, i, 199;
his influence, i, 42, 54, 115, 127, 136, 199, 221, 228, 246,
273, 293, 313-14, 315, 316, ii, 52, 226, 245-6, 248, 249,
277, 306, 351;
contemporary, i, 236;
on medieval Europe, i, 200, 293, ii, 24;
(see also Hegel; Marx).
Platonism, Platonists, i, 112, 221, 236, 284, 342, ii, 246, 249-50;
(see also Neo-Platonism).
plutocracy, Plato on, i, 256, 267, 316.
point of view, ii, 259-68;
and hypothesis, ii, 260;
and interpretation, i, 171, 328, 331, ii, 267.
politics, i, 111, 113, 135, 189;
(see also institutions, political; ethics, and politics);
principle of, ii, 334;
Kant on, i, 139;
Marx on impotence of, ii, 119, 120, 322;
‘Old Oligarch’ on, i, 187-8;
Pericles on, i, 186;
Plato on, i, 138-9;
Socrates on, i, 130.
population increase, i, 245, 295.
positivism, ethical or juridicial, i, 68t, 71-2, 73, ii, 206, 392-5;
Catlin, i, 238-9, 257;
Hegel, ii, 8, 37, 41, 57, 206, 305-6, 308, 393-5;
Heraclitus, i, 16, 207;
Marx, ii, 206, 319;
Spinoza, ii, 305;
Toynbee, ii, 255, 360.
positivism, logical;
positivist theory of meaning, i, 234, ii, 20, 215, 293, ch. 11,
296-9, 351, 353, 355-6, 358, 363, 366, ns. 46, 47, 50, 52.
potentiality, Aristotle on, ii, 6, 286;
Bergson on, ii, 307;
Hegel on, ii, 8, 37, 3.07;
power, ii, 129;
(see also logic of power);
economic, ii, 124, 127;
political, ii, 127-9, ch. 17 (V), 162, 270;
Plato on misuse of, i, 259, 269;
state, ii, 130.
pragmatic rationalism, ii, 357t.
pragmatism, Marx’s, ii, 84, 86, 322.
precision, ii, 19, 20, 296.
prediction, i, 3, 260, 286, ii, 84-6, 260, 262-3.
prejudice, i, 129, 267, ii, 217, 220-3, 226, 318.
Principia Mathematica (B. Russell and A. N. Whitehead), ii, 301,
359.
Process and Reality (A. N. Whitehead), ii, 249.
productivity, ii, 106, 195, 241.
prognosis, ii, 262t-3.
progress, ii, 197-8, 279, 366;
in art, i, 230;
in metaphysics, ii, 247-8;
in science, ii, 12, 13, 39, 244, 247, 322, 352.
progressivism, ii, 186, 198, 322;
(see also evolutionism);
and ethics, i, 234;
and evolutionism, i, 40;
Hegel, ii, 47, 48;
Marx, ii, 197, 319;
Mill, ii, 88, 322;
Speusippus and Aristotle, ii, 5, 285;
Fisher’s attack on, ii, 197-8, 366.
proof, the doctrine of, ii, 13, 21, 291, 294.
propaganda, i, 330, 11, 143, 331;
Critias on, i, 273;
Plato on, i, 184, 298, 336 f.
(see also persuasion).
proposals, i, 631, 234, ii, 334;
(see also language, of proposals and demands).
protectionism, political, i, 111t, ch. 6 (VI), 115, 261, ii, 130, 330;
Aristotle and Burke against, i, 112, 261;
Hegel against, ii, 309;
Kant for, ii, 309;
Lycophron for, i, 114-115, ch. 6 (VII), 117, 261, ii, 309;
Plato’s presentation of, i, 69, 117-118, 262-3, ch. 6, n. 52.
psychoanalysis, i, 313, ii, 215, 216, 242, 267, 351, 352.
psychological naturalism, see naturalism.
psychologism, i, 841, 234, 290, ii, 88t, 90-9, 252;
and historicism, ii, 92;
and the myth of social contract, ii, 93-4, 106.
psychology, ii, 97-8.
public opinion,
Hegel on, ii, 68, 73, 305;
Heraclitus on, i, 13.
punishment, i, 261, 289-90;
Antiphon on, i, 69;
Hegel on, i, 246;
Heraclitus on, i, 14, 60;
Plato on, i, 138, 143, 195, 222, 261.
Pythagorean sect, i, 148, 188-9, 250, 301, ii, 325;
communism, i, 104, 241, 259;
mathematical programme, i, 248-9, 267, 319 f.;
natural philosophy, i, 308;
table of opposites, i, an, 212;
taboos, i, 148, 300.
quantum theory, ii, 85, 293, 364.
racialism, i, 9, 49, 231, 288, 317, ii, 61-2;
(see also breeding);
of Aristotle, ii, 284;
of Plato, i, 49, 51, 75, 82-3, 141, 149-52, 240, 242, 279, 331,
336-8, ch. 8, n. 50;
(see also i, 27; myth, of metals in man).
radicalism, i, 164, 167, 291-2, ch. 9, n. 12.
rationalism, ii, 224-6, ch. 24 (I), 229, 238-9, 243, 258, 352t;
critical, i, 32, ii, 230-2, 233, 237, 238, 253;
and the open society, i, i 73, 202;
and ethics, i, 287, ii, 232, 238-40;
and institutionalism, ii, 132, 238;
pragmatic, ii, 357t, ch. 24, n. 19;
true and pseudo, ii, 227, 229, 230;
uncritical, ii, 230-1, ch. 24 (II), 246, 357.
rationalist tradition within the borders of the Roman Empire, ii,
229, 253.
rationalization, ii, 238, 256, 278, 357, ch. 24, n. 19.
realism, ii, 280, 367t.
reason, reasonableness, see despair; faith; rationalism.
Reformation, the, ii, 30, 48.
refutability or falsifiability or testability, ii, 13, 222, 260, 263, 326,
332, 363t.
relativism, ethical, i, 16t, 369-96, ii, 202-3;
of Heraclitus, i, 16, 17;
of Marx, ii, 202-3, 319.
relativism, philosophical, see paradox; truth.
religion, i, 1, 9, 65, 66, 235, ii, 198, 242, 337, 341;
(see also Christianity; faith in reason; meta-biology);
Critias on, i, 142;
Plato on, i, 141-143, 213, 273, ii, 283;
Protagoras on, i, 235;
Greek, i, 27;
in the Roman Empire, ii, 23, 301, 302;
historicist, i, 207, 300;
and mysticism, ii, 243, 258;
and science, ii, 246, 359;
and tolerance, ii, 257, 258;
and war, ii, 244;
Marxism as, ii, 198, 225, 337;
‘is opium’, i, 273, ii, 302;
progressivist, ii, 198.
Renaissance, the, i, 221, 293, ii, 30, 151, 303.
resemblance, i, 27, notes 19 and 20 to ch. 3, ii, 301, note 54 (3) to
ch. 11.
responsibility, i, 4, 5, 49, 61, 65, 66, 113, 173, 200-1, ii, 24, 208,
237, 238, 242, 243.
return to the beasts, i, 201, 232, 317, 318, ch. 10, n. 71, ii, 242,
303, 317.
revolt against freedom, i, 188, 199, 315, 317, ii, 62, 72, 75, 81.
revolt against reason, i, 317, ii, 239.
revolt against science, ii, 57, 241-2;
(see also ii, 228).
revolutions, ii, 138-9, 349;
Heine on, ii, 709;
Marx on, ii, 109, 119, 146, 159, 326, 328, 340, 341;
Plato’s law of, i, 381, 44-5, 223;
‘in permanence’, ii, 335, 340, 350.
rhetorics, i, 129, 263, ii, 4.
Robinson Crusoe, ii, 219 20, 225.
romanticism, i, 168t, 218, 288, 292, ii, 237, 239, 241, 333-4, ch.
18, n. 4;
in education, ii, 275-7;
German, ii, 21, 60, 302, 317;
of Heraclitus, i, 17;
of Marx, ii, 130, 333, 337, ch. 18, n. 4;
medievalist, i, 16, 25, ii, 241-2, 302-3, 360-1;
of Plato, i, 84, 218;
Rousseau’s rural and pastoral, i, 246, 293.
Rome, Roman imperialism, i, 233, 297-8, ch. 10, n. 19, ii, 23, 301-
2.
rulers, i, 122, ii, 228, 257.
ruling, i, 120-1;
(see also philosopher king; democratic control; paradox, of
sovereignty).
Russia, ii, 108, 144, 326, 336, 349.
scepticism, i, 267, 287, ii, 369-95.
scholasticism, ii, 9, 20, 21, 222, 229;
(see also knowledge, theory of; hypothesis; explanation).
science, ii, 85, 242, 245, 283, 289;
‘bucket theory of mind’, 214t, 260, 361;
Crusonian, ii, 219-20;
definitions in, ii, 290, ch. 11, n. 39;
demarcation of, ii, 297-9, ch. 11, n. 51;
(see also refutability);
generalizing, ii, 263, 264, 364;
historical, ii, 264t;
natural and social, i, 33, 67, 216, 286, ii, 324;
‘searchlight theory of science’, ii, 260t-262;
(see also ‘bucket theory of mind’);
revealed, ii, 218-19;
Socratic approach to, i, 28-9, 131, 267;
(see also intellectual honesty);
and ethics, ii, 238;
and intuition, ii, 15-16, 292, 361;
and mysticism, ii, 243-6;
(see also revolt against science);
and religion, ii, 246, 359;
social, see social science.
scientific method, i, 3, 163, 285, 307, ii, 13, 82, 230, 233, 260, 289,
298, 324, 363;
(see also methodology);
and criticism, ii, 218;
and determinism, ii, 321;
and ethics, i, I, 69, 233, 285;
and piecemeal social engineering, i, 126, 291;
and situational logic, ii, 97;
public character and social aspect of, ii, 217-222.
scientism, i, 286t.
‘searchlight theory of science’, ii, 260t-262, 361;
(see also ‘bucket theory of mind’).
security, i, 111, 198, 201, 315, ii, 130, 132, 194.
self-evidence, ii, 291.
self-expression, ii, 239, 276, 278, 366.
self-sufficiency,
of the individual, Socratic vs. Platonic theory of, i, 76, 236,
240, 259;
of the state, Plato’s theory, i, 76, 87, 182;
Hegel on, ii, 310.
semantics (A. Tarski), i, 216, 234, 273-4, ch. 8, n. 23, ii, 290, 294,
353, 362.
sense of drift, see strain of civilization.
similarity, see resemblance.
simultaneity, ii, 20, 220.
slavery, i, 62, 65, 328-9, ii, 241, 278, 329, 340;
in closed societies, i, 295;
Athenian movement for abolition and the evidence for its
existence in Plato’s and Aristotle’s attacks on it, i, 43, 46,
47, 53, 70, 221, 222, 224-5 (ch. 4, ns. 18 and 29), 236, ch.
8, n. 48, 261, 278, 299, 3 16, 333-6, ii, 2-3, 282, 286-287;
Socrates’ attitude towards, i, 129;
Hegel on, see domination and submission;
Marx on, ii, 183, 187, 328.
smaller democracies, ii, 140-1, 189, 335, 336.
social contract, theory of, i, 115;
Critias, i, 273;
Lycophron, i, 76-7, 114, 261-2;
Plato, i, 76-7, 226, 263;
Rousseau, i, 246;
Barker on, i, 114-15, 261;
Hume and Nietzsche on, i, 230;
psycho-logistic methodological myth of, ii, 93-4, 106.
social democrats, ii, 144, 152, 159, 164-5, 189, 336, 339.
social dynamics, i, 16, 39, 83;
(see also social equilibrium).
social engineering, i, 22-4, ch. 3 (IV), 210t;
piecemeal, i, 158t, 159, 162, 167, 285, 286t, 291, ch. 9, n. 8,
ii, 125, 129, 130, 132, 142, 143, 194, 222, 237, 238, 367;
(see also social technology);
Utopian, i, 157t, 159-63, 167, 284, 285, 291, ii, 130;
(see also Utopianism; radicalism);
Marx against, i, 164, ii, 82-3, 115, 130, 142, 144-5, 198, 337;
Hayek on, i, 285.
social equilibrium, i, 46-9, ch. 4 (III), 52.
social experiment, see experiment.
social institutions, see institutions.
social science, i, 2, 5, ii, 9, 21, 216, 221-2, 256;
(see also laws, sociological);
backwardness of, i, 2, 33, ii, 256;
the task of, i, 22, ii, 95, 222.
social system, the, i, 167;
Marx’s theory of, ii, 118, 123, 326.
social technology, i, 211, 285, ii, 82, 87, 94, 143, 194, 222.
social zoology, i, 317, ch. 10, n. 71.
socialism, ii, 139, 193, 198, 333;
origin of, ii, 254;
(see also communism);
Marxist, ii, 83, 86, 108, 115, 140, 254, 360;
(see also Marx).
sociological laws, see laws, sociologism, sociology of knowledge,
socio-analysis and sociotherapy, ii, 208-16, 222-3, 242, 251-2,
267 (cp. i, 76).
sociology, see science, social; laws, social;
autonomy of, ii, 89-90, 106, 111-12;
of knowledge, see sociologism.
Socrates, i, 189-99, ch. 10 (V), 283, 313, 315, 332 f.;
see cosmopolitanism;
the democratic critic, i, 128, 188, 191, 194, 303;
the ethical reformer, i, 29, 193;
the individualist, i, 158, 196, 267, 301, 333;
the teacher, i, 130, 191-2, 222, 303, ii, 42, 276;
intellectual honesty, i, 128, 129, 190, 222, ii, 227, 244;
and the Thirty, i, 128, 193, 266, 303, 310;
trial and martyrdom, i, 193, 194, 268, 304, 305, 310;
his indifference to natural philosophy, i, 301, 308;
Aristophanes on, i, 308;
Aristotle on, i, 311;
Crossman on, i, 267;
and Plato, see Plato;
see Socratic problem;
his teaching, i, 105, 128-32, ch. 7 (IV), 185, 189-92, ii, 227,
301;
agnosticism, i, 128, 267, 308;
on democracy, i, 305;
on wisdom, i, 128-130, 308-9;
(see also soul; self-sufficiency; science).
Socratic problem, i, 210, 221, 299, 301, 306-13, 332 f., ch. 10, n.
56;
(see also ii, 313).
solar system, i, 260, 286.
Sophists, i, 57, 128, 131, 132, 142, 173, 263, 308.
sophocracy, i, 144t, 283.
soul, the, i, 301-2, ch. 10, n. 44;
Aristotle on, ii, 6-7;
Freud on, i, 313;
Plato on, i, 75, 78, 80, 81, 197, 212, 217, 240, 302, 313;
Pythagorean and Orphic sects on, i, 301, ii, 285.
sources of knowledge, ii, 378, 388, 389, 390.
sovereignty, i, 121-2;
(see also paradox, of sovereignty);
Hegel on, ii, 56;
Rousseau on, ii, 52 (cp. i, 125).
space as mother of sensible things, i, 211-13, 274;
(see also ideas, as fathers of sensible things).
Sparta, i, 177, 182, 184, 198, 227, 228, 259, 295, 298, 325 f.;
great myth of, i, 41.
standard of living, ii, 195;
(see also increasing misery).
state, i, 288, ii, 129, 328;
(see also protectionism, interventionism);
capitalism, ii, 193, 328, 334;
censorship, i, 53, 86, 132, 229, 267, 268, 275;
control of education, i, 103, in, 130, 131;
control of economics, i, 111, ii, 125-30;
interference, i, 110-11;
origin of the, i, 215, 230-1;
(see also organic theory of the state);
Aristotle’s classification of, i, 222;
Hegel’s, ii, 48, 305, 311;
Plato’s, i, 40, ch. 4 (II), 44, 220, 222;
(see also classes);
Aristotle’s theory, i, 112, ii, 3, 282;
Hegel’s theory, ii, 31, 45-7, 57, 63-6, 74, 305, 310, 311;
(see also national state);
Marx’s theory, ii, 118-20, 157, 162, 193, 328;
modern totalitarianist theory, ii, 63, 65;
(see also national state);
Plato’s theory, i, 25, 31, 39, 53, 45-9, 50-4, 226.
statesmen, see rulers.
status quo, i, 110, 117, 288.
stoicism, i, 277, 298.
strain of civilization, i, 5, 171, 176t, 188-9, 195, 199, 295t, ch. 10
(VII), 301, 316, 317, ii, 64, 98, 161, 228, 276.
Study of History, A (A. J. Toynbee), ii, 251, 360.
Sumer, i, 295, ii, 50.
superstition, ii, 95, 318;
(see also prejudice).
surplus population, ii, 176, 179.
taboo, tabooism, i, 15, 60, 65, 148, 172, 173, 300, ii, 301;
(see also tribalism).
taxation, taxes, ii, 141, 170, 334, 335.
technocracy, ii, 334.
technology (proper), i, 163, ii, 143, 324;
social, see social technology.
teleology, ii, 5, 6, 285, 286.
testability, see refutability.
Theaetetus, dating of, i, 320.
Themis, i, 253.
theory, ii, 262-3, 363;
and experiment, ii, 260;
(see also experiment);
and practice, ii, 222, 243, 256, 263.
Thirty Tyrants, the, i, 18, 128, 142, 192, 193, 195, 200, 266, 299,
505-4, 326, ch. 10, n. 48.
timocracy, i, 401-41, 47.
tolerance, i, 235, 265, 266, ii, 109, 238, 257.
Tom Sawyer (Mark Twain), i, 270.
totalitarianism, i, 2, 2, 4, 5, 107-8, 113, 119, 770, 182, 189, ii, 66-
8, 302, 395;
Hegel’s, ii, 69-70, 72-3, 310;
Plato’s, i, 86, 87, 138-9, 338, 341.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (L. Wittgenstein), i, 205, 234; ii,
16, 246, 293, 296-8, 316, 353, 355, 359, 366.
trade cycle, see economics, unemployment.
tradition, i, 115, 124, 231, 266, 268, ii, 60, 308;
rational, i, 188, 204, 300.
trahison des clercs, ii, 393.
translations, literal, i, 328.
trial and error, i, 167, 286, ii, 82, 132, 221 (cp. ii, 238, 244, 288-9).
tribalism, i, 9t, 172, 174, ii, 228;
(see also collectivism);
breakdown of, 176-7, 294;
Greek, 176-7, ii, 281;
(see also Sparta);
Jewish, i, 17, 203, 279, ii, 22, 301;
Marxist, ii, 337;
modern, i, 316;
Scottish, ii, 301;
Aristotle, i, 261;
Hegel, ii, 30;
(see also nationalism);
Plato, i, 80, 199;
Toynbee’s attack on, ii, 251.
truth, i, 273-4, ii, 221, 261, 369-96;
(see also semantics);
Hegel’s theory of, i, 144, 274, ii, 41-2, 60, 68;
Plato’s theory of, i, 143-4;
Pragmatic, i, 274;
science and, ii, 12-13, 20, 221, 244, 261, 363, 363.
tyranny, i, 124-5, 151-2, 159, 235, 315, ii, 160-1, 305, 342;
Plato against, i, 40-4, 123, 170, 198, 200, , 315;
(see however i, 317);
Plato on inevitability of war under, i, 43, 198;
Plato on tyranny and Utopian engineering, i, 44, 222.
unemployment, ii, 168-9, 178, 180-2, 194, 195;
insurance against, ii, 140, 182, 183;
and trade cycle, ii, 348.
United States, i, page vii, 197, ii, 158, 189, 329, 335, 340.
unity of mankind, i, 152, 236, 278, 279, 281, ii, 214, 224, 225, 232,
239, 244, 246, 258, 361.
unity of opposites, i, 16, 171, 204-5, 207, 209, ii, 40, 76, 249.
universal laws, see laws, universals, ii, 245, 290.
utilitarianism, i, 235, 254, 284-5, ii, 304;
Plato’s collectivist, i, 107, 108, 138;
of Antiphon, i, 69;
Hegel’s attack on, ii, 75.
Utopianism, i, 157t, 164, ii, 367;
(see also aestheticism; ‘canvas-cleaning’; romanticism; social
engineering, Utopian), ch. 19 (II);
Marx’s and Marxists’ ambiguity regarding, ii, 150, 154, 156,
157, ch. 19 (IV), 342;
economic, ii, 124-5;
and irrationalism, ii, 212, 234, 257.
Virgo, constellation, i, 254.
War, see international relations;
American civil war, ii, 329;
and economics, ii, 105;
religious, ii, 237, 244;
World War I, ii, 116;
World War II, page vi;
Hegel on, ii, 37, 58, 65, 68-9;
(see also fame and fate);
Heraclitus on, i, 16;
(see also fame and fate);
Kolnai on, ii, 77;
modern totalitarians on, ii, 65, 70, 71;
Plato on, i, 43, 198, 259.
west, the, western civilization, i, 102, 171, 175, 232, 267, ii, 24,
243, 257.
wisdom,
Plato on, i, 128, 144, ch. 8 (III), 145, 146, 269, 275;
Socrates on, i, 128-9, 308-9.
wishful thinking, ii, 139, 197, 333.
workers, working class, ii, 343 f.;
Aristotle on, i, 261, ii, 3, 282-3;
Hegel on, ii, 315;
Marx on, ii, 108, 114, 115, 121 146, 189-90, 198, 337;
Plato on, i, 47, 76, 98, 225, 258, 259, ii, 283;
(see also human cattle).
‘Workers, unite!’, ii, 108, 145, 178, 185.
Versailles, Treaty of, ii, 318.
violence, i, 331, 336, ii, 143, 149-52.
Zeus, i, 15, 16, 43, 66.
zoologism, i, 317t.

[admin]

Index Of Platonic Passages

This Index has been compiled upon the suggestion of Mr. Richard Robinson, made in The Philosophical Review, 60, 1951, p. 503. Numbers in brackets refer to Platonic passages. Numbers outside brackets refer to pages of vol. I of the present book; those following brackets refer to pages where the passages in brackets are quoted or discussed.

Alcibiades I, 303.

Apology, 269, 304-5, 306, 308, 309, 310; (18b-c) 307; (18d-e) 308, (19c) 190, 301, 307, 308, (20e/21a) 310, (23d) 307, (30e/31a) 194, (32b-d) 128, 266, 305, 310, (40 ff.) 308, 322, 330 f., 333.

Charmides, (157c, 162d) 273, 311.

Crito, 304-5, 306 (45e) 304, (47e/48a) 302, (51-54) 194, 304, 305.

Euthyphro, 197, 315.

Gorgias, 309-10; (451a/b, c, 453e, 465a, b/c) 320, (483b) 117, 262, (488e-489b), 92-93, 117, 254-5, 262, (508a) 256, 262, 320, (521d) 130, (522e) 320, (525e) 269, (527b) 262.

Hippias (Greater), (303b/c) 249.

Laws, 219, 229, 306, 309, 331, 338f.; (634d/e) 267, (636b) 295, (649d/e) 269, (676a) 38, (575b/c) 44, 210, 217, 223, (681b) 226, (682e-683c/d) 226, 227, (683e) 45, (689c-d) 275, (690b/c) 77, (704d) 283, (709e-714a) 44, 222, 245, (718c-722b) 139, 213, 270, 271, 316, (739c) 102, 219, 258, (740d-741a) 295, (742 -c) 184, 298, (744b) 256, (757a) 96, 256, (757b-d) 248, 270, (797d) 217, 218, 224, (836b/c) 295, (838e) 295, (895b) 217, 219, (895d-e) 216, 249, (896e, 898c) 317, (903c) 80-1, 100, 219, 242, 258, (904-909) 36-7, 142, 217-18, 273, (907d-909d) 331, (942a) 103, 219, 259, (942c) 103, 132, 259, (942) 342, (950d) 298, (966e) 217, 219.

Menexenus, 197, 299; (235b) 197, (236a) 296, (238e-239a) 96, 255-6, (245c-d) 226, 278.

Meno, 129, 267, 309; (81a) 314, (86d/e) 216.

Parmenides, 313; (135c-d) 134, 268.

Phaedo, 222, 266-7, 308, 309, 312; (65a-66a) 214, (70e/71a, 72a/b) 209, (73a) 312, (74a) 214 (79d) 314, (89c-d) 283, 299, (100d) 211.

Philebus, (16c) 219, (48c/d) 269, (59a-c) 215.

Protagoras, 235, 241; (322a) 66, (337a) 256, (337e) 333.

Republic, 93, 195, 197, 209, 219, 220, 228, 301, 305, 306, 308, 309, 320, 330-7; (344a) 105, (358c) 117, 261, 262, (359) 118, 254, 262, (362) 262, (365-8) 105, 262-3, 271-2, 282, 315, (369b-c) 77, 219, 226, 240, 241, 247, (378c) 229, 240, (380d) 212, 219, (380e- 381c) 217, (387d/e) 259, (389b-d) 138-9, (390e) 271, (397e) 247, (398e) 229-30, (406c, 407e), 138-9, (414b-d) 140-1, 209, 270, 272, 273, (415a-6) 140-1, 225, 240, (415d/e) 226, (423b) 80, 182, 298, (425b-427a/b) 224, (430d) 98, 257-8, (432b) 99, 258, (433) 90, 96- 7, 257, (434a-c) 49, 106-7, 225, (440c-d) 51, 92, 254, (459b) 51, 150, 276, (460a-b) 150, (460c) 51, 82, 228, (466b/c) 108, 269, (468c) 150-1, 276, (469b-471c) 152, 224, 278-80, (473c-e) 132, 151-2, 276-7, 279-81, (474c-502d) 145-6, (475) 138, 145, 314, (476b) 145, (484c) 149, (485) 146, 214, 217, 240, 275, (489b/c) 154, 283, (494b) 154, 282-3, (494c/d) 278, 281, 282, (495d/e) 277, (496c-d) 154, 185, 282-3, 299, (497d) 133, (498b/c) 133, 267, (498d/e) 155, 283-4, (499b-c) 282-3, (499c/d) 280, (500c-501e) 146, 149, 150, 165, 166, 224, 276, (506) 146, 274-5, (508b/c) 215, 274, (508d-e) 217, (509c) 274, (509c-511e) 214, 271-272, (519e) 80, 102, 140, 169, 242, 271, (520c) 165, (520d) 155, (525c) 248, (527a/b) 214, 217, (528b-d) 249-50, (534d) 249, (535a/b) 149, 275, (536a/b) 281, (537c-e) 137, 268, (539d) 134, (537-540) 134, 262, (540c) 132, 138, 149, (540e/541d) 165, 1 66, 292, 327, (544c) 40, 227, (545d) 45, 219, (546a) 81, 141, 217, 272, 281, 282, (546b) 82-3, 242-6, (546c) 249, (546d/e) 153, 281-2, (546e/547a) 209, 219, (547a) 141, 198, 315, (548e-549d) 41, 224, 228, 313, (554c, f.) 42, 221, (558b) 221, 316, (558c) 96, 254, (592b) 280, (560b) 42, (561e) 254, (562b-565e)43, 123, 221, 265, 278, (563b-d) 254, 255, 316, 334, (566e) 43, 170, 198, 315, (571b, 575a) 313, (577a, f.) 43, 222, (577c) 315, (580b) 221, (588c) 197, 313, (592b) 280, (595b) 229, 240, (608e) 35, (615d) 269.

Second Letter, (314c) 313.

Seventh Letter, 208, 309; (314b/c) 275, (325) 19, 282, 311, (326a) 309, 311, (342a) 309.

Sophist, 322; (223c) 219, (242e) 208, (248e-249c) 220, (252e, ff.) 219.

Statesman, 19 f., 208, 211, 219, 220, 283, 309, 331, 336; (258b) 283, (268c-274e) 19-20, 36, 50, 209, 270, (271a, f.) 226, 270, 273 (274d) 280, (289b-e) 225, (292c) 283, (293c-6) 166, 209, 292, 328, (296b, ff.) 271, (296d) 36, (297c) 209, 222, (300e, f.) 222, (301c/d) 43 f., 209, 222, (302b, ff.) 209, (303b) 209, (304c/d) 271, (309a) 225.

Symposium, (178e), 295, (179e), 325, (191b) 209, (193d) 169, 218-19, (199c/d) 216, (200a) 313, (208d) (174e/f) 320, 153, 208, 282.

Theaetetus, 321; (142a-143c) 321-2, (174) 215, (174e, f) 281, 321, (179e) 312.

Timaeus, 215, 230, 320; (18c/d) 48, 225, (20a) 311, (24a-b) 224, 275, (45b-c, 47a-d) 314, (48) 30, 215, (50) 27, 211, (53c-62c) 249-53, (91b-92b/c) 37. There is also a discussion of 42a, f., 90e, and 91d, f., in the second volume of this book (note 11 to chapter 11, pp. 284 f.).

_______________

Notes:

[1] ‘A’ stands in this Addendum for the American editions of 1950 and 1956; ‘E’ for the present edition and for the English editions from 1952 on.

[2] Added in 1965. That the word ‘douleia’ in the passage in question (Republic 563d) bears this literal meaning (in addition to the figurative meaning which Professor Levinson correctly attributes to it) is confirmed by Shorey, the great Platonist and open enemy of democracy, whom Professor Levinson considers an authority on Plato’s text. (I can often agree with Shorey’s interpretation of Plato because he rarely tries to humanize or liberalize Plato’s text.) For in a footnote which Shorey attaches to the word ‘servitude’ (douleia) in his translation of Republic 563d, he refers to two parallel passages: Gorgias 491e, and Laws 890a. The first of these reads in W. R. M. Lamb’s translation (Loeb Edition): ‘For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anybody at all?’ Here the phrase ‘to be a slave’ has, like the one in the Republic, not only the figurative meaning ‘to submit oneself’ but also the literal meaning; indeed, the whole point is the merging of the two meanings. The passage from the Laws 890a (an elaborate attack on certain Sophists of the Great Generation) reads in Bury’s translation (Loeb Edition) as follows: ‘these teachers [who corrupt the young men] attract them towards the life...” according to nature” which consists in being master over the rest, in reality [aletheia], instead of being a slave to others, according to legal convention. Plato clearly alludes here among others to those Sophists (p. 70E = p. 70A and note 13 to chapter 5) who taught that men cannot be slaves ‘by nature’ or ‘in truth’, but only ‘by legal convention’ (by legal fiction). Thus Shorey connects the crucial passage of the Republic by this reference at least indirectly to the great classical discussion of the theory of slavery (‘slavery’ in the literal sense). HTPU

[3] UPTH It is by no means the only instance, as may be seen from my chapter 8. The passage quoted in the text to note a, for example (Rep., 389b), is a different instance from the passage (Rep., 460a) which Professor Levinson has in mind. There are several other passages. See Rep., 415d and especially Tim,, 18e, which prove that Plato finds his instruction to lie of sufficient importance to be included in the very brief summary of the Republic. (See also Laws, 663d down to 664b.)

[admin]

Part 1 of 2

Index

absolute idealism 688
absolute monarchy 259-60
absolutism 267, 493, 501, 506, 590-1
absolutist theory 673
abstract rationalism 271
abstract society 166-7
accumulation 362, 390-1, 398, 692: capital 356, 373, 385; Marxism 374-6: wealth 47, 391
activism 407, 408, 110, 416
activist theory of knowledge 421
ActsTM,
Adam, J, 41, 79, 133, 520-1, 525, 533, 534, 535, 538, 578; autarky 554; awe-inspiring 593:
City in Heaven 598: exile 689: infanticide 541: justice 94, 569: knowledge 593 ; music 542:
Number 558-9; Philosophy of History 140, 520; slavery 537
Adeimantus 573, 578-9
Adler, Alfred ix, Ml, 688, 217
Aesculapius 131
aestheticism 154-5, 156, 157, 663
aesthetics 415, 611
age of Cronos 18-19, 521
age of dishonesty 237, 243, 660
age of industrialization 445
age of irresponsibility 243
age of Zeus 14, 19, 63
aggression 142, 272, 326; see also violence
Alcibiades 144, 181, 182, 595, 598, 600, 615, 622-3, 631
Alcidamas 67, 91, 108, 143, 175, 550, 577, 595, 613, 641
Alcmaeon 75, 165
Alexander the Great 220, 262-3, 596
altruism 96-8, 114, HI, 480, 574, 575
ambiguity, Marxism 365-6, 371
ambition 40, 128, 145, 51i, 623
anamnesis 53 1
Anaximander 179, 515, 516, 512, 523, 620
Ancillon 256
Anderson, E, N, 265-7, 668, 671, 674-6
Anderson, Maxwell 205
animal instincts 75
Antiphon 66, 70, 91, 547, 549, 554, 571, 595, 596, 611, 615, 618
Antisthenes 91, 123, Ml, 175, 550, 555, 600, 611, 642, 652; definitions 217, 660-1:
monotheism 593-6: Plato's attitude 144-5: and Socrates 184, 237, 63 1
Anytus 182-3, 584
Apology 184, 191, 201, 200, 520, 628-31
Aquinas, Thomas 441, 637
Archelaus 547
Archidamian War 615
Archytas of Tarentum 215
aristocracy U, 11, 164, 348, 600-1
Aristophanes HI, 115, 511, 511, 621, 628, 610
Aristotle 24, 28, 29, 61, 641; and
Antisthenes 660: ascent theories 644: banausic 642: corruption 529: doctrine of the mean 220;
equalitarianism 92; essence 27-8, 29, 30, 223-4: forms 36, 223: geometry 190-1, 211:
Heraclitus' influence 9, H, 15,; individualism 91; justice 88; leisured classes 643: logic 655:
love 635, 640; Menexenus 619: music 543: non-being 524: Oligarchs 615: Plato criticism
171, 576-7: protectionism 107, 108: religion as opium 348, 590, 663: roots of Hegelianism
219-41: slavery 220-1: sociology of knowledge 428: Timaeus parallelism 527
arithmetization 190, 563, 583
armed auxiliaries 45
Arndt, E, M, 674
arrested change 20, 29, 37, 44, 83, 169, 419, 420, 536-7: development 540; society 174, 546:
state 45, 79; see also Forms or Ideas; ideal state
art 154, 732
artificial 554
ascent theories 644-5
astrology 483, 521, 546, 569, 664
astronomy 77, 142, 190, 297, 557
Athenians 10-1 1
Athens 45, 51, 168, 169, 170, HI, 172; defence 589; democracy ix, xxxviii, 17, 39, 53, 149:
education 50-2; fall of 169-75, 182, 187: imperialism 172, 173, 174: infanticide 541:
Levinson's critique 194-212: Melian Affair 615: Peloponnesian war 169-75, 182: slavery
42, 46, 67, 172, 595, 616, Ml
Atomists 676
atoms 606, 607, 665, 677, 687
Augustus 238
autarky 84, 111, 549, 554
authoritarian intellectualism 432-3
authoritarianism 123, 127, 268, 432-3, 695: Christianity 293; education 124, 126, 129:
medieval 241, 245; positivism 68; religion 239, 240-1, 497, 498, 500-1: and truth 493,
494, 504-5; Utopian engineering 149
authority 70
autochthonous warriors 589
autonomy 301-10, 321, 322, 500
auxiliary hypothesis 392, 393, 394

Bacon, Francis 232, 451, 452, 494
Bakunin, M, 691
banausic 221, 642
Banse, E, 280
Barker 99, 109, 579, 590, 600; contract theory 577; Cynics 237-8: militarism 574
Barth, K, 477, 731, 762
basic premises 227, 228
beauty 136, 154-5, 156
Beethoven, L, van 415
Bentham, J, 442
Bergson, Henri 273, 435, 460, 512, 513, 544, 677; creative thought 668; Hegelianism 669, 677:
mysticism 635
Bernstein, A, 703
Best State 23, 29, 31, 39, 44-9, 51, 53, 77, 84, M, IM, 221, 521, 523, 534, 536, 540, 625,
640, 642: see also ideal state
Bias 11, 211, 422, 423, 424, 465-7, 502-3: see also prejudices
biological holism 285
biological naturalism 65-8, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78-9, 556
biological theory of state 72, 166, 167, 251, 613, 614, 666
Bismarck, Otto von 270
Black Death 240
Blanc, Louis 555
Bleak House (Dickens) 96-7
Blueher, H, 725
Bodin, J, 115
Bohr, Niels 723
bolshevism 101
Book of the Judge (Kierkegaard) 407
Borel, E, 567
bourgeous economists 379
bourgeousie 347, 349, 355-7, 366, 367, 371, 372, 409, 689-91, 702, 707, 715; overthrow
392-3, 395: war 368
Bowra, C, M, 529
Bradford, Bishop of 514
bravery 280
breakdown of closed societies 178, 546, 613
breeding 77-8, 79, 140-2, 206, 207, 544-5, 560: guardians 45, 49-5i, 75; philosopher king
140-3: Royal Science 601: ruling classes 45, 49, 50, 51; see also eugenics
Broadhead, H, D, 597
Bryson 568
bucket theory of mind 421, 728
Budget 340, 603
Burke, Edmund 2, 107, 250, 271, 346, 432, 435, 575, 666, 669, 671, 696
Burnet, John 63, 180, 527, 549, 584, Ml, 620-1, 632: Aristophanes 627, 628, 630; charmed
circle 546: Demos 632: Greeks and Maoris 613: Parmenides 526: Seventh Letter 584:
Socratic Problem 626-7: soul 621-2: Xenophanes 526, 632-3
Burns, E, 532, 555, 680, 695
Butler, Samuel 2, 128, 585

Caird, E, 225
Callicles HO, HI, 111, 175, 577, 578, 622
Callippus 129, 585
canvas-cleaning 155-6, 188, 198, 200, 205, 305, 686
Capital 298, 299, Ml, 113, 114, 321, 324, 331-2, 341, 345-6, 362, 381, 390-1, 406:
capitalism 373: child exploitation 331, 350, 391: competition 373-4, 375; ethics 406: misery
374-5: profits 388-90, 400: social development 405
capital: centralization 374, 375, 376, 704: concentration 702; constant and variable 389
capitalism: antagonistic tendencies 698: and Christianity 406-7: class structure 355:
contradictions 373-5, 390, 395-6: evils 605: fate 373-96: laissez-faire 299, 350, 456, 690:
Marx 298, 299, HI, HI, 114, 321, 326, HI, 114; moral condemnation 323-4, 416:
overthrow 345-6, 356: rise of HO; unrestrained HO, HI, 185, 187, 190, HI, 691
capitalist competition 448, 375
Carlyle, Thomas 692
Carnap, Rudolf xviii, 547, 650, 654, 678, 718, 728; implicit definitions 656-6: semantics 528
Carneades 1 12, 579
Carmthers, John 610, 683
Carthage 617
caste state 544-5, 554, 589
Catlin, G, E, G, 28, 552, 553, 572, 611, 637
cattle breeders 140
causal explanations 467-8, 728
causality 299, 728, 730
causal laws 517
causal relations 729
centralization 374, 375, 376, 704
centralized economic planning 603
Chaerephon 183, 624, 630
change, theory of 43, 77, 143, 520, 535; Aristotle 222-4; Hegel 250, 259-60: Heraclitus
10-16, 515-18: Jaspers 287; law of revolutions 38, 536: Parmenides 26-7: philosophies of
419-20: Plato 18-20, 23-9, 250; Plato's descriptive sociology 35-8, 53; ruling classes 47;
theory of forms/ideas 524: see also Forms or Ideas; Plato; social change
chaos, myth of 523
Charles V 336
Charmides 18, 519, 583, 586, 590, 623, 630, 632
Charmides 18, Ml, 182, 622
checks and balances, theory of 115-16, 120
child labour 331, 350, 391
children 26, 28, 78, 519, 525, 530, 538, 557, 558, 559, 641: canvas-cleaning 155-6: common
ownership 47-8, 98, 641: communist revolution 94, 389, 636: education 124, 350;
exploitation 389-91: militarist principles 52, 99
Chion 129
chosen people 8, 238, 456, 514
Christianity 9, 63, 293, 716, 722: altruism 98, 99; closed society 237-41, 664, 716; economics
697; equality 476; ethics 285-6, 408-9: French Revolution 245; history 476-7;
humanitarianism 270: Marx 406-7, 457: medieval conversion 270; myths 620; nationalism
662: Plato 134-5: rationalism/irrationalism 440-1, 446-7, 448, 454, 455: rise of 226:
science 478-9; spiritual naturalism 71-2: totalitarianism 100: Toynbee 662-3
Christians in the Class Struggle (Cope) 514
city 54, 533, 598: as super-organism 72, 73, 75, 76
civilization xxxv: origins 38, 304-6, 532-3, 543-4: strain 163, 168, 179, 184, 187, 188, 309,
446, 480, 614
civil peace 576, 606-9
civil war 17, 41, 353, 358, 368, 604-5, 692, 701, 706-16
classes: antagonism 42; collectivism 8; consciousness 301, 322, 394, 395, 681, 696: division
47, 83, 86, 537: egoism 96-7, 99: equilibrium theory 329; Happiness 161, 168: knowing
one's place 87-8, 93, 94, 101-2, 103, 131, 221: Marx 311, 321-6: privileges 87, 91, 93;
rule 83, 168; structure 355, 357; struggles 39, 40, 11, 45-51, 53, 78, 165, 174, 179, 184,
347, 348, 349, 355, 409; war 38-9, 45, 78, 174, 312, 321, 358, 371, 698
class interest 170, 174, 249, 311, Ml, 321-3, 325
classless society 9, 347-8
Clausewitz, Carl von 278
Clearchus 129
Clenias 536
closed societies 55, 57, 165, 166, 178, 179, 180, 189; Christianity 237-41, 664, 716: Fall of
Man 187: naive monism 57-8, 65; organic character 614: see also tribal societies
The Clue to History (Macmurray) 478
Codrus 18, 144, 519, 599, 600
cogs 103
Cohen, M, R, 653, 655, 684, 685
Cole, G, D, H, 688, 693, 709, HO
collective bargaining 384, 401
collective utility 103, 130, HI, 195, 274
collectivism 8, 76, 80, 95-101, 104, 126, 258, 514, 573-4; Hegel 246; H, G, Wells 723;
methodological 303, 686; Plato 91, 94, 130, HI, 195, 196-7: and psychologism 303,
309-10: radical 246; reason 449-50; romantic 481; tribal 75-6
collectivist economic system xxxvi
collectivist theory, morality 452
colonial exploitation 392, 393, 700
commandments 56, 57
commerce 168-9, 174-5
commodity, value 374, 692, 693, 709-10
common meals 47, 538, 574, 575
Communism 2di, xiv, 46-7, 349, 350, 353, 395-6, 555, 682: ideal state 39; principle of 555;
revolution 372, 595
Communist Manifesto ^TL, 329, 352, 356, 364-6, 369, 394, 457, 532, 682, 689, 690, 691, 696,
698, 701, 704, 705-7, 709, 213, 111, 726
competition 331, 373-4, 375: accumulation due to 380: and profits 388
completely abstract society 166
Composition of Forces, principle of 580
compromise 149, 220, 363, 364, 395, 441, 619, 699
Comte, A, 35, 40, 298, 354, 401, 419, 519, 533
condescension 42, 202, 629
Congress of Vienna ix, 263
consciousness 282-3, 301, 116, 322, 324, 325, 329, 335, 348, 355, 356, 362, 394, 395
conspiracy theory of society 306-8, 3 12, 340-1, 687
constant capital 389
constitution 40, 165, 170, 172, 177, 185, 532, 533, 562, 579, 616, 618, 619, 623, 625, 654,
655, 656, 663, 671, 672, 675: democratic 360; England 248, 676; Hegel 256-7, 258, 259:
Kant 562: Plato 597: Roman 663
Constitution of Athens 177-8, 534
consumption 399
contract theory 72, 73, 109, 112, 539, 555, 578, 579; Barker 109, 577; Lycophron 109, 555;
Plato 543: see also social contract
convention, and nature 62, 65, 66, 70, 72-3, 134, 728
conventional social laws 301, 302
conventionalism 72-3, 74, 551: critical see critical dualism; naive 58
Cope, Gilbert 514-15, 611
Corey raean Revolution 170
Cornford, F, M, 524, 525, 536, 537, 642; grading 565; noble lie 587
correlation, definitions 656
correspondence theory 590
corruption 36, 37, 129, 529
cosmic laws 19
cosmos 11
counter cycle policy 387
creative evolution 251, 273, 668, 677
Creator of the Universe 57
credit system 374, 398, Zli
Credo ATL, 731
Crete 40, 45, 53, 536-7, 540, 541
crime 105, 108, HI, 111, 439, 441, 475, 576, 583, 612; Catlin 611; science 609-10
criteria, truth 487-9
Critias 44
Critias 18, 44, IM, 175, 181, 182, 184, 239, 519, 520, 530, 536, 575, 613, 618, 619, 622,
623-4, 630, 632, 638, 680: Levinson's critique 194, 195, 196-7: religion as opium 663
critical dualism 57, 58-61, 63, 65
critical rationalism 435, 437, 442-3, 444, 719
critical thought 513, 619
criticism 176, 492, 493, 496, 504, 505, 507, 640; assumptions 495; free 424-5, 427: scientific
432-3 ; self-criticism 123, IM, 502-3
Critique of All Revelation (Fichte) 266
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant) 252
Crito 184, 624, 625
Cronos 43, 52i, 535; age of 18-19, 521
Grossman, R, H, S, 124, 126, 233, 529, 561, 583-4, 587, 624, 634, 636, 653, 654; definitions
655; Happiness 84-5, 161: propaganda 131, 587
customary life 164, 174
cycles 18, 19, 520-2, 530, 531: laws 18; Plato 40, 471, 530, 531
Cynics 237-8, 550

Damon 542, 543
Darwin, Charles 273, 634, 645
Darwinism 273, 638
Davie s 561, 573
De Anima 228
death duties 376
decay 53,, 250, 521-2, 53 1, 559: historical law of 37-8; human nature 72: Plato 35: ruling
classes 40
decisions 60, 61-3, 64, 482-3, 496, 498, 499, 522, 723
decline and fall 53, 280, 530, 545, 546, 559, 602, 642
Decline of the West 53,
defence 104-5
defined term 227
defining formula 227, 230
definition 95-6, HS, 125, 358; Aristotle 226, 228-9, 230-7: essentialism 226, 227-8, 228-9,
230-1, 233-4, 235-6, 237, 655-61: implicit 656-61: operational 490, 656, 657; and proof
232-3 ; radicalism 154: rationalism/irrationalism 430-1: scientific 230-1, 234-6: theory of
660; of things 29-31; wisdom 122, 123
degeneration, breeding 49-50, 78, 133, 140-2, 222, 250; and change 18-20, 23-5, 27, 29;
Hesiod 10; human nature 72, 76; Plato 35,, 37, 38; ruling castes 143: states 77, 79; see also
change; decay; Forms or Ideas
delusive opinion 26, 27, 66, 21, 21, 523, 524, 526, 549, 557, 588
demands see political demands
democracy 12, 39, 53, iH, 118, 119, 149, 179, 337-8, 360, 361, 368, 370-1, 532; Aristotle
88, 220, 630: Athens ix, xxxviii, 17, 39, 53, 149: criticisms of 120: degeneration 41-3:
economic 335: and freedom 105, 693: Greeks 17; Heraclitus H; industrial revolution 331:
interventionism 340, 350, 391-2: Lenin 705: majority rule 117, 118: and naval imperialism
178: paradox of 1 18, 581-2: Plato on 532, 569-73: requirements of 368-9: Socrates 121,
625-6
Democritus U, 93, 175, 176, 241, 243, 593, 596, 613, 618, 660, 665, 666
demonstrative knowledge 227, 228, 229
Demos 632
depersonalized society 166
derivation 655
Descartes 267, 494, 661-2, 729
descriptive sociology 30; nature and convention 55-80: Plato 35-54
destiny 733; Hegel 225, 277, 282; Heraclitus 10-15, 19; Homer 10, 515; law of 12-15, 19,
36-7: myth of 7-9, 178: Plato 19, 20; see also fate
determinism: biological 9; economic 342: Marx 293-300: science 420; sociological 315, 413,
414, 415-16, 420
de Tocqueville 149, 604
dialecticians 127
dialectical reasoning 698
dialectical studies 126, 584, 592
dialectical twist 254
dialectic triad 253-4
dialectics 243, 670, 672, 716; capitalism, end of 348; Hegel 250-1, 252, 255, 257, 259: and
identity, philosophy of 259-62: Kant 669-70: Marx 313, 698
Dickens, Charles 96-7
dictatorships US, 119, 121, 129, 254, 338, 372; benevolent 149-50, 549, 585-6: Utopian
engineering 149
Diels, H, 190, 192, 502, 515, 517, 525, 543, 612, 618-20, 623
Dik 569
Dio 129, 637
Dionysius 18, 42, 43, 129, 600
dishonesty, age 237, 243, 660
Dissension 78, 133, 163
disunion 40, 43-7, 53, 72, 611, 702
divine: authority 63, 68, 74, 134, 139, Ml, 145-6, 246: city 598; progenitors 71; soul 36-7;
state 246: workmanship 71
division of labour 73, 165, 445, 539, 555, 682, 723, 724
doctrine of the chosen people 8, 238, 514
doctrine of the mean 220
dogmatism 176, 444, 493, 695; reinforced 254, 422, 658, 659, 670
dogs 45, 49, 50, 83, MO, Ml, 285, 539, 540, Ml, 556, 636, Ml
Dorians 48-9, 539, MO, 6M
dualism 313, 314, 526: Christian 3 14: critical 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 69; facts/decisions 482-3,
498, 522; facts/standards 498-9, 506-7: Marx 315; Plato 79-80
Duboc, M, 667
Duemmler, E, 594
du Gard, Roger Martin 147, IM, 602
Duhem, P, 728
Durkheim, E, 167

earthborn, myth of 49, 132, 133, 273, 521, 538, 539
Eastman, M, 522, 602, 682
economic abstinence 46, 50
economic democracy 335
economic historicism 8, 3 1 1-20, 341
economic interventionism 333-6, 338, 339-40
economic law M6, 373, 385, 405, 410, 6M
economic man 303
economic policy, Lenin 156
economic power 335-6, 336, 337-8, 339
economics 303: Christianity 697: Euken's theory 711: interventionism 333-6, 338, 339-40;
Marx 317, 318, 320; natural laws 60; Plato 38, 40, 45, 73, 79; structure of society 323
economism 315, 317, 318, 320
Eddington ix, 448, 466, 551
education 84, 128-9, 350, 480, 540-1, 643: authoritarianism 124, 126, 129: canvas-cleaning
188: future leaders 121, 123, 128: instincts 301-2: institutionalism 126, 129: liberal 221,
643: literary 51, 541, Ml; military 52, 99, 676; morals 482; Plato 50-2, iH, 126-7: ruling
castes 143, 584; state control 106, 124, 125, 138-9
egoism 96-7, 99
Egyptians 537, 544
Eighth Letter 641
Einstein, Albert 235-6, 426, 427
Eisler, Robert 515, 540, 546, 556, 569, 572, 589, 599, 731
emergent evolution 251
Empedocles 519, 520, 521, 523, 526, 529, 531, 644
empiricism 241, 430, 504, 558
employment, children 331, 350, 391: see also unemployment
Encyclopaedia (Hegel) 259, 260, 268, 276
ends 147-8, 150-1, 604-6, 733
energy 75
Engels, F, 311, Ml, 363, 367, 368, 371, 392-3, 408, 110, 680, 682, 684, 686, 688, 690, 691,
693, 695, 696, 701, 703, 705, 706, 215, 726; freedom 316; production 710; theory of
surplus value 378-9, 710
England 248, 268-9, 346, 350, 363, 387, 407, 519, 528, 561, 602, 675; constitution 676:
interventionism 350
England, E, G, 99, 535, 536, 575
entelechy 224, 646
environment, natural/social 55-80, 547, 664-5: marriage laws 301: and morality 414: snakes,
aversion to 302: tribalism 164
Ephesians 12,
Epicureanism 241
Epicurus 665
equalitarianism 88, 89, 90, 91-5, 113, 550, 595: biological naturalism 66; dialectics 257: Kant
722-3: leadership 122: Lycophron 109: open society 179: Pericles 177: Plato 143, 187-8,
563, 569-73; politics 155: private property 534: protectionism 109, Ill: religion 476:
Socrates 93, 95, 124, 125, 179, 180
equalitarian society 45
equality: geometrical 578; Glaucon 636: individual differences 723: Marxism 412: of
opportunity 335; proportionate 563: rationalism 439-41, 445
equilibrium, theory of 38, 44, 50, 329
Eskimos 638
essences 27-8, 29, 30, 70, 71, 526, 528, 533, 562, 576, 581, 591; Aristotle 645, 647-9, 662:
England's note 528; Hegel 250, 251, 254; hidden 729; Marx 383
essentialism 651, 652, 656, 661, 662, 664, 668, 669: Aristotle 223-4: biological 273:
definitions 528, 655-61: fate 282; legal system 328; Marx 317, 692-3: methodological 29,
30-1: social sciences 528; versus nominalism 649-61
Estabrooks, G, H, 638
ethical idea 86, 277: war 274
ethical individuahsm 66
ethical naturalism 68, 552
ethical nihilism 68, 1 12
ethical positivism 65, 68, 69, 74, 255
ethics: education 482; Marx 405-16: moral judgements 169, 551, 572, 656: rationalism
437-45, 448; relativism 408-9: rehgion 483; responsibility 59; scientific 551, 552: Socrates
27-8: see also morality
Euclid 190, 193
eugenics 49-50, 77, 78, 138, 139, 140-2, 187, 206, 207, 559
Euken, Walter 711
Eurastus 585
Euripides 67, 91, 175, 550, 618
Euthyphro 186, 635
evil: degeneration 39, 597; Fall of Man 187; Plato's 36, 37; state 43
evolution: creative 251, 273, 668, 677; emergent 251: law of 684: of society 40; origin of
species 37, 522, 644
evolutionary mysticism 635
Ewing, A, C, 561
Existence 225, 286, 287
exogamy, rules of 301
experience 228, 230, 503-6
expertise 124, 129
exploitation 330, 375, 376, 379, 380, 382, 384, 389; children 389-91: colonial 392, 393, TOO

facts: and decisions 59-64, 20, 482-3, 493, 496, 498, 499, 522, 723, 728; and standards
485-95, 498-510
faith in reason 436, 439, 442-3, 450, 460-1
fallibilism 490-94, 510
fallibilistic absolutism 493
Fall of Man 39, 54, 77, 78, 133, 143, 187, 520, 532
false morality 278
fame 15, 282, 480, 482
families 17, 25, 39
fanaticism 240
Faraday, M, 448
Farrington, B, 529
fascism 245, 272-3, 350, 371-2: Central Europe 700: heroic man 274: historical philosophy 9
fatalism 2di, xxxviii, 282
fate 15,, 225, 282, 484: see also destiny
fatherhood of God 237-8, 461
feudalism 221, 323, 345: medieval 245
Fichte, J, G, 236, 265-9, 281, 293, 562, 598, 666, 668, 669, 674-5, 680: and Kant 718:
national state 680
Field, G, C, 522, 526: Second Letter 633: Socratic Problem 627
fierceness 50-1, 52
final cause 222-4
fire 13-14, 518-19
First World War 326
Fisher, H, A, L, 401, 733
flux, universal 515-18, 520, 523: see also change, theory of
formal freedom 332, 335, 337, 675-6, 681, 693
Forms or Ideas 17-31, 39, 83, 127, 522, 523; Aristotle 223: bed 554: descriptive sociology
35-6, 37, 38, 53, 54; divine state 77; education 126: Good 136, 137, 590-2: natural/social
environments 70; searching after truth 125: wisdom 136, 137-8
Foster, M, B, 673, 732
Fourier, C, 398
Fowler 197, 198, 199
fraternity 278
Frederick William III, king 246, 247, 248, 249, 254, 256-7, 262, 267
free markets 333, 400
free will 414
freedom: class struggles 322; education 124: Engels 316: formal/material 332, 337; Hegel
257-8, 261; interventionism 338; kingdom of 331; love of 406, 116; Marx 313, 314, 114,
412: paradox of HI, 333, 338, 339, 575, 581, 582, 671, 111, 219; planning 398; and
power of the state 104-6: and rationalism/irrationalism 443: realm of 420, 429: and religion
476: revolt against 178: thought 256: and violence 360
French Revolution 16, 245, 265, 267-8, 298, 119, 514
Freud, S, Ill, Mi, 611, 660, 717
Freyer, H, 280, 677, 678
friends 167, 334, 402, 441, 442, 450, 480, 555, 569, 574, 587, 599, 601, Ml, 630, 690
futurism 521; moral 411, 412, 413, 476, 681, 724

Gabii 616, 611
Galiani, Abbe 716
gamblers 679, 733
gangster philosophy 189, 284, 287, 336, 647
Gauss 232
general interpretations 471-2
generalizing sciences 468-9, 470
genus 533
geometrical equality 578
geometry 190-1, 211, 563-9, 567
German Idealism 243, 247
German manhood 281
German nationalism 262-70, 275, 286
German Romantic Movement 271
Germany 249, 261, 287-8, 326, 674
Glaucon 94-5, 95, HO, HI, Ml, 155, 578-9, 636
Glauconic Edict Ml, 142
glory 282, 283
Gobineau, Count 9, 514
Godel, K, 490
gods 68, 237-8, 261-2, 306, 532; Form or Idea 25; Heraclitus 10; will of 8, 23
Goethe, J, W, von 668, 6M
Gogarten 285
gold Zli, 111
Golden Age 10, 18, 20, 23, 521, 530
Golden Rule 443
Gombrich, E, H, xvii-xxviii, 673, 687
Gomperz, T, 85, 127, 220, 222, 526, 537, 542, 550, 561, 573, 574, 594, 619, 620, 622, 647,
619, 640: ascent theories 644-5: Crito 624
good 84, 551-2, 590-2: and evil 80, 590; fmal cause 222-4: life 644
Good Samaritan 240
good shepherd analogy 48, 49, 52, 538-9
goodness 136, 137, 523, 53 1, 533
Gorgias 66, M, 111, 112; equalitarianism 90, 122: geometry 191: individualism/collectivism
100: protectionism UO, HI, 113
Gorgias 175, 577, 593, 595
grasshopper analogy 521, 539, 589
Great Cycle 517-18
Great Dictator 254, 283
Great Dog 146
Great Generation 67, 175, 177, 184, 185, 187, 188, 202, 238, 245; open/closed society, conflict
237,241
great lawgiver 43
Great Man 16, 274, 278, 283, 471, 480
Great Men 278, 283, 421
Great Mystery 126
Great Myth of Sparta 40
Great Philosopher 247
Great Year 18, 518, 520, 521, 521
Greeks 16-18, 25, 35, 29, 598; religion 25; slavery 122, 220-1, 630: society 163-5, 167,
167-70
Green, T, H, 288, 525
Grote, G, 21, 85, 516, 519, 521, 539, 621, 616, 642, 661, 662; Aristotle 640, 641, 642; and
Meyer 616; Nous 648; Plato criticism 529, 561, 521, 592, 625; Socrates 556, 584, 589, 590,
625
guardians 45, 49-51, 25, 82, 94, 102, 101, HI, 140, Ml, 141, 144, 206, 202
guns 92, 116, 202
gymnastics 51

Haeckel, E, 273, 676
Haiser, F, 277-8
Happiness 136, 161, 163, 441-3, 501, 533, 548-9, 554, 602-3
harmonics 142, 144
Harris, W, T, 646
Hastie 562
Hayek, F, A, von xxn, xxy, xxvii, 498, 119, 603-4, 636, 659, 677, 686, 695, 700, 213
heat 651, 666: and sound 243
Heath, T, 564, 566, 568
Hecker, J, F, 688, 697
Hegel, F, ix, x, 9, 135, 244-7, 248, 249-50, 254, 256, 259, 267, 289: absolute idealism 688:
Aristotelian roots 2 1 9-4 1: change 250, 259-60: formal freedom 693: freedom 257-8, 261,
293: historicism 219, 226, 242, 246, 250-62, 269-70, 271, 272, 278, 285, 288; idealism
244, 247, 319, 320; Kierkegaard 479; knowledge 420, 428, 429; logic 515; Marx 313-14:
Meyer 616: morality 416: new tribalism 272-89; rationalism 432, 451-2, 460; relativism
507-10: Schopenhauer 732: self-consciousness 646, 717: slavery 225, 646-7: Whitehead
452
Hegemann, W, 612, 624, 621
Heidegger, M, 286, 628, 629
Heine, H, 319, 320
Heraclides 129
Heraclitus 9, 10-16, 38, 53, 69, 28, 515, 521; beasts quote H, 42, 69, 25, 94, 99, 145, 189,
241, 313, 546, 579: cyclic laws 18; history 260-1: leadership 117: oppo sites 251-2: Plato
19, 20; strife 39, 129; universal flux 515-18, 520, 523
Herder, J, G, 264-5, 545, 562, 612, 666, 674
herdsmanship 49
heredity 414, 115, 560
heritage 440
Hermias 585
Hermodoms 12
Herodotus 91, 175, 619
heroes 25, HO, 122, 142, 180, 187, 247, 283, 284, 480
heroic life 274
heroic man 274, 284
heroism 164, 284
Hesiod 10, 11, 37, 38, 53, 103, 178, 515, 542, 549, 569, 588; metals 521, 531; myth of chaos
523
hidden reason 260
Hippias 66, 91, 203, 550
Hippodamus 165, 522, 612, 614
historical decay, law of 37-8
historical descriptions 467
historical: materialism 311-13, 315, 317-20, 321, 688
historical prophecy see historicism; prophecy, historical
historical relativism 408-9, 681
historical sciences 469
historical theory of the nation 269-70
historicism x, xxxvi, 521, 733: and change 16; definition xxxvii, 7-8, 681: economic 8,
311-20, 341, 345: and Forms/Ideas 26, 31; Hegel 219, 226, 242, 246, 250-62, 269-70,
271, 272, 278, 285, 288; Heraclitus 10, H; Marxism 272; myth of destiny 7-9; social
engineering clash 21-3, 334: theory of society 40; see also Marx; Plato; prophecy
historicist methodology 71
historicist moral theory 405-16, 481
historism 413, 421
History of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides) 169-75, 182
Hobbes, T, HI, 133, 662
Hobhouse 288
holism 2d-2di, 2dii, 2dY, 91, 89, 303, 338, 450, 635; justice 89; Marxism 338; Plato 75, 76, 88,
94
Homer 10, 306, 477, 479, 515, 539, 541-2, 572, 598, Ml
hubris 179
human: Plato 597-8
human cattle 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 83, 541
humanism 460
humanitarianism 67, 86, 97, 113, 174, 179, 199-200, 202, 203, 579, 663; anti-281; Athens
176, 177: biological naturalism 65-8, 69; Hegel 262, 293 ; justice 99, 100; Marx 293-4,
330, 341, 402; Plato 85, IM, 187, 188, 200; rationalism 440, 443, 444-5, 460: and religion
270, 476, 477: and protectionism 109, 113: Socrates 186: and tyranny 173
humanity 143: Fichte 281
human nature 64, 69, 72, 79, 284, 302, 551, 580, 609; hidden motives 422, 423; laws 301, 401,
458; Mill 299, 301, 303, 304; limitations 629; rationalism 433, 439, 440; society 69, 305,
310: Toynbee 458
Humboldt, Wilhelm von 509
Hume, D, ix, 252, 267, 420, 451, 543-4, 577, 655
Husserl, E, 232, 670, 678, 685, 720, 728
Huxley, A, 723
Huxley, T, H, 643, 684
hypotheses 56, 469: science 229: working 466-7

idealism 83, 129, 153: absolute 688: German 243, 247
ideal state 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 84, 148; see also Best State; Forms or Ideas;
Plato
Ideas, theory of 17-31, 39, 532: Aristotle 223: change, theory of 529: descriptive sociology
35-6, 37, 38, 51, 54; education 126: Hegel 251, 255: natural/social environments 70;
philosopher king 130: Plato 83; power of 318-19: truth 125: Socrates 527: space 525: see
also Forms or Ideas
identity 259: of opposites 15,; philosophy of 254, 255, 509, 670
imagination 438, 444, 445-6
immobilized capital 389
immorality see morality
impartiality 51, 86, 93, 170, 424, 426, 440, 441, 442, 443, 615
imperfections 188: see also perfection
imperialism 393, 700, 702; Athens 169, 171-4: modern 392; naval 178; Sparta 173
implicit definition 656-61
incest 301
independent thought 139, 592
indeterminism 415
individualism 80, 91, 95-101, 104, 109, 111, 111, 143, 155, 167, 177, 480, 481, 585 ; Plato on
187-8: and protectionism 1 11, 113: and psychologism 303, 309-10: and rationalism
449-50;; and religion 135; Socrates 122, 124, 180
indoctrination 106
induction 649: problem of 722: Socrates 192
inductive interference 70
inductive method 580, 581, 655
industrial reserve army 391, 374, 375-6, 386, 391
industrial revolution 330, 331
industrialization 356, 357: age of 445
inequality 47, 73,, 76, 89, 439: Kant 722-3: Rousseau 674: see also equalitarianism
infanticide 49, 207, 541
initial conditions 468
innovation, fear of 84, 531
inquisition 184 the Inquisition 189, 239
instincts 75, 301-2
institutional control, of rulers 116, 117, 119, 129
institutional intervention 340-1
institutional selection 128
institutions 401, 686: beginnings of society 304-6: education 126, 129: legal system 328;
machine analogy 64-5: personal solutions 339-40; psychologism 302-3
insubordination 127
intellectual independence 139, 592
intellectual intuition 29, 231-2, 651-60
intellectual superiority 48, 50
intellectualism xiv-xvi, xxxix, 84, 430; authoritarian 432-3 ; Hegel 271: moral 121, 123; and
rationalism 447, 450, 455; Socrates 121, 121, 121, HA, 129
international crime 108, 151, 460, 475, 476, 482, 576, 606
international peace 576, 606-9
international relations 102, 225
international trade, theory of 64
inter-personal theory 432-3
interpretation, historical 163, 471-2, 473-4, 628
interventionism 350, 352, 387, 391-2, 393, 699, 712: economic 333-6, 338, 339-40:
institutional 340-1: piecemeal 397-8; state 384-5, 398: and rationalism 459
intuition 285, 433, 434, 513, 635; of essences 651-3: intellectual 29, 227, 228, 231-2, 651-60
intuitive knowledge 227, 228, 503-6
Ionian school 515, 619
irrational behaviour 309
irrationalism 156, 157, 420, 422, 659-60, 664; geometric 190-1: and truth 496; Hegel 271:
Toynbee 454-60; Whitehead 451-4: see also rationalism
irresponsibility, age of 243
Isocrates 129, 144, Ml, 682
isolation 166
isonomy 569, 570, 612

Jaspers, K, 286, 287, 679
Jeans, J, 448
Jews 10, 238, 620: Babylonian conquest 16, 238
Joad, C, E, M, 84, 561
judges 93
Julian the Apostate 239, 663
Jung, E, 281
juridical positivism 65, 68, 254, 262, 269, 552, 676
justice xxxix: absolute 84; Adam 94, 569: Aristotle 88; definition 86-9: and individualism 97;
Marx 416: Plato 135, 293; relativist interpretation 408: Socrates 180: totalitarian 83-1 13: to
the universe 223; and war j_5; World's Court of 225, 251

Kafka, F, 449
Kant, Immanuel 205-6, 252, 258, 669: constitution 562: dialectics 669-70: equalitarianism
722-3: and Ewing 561: Golden Rule 443: and Hegel 508, 509; individualism 98; knowledge
421: nationalism 265, 266: and Nietzsche 497-8; peace 594: Prolegomina 451-2: proof 236
Kapp, W, 370
Katz, D, 685
Kaufmann, E, 280
Kautsky, K, 544
keeping one's station 87-8, 93, 94, 101-2, 103: Aristotle 221: and happiness 161, 168:
physician example 131
Keller, A, 445
Kelsen, H, 529, 601-2, 634
Kepler, J, 242, 493
Kierkegaard, S, 407, 479, 731
King, C, 504
Kingship of the Law 117
Kleist, Heinrich von 497-8
knowledge: and fallibihsm 491-2; growth of 491-2, 498: intuitive 227, 228, 503-6: know
thyself 193, 629: moral 121: and opinion 227, 557: receptacle theory 421: sociology of
419-29, 447: sources 493-4, 503-6: theory of 420, 485, 496
Kolnai, A, 281, 282, 287, 288, 725
Kraus, K, 698, 701
Krohn 573
Kuratowski, K, 545

labour 339, 379, 380, 384; division of 73, 165, 445, 539, 555, 682, 723, 724; manual 555, 595,
642; productivity 388-90, 398-9: theory of value 377-83, 709-10
Laird, J, 720
laissezfaire 124, 299, 350, 456; capitalism 299, 350, 456, 690; liberalism 299
Langford, C, H, 720
language 443-4: Carnap 725: precision 96, 231, 234-5, 250; theory 264-5, 269: tripartition
721, 722
Lassalle, Ferdinand von 515, 519
Laurat, L, 695
Laws 44, 66, 21, 525: best state 523 ; betrayal of Socrates 184: change, theory of 530: critique of
text, reply to 200, 201: cyclicity 521: degeneration 522: descriptive sociology 38-9, 43, 44,
46, 48, 53,; equalitarianism 92; essence of things 528; Forms, theory of 524:
individualism/collectivism 98-9: indoctrination 125: influence on Aristotle 221: justice 88;
origins of things 72; Plato 36, 520: reactionary character 85; religion 134-5: soul 524, 529:
spiritual naturalism 74
laws 535: accumulation 390-1: brutal 141: competition 375: destiny 12-15: development 37-8,
346: Heraclitus 517: increasing misery 376, 377, 385, 392, 393-6; of increasing wealth 376;
political revolutions 38, 53, 536: sociology 19; sociological 36-7, 44, 60-2, 64, 65, 684:
supply and demand 381-2: see also natural laws; normative laws; universal laws
leadership 2, 3, 99, 208, 209, 210, 211, 283, 585; and education 121: natural leaders 69; Plato
114-29: principle 149; selection 119, 125, 127, 128, 129
legal system 327-42
leisured classes 643
Lenin 156, 295, 313, 318, 373: imperialism 393: New Economic Policy 156: social engineering
683 ; Vulgar Marxists 311, Ml, 322, 422
Lenz, F, 281
Leptines 129
Lessing 674
Leucippus 517
Levinson, Professor Ronald B, 194-212
Lewis, Sinclair 637
liar, paradox of 435, 436, 458, 719, 720, 721
liberal education 221, 643
liberalism 117, 106, 406, 506-7, 509; laissezfaire 299
liberty 28, 39, 41, 176, 203, 233, 406, 562, 570, 581, 636, 664, 671; Hegel 257, 258, 259
lies 130-2, 134-5, 141, 206: lordly/noble 587-8; Plato 186, 195; see also paradox of liar;
propaganda
Lindsay, A, D, 534, 588, 593
Lippmann, Walter 214, 293, 336, 513
liquidation 611
literary education 51, 541, 643
Locke 729
logic 655; Hegel 515; norms 547; power 308-9, 687: situational 308-9, 324, 326, 470
love 531; freedom 406, 116; mystic 635; and rationalism 440, 441-2, 444, 450
Loyola, Ignatius 459, 727
Ludendorff, General 280
Lutoslawski 633
Lybyer, A, H, 540
Lycophron 67, 72, 91, 108, 109, UO, 175, 577
Lysander 175

[admin]

Part 2 of 2

Mabbott, J, D, xxix, 523
Macaulay 580, 581
Macedon 220, 221, 640-1
machinery 64-5, 385-6: Marx 297, 318, 323, 328, 330, 334, 369, 374, 376, 379, 380, 382,
385, 386, 389, 398, 446, 689, 713-14
Macleod, W, C, 544
Macmurray, J, 447, 448, 478, 731
McTaggart, J, 244, 634, 635, 224
Magee, Bryan xxx, 522, 604, Ml, 698
magical monism 65
magical thinking 63, 122, 165, 167-8, 176
magical tribalism 55, 58, 164, 178, 513, 613
majority rule ill, 118, 117, US, 581, 582
Malinowski, B, 684
managerialism xxxviii
manhood 281
Manifesto see Communist Manifesto
mankind 406, 638; history 332, 345, 455, 474-6, 681, 731: unity 550, 595-8
Mannheim, H, 606
Mannheim, K, 420, 716, 211
manual labour 555, 595, 642
Maoris 611
Marinelli, W, 567
Marx, Karl 154, 219, 325, 326, 328: autonomy of sociology 301-10: class struggles 321-6:
coming of socialism 345-54: economic historicism 3 1 1-20: ethics 405-16: fate of
capitalism 373-96: historical materialism 18; historical philosophy 9; legal/social system
327-42; method 291-342: moral theory 405-16, 481: prophecy, historical 397-402:
psychologism 299-303, 322: rationalism 455-7: revolution, social 355-72: Schwarzchild's
book 510-11: Toynbee's assessment 455-7: utopianism, criticism of 153-4
Marxism 293-300, 522: Capitalist evils 605: communism 683-4: dogmatism 695: essentialism
692-3: Hegel 245, 313-14: Hegelianism 681; historicism 293-8, 315-17, 353, 362, 364
Masaryk, T, 261, 673-4, 680
material things H, H, 71
materialism 74, 241; historical 18, 311-13, 315, 317-20, 321, 688: and rationalism 414, 435,
440, 445-6
mathematics 318, 451, 563, 563-9, 567, 657, 725: geometry 190-1, 211, 563-9, 567: see also
Platonic Number
meals 64, 473, 575
meanings 653-5, 657-8, 722, 731: definitions 230, 234-5: history 474-84: life 732-3
means and ends 147-8, 150-1, 604-6, 733
mechanical engineering 64, 686
mechanization 445-6
medicine, lies as 131, 141
medieval feudalism 245
Meletus 584
Menexenus or the Funeral Oration 92, 177, 186, 92, 570, 571, 619
Menger, A, 683
Menger, K, 547, 650, 687
Meno 121
Mesopotamian civilization 544
meta-biology 78, 560
Metaphysics 221, 516, 517, 518, 523-7, 530, 549, 554, 564, 577
metaphysics xxxvii, 252, 273, 286, 451, 454, 590, 696, 732; Marx 696, 711; soul 622
methodological collectivism 303, 686
methodological determinism 315, 413, 414, 415-16, 420
methodological essentialism 29, 30-1
methodological individualism 303, 309, 310
methodological nominalism 30-1, 528, 647
Metz, R, 288
Meyer, E, HI, 172, 278, 615-16, 617, 618, 620, 623, 637, 678, 730, 731
middle classes 355-7
midwifery 122
Miksch, Leonhard 711
Milford, P, 612
militarism 574
militarist principles 98, 208, 209, 210, 211
military caste 45
military discipline 98, 127
military education 52, 99, 676
Mill, James 580
Mill, J, S, 298, 299, 301, 303, 304, 308, MO, 312-13, 316, 528, 533, 560, 579-81
mind, bucket theory of 421, 728
misanthropy 601, 619
misery 373, 375-7, 382, 384, 385, 387, 388, 391, 402, 554, 111; decreasing 391, 392, 394:
Euken's theory 711: Marxism 357, 364: revolutions 714: trade cycle 389
misology 189, 619
mistakes, learning from 152-3, 156-7, 491-2, 498, 501, 503-5, 510
modern imperialism 392, 393
The Modern Nation (Ziegler) 288
modernism, moral 412
Mohammed 447, 459
Monarchy 259, 260
money 337, 538, Ml, 573, 577, 583, 617, 618, 636-7, 642, 709, 711-13
monism 70, 551: magical 65; naive 57-8, 65
monopoly 54, 125, 362, 378, 381, 384, 393
monotheism 237, 593, 595, 596
Moore, G, E, 656
moral conservatism 412
moral degeneration 19, 76
moral excellence 121
moral futurism 411, 412, 111, 476, 681, 724
moral intellectualism 121, 123
moral judgements 169, 551, 572, 656
moral knowledge 121
moral modernism 412
moral nihilism 102
moral opinion 554
moral positivism 225, 250-62, 411-13, 547
moral theory: historicism 405-16: rationalism 437-45
moral urgency 548
moral valuations 47, 572, 604
morality 107, 278, 448, 483; and capitalism 323-4; closed society 103, 480; collectivist theory
452: equality 572; false 278; Hegel 225, 250-62, 262: theory of 452; totalitarian 102, 103,
113, 130, 133: value theory 709-10: see also ethics
Morgenthau, H, J, 576
Morrow, G, R, 538, 562
motion, theory of 223, 525
motives 422, 423
Mueller, A, 266, 288
music 5i, 52, 139, 415-16, 542-3
mystic: intuition 635
mysticism 14, 78, 79, 139, 236, 237, 258, 396, 408, 422, 515, 634-5, 718, 724: closed society
513: evolutionary 635: Heraclitus 517: and rationalism 434, 445-50: number 78, 242, 536:
religion 460
Myth of Blood and Soil 132, 133
myth of chaos 523
myth of destiny 7-9, 178
Myth of the Earthborn 132, 133, 273, 521, 538, 539
Myth of the Metals in Man 132
myth of revolution 445

Nagel, E, 653, 655
naive conventionalism 58
naive monism 57-8, 65
naive naturalism 58
Napoleon 61, 244, 264, 266, 267, 269, 411, 674
National Genius 275
nationalism 175, 274, 460, 662, 675, 680; Christianity 662; German 262-70, 674; Hegel 275,
279, 676, 715; Schopenhauer 668
national self-determination 263, 680
national state, principle of 263, 264, 606, 607, 674, 680
natural environment 55-80, IM, 301, 302, 414, 547, 664-5
natural laws 55-70, 552-4, 555-6; see also natural environment
natural leaders 69
natural places, theory of 223, 225
natural privilege 87, 91, 93
natural rights 68, 69, 92
naturalism 70, 72-3, 273, 549, 554: biological 65-7, 577; equality 67; ethical 68, 552: naive
58; Plato 83, 72-3, 92, 549, 555, 556, 561, 578, 612; psychological/spiritual 65, 69, 71-2,
74, 134, 552-3, 554, 555-6
naturalistic historicism 8, H, 83
naturalistic theory of slavery 220
nature 71-2: and convention 72-3: of the good 551-2: and soul 71, 554
naval imperialism 178
« -dimensionality 650
Nelson, L, 545, 582, 585
Neurath, Otto 196
New Economic Policy (NEP) 156, 295
Newton 190, 242, 455, 471, 493, 729
Nicolovius 675
Nietzsche, F, 497-8, 498, Ml, 544, 601-2
nihilism 175, 286, 287, 497, 498
nominalism 528, 649-61: definitions 230-1, 234, 528; methodological 30-1, 528, 647
non-intervention 106, 333, 384
normative laws (norms) 56-70, 74, 96, 546, 547, 552, 553, 686: logic of 547-8: monistic
tendency 551
Nothingness 286, 287
Nous 648

objective: description 467: Hegel 255, 261, 271: knowledge 422: methods 423-7, 687: value
379, 709
objectivity 431, 423-8, 431, 442, 473, 502
offence 278, 447, 475
Old Oligarch 187, 188, 195, 262, 619, 622, 623
oligarchy 39, 40-1, 43, 519
operational definitions 490, 656, 657
opinion 66; delusive 26, 27, 66, 71, 77, 523, 524, 526, 549, 557, 588: knowledge distinction
227, 527: moral 554: science 229
Oppenheimer, F, 544
opportunism 134, 135, 413
opportunity, equality 335
opposites: identity of 15,, 254: table of 523, 524, 560: unity of 251-5, 257, 518-19: war of 252
oracular philosophy 226, 237, 402, 413, 438, 444, 447, 659, 660
organic theory of state 72, 166, 167, 251, 613, 614, 666
organic tribalism 167
origin of species 37, 522, 644
Orphic mystery 620
Orphic sects 178, 540
Osborn, H, F, 645

Paine, T, 69
paradox of democracy 118, 581-2
paradox of freedom UJ, 333, 338, 339, 575, 581, 582, 671, 111, 719
paradox of the liar 719, 720
paradox of sovereignty 115, 116, 117, 118, 582, 719
paradox of tolerance 581, 723
Pareto 38, 118, 239, 268, 270, 348, 482, 536, 636, 680
Paris Commune 701, 726
Parkes, H, B, 366, 388, 391, 703, 709, 111, IM
Parmenides 127
Parmenides 26-7, 524, 620, 633: change il; knowledge and opinion 647: mystic unity 718:
Opinion of the Mortals 526: Way of Delusive Opinion 523
passion 149, 283, 411, 434, 439, 440, 531
passivist theory of knowledge 420-1
patriotism 170, 175, 177, 262, 266, 589, 600, 673
pauperism 392
peace, civil/international 576, 606-9
Peloponnesian war 17, 169-75, 182
perception 557-8; limitations of 77-8, 79-80
Perdiccas III 585
perfect competition 693-4
perfect state 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, M, 148; see also Best State; Forms or Ideas;
Plato
perfection 24, 25, 29, 36, 39, 72, 530
perfectionism 147-57
Pericles 3, 91, 92, 93, 100, 175, 176, 237, 238, 514; funeral oration 176-7: School of Hellas
172, 177: Thucydides' version 570
Persian conquests 620
Persian Empire 53,, 530, 620
personal decisions 165
personal intervention 340
personal relations, theory of 225, 432, 480
personal responsibility xxxix, 164, 165, 188, 189, 239-40, 416, 483
personal solutions 339-40
personalism 120: anti-institutional 585
persuasion 76, 132, 327, 577, 586, 588-90, 637
pessimism/optimism 222-3, 250-1, 285, 401, 535
Phaleas 165
Pharisaism 48
Philebus 137
philosopher king 130-46, 599, 601, 673-4: Mill 601; Plato as 144-6, 601
philosophical method 242
Philosophy of Existence 286, 287
Philosophy of History (Hegel) 261, 279, 646, 666, 673, 675, 678
Philosophy of History (Marx, Plato) 9, 79, 140
philosophy of identity 254, 255, 509, 670
Philosophy of Law (Hegel) 256, 257, 259, 268, 276, 279
Philosophy of Nature (Hegel) 243-4
physics U, 30, H, 297, 427, 451, 467-9, 471, 517, 518, 577, 645, 654, 653, 655, 729, 731
piecemeal interventionism 397-8
piecemeal scientific methods 428
piecemeal reform 156, 537, 610
piecemeal social engineering xxxvi, 21, 147, 148-9, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157, 338, 340, 341,
352, 387, 442, 443, 537, 603, 610, 699, 734
Pindar 66, 73, 547, 549, 555, 577
planets 493
Plataea 615
Plato ix, X, xxxix, 3, 9, 147-57, 185, 189, 201, 207-8, 211, 549; Aristotle's criticism 642:
Aristotle, influence 220-6; attack background 161-89: betrayal of Socrates 184-5:
biographical details 17-18; change 13, 419, 420, 530; class struggles 39, 40-1, 43-50;
collectivism 196-7: conflict of 185-7, 188-9: cycles 530: critique, reply to 193-212:
descriptive sociology 36, 38-9, 41, 43, 44, 46, 49, 51; education 127; equality 91, 92, 93;
Fall of Man 187 geometry 190-1: Gospels, influence 662: Greek tribes 10; and Hegel 242,
245-7, 250, 251, 254, 257, 732; and Heraclitus 15, 16, 19, 20, 516-17: individualism 98,
100: inquisition 184: intellectualism 124: leadership principle 1 14-29: Macedon 640-1:
philosopher king 144-6, 601: political programme 83-157: and Protagoreanism 549:
religion as opium 348, 590, 663: Seventh Letter 519, 520; slavery 186, 203-5, 537; theory
of definition 660: theory of forms/ideas 1 7-3 1: totalitarian justice 83-1 13: tyranny 187:
violence, approval 196: see also Republic
Platonic Number 77, 78, 79, 142, 143, 144, 557, 558-9, 599
pleasure maximization 501, 548-9: see also utilitarianism
Plutarch 550, 557, 563, 565, 569, 615, 642
Poincare 55 1
Poland 470
Polanyi, K, 528
political constitution: Hegel 256-7, 258, 259: see also constitution
political demands 35, 38, 44, 85, 86, 91, 104, 106, 107, 120, 140, 142, 143, 263, 440, 442,
443, 582, 691, 723: see also propositions/proposals
political economy: Marx 682, 685, 686, 688, 689, 690, 691, 696
political history 475-6, 480, 484
political intervention see interventionism
political justice 88, 563
political power 335-8; history 475-6, 480, 484; Marx 338-9, 405: money 709, 711-13:
proletariat 706: unchecked 115-16: see also power
political problems 496-8
political programme, Plato's 83-157
political revolutions 16, 44, 167, 330, 110; law of 38, 53, 536
political utilitarianism 102
politics xv-xvi, 171, 641: state theory 327-42
Politicus see Statesman
Polybius 663
polytheism: Homer 10
Poor Law 406, 716
Popper-Linkeus, J, 613, 683
Poseidon 519
positivism, ethical 225, 250-62, 411-13, 547
Posterior Analytic 228
Pound, Roscoe 522, 602, 604
poverty, avoidance 47
The Poverty of Historic ism (Popper) xxxvii, 522
power ill, 124, 129, IM, 309, 370, 379, 398, 667; economic 335-6, 337-8, 339: and
freedom 104-6: history 475-6, 480; logic 308-9, 687: Marxism 338-9, 405: philosopher
king 130-46: unchecked 115-16: will to 601-2: see also political power
power-politics 180, 636
pragmatic rationalism 723
pragmatism 296, 297
prediction xxxvii, 576, 604, 687, 695, 714: science 352, 401-2: see also historicism; prophecy,
historical
prejudices 427, 428, 429: see also bias
priest caste 592, 663
Primary Bodies, Theory of 564-6
primitive society 44, 48
primogenitor 23-6, 29, 36, 20, 21
privileges 87, 91, 93, 108
Process and Reality (Whitehead) 451-4
production 322, 330, 324, 126, 328, 385, 696, 204, 211; Marx 316-17, 318, 346-7
productivity: increasing 321, 388-90, 398-9, 400, 401
professionalism 221-2
profits 328, 388-90, 400
prognosis 468, 469
progressivists 44, 45, 85, 154, 401, 509, 535, Mi
Prolegomina (Kant) 45 1-2
proletariat 329, 338, 355, 357, 365, 715: bourgeousification 392-3, 395; morality 409, 410:
revolution 353, 364: see also workers
proof 229-31, 232-3, 647: doctrine of 236
propaganda 131-2, 206, 233-4, 274, 278-9: see also lies
property 15, 42, 46, 82, 98, 112, 156, 252, 269, 332-4, 336, 339, 350-1, 356, 362, 689, 693,
704, 705, 711, 715, 721
prophecy xxxvii, xxxix, 20, 689: evaluation 397-402: law of increasing misery 394-5: Marx
345-93: see also historicism
proportionate equality 563, 565
propositions/proposals 498-9, 499-501, 507, 548, 657, 659
prosperity 47, 176: dangers of 279
Protagoras 55, 58, 63, 64, 72, 73, 134, 175, 203, 550
Protagoreanism 549
protection by the state 334, 335
protectionism 106-13, 175, 577-9, 582, 694
Proudhon, P, 332
Providence 260, 262, 278, 280
Prussia 244, 246, 249, 250, 254, 256, 259, 261, 268; monarchism 260; nationalism 263, 265-6
Prussianism 246, 250
pseudo-rationalism 433, 434, 483
psycho-analysis 422-3, 446-7, 634, 111
psychological naturalism 65, 69, 71-2, 74, 134, 552-3, 554, 555-6
psychologism 299-300, 301, 302-3, 304-6, 308, 309-10, 316, 322, 547, 560, 609, 685
public opinion 279
Pure Being 286
Pure Nothingness 286, 287
Pythagoras 14, 78, 139, 180: geometry 563-9, 567: table of opposites 523, 524, 560: theorem
122
Pythagorean creed 185
Pythagorean number mysticism 78, 242, 536
Pythagorean programme 190, 191, 564
Pythagorean taboos 514, 619
Pythagorean theory, soul 644
Pythagoreanism 185, 191, 526, 527, 564, 569, 583, 620, 628, 631, 632

quasi-theories 472
Quine, W, V, 492, 545

rabble proletariat 357
race: Kolnai 282: and nature 71
The Race as the Principle of Value (Lenz) 281
racial degeneration 19, 76, 78, 142, 143, 250, 599
racial superiority 9, 47-50
racialism 9, 132, 133, 143, 201, 273, 282, 545: Plato 206: see also eugenics
Rader, M, M, 619
radical collectivism 246
radicalism 156: and aestheticism 154-7: irrationalism 156: Marx 362; skepticism 421, 424, 427
Ramsey, R, P, 226
rate of profit 388-90, 400
rational behaviour 309
rationalism 165, 166, 178, 271, 284, 119, 420, 430-52, 459-61, 512-13, 524, 671-2, 718:
abstract 271: comprehensive/critical/uncritical 435, 437, 442-4, 719: pragmatic 723; see
also irrationalism
rationality 78, 79, 165, 166, 178, 284, 419
Rats, Lice, and History (Zinsser) 240-1
reality 317, 383
reason 27, 75, 125, 149, 176, 179-80, 189, 252-3, 283-4: faith in 436, 439, 442-3, 450,
460-1; Hegel 255, 261, 271, 432, 451-2, 460, 733; Heraclitus' theory 14; international
affairs 460, 576: Marx 455-7: Parmenides 27; revolt against 430-61: Schopenhauer 669
reasonableness 431-2, 667
receptacle theory 421, 728
The Red Prussian (Schwarzchild) 510
Reformation 245, 261
reinforced dogmatism 254, 422
relativism 15, 271, 467; criticism 427, 485, 486, 487, 490-1, 497, 502-3, 508: Hegel 507-10:
historicist 408: values 15,
religion 9, 62-4, 134, 267, 273, 283, 134-5, 401-2, 442, 513, 620; authoritarian 497, 498,
500-1: ethics 483; Greek beliefs 25; historicism 476, 477-9: mysticism 455, 460: as opium
348, 590, 663: Protagoras 549: standards 506: state -worship 107: see also Christianity; Jews
Renan 676
Republic (Plato) 26, 73, 75, Hi, 132, 134, 520, 522, 526, 532, 537; authoritarianism 124:
betrayal of Socrates 184: critique, reply to 200, 203-4, 206, 207: debased states 43; divine
state 246: Earth-born 521: equalitarianism 91, 92, 93 ; Forms or Ideas 524: justice 86, 89, 90,
100: myth 72, 132, 133: Pericles caricature 177: primitive society 44; protectionism 110,
111, 113: strong, rule by the 66; translation 85; tribal collectivism 98, 100
rest: Plato's descriptive sociology 35-53
revolution 38, 229, 395, 689, 704, 708; bourgeousie TOO; industrial 330, 331; law of 536:
misery 714: myth of 445: social 347, 355-72: violence 707; see also French Revolution;
Russian revolution
revolutionaries, Plato as 85
Revue Positiviste 354
Ricardo, David 377, 378, 709, 210, ZM, 215
Robespierre, Maximilian 319
Robinson, Richard xxix, 202, 208, 211
Rodman, H, N, 508
Rogers, A, K, 522, 627
romantic collectivism 481
romantic medievalism 240
Romanticism 157, 236-7, 271, 284, 285, 442, 446-7, 481, 482, 561, 572, 697
Rome 111, 238, 550, Ml, 616, 611, 663
Rosenberg 281, 283
Ross, W, D, 641, 647, 648, 653
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 40, 251, 254, 264, 265, 261, 284, 293, 303, 119, 516, 666, 674:
inequality 572: paradox of freedom 258, 671: Plato's influence 115, 533, 561, 612
Royal Science 629
rule of the strong 66, 73, UA, Ul, 254, Ml
rules of exogamy 301
ruling classes 44-51, 53, 73, 78, 83, 84, 208, 697, 705; breeding 143; degeneration 40, 76,
143: education 47, 52, 143, 584; origins 48-9; revolution 38, 691
Russell, Bertrand 124, 267, 336, 419, 451, Ml, 591, 653, 658, 665, 694, 720, 725
Russell, L, J, 498, 547, 548, 691, 723
Russia 156, 249, 294-5, 397, 402, 470, 683, 689, 691; interventionism 699; social engineering
295
Russian Communists 350, 353, 371
Russian Revolution 318, 319-20, 371, 613, 700, 214

Sachs, Eva 192
St, Vitus' dance 240
Salomon, E, von 679, 725
Samos 172
Sanazzaro 533, 561
Schallmeyer, W, 273
Scheler, Max 280, 286, 420, 678
Schelling, F, 236, 243-4, 265
Schiller, F, 203, 509, 666, 667, 675
schism 78, 214, 238, Ml
Schlick, M, 654, 659
scholasticism 226, 236, 237, 428, 434, 444
Schopenhauer, A, xxi, 242, 247, 249, 252, 255, 259, 288-9, 467, 479, 497, 508, 666, 667,
669, 675, 766, 680, 728, 731, 732; age of dishonesty 237, 243, 660; on Fichte 266, 281;
and Hegel 242, 243, 247, 248, 266, 287, 288, 289, 294, 731, 732; historical description
467; metaphysics 660: nationalism 274, 668: and Nietzsche 497
Schwarzchild, Leopold 510
Schwegler, A, 249, 667
scientific description 30, 467
scientific determinism 420, 684
scientific method xxxvii, 28, 176, 229, 234-6, 244, 245, 253, 255, 465-7, 469, 492, 504:
causality 730: knowledge 655: and morality 409-10, 438, 448: politics 153: and prophecy,
historical 352, 401-2: nationalism 434, 435, 448; social engineering 294-9: theories
467-70; and truth 229-31, 490-1
scientific objectivity 423-7
Scientific Socialism 323, 349, 353, 396
scientism 604
sea-communications 168-9
searchlight theory of science 466, 728
Second Letter 633
security 168, 398
self-analysis 429
self-assertion 225, 646
self-conscious 325
self-consciousness 275, 286, 646, 717
self-control 50, 66
self-criticism 123, IM, 503
self-evidence 236, 255, 498, 651-2
self-protection 109-10
self-sufficiency (autarky) 84, 173, 549, 554
selfishness 96-8, 1 14, 121, 480, 574, 575; see also individualism
semantics 528, 547, 590, 591, 651, 654, 670, 728
Seventh Letter 18, 519, 520, 584, 592, 600, 629, 633
Shaw, G, B, 273, 438, 560, Ml, 677
Sherrington, C, 547
Shorey 198, 203, 204, 205, 207
shorthand labels/symbols 230-1, 234
Simkhovitch, V, G, 611
Simkin, C, G, F, 521
Simplicius 633, 660
simultaneity 235-6
situational logic 308-9, 324, 326, 470
slavery 42, 46, 66, 67, 175, 534, 537-8, 541, 562, 630, 662, 676: Aristotle 220 social
technology 1; Athens 42, 46, 67, 112, 595, 616, 641; Hegel 221, 646-7, 677: Marx 405,
691, 692, 705; naturalistic theory 220; Plato 186, 203-5, 537
Slavery: Its Biological Foundation and Moral Justification 277-8
Smith, Adam 377, 391, HO, 214
social change 16, 18, 29, 35, 40, 53, 102, 163, 168, 174, 189, 221, 410, 419, 137, 631
social contracts 72, 73, 109, 1 10: see also contract theory
social decay 40
Social Democrats 353, 367, 371-2, 394, 699, 700, 703
social development 39-40
social dynamics 15, 39
social engineering 29, 147, 148-9, 294, 338, 522, 604, 683 ; attitude of 21; historicism clash
334; Russia 295; see also piecemeal social engineering; Utopian social engineering
social environment 55-80, IM, 301, 302, 414, 547, 664-5
social habitat 72, 420-1, 423, 455, 458, 502, 555, 716
social institutions 21-3
social laws 576
social problems 496-8
social psychology 299
social reconstruction xxxi, xxxvi
social revolution 347, 354, 355-72
social system 327-42
social technology 21, 151, 294-5, 298-9, 306, 323-4, 352, 398, 402, 428, 522, 603, MO, 682,
701
socialism 293-300, 318, 345-54, 397, 407, 611, 612: origins 457; see also Communism; Marx;
Marxism
society 513: breakdown of closed 178, 546, 613: primitive beginnings 38, 304-6, 532-3,
543-4
Society of the Friends of Laconia 177
socio-analysis 422, 423, 447
sociological determinism 293-300, 315, 413, 414, 415-16, 420
sociological laws 36-7, 44, 60-2, 64, 65, 684
sociologism 413, 414, 415-16, 720; see also sociological determinism
sociology: autonomy 301-10, 321, 322: of knowledge 419-29, 447
socio-therapy 422, 423, 447
Socrates 17, 27, 28, 31, 63, 64, 69, HI, 125, 132, 176; and Alcibiades 631; and Antisthenes
184, 237, 631: betrayal 184-5: comparison with Plato 202; condescension 42, 629: critique
of closed societies 179, 180-1: Crito 624, 625: democracy 121, 625-6: dialectics 255-6:
education 127: equalitarianism 93, 95, 124, 125, 179, 180: ethics 27-8: execution/death
124, 181-4, 193, 239, 629: and Glaucon 636: humanitarianism 186:
individualism/collectivism 100, 104, 180: integrity 188: intellectualism 121, 122, 123, 179:
justice 101, 180: mistrust 441: Myth of Blood and Soil 132, 133: philosopher king 130:
protectionism 111: religion 134, 135: reply to Callicles 577, 578, rule of the strong 66;
Second Letter 633: self-criticism 180: ship-yard criticism 622: soul 180, 184-5, 621-2:
teaching 179-80, 181, 185: temperance 94-5: theory of Forms or Ideas 527: Thirty Tyrants
626: trial 624, 628; truth 180, 629
Socratic Problem 202, 203, 512, 522, 626, 627, 631
soldiers 99, 138, 139, 210
Solon 18, 58
Sophistic Refutations 219
Sophists 55, 524-5, 527, 628
Sophocles 175, 618
sophocracy 136
soul 69, 180, 201, 204, 524, 525, 533; Aristotle 224; divine 36-7; divisions of 75, 78; doctrine
of 69: immortality 628: Laws 529: and nature 554: origins of things 74; perfect 72: Plato
176, 186, 224, 528; political theory 556; power of 71; Socrates 180, 184-5, 621-2: split 634
sound 243-4
sovereignty: paradox of 115, 116, 117, 118, 582, 719: philosopher king 142: theory of 115,
116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 125, 136, 142, 146
space 25, 523-4, 525
Sparta 17, 40, 45, 46-7, 51, 52, 53, 168, 169, 170, HI, 173, 174, 187, 541; arrested change
536-7, 540; common meals 47; human cattle 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 83,, 541: infanticide 49;
Levinson's critique 195, 196: Peloponnesian war 17; ruling classes 40
Spearman, Diana 212
species origin 37, 522, 644
specific interpretations 472
Spencer 35,
Spengler, O, 53, 281, 285, 401, 545, 678, 679
Speusippus 222, 223, 529, 549, 644, 645
Spinoza 267, 575, 666, 667, 669, 718
Spirit 251, 261, 673, 285, 313-15, 440: Great Men 283; of the Nation 251, 258, 269, 274-5,
279-80
spiritual historicism 8
spiritual naturalism 65, 69, 71-2, 74, 134, 552-3, 554, 555-6
square roots 523, 564, 565, 566, 568, 583
standards 485-95, 498-510
Stapel 282, 285
state 115-16, 124, 339; degeneration 77, 79; divine 246; foundation of 136-8: Hegel 276, 277,
279: interventionism 384-5, 398: Marx 327-8, 330, 338, 338-9, 405: morality 123; national
263, 264, 606, 607, 674, 680; organic theory of 72, 166, 167, 251, Ml, 614, 666; power of
104-6, 115, 124, 146, 339, 370, 398, 667; preservation of 138-9: protection 334, 334, 335:
social development 39-40; as super-organism 72, 73, 75, 76; theory of 104-1 1, 559:
totalitarianism 274: war 543-4: worship 246: see also ideal state
statements 651, 653
Statesman 19, 20, 38-9, 42, 43, 48, 198-9, 200, 205, 232, 520, 521, 523, 527, 530, 535
Stirling, J, H, 242, 244, 248, 667-8
Stoicism 617
Story of the Number 54
Strabo 663
strain of civilization 163, 168, 179, 184, 187, 188, 309, 446, 480, Mi
strong, rule of the 66, 73, HI, HI, 254, 662
A Study of History (Toynbee) 454-60, 540, 544
Subjective, Hegel 255
subjective freedom 672, 676
subjective methods 687
subjective value 687, 709
Sumer 614
superstition 79, 483, 663: see also magical thinking
supply and demand 381-2, 400, 711
surplus population 382, 383-5, 391, 401, 711: see also trade cycle; unemployment
surplus value 710: theory of 378-9, 710
Sweden 350, 387
syllogism, dialectical 261

tabooism, tribal H, 58, 63, 164-5, 166
taboos ii, 11, 55, 58, 63, 107, 139, 164-6, 173, 175, 189, 517, 559: Pythagorean 514, 619
Tarn, W, W, 550, 595
Tarski, A,: semantics 528, 547, 590, 591, 654, 728; truth 485, 486-7, 489, 490, 492, 650, 722,
728
taxation 152; Athens 172; Marx 376, 697, 699, 715
Taylor, A, E, 144, 516, 537, 559, 578, 599-600, 602, 624, 625-7, 628, 642; Aristophanes 628;
Socrates 200, 522, 527, 622, 624, 627, 632; Thirty Tyrants 623
technological unemployment 385-6
technology, Utopian 405
temperance 94, 573, 592
Thales 515
Theaetetus 527: dating 192
theism: chosen people doctrine 8
theistic historicism 8
Themis 569
Theopompus 660
theoretical sciences 467-70
theory: distrust 176: quasi 472
Theses on Feuerbach (Marx) 407
third man 532
Thirty Tyrants 17, M, IM, 175, 181, 182, 1%, 239, 583, 615, 618, 623, 626, 629, 637, 638:
and Socrates 121, 583, 623-5, 630
thought, freedom of 256
Thrasybulus 182
Thrasymachus 66, 101, HO, HI, 111, 115, 578, 579, 622
Thucydides 91, 178, 541, 614-15, 617, 618, 619: History of the Peloponnesian War 169-75,
182
Timaeus 24-5, 26, 28, 37, 44, 191, 242, 522, 523, 524, 525, 527, 532
timarchy/timocracy 39, 40, 46
time 525
tolerance 443, 459; paradox of 723
total ideology 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 428, 447, 716
totalitarian justice 83-113
totalitarian morality 103, 130, 133, 278, 592
totalitarianism x, 2di, xviii-xix, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxviii, xxxix, 124, 125, 130, 132, 135, 162-3,
239, 372, 647; critique 179, 206, 210; ethical idea 274; Hegel 245-6: interventionism 350:
law of political revolutions 38; modern 272, 273-4, 277: and nationalism 262, 264, 275:
state 274
Townsend, J, 406, 716
Toynbee, A, J, 584, 723, 726-7, 733: Christian persecution 662-3: division of labour 724: and
Fisher 733: historicism 546, 727: rationalism 723 ; A Study of History 454-60, 540, 544:
schism 613: strain of civilization 614
trade cycle 385-8, 389, 390, 400, 401; theory of 385-8: and unemployment 398, 111
trade unions 384
tradition 174, 178, 432, 494
transformation 13,, 32
Treitschke 276
trends 576
trial and error 153, 156, 294, 340, 427, 428, 498, 505, MO, 631
triangles, sub-elementary 563, 565, 566, 568
tribal aristocracy H, 17
tribal collectivism 75-6
tribal life: Greeks 163-5
tribal morality 480
tribal paradise 638
tribal priest-kings 139
tribal tabooism 13
tribalism xi, xxxv, 38, 47, 79, 139, 180, 189, 434, 450, 460, 546, 620, 725; chosen people 8;
Christianity 446; group spirit 637; Hegel 272-89; Jewish 238; knowing one's place 11-12:
magical thinking 55, 58; organic 167: Plato's theory 44-5, 53,; schools 619
truth 486-7: absolute 493, 501, 590-1: artificial distinction 554; criteria 487-90;
definition/concept 650, 651, 728; dualism 498-9, 506-7; fallibilism 490-2: Hegel 247-8,
255, 507-10: knowledge sources 493-4, 503-6; norms 547: relativism 502-3; science
229-31, 490-1; searching after 125, 129, 130, 111, 135, 136, 243, 294, 491, 492-3:
rationalism 431, 433, 435; relativism 427, 485, 486, 497; Socrates 180, 629; theory of 485,
486-7, 489, 490, 492, 650, 722, 728
tyranny 42, 43, 162, 173, 549, 581, 706; Plato on 187; and violence 360, 361

unalterable facts 60
uncritical rationalism 435, 437, 442-4, 719
undecidability theorem 490
unemployment 374, 375-6, 399, 400: insurance 149, 350, 387, 388: technological 385-6: trade
cycles 398; see also industrial reserve army; surplus population
unity of opposites 251-5, 257, 518-19
universal flux 515-18, 520, 523
Urey, Harold C, 490
utilitarian ethics 66
utilitarianism 102, 103, 548-9
Utopian programme 44
Utopian social engineering xxxvi, 21, 23, 44, 52, 147, 148-9, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156,
295, 298, 338, Ml, 602, MO
Utopian systems 23
Utopian technology 405
utopianism 2di, 2LV, 147-57, 682: crime prevention 108: Marx 294, 295, 338, 701

value theory 377-83, 709-10
values 47; relativism 15
variable capital 389
Vaughan, C, E, 561, 573, 588, 634, 672-3
verbalism 232-6, 237, 294, 662
verification principle ix, 591, 659
Versailles settlement 681
Vico, Giambattista 533, 534
victims 180
Viner, Jacob xxm, 635, 683, 709, 211, 211
violence 149, 156, 475, 703, 707; Marxism 358, 359-69, 371: Plato 196; and rationalism 439,
441, 459-60, 671-2: see also war
virtue 24-8, 37, 41, 84, 88, 93, 94, 103, 107, 122, 174, 176
Voltaire 411
von Humboldt, W, 266
vote buying 337
Vulgar Marxism 311, Ml, 322, 422, 688

wage capital 389
wage-slavery 692
wages 388, 390: constant capital 713-14: depression 386: starvation 373, 386: subsistence 373,
theory of surplus value 378-9, 710: trade cycle 385-8: value theory 383
Wagner, R, 543
Waismann, F, 659
Walkley, Mary Anne 331
Wallas, Graham 513
war x; causes 609: ethical 274: Hegel 276-81: and justice 15,; Marxism 295: of opposites 252:
religious 442
warriors 45, 52, 75, 132, 163, 589
water, heavy 490-1
Way of Delusive Opinion 523, 526
wealth 375, 376, 401: accumulation 47, 391: law of increasing wealth 376
Weber, Max 309, 528, 652, 662, 687, HI, 730, 211
Wells, H, G, 524, 223
White, Morton G, 230
Whitehead, A, N, 432, 451-4, 666, 722, 725
Wiener, N, 545
Wilde, Oscar 503
Will 293; of Gods, 23
Wilson, W, 263, 680, 681
Winckelmann, J, 674
Winspear, A, D, 529, 584
wisdom 22, 122-3, 125, 129, 136, 137-8, 176, 193: rule of the wisest 66, 111, 114-15, 117,
122, 125: see also leadership
Wittgenstein, L, 216, 642, 658, 629, 212, 218, 720-1, 725: mysticism 224, 225, 733:
propositions 653, 654, 657-8, 659, 720-1: sense of life 732: verification principle 659
women: common ownership/property 47-8, 98
Wood, William HI
workers 329, HI, 112, 118, 142, 155, 152, 165, 199, 211; age of death 191; class
consciousness 301, 322: revolution 353, 364: see also human cattle; proletariat
World: creation 620; history 211, 260, 261, 222, 228, 285, 662, 621
World Historical Personality 274, 283
World-Historical People 275
World-Spirit 222
World War, First 326
worship: hero 480: state 475-6

Xenophanes 14, 129, 502, 614, 632-3
Xenophon 631

Zeller 224, 516, 517, 529, 640, Ml, 644, 645
Zeus 14, 19, 63
Ziegler, H, O, 288
Zimmern, A, 273, 677
Zinsser, H, 240-1, 475, 617, 665