By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of the

"Science," the Greek word for knowledge, when appended to the word "political," creates what seems like an oxymoron. For who could claim to know politics? More complicated than any game, most people who play it become addicts and die without understanding what they were addicted to. The rest of us suffer under their malpractice as our "leaders." A truer case of the blind leading the blind could not be found. Plumb the depths of confusion here.

Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

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17. Beirut

IT WAS NOT Israel's finest hour. In mid-5eptember 1982, images of the massacre were being seen around the world, on television, in newspapers and magazines. There were bodies everywhere. Men, women, children. Even horses had been slaughtered. Some of the victims had been shot point-blank in the head, others had had their throats slashed, some had been castrated; young men in groups of 10 and 20 had been herded together and shot en masse. Almost all of the BOO Palestinians who had died in the two Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila had been unarmed, innocent civilians caught in a murderous revenge by the Lebanese Christian Phalangists.

Reaction against Israel was unanimous. In Italy, for example, dock workers refused to load Israeli vessels. Britain formally condemned Israel, and Egypt recalled its ambassador. There were mass protests within Israel itself.

* * *

Since the country's beginning, many Israelis have had a dream of being able to live in cooperation with the Arab countries - of becoming part of a world where its people could cross those borders and be greeted as friends. The idea of an open border, such as the much-celebrated U.S.-Canadian border, is still virtually incomprehensible to Israelis.

So it was that in the late 1970s, Admony, then head of liaison for the Mossad, made solid contact through the CIA and his European connections with Lebanese Christian Phalangist Bashir Gemayel, a man as brutal as he was powerful, persuading the Mossad that Lebanon needed their help. The Mossad, in turn, persuaded the Israeli government that Gemayel - a close friend of 5alameh, the Red Prince - was sincere. It was a picture they perpetuated for years through the selective distillation of intelligence to the government.

Gemayel was also working for the CIA at the time, but for the Mossad the notion of having a "friend" inside an Arab country - no matter how double-dealing he might be - was exciting. In addition, Israel had never feared Lebanon. The joke was that if the two countries went to war, Israel would send its military orchestra to defeat the Lebanese.

In any case, the Lebanese were too busy fighting among themselves at the time to take on anyone else. The various Muslim and Christian forces were fighting for control, as they still are, and Gemayel, his forces under siege, decided to turn to Israel for help. As an added bonus, the Mossad saw this as a way to get rid of Israel's Public Enemy Number One, the PLO. Throughout the whole period, long after Israel's actions had backfired, the Lebanese connection remained critical for the Mossad, because Admony, its head, was the man who started it all and saw it as his crowning achievement.

In many respects, Lebanon today is like Chicago and New York in the 1920s and 1930s when the various mobs, or mafia families, were openly fighting for control. Both violence and ostentation were the norm, and for a time, government officials seemed unable, or unwilling, to do anything about it.

Lebanon, too, has its families, each with its army or militia loyal to the "don." But religious and family loyalties have long played second fiddle to the power and money of the drug trade and numerous mafia-type activities that feed the engine of Lebanese corruption and maintain the current state of anarchy there.

There are the Druzes, the fourth largest of more than a dozen Lebanese sects, an offshoot of Ismaili Muslims, with about 250,000 adherents in Lebanon (260,000 in Syria, which backs them, and 40,000 in Israel), headed by Walid Jumblatt.

The governmental system is based on the last census, in 1932, when the Christians still formed a majority. So, the constitution dictates that the president must be Christian, even though there is general acceptance that Muslims now make up about 60 percent of the country's 3.5 million people, and the largest sub-group, about 40 percent, are Shiite Muslims, led by Nabih Berri. Another significant fighting force in the early 1980s were the Sunni Muslims, under Rashid Karami.

The Christian forces are divided into two main families, the Gemayel and the Franjieh. Pierre Gemayel founded the Phalangists, and at one time, Suleiman Franjieh was president. When Bashir Gemayel was maneuvering to become president, he eliminated his main rival, Tony Franjieh, in a June 1978 attack on the family's summer villa at Ehden.

His Phalangist soldiers murdered Tony, his wife, their two-year-old daughter, and several bodyguards. Gemayel, the Jesuit-educated thug who would become Israel's "friend" through the efforts of the Mossad, dismissed the attack as a "social revolt against feudalism." In February 1980, a car bomb killed Gemayel's 18-month-old daughter and three bodyguards. In July 1980, Gemayel's troops virtually wiped out the Christian militia of ex-president Camille Chamoun's National Liberation Party.

Gemayel ruled from his family's 30o-year-old estate at Bikfaya, in the mountains northeast of Beirut. The family had made untold millions in a scam that began when they won a contract to build a road through the mountainous terrain. The long-term contract also involved regular maintenance fees for upkeep and repairs. The family faithfully collected their money for the road construction and, over the years, for maintenance. The only problem was that they never did build the road. And they argued that they had to keep collecting for maintenance, because if they didn't, someone would come to check and discover the road wasn't there.

In any event, Gemayel was just 35 when he won election by parliament to a six-year term as president in September 1982. He did not live long enough to assume the post, but at the time he was the only candidate. Yet when as few as 56 deputies showed up to vote at the special session to elect him - six short of a quorum - Gemayel's militiamen quickly rounded up six more reluctant deputies and he won the vote 57-0, with five abstentions. Begin sent him a congratulatory telegram that began, "My dear friend."

In addition to the ruling families, there were at the time a host of unaligned gangs, most led by such colorful but brutal characters as Electroman, Toaster, Cowboy, Fireball, and the King. Electroman got his name after being shot through the neck by the Syrians. He was sent to Israel for treatment, where an electronic voice box was installed in his throat. As for Toaster, when he caught someone he didn't like, he'd connect them to high-voltage electricity and literally toast them. Fireball came by his name honestly. He was a pyromaniac, who loved to watch buildings burn. Cowboy looked like something out of a Hollywood western, wearing a cowboy hat and two guns in holsters at his sides. And the King, believe it or not, thought he was Elvis Presley; he had an Elvis hairstyle, tried to speak English with Elvis's twang, and used to serenade his family with off-key Elvis songs.

The gang members drove around in Mercedes and BMWs. Inevitably, they dressed in the finest silk suits from Paris. They always ate well. It wouldn't have mattered if they were under siege for six months, they'd still have had oysters for breakfast. In fact, at the height of the 1982 siege of Beirut, a Lebanese restaurateur tried to buy a scrap German submarine, not to join the war, but to bring fresh food and wine from Europe for his restaurant.

The gangs, in addition to their own criminal activities, often freelanced for the major families, performing such duties as manning roadblocks. For example, to get to the government palace in those days, the president had to pass through two roadblocks and pay twice.

In Beirut, people can live very well, but no one knows for how long. Nowhere today is the end nearer than in Beirut, which explains why those involved in the families and gangs live to the fullest, while they can. At most, they account for 200,000 people living on the fast track, which leaves more than a million Lebanese in and around Beirut trying to live their lives and raise their families under impossible conditions.

In 1978, the baby-faced Bashir Gemayel, with his Mossad connections, had asked for weapons in his ongoing dispute with the Franjieh family. (Tony Franjieh was not on good terms with the Mossad.) The Mossad sold them weapons, bought in a way the Mossad had never seen before.

A group of Phalangists were training in the Haifa military base in 1980, learning, for example, how to operate the small Dabur gunboats manufactured by an Israeli weapons company in, of all places, Beersheba, a city surrounded by desert but halfway between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. When their training was complete, the head of the Lebanese Christian navy, wearing the customary shiny silk suit, arrived in Haifa by boat along with three bodyguards and three Mossad officials, carrying several suitcases. Gemayel's forces bought five of the boats, at about $6 million (U.S.) each, and they paid for them in U.S. currency - cash they had brought with them in the suitcases. They took the gunboats back to Juniyah, the picturesque harbor city on the Mediterranean north of Beirut.

When the suitcases were opened, the Lebanese navy commander asked the senior Mossad official if he wanted to count the money. "No, we'll believe you," he said. "But if you're wrong, you're dead." They counted it later. It was all there.

For the most part, the Phalangists used their "navy" to cruise at five knots - about one mile per hour - offshore, past West Beirut, firing their machine guns at the Muslims: an exercise that killed hundreds of innocent civilians but made little impact on the actual military hostilities.

Because of his Mossad links, strongman Gemayel agreed to allow Israel to set up a naval radar station in Juniyah in 1979, complete with about 30 Israeli navy personnel - the country's first physical structure in Lebanon. That they were there, of course, strengthened the Phalangist hand, since the Muslims - and the Syrians for that matter - were not anxious to tangle with Israel. Many of the negotiating sessions between the Mossad and Gemayel for the radar station took place at his family compound north of Beirut. In return for his trouble, the Mossad was paying Gemayel between $20,000 and $30,000 a month.

At the same time, the Israelis had another friend in southern Lebanon _. Major Saad Haddad, a Christian who commanded a militia composed mainly of Shiites and who was almost as anxious as the Israelis to get Vassar Arafat's PLO forces out of southern Lebanon. He, too, would prove cooperative when the time came to move against Arafat.

In Beirut, the Mossad station, called "Submarine," was located in the basement of a former government building near the border between Christian-dominated East Beirut and Muslim-dominated West Beirut. At any given time, about 10 people were working in the station, seven or eight of them katsas, with one or two from Unit 504, the Israeli military equivalent of the Mossad, which shared office space with them.

By the early 1980s, the Mossad was deeply involved with several other warring Lebanese families, paying for information, passing it between groups, even paying the gangs and some Palestinians in the refugee camps for intelligence and services. Besides Gemayel, both the Jumblatt and Berri families were on the Mossad payroll.

The situation was what the Israelis called halemh, an Arab word meaning "noisy mess." About this time it became even messier, as westerners began to be kidnapped. In July 1982, for example, David S. Dodge, 58, acting president of the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped by four gunmen as he walked from his office to his campus home.

A common way of transporting hostages was called the "mummy transport." That meant wrapping a man tightly, head to toe, with brown plastic tape, usually leaving only an opening at his nose so he could breathe, and sticking the "parcel" in the trunk of a car or under the seat. Several victims were simply left there to die, usually when kidnappers came upon a roadblock set up by a rival group, underscoring a favorite saying in Lebanon that it's only terrible if it happens to you.

* * *

And so it was that, with the Mossad working its various Lebanese connections and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon - described by the Americans as a "hawk among hawks" -- itching to get into battle, pressure began building on Begin; at the very least, it was time to wipe the PLO out of southern Lebanon, where they had been using their position to lob shells and stage raids into Israeli villages near the northern border.

Sharon had been hailed by his soldiers after the 1973 Yom Kippur War as "Arik, Arik, King of Israel." The five-foot, six-inch, 235-pound Sharon, frequently called "the bulldozer" because of his shape and style, was only 25 when he led a commando raid that killed scores of innocent Jordanians, forcing Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, to make a public apology. Later, Moshe Dayan nearly court-martialed him for defying orders during the 1956 Sinai campaign by staging a paratroop maneuver that cost the lives of dozens of Israeli soldiers.

Months before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO had suspected it was coming, and Arafat ordered a halt to the bombardment of Israeli villages. Still, in the spring of 1982, Israel massed its invasion forces near its northern border four times, each time backing off at the last minute, largely because of U.S. pressure. Begin assured the Americans that if Israel ever did attack, its soldiers would go only as far as the Litani River, about 18 miles north of the border, to force the PLO out of the range of Israeli settlements. He did not keep his promise, and considering the speed with which Israeli forces appeared in Beirut, clearly he had not meant to.

On April 25, 1982, Israel withdrew from the last third of the Sinai, which it had occupied since the Six Day War in 1967, fulfilling the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Camp David accord.

But as Israeli bulldozers were destroying the remains of Jewish settlements in the Sinai, Israel broke a ceasefire along its 63-mile Lebanese border that had been in effect since July 1981. In 1978, Israel had invaded Lebanon with 10,000 men and 200 tanks, but had still failed to dislodge the PLO.

On a sunny Sunday morning in Galilee, June 6, 1982, Begin's cabinet gave Sharon the go-ahead to begin the invasion. That day, Irish Lieutenant General William Callaghan, commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL), strolled into the forward headquarters of Israel's Northern Command in Zefat to discuss a UN Security Council resolution calling for the end of the PLO-Israeli barrages across the border. Instead of the expected discussion, however, he was told by Israel's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, that Israel would invade Lebanon in 28 minutes' time. Sure enough, 60,000 troops and more than 500 tanks were soon sweeping into Lebanon on the ill-fated campaign that would drive some 11,000 PLO fighters out of that country, but tarnish Israel's international image, costing the lives of 462 Israeli soldiers, with another 2,218 wounded.

Within the first 48 hours, much of the PLO strength was wiped out, although they did put up considerable resistance at Sidon, Tyre, and Damur. Begin had responded to two urgent letters from Reagan asking him not to attack Lebanon by saying that Israel wanted only to push the PLO back from its borders. "The bloodthirsty aggressor against us is on our doorstep," he wrote. "Do we not have the inherent right to self-defense?"

While they were attacking the PLO in the south, the Israeli forces joined Gemayel's Christian Phalangists on the outskirts of Beirut. At first, they were hailed as liberators by Christian residents, and showered with rice, flowers, and candy as they entered the city. Before long, they had several thousand PLO commandos sealed off in a siege, along with some 500,000 residents of West Beirut. For the Israeli soldiers, their stay in Lebanon wasn't all war; they'd found a convenient way to make love at the same time in a village just outside Beirut. The place was noteworthy for two things: its beautiful women, and their absent husbands.

But the deadly military bombardment continued, and in August, amid growing domestic and international criticism that they were killing civilians, not warriors, Begin said, "We will do what we have to do. West Beirut is not a city. It's a military target surrounded by civilians."

Finally, after a lo-week siege, the guns fell silent and the PLO commandos evacuated the city, prompting Lebanese Prime Minister Chafik al Wazzan to say, "We have reached the end of our sorrows." He spoke too soon.

In late August, a small U.S.-French-Italian peacekeeping team arrived in Beirut, but the Israelis continued to tighten their grip on the embattled city.

On Tuesday, September 14, 1982, at 4:08 in the afternoon, a 20o-pound bomb on the third floor of the Christian Phalange Party headquarters in East Beirut was detonated by remote control, killing president-elect Bashir Gemayel and 25 others as he and about 100 party members were holding their regular weekly meeting. Bashir was replaced by his 40-year-old brother, Amin.

The bombing was traced to Ptabib Chartouny, 26, a member of the Syrian People's Party, rivals of the Phalangists. The operation had been run by Syrian intelligence in Lebanon under Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed G'anen.

Since the CIA had helped put Gemayel together with the Mossad, the United States had an intelligence-sharing agreement with it (this worked largely in the Mossad's favor, since they share very little with any other organization), and because the Mossad saw the CIA as "players who can't play," there is no doubt it was fully aware of the Syrian role in Gemayel's assassination.

But two days after the bombing, Israeli Major General Amir Drori, head of the Northern Command, and several other top Israeli officers had guests at their command post in Beirut port: Lebanese Forces Chief of Staff Fady Frem, and their infamous intelligence chief, Elias Hobeika, a colorful but vicious man who always carried a pistol, a knife, and a hand grenade, and was the most feared Phalangist in Lebanon. He used to kill Syrian soldiers and chop their ears off, stringing them up on a wire in his house. Hobeika was a close associate of Christian General Samir Zaza, and later the two men often alternated as commanders of the Christian army. For the Mossad, however, Hobeika had been an important contact. He had attended the Staff and Command Col lege in Israel. He was the main leader of the force that went into the refugee camps and slaughtered the civilians.

Hobeika, who hated Amin Gemayel and wanted to embarrass him, was involved in a bitter internal power struggle because he was being blamed by some for not having protected Bashir Gemayel.

At 5 p.m. on September 16, Hobeika assembled his forces at Beirut International Airport and moved into the Shatila camp, with the help of flares and, later, tank and mortar fire from the Israeli Defense Force (!DF). At the time, an Israeli cabinet press statement claimed the IDF had "taken positions in West Beirut to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed, and anarchy."

The next day, Hobeika received Israeli permission to bring two additional battalions into the camps. Israel knew the massacre was taking place. Israeli forces had even set up observation posts on top of several seven-story buildings at the Kuwaiti embassy traffic circle, giving them an unobstructed view of the carnage.

Outraged by this slaughter and by Israel's role in it, the war of words between Reagan and Begin escalated, and by early October, Reagan had sent 1,200 U.S. marines back to Beirut, only 19 days after they had left. They joined 1,560 French paratroopers and 1,200 Italian soldiers in yet another peacekeeping force.

* * *

All this time, the Mossad station in Beirut was busy carrying on its work. One of its informants was a "stinker" - actually also a Yiddish term, used in Israel when referring to an informant (like the English expression "stool pigeon"). The stinker had links with a local garage that specialized in refitting vehicles for smuggling purposes. Many Israeli military people, for example, were smuggling tax-free videos and cigarettes out of Lebanon and turning huge profits in Israel, where the taxes are 100 to 200 percent on such items. The Mossad, in turn, often passed pertinent information along to the Israeli military police, with the result that many smuggling attempts were foiled.

In the summer of 1983, this same informant told the Mossad about a large Mercedes truck that was being fitted by the Shiite Muslims with spaces that could hold bombs. He said it had even larger than usual spaces for this, so that whatever it was destined for was going to be a major target. Now, the Mossad knew that, for size, there were only a few logical targets, one of which must be the U.S. compound. The question then was whether or not to warn the Americans to be on particular alert for a truck matching the description.

The decision was too important to be taken in the Beirut station, so it was passed along to Tel Aviv, where Admony, then head of Mossad, decided they would simply give the Americans the usual general warning, a vague notice that they had reason to believe someone might be planning an operation against them. But this was so general, and so commonplace, it was like sending a weather report; unlikely to raise any particular alarm or prompt increased security precautions. In the six months following receipt of this information, for example, there were more than 100 general warnings of car-bomb attacks. One more would not heighten U.S. concerns or surveillance.

Admony, in refusing to give the Americans specific information on the truck, said, "No, we're not there to protect Americans. They're a big country. Send only the regular information."

At the same time, however, all Israeli installations were given the specific details and warned to watch for a truck matching the description of the Mercedes.

At 6:20 a.m. on October 23, 1983, a large Mercedes truck approached the Beirut airport, passing well within sight of Israeli sentries in their nearby base, going through a Lebanese army checkpoint, and turning left into the parking lot. A U.S. Marine guard reported with alarm that the truck was gathering speed, but before he could do anything, the truck roared toward the entrance of the four-story reinforced concrete Aviation Safety Building, used as headquarters for the Eighth Marine Battalion, crashing through a wrought-iron gate, hitting the sand-bagged guard post, smashing through another barrier, and ramming over a wall of sandbags into the lobby, exploding with such a terrific force that the building was instantly reduced to rubble.

A few minutes later, another truck smashed into the French paratroopers' headquarters at Bir Hason, a seafront residential neighborhood just two miles from the U.S. compound, hitting it with such an impact that it moved the entire building 30 feet and killed 58 soldiers.

The loss of 241 U.S. Marines, most of them still sleeping in their cots at the time of the suicide mission, was the highest single-day death toll for the Americans since 246 died throughout Vietnam at the start of the Tet offensive on January 13, 1968.

Within days, the Israelis passed along to the CIA the names of 13 people who they said were connected to the bombing deaths of the U.S. Marines and French paratroopers, a list including Syrian intelligence, Iranians in Damascus, and Shiite Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah.

At Mossad headquarters, there was a sigh of relief that it wasn't us who got hit. It was seen as a small incident so far as the Mossad was concerned - that we had stumbled over it and wouldn't tell anybody. The problem was if we had leaked information and it was traced back, our informant would have been killed. The next time, we wouldn't know if we were on the hit list.

The general attitude about the Americans was: "Hey, they wanted to stick their nose into this Lebanon thing, let them pay the price."

For me, it was the first time I had received a major rebuke from my Mossad superior, liaison officer Amy Yaar. I said at the time that the American soldiers killed in Beirut would be on our minds longer than our own casualties because they'd come in with good faith, to help us get out of this mess we'd created. I was told: "Just shut up. You're talking out of your league. We're giving the Americans much more than they're giving us." They always said that, but it's not true. So much of Israeli equipment was American, and the Mossad owed them a lot.

During all this time, several westerners continued to be held captive while others became fresh hostages of the various factions. One day in late March 1984, CIA station head William Buckley, officially listed as a political officer at the U.S. embassy, left his apartment in West Beirut and was abducted at gunpoint by three Shiite soldiers. He was subsequently held for 18 months, tortured extensively and, finally, brutally murdered. He could have been saved.

The Mossad, through its extensive network of informants, had a good idea of where many of the hostages were being held, and by whom. Even if you don't know where, it's always crucial to know by whom, otherwise you might find yourself negotiating with someone who doesn't have any hostages. There's the story of the Lebanese who instructed his aide to find someone to negotiate a hostage with. The aide said, "Which country is your hostage from?" The reply: "Find me a country and I'll get the hostage."

Men at Buckley's level are considered of major importance because they have so much knowledge. Forcing information from them can mean a death sentence for many other operatives working around the globe. A group calling itself the Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War) claimed responsibility for Buckley's kidnapping. Bill Casey, CIA chief, was so anxious to save Buckley that an expert FBI team specially trained in locating kidnap victims was dispatched to Beirut to find him. But after a month, they'd come up with nothing. Official U.S. policy then prohibited negotiations to ransom hostages, but Casey had authorized considerable sums to pay informants and, if need be, buy Buckley's freedom.

It didn't take the CIA long to turn to the Mossad for help. Shortly alter Buckley's kidnapping, the CIA liaison officer in Tel Aviv 'asked the Mossad for as much information as it could get about Buckley and some of the other hostages.

About 11 :30 one morning, an intercom announcement at headquarters asked all personnel to stay off the main floor and the elevator for the next hour because there were guests. Two CIA officials were escorted in and taken to Admony's ninth-floor office. The Mossad head told them he would give them everything the Mossad had, but if they wanted something in particular, they'd have to go through the prime minister, "because he's our boss." In fact, Admony wanted a formal request, so that he could collect on the favor later on, if need be.

In any event, the Americans made a formal request through their ambassador to then prime minister, Shimon Peres. Peres instructed Admony to have the Mossad give the CIA everything it could to help with the U.S. hostage situation. Normally, this sort of request includes limitations -- such strictures as "We'll give you whatever information we can, as long as it doesn't harm our personnel" - but in this case, there were no limitations, which was a clear indication of how significant both the United States and Peres considered the hostage issue to be.

Politically, these things can be dynamite. The Reagan administration would remember only too well the irreparable political damage and humiliation Jimmy Carter suffered when Americans were held hostage in Iran following the overthrow of the Shah.

Admony assured Peres that he would do everything he could to help the Americans. "I have a good feeling in this regard," he said. "We might have some information that will help them." In truth, he had no intention of helping them.

Two CIA officials were called in to meet with the Saifanim ("goldfish") department, the PLO specialists. The meeting took place at Midrasha, or the Academy. Since Israel considers the PLO its main enemy, the Mossad often calculates that if something can be blamed on the PLO, it has done its job. So they set about attempting to blame the PLO for the kidnappings, even with the knowledge that many of them, including Buckley's, had no PLO connection.

Still, hoping to look as if they were cooperating fully, the Saifanim men plastered maps all over a boardroom wall and offered the Americans a considerable amount of data regarding general locations of hostages; although they were constantly being moved to new locations, the Mossad usually had good general knowledge of where they were. The Mossad left out many of the details they had garnered from their sources, but told the Americans that from the general picture, they could decide if it was worth going further into the specifics. This was all part of an unstated, but very real, system of debt repayment, building Brownie points in return for future favors.

At the end of the meeting, a full report was sent to Admony. For their part, the Americans went back and discussed it with their officials. Two days later, they returned, seeking more specific information on one answer given them in the original briefing. The CIA thought this might prove to be a diamond in the rough, but they wanted to verify the specifics. They asked to speak to the source.

"Forget it," the Mossad man said. "Nobody talks to sources."

"Okay," the CIA man said. "That's fair enough. How about letting us talk to the case officer?"

The Mossad protects katsas' identities vigorously. They simply can't risk letting others see them. After all, who knows when they might be recognized as a result? A katsa in Beirut today could end up working anywhere tomorrow, run into the CIA man, and blow an entire operation. Still, there are many ways of arranging interviews where the two sides don't actually meet. Such methods as speaking behind screens and distorting the voice, or wearing a hood, would have served the purpose. But the Mossad had no intention of being that helpful. Despite direct orders from their "boss," Peres, the Saifanim officials said they'd have to check it with the head of the Mossad.

Word went around headquarters that Admony was having a bad day. His mistress, who was the daughter of the head of Tsomet, had a bad day, too. She was having her period - at least, that was the joke. At lunch in the dining room that day, everybody was talking about the hostage thing. By the time it got down to the dining room, the story may have been slightly exaggerated, but Admony is supposed to have said, "Those fucking Americans. Maybe they want us to get the hostages for them, too. What are they, crazy?"

In any event, the answer was no. The CIA could not see a katsa. Furthermore, they told the Americans that the information they'd been given was outdated and related to a completely different case, so it had nothing to do with the Buckley case. That wasn't true, but they further embellished their story by asking the Americans to disregard that information in order to save the lives of other hostages. They even promised to double their efforts to help the Americans in return.

Many people in the office said the Mossad were going to regret it someday. But the majority were happy. The attitude was, "Hey, we showed them. We're not going to be kicked around by the Americans. We are the Mossad. We are the best."

* * *

It was just this concern over Buckley and the other hostages that prompted Casey to circumvent the congressional arm of the U.S. system and become involved in the plan to supply Iran with embargoed arms in return for the safety of American hostages, culminating in the Iran-Contra scandal. Had the Mossad been more helpful initially, it not only could have saved Buckley and others, it might also have averted this major U.S. political scandal. Peres had clearly seen it as being in Israel's interest to cooperate, but the Mossad - Admony in particular - had other interests and pursued them relentlessly.

The final tragedy of Israel's Mossad-led involvement in Lebanon was that when their station "Submarine" was closed, a lot of agents were left behind, and their entire network collapsed. Many agents were killed. Others were smuggled out successfully.

Israel didn't start the war and they didn't end it. It's like playing blackjack in a casino. You don't start the game, and you don't end it. But you're there. Israel just didn't hit any jackpots.

During this period, Peres's "adviser on terrorism" was a man named Amiram Nir. When Peres suspected the Mossad wasn't being as helpful as it might have been with the Americans, he decided to use Nir as his personal liaison between the two countries, a move that brought Nir into contact with U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a central figure in the subsequent Iran-Contra scandal. Nir's position in the scheme of things was such that he carried the famous Bible autographed by Ronald Reagan when North and former United States national-security adviser Robert McFarlane - using false Irish passports - secretly visited Iran in May 1986 to sell arms. Money from that sale was used to buy arms for the U.S.-backed Contras in Nicaragua.

Nir was definitely a man with connections and inside knowledge. He had played a major role in capturing the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985, and he briefed then U.S. Vice-president (and former CIA director) George Bush on the Iran arms negotiations.

Nir was on record as saying that he and North supervised several counter-terrorist operations in 1985 and 1986, authorized by a secret U.S.-Israel agreement. In November 1985, North credited Nir with the idea of generating profits from arms sales to Iran to pay for other covert operations.

Nir's involvement in all this becomes even more intriguing because of his relationship with a shadowy Iran-based businessman called Manucher Ghorbanifar. CIA chief Bill Casey eventually warned North that Ghorbanifar was almost certainly an Israeli intelligence agent. Still, Ghorbanifar and Nir did successfully arrange for Iranian help in the July 29, 1986, release of the Reverend Lawrence Jenco, an American hostage held by Lebanese extremists. Within days of Jenco's release, Nir briefed George Bush on the need to respond by shipping arms to Iran.

Ghorbinafar had been a CIA source since 1974, the man who planted rumors in 1981 about Libyan hit teams being sent to the United States to kill Reagan. Two years later, after determining the rumor was fabricated, the CIA ended his relationship as a source, and in 1984 issued a formal "burn notice" warning that Ghorbinafar was a "talented fabricator."

Even so, it was Ghorbinafar who produced a bridge loan of $5 million from Saudi Arabian billionaire Adnan Khashoggi to overcome distrust between Iran and Israel in the arms deal. Khashoggi himself had been recruited years earlier as an agent by the Mossad. Indeed, his spectacular personal jet, about which much has been written, was fitted in Israel. Khashoggi was not getting a base salary from the Mossad the way regular agents do, but he was using Mossad money for many of his exploits. He got loans whenever he needed money to tide him over, and considerable sums of Mossad money were funneled through Khashoggi's companies, much of it originating with Ovadia Gaon, a French-based Jewish multimillionaire of Moroccan background who was often called upon when large amounts of money were needed.

In any event, Iran didn't want to pay until it had the weapons in hand, and Israel didn't want to send the 508 TOW missiles until it had the money, so the bridge loan through Khashoggi was critical in completing the transaction. Shortly after that deal, another American hostage, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, was released, further convincing the Americans that despite his talents as a liar, Ghorbanifar could still deliver hostages through his contacts in Iran. At the same time, Israel was secretly selling about $500 million worth of arms to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, so there is little doubt that Ghorbanifar and his associate, Nir, used this leverage to wrangle deals over American hostages.

On July 29, 1986, Nir met with Bush at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Details of the meeting were recorded in a top-secret three-page memo written by Craig Fuller, Bush's chief of staff. It quotes Nir as telling Bush of the Israeli involvement, "We are dealing with the most radical elements [in Iran because] we've learned they can deliver and the moderates can't." Reagan had consistently claimed he was dealing with Iranian "moderates" in sending weapons to Iran. Nir told Bush the Israelis "activated the channel. We gave a front to the operation, provided a physical base, provided aircraft."

Nir was scheduled to be a key witness in the 1989 trial of North over the Iran-Contra scandal; particularly since he had claimed that counter-terrorist activities he and North supervised during 1985 and 1986 were authorized by a secret U.S.-Israeli agreement. His testimony could have been highly embarrassing, not only to the Reagan administration, but also in outlining just how large a role the Israelis played in this whole affair.

However, on November 30, 1988, while flying in a Cessna T210 over a ranch 110 miles west of Mexico City, Nir was reportedly killed along with the pilot when the plane crashed. The other three passengers, all slightly injured, included Canadian Adriana Stanton, 25, of Toronto, who claimed to have no connection with Nir. However, the Mexicans described her as his "secretary" and his "guide," and she did work with a firm with which Nir was connected. She refused further comment.

Nir had been in Mexico to discuss marketing avocados. On November 29, he had visited an avocado-packing plant in the western Mexican state of Michoacan. He held a large financial interest in the plant. He chartered a light plane the next day for a flight to Mexico City, using the alias Pat Weber and, according to officials, was killed when it crashed. However, his "body" was identified by a mysterious Argentine, Pedro Cruchet, who worked for Nir and was in Mexico illegally. He told police he had lost his ID at a bullfight, but even without it, he managed to obtain custody of Nir's remains.

In addition, original reports from the state attorney general's office confirmed both Nir and Stanton, while supposedly on legitimate business, were traveling under assumed names. Later, an inspector at the departure airport said that wasn't true, although the error was never explained.

More than 1,000 people came to Nir's funeral in Israel and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin spoke of his "mission to as-yet-unrevealed destinations on secret assignment and to secrets which he kept locked in his heart."

At the time of Nir's accident, one unnamed intelligence official was quoted in the Toronto Star as saying that he did not believe Nir was dead. Rather, he said that Nir had likely got his face surgically altered in Geneva, "where the clinics are very good, very private, and very discreet."

Whatever happened to Nir, we can only speculate on how much damage to the Reagan administration and the Israeli government his testimony could have done in the subsequent Iran-Contra hearings and criminal trials.

But during the U.S. Senate Select Committee investigations in July 1987, a memo written by North to former national-security adviser, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, dated September 15, 1986, and censored for security reasons, recommended that Poindexter first discuss the arms deal with Casey and then brief President Reagan.

Poindexter was the only one of seven people convicted in the scandal who had to go to jail. On June 11, 1990, he received a six-month sentence and a stern lecture from U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene, who said Poindexter deserved incarceration as the "decision-making head of the Iran-Contra operation."

On March 3, 1989, Robert McFarlane was fined $20,000 and given two years' probation after pleading guilty to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. On July 6, 1989, following the sensational Washington trial, Oliver North was fined $150,000 and ordered to do 1,200 hours of community service. He had been found guilty by a jury on May 4 on three of 12 counts. North also received a three-year suspended sentence, plus two years' probation.

North's memo to Poindexter underscores the importance of Nir's role in this scandal in a section that reads: "Amiram Nir, the special assistant to Prime Minister (Shimon) Peres on counter-terrorism, had indicated that during the 15minute private discussion with the president, Peres is likely to raise several sensitive issues."

By then, three American hostages had been released in connection with the arms sales. They were Jenco, Weir, and David Jacobsen.

Under the heading "hostages," the memo said: "Several weeks ago, Peres expressed concern that the United States may be contemplating termination of current efforts with Iran. The Israelis view the hostage issue as a hurdle which must be crossed en route to a broadened strategic relationship with the Iranian government.

"It is likely that Peres will seek assurances that the United States will indeed continue with the current 'joint initiative' in that neither Weir nor Jenco would be free today without Israeli help ... it would be helpful if the president would simply thank Peres for their discreet assistance."

Apparently, Reagan did. And it's highly likely that Peres returned the thanks, at least in part, by arranging for Nir's convenient "death" to avoid his testifying in public.

It is difficult to be certain, but given the questionable circumstances - plus the fact that Israeli arms dealers were funneling weapons and training through the Caribbean to Colombian drug lords at the time - it is unlikely that Nir is dead.

We may never know for sure. But we do know that, had the Mossad been more forthcoming with intelligence concerning American and other western hostages, the entire Iran-Contra affair might never have happened.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:28 am


ON DECEMBER 8, 1987, an Israeli army truck collided with several vans in Gaza, killing four Arabs and injuring 17 others. The incident sparked widespread protests the next day, particularly as rumor spread that the accident had been a deliberate reprisal for the December 6 stabbing death of an Israeli statesman in Gaza.

The next day, Gazon protesters blocked roads with barricades of burning tires. They threw stones, Molotov cocktails, and iron rods at Israeli troops. On December 10, the rioting spread to the Balata refugee camp near the West Bank city of Neblus.

On December 16, special Israeli anti-riot forces used water cannon for the first time against protesters, and great numbers of Israeli soldiers were sent to the Gaza Strip, attempting to quell the growing unrest.

Two days later, after Friday prayers, Palestinian youths rushed out of Gaza's mosques, confronting Israeli troops in running street battles. Three more Arabs were shot to death. Afterward, Israeli troops stormed Gaza's Shifa Hospital, arresting dozens of wounded Arabs, and beating doctors and nurses who tried to protect their patients.

The intifada had begun.

On May 16, 1990, a 1,000-page report sponsored by the Swedish branch of the Save The Children Fund, and financed by the Ford Foundation, accused Israel of "severe, indiscriminate, and recurring" violence against Palestinian children. It estimated that between 50,000 and 63,000 children had been treated for injuries, including at least 6,500 wounded by gunfire. It said most of the children killed had not been participating in stone-throwing when they were shot, and one-fifth of the cases it examined showed that the victims were shot either at home or within 30 feet of their homes.

The intifada still rages, with no end in sight. By July 1990, according to Associated Press, 722 Palestinians were killed by Israelis, and 230 more by Palestinian radicals; at least 45 Israelis have died.

During 1989, Israel sent a peak of 10,000 soldiers into Gaza and the West Bank to try to keep order. By April 1990, that had fallen to about 5,000 troops.

On February 13, 1990, the Wall Street Journal reported that an Israeli bank study had estimated that the first two years of the uprising had cost Israel $1 billion in lost growth and production. In addition, it had cost that country $600 million for the army to suppress the intifada.

There are more than 600,000 Palestinians crammed into the Gaza Strip's 146 square miles. About 60,000 of them travel into Israel to work each day, toiling primarily in low-paying menial jobs, returning home each night because they are forbidden to stay there overnight.

On March 16, 1990, Israel's Knesset defeated the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir by a vote of 60 to 55, the first time an Israeli government had fallen on a non-confidence vote. It came after Shamir refused to accept a U.S. plan for beginning Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

On June 7, Shamir and his right-wing Likud Party formed a coalition with some splinter parties, giving them a two-seat edge in the Knesset in what most observers saw as the most extreme right-wing government in Israeli history, allowing Shamir to continue his policies of promoting settlements in the disputed territories and refusing to talk to the Palestinians.

On November I5, 1988, at the climax of a four-day meeting in Algiers, the Palestinian National Council, considered by the PLO to be its parliament in exile, had proclaimed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and voted for the first time to accept key UN resolutions that implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist.

* * *

During this prolonged period of unrest, Israel's image abroad has suffered serious harm. Despite increasing efforts by Israeli officials to muzzle the reporting of West Bank and Gaza unrest, the images of armed troops beating and shooting unarmed Palestinian youths have begun to upset even some of Israel's staunchest allies.

Three days after Shamir lost in the non-confidence vote, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, on a tour of the region, said the revolt was "being perpetuated partially by the abuse of the Palestinians" by Israeli soldiers, including unjustified killings, house demolitions, and detention without trial.

"There is hardly a family that lives in the West Bank that has not had one of its male members actually incarcerated by military authorities," said Carter.

Israeli army figures show that between 15,000 and 20,000 Palestinians have been wounded and up to 50,000 arrested. About 13,000 of them remain in jail.

In what seemed a deliberate attempt to provoke the Christian community, on April 12, 1990, during Easter week, a group of 150 ardent Jewish nationalists moved into a vacant, four-building, 72-room complex known as St. John's Hospice, in the heart of Jerusalem's Christian quarter. The hospice is within yards of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, revered by Christians as the traditional site of the tomb of Jesus Christ.

For 10 days, the Israeli government denied any role in the event. Finally, it admitted that it had secretly funneled $1.8 million to the group, 40 percent of the cost of subletting the complex.

U.S. Senator Robert Dole, during an interview while he toured Israel, suggested that the United States should consider cutting its massive aid package to Israel to free up funds for emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

On March 1, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said that the Bush administration was willing to consider "shaving" foreign aid to Israel and other countries to help emerging democracies. Baker outraged Shamir by linking an Israeli request for a $400 million loan guarantee to a freeze on new settlements in the occupied territories.

Perhaps the best illustration of the prevailing mood of the right wing in Israel is the celebrated case of Rabbi Moshe Levinger, leader of the far-right Jewish Settlers' Movement. In June 1990, he was sentenced to six months in jail for negligence: he had shot and killed an Arab.

Levinger had been driving his car in Hebron on October 7, 1988, when someone threw a stone at it. He jumped out and began firing his gun, killing an Arab who was standing in his own barber shop. During one court appearance, Levinger approached the court waving his gun over his head and saying he had been "privileged" to have shot an Arab. After he was sentenced, he was carried off to jail on the shoulders of a cheering throng.

Rabbi Moshe Tsvy Neriah, head of the famous B'Nai Akiva Yasheeva (religious school), said during a lecture on Levinger's behalf, "It's not time to think, but it's time to shoot right and left."

Justice Heim Cohen, a retired judge of Israel's supreme court, said, "The way the situation is going now, I would be afraid to say where we are going. I never heard of anybody who was tried for negligence after shooting somebody in cold blood. I'm probably getting old."

* * *

The intifada and resultant breakdown of moral order and humanity are a direct result of the kind of megalomania that characterizes the operation of the Mossad. That's where it all begins. This feeling that you can do anything you want to whomever you want for as long as you want because you have the power.

Israel is facing its biggest threat ever. This thing is uncontrollable. In Israel, they're still beating Palestinians, and Shamir says, "They're making us become cruel. They're forcing us to hit children. Aren't they terrible?" This is what happens after years and years of secrecy; of "we're right, let's be right, no matter what"; of keeping the officials deliberately misinformed; of justifying violence and inhumanity through deceit, or, as the Mossad logo says: "by way of deception."

It's a disease that began with the Mossad and has spread through government and down through much of Israeli society. There are large elements inside Israel who are protesting this slide, but their voices are not being heard. And with each step down, it gets easier to repeat, and more difficult to stop.

The strongest curse inside the Mossad that one katsa can throw at another is the simple wish: "May I read about you in the paper."

It might be the only way to turn things around.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:28 am

Postscript to the Paperback Edition

IT WAS NOT A complete surprise. I was in the kitchen making coffee about 9:45 p.m. on September 5 when they knocked on my front door. Bella answered. It was Oren Riff, my former course commander, and Atelah Sherf, head of the Academy, both senior Mossad officers. Riff, standing on the right, wore, a black leather jacket and white shirt, and had a leather carrying pouch slung over his shoulder. Sherf wore a brown wool blazer, brown pants, shirt and tie.

"We want to talk to you," Sherf shouted In Hebrew.

"I have nothing to tell you," I replied, picking up the telephone and dialing 911.

"Just one minute," said Sherf.

I hung up. A few seconds later the Nepean city police called and asked if I had dialed 911. I said yes, but everything was fine for the moment.

I walked to the door. They wanted to come in but I said no. About that time, our daughter Leeorah, hearing Hebrew being spoken and thinking we had visitors from Israel, ran happily partway down the stairs, but quickly retreated when she heard me speaking in an angry voice. Bella was even more upset, especially at Sherf who had refused to talk to me when I had wanted somebody to talk to, and now was at my door.

"I didn't believe you would do it, said Riff. "Let's be civilized," he added, wanting to come in and sit down.

"Forget it. There's nothing to talk about."

"We know about the book," said Sherf, as If I didn't know why they were there. "We want to know what stage it is at. You know, we're at war now."

"As far as I know, it's the Americans and Canadians over there, not you.

"Help us stop the book," he said. "If it's only in Canada, how many copies could there be? Look, whatever the cost to you and the people you are involved with, we'll pay. Whatever profit you think you were going to make, we'll pay that, too."

"You have to stop it," Riff interjected.

"You know that money is no problem," Sherf continued. "You have to think about your family and your children. You know people from the PLO and other groups. They'll be after you."

''Why would the PLO be after me?"

"They'll think you know even more, and they'll be after you."

I realized two high-ranking Mossad officers wouldn't come up to the door without having set up some surveillance operation; so they knew that nobody was inside who could harm them and that the territory was clear. This would be the best time to kidnap me. I wasn't known yet and the book wasn't out. So I stalled.

"It's not up to me. I have to talk to somebody. I'll get back to you. Where can I reach you?"

Sherf gave me a number in Israel. I told him not to be ridiculous, and to give me a number here. He told me to call the Israeli consulate in Toronto.

"Why not the Embassy here?" asked Bella.

Riff, Sherf and I all simultaneously said, "No, no, the consulate." At this point, the Embassy would not have known about the operation. It was too politically sensitive to work in a friendly foreign country through the Embassy, so it would have been handled by the Shaback, or the internal security, in the consulate. They gave me until 8 p.m. the next day to call. They sat outside the house for about ten minutes in a red, mid-sized rental car with Quebec plates. Then they left. I knew it was time for me to leave too. First, if they tried to get me, I didn't want them to do it in front of my family where they would be endangered. And second, I didn't want them to get me.

Earlier that week, Claire Hoy and I had met in Toronto with the executives of the Stoddart Publishing Company, and two marketing executives from St. Martin's Press in New York. Because the Americans had only been told about the book in August, it was agreed the publication date in Canada would be delayed a month, from September 4 to October 4, to give St. Martin's the chance to publish simultaneously. Ironically, without the delay, the book would have already been out when the Mossad came calling. Now, it seemed, all bets were off.

I waited an hour, packed an attache case, got into my car, did a few small maneuvers to see if I was being followed -- I was, by men in a small grey hatchback and others in a dark van. I then lost them and headed directly for the Ottawa airport. There wasn't a flight to Toronto until the morning, so I went to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police security office at the airport, showed them a copy of the book jacket -- which is all I believe the Mossad had at this time -- told them about the Mossad visit, and that I was going to stay in the airport for the night. They promised to check me regularly. About 1 a.m. I called both publisher Jack Stoddart and Hoy at their homes and told them the situation.

The next day when I arrived at Stoddart I learned they had just received a letter from lawyer Joel Goldenberg on behalf of the State of Israel announcing that he was seeking an injunction against publication of the book in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The good news was that contrary to established Mossad policy, Goldenberg's letter confirmed publicly that I had worked for the Mossad and had learned information which, if made public, could be dangerous to many people and countries, thereby ending our fears that Israel would flatly deny any knowledge of me or the information in the book.

The bad news was that the next morning, the Honorable Mr. Justice Robert Montgomery awarded Israel a ten-day restraining order, the first time in Canadian publishing history a foreign government ever received such a pre-publishing ban. (Copies of the Order of Mr. Justice Montgomery and the Statement of Claim follow this Postscript.)

After an impromptu afternoon press conference, my immediate concern was security. I had to assume the Mossad would want to kidnap me and smuggle me back to Israel. Nelson Doucet, an executive of Stoddart, took me to Metro Toronto Police Intelligence services officer Thomas Milakovic. The RCMP security was called in and decided to drive me back home, where they said it would be easier to provide security against a possible abduction attempt. When Hoy showed up at the Prince Hotel with my suitcase, he was informed by an RCMP officer that they'd driven me back to Ottawa. Hoy then went on to Brantford, a medium-sized city one hour west of Toronto, to spend the weekend at his parents' house. The Brantford police, alerted by the RCMP, took the threat seriously enough to assign Detective Dan Camilleri of its criminal intelligence unit to meet with Hoy, drop by the house a few times over the weekend, and oversee extra police patrols.

Meantime, Bella had received calls from old friends in Israel saying that a group of them were going to be flown to Canada to convince me to stop the book. Bella told them not to bother, but they said they were just waiting for their tickets. Riff telephoned Bella several times that day, telling her to ask me to get in touch with him so we could talk. When Bella told him to instruct our Israeli friends not to come, he said, "I don't know what you're talking about." Bella replied, "If you want me to give that message to Vicky, you tell your people who do know what I'm talking about." He did, and my friends' trip was cancelled.

In Israel, the media were having a field day, printing stories accusing me of being a liar, drunk, convicted thief and lots more. There was even a story about finding a box of Mossad files in my apartment in Tel Aviv. The first version said it had been found in an alley; but somebody realized a cardboard box full of files wouldn't last for four years outside, so the story was changed to the attic of my apartment. I don't have an apartment in Tel Aviv. Recalling an incident where I'd helped the police arrest some men for credit card fraud, stories were leaked to the media saying that instead of working for the police, I'd been part of the scam. Later on, a tale appeared that said I'd faied my security test -- which, considering that the Mossad accepted me, is a ridiculous charge from an organization that prides itself on being the most selective security agency in the world. In addition, the stories shortened the length of my service in the Mossad so much it prompted Hoy to joke, "What will they say next -- that you spent a long weekend in the Academy?"

I was not surprised that the Mossad was trying to smear me, though I did expect more finesse. It was frustrating because we were muzzled by the court order while the Mossad and the media could say anything they wanted. There was an Israeli journalist sitting in a downtown Ottawa hotel reading the book to his radio audience in Israel, yet we -- its writers and its publishers -- were forbidden to discuss its contents.

It was 4 a.m. when I arrived back from Toronto with the RCMP. Contrary to the RCMP's opinion, I did not think home was the best place for me to be. Later that morning Bella drove me to the train station, where I arrived just three minutes before the Toronto train was to leave. If somebody had wanted to follow me I would have seen them; I was the last one on the train.

On September 9, at approximately 7 p.m., Bill Hanna, Stoddart's Vice-President for Foreign Rights, checked into the Sheraton Centre Hotel in downtown Toronto in his name (so my name wouldn't be on the register), took my bags up to the room, and met me near the pay phone bay off the main lobby. I knew the Mossad would be staking out the major hotels. They could easily gather twenty or thirty security people from the Embassy and the consulate and from their various New York operations. These were not the best surveillance professionals. They're what we call "fingers": Their job is to spot you, then notify someone else, and leave.

When Bill and I were talking on adjacent phones to each other I noticed a man dressed in a dark blue blazer. He had dark, short-cropped curly hair and he was looking at me. I could see in the mirror that he was signalling to somebody else by jerking his head to one side, so I glanced where he was signalling and saw the other man. He was wearing jeans, a sweatshirt and Palladium shoes -- the tan, canvas basketball-type shoes worn in the Israeli military for commando training.

I told Bill I'd go back down to the mall area and he could watch to see if they moved to certain locations. Two minutes later, Bill came down to tell me they'd done exactly what I said, so I told him to leave and come back to the side door in exactly one hour. I went back to the lobby and looked straight at the man with the jeans. He looked uncomfortable and walked behind a pillar. I went to the other side of the pillar too, and he moved. We both zig-zagged a couple of times until finally he walked away and I took the elevator up to my room. I had a shower and then shaved my moustache off.

I'd gone to the room wearing jeans. When I came back down I was wearing a dark suit. The guy in jeans was staring right at the elevator when I got out. I broke into a conversation with two men from Alberta talking about aging beef, and the man watching the elevator didn't even notice me. I walked straight to the exit as Bill's car pulled up; I hopped in, and we left. Until late that week, I spent my nights switching hotels, and staying with various Stoddart employees.

Canada's Solicitor-General Pierre Cadieux, the minister responsible for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, was asked by journalists on September 11 why Mossad officers are allowed to harass a Canadian citizen. Cadieux said no friendly foreign spy agency can operate in Canada without his authorization. "I am not aware of any such request that has been made ... and to my knowledge there is no such operation going on in Canada." If Cadieux really believes that the Mossad only operates in friendly countries with official approval of the government, he has a lot to learn.

He may not have been aware of it, but in Israel, a Mossad source had already confessed to a journalist that the Mossad had indeed sent the two men to try to convince me to stop the book and that they had a kidnap plan, but it was abandoned when I went into hiding. According to the Boston Globe, this was corroborated by Yossi Melman, co-author of another bestselling book about Israeli Intelligence called Every Spy a Prince, who was reported to have been told "authoritatively" that the Mossad had wanted to kidnap me and bring me back to Israel.

In fact, the Massad has a history of kidnapping people it wants to punish in Israel. Most people are aware, for example, of the case of Mordechai Vanunu, who was lured onto a yacht near Rome by a beautiful agent named Cindy. The September 19 issue of the Israeli newspaper Maariv carried a small, hand-printed advertisement obviously designed to catch my attention. The ad read: "To Victor Ostrovsky. Have A Happy And Sweet New Year (Wherever You Are). I Will Soon Come To Visit. Cindy."

The book was beginning to garner some attention abroad, but it exploded onto the international scene after a group of approximately ten lawyers crowded into the Fifth Avenue living room of New York State Supreme Court Justice Michael J. Dontzin. This was on the 11th of September. Israel had retained that same day the huge New York law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom to seek an injunction stopping publication.

Israel's lawyers asked for the urgent meeting about 9:30 p.m. and Dontzin agreed. Skadden sent a team of lawyers to Dontzin's apartment, including top litigation partners Jonathon Lerner and Barry Garfinkel.

The American publisher, St. Marlin's Press, was represented by its general counsel and an associate, along with well- nown civil liberties lawyers John Lankenau and Robert Balin from the firm of Lankenau & Bickford. As unusual as the late-night meeting in the judge's living room was, the result was even more unusual. Without having read the book, Dontzin agreed to a temporary restraining order, the first time such a pre-publication order was ever granted to a foreign government by an American court on national security grounds. Israel stated that publication of the book would jeopardize lives, but Dontzin was shown no evidence to support that.

The reaction to Dontzin's restraining order was explosive in the American news media and the entire legal community. A front-page story in The New York Times was followed by features on the nightly news programs of every national and cable network.

The courts didn't need much time to decide that Israel had not made its case. Dontzin ordered both sides to appear before him on Friday, September 14, for a full hearing, but the St. Martin's lawyers immediately appealed his ruling. On September 12, Appellate Division Justice Ernst Rosenberger told both sides that the full appeals court would have to review St. Martin's' request to overturn Dontzin's order. The next morning, the lawyers argued their cases. At 4 p.m. the court announced that Israel had not proved its claim, and, since innumerable bookstores and wholesalers, as well as major media book reviewers, had received copies of the book before Dontzin's order, a ban based on the jeopardy argument would not be effective anyway.

Two days after that ruling, in light of the tremendous flood of media publicity, I decided to come out of hiding and go back home. I judged I would be relatively safe there, at least until somewhere down the road when the media lose interest and people forget about me. I know the Mossad won't forget, but I realized that going into the project. As I was leaving Toronto, I told Jack Stoddart and Nelson Doucet I was sure my former colleagues were still in town.

On Monday, September 17, battered by the New York court decision and the roaring public reaction, Israel decided not to pursue the injunction in Canada. Over the previous weekend, Stoddart's offices had been broken into. The police did not know who accomplished the break-in, but they said it was a "professional job." Nothing really was taken, but desk drawers were left ajar, the keys on top, a message as if to say "we were here, and we can come in here any time we want."

What all this legal fighting did, of course, was immediately make By Way of Deception the fastest-selling book in St. Martin's' history. Orders skyrocketed from the initial 42,000 projected to over 300,000 in just a few days. It is now being translated into 23 languages, and Hoy and I have even recorded an audiocassette version of the book.

The existence of the book, its success, and the misguided attempts of the Mossad to suppress it, had repercussions in Israel. In a rare move, the Knesset summoned the head of the Mossad to assess possible damage to ties between Israel and the U.S. as a result of the revelations in the book and of the moves to prevent its publication. Politicians, including some from Yitzhak Shamir's own Likud party, criticized the government's ill-conceived and inept attempts to kill the book. By then it was clear that the sole effect of these attempts was to raise the book in one week to the #1 bestseller positions in Canada and the U.S., thus making Israel look at once oppressive and foolish.

The success of the book prompted a barrage of criticism focused mainly on my veracity or my intentions.

The original accusation -- that it endangered lives of Mossad agents or contacts -- was quietly dropped. My American publisher had questioned me at length about this possibility before he agreed to do the book. I convinced him that every person in conceivable jeopardy was either totally veiled by disguise or never mentioned to begin with. And this turned out to be true.

The attacks were usually hobbled by inconsistency.

In Israel, Prime Minister Shamir told the Jerusalem Post that "the whole book was written with evil intentions. I believe everything written there is based on bad will and lies, with the intention to hurt Israel."

But the dismissal of the book as "lies" flies directly in the face of Israel's Canadian court papers which, in addition to verifying my employment in the Mossad, specifically list a series of documents, charts, maps and other information we used in the book as bona fide material belonging to them.

In Israel, the "Ostrovsky Affair," as it came to be known, dominated the media for some time. The September 14 front page of Maariv was completely consumed by the story, much of the space taken up with a collage depicting me as a Saddam Hussein lookalike. A radio reporter interviewing me for an Israeli station called me a "traitor," and a writer for the mass-circulation Yedioth Ahronoth wrote, "My first thought was that someone should put a bullet through Victor Ostrovsky's head." Former Mossad chiefs Meir Amit and Isser Harel made the rounds of news shows trying to discredit me.

The theme of the assault was regularly that the text revealed state secrets of high importance -- and that it was all lies.

Despite the repeated general charge of falsity, not a single specific misstatement of major fact has ever been cited by Mossad spokesmen. In addition, the book has withstood intense international scrutiny in countries around the world. In Sri Lanka, the government was so concerned about our revelations that it appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate, and the commissioner came to Canada to take evidence from me under oath. In Denmark, the Mossad's use of Danish Intelligence became a major political Issue when former intelligence officers were reported to have publicly confirmed our version of the story. News of Israel's control over Danish taping of Palestinian telephone conversations became part of a major trial of a terrorist cell that had been operating for many years in Copenhagen. Israel reportedly told the Danish that the book's appendix on Danish Intelligence is a bogus document. Yet it is listed along with the other material cited by Israel in the Canadian court proceeding as a bona fide Mossad document. Either they are lying to the courts, or they are lying to Denmark.

In the U.S., media coverage has been extensive and generally fair, and no one has come forward yet to dispute the substantial claims made in the book about Mossad activities inside North America. The most widely-publicized event concerning Americans describes the Mossad's deliberate failure to tell the Americans everything they knew about the installation of a bomb in the Mercedes truck which subsequently smashed into the marine compound in Beirut. The Mossad now claims that they issued a full-alert warning to the Americans. But if they did, it would have been on paper, and they could have produced it by now. They haven't. What's more, if the Mossad was surprised by this attack, how were they able to hand over a list of thirteen culprits connected to the bombing the next day?

While most critics have recognized Israel's smear tactics for what they are, one recurrent note was the question of my access to all this information, given my relatively junior position in the Mossad. This is a legitimate concern which perhaps we did not elaborate on fully enough in the original edition. But as a Mossad katsa trainee, I did have access to the main Mossad computer. I also had access, as did all the other trainees, to the documents, files and oral histories of the specific operations, including tapes and transcripts of bugged conversations, as described in this book.

Not everyone working in Mossad headquarters has free access to most information, but katsas have almost unlimited access. It is, remember, a small club, where each member not only knows the other but shares with him the trust that comes from being part of the same cause. Granted, computer information on the various desks is compartmentalized, but if an officer wants to access some information from another desk, all he has to do is walk down the hall and ask his colleague. It's done routinely. In addition, it should surprise no one that outside the office, in our social contacts with each other and with our families in our homes, we freely discussed these affairs among ourselves.

The Mossad has adopted much the same attitude about access to vital information that the Israeli army uses. Unlike many armies, where only the generals and a few senior officers really know what's going on, the Israelis like to involve many more people from the top down, the idea being that if the top officer is killed, the man below him will know what the object of the exercise is. If he is killed, the man below him can carry on, and so on. Among katsas, this same philosophy applied.

The reaction of the Jewish community in Canada and the U.S. to the book, and to me, has been mixed. Much of it is hostile. In Ottawa, for example, the Jewish community center struck me off its mailing list, and a prominent rabbi told a group of people he was planning a book-burning party for By Way of Deception.

The Initial charges of "Traitor!" came from people who did not and never will read the book. In the months since publication I have heard from more and more Jewish people who by now have read the book and see that it is not an attack on Israel but on an out-of-control agency whose policies and practices often do more harm than good. I am an Israeli, always committed to the survival and welfare of our Jewish national state. And I know that Israel needs a Mossad -- but a better Mossad than this one.

I did not write By Way of Deception for money; if I had I would have accepted the Mossad's offer of money in Ottawa. I wrote it because I deeply believed, with a feeling of fear and outrage, that Israel was being hurt -- both by the Mossad and by certain government policies. Once I believed this, I felt with growing urgency a responsibility to say so as loudly as I could. I was not unaware of what the "whistle-blower" is usually subjected to, and I won't pretend it doesn't hurt. But it will be worth it if my book prompts a self-examination in Israel that ultimately leaves it a stronger, healthier nation that all can be prouder of.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:29 am

Court Documents

(General Division)



THIS MOTION made by the plaintiff for injunctive relief, and made without notice, was heard this day at Toronto.

ON READING the Notice of Motion, the Affidavit of Yoav Ben-Dror, and upon the undertaking of counsel for the plaintiff to issue a Notice of Action herein as soon as practical.

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants and each of them be and are hereby restrained from printing, causing to be printed, publishing, causing to be published, reproducing, distributing any books, essays or articles containing information provided by the defendant Victor Ostrovsky or any other person on his behalf that reached the said Victor Ostrovsky by virtue of his duty or in the course of his work with the Mossad, The institute of Intelligence and Special Functions of the State of Israel, until Monday, September 17, 1990 or until such further time as this Honourable Court may direct.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the within Notice of Motion, Affidavit of Yoav Ben-Dror sworn September 6, 1990 and Notice of Action herein be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record.


Court File No. 54362/90Q



(Notice of Action Issued September 7, 1990)

1. The Plaintiff claims:

a) a declaration that each of the Defendants hold by way of constructive, resulting or express trust in favour of the Plaintiff, all revenues received or receivable from the sale of the book entitled "By Way of Deception" and any other books, essays or articles, containing information provided by the Defendant Victor Ostrovsky or any persons on his behalf that reached Victor Ostrovsky by virtue of his employment with the Institute of Intelligence and Special functions of the State of Israel, including revenues from all licensing or royalty agreements entered into by any of the Defendants in respect of the said book and other books, essays or articles;

b) an Order for an accounting of all revenue received or receivable by the Defendants from the sale of the book "By Way of Deception" and the other above mentioned books, essays or articles;

c) an Order directing the Defendants to pay over to the Plaintiff all revenues determined through the accounting herein;

d) an interlocutory and permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd. from paying over to the Defendants Ostrovsky and/or Hoy any monies they would be entitled to from the publication and sale of "By Way of Deception" pending the decision of this Court;

e) an Order for the delivery up to the Plaintiff of the Defendant Ostrovsky's diary and all documents and photographs disclosing information which belong to the Plaintiff and which have been unlawfully obtained directly or indirectly by the Defendant Victor Ostrovsky by virtue of his employment with the Institute of Intelligence and Special Functions of the State of Israel, including all copies and translations, of such information, howsoever stored, copied or reproduced;

f) an Order sealing this Court file pursuant to s. 147 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O., 1984 c. 11 as amended;

g) punitive damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00;

h) solicitor and client costs of this action;

i) prejudgment interest pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, supra;

j) such further and other relief as this Court may deem just.


2. The Plaintiff is a sovereign nation which maintains an embassy in the City of Ottawa, in the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carlton and maintains a consular office in the City of Toronto, in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.

3. The Plaintiff maintains an agency in the State of Israel known as the Institute of Intelligence and Special functions of the State of Israel ("the Mossad").

4. The Defendant Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd. ("Stoddart") is an Ontario corporation carrying on the business of book publishing and distribution in the Province of Ontario and elsewhere.

5. The Defendant Victor Ostrovsky ("Ostrovsky") resides in the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carlton and was at all material times a citizen of both Canada and the State of Israel.

6. The Defendant Claire Hoy ("Hoy") resides in the Regional Municipality of Ottawa- Carlton and is an author.


7. On or about December 30, 1984, Ostrovsky commenced employment with the Plaintiff. Upon commencing employment, Ostrovsky was assigned to work in the Mossad.

8. As a condition to his commencing employment with the Plaintiff, Ostrovsky entered into a Declaration of Observance of Information agreement with the Plaintiff on or about December 31, 1984 whereby he agreed to comply with the internal regulations of the Mossad. He also agreed not to pass on information acquired by virtue of his employment. The Declaration of Observance was entered into in the State of Israel.

9. Section 4 of Regulation 70.01.16 prohibits the publication of books, essays and articles, and the like containing information which reaches the employee by virtue of his position or incidental to the execution of his duty or in the course of his work, even if such information is not directly connected with his duty. Section 4 also prohibits the passing on of any information to any person so as to enable him to write a book, essay, article, etc., which will contain information and articles containing information as aforesaid.

10. On or about January 18, 1985, as a condition to Ostrovsky's continued employment with the Plaintiff, Ostrovsky and a representative of the Plaintiff executed a contract of employment (the "Employment Contract"). The Employment Contract was executed in the State of Israel.

11. Paragraph 1 of the Employment Contract provides that it is made in accordance with regulation 1(2) of the State Service Regulations (appointments) (special contract) 5120 - 1900 and paragraph 16.413 of the Takshir. The Takshir reiterates the obligation of non- disclosure both during and after employment.

12. Paragraph 8 of the Employment Contract expressly incorporates the provisions of the State Service Regulations and the notices of the State Service Commissariat as are in force from time to time.

13. The State Service Regulations provide, inter alia, as follows:


42.512 Information -- including incorrect information, and any description, plan, motto, symbol, formula, object or part of them that include information or could serve as a source of information.


42.521 b) An employee who does not have the legal authority to do so, will not pass on information received by virtue of his functions to a person who has not been authorized to receive it.

c) An employee will not retain, without legal authorization, a document that has come into his possession by virtue of his function. An employee who retires from service ... will return all the documents he obtained by virtue of his function to the person responsible

42.523 An employee wishing to include information that became available to him by virtue of his function in a publication (as defined in paragraph 42.522) which he is about to publish, will submit his request to the government secretariat together with the draft of the publication which he intends publishing ... The employee will submit his request to the Director General of the Ministry in which he is employed, or, if he has already retired from civil service, to the Director General of the Ministry in which he had been employed.

42.525 It is forbidden to pass information to a journalist, unless the employee has been authorized to do ...

42.531 An employee will not publish the contents of any official document or information that becomes available to him in the course of his work, unless he has been authorized to do so by the Director General of the Ministry where he is employed ....

42.532 An employee will not publish anything that has to do with his official task or with matters which he deals as part of his official task unless he received permission to do so from the Director General of his Ministry


42.541 Should an employee wish to publish a book on a matter related to his work or to matters for which he is responsible by virtue of his function, and should the Director General of any other official authorized by him, be inclined to allow publication of all or part of the book ... the authorizing person is entitled to make his consent conditional on the publication of the book as an official document.

42.542 If the permission to publish the book was made conditional on it being published as an official document in accordance with paragraph 42.541, the employee is entitled to remuneration agreed upon between him and the responsible person, which will not exceed the official rate agreed upon between the publishers' union and the authors' union, or payment at another rate to be fixed with the approval of the civil service commission....

14. On or about March 9, 1986, on the occasion of Ostrovsky's leaving the Plaintiff's employ he executed an Undertaking and Declaration of Observance of Secrecy Upon Termination of Employment in the Mossad whereby he, inter alia, acknowledged:

a) his obligation not to divulge any information which reached him by virtue of his position or in the course of his work in the Mossad;

b) that he is prohibited from publishing books, articles, reports, etc. containing information which reached him by virtue of his position and work;

c) that he is prohibited from divulging to journalists, authors, publishers and other publicists any details which became known to him due to or in the course of his work.


15. During the course of Ostrovsky's employment with the Plaintiff, Ostrovsky was privy to information protected by the Employment Contract about the Plaintiff's operations. During the course of his employment Ostrovsky prepared a diary of his work containing protected information and wrongfully appropriated documents belonging to the Plaintiff (the "Documents"), including:

a) Mossad Organizational Charts;

b) Tsomet Organizational Chart;

c) lay-out of the Mossad Academy;

d) training materials, including maps;

e) Computer printouts including a printout describing Danish Intelligence;

f) AMAN Questionnaire;

g) Photographs; and

h) further and other documents, particulars of which will be provided prior to trial.

16. In breach of the Employment Contract Ostrovsky failed to surrender his diary to the Plaintiff and failed to return the Documents.

17. In or about April 1988, in breach of the Employment Contract, Ostrovsky divulged to Hoy the information about Mossad's operations and its contacts that Ostrovsky learned while in the employ of the Plaintiff and which is protected by the Employment Contract.

18. In return for a share in the proceeds from publication, Hoy agreed to co-author with Ostrovsky a book entitled "By Way of Deception" (the "Book") revealing the information obtained from Ostrovsky which is protected by the Employment Contract.

19. From April 1988 to November 1989, Hoy and Ostrovsky worked together to complete a manuscript of the Book using information, the diary and the Documents all of which are protected by the Employment Contract.

20. In or about November 1989, Hoy and Ostrovsky entered into an agreement with Stoddart Publishing whereby in exchange for royalties to be paid to Hoy and Ostrovsky, Stoddart was given exclusive rights to produce, publish and sell the Book, or authorize others so to do throughout the world.

21. At no material time did Ostrovsky ever seek permission or authority, pursuant to the Employment Contract, to publish or otherwise pass on the information, including the diary and Documents.

22. The Plaintiff pleads that Hoy and Stoddart participated in Ostrovsky's breach of contract. They induced Ostrovsky to breach his contract with the Plaintiff in that:

a) Hoy and Stoddart knew of Ostrovsky's obligations not to reveal information as a result of his employment with the Plaintiff;

b) Hoy and Stoddart were aware that publication of the Book would violate Ostrovsky's obligations to the Plaintiff;

c) Hoy and Stoddart encouraged and assisted Ostrovsky in writing the Book and arranging for its publication in breach of the Employment Contract;

d) Hoy and Stoddart received and converted the diary, information and Documents to their own use with knowledge of its protected nature.


23. On September 6, 1990 the Plaintiff's solicitors informed Stoddart's solicitors that the Plaintiff intended to seek an injunction on an urgent basis in the morning of September 7, 1990.

24. The Plaintiff's solicitor attended before this Honourable Court on the morning of Friday September 7, 1990 and obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining the publication of any information provided by Ostrovsky or any other person on his behalf that reached Ostrovsky by virtue of his duty or in the course of his work with the Mossad until September 17, 1990 or such further time as this Honourable Court may direct.

25. On the morning of September 7, 1990, with full knowledge that the Plaintiff was at that time before this Court seeking the interlocutory injunction, and with the intent to wrongfully defeat any lawful attempt by the Plaintiff to enjoin the publication of the Book or the protected information contained therein, Stoddart and Ostrovsky proceeded to meet members of the media and distributed to them descriptive material concerning the content of the Book.

26. As a result of Stoddart and Ostrovsky's meeting with members of the media, protected information was published by the Global Television Network on September 7, 1990 and the Toronto Star on September 8, 1990.

27. Subsequent to November 1989, Stoddart entered into an agreement with its U.S. affiliate, St. Martin's Press Inc. ("St. Martin's") for the distribution of the Book in the United States. Distribution was to commence in October 1990.

28. On or about September 7, 1990 after learning of the interlocutory injunction of this Court, Stoddart caused St. Martin's to move the distribution date in the United States to September 17, 1990. Distribution was commenced in the United States on or about September 11, 1990.

29. The Plaintiff pleads that in breach of the interlocutory injunction of this Court and with the intent to improperly defeat the effect of any injunctive remedy in Ontario, Stoddart caused publication in the United States to commence prior to the return of the motion for an injunction in this Court.

30. As a result of the early publication of the Book in the United States any reasonable benefit to the Plaintiff from an injunction in Ontario was defeated. Stoddart commenced distribution of the Book in Ontario on or about September 17, 1990.

31. The Plaintiff pleads that the Defendants ought not to be entitled to profit from their own wrongful conduct.


32. The Plaintiff pleads that the information, including the diary and the Documents, obtained by Ostrovsky as a result of his employment with Mossad constitutes protected information and is the Plaintiff's exclusive property.

33. The Plaintiff pleads that the Defendants converted to their own use the protected information including the diary and Documents belonging to the Plaintiff and claims from the Defendants an accounting of all revenues derived from the use thereof including all revenues from the publication and distribution of the Book.


34. The Plaintiff claims that the conversion of its information and publication of the Book in breach of the Employment Contract is unjustly enriching the Defendants at the expense of the Plaintiff without juristic reason.

35. The Plaintiff claims that each of the Defendants hold by way of constructive, resulting or express trust in favour of the Plaintiff, all revenues from the sale of the Book and any other books, essays or articles, containing information provided by Ostrovsky or any persons on his behalf that reached Ostrovsky by virtue of his employment at Mossad, including revenues from all licensing or royalty agreements entered into by any of the Defendants in respect of the said book and other books, essays or articles.


36. The Plaintiff pleads that the conduct of Stoddart and Ostrovsky described in paragraphs 24 to 31 herein, independent of Ostrovsky's breach of contract, was so high- handed, vindictive, reprehensible and so contumeliously disregarded the reasonable interests of the Plaintiff and the process of this Court that punitive, aggravated or exemplary damages ought to be awarded against the Defendants.


37. The Plaintiff proposes that the trial of this action take place in the City of Toronto.

Date of issue:

Barristers and Solicitors
200 King Street West
Suite 2300
Toronto, Ontario
M5H 3W5

Joel Goldenberg
(416) 595-2300
Solicitors for the Plaintiff
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:35 am

Appendix I

Mossad Organizational Chart

Tsomet Organizational Chart

Official Flow of Intelligence

Organization of a Station

Actual Flow of Intelligence

Layout of the Mossad Academy

Mossad Pay Sheet Indicating Monthly Salary Paid to Victor Ostrovsky (The form indicates its origins in the Office of the Prime Minister)

Protective Route: Methods of Dealing with Dangerous Agents
The Team that Protects the Katsa in Stage One
Everybody Gets Into Position
1. #2 waits inside the restaurant. (Restaurant has already been determined "clean"; it was under surveillance before its address was passed to the subject so that he could not have staked it out.)
2. #3 is across the street, watching the entrance, ready to follow subject.
3. #4 is in position to watch and follow.
4. Car #1 is in position.
5. Katsa is in car #2, well out of the way and waiting. Car will be positioned near a pay phone so katsa can call subject and give instructions.
6. #5 is in car #1, following subject's cab.

1. All in position as subject arrives in cab.
2. #5 will get out of car #1 and signal the katsa in car #2 to phone the subject in the restaurant.
3. When the call has been made, car #2 will flash its lights to signal this to car #1 from which signals will go to #4 (etc) that subject has received instructions.
4. Subject leaves restaurant.
5. #3 follows subject and receives signal from #2 that subject made no phone calls while in restaurant (if he had, operation would be called off, with everyone leaving area by car).
6. #2 then walks to car #1 and waits (because he was with the subject in the restaurant, he is now out of hte picture).
7. #5 advances to the pick-up point (or "take" point).

8. Subject continues along as instructed.
9. #3 leaves subject to #4, signaling that he is clean.
10. #4 takes over subject.
11. Car #2 with katsa gets into position2.
12. #5 gets into position and will close.
13. Subject continues.
14. #5 takes subject.
15. #4 gets to corner and signals head of team and #4
16. Car #1 advances and picks up head of team and #4.
17. Car #2 advances and picks up #3.
18. At this point, #5 closes on the subject.
19. Car #2 converges on subject.
20. The katsa opens the back door, while the subject is helped in by #5 who frisks him.
21. Car #2 comes in closer to follow and protect.
22. They disperse.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:42 am

Appendix II

Mossad Reports on the Structure of Danish Security Services

[Translation of a Mossad computer printout describing Danish intelligence.]

Country 4647 1985

copy for country

Regular - 1536 13 June 1985

To: Mashove

From: Country

SECRET - 4647

Purple A- Danish Civil Security Service (DCSS)

1. The Danish Civil Security Service is an integral part of the police. It is a subordinate of the justice department.

2. The police provide the service with manpower and logistical support; the justice department supervises the activities of the service. That supervision includes the approval of operational activities, with each one considered according to the target in question.

3. Under the head of the service and his second-in-command are three legal advisers who act as liaison of the command to the field level. Each of the three works with several units.

4. The main objectives of the service are counterespionage and counter terrorism. The service is also responsible for safeguarding Danish installations and foreign embassies. Its obligations to Israel include maintaining a constant observation of the Palestinian community in Denmark - numbering about 500 people.

5. There is suspicion and hostility toward any operational activity of the DCSS. This limits Its capabilities.

The service is also overseen by the judicial establishment, limiting its activities. The service is obligated to explain, analyze, and justify every action it wants to take, especially where individual freedoms are involved. Since the service is headed by legal people, it Is virtually paralyzed.

6. Meetings with Purple are frequent. Should we need clarification operational subjects we can organize a meeting within several hours.

Once every three years there is a PAHA seminar. The last one took place last month.

7. There is very close cooperation with Purple A. The relationship is good and intimate.

One of our listening people [marats] sits in the Purples' listening department, acting as an adviser to them on PAHA.

The Purples do and will consult us regarding targets for mayanot [code for listening locations; literal translation is "fountain" or "source"].

The highlight of the cooperation is operation "friendship" [the interrogation of a Palestinian pilot in a hospital In Denmark by someone from HQ in Tel Aviv. The code used for Tel Aviv HQ is HA-Y-HAL or "palace"]. In this operation to recruit an Iraqi pilot, the Purples have taken great risks, and the whole operation is only for our benefit.

In the past we began an operation with "Shosanimo" and "Abu el Phida" that was supposed to take place In Denmark. It was not carried out because of an operational decision on our part.

8. The information we get from the mayanot gives us a full and comprehensive picture of the Palestinian community in Denmark and some material on PLO political activities.

9. There is a good dialogue on the above subjects.

10. On the subject of mahol [literally "dance" - referring to mutual recruitment operations] there is total cooperation when and as we call for it.

11. Central Figures

A. Henning Fode - head of the service. Appointed November 1984.

B. Michael Lyngbo - second-in-command from August 1983. Has no experience in intelligence and yet he is in charge of counterespionage.

C. Paul Moza Hanson - legal adviser to the head of the service, he is our contact man with the Purples. His main activity is counter terrorism. He is about to finish his term. Hanson took part in the last PAHA seminar in Israel.

D. Halburt Winter Hinagay - head of the anti terrorism and subversive activity department, participated in the last PAHA seminar in Israel.

Country 4648

copy for country

Regular-1024 14 June 1985

To: Mashove Regular

From: Country

SECRET - 4648

Purple B- Danish "Mossad" (Danish Defense intelligence Service, DDIS)

1. General

The Danish "Mossad" is the intelligence arm of the Danish military. It is directly subordinate to the army chief and the minister of defense. Head of the DDlS is a department head in the army.

2. "Mossad" Structure

The DDIS is comprised of four units.

A. Administration.

B. Listening (8200).

C. Research.

D. Gathering.

3. DDIS Responsibilities

A. For NATO:

(1) Covering Poland and East Germany.

(2) Covering East Bloc ship movements in the Baltic, using a very powerful and highly sophisticated unit.

B. Internally:

(1) Political and military research.

(2) Positive gathering inside Denmark.

(3) Liaison with the foreign services.

(4) Providing the government with national evaluations. [In general the main subject of interest to the DDIS is the East Bloc.]

C. There is a new function in the making, that will cover the Middle East. At first it will be covered by one person one day a week. The objective is to gather intelligence information from Danish trade and businessmen who come in contact with the Middle East, as we have recommended In the PAHA conference.

4. Material we receive from DDIS is mainly on the subject of East Bloc, e.g. Soviet land, sea, and air activity. They specialize in photographing Soviet aircraft.

There has been special emphasis on installation of new antennas on the aircraft.

The Purples are the first service to pass to us photos of the SSC-3 system.

5. As of the visit of their air research branch head to Israel and their navy research head to Haifa, there has been an awakening of the relations with the DDIS.

There will be a combined military meet In Israel In August.

6. Central Figures

A. Mogens Telling. Head of the service from 1976: visited Israel 1980.

B. Ib Bangsbore. Head of humant gathering department from 1982. Plans to leave 1986.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:42 am

Appendix III

AMAN Questionnaire on Syrian Military Preparedness

[This is a translation of an actual document given to a high-ranking Syrian agent prior to his departure from Europe back to Syria.]

The following is a military information briefing for a subject who is going down to a target country. It is set up in descending order of importance. Use your own judgment in dropping subjects that you think the source will not be capable of answering.


1. How is each state of readiness defined in the Syrian ground forces and how is it apparent in the following:

a) The presence of soldiers in the bases;

b) Training routines;

c) Operational fitness of equipment;

d) Quantity of armaments and ammunition.

2. What is the present readiness of the Syrian army for war based on the following criteria:

a) Manpower status in the units;

b) The level of equipment fitness;

c) Levels of stock, ammunition, other equipment (quartermaster);

d) Training that various units have received;

e) Strategic stock levels in Syria - food, gasoline.

3. How many battalions constitute the following brigades:

a) Armored Brigade 60;

b) Armored Brigade 67;

c) Mechanized Brigade 87 from the 11th Armored Division;

d) The 14th 'Special Forces" Division.


4. What are the Syrian goals within the training framework of 1985?

5. Which units at the brigade or division level are expected to exercise this year In full mobilization and when?

6. Which exercises are expected at the top command staff/corps/division/ and what Is the timetable?

7. What are the lessons the Syrian army has taken from the 1984 training year?

8. Which units in particular excelled in this training year and what objectives were achieved?


9. What techniques were tested in offensive exercises?

10. How long does the management of a battle take in the various training levels?

11. What part of this training is done at night?

12. What exercises have been carried out by Armored Division N. 11 and its various units?

13. Were there exercises this year that involved SSM [surface-to-surface missile] units?

14. Which commando units trained during 84 and at what levels?

15. What are the lessons learned by Syrians from the Galily peace move in the following subjects:

a) Armored units;

b) Commando units;

c) Artillery and anti-aircraft units;

d) Command and control;

e) How far have the Syrians gone in finding answers to the various lessons?

THE THEORY OF BATTLE [Teaching of War]

16. The Syrian battle theory in terms of breaking through a fortified space such as the Golan Heights:

a) How do the Syrians regard the Israeli fortifications and how do they think it's composed from the engineering aspect?

b) What do the Syrians possess to overcome those obstacles?

c) Do the Syrians have models of the Israeli line?

d) What is the battle theory the Syrians have developed to overcome the Israeli fortifications?

e) Which units are designated for the breakthrough? What means will be allotted to them for that particular job during the war and what means do they have today?

f) How well trained are they as units in fulfilling their job?


17. How will "Special Forces" Division No. 14 operate as an airborne division as the "source" says if (as he says) the Syrians have a limited helicopter transport capability?

18. Are commandos equipped with armored troop carriers or will they be In future? If so, for what purpose?

19. Will they create more "Special Forces" divisions? If so, what Is the timetable?


a) Do the Syrians plan to land commandos on the front line fortifications?

b) Do the Syrians plan to land commandos on Tel Abu Nida?

c) Do the Syrians plan to land commandos on Tel El Hantsir?

d) Do the Syrians plan to land commandos on Tiel Pars?

e) Do the Syrians plan to land commandos on the Bukata Ridge?

f) Will they land commandos on intersections?

g) Will they land commandos to try and take command posts?

21. What is the exact technique the Syrians plan to use to land commandos?


22. What is the force the Syrians estimate they will need to achieve strategic balance with Israel?

a) How many divisions and corps do the Syrians assume they need to achieve this goal?

b) How many tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery do they think they need to achieve this goal?

c) How many special means (see itemization below) do they need to achieve this goal?

1. Bridge and minefield penetrators.

2. SSMs.

3. Capability for operating chemical warfare.

d) What troop helicopter transport capacity Is the Syrian army striving for?

e) How many anti-tank helicopters should there be in the Syrian army within this framework?

23. What is the essence of the multi-year growth plan? (See itemization.)

a) Was the growth plan completed over 84? If yes:

1) What were the original targets?

2) How many did they achieve?

3) Do they think they have completed the task and to what degree of success?

b) What are the goals of the present growth program?

1) The number of units/regiments that are going to be formed or reformed?

2) What is the quantity goal of the plan regarding tanks, ATC, artillery, anti-aircraft, and engineering?

3) What is the process that the army has to go through according to the plan?

4) What is the timetable for every phase of the plan? When is the process expected to be completed?

24. The structure of the defense company today.

a) What units are included in "Defense Company"?

b) What is the hierarchy among the defense companies?

c) What units were transferred from the defense company to Siroko?

d) Were there signs of revolt on the grounds of transferring soldiers from the defense companies to other units?

e) What are the operational objectives of the defense companies today?

25. "Special Forces" Division No. 14.

a) What units are incorporated today within the division?

b) Are there plans to create more logistical support units to be subordinated to the division command?

26. The Guard of the Republic.

a) What secondary units are included in the Guard today and what are their weapons?

b) Are there plans to expand this unit?

27. Reserve units in the Syrian army.

a) Are there (outside of recruiting reserves to fill in gaps for casualties of war) such reserves organically extant?

b) What units are they and what is their deployment?

c) What type of training do they receive and what is the level of their readiness?


28. More itemization in all that regards the sub units of the division (organic battalions of the brigades, battalions of the artillery batteries, and battalions subordinated directly to the division command). The armaments and supplies in the various units; officers and manpower in Division 11; present deployment, training and alert status of the division.

29. The tasks and objectives of Division 11. Will the division act as general staff reserves for deployment in the rear or will it be part of a new corps?

30. What type of tanks are there in every brigade of Division 11? And what is the quantity per brigade through to November 84?

31. Brigade 87 and Brigade 60. Itemize their sub units, their numbers, weapons and equipment, manpower and officers, present deployment, training and alert.  



a) To whom is Brigade 120 subordinate today?

b) Where is it deployed today?

c) Where are its permanent bases?

33. itemize the units subordinate to Brigade 120, weaponry and equipment, manpower and officers, training.

34. Goals and objectives of the brigade. Where will it be deployed in an emergency and who will it belong to?


35. Itemize the various territorial commands and which operational units are under their command.

36. Officers and manpower in the various commands.

37. The duties of the various commands during peace and war.

38. Military camps and installations in the various commands.


39. Are there plans to create more corps in the SA? if so, Itemize and provide timetable.

40. If such corps are created, will there still be general command reserves?


41. At what stage is the creation of the field forces general command?

42. What units will be subordinate to such a command?

43. Officers and manpower in the command?

44. Deployment of units and command posts during emergency and routine?

45. Objective of such command?


46. Give list of the general staff command anti-tank units, their numbers, and officer staff.

47. Their present deployment.

48. Objectives and targets.

49. The standard weapons of a unit.


50. Itemize the purchasing contracts with the Soviet Union since Assad's visit to Moscow, October 84, with emphasis on advanced weapons systems (type, quantity, time of arrival, method of payment).

51. Which units will be first to receive the advanced weapons systems (improved T-72 tanks, armored troop carriers BMP.1, anti-tank systems, tank assistance systems and artillery) that are planned to arrive this year?

52. Contacts and contracts with western European countries in the last year and in the near future, with the emphasis on advanced weapons systems (tanks, ATC, mobile artillery, assistance equipment).


53. Itemize the storage facilities for new purchases and old equipment in the S.A. Capacity, subordination, objective.

54. Specify the contents of each storage area.


55. Is there an interest In the SA in purchasing such equipment and for what use? Where are such purchases taking place? It sounds strange that the "source" does not know about the use of such equipment in the S.A.


56. On what does the subject base his determination that the anti-tank fodge will not be turned into anti-tank brigades? [A "fodge" is a unit smaller than a brigade; relevant to Arab armies.]

57. What Is the difference between an anti-tank fodge and an anti-tank brigade?


58. On what does the source base his determination that the commando fodge will not be turned into commando battalions?

59. What is the difference between a commando fodge and a commando battalion?


60. List the new appointments and expulsions according to the bulletin expected Jan. 85.

61. The changes among the command staff after the return of Rifad Assad and after the Baath Convention expected soon.

62. Why is Halmat Shaby absent from military formalities that normally call for the participation of the chief of staff? Are there any changes expected in his status as chief of staff?

63. Are the rumors that Ebrahm Tsafi from Division No. 1 is expected to be appointed second-in-command to chief of staff after the appointment of Ali Atslan to chief of staff, Instead of Shaby correct?

64. Are there any changes expected to the placements of Ali Duba and his second-in-command, Magid Said? If so, where will they be appointed and who will replace them?

65. Are there any changes expected in the responsibility and objectives of the body to be headed by Rifat Assad? According to the "source," Rifat will replace Ahamed Diab as head of the office for national security.

66. New appointments in Division 569.

67. The structure of the Syrian defense department.

68. Specify the training programs for cadets in the military academy at Horns.

69. What is the size of the new cadet course that is supposed to start train ing in 1985 in the military academy in Timz?

70. What is the system by which they give out the advance serial numbers to the cadets in the military academy in Homs? Explain in detail.

71. Quantity of manpower in S.A. compared to status allotment, specifically in the divisions.

72. Lists of officers for as many units as possible in the S.A.

73. The codes of the reserve reservoir according to professions or per specific units.

74. Places of storage of the above? (73 x 73)

75. How often do those codes change?

76. Specify the expected recruitment class expected for 84-85 based on education structure.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:47 am

Glossary of Terms

ACADEMY - (Midrasha) Officially called the prime minister's summer residence, it is the Mossad training school north of Tel Aviv.

AGENT - A widely misused term. It is a recruit, not a domestic employee of an intelligence agency. The Mossad has about 35,000 in the world, 20,000 of them operational and 15,000 sleepers. "Black" agents are Arabs, while "white" agents are non-Arabs. "Warning" agents are strategic agents used to warn of war preparations, e.g., a doctor in a Syrian hospital who notices a large new supply of drugs and medicines arriving; a harbor employee who spots increased activity of war ships.

AL - A secret unit of experienced katsas working under deep cover in the United States.

AMAN - Military intelligence.

APAM - (Avtahat Paylut Modienit) Intelligence operational security.

BABLAT - "Mixing up the balls" or bilbul baitsin, talking nonsense.

BAWAR - Courier.

BASE COUNTRY - Western Europe, United States, Canada: Wherever the Mossad has bases.

BAT LEVEYHA - Female escorts, not for sex; usually local women, not necessarily Jews, hired as assistant agents.

BENELUX - The Belgian/Holland/Luxembourg desk at Mossad headquarters.

BODEL - (bodlim, plural) Or lehavdil. Go-between, messenger between safe houses and embassies or between various safe houses.

CASE OFFICER - In most intelligence services, the name used instead of the Mossad's katsa. In the Mossad, case officers are the people in Metsada who handle the combatants.

COMBATANTS - The real "spies": Israelis sent to Arab countries to work under cover.

DARDASIM (Smerfs) - A sub-department within Kaisarut; they work in China, Africa, and the Far East establishing relations.

DAYUGHT - Highest state of alert of a Mossad station.

DEVELOPMENT - Tied in to military unit 8520; they manufacture special locks, suitcases with false bottoms, etc.

DIAMOND (yahalomim) - A unit in the Mossad that handles communications to agents in target countries.

DIRECT INTELLIGENCE - Actual physical movements or activities that can be observed; e.g., movements of arms or troops, or readiness of hospitals or harbors for war.

DINSHANIN - Usually UN peacekeeping troops paid to transport messages and packages back and forth across Israeli-Arab borders.

EXPERTS WITH HANDLES - Term used to describe a professional in a field outside of espionage and/or intelligence who is taken on missions to identify documentation or equipment in his area of expertise. "With handles" is a metaphor for a parcel, i.e., he is carried in by the Mossad team.

FALACH - Arab peasant farmers in Lebanon, often recruited by Israeli military as low-grade agents.

FIBER INTELLIGENCE - Observations that are not physical, such as economic indicators, rumors, morale, general feelings. FRAMES (Misgarot) - Jewish self-protection units set up all over the world.

GADNA -Israeli para-military youth brigades.

HETS VA-KESHET (bow and arrow) - The emblem and summer training camp of Gadna.

HORSE (SUS) - A higher-ranking person who helps you up the ladder.

HUMANT - The collection of information from human beings, i.e., agents of all types.

INSTITUTE - The formal name of the Mossad. In Hebrew, Mossad is Ha Mossad, le Modiyn ve le Tafkidim Mayuhadim, or in English, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations.

JUMBO - Personal information beyond official intelligence, gathered by Mossad liaison officers from foreign intelligence liaison officers, e.g., CIA.

JUMPERS - Katsas stationed in Israel who jump into various countries on a short-term basis, as opposed to katsas actually stationed abroad.

KAISARUT (originally Tevel) - Liaison at Israeli embassies; known as intelligence officers by local authorities.

KATSA - "Gathering officer" or "case officer." Mossad has only about 35 in operations recruiting enemy agents worldwide, compared with many thousands for KGB and CIA.

KESHET - (Later neviot) "Bow." Gathering information from still objects, e.g. break-ins, installing listening devices.

KIDON - "Bayonet." Operational arm of Metsada responsible for executions and kidnappings.

KOMEMIUTE - See Metsada.

KSHARIM - "Knots." Computer records of who is tied in with whom.

LAKAM - (Lishka le Kishrei Mada) Israeli prime minister's scientific affairs liaison bureau.

LAP - (Lohamah Pscichlogit) or psychological warfare.

LEAD - Recruiting one person to get at another.

MABUAH - Someone who brings information from a source of information rather than directly.

MALAT - Branch in liaison dealing with South America.

MARATS - Listeners.

MASLUH - "Route." a system used for self-protection, to know if you're being tailed or not.

MAULTER - Hebrew word meaning simply "unplanned." Used to describe unplanned or improvised security route.

MELUCKHA - Originally Tsomet, meaning "kingdom." Recruiting department that handles katsas.

METSADA - (Later Komemiute) Highly secret, like a mini-Mossad within the Mossad; operates combatants.

MISGAROT - See "frames."

MISHLASHIM - "Triplers." Drops and dead-letter boxes.

MOLICH - "Walker." Like a seeing-eye dog; one recruited not for himself, but to lead someone else.

NAKA - Uniform Mossad writing system for operation and information reports.

NATIV - Collects information re Soviet Union; helps create escape routes for Eastern Bloc Jews.

NEVIOT - See Keshet.

OTER - An Arab paid to help make contact with other Arabs, often used in recruitment process, usually paid $3,000 to $5,000 a month, plus expenses.

PAHA - (paylut hablanit oyenet) Hostile sabotage activities, e.g., PLO.

ROUTE - See maslut.

SAFE HOUSE - Actually called "operational apartments" by Mossad; apartments or houses owned or rented for secret meetings and as operations bases.

SAIFANIM - "Goldfish," the department within the Mossad that deals with the PLO.

SAYAN - (Sayanim, plural) Volunteer Jewish helpers outside Israel.

SEVEN STAR - Small, leather-bound daybook carried by katsas, containing phone numbers and contacts in code.

SHABACK - The Israeli equivalent of the FBI; the internal security force.

SHICKLUT - The department handling listening personnel, i.e. marats.

SHIN BET - Former name for Shaback.

SLICK - Hiding place for documents, weapons, etc.

TACHLESS - Getting to the point.

TARGET COUNTRY - Any Arab country.

TAYESET - Code name for training department.

TEUD - "Documents" - manufacturing documents, e.g. passports.

TEVEL - See Kaisarut.

TSAFRIRIM - "Morning breeze" in English. Organizes Jewish communities outside Israel; helps set up frames.

TSIACH - (Tsorech Yediot Hasuvot). Annual meeting of military and civilian Israeli intelligence organizations; also name of document describing intelligence requirements for the next year, listed in descending order of importance.

TSOMET - See Meluckha.

UNIT 504 - A mini-Mossad; intelligence-gathering unit in military for cross-border intelligence.

UNIT 8200 - A military unit that handles all communication intercepts for Israeli intelligence.

UNIT 8513 - A branch in military intelligence that is in charge of photography.  

YARID - "Country fair." Teams in charge of European security.
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Re: By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of

Postby admin » Wed Oct 18, 2017 3:50 am


Action Directe (France), 199, 210, 215
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 288-89
Aderet, Pinhas, 73
Admony, Nahum
career, 171, 311-12, 321-22
Exocet operation, 222, 226-27
Operation Moses, 291~92
U.S. hostages in Iran, 324-27
Adriatic Sea, 185-86
Aerna (katsa), 121
Aerospatiale (company), France, 220-21
Africa, 124-25, 131-32
Agasyy, 164
Ahmad, Abdel Rahim, 250
Allul at Aswad See Black September
aircraft (Argentinian), crashes into Russian
plane, 253
aircraft (Belgian)
Boeing 707, 288
Sabena let, 177
aircraft (Israeli)
Boeing 707, 26
Electronic Warfare & Communications,
F-15s, 26
F-16s, 26, 247
Hercules, 165
jet carrying Melr, 193-94
Phantom jets, 197, 228
shot down, 178
aircraft (Ubyan)
Boeing 727, 197
Gulfstrearn 11 executive jet, 167, 170
aircraft (private), Cessna T210, 329
aircraft (Russian), crashed into by Argentinian
plane, 253
aircraft (syrian), shot down, 178
aircraft (U.S. )
Hercules, 289-00, 295, 29S-301
Pioneer 1s, 270
Skyhawk fighter jets, 125-26
Altan, Daniel, 25s-61, 264-65
Akbar (double agent), 182-90
AI (division of Massad), 269-72, 27s-BO,
283, 285-86
AI Fatah (palestinian intelligence), 179
Alan, Zave, 85-86
Algeria, 302
Algiers, 124, 333
Alon, Yosef, 205
Aloony, luad Ahmed Hamid, 254, 259-60,
262, j;5
Alsharif, Abd Alrahaman Ahmed Hassim,
254, 259, 263
Alta (company), 12S-29
AMAN (military Intelligence), 34, 220, 235
Ami (katsa), 231-35
Ami (recruit), 99-100
Amikan (kidon agent), 14348
Amin, Idl, 222
Amir (Massad officer), 222-27
Amir, Rehevam, 187-88
Amlram (recruit), 117, 119
AmIi, Abu Khafed, 167
anti-Semitism, 20, 122, 140, 291
APAM training, 56-59, 63-65, 103-4, 154-55
Arab League, 290
Arab Liberation Front, 250
Arafat, Yasser
arms for Force 17, 262-64, 266
contacts, 120-21
controls PLO, 247, j;0
curtails activities, 275, 317
Lebanon's views on, 316
and Saudi Arabia, 122
swears revenge for Bashir's death, 17980
and U.S. , 278, 284-85
Arbel, David, 4, 23, 137-38, 206, 291-92
Argentina, 221
Argove, Shlomo, 248
Arlk F, , 78, 94-95, 99-101, 120-21, 158-59
arms sales
Arafat tries various countries, 251,
between PLO and European buyers,
to Ethiopia, 289
to indonesia, 125-26
to Iran, 131, 328-29
to Lebanon, 315
lectures on, 67-69
to Sri Lanka, 128-29
to Taiwan, 131
U.S. to Iran See Iran-Contra affair
Arnon, Am1ram, 171
Arnon (professor), 76
Asia Building, Tel Aviv, 126
Assad, Fefat, 235
Assad (Syrian president), 122, 235-36
assassination training, 139-40, 143-48
assassins, 118
Athens, 143-48
Atlantic Hotel Kemplnksl, Hamburg, 256
Atilt naval base, 130
Atomic Energy of Canada Umlted, 222-23
Australian security services, 260
Austria, liaison with, 133
Austrian police, 266
Avidar, Tamar, f 11
Avigdor A, 99-102, 108, 110, 164
Avimor, Shimon, 187
Avnets, Yoade, 79
Avtahat Peylut Modlenlt See APAM

Baader-Melnhof gang (Germany), 199, 210
Baker, James, 335
Salata refugee camp, Neblus, 332
Bamtam (missile manufacturer), Atlit, 226
Bangkok, Thailand, 187-88, 190
Bangsbore, Ib, 234
Bank Hapoallm, Tel Aviv, 48
Banna, Sabri AI See NIdal, Abu
Barda (katsa), 24445
Barl, Italy, 186
Basel Hotel, Tel Aviv, 4142
Bashlr, HusseIn AI, 179
Basque ETA (Spain), 199
Beersheba, Israel, 26
Begin, Menachem
elected, 123
and Falashas, 289
health problems, 274-75
Iran-Contra affair, 253
Lebanon operations, 248, 310-11, 314,
meetings with Arab leaders, 272-73
militant, 32
Operation Babylon, 28
and Palestinians, 280-82, 285
political problems, 247, 252, 274, 276
Israelis In, 197, 318-21
massacre, 311
Mossad operations, 326
peacekeeping, 310
Phalanglsts, 316
PLO headquarters, 186, 202, 249
selge, 250, 315
U.S. hostages, 323-24
Beirut International Airport, 320
BeIrut station, 249, 316, 327
Belgium, 133, 164
Bellow, Saul, 273
Ben-Gurlon, David, 32, 150, 317
Benghazi, Ubya, 302-3
Berlin, Germany, 133, 262-63
Berrl family, Lebanon, 316
Berr!, Nablh, 313
Blkfaya, Lebanon, 314
Biran, David, 34
Blshara, Abdalla Yaccoub, 275, 279-81
BJO See Black June Organization
Black Bloc, PLO, 252, 255, 260-82, 265-66
Black June Organization, 248, 256
Black September
See also PLO
attempt to assassinate Melr, 181-96
avenge Boudla's death, 205
Carlos takes over, 206
chief killed, 197
raid Israeli embassy, 187-88
terrorist activities, 177-80, 202
Blanco, Carrero, 199
Blum, Yehuda, 281-82, 264
bodlim, 7~77
Bolivia, 222-23
Bose, WIlfred, 210
Boudla, Mohanuned, 202-5
Brandt, Willy, 278
Britain, 133, 290, 310
British embassy, Tel Aviv, 160
British Intelligence, 86, 121, 199, 234
Brussels, 191, 256, 273
Brussels station, Tsomet, 133-36, 166
Buckley, William, 311, 323-26
bugs See listening devices
Bulgaria, 251
Burg, Yosef, 162-63
Bush, George, 289, 327-29, 335

Callaghan, William, 318
cameras, "damper, " 5
Camp David, 272-73, 276, 278, 289
Canada, 68, 118, 124, 222
Canadians, recruiting, 162
Carleton Hotel, Tel Aviv, 160-61
Carlos See Ramirez, Carlos
Carter, Jimmy, 3, 272-74, 278-79, 282-83,
324-25, 334
Casey, Bill, 324, 326, 328, 330
Central African Republic, 303
Chad, 303
Chamoun, Camille, 313
Chartlchal Choonhaven, 187
Chartouny, Ptahlh, 319
Chassepied, Damien, 27
Chile, 217, 221-22, 227
Chilean police, 222-25, 227-28
China, 124, 126, 132
and Arabs, 237
In Beirut, 311-12, 319, 322
Letelier assassination, 217
relations with Massad, 85, 199-200,
206-7, 252-54, 269
staUon head kidnapped, 323-26
Cobra See Harari, Mike
coding system, S, II
Cohen, Baruch, 180
Cohen, Helm, 335
Cohen, Jake, 100, 102, 109-10
communications, international, 151
computer system, Massad headquarters,
computer training, 119--21
Connally, John, 141-43
Contreras Sepulveda, Manuel, 217-18, 222-
Copenhagen, 133, 230, 236-39
Corkscrew See Jadid (Syrian official)
costs of Massad, 90-91
Country Club (recruiting centre), 38, 43,
47, 50
Cover training, 59-63
Cruchet, Pedro, 329-30
Cuba, 251
Cyprus, 26, 89, 165-67, 173-74, 303, 308

Damascus, 167, 239, 278
Damur, Lebanon, 318
Danish Civil Security Service, 231-32
Danish Defense Intelligence Service, 233-
Danish Defense Research Establishment,
Danish intelligence, 231-34
Dawee Chullasapya, 187
Dayan, ~oshe, 273-76, 285, 289, 317
DCSS See Danish Civil Security Service
DDIS See Danish Defense Intelligence Service
DDRE See Danish Defense Research Esta~
dead-letterboxes, 77
Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, lsrael,
Denmark, 231-33, 237, 241
Deuxieme Bureau, 178
Diab, Ahrnad, 235
Diamond, David, 81-82
Dimona research center, 150-51
DINA (Chilean secret police), 217-18, 222,
Dina (yarid), 7-10
Dlnure, Ury, 138, 272, 280, 283
documentation, training, 73-75
Dodge, David S, 317
Dole, Robert, 334
Domlnitz, Yehuda, 290
Donovan, Jack See Ran S,
Dori, Menachem, 305
double agents
Akbar, 182-90
Khodr Kanou, 180
Moukharbel, 203-7, 209-14
Dov L, , 58-59, 86, 91, 104
drops, 77
Drorl, Amlr, 320
Drury, Dan, 143-48
Dmzes, 313

East Bloc, 248-49, 251, 271
Edmonton, Alberta, 31, 33
Elralm (lIaison to CIA), 122-23
buys weapons, 199-200, 220
Camp David, 289
and Falashas, 289-90
forms United Arab Republic, 230
Mossad research, 89, 124
relations with Israel, 133, 273, 302, 310
U.S. aid to, 274
view on Palestinian autonomy, 276
Yom Kippur War, 197-98
Ehden, Lebanon, 313
ElIat military base, 294, 298
Eisenberg, Saul, 126, 222
Eltan, Rafael, 28, 267, 318
Eiten (security officer), 54-55
Ellaze, Hayem, 293, 301
Elon Moreh, West Bank, 274
Erb, Irlt, 267
Espinoza Bravo, Pedro, 218
Essaway, Moustafa el, 187-88
Ethiopia, 287-91, 298, See also Falashas
Etlnger, Amos, 110-11
Europe, Mossad research, 124
European Economic Community, funds
Sri Lankan project, 68
European police, 150
execution list, 24-26
Express, Marle See Magal, Marie-Claude

F-7 (Panamanian security force), 265
Fadlallah, Mohanuned Hussein, 323
Fahd (Saudi prince), 275
Falashas, 287-95, 297-301
Far East, Halson, 125
FBI, 268
Fernandez Larios, Armando, 218
Andley, Paul, 278
firearms See weapons
Fischer, Dean, 285
Fode, Henning, 232
Force 17 (Aralat's personal force), 249,
251, 253, 255, 259, 263, 266
Ford, Gerald, 278
liaison with, 133
peacekeeping, 310, 319, 321
sells Exocets, 220-21
sells nuclear power to Iraq, 2-3, 17
Franjieh, Suleiman, 313
Franjleh, Tony, 313, 315
Frankfurt, Germany, 254, 262-63, 265
Frem, Fady, 320
French Intelligence, 95, 199
French paratroopers, massacred, 311,
French police, 205, 209, 211-15
Fuller, Cralg, 329

Galil (factory), Israel, 131
Galili, Israel, 190
G'aneD, Mohammed, 319
gangs, Lebanon, 314-15
Gaolt (katsa), 121
Ganlt (lecturer), 83
Ganud, Fran~ols, 252, 255, 265
Gaon, Ovadia~ 328
Gaza Strip, 247, 274-75, 332-34
Gemayel, Amln, 319-20
Gemayel, Bash!r, 253, 312-16, 319-20
GemayeJ, Pierre, 313
general military training, 59-60
Geneva, 265
German pollee, 254-56, 266, See also GSG-9
Germany, 68, 133, 233, 251-53
Ghamen, Abdul Fatah, 167
Ghorbanifar, Manucher, 328-29
Gil, Yehuda
as katsa, 23, 231, 236-39
as lecturer, 91·93
Operation Moses, 295-96, 298, 301
Golan Heights, 32
Goldstein, Benjamin, 14-15
Gossens, Allende, 217
Grand Beach Hotel, Tel Aviv, 158-59
Greece, 89, 133
Greene, Harold, 330
Grenzschutzgruppe See GSG-9
Grey, L, Lorne, 223
GSG-9, 252, 254, 259-60, See also German

Habib, Philip, 247, 252
Hadar Dafna Building, Tel Aviv, 35
Haddad, Sa'ad, 316
Halez (Syrian president), 235
Haifa, Israel, 156, 162, 276
Halfa military base, 315
Haled (Syrian ollicial), 241-45
Halevy, David, 285
Halevy, Efraim, 164
Hallm, Butrus Eben, 1-2, 6-21, 26
Halim, Samira, 1, 6-11, 18-21
Hamburg, Germany, 133, 177, 186, 254-56,
260, 262-65
Hamchari, Mahmoud, 179
Hanson, Paul Moza, 232
Harari, Mike, 100-102, 104-9, 164-65, 206,
Hassan, Abu See Salameh, Ali Hassan
Hatcher, Richard, 283
Hatsrea, Abu, 247
Hatsrim air base, 229
Hearst, Patricia, 199
Hebron, Israel, 335
Heim M,
at Israel station, 164
training (cadet), 60, 84, 96, 111-12
training (operationaJ intelligence),
138, 152
Helms, Richard, 268
Henderson-Pollard, Anne, 267-68
Hessner, Mark, 95-97, 190-93, 196
hijacking, of Sabena jet, 177
Hilton Hotel, Tel Aviv, 109-10
Hinagay, Halburt Winter, 232
Hinckley, John, 252
Hobeika, Elias, 320
Hochman, Rali, 106
Holi, Yitzhak, 144, 146-47, 253, 280-81
Holocaust, 140
Holan, Israel, 31
Hombre (Mossad liaison), 232-33
Honecker, Erich, 251-52
Hooks, Benjamin, 283
hostages, 311, 317, 323-28, 331
Houphouet-Bolgny, Felix, 181
House of the Diaspora, University of Tel
Aviv, 82-83
Howe, Irving, 273
Hungary, 251
Hussein, Gbazi, 259-60, 262-64, 266
Hussein (King of Jordan), 83, 177
Hussein, Saddam, 3, 27-28

IDF See Israel Defense Forces
India, 127, 130-31
Inflation in Israel, 246-47, 274
Intifada, 332-33
arms sales to, 131
hostage-taking, 325'
Massad research, 124
Savak trained by Massad, 221
fran-Contra alfalr, 312, 326-31
Iran-lraq war, 121
Mossad research, 124
nuclear power, 2-3, 14, 16, 21-22, 26-28,
011 pipeline, 121
Islamic Jihad, 324
Israel Delense Forces, 219-20, 311, 320
Israel station, 89, 164
Israeli Aeronautical industrIes, 123, 125,
Israeli air force, 109-10, 167
Israeli embassy
Bangkok, 187-88
Brussels, 253
London, ISO
Paris, 4
Santiago, 223
Washington, 205, 267
Israeli intelligence, internal See Shjn Bet
Italian Intelligence, 108, 191-92, 194, 198201, 303
Italian pollee, 194, 196, 198, 201-2
peacekeeping, 310, 319, 321
relations with Israel, 133, 310
Itslk E,
allair, 154, 156-57
dealings with Victor, 159-61, 164-165,
as katsa, 14-16
in Meir operation, 184-85
training leader, 137-38

Jackson, Jesse, 283-85
Jacob (recruit), 95
Jacobsen, David, 331
Jacqueline See Dina
Jadld (Syrian official), 231, 236-37, 239-41
Japan, funds Sri Lankan project, 68
Japanese embassy, Saudi Arabia, 121
Jayawardene, Junius, 68
Jayawardene, Penny, 69, 128
Jenco, LaWTence, 328, 331
Jerry 5, , 58, 84, 153-60, 164, 174
Jerusalem, safe house training, 158, 162
JIbril, Arabi Awad Ahmed, 167, 170
Jordan, 124, 177
Jordan, Hamilton, 282
Jordan River, 32
Jordan, Vernon E, , Jr, , 285
Jumblatt family, Lebanon, 316
Jumblall, Walld, 313
Juniyah, Lebanon, 315-16

Kadhafi, Moamer al, 167, 169-70, 199-201,
Kaisarut See Tevel
Kanou, Khodr, ISO
Kapulsky (cal~), Ramat Hasaron, 60, 84
Karami, Rashid, 313
kasaht See nevJot
Kaslm, Durak, 249, 251-53, 258-59, 266
Kauly, Shal
at Academy, 56, 111, 117, 119, 137
foils Meir assassination, 188, 190-96
head of Milan station, 198
meets Victor, 44
supervises safe house training, 99-102,
105-9, 159-60
teaches coffee, 78-79
teaches Cover, 60-62
Kayyale, Abde1 Wahab, 250
Kennedy, John F, , assassination, 141-43
Key (faiwanese general), 131
Klar Sirkin military base, 127, 129-30, 224
Khader, Nairn, 251-53, 266
Khadra, Tariq, 243, 248, 251
Khalil, Mostala Did, 250
Khalil, Moustala, 273, 276
Khartoum, Sudan, 288, 290, 296, 298-99,
Khashoggi, Adnan, 258, 260, 328
Khomelnl (Ayatollah), 329
kidon (assassination unit), 34, 118, 143,
Kimchy, Ruty, 59
King David Hotel, Jerusalem, 329
Kissinger, Henry, 278
Knaly, Yetzak, 93
Komemlute See Metsada
Kreisky, Bruno, 278
Kuhan, Yitzhak, 311
Kur Building, Tel Aviv, 1024Kuwait,
275, 279

La Seyne-sur-Mer, France, 19
LAKAM, 267-68, 286
LAP, 198-20I, 253-54
Lavy, Nahaman, 138
Lebanese Christian Phalangists, 310, 31213, 315-
16, 319-20
Lebanon, 310-23
PLO bases, 70-71, 178, 273-74, 316-19
and Syria, 253
training terrorists, 202
war with Israef, 24748, 254, 311, 317-18
Leonardo da Vinci Airport, Awnlcino
(Rome), 185, 193-94
Letelier, Orlando, 217-18, 228
Levinger, Moshe, 335
liaison See Tevel
Libya, 124, 167, 170, 290, 302-9
Lillehammer, Norway, 206
L1pean (lecturer), 83
L1shka Ie Kishrel Mada See LAKAM
listening devices, 6
Lod International Airport, Tel AviV, 177-78
Lohamah Psichlogit See LAP
London, England, 133, 177, 182
London, Ontario, 31
Lowery, Joseph, 284-85
Luxembourg, 133
Lyngbo, Michael, 232

McFarlane, Robert, 247, 253, 327, 330
Madrid, Spain, 180
Mafia, 141-42
Magal, Marie·Gaude, 13, 18, 22-24
Magid (Syrian businessman), 230, 234-40
Mahawell Project, Sri Lanka 68-69
Maldan, Pinhas, 148-49
Malll, Adaglio, 194
Man Concert Hall, Tel Aviv, III
Marcel, Jacques, 4-5
Margalil, Dan, 123
Margolin, Ester, 32
Margolin, Halm, 32
Margolin, Maza, 32
Margolin, Rata, 32
Martam, Mengltsu Haile, 289
Mark See Gil, Yehuda
Marseille station, Tsomet, 133
Mazlat (company), 270
Mediterranean Sea, 302, 304
Meir, Golda, 83, 122, 17S-83, 185, 187-98
MeJuchaSee Tsomet
Meshad, Yahia EJ, 17-18, 21-24
Meshad, Zamuba, 22
assassinate Boudia, 204-5
assassinate Khader, 256
kidon, 34, 139
organization, 117-19
sex, 113
tracking Black September, 179
Tripoli operation, 306
Mexico, 329
training (cadet), 60, 84, 96
training (operational intelligence),
138, 158
in Belgium, 164, 166
Michele, Vito, 191-92
Midrasha (training academy), 38, 49
Migdal Insurance, Tel Aviv, 101-2
Mikey (pilot) See Cohen, Jake
Milan station, 133, 188, 190, 192-93
Mishlaslm training, 77
missile boats (Israeli)
mishap on Red Sea, 293-94
SAAR-4 class, 308
Moffit, Ronnl, 217
Montreal, 31
Mow, Aldo, 199
Morocco, 124, 302
Mossad full name, 53
Mossad headquarters, 35, 69, 112
Mossad motto, 53
Mossad stafl, 88
Massad training academy See Midrasha
Moukharbel (double agent), 203-7, 209-14
Mousa M, , 5s, 59, 65, 109, 157, 256-58
Munich, Germany, 178-79
Mustafa, Abu Ali, 167

NAACP, 285-84
Naftaly, Gidon, 305
Nahal Sorek nuclear facility, 150
Naharta, Israel, 240
Najjar, Mohammed Yusif See Yusuf, Abu
NAKA regulations, 208
NAKA training, 56-57, 59, 138
Nakdimon, Vzi, 36-39
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 230
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People See NAACP
natlv (escape route service), 271
NATO, 233-34, 271
naval operations, 302-9
al-Nemery, Jaafar, 289, 297
Neriah, Moshe Tsvy, 335
Netherlands, The, 133
nevlot, 73, 81
New York, 278, 280, 284, 286
New Yorkstalion, AI, 272, 277-79, 281, 283
Nicaragua, 327
Nicosia, Cyprus, 179
Nidal, Abu, 248, 256, 307
Nlr, Amlram, 327, :11
NorIega, Manuel, 109, 222, 228
North, Oliver, 327-31
Norway, 234
nuclear power
Argenlina, 222
India, 127
Iraq, 2-3, 14, 16, 21-22, 26-28, 247
Israel, ISO-51
Paldstan, 127
South Africa, 150-51
South Korea, 223
Nueima, West Bank, 274

Oded L., 137, 158, 184
Offir, Tsadok, 97-98
Olympiad (XX), Munich, 178
Olympic Hotel, Nicosia, 179
OPEC headquarters, Vienna, 215
Operation Babylon, 2&28
Operation Ben Baker, 95
Operation Moses, 287-88, 292-301
Operation PASAT, 143-48
Operation Sphinx, 1-2, 4-24
Orly airport, Paris, 184-85, 210
Osman, Hashem, 290
Osten, Syd (father), 3f, 109
Ostrovsky, Bella, 33-34, 37, f 12, 140, 172-73
Ostrovsky, Mira, 31
Ostrovsky, Syd (lather) See Osten, Syd (father)
Ostrovsky, Victor
pre-Massad, 31-34
recruitment, 33-50
training (cadet), 51-114
tralnlng Ounior katsa), 117-36
training (operational intelligence),
katsa, 164-72
quits Massad, 172-74
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 141-43
otees, 92-93
Ottawa, 173

Pakistan, 127
Palermo, Sicily, 151
Palestinian Armed Struggle Command
Palestinian autonomy, 274-77, 279, 334
Palestinian Coordination Council See
Palestinian intelligence See AI Fatah
Palestinian Uberatlon Army See PLA
Palestinian National Council, 333-34
Palestinian Youth Organization, 206
In Gaza Strip, 332-33
killed by Phalangists, 310-11, 320-21
Panama, 105-7, 109, 222, 265
Panamanian embassy, Tel Aviv, 105
paper paper, 16
Action Directe bombs, 210
international socialist conference, 181
Operation Sphinx, 1-2, 4, 21-22
PLO, 179, 204, 206, 209, 212
Syrian embassy, 134, 136
Syrian journalist killed, 180
Paris station, 133, 183
PASC, 250, 252, 254, 259
passports, 73-75
Paul VI, 181
peacekeeping in Lebanon, 310, 318
Peres, Shimon
and Buckley kidnapping, 324-27
challenges Begin, 28, 247
and Falashas, 291-92
and LAKAM, 268
and Massad, 126, 170
photography training, 148-49
Pinhas M, , 137
Ponochet Ugarte, Augusto, 217-18, 222
PLA, 248-49, , 254
buying arms, 47-49, 251, 254-55, 25860,
262-63, See also Black September
Athens assassinations, 14348
attempts to assassinate Melr, 181~96
bases In Lebanon, 197, 203, 251-52,
273-74, 316-19
blamed for Buckley kidnapping, 325
bungled operation against, 167, 16970, 173-
killed by kldon, 179
lecture on, 69-71
malls letter bombs, 150
Mossad research, 269, 303
most important enemy of Mossad, 19799
relations with various countries, 32,
166, 209, 275, 281-65, 302-3
United Nations, 279-80
Vatican connections, 181
PLO ships, in TripolI harbour, 303, 306-9
Poindexter, John, 330-31
Poland, 233
pick up Victor, 45-47, 49-50, 107
relationship with Mossad, 9+95, 16263,
Politiets Etterretingsjtneste
Politistatonen See Danish intelligence
Pollard, Jonathan J., 267-69, 286
Pompldou, George, 181
Popular Front (palestinian group), 206
Powell, Jody, 282
psychological warfare See LAP

Rabin, Yitzhak, 122-23, 170, 330
Rabitz (lecturer), 89
Ramat David air base, 170
Ramirez, Carlos, 205-7, 209-15
Ran H., 154
Ran S.
Academy instructor, 56, 58, 61~2, 86,
OperationSphfnx, 2, 10-18, 21
runs jumper pool, 164
Reagan, RonaId, 252, 302, 310, 312, 318,
321, 324, 329-31
recrUiting, 31, 33-50, 90-93, 98
Red Army (Japan), 199
Red Brigade (Italy), 199
Red Prince See Salameh, Ali Hassan
Red Sea resort, 287-88, 294-301
report-writing See NAKA
research training, 121-24
Reston, Tom, 281
Rill, Oren
at Academy, 55-58, 72, 84-S5, 16~4
fights Carlos, 207-8, 211-15
introduces Yehuda Gil, 91
recruits Moukharbel, 203-5
transferred, 137
warns Vlelor, 16~, 17I
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 275
Rizak, Georgina, 185
and attempted assassination of Me1r,
18:Hl6, 188-89, 192·94, 196
PLO representative killed, 179
Strella missiles, 208-9
Rome station, Tsomet, 133
Russia, 234, 236
Russian Intelligence, 234

Sabra refugee camp, Beirut, 310
Sadat, Anwar, 197, 272, 274, 289
safe houses, 4, 76-77
training, 99, 103, I~
Salfanlm (PLO specialists), 325-26
Salameh, Ali Hassan
plot to assassinate Melr, 179, 181, 18~
86, 191, 197, 201
target of Mossad, 201-2, 205-6
Salem, Isam, 255, 2~3
Sanchez See Ramirez, Carlos
Santiago, Chile, 223, 225-27
Sarcelles, France, 2, +5, 18, 22
Sartawi, Issam, 278
Saudi Arabia, 121-24, 275, 289, 293-94
Save The Children Fund, 332
sayanim, 86-88
Sayret Matcal (reconnaissance group),
Scala Cale, Tel Aviv, 33
Scandinavia, liaison with, 133
Schultz, George, 268
Scientific Affairs Uaison Bureau, 267
security training See APAM training
Sede Dov air base, Tel Aviv, 31
as hook for recruitment, 91-92
as Intelligence too), 149
and katsas, 120
and Metsada, 112-13
parties at headquarters, 9&97
and attempted assassination of Melr,
188, 201-2
knowledge on Aralat, 2S0
teach security, 55-56, 83
Shachori, Ami, 180
Shahar, Aharon, 117
Shallshut military base, Ramt Gan, 31, 33
Shamlr, Y1tzhak, 289, 292, 333, 335-36
Shara'a, Farouk ai, 170
Sharon, Ariel, 3Hl-II, 317-18, 320
Shatila refugee camp, Beirut, 310, 320
Shehabl, Hlkmat, 170
Sheraton Hotel, Cairo, 177
Sheraton Hotel, Tel Aviv, 41, 105
Sheri, Aharon (Arelah)
heads Academy, 53-54, 100, 107-8, no
leaves academy, 137
heads Tsalrlrim, 164, 169, 172
Shlfa Hospital, Gaza Strip, 332
Shi'lte Muslims, 313, 316, 321, 323
Shin Bet, 178
Shultz, George, 289
Sidly, 303
Sidon, Lebanon, 318
Sinai, Israeli withdrawal, 318
Six Day War, 181
slicks, 77-78
Sotltel-Bourbon Hotel, Paris, 13
South Africa, 150-51
South America, 124
Soviet Union, 124, 199-200, 271
Spain, 133
spy reaction, 16
Sri Lanka
arms sales to, 67-ti9
groups trained by Mossad, 127-31
staff, Mossad, 88
Stanton, Adriana, 329-30
Stoler, Harry See Aitan, Daniel
Stone, Richard, 273
Strauss, Robert S, , 274, 282
St, John's Hospice, Jerusalem, 334
Sudan, and Falashas, 288-90, 292-95, 297-
Suez Canal, 32
Suitan (company), 131
Sun Hall Hotel, Lornaca, Cyprus, 166
Sunni Muslims, 313
Sweden, 68, 234
Symbionese Uberation Army (United
States), 199
and Aralat, 122
brings missiles into Lebanon, 253
forms United Arab Republic, 230
guerrilla bases, 178
Mossad research, 124, 235-38, 240
war, 197-98, 247
Syrian embassy, London, 241-42, 24445
Syrian embassy, Paris, 134-36
Syrian Intelligence, 134, 323
Syrian potlce, 240-41

Taan, Abu, 250, 254, 259, 261, 263
Taiwan, arms sales to, 131
Tal Hotel, Tel Aviv, 43, 49
Tal (security instructor), 138
Tamils, 67-68, 128-31
Tamir, Shmuel, 276
Tamuze 17, Tuwaltha, Iraq, 2
Tanga, Baruch, 301
Tayeb, Abu, 249
Al-Tayeb, Orner Mohanuned, 297
Teli, Wasfi, 177
Telling, Mogens, 234
Terzi, Zehdi Labib, 279-81
Alrlca, 67, 125, 127, 131032
and Aralat, 255
CiA and Mossad, 85
Far East, 67, 125
gets Exocet, 221
importance, 84-85
rivalry with Tsomet, 213
Victor's service, 125-33
level training, 125-33
Thaliand, 277
Thatcher, Margaret, 122
Townley, Michael Vernon, 218
APAM, 5&-59, 63-65, 1034, i54-55
assassination, 13940, 143-48
cadets, 51-I i4
computers, 119-21
Cover, 59-63
documentation, 73-75
general military, 59-60
junior katsas, 117-36
liaison, 125-33
NAKA, 5&-57, 59, 138
operational Intelligence, 137-64
for other countries, 67-68, 127-31, 22125, 227-
28, 315
photography, 148-49
recruiting agents, 9<1-93, 98
research, 121-24
Tsafirim, 140
Tsomet, 85-86, 93, 133-36
weapons, 71-73
training academy, 137
description, 52
parties, 95-97
relationship with police, 95
training exercises
boutiques, 66
coffee, 78-79
Da, 80
green, 80-81
Trieste, Italy, 177
Tripoli, Lebanon, 303
Tripoli, Libya, 167, 173, 302-9
Tsafririm, 291-92, 295-96, 298
Tsafririm training, 140
Tsiach, 218-19, 235
and Aralat, 255, 261
Operation Sphinx, 3, 5
rivalry with Tevel, 213
Tsomet training, 81, 85-86, 93, 133-36
Tsorech Yediot Hasuvot See Tsiach
Tsvl G, , 61-02, 99, 117, 119
Tunis, Mossad research, 124
Tunisia, relations with Israel, 302
Turkey, 89, 133
Tuwaltha, Iraq, 2, 26
Tyre, Lebanon, 318

U.S. compound, Lebanon, 321-22
U.S. Intelligence Research Centre, Suitland,
Maryland, 267
U.S. Intelligence See CIA
U.S. Marines, massacred, 311, 322
U.S. Naval Investigative Service, 261-68
Uganda, police trained by Mossad, 222
UN peacekeeping troops, 162
UN Security Council, 170, 279-80, 318
Unit 504, army Intelligence, 5~O, 316
Unit 8200, army Intelligence, 60, 121, lSI,
169, 219
United Arab Republic, 230
United Nations, 236, 247, 275-77, 279, 334
United States
and Chile, 218
and Danish intelligence, 234
and Falashas, 289-90
funds Sri Lankan project, 68
invades Panama, 109
JeWish-black relations, 272, 283-85
and Libya, 167, 170, 199-201
Mossad research, 124
opposes Iraq's nuclear power, 3
peacekeeping, 310, 319, 321
relations with Israel, 170, 247, 253, 26786, 310, 318,
324-27, 329030, 334-35
relations with PLO, 277-78, 282-85

Vajiralongkorn (prince), 187
Vance, Cyrus, 272, 281-82
Vanunu, Mordechal, 15<l-51
Vered Hagill (restaurant), 128
Vleona, Austria, 260, 262-66, 278, 281
Vietnam, 251
Villejuif, France, 1-2
Vivani, Amburgo, 192, 194, 208

War of Independence, 31·32
Washington, 173, 217, 269, 278, 286
Washlngton station, AI, 270, 277, 279
aI Wazzan, Challk, 319
AK-47 assault rifle, 126
bazookas, 224
Beretta, 71, 143
bouncing Betty, 195-96
Chapparal missile, 1251
double-bladed claw, 144
Eagle magnwn and weapons, 58, 143
Exocel missiles, 217-18, 22()'21 , 225,
Gabriel missile, 226
Galli assaull rille, 126
hand grenades, 178
Hawk missile, 1251
jron bombs, 26
Kalashnlkovassaull rilles, 178 "
Katyusha rockels, 248
laser-riding bombs, 26
leech mines, 308
machine gun, 58
Mannllcher-Carcano rifle, 142
mortars, 131, 224
nuclear See nuclear power
Parabellum plslol, 143
plslols, 178
RPG-7 anll-lank grenades, 210
sales See arms sales
Shtutser rifle, 51
Sidewinder missiles, 26
Smith & Wesson revolver, 142
SSC-3 missiles, 234
sillello, 143-44
Sirelia missiles, 185-86, 192-96, 200,
Iralnlng, 71-73
Uzis, 128, 258
Weathermen (United States), 199
Weir, Benjamin, 331, 328
Weizman, Elzer, 28, 276
West Bank, 247, 273-75, 277, 333-34
West Germany, 177
Wolde, Goshu, 290
Wolf, Milton, 278, 281, 284
World Bank, 68-69

Yaar, Amy, 67-69, 125-27, 12!l-30, 132-33,
165, 323
Yahalomim (Mossad communications),
Yakov (employee of Migdal Insurance),
yarid, 91, 154
Yegal A, , 137
Ygal (recruiting officer), 33-34
Yom Kippur War, 33, 198
Yosef, Ovadia, 288
Yosy C.
training (cadet), 60, 78, 96, 111-12
training (junior katsa), 129-31
training (operational intelligence),
138, 152
at Israel station, 164
Young, Andrew, 279-84
youth brigades, 291-92
Yshai, Moshe Hanan, 180
Yugoslavia, 185-86, 200, 253
Yusuf, Abu, 179, 181-82, 186-87, 197, 202

Zaim, Abu, 249, 263
Zamir, Tsvy, 3
Zaza, Samir, 320
Zefat, Israel, 318
Zeira, Eliahu, 198
Zigel (police officer), 162
Zwaiter, Abdel Wa'il, 179
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