4: THE CREATION OF AN ISRAELITE STATE
CREATING A STATE: CLAIMING THE PAST
The protracted search for, and location of, ancient Israel in the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition provides only one of the defining moments in the history of Palestine. The creation of an Israelite state, which the biblical traditions associated first with Saul and then particularly David and Solomon, is for biblical scholarship the defining moment in the region's history. It takes on an importance which derives from but ultimately overshadows the period of so-called emergence during the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition. The creation of a state not only signals the realization of the ultimate in political development but also demarcates Israel as an autonomous and sovereign nation state independent of imperial control. The labours of biblical scholarship in pursuit of the Davidic monarchy are not merely of antiquarian interest given that the modern state of Israel traces its historic and natural claim to existence back to this Iron Age state. The Proclamation of Independence of the State of Israel issued by the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv on 14 May 1948 refers to 'the re-establishment of the Jewish State' (Laqueur and Rubin 1984: 126). Any attempts by biblical scholars to divorce themselves from the implications of their research, to claim a disinterested objectivity in the past divorced from the realities and struggles of contemporary politics, are exposed in the opening sections of the Proclamation:
The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world.
Exiled from the Land of Israel the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom.
Impelled by this historic association, Jews strove throughout the centuries to go back to the land of their fathers and regain their statehood. In recent decades they returned in their masses. They reclaimed the wilderness, revived their language, built cities and villages, and established a vigorous and ever-growing community, with its own economic and cultural life. They sought peace, yet they prepared to defend themselves. They brought the blessings of progress to all inhabitants of the country and looked forward to sovereign independence.
-- Laqueur and Rubin 1984: 125
The right to the land is advanced on the basis of historic precedent of the existence in the area of an ancient sovereign and independent Israelite state. It is this state, above all, which has the right to the land since this is the ultimate expression of political development and supersedes any other forms of political organization in the region -- developments that are inevitably seen as inferior. Explicit in the claim is that in the modern period Jewish settlers had 'brought the blessings of progress to all the inhabitants' prior to the formation of a national state. These very same implicit and explicit assumptions underlie many of the constructions of the imagined past of Israelite emergence in Palestine, as we have seen. The explicit claim to the land, or reclaiming of the land, on the basis of this historic precedent is a widely held view that has long informed political and popular perceptions of modern Israel and its right to the land. A memorandum produced by Lord Balfour two years after his famous Declaration of 1917 which committed the British government to favouring a 'national home in Palestine for the Jewish people' contained the following statement:
The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
-- Khalidi 1971: 208
It is a claim, of course, that is embodied in the frequent modern-day references to 'historic Eretz Israel'. It finds expression in the 1948 Proclamation of Independence with the claim to 'the reestablishment of the Jewish State'. This is a significant rephrasing of Balfour's Declaration thirty-one years earlier which talked of 'the establishment of a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people'. Weizmann's concern to rephrase Balfour's terminology (Said 1992: 86) finds its fulfilment in the Proclamation which makes explicit the right to a Jewish State, no longer simply a national home, on the basis of historic precedent; it is the 're-establishment' of what was once there.
The context of claim and counter-claim over the possession or dispossession of land means that biblical scholarship, in its construction of an ancient Israelite state, is implicated in contemporary struggles for the land. The Zionist struggle for the realization of a sovereign and independent state has dominated the history of the region throughout this century. What has not been sufficiently appreciated is just how far this contemporary contest for Palestine has influenced the way in which the ancient past has been imagined. Even though the Zionist struggle was not realized until 1948 with the founding of the modern state of Israel, events earlier in the century have made an indelible mark upon the conscious and largely unconscious assumptions of biblical scholars as they have imagined the Davidic past as a golden age of Israelite history. [1] If nations are narrations, in the words of Homi Bhabha, then narrations of the past are intricately linked to the realities of the present excluding other possible representations or creations of the past. Biblical specialists and archaeologists have searched for and constructed a large, powerful, sovereign and autonomous Iron Age state attributed to its founder David. It is this 'fact' which has dominated the discourse of biblical studies throughout this century, providing a location for the development of many of the biblical traditions at the royal court -- 'a fact', more than any other, which has silenced Palestinian history and obstructed alternative claims to the past.
It is, of course, not new to say that Palestine has been subject to outside control for the vast majority of its history; it is accepted as a given in most historical accounts. However, the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition is considered by most 'biblical historians' to be an exception to this rule. It is this period which sees the collapse of the Mycenaean, Egyptian, and Hittite empires and the so-called 'emergence of Israel'; 1200 BCE is viewed as a watershed in the history of the region, marking the dramatic decline and then conspicuous absence of imperial control. [2] More significantly, it is presented, as we have seen, as an important watershed, as the period in which the autonomous entity Israel emerges on the scene of Palestinian history, crossing the threshold to statehood in a remarkably short time. It is this entity, rather than the imperial powers of Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome, which, in our standard 'biblical histories', comes to dominate the history of the region. The period of 'emergence', which, as we have seen, defines the essential nature of Israel, is followed by the rise of an Israelite state under David and Solomon which, it is argued, takes advantage of the international power vacuum to become the defining entity in terms of the geographical extent of Israel. Although the later Hasmonean period is seen as a brief interlude of autonomous control which manages to throw off the otherwise constant of imperial domination, it is the Davidic monarchy which becomes the dominant feature of the history of the region.
John Bright's (1972) classic treatment of the rise of the Israelite state, the 'united monarchy' of David and Solomon, provides a useful illustration of the way in which it comes to dominate and obliterate Palestinian history for the early Iron Age:
The crisis that brought the Israelite tribal league to an end came in the latter part of the eleventh century. It set in motion a chain of events which within less than a century transformed Israel totally and made her one of the ranking powers of the contemporary world. This rather brief period must occupy our attention at some length, for it is one of the most significant in Israel's entire history.
-- Bright 1972: 179
The claim as to the status of the Davidic and Solomonic state as 'one of the ranking powers of the contemporary world', a phrase that could just as easily be used of the modern state, shows just how remarkable this entity is thought to have been. It would appear from Bright's narration that the inhabitants of small, rural, materially poor villages in the highlands of Palestine had outstripped the great riverine civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia to claim a place as a world-class power. This is a claim which will need to be examined later in the chapter. For the moment, it is the claim that this period, one of an absence of imperial interest in the region, is 'one of the most significant in Israel's entire history' which, though related, is of primary concern. It is of such overwhelming concern that, once the Philistine threat has been dealt with by David, the Davidic state becomes the history of Palestine for the period. The reason for this implicit assumption is not hard to find since Bright (1972: 197) presents the period as one of consolidation of the dynastic state and the building of an 'empire': 'But in the end David was the master of a considerable empire.' Here was an 'empire' that included Ammon and Syria in the north, Edom and Moab in the east, such that Bright (1972: 200) is able to conclude that 'with dramatic suddenness David's conquests had transformed Israel into the foremost power of Palestine and Syria. In fact, she was for the moment probably as strong as any power in the contemporary world.' Here was an 'empire' whose borders stretched from the Gulf of Aqabah to the Mediterranean, from the Wadi el-' Arish in the south to the Lebanon range and Kadesh on the Orontes in the north. In effect, according to Bright's account, David had managed to inherit the Asiatic empire of New Kingdom Egypt. [3] The borders of this 'Davidic empire', maintained more or less successfully by Solomon (Bright 1972: 207-10), meant that the history of the Israelite state becomes the history of Palestine.
What Bright has constructed is a biblically inspired view of 'Greater Israel' which coincides with and helps to enhance the vision and aspirations of many of Israel's modern leaders. Ben-Gurion expressed the view that the borders of Israel ought to include southern Lebanon, southern Syria, Jordan, all Cisjordan, and the Sinai. Chomsky notes Ben-Gurion's view that:
The acceptance of partition does not commit us to renounce Transjordan; one does not demand from anybody to give up his vision. We shall accept a state in the boundaries fixed today, but the boundaries of Zionist aspirations are the concern of the Jewish people and no external factor will limit them.
-- cited by Chomsky 1983: 180
Ben-Gurion even referred to the founding of 'the Third Kingdom of Israel' following the 1956 capture of the Sinai (cited by Chomsky 1983: 163 from Nar-Zohar 1978: 91-2; 166; 186-7; 249-50). Any scholarly construction of the Israelite past, particularly the construction of the Israelite monarchy and its boundaries, has to be read in this contemporary context since it is both informed by and informs contemporary claims and aspirations. The implications of biblical scholarship for the world of politics, whether the scholar acknowledges this or not, are brought out in Begin's statement following the establishment of the state in 1948:
The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature institutions and individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will be forever our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And forever.
-- cited by Chomsky 1983: 161
The biblically inspired political vision and claims of the modern world are confirmed, for the most part, by the construction of an imagined past of the ancient Israelite state within the discourse of biblical studies. Furthermore, here ironically is an imperial control, constructed by the Hebrew Bible and modern 'biblical historians', which mirrors the dominant theme of empire in the history of the region to such an extent that Palestinian history no longer exists: all we have is a history of an imagined imperial Israel. [4]
Confirmation of the importance which the discourse of biblical studies has always placed upon this period can be found in Soggin's assessment of the inauguration of an Israelite monarchy:
With the formation of a united kingdom under David, the history of Israel leaves the realm of pre-history, of cultic and popular tradition, and enters the arena of history proper. The kingdom under David and Solomon constitutes a datum point from which the investigation of Israel's history can be safely begun.
-- Soggin 1977: 332
Soggin's view is noteworthy for several reasons since he had argued against the possibility of using the biblical traditions to construct early pre-monarchic Israel, the essential Israel of biblical scholarship discussed in the previous chapter. His History of Israel was one of the first to take seriously the growing objections to standard assumptions about the historicity of the biblical traditions. For Soggin, the search for Israel in the Late Bronze Age had to be abandoned since the source material was not available. Instead the real starting point for a history of Israel was, for him, the foundation of a monarchy. However, it is clear that he is working with the common assumption in biblical studies that 'history proper' can only be written on the basis of written documents. Without such documents we are condemned to 'pre-history' which somehow does not carry the same weight, is not real somehow, and so these periods and their peoples are silenced. This is the principle of Western historiography of the nineteenth century as it developed in the context of the nation state. It is now reinforced in the construction of Israelite history by the fact that it is only with the Israelite state (nation state) that we enter the realm of 'history proper'. History, in effect Palestinian history, before this time cannot be 'proper'. For most other scholars, who have been content to date parts of the biblical tradition much earlier or argue that late traditions still accurately reflect a much earlier historical reality, the 'emergence' of Israel, as we have seen, is the other defining moment in the history of Palestine.
It is not simply the assumption that the rise of an Israelite state, and in particular the Davidic monarchy, brings us to history proper but that this is the defining moment of Israelite history and so of the region as a whole. The assertion of Bright (1972: 179) that Israel under the monarchy became 'one of the ranking powers of the contemporary world' and that this is 'one of the most significant in Israel's entire history' is representative of a common view in biblical studies. The emphasis on the crucial nature of this period is found throughout our standard histories and reference works. It is necessary to trace the discourse of biblical studies in relation to the invention of an Israelite state or 'empire' in the context of the Zionist agitation for and eventual realization of a modern state of Israel. [5] The two processes are intricately linked in that the scholarly discourse has been conducted in the context of the struggle for a state in the first part of this century and then dominated by the existence of that state ever since. If 'politics is everywhere', as Said (1994b: 16) claims, then the discourse of biblical studies has steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the construction of the past is a political act. Biblical scholars and archaeologists have sought to escape to the haven of objectivity effectively ignoring, or even denying, the context in which they work and the contexts in which their work is received and read. The cumulative effect of frequently circulated ideas and values both shapes and is shaped by their findings. This is particularly true of any history of ancient Israel and particularly one which deals with the creation of a state. The attachment to place, the claim of 'historic right' to the land, excludes any counter-claims. Biblical studies in imagining a past dominated by an Israelite state, elevated to the rank of a world power, simply adds to the legitimacy of the claim of 'historic right' by excluding any other possible construction of the past.
Furthermore, as we saw with the discussion of the so-called emergence of Israel, there are a number of domain assumptions which have permeated considerations of the inauguration of an ancient Israelite state. The presentation, invariably, has been in terms of objective scholarship divorced from the sordid realities of the world of politics. It has not been seen as a matter worthy of comment that biblical scholarship's discussion of an Israelite state in the past has no bearing upon or implications for claims in the present for the land of Palestine. It is simply assumed that biblical studies has no part in contemporary struggles for identity and land, when in fact the very silence, the fact that the 'problem' of Palestine and the existence of a Palestinian past remains unspoken in the discourse of biblical studies, has only served to legitimate Israel's claims to the past and the exclusion of any alternative competing Palestinian claims. The discourse of biblical studies has imagined an ancient Israelite state that is remarkably similar in many aspects to the modern state. What is striking are the recurrent themes, images, and phrases which appear throughout this discourse from the 1920s onwards to the present day: the Davidic monarchy as the defining moment in the history of the region, the existence of a Davidic empire to rival other imperial powers in the ancient world, the defensive nature of David's state, the paradox of the alien nature of the monarchy to Israel, and Israel as a nation set apart from surrounding nations.
IMAGINING AN ANCIENT ISRAELITE STATE
Just as with the study of Israel's emergence, Alt's seminal work (1966) on the Israelite monarchy, originally published in 1930, represents the classic formulation of the formation of an Israelite state in Palestine which sets and continues to set the agenda for the study of the history of the period. The underlying presupposition that the history of the region must be understood in terms of national entities is set out in the opening sentences of his study. He states that the time during which the tribes of Israel were migrating from 'the southern wastelands in the mountain regions of Palestine' (1966: 173) coincided with the arrival in the lowlands of Aegean groups including the Philistines. He claims that it is not possible to 'understand the history of Palestine during the following centuries without first grasping the difference in the way of life and in the achievements of the two nations after they had settled in Palestine' (1966: 173). The claim that subsequent Palestinian history can only be understood from this vantage-point emphasizes that this is the defining moment in the history of the region. Furthermore, it is a struggle between the expression of Israelite national consciousness and the Philistines. Yet the Philistines are not responsible for this defining moment. This is a claim that must be reserved for Israel. The Philistines' failing is that they are identified with indigenous political structures. They more or less adopted the existent form of political organization: 'we are justified in seeing in the little states of the Philistines and the other Aegean peoples in the plains of Palestine the heirs and successors to the early Canaanite system of city-states' (1966: 174). Although he admits that they developed a distinctive form of political organization which could not be attributed to the Canaanites, ultimately they failed because they were contaminated by indigenous political structures. As we have been told repeatedly, indigenous political structures could not compare with external forms of organization. Indigenous 'states' were always small. The defining moment in the history of the region was dependent upon a political system of a completely different order, the formation of an Israelite state. His explanation of this development and the ultimate failure of the Philistines is very revealing:
During their wars of migration, the collective nature of their every undertaking had been of vital importance, and even when they annexed Palestine they were to owe a great deal of their success to their strong cohesive unity. Naturally the other Aegean tribes had entered into the alliance during the nomadic period, or had individually founded similar organizations; after their occupation of Palestine, however, they seem to have rapidly fallen victim to the disunity effected by the system of tiny city-states which they adopted, so that in the Israelite tradition they are never again called by their tribal names and the only reference is to their cities. The Philistines, on the other hand, were able to preserve their combined organization for some time, and because of it were in a position to develop a political and military strength with a wide influence beyond the immediate area of their settlements. This would inevitably lead them to a position of political domination in Palestine, where the old Egyptian regime was now practically without influence. To this extent, they can actually be described as being the successors to the Pharaohs; even though their power was always confined to a far smaller area than had been that of the Egyptians previously, it was as a result much more effective.
-- Alt 1966: 174-5 [6]
Interestingly, the indigenous peoples cannot be considered to be a nation in contrast to Israel. He then goes so far as to say that the Philistines had the opportunity to create 'an empire of the first rank' (1966: 175). [7] This is to be contrasted with the slow, mostly peaceful, immigration of Israelite tribes into the hill country of Palestine in which they were separated by chains of non-Israelite tribes, as we have seen in chapter 3. He stresses their nomadic origin, lacking the military superiority of the Aegean groups. Yet it is Israel who is able to create an 'empire', not the Philistines. Israel of the imagined past, as of Alt's own present, claims to take possession of an empty and unpromising land:
Already the difference between them and the Aegeans was as great as it could be; these, as we saw, moved immediately into the older civilized regions, and took possession of its riches; on the other hand, the Israelite settlement in Palestine was really in undeveloped territory which was at first necessarily isolated from civilization. Immediately after the occupation it held the Israelites apart from the native Canaanite system, giving them time to develop their own civilization more vigorously in its new homeland, whereas the Aegean culture very quickly degenerated into that of the occupied country.
-- Alt 1966: 176
It is not just that they take possession of this empty land but because they remained isolated they do not suffer the same fate as the Philistines who are dragged down by the indigenous Canaanite system.
Alt was writing, of course, well before the realization of a modern state of Israel. But the context in which he worked is not an insignificant factor in determining his conception of the past, as we have seen (Sasson 1981). His guiding principle is that it is the nation state which defines history: thus the struggle for national self-determination and self-consciousness is the key element in Israel's imagined past. This articulates well with Alt's own training in German historiography, itself a product of the struggle for German unification, and is reinforced by the contemporary struggle in Palestine, at the time he was writing, of the Zionist struggle for a 'national homeland'. The themes of national awareness and self-determination inform his work throughout.
Alt (1966: 177) goes on to stress that Israel's nomadic past contained 'some rudimentary functions of a national nature' -- we are not told what these are -- but that their settlement in a 'civilized country' made the development of 'national functions' almost inevitable. This provides an interesting contrast with more recent studies of state formation which stress that crossing the threshold to statehood is by no means inevitable. [8] Yet we find that Israel's move to statehood is 'almost inevitable'. For Albright and much of subsequent American biblical scholarship, this inevitability is explained in terms of evolutionary development in the context of a divine providential plan. Alt offers no explanation for the inevitability of Israel's move to statehood beyond the assertion of its inevitability. However, he stresses the Philistine threat as the crucial factor which pushed Israel towards state formation but in so doing emphasizes just how far this is the defining moment in the region and in terms of world history:
As regards the Israelites themselves, however, it involved them directly in a completely different manner and to a far greater degree in the course of the history of their country and the world than at the time of their emigration, imposing on them a new and unavoidable intercourse and participation in the life of the surrounding culture, from which they were unable to withdraw again by their own power.
-- Alt 1966: 182
The language here suggests that this 'unavoidable intercourse' with surrounding cultures was distasteful, an unavoidable contact which threatened the very existence and distinctiveness of Israel just as it had corrupted the Philistines. The crucial difference here is that Israel, unlike the Philistines with their military superiority, was not dragged down by the indigenous circumstances but managed to transform the region and the world. Here is a triumph against all the odds. Israel was able to defeat the 'oppressive rule' (1966: 183) of the Philistines and establish a state despite the contaminating influence of the corrupt Palestinian setting.
The other striking feature of Alt's construction, which has continued in biblical scholarship, is his stress on the foundation of an Israelite 'national-state' (1966: 185). Notice he refers to it a few pages later as the 'first unified national state' (1966: 187) and a 'nation state' (1966: 191). The claim of 'historic right' to the land is reinforced, of course, by the claim of priority and exclusivity to statehood in the region. An equally influential idea has been his view that the Israelite state was founded for defensive purposes only, an attempt to deal with the Philistine military threat: 'it was a kingship for the sole purpose of defence against the Philistines, and the idea of establishing a dominion over non-Israelite areas was far removed from it' (1966: 196). This notion of the defensive nature of Israel is a theme that runs throughout the discourse of biblical studies on the Israelite state and which articulates closely with Zionist claims and later apologetics following the foundation of the modern state of Israel. The modern state is frequently described as being defensive in nature: a view that is expressed in the Proclamation of Independence: 'They sought peace, but they prepared to defend themselves.' [9]
It is 'scarcely conceivable' (1966: 197) for Alt that Israel could have been influenced by Canaanite states. Instead it was influenced much more by what Alt describes as the 'national foundations' (1966: 200) of Edom, Moab, Ammon, and Aram:
The kingdom of Israel came on the scene as one of the last of this series of closely similar political structures, and so played its own part in the sweeping change in the political map of Palestine which came to its conclusion in the tenth century B.C. From the purely chronological point of view, one might consider the much later development of the Israelite state as a mere imitation of the long-established nation-states east of the Jordan. But it is intrinsically improbable that the connection can be explained in such a mechanical way. In both cases we are dealing with related peoples, who were led from their common desert home by a similar route into the various parts of the civilized region of Palestine. If, as far as we can see, all these nations show in the formulation of the state traces of the same creative principles in operation, and if this is in fact a principle which was unknown to the previous inhabitants of the territory in which their new states were set up, then we should be able to recognize with greater confidence the consequences of a tendency which was common to all the new intruders, and which sooner or later, and according to individual circumstance, brought into being the same type of national structure, without one nation first having to learn from the others.
-- 1966: 200-1
All of this is simply a working out of the major assumptions which inform Alt's understanding of the emergence of ancient Israel, the expression of the essential Israel. The real civilizing influence in the region was therefore external. The indigenous cultures were simply incapable of structuring themselves in such a way. The other striking feature of this construction is just how close it is to the modern period with the creation of nation states by the European imperial powers. The boundaries of the region were fixed, however artificially, by Europe: the indigenous peoples were unable to organize themselves in such a 'civilizing' manner. The indigenous peoples were devoid of this so-called 'creative' principle, a creative principle which amounts to little more than the ability to organize and cooperate. For Alt, the nation state is the pinnacle of civilization; it is unknown to the region until introduced by outsiders of which Europe is the heir.
Israel is seen as a special case because of its greater isolation in an area 'influenced by the ancient and completely dissimilar city-states of Palestine' (1966: 201). The form of the state might have been similar to its Jordanian neighbours at first but it developed independently. The critical stage is seen as the reigns of David and Solomon who are credited with extending their control 'further than any native power of earlier times known to us, even the Philistines' (1966: 225). The 'great men' view of history is encapsulated in Alt's influential conclusion that 'the whole of Palestine was incorporated into a very complicated system of dependencies, the only focal-point of which was the person of David and Solomon' (1966: 226). Alt's conclusion at the end of his article illustrates many important points about the assumptions of biblical scholarship. David and Solomon are seen as departing from the founding principle of Saul's kingdom based upon national organization to that of a supra-national power based upon personal allegiance. The recently formed 'national states' remained in existence but were incorporated into this wider structure. However, the national principle reasserted itself against the personal union:
History here has something very significant to say; it shows the empire created by David and Solomon with such amazing speed to be a swing of the political pendulum, which went too far, beyond the prevailing inclinations and capabilities of the people of Palestine at the time, to make possible for it to stay longer, let alone permanently, in this position, and it makes it apparent that actually only the principle of the nation-state, which was a very early, if not the earliest, type of political organization in the country, fulfilled the requirements of the peoples concerned and enabled some sort of balance to be set up between them.
-- Alt 1966: 237
The notion of the nation state dominates Alt's construction to such an extent that it is to be seen as the essential principle underlying the political organization of the region. But it is a principle which has had to be introduced from outside. Even more amazingly, he claims that this was an early, 'if not the earliest', type of political organization in the country. This suggests that the indigenous peoples of Palestine were incapable of any form of political organization until the introduction of the nation state by nomads infiltrating from outside!
These and other important trends in biblical scholarship were continued and perpetuated by Alt's most distinguished pupil Martin Noth. His construction of the period of the formation of an Israelite state followed closely the outlines of the biblical traditions. He articulated a problem which has exercised the minds of many biblical scholars relying for their constructions of the period on traditions contained within the Hebrew Bible: namely that the inauguration of the monarchy denies the essential theocratic nature of Israel. Furthermore, Israel's uniqueness, its claim to priority in the formation of a state in the region, is compromised by the acknowledgement that it had adopted this political structure from surrounding cultures:
But the very fact that the monarchy in Israel was based on a model that had proved its worth in other peoples inevitably made it a problem for Israel. Was it right for Israel to try to be a nation like other nations and to install a king on the model of foreign monarchies and, in spite of its distress, to embark on the road to political power? Modest though the first steps which it took in this direction were, it was a fundamentally new departure for Israel.
-- Noth 1960: 172
Traditional constructions, based upon the biblical text, have failed to resolve this paradox: it is seen to be alien to Israel and a rejection of its essential theocratic nature while becoming the defining moment in Israelite history which determined its national boundaries and autonomy. [10]
Noth portrays Saul's reign in typically biblical terms as a failure, 'a mere episode': the Philistines established sovereignty in Palestine and the result of Saul's reign was 'as hopeless for Israel as it could be' (1960: 178). The nature of the defining moment is expressed by Noth as the reign of David in which 'Israel's progress to political power entered a completely new and decisive phase' (1960: 179). He also states that the newness of the situation is confirmed by the introduction of a 'new historical tradition' in the Old Testament, a 'historical record, a work of scholarship'. The connection between the rise of modern historiography and the nation state with an emphasis upon the uniqueness of great statesmen and the importance of state archives is confirmed in Noth's representation of this imagined past. The connection between past and present is also assured by the contemporary scholar's study of this ancient 'work of scholarship'. It is, of course, a guarantee of objectivity as well as a product of disinterested scholarship. He states that the development of political power and the active participation in historical events was the precondition for the beginning of historical writing. This is to assume, of course, that his proposed twelve-tribe amphictyonic structure or the reign of Saul were not 'political'! Interestingly, it seems, only states are political and only states provide the foundation for historical records. Yet at the same time biblical scholarship can deny or ignore the political context and implications of its research.
One of the major historical puzzles about the biblical accounts and constructions based upon them is that the Philistines who are presented as such a potent threat to the very existence of Israel under Saul are not just defeated by David but virtually disappear from the historical record. [11] Thus Noth is able to say that:
The Philistines made no further attempt. They were forced to surrender their supremacy in the land. The period of their predominance had come to a rapid end. Henceforth they were limited to their old possessions in the southern part of the maritime plain and formed one of the small neighbouring states which gave trouble to Judah and Israel as occasion offered but were no longer able to make any decisive historical interventions. David's decisive victories over the Philistines were the fundamental and the most lasting successes of a life that was rich in success. They gave him freedom to develop and elaborate his political system along his own lines.
-- Noth 1960: 189
The Philistines are, interestingly, confined to 'the southern part of the maritime plain', the modern Gaza strip. They are no longer able to participate in historical events whereas the region is defined in terms of the Davidic monarchy. Indeed, what we see here is the elevation of Israel to the point where it silences Palestinian (Philistine) history. The choice of Jerusalem as the capital of what Noth terms 'the greater kingdom Israel' (1960: 189), the combination of Israel and Judah, was crucial. The allusion to 'Greater Israel' is particularly significant, as we have seen, in considering the subtle influence of the present on the imagined past. The phrase has been of crucial significance in the period since 1948 (see Chomsky 1983). It is a phrase that we see used by Alt, now Noth, and which becomes common parlance in the discourse of biblical studies. The capture of Jerusalem also helps to define the crucial moment in the history of the region:
It was near the main north to south road over the hills, which followed the watershed, but lacked good communications with the east and the west. It was in no sense the obvious centre of the land and the natural features of its position did not mark it out as the capital. What it became under David, and what it has meant in history right up to our own day, it owes not to nature but to the will and insight of a man who, disregarding the natural conditions, made a decision that was right in a particular historical situation.
-- Noth 1960: 190
The guiding principle, once again, is that it is great men who write history. Yet the view expressed does not correspond to any known historical reality in terms of the size and importance of Jerusalem at the time of the supposed reign of David. [12] Yet its meaning is carried through to the present day. For Noth (1960: 7), as for most biblical scholars and certainly for the Zionist movement, there is a direct continuum between the Davidic and modern states. The claim of Israel's inviolable right to Jerusalem as its capital, espoused most vociferously by Menachem Begin and many other Likud leaders, has its roots in this imagined Davidic golden age. The opening sentence of Avigad's popular report (1980) on the archaeological excavations in Jerusalem from 1969 to 1981 shows the political context in which such work needs to be understood: 'The reunification of Jerusalem in 1967 was not only a great historical event ... but was as well an event that will long be remembered as a turning point in the archaeological exploration of the city' (1980: 13). The significance is then said to be the fact that this allowed Israeli archaeologists access to locations previously inaccessible. Yet the fact that he describes the result of the 1967 war as 'a great historical event' shows that the archaeological enterprise is not just an academic exercise. Jerusalem is described as 'a symbol of deep emotional significance for the Jewish people and for much of mankind' (1980: 13). Avigad completes his study with the observation that the excavators were able to witness a further historical process in accord with the patterns of the past: the restoration of the Jewish quarter. It is clear that Avigad sees a direct continuum between the past and present of Israel which centres on the political and religious significance of Jerusalem for the Jewish community. [13] The direct continuum between past and present which is invoked, or implicitly assumed, in biblical scholarship and in the realm of politics means that the two spheres are intricately related.