Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

"Science," the Greek word for knowledge, when appended to the word "political," creates what seems like an oxymoron. For who could claim to know politics? More complicated than any game, most people who play it become addicts and die without understanding what they were addicted to. The rest of us suffer under their malpractice as our "leaders." A truer case of the blind leading the blind could not be found. Plumb the depths of confusion here.

Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:02 am

Chapter 9: The Car Connection

William Weiss's partner in General Aniline and Film, Edsel Ford, whose father, Henry Ford, was chairman of the Ford empire, played a complex part in The Fraternity's activities before and during World War II. The Ford chairman in Germany, in charge of all Ford operations after Pearl Harbor, was Dr. Heinrich Albert, partner until 1936 of Gerhardt Westrick in the law firm associated with the Dulles brothers -- Sullivan and Cromwell.

Henry Ford was once ranked in popular polls as the third greatest man in history: just below Napoleon and Jesus Christ. His wealth may be gauged by the fact that when young Edsel turned twenty-one, the father took the boy into a private vault and gave him $1 million in gold. Henry Ford controlled more than half of the American automobile market by 1940: in the early years of the century, his famous Model T, the chariot of the common man, revolutionized the nation.

Lean and hard as a Grant Wood farmer, Henry Ford was a knotty puritan, dedicated to the simple ideals of early-to-bed, early-to-rise, plain food, and no adultery. He didn't drink and fought a lifetime against the demon tobacco.

He admired Hitler from the beginning, when the future Fuhrer was a struggling and obscure fanatic. He shared with Hitler a fanatical hatred of Jews. He first announced his anti-Semitism in 1919, in the New York World, when he expressed a pure fascist philosophy. He said, "International financiers are behind all war. They are what is called the international Jew: German-Jews, French-Jews, English-Jews, American-Jews ... the Jew is a threat. "

In Germany, Hitler was uttering identical sentiments. In 1920, Ford arranged for his Dearborn Independent, first published in 1918, to become a platform for his hatred of the Jews. Week after week the newspaper set out to expose some horror of Jewish misbehavior. The first anti-Semitic issue on May 22 carried the headline THE INTERNATIONAL JEW: THE WORLD'S PROBLEM. The leading article opened with the words "There is a race, a part of humanity, which has never been received as a welcome part ..." and continued in the same vein to the end. A frequent contributor was a fanatical White Russian, Boris Brasol, who boasted in one piece: "I have done the Jews more injury than would have been done to them by ten pogroms."

Brasol was successively an agent of the Czar and of the U.S. Army Intelligence; later he became a Nazi spy.

Ford's book The International Jew was issued in 1927. A virulent anti-Semitic tract, it was still being widely distributed in Latin America and the Arab countries as late as 1945. Hitler admired the book and it influenced him deeply. Visitors to Hitler's headquarters at the Brown House in Munich noticed a large photograph of Henry Ford hanging in his office. Stacked high on the table outside were copies of Ford's book. As early as 1923, Hitler told an interviewer from the Chicago Tribune, "I wish that I could send some of my shock troops to Chicago and other big American cities to help." He was referring to stories that Ford was planning to run for President.

Ford was one of the few people singled out for praise in Mein Kampf. At Hitler's trial in 1924, Erhard Auer of the Bavarian Diet testified that Ford had given Hitler money. Ford formed crucial links in The Fraternity at an early stage. He appointed Gerhardt Westrick's partner Dr. Heinrich Albert as chairman of the Ford Company. Other prominent figures in that company were fanatically pro-Nazi. They included a grandson of the Kaiser and Carl Bosch, Schmitz's forerunner as head of I.G. Farben. Later, Carl Krauch of I.G. Farben became a director and Kurt von Schroder, as one might have predicted, handled the banking.

Carl Krauch testified in an interrogation in 1946:

I myself knew Henry Ford and admired him. I went to see Goring personally about that. I told Goring that I myself knew his son Edsel, too, and I told Goring that if we took the Ford independence away from them in Germany, it would aggrieve friendly relations with American industry in the future. I counted on a lot of success for the adaptation of American methods in Germany's industries, but that could be done only in friendly cooperation. Goring listened to me and then he said: "I agree. I shall see to it that the German Ford Company will not be incorporated in the Hermann Goring Company." So I participated regularly in the supervisory board meetings to inform myself about the business processes of Henry Ford and, if possible, to take a stand for the Henry Ford Works after the war had begun. Thus, we succeeded in keeping the Ford Works working and operating independently of our government's seizure.


Edsel Ford had a great deal to do with the European companies. He was different in character from his father. He was a nervous, high-strung man who tried to work off his extreme tensions and guilts over inherited wealth in a furious addiction to tennis and other sports. Darkly handsome, with a whipcord physique, he was miserable at heart. He could not relate to his father, who despised him, and his inner distress caused him severe stomach ulcers that developed into gastric cancer by the early 1940s. Nevertheless, he and his father had one thing in common. True figures of The Fraternity, they believed in Business as Usual in time of war.

Edsel was on the board of American I.G. and General Aniline and Film throughout the 1930s. He and his father, following their meetings with Gerhardt Westrick at Dearborn in 1940, refused to build aircraft engines for England and instead built supplies of the 5-ton military trucks that were the backbone of German army transportation. They arranged to ship tires to Germany despite the shortages; 30 percent of the shipments went to Nazi-controlled territories abroad. German Ford employee publications included such editorial statements as, "At the beginning of this year we vowed to give our best and utmost for final victory, in unshakable faithfulness to our Fuehrer. " Invariably, Ford remembered Hitler's birthday and sent him 50,000 Reichsmarks a year. His Ford chief in Germany was responsible for selling military documents to Hitler. Westrick's partner Dr. Albert continued to work in Hitler's cause when that chief came to the United States to continue his espionage. In 1941, Henry Ford delivered a bitter attack on the Jews to The Manchester Guardian (February 16, 1941) saying inter alia, that the United States should make England and Germany fight until they both collapsed and that after that there would be a coalition of the powers.

And in 1941 he hired Charles Lindbergh as a member of his executive staff. Lindbergh had been one of the most vocal supporters of Hitler. Indeed, the advent of Pearl Harbor made no difference to Lindbergh's attitude. On December 17, 1941, ten days after the Japanese attack, Lindbergh said to a group of America Firsters at the home of prominent businessman Edwin S. Webster in New York,

There is only one danger in the world -- that is the yellow danger. China and Japan are really bound together against the white race. There could only have been one efficient weapon against this alliance. ... Germany. ... the ideal setup would have been to have had Germany take over Poland and Russia, in collaboration with the British, as a bloc against the yellow people and Bolshevism. But instead, the British and the fools in Washington had to interfere. The British envied the Germans and wanted to rule the world forever. Britain is the real cause of all the trouble in the world today.*


While Lindbergh took over as consultant, Edsel Ford began to concentrate on insuring that his interests in France would not be affected following the German invasion. Management of the Ford interests was in the hands of the impressively handsome and elegant Paris financier Maurice Dollfus, who had useful contacts with the Worms Bank and the Bank for International Settlements. Although he had little knowledge of manufacturing processes, Dollfus supplied much of the financing for the new sixty-acre Ford automobile factory at Poissy, eleven miles from Paris in the Occupied Zone. Under Dollfus the Poissy plant began making airplane engines in 1940, supplying them to the German government. It also built trucks for the German army, as well as automobiles. Carl Krauch and Hermann Schmitz were in charge of the operation from their headquarters in Berlin along with Edsel Ford at Dearborn.

After Pearl Harbor, Edsel Ford moved to protect the company's interest in Occupied France, even though this would mean collaboration with the Nazi government. Edsel and Dollfus decided to consolidate their operation in conjunction with Carl Krauch, Heinrich Albert, and Gerhardt Westrick in Germany. The problem they had was how to keep in touch, since their two countries were at war. In order to overcome this difficulty, Edsel traveled to Washington at the beginning of 1942 and entered into an arrangement with Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, who simultaneously was blocking financial aid to German-Jewish refugees by citing the Trading with the Enemy Act. Long agreed that it should be possible for letters to travel to and from Occupied France via Lisbon and Vichy. Since it would be too dangerous to risk the letters falling into the hands of the press or foreign agents, they would have to be carried by a Portuguese courier named George Lesto who, with clearance from the Nazi government, was permitted to travel in and out of Paris.

On January 28, 1942, Dollfus sent the first letter after Pearl Harbor to Edsel Ford in Dearborn, Michigan, via the Portuguese courier Lesto. Dollfus wrote that, "Since the state of war between U.S.A. and Germany I am not able to correspond with you very easily. I have asked Lesto to go to Vichy and mail to you the following information." He added that production was continuing as before, that trucks were being manufactured for the occupying Germans and the French, and that Ford was ahead of the French automobile manufacturers in supplying the enemy. Dollfus said he was getting support from the Vichy government to preserve the interests of the American shareholders and that a company in North Africa was being founded for the Nazis with ground plots in Oran. Amazingly, the letter concluded by saying, "I propose to send again Mr. Lesto to the States as soon as all formalities and authorizations are accomplished."

Edsel replied at length on May 13: "It is interesting to note that you have started your African company and are laying plans for a more peaceful future. " He went on, "I have received a request from the State Department to make a recommendation for issuance of a visa to Mr. Lesto. " However, the letter went on, Ford was uneasy about making the request; it was clear that he was nervous about the matter being disclosed.

The Royal Air Force, apparently not briefed on the world connections of The Fraternity, had just bombed the Poissy plant. Ford wrote on May 15 that photographs of the plant on fire were published in our newspapers here but fortunately no reference was made to the Ford Motor Company. In other words, Edsel was relieved that it was not made clear to the American public that he was operating the plant for the Nazis.

On February 11, 1942, Dollfus wrote again -- that the results of the year up to December 31, 1941, showed a net profit for Ford's French branch of 58 million francs including payment for dealings with the Nazis.

On June 6, Dollfus wrote Edsel enclosing a memorandum prepared by George Lesto. The memo stated that the RAF had now bombed the plant four times, and that all machinery and equipment had been taken from the plant and scattered all over the country. Lesto was pleased to state that the Vichy government "agreed to pay for all damages." The reparation was "approved by the German government." Ford replied to this letter on July 17, 1942, expressing pleasure with this arrangement, congratulating Lesto on organizing the repayment, and saying that he had shown the letter to his father and to Charles E. Sorenson, and that they both joined him in sending best wishes to Dollfus and the staff, in the hope that they would continue to carry on the good work that they were doing.

Meanwhile, Dollfus and Heinrich Albert set up another branch of Ford in North Africa, headquartered in Vichy Algiers with the approval of I.G. Farben. It was to build trucks and armored cars for Rommel's army. In a lengthy report to the State Department dated July 11, 1942, Felix Cole, American Consul in Algiers, sent a detailed account of the planned operation, not complaining that the headquarters was located in the Occupied Zone of France or that Dollfus was prominent in the Pucheu ** group of bankers that financed the factory through the Worms Bank, the Schroder Bank, and BIS correspondent in Paris. Cole remarked en passant, "The [Worms] firm is greatly interested in the efforts now being made to effect a compromise peace" on behalf of Germany." Cole had put his finger on something: Dollfus was more than a mere Nazi collaborator working with Edsel Ford. He was a key link in The Fraternity's operation in Europe, scheming with Pucheu, the Worms Bank, the Bank of France, the Chase, and the Bank for International Settlements.

The letter from Cole went on: "It is alleged that the main outlets for the new works [in Oran] will be southwards, but the population which is already getting plenty of propaganda about the collaboration of French-German-American capital and the questionable (?) sincerity of the American war effort *** is already pointing an accusing finger at a transaction which has been for long a subject of discussion in commercial circles. "

Dollfus wrote again on August 15, 1942; the letter reached Edsel Ford two weeks later. Dollfus stated that following the RAF bombing, production had been resumed in France at the same rate; that he was not permitted to say where the new plants were to which production had been disbursed but that they were four of the principal plants. He went on, "Machinery has been overhauled and repaired and some new machinery purchased so that the capital in machinery and equipment is completely restored to its pre-bombing status. I have named a manager in each plant and the methods and standards are the same as they were in Poissy. Essential repairs have been started at Poissy but work is slow because of the difficulty in obtaining materials."

In the rest of a very long letter, Dollfus pointed out that at this stage the Poissy and other works came directly under Dr. Heinrich Albert and a German officer named Tannen, in trust. "Mr. Tannen has in turn given me back most of the powers that I used to have previously to run our business, with the exception of certain ones that he does not hold himself, and some others which I believe should have been given me but anyhow they are not indispensable for me to continue to run the business normally." Dollfus added that Dr. Albert was clearly anxious to play a part "so as to appear a Good Samaritan after the war in the eyes of the Allies."

On September 29, 1942, Breckinridge Long wrote to Edsel enclosing a letter from Dollfus saying that Vichy's compensation payment to Ford to the tune of 38 million francs had been received. On October 8, Ford sent a letter of thanks.

In Apri1 1943, Morgenthau and Lauchlin Currie conducted a lengthy investigation into the Ford subsidiaries in France, concluding that "their production is solely for the benefit of Germany and the countries under its occupation" and that the Germans have "shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interests" because of the "attitude of strict neutrality" maintained by Henry and Edsel Ford in time of war. And finally, "the increased activity of the French Ford subsidiaries on behalf of Germans receives the commendation of the Ford family in America."

Despite a report running to hundreds of thousands of words and crammed with exhaustive documentation including all the relevant letters, nothing whatsoever was done about the matter.

Meanwhile, Ford had gone on making special deals. On May 29, 1942, the Ford Motor Company in Edgewater, New Jersey, had shipped six cargoes of cars to blacklisted Jose O. Moll of Chile. Another consignee was a blacklisted enemy corporation, Lilienfeld, in Bolivia. On October 20, 1942, John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to London, coolly reported to Dean Acheson that two thousand German army trucks were authorized for repair by the Ford motor works in Berne. On the same day, Winant reported that the British Legation and the U.S. authorities recommended the Ford Motor Company of Belgium be blacklisted because its Zurich branch, on U.S. orders, was repairing trucks and converting the use of gasoline for trucks and cars of the German army in Switzerland.

In December 1943 a further report from Minister Leland Harrison in Berne said, "The Ford Motor Company in Zurich, acting for Cologne, supplies spare parts for the repair of Ford trucks and passenger cars to U.S. Ford Motor Company agents in Switzerland. Some of these parts are imported, which provides the enemy with clearing funds." Thus, one year after these matters were reported in Washington, trading with the enemy was continuing. All Swiss operations functioned under the guidance of Ford's Charles E. Sorenson.

Edsel died of cancer in 1943, but Sorenson went on with the dealings. On November 6, 1945, Maurice Dollfus, enemy collaborator, traveled to New York (by U.S. Army Air Transport Command) and gave an interview to The New York Times at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. He discussed his operation during the war, but apparently nobody on the New York Times staff thought to question him on the nature of that operation, which remained a complete secret to the American public.

***

General Motors, under the control of the Du Pont family of Delaware, played a part in collaboration comparable with Ford's. General Aniline and Film had heavy investments in the company.

Irenee du Pont was the most imposing and powerful member of the clan. He was obsessed with Hitler's principles. He keenly followed the career of the future Fuhrer in the 1920s, and on September 7, 1926, in a speech to the American Chemical Society, he advocated a race of supermen, to be achieved by injecting special drugs into them in boyhood to make their characters to order. He insisted his men reach physical standards equivalent to that of a Marine and have blood as pure as that in the veins of the Vikings. Despite the fact that he had Jewish blood in his own veins, his anti-Semitism matched that of Hitler.

Between 1932 and 1939, bosses of General Motors poured $30 million into I.G. Farben plants with the excuse that the money could not be exported. On several visits with Hermann Schmitz and Carl Krauch of Farben in Berlin in 1933, Wendell R. Swint, Du Pont's foreign relations director, discovered that I.G. and the gigantic Krupp industrial empire had arranged for all Nazi industry to contribute one half percent of its entire wage and salary roll to the Nazis even before they rose to power. Thus, Swint (who testified to this effect at the 1934 Munitions Hearings) admitted under oath that Du Pont was fully aware it was financing the Nazi Party through one half percent of its Opel wages and salaries as well as through its deals with I.G. and its building of armored cars and trucks.

Simultaneously with the rise of Hitler, the Du Ponts in 1933 began financing native fascist groups in America, including the anti-Semitic and anti-black American Liberty League and the organization known as Clark's Crusaders, which had 1,250,000 members in 1933. Pierre, Irenee, and Lammot du Pont and John Jacob Raskob funded the Liberty League, along with Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors. The League smeared Roosevelt as a communist, claimed the President was surrounded by Jews; and despite the fact that they were Jewish, the Du Ponts smeared Semitic organizations.

The connections between General Motors and the Nazi government began at the moment of Hitler's rise to power. Goring declined to annex General Motors and indeed received with pleasure William S. Knudsen, General Motors' president, who returned on October 6, 1933, to New York telling reporters that Germany was "the miracle of the twentieth century."

Early in 1934, Irenee du Pont and Knudsen reached their explosion point over President Roosevelt. Along with friends of the Morgan Bank and General Motors, certain Du Pont backers financed a coup d'etat that would overthrow the President with the aid of a $3 million-funded army of terrorists, modeled on the fascist movement in Paris known as the Croix de Feu. Who was to be the figurehead for this ill-advised scheme, which would result in Roosevelt being forced to take orders from businessmen as part of a fascist government or face the alternative of imprisonment and execution? Du Pont men allegedly held an urgent series of meetings with the Morgans. They finally settled on one of the most popular soldiers in America, General Smedley Butler of Pennsylvania. Butler, a brave hero, had been awarded two Congressional Medals of Honor and his brilliant career as commandant of the Marine Corps had made him a legend. He would, the conspiratorial group felt, make an ideal replacement for Roosevelt if the latter proved difficult. These business chiefs found great support for their plan in Hermann Schmitz, Baron von Schroder, and the other German members of The Fraternity.

The backers of the bizarre conspiracy selected a smooth attorney, Gerald MacGuire, to bring word of the plan to General Butler. MacGuire agreed Butler would be the perfect choice. Butler had attacked the New Deal in public speeches.

MacGuire met with Butler at the latter's house in Newton Square, Pennsylvania, and in a hotel suite nearby. With great intensity the fascist attorney delivered the scheme to the general. Butler was horrified. Although there were many things about Roosevelt he disliked, a coup d'etat amounted to treason, and Butler was nothing if not loyal to the Constitution. However, he disclosed nothing of his feelings. With masterful composure he pretended interest and waited to hear more.

When MacGuire returned, it was with news of more millions and more extravagant plans, which included turning America into a dictatorship with Butler as a kind of Hitler. Once more Butler was infuriated but kept quiet. After MacGuire left on the second occasion, the general got in touch with the White House. He told Roosevelt of the entire plan.

Roosevelt's state of mind can scarcely be imagined. He knew that in view of the backing from high banking sources, this matter could not be dismissed as some crackpot enterprise that had no chance of success. He was well aware of the powerful forces of fascism that could easily make America an ally of Nazism even that early, only one year after Hitler had risen to power.

On the other hand, Roosevelt also knew that if he were to arrest the leaders of the houses of Morgan and Du Pont, it would create an unthinkable national crisis in the midst of a depression and perhaps another Wall Street crash. Not for the first or last time in his career, he was aware that there were powers greater than he in the United States.

Nevertheless, the plan had to be deactivated immediately. The answer was to leak it to the press. The newspapers ran the story of the attempted coup on the front page, but generally ridiculed it as absurd and preposterous. When Thomas Lamont of the Morgan Bank arrived from Europe by steamer, he was asked by a crowd of reporters to comment. "Perfect moonshine! Too utterly ridiculous to comment upon!" was the reply.

Roosevelt couldn't quite let the matter rest. Under pressure from liberal Democrats he set up a special House committee to investigate. Butler begged the committee to summon the Du Ponts but the committee declined. Nor would it consent to call anyone from the house of Morgan. Then Butler dropped a bombshell. He gave interviews to the press announcing that none other than General Douglas MacArthur was a party to the plot. This again was dismissed by the press, and MacArthur laughed it off.

The committee hearings were a farce. MacGuire was allowed to get away with saying that Butler had "misunderstood" his intentions. Other witnesses lamely made excuses, and there the matter rested.

It was four years before the committee dared to publish its report in a white paper that was marked for "restricted circulation." They were forced to admit that "certain persons made an attempt to establish a fascist organization in this country ... [The] committee was able to verify all the pertinent statements made by General Butler." This admission that the entire plan was deadly in intent was not accompanied by the imprisonment of anybody. Further investigations disclosed that over a million people had been guaranteed to join the scheme and that the arms and munitions necessary would have been supplied by Remington, a Du Pont subsidiary.

The Du Ponts' fascistic behavior was seen in 1936, when Irenee du Pont used General Motors money to finance the notorious Black Legion. This terrorist organization had as its purpose the prevention of automobile workers from unionizing. The members wore hoods and black robes, with skull and crossbones. They fire-bombed union meetings, murdered union organizers, often by beating them to death, and dedicated their lives to destroying Jews and communists. They linked to the Ku Klux Klan. Irenee du Pont encouraged General Motors foremen to join the Legion. In one episode a Detroit worker, Charles Poole, was brutally murdered by a gang of Black Legionists, several of whom belonged to the sinister Wolverine Republican League of Detroit. This organization had as its members several in big business. However, their names were kept out of the papers during the Poole case trial. It was brought out that at least fifty people, many of them blacks, had been butchered by the Legion, which swept through General Motors factories and had 75,000 members.

At the same time, the Du Ponts developed the American Liberty League, a Nazi organization whipping up hatred of blacks and Jews, love of Hitler, and loathing of the Roosevelts. Financed by Lammot and Irenee to the tune of close to $500,000 the first year, the Liberty League had a lavish thirty-one-room office in New York, branches in twenty-six colleges, and fifteen subsidiary organizations nationwide that distributed fifty million copies of its Nazi pamphlets. In September 1936, while Hitler at Nuremberg expressed his grand design for the Four Year Plan, the Du Ponts and the American Liberty League poured thousands into backing Republican Alf Landon against Roosevelt in the election. Other backers were the American Nazi party and the German-American Bund.

The attempt to launch Landon failed, which made the Du Ponts hate Roosevelt even more. In outright defiance of Roosevelt's desire to improve working conditions for the average man, Knudsen of General Motors along with the Du Ponts instituted the speedup systems created by another prominent figure of The Fraternity, Charles Bedaux. These forced men to work at terrifying speeds on the assembly lines. Many died of the heat and the pressure, increased by fear of losing their jobs at a time when there were very few available. Irenee personally paid almost $1 million from his own pocket for armed and gas-equipped storm troops modeled on the Gestapo to sweep through the plants and beat up anyone who proved rebellious. He hired the Pinkerton Agency to send its swarms of detectives through the whole chemicals, munitions, and automobile empire to spy on left-wingers or other malcontents.

By the mid-1930s, General Motors was committed to full-scale production of trucks, armored cars, and tanks in Nazi Germany. The GM board could be guaranteed to preserve political, personal, and commercial links to Hitler. Alfred P. Sloan, who rose from president of GM to chairman in 1937, paid for the National Council of Clergymen and Laymen at Asheville, North Carolina, on August 12, 1936, at which John Henry Kirby, millionaire fascist lumberman of Texas, was prominent in the delivery of speeches in favor of Hitler. Others present, delivering equally Hitlerian addresses, were Governor Eugene D. Talmadge of Georgia and the Nazi Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith. Sloan frequently visited Berlin, where he hobnobbed with Goring and Hitler.

Graeme K. Howard was a vice-president of General Motors. Under FBI surveillance throughout his whole career with the company, he was an outright fascist who wrote a poisonous book, America and a New World Order, that peddled the line of appeasement, and a virtually identical doctrine to that of Hitler in terms of free trade and the restoration of the gold standard for the United States of Fascism in which General Motors would no doubt play a prominent part.

Another frequent visitor to Germany was the rugged, cheerful, hearty James D. Mooney, head of the European end of the business, directly in charge of the Adam-Opel production. On December 22, 1936, in Vienna, Mooney told U.S. diplomat George Messersmith, who despite his German family origin hated Hitler, "We ought to make some arrangement with Germany for the future. There is no reason why we should let our moral indignation over what happens in that country stand in the way." In other words, although the mass of Americans despised the Nazis, business must continue as usual. Messersmith was furious. He snapped back, "We can hardly be expected to trade with a country only so that it can get those articles which it intends to use against the peace of the world."

In a report of December 23 to the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, Messersmith wrote, "It is curious that Mooney and Col. Sosthenes Behn ... both give this opinion. The factories owned by ITT in Germany are running full time and in double shifts and increasing their capacity for the simple reason that they are working almost entirely on government orders and for military equipment. The Opel works, owned by General Motors, are [also] working very well [in the same way]."

That Christmas, Mooney was in Berlin for talks with Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht to discuss Germany's and America's joint future in the world of commerce. He attracted the hatred of the liberal U.S. Ambassador to Germany William E. Dodd, who returned from Berlin to New York in 1937 and referred to The Fraternity in a shipboard press conference in New York harbor. Dodd was quoted in The New York Times as saying:

A clique of U.S. industrialists is hell-bent to bring a fascist state to supplant our democratic government and is working closely with the fascist regime in Germany and Italy. I have had plenty of opportunity in my post in Berlin to witness how close some of our American ruling families are to the Nazi regime. On [the ship] a fellow passenger, who is a prominent executive of one of the largest financial corporations, told me point blank that he would be ready to take definite action to bring fascism into America if President Roosevelt continued his progressive policies.


Dodd's words were ignored.

On November 23, 1937, representatives of General Motors held a secret meeting in Boston with Baron Manfred von Killinger, who was Fritz Wiedemann's predecessor in charge of West Coast espionage, and Baron von Tippleskirsch, Nazi consul general and Gestapo leader in Boston. This group signed a joint agreement showing total commitment to the Nazi cause for the indefinite future. The agreement stated that in view of Roosevelt's attitude toward Germany, every effort must be made to remove him by defeat at the next election. Jewish influence in the political, cultural, and public life of America must be stamped out. Press and radio must be subsidized to smear the administration, and there must be a fuehrer, preferably Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, in the White House. This agreement was carefully hidden. But a secretary who was loyal to the American cause managed to obtain a copy and give it to George Seldes, liberal journalist, who published it in his newsletter, In Fact. The patriotic liberal Representative John M. Coffee of Washington State entered the full agreement, running to several pages, in the Congressional Record on August 20, 1942, demanding that the Du Ponts and the heads of General Motors be appropriately treated. Needless to say, the resolution was tabled permanently.

In 1938, Mooney, like Henry Ford, received the Order of the Golden Eagle from Hitler. On March 27, 1939, he arrived in England to confer with the heads of his British company. He learned that three of the Adam-Opel staff had been seized by the Gestapo and charged with leaking secrets of the new Volkswagen to the United States. Mooney rushed to Berlin and arranged meetings with one Dr. Meissner, who was in charge of foreign VIPs. Meissner said that even the Fuhrer could not interfere with Himmler and the SS. Mooney reminded Meissner of his commitment to the Fuhrer.

Meissner agreed that this trivial matter must not be allowed to interfere with German-American relations but that the men would be punished if found guilty. Mooney offered to testify on their behalf; on April 6 he went to see one of Himmler's lieutenants and on the same day he visited Ribbentrop. But he was powerless to affect the fate of his employees.

On April 19, Mooney met with the invaluable Emil Puhl of the BIS and the Reichsbank, and Helmuth Wohlthat, Goring's American-educated right-hand man in the Four Year Plan. Mooney conferred with these men on Hitler's basic plan of the massive American gold loan that would provide the basis for the New Order. Mooney enthusiastically endorsed the scheme and promised to bring it about.

In a state of excitement he traveled to London on April 25 to see Ambassador Joseph Kennedy. Kennedy agreed to meet with Puhl and Wohlthat in Paris. Mooney talked with Francis Rodd of Morgan, Grenfell, the British representatives of the Morgan Bank. They agreed that the loan should be made to Germany through the Bank for International Settlements. Rodd said significantly that the BIS provided a flexible medium for avoiding conflict with some of the internal legal limitations on international loans -- a complicated way of saying that the BIS could dodge the law whenever it felt like it.

Mooney went to Berlin on April 29. On May 1 he urged Puhl to meet with Kennedy in Paris. He promised to arrange the meeting secretly at Mooney's apartment in the Ritz Hotel. Puhl was interested. But on the following day he said he dared not make the trip because it would attract too much attention in Germany and that Wohlthat should go instead. Wohlthat agreed to go.

On May 3, Mooney called Kennedy in London. Kennedy replied that he would be willing to come on the weekend of May 5-6. But he hesitated and asked if Mooney didn't think it was advisable that he put the matter up to the White House first. Mooney said he would only do that in Kennedy's place if he thought he was a good enough salesman to get approval. Otherwise it would be taking a long chance. He added that the arrangements had been accepted in Berlin and it would not be wise to withdraw at this late hour.

After this conversation, Kennedy panicked. He called Roosevelt, who told him immediately not to make the trip. Roosevelt knew the nature of the arrangements in which Mooney was involved. There was no way he would sanction Kennedy's involvement.

Kennedy tried to reach Mooney several times. When he finally got through, Mooney chartered a plane in Brussels and flew to London. The idea of peace was clearly such an obsession he couldn't wait. On the plane, he scribbled out his notes on what was needed: a half to one billion gold loan through the BIS, a restoration of Germany's colonies, a removal of embargo on German goods, participation in Chinese markets. On Germany's side there would be armaments limitations, nonaggression pacts, and free exchange. Whatever Mooney's motives, these were pure Nazi objectives, nothing else.

Mooney went straight to the embassy from his plane and laid out the points of the peace agreement on Kennedy's desk. He begged him to see Wohlthat. Kennedy promised to put pressure on Roosevelt once more. Next morning, Mooney found Kennedy deeply depressed. Kennedy had tried to reach Roosevelt for hours, and when he had done so, Roosevelt had once again refused him.

Mooney now suggested Wohlthat should come to London. Kennedy agreed at once. Mooney called Wohlthat in Berlin and asked him to come to London. Wohlthat obtained permission from Hitler and Goring and arrived at the Berkeley Hotel on May 8. The meeting was held on May 9, apparently without Roosevelt's knowledge or approval. The Nazi economist got along well with Kennedy. Mooney noted that the two men saw eye-to-eye on everything. Wohlthat returned to Berlin, promising his help. The press discovered Wohlthat was in London and played the visit up tremendously with headlines like "Goering's mystery man is here." This greatly annoyed Mooney, who had assumed the visit was secret.

Roosevelt stepped in as soon as the news was announced and forbade Kennedy to have anything further to do with the arrangement. Mooney was greatly disappointed by this lack of rapport between the President and Nazi Germany. It was this series of meetings with Kennedy and Wohlthat that helped to spawn ITT's Gerhardt Westrick's visit to New York the following year, and it is significant that Mooney was high on the list of people who received and encouraged Westrick. Roosevelt was greatly aggravated by Mooney but played along with him in order to see what he was up to.

In the Mooney diaries at Georgetown University in Washington, there is an eighteen-page document signed by Wohlthat that lays out Germany's economic plans. It is quite clear that Mooney was in total accord with these.

On September 22, 1939, Mooney had a meeting with Roosevelt. His notes after the meeting, quoting as nearly as possible the President's actual words, suggest that Roosevelt was using Mooney to see what Hitler was up to. Roosevelt pretended he was not interested in telling the Germans what they should do about Hitler. That Mooney should remind the Germans that Roosevelt had gone to school in Germany and had a great many personal friends there. He said he wished Germany would pipe down about domination of the world. He discussed the question of broader distribution of goods in time of peace and that it ought to be reasonably simple to get around a table with the proper will and settle problems like Silesia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the general attitude toward Russia. Roosevelt said he would be glad to offer himself as moderator, that the Pope could serve a useful purpose in negotiations, and that practical suggestions must be made satisfactory to Berlin, London, and Paris. He encouraged Mooney to see Hitler but to be careful in communicating the results to the White House by telephone.

Armed with this artificial, carefully calculated authorization, Mooney traveled to Europe at the same time as Roosevelt's official emissary, Sumner Welles, in March 1940. He was only one day later than Welles in audience with Hitler on March 4.

Because of the importance of Adam-Opel and the Du Ponts to the Nazi war machine, Hitler was extremely cordial. Mooney said that Roosevelt's early days in Germany had remained a nostalgic recollection; that the President's attitude to Germany was more sanguine and warm than was generally believed in Berlin; that Roosevelt would help toward a negotiated peace; that the German reporters ought to emphasize what Germany and America shared together.

Hitler smiled broadly at these sentiments. He did not want war with America: he had his hands full enough already. He wanted America to remain inactive until it either entered the Axis or was conquered. Hitler said he was delighted to hear Roosevelt's viewpoint and that Roosevelt had constructively undertaken the tasks of the Presidency. He suggested that Roosevelt would be well placed to negotiate peace. These statements were as calculated to deceive Mooney as Roosevelt.

From the Chancellery, Mooney proceeded to the Air Ministry to see Goring, who later had him to dinner at Karin Hall. Goring played out a similar line of lies, denying among other things that Germany had any desire to affect the British colonial empire when in fact one of Hitler's burning obsessions was to retrieve his lost colonies. Wohlthat also attended the meeting at Goring's house, and everyone concurred that the gold loan must once again be pushed by Mooney with the President.

From a warship off the Italian coast in March, Mooney beseeched Roosevelt with a stream of messages calling for peace and unison with Hitler. On April 2, Roosevelt wrote to Mooney that public opinion in America was all for peace and disarmament.

Back in New York, Mooney met with Gerhardt Westrick, and joined that party at the Waldorf-Astoria in which some American leaders of The Fraternity, including Sosthenes Behn and Torkild Rieber, celebrated the Nazi conquest of France. On June 27 the Nazi consul general in New York and local Gestapo chief, Heinrich Borchers, sent a report prepared by Westrick to Ribbentrop. It read:

A group of prominent businessmen and politicians whom I personally regard as reliable in every way, and whose influence I consider to be very great, but who, in the interest of our operation, do not want to be mentioned in any circumstances at this time, suggested that I convey to the Foreign Ministry the following: the aforesaid group, which has the approval and support of a substantial number of leading personalities, will shortly urge upon President Roosevelt the following recommendations: 1. Immediate sending of an American Ambassador to Berlin. 2. A change of Ambassadors in London. 3. Suspension of armament shipments to Great Britain until the new Ambassador to Berlin has had an opportunity to discuss matters with the German government.


On July 18, Hans Thomsen, charge d 'affaires in Washington, wrote to Berlin that this group was headed by James D. Mooney. Thomsen went on to report that Henry Ford had conveyed the same idea to him two days earlier.

In December 1940, Mooney set off on a journey to South America to contact some of the General Motors managers. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, in an urgent meeting with Roosevelt and Cordell Hull on December 20, asked, "Wouldn't it be a good thing if we refuse Mooney a passport and told him why?" Roosevelt said, "That is a good idea. Cordell, how about it?" Hull said, "Passports to South America have never been refused." Ickes commented, "South America is a critical zone. We shouldn't let Mooney in." But Hull did.

The FBI apparently traced Mooney to further meetings with representatives of the German government. In a letter dated February 5, 1941, marked Strictly Confidential, James B. Stewart, U.S. consul in Zurich, wrote to Fletcher Warren of the State Department that he had heard from a French journalist connected to Charles de Gaulle that Eduard Winter, GM distributor in Berlin now in Paris, acted as a courier for Mooney, carrying secret messages to the Nazi high officials in Paris. Stewart said that Winter had a special passport that allowed him to travel between occupied and unoccupied France. The letter continued, "Mr. Mooney is known to be in sympathy with the German government."

However, Stewart wondered if there was anything in the story, since he believed Mooney to be a fine person. Would Warren comment? Warren forwarded the letter to Messersmith, who was ambassador to Cuba. In his letter to Messersmith, dated March 1, 1941, Warren said: "I may say that I, personally, am rather unhappy about Mr. Mooney, and I am not sure that there is not truth in Mr. Stewart's information. There are too many rumors."

Messersmith replied to Warren on March 5, saying that in his mind there was no doubt that Mooney was transmitting messages of a confidential character to the Nazi government. He added, "Mooney is fundamentally fascist in his sympathies. Of course he is quite unbalanced ... he is obsessed by this strange notion that a few businessmen, including himself, can take care of the war and the peace. I am absolutely sure that Mooney is keeping up this contact with the Germans because he believes, or at least still hopes, that they will win the war, and he thinks if they do that he will be our Quisling."

Messersmith sent a further letter to Warren on March 7, adding, "The attitude of Jim Mooney has a great deal to do with the attitude of some of the people of the GM Overseas Corp. who are making this difficulty about getting rid of Barletta and other anti-American representatives of GM." Barletta was GM's Cuban representative.

Questioned about these activities by Hoover's men, Mooney insisted he was a patriotic American, a lieutenant commander in the Reserves in the United States Navy, with a son on active duty with the Navy. Asked by the FBI's L.L. Tyler in mid-October 1940 if he would return the Hitler medal he said he would, "but it might jeopardize General Motors getting part of the $100,000,000 of stockholders' money invested in Nazi Germany." Clearly, along with other Fraternity members, Mooney was working for a quick negotiated peace to release those funds; but even in this time of European war, they were gathering interest toward the time when the war would be over, and America would stand next to Hitler in the scheme of things. He added, "Besides, Hitler is in the right and I'm not going to do anything to make him mad. I know Hitler has all the cards." He said he was sure Hitler would win the war; that there was justice in Hitler's general position; that Germany needed more room; and that if we tried to prevent the expansion of the German people under Hitler, it would be "just too bad for us."

Soon after making these remarks, Mooney was promoted to assistant to Sloan in charge of defense liaison work in Detroit! In a special report to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI agent Tyler stated (July 23, 1941): "Men of Mr. Mooney's prominence, holding the views he holds, are potentially dangerous to national security."

Tyler was convinced, he went on, that Mooney "was threatening to the National Defense Program" that Mooney purportedly was aiding. Tyler also felt that Graeme K. Howard was a danger. He had been given a secret report from the State Department, which made clear that Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, had had to threaten Howard with public exposure before Howard would agree to fire nine hundred Nazi spies working for the General Motors Export Corporation in South America.

On May 1, J. Edgar Hoover reported to Adolf Berle that he had evidence that Eduard Winter was a Nazi agent, who moved freely around Europe and had been given his position by Mooney in Antwerp just after Hitler occupied the Low Countries. Adding that Winter "hopes to be on the winning side whichever is victorious in the present conflict," Hoover stated that Winter was the son-in-law of a German Foreign Office official. He had good party connections in Germany. In a comment on this note, John Riddleberger of the State Department said, "I can easily understand how Mr. Mooney's and Mr. Winter's minds would run along the same channel with respect to the war."

Further reports on Mooney state that he had aided the Germans as director and financial contributor to the German-American Board of Trade for Commerce, which greatly aided certain Nazis. The German-American Commerce Association Bulletin contained pictures of Mooney standing in front of a swastika; it named him as a GACA financial contributor.

On March 21, 1942, representatives of Du Pont were reported by the U.S. Consulate in Basle to be meeting with representatives of Hermann Goring's industries at Montreux and St. Moritz. The subject of the discussions was not disclosed, but the meeting caused grave concern in Switzerland. It was alleged in reports after the war that substantial Du Pont funds were retained from 1942 on in Occupied France, gathering interest for Du Pont/General Motors.

On April 15, 1942, a curious item appeared in Gestapo reports in Berlin. Eduard Winter, it seemed, had been arrested on suspicion of American espionage. He was now running the General Motors Adam- Opel unit in Nazi Germany and had fallen foul of Wilhelm Ohnesorge, the postminister who had similarly denounced Westrick. As in the ITT matter, Himmler stepped in and Winter was released. It was clear that, like Ford, General Motors was protected from seizure in time of war. Winter continued as usual.

On July 3, 1942, the U.S. Embassy in Panama sent a lengthy report to the Secretary of State, giving particulars of Nazi activities in the area. A paragraph read: "General Motors gives orders for molds to the Nazi firm, Erca, or via, the firm Alpa, San Martin. Both firms should be on the blacklist because they employ Nazis and work together with Nazi firms." The companies were not blacklisted.

On November 25, the Nazi alien property custodian appointed Carl Luer, an official of the government and the Dresdnerbank as manager of the General Motors Adam-Opel establishment at Russelsheim. This establishment manufactured military aircraft for the German government throughout World War II. It manufactured 50 percent of all Junkers Ju 88 propulsion systems; the Junkers was the deadliest bomber of the Nazi air force. It was decided by a special court at Darmstadt shortly after November 25 that the directorial board under Eduard Winter would remain unaltered.

Charles Levinson, formerly deputy director of the European office of the GO, alleged in his book Vodka-Cola,

Alfred Sloan, James D. Mooney, John T. Smith and Graeme K. Howard remained on the General Motors-Opel board ... in flagrant violation of existing legislation, information, contacts, transfers and trade continued [throughout the war] to flow between the firm's Detroit headquarters and its subsidiaries both in Allied countries and in territories controlled by the Axis powers. The financial records of Opel Russelsheim revealed that between 1942 and 1945 production and sales strategy were planned in close coordination with General Motors factories throughout the world. ... In 1943, while its American manufacturers were equipping the United States Air Force, the German group were developing, manufacturing and assembling motors for the Messerschmitt 262, the first jet fighter in the world. This innovation gave the Nazis a basic technological advantage. With speeds up to 540 miles per hour, this aircraft could fly 100 miles per hour faster than its American rival, the piston-powered Mustang P150.


As late as April 1943, General Motors in Stockholm was reported as trading with the enemy. Henry Morgenthau, in an instruction given in special code, instructed W. B. Wachtler, regional manager of GM in New York, to order his Stockholm chief to discontinue trading.

Further documents show that, as with Ford, repairs on German army trucks and conversion from gasoline to wood-gasoline production were being handled by GM in Switzerland.

In April 1944 various letters between the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm and the State Department indicate that GM in Sweden was importing products of Nazi origin, including Freon, with permission from State. One letter, dated April 11, 1944, from John G. Winant said, "We are ... of the opinion that local manufacture of a suitable refrigerant in Sweden should be encouraged, but if it proves impossible for Svenska Nordiska to obtain a suitable local product, we agree that there would be no objection to the supply of [German] refrigerant [similar to that from] I.G. Farben." The refrigerant was imported.

On April 3, 1943, State Department officials reported to Leland Harrison of the American Legation in Berne that censorship had intercepted cabled reports from Swiss General Motors to the parent company in New York showing that Balkan sales were made from stock held by General Motors dealers in Axis areas. The report continued, "It is understood that the parent company recently instructed the Swiss company to cease reporting on sales in enemy territory."

A GM overseas operations man in New York cabled Swiss GM that "We have been placed in an extremely embarrassing position by your action." However, there was no indication that the action ceased. Only that it must be authorized by the American Legation! "It is our desire," the cable continued, "that you keep the Legation completely informed of your operations and engage in no transaction to which trading with the enemy regulations of the U.S. government apply without clearing with the Legation." *** A copy of this telegram was forwarded by State officials to Cordell Hull with the understandable proviso: "This cable has been sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone."

In June 1943, when he was in the Navy, James D. Mooney's activities were still under surveillance by the FBI. He became a prime reason for a contretemps between the Duke and Duchess of Windsor and the State Department that month. Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, had written to Cordell Hull requesting that the Duchess of Windsor, who was now in Nassau with her husband, the governor of the Bahamas, should be freed from the censorship of her correspondence. This request immediately heightened grave suspicions in Adolf A. Berle. He sent a memorandum to Cordell Hull urging him to deny the request. Dated June 18, 1943, it read:

I believe that the Duchess of Windsor should emphatically be denied exemption from censorship.

Quite aside from the more shadowy reports about the activities of this family, it is to be recalled that both the Duke and Duchess of Windsor were in contact with Mr. James Mooney, of General Motors, who attempted to act as mediator of a negotiated peace in the early winter of 1940; that they have maintained correspondence with Charles Bedaux, now in prison in North Africa and under charges of trading with the enemy, and possibly of treasonable correspondence with the enemy; that they have been in constant contact with Axel Wenner-Gren, presently on our Blacklist for suspicious activity; etc. The Duke of Windsor has been finding many excuses to attend to "private business" in the United States, which he is doing at present.

There are positive reasons, therefore, why this immunity should not be granted -- as well as the negative reason that we are not according this privilege to the wife of an American official.


Hull called Halifax and told him the Duchess's request was denied.

General Motors went unpunished after the war. According to Charles Levinson, in 1967, after a prolonged series of detailed requests, the United States awarded the corporation a total of $33 million tax exemption on profits for the "troubles and destruction occasioned to its airplane and motorized vehicle factories in Germany and Austria in World War II."
_______________

Notes:

*FB1 report, December 18, 1941.
** Pierre Pucheu, Vichy Minister of the Interior, who helped to leak the secret of Eisenhower's
North African invasion plan to the Nazis and was executed by the Free French for treason in
1944.
*** Author's italics.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:06 am

Chapter 10: The Systems Tycoon

In 1938, Nazi diplomat Fritz Wiedemann appointed the American millionaire industrial systems inventor, Charles Bedaux, as head of I.G. commercial operations on behalf of The Fraternity in Europe. Bedaux had supplied industrial systems of time and motion study to I.G., ITT, Standard Oil, General Motors, Ford, Sterling Products, and the other Fraternity members. He had introduced brutal methods of production that brought about frequent strikes in the 1930s. He was working in Paris with Torkild Rieber's Texas Corporation Nazi contact Nikolaus Bensmann.

It was Bedaux who delegated himself to inveigle the Duke and Duchess of Windsor into the Fraternity's plans for a negotiated peace. Since Hitler's rise, the Windsors had been fascinated by the Fuhrer and his New Order in Europe.

In February 1941 the right-wing journalist Fulton Oursler interviewed Windsor at Government House in the Bahamas, publishing the results in Liberty magazine. The Duke declared his approval of negotiated peace to Oursler. He said, "It [the peace] cannot be another Versailles." He went on to express views that were hardcore expressions of Fraternity thinking, with their emphasis on gold as currency, Himmler's police, and the German system: "Whatever happens, whatever the outcome, a New Order is going to come into the world. ... It will be buttressed with police power. ... When peace comes this time, there is going to be a New Order of Social Justice * -- don't make any mistake about that -- and when that time comes, what is your country going to do with its gold?"

During his brief period as monarch, Windsor made every effort to overcome British prejudice against the Nazis. He became an inspiration for The Link, the British organization of highly placed Nazi sympathizers, which included in its membership some of the most prominent aristocrats in England.

The Fraternity wanted the Duke tied in more completely with them. Charles Bedaux was selected by Himmler to insure the Duke's political and economic commitment.

Sprightly, stocky and squat, with slicked-back black hair, jug ears, and the bow legs of a jockey, Bedaux first came to the United States in 1907 from his native France and became a citizen in 1916. He had served a stretch in the Foreign Legion before he arrived. He obtained a job digging his way as a sandhog through the construction of the East River subway tunnel. He scraped together what money he could and began developing a system of speeding up labor, cutting out wasted motion, and improving efficiency. In his scheme an expert would time the workers with a stopwatch. Each hour was divided into sixty Bedaux units instead of minutes. Workers who exceeded the average would be paid more and those who fell below it would be demoted or fired. By circulating booklets containing his philosophy of labor, he succeeded in becoming very rich very fast.

Bedaux's office on the fifty-third floor of the Chrysler Building in New York was designed like the refectory of a medieval monastery. He often met with his friends Lammot du Pont, and Walter Teagle, and Hermann Schmitz there -- in the Chrysler's Cloud Room for lunch. He had an apartment in Greenwich Village in which he entertained his mistresses, redecorating the rooms according to the lady's background or nationality.

He married a Daughter of the American Revolution, Fern Lombard, and thereby obtained a place in the New York Social Register. He bought a chateau in Touraine, France, for three quarters of a million dollars. It was a former abbey, with catacombs under the golf course. He snapped up an estate in North Carolina, a hunting lodge in Scotland next to Walter Teagle's, and property in North Africa. An automobile buff, he crossed the Rockies by car in July 1934, and took a caravan of six cars over 9,500 miles of the Algerian and Tunisian deserts the following year.

He insinuated himself with the Windsors, offering his chateau to them for their wedding. Bedaux's wedding present was a statue entitled "Love," the work of Anny Hoefken-Rempel, the lover of Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht had introduced Bedaux to Fritz Wiedemann, who appointed Bedaux industrial espionage agent for the Nazi government.

As the German government's chief overseas contact for The Fraternity next to Wiedemann, Bedaux was ideally placed to snare the Windsors. He was helped by the Windsors' friend Ambassador William Bullitt, who moved the U.S. Embassy into the Bedaux chateau just before the fall of France.

Bedaux wanted to involve the Windsors in his international schemes. First, arrangements must be made for them to meet with Hitler and be given a tour of Nazi Germany. In the summer of 1937, according to MI-6 files in the Ministry of Defence, London, Bedaux met with the Duke of Windsor, Bedaux's close friend Errol Flynn, Rudolf Hess, and Martin Bormann in a secret encounter at the Hotel Meurice in Paris. At the meeting the Duke promised to help Hess contact the Duke of Hamilton, who had a direct link with Himmler and Kurt von Schroder to the Schroder Bank and the Worms Bank through their common membership in Frank Buchman's Moral Rearmament Movement. Hess was determined to insure an alliance with Great Britain that would continue despite Hitler's conquest. Bedaux was the instrument and Errol Flynn the glamorous accomplice. The plan was postponed; efforts were made by Hess to meet with Hamilton on several further occasions, which finally led to Hess's dramatic landing on the Hamilton estate in 1941.

The Windsors were enchanted with their visit with Hitter and their tour of Germany, and the Duchess was seen handing a bagful of money to a Nazi officer on the border of Austria.

In November 1937, Bedaux tried to arrange a state visit for the Windsors to the United States. He bombarded Washington high-ranking officials with telegrams. He wanted the Duke of Windsor to be received at the White House along with the Duchess; State Department officials planned that the Duke and the President should enjoy a Gridiron Club dinner while the Duchess appeared separately at the Women's National Press Club. Thousands of letters poured into the White House and the government departments, criticizing Roosevelt for snubbing the couple.

Bedaux and his wife arrived on the Europa in November to see what they could do. He had already talked with British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay about the matter. The biggest blow was that Mrs. Roosevelt was "away on a lecture tour" and would be unable to receive the Windsors. Finally, it was decided by the government not to go ahead with the visit; the reasons were not officially disclosed, but Bedaux's fascist connections may have had a great deal to do with it. Appeal after appeal proved useless. Unions made clear they would picket the Duke's ship. Francis J. Gorman of the CIO Textile Workers condemned Bedaux outright for his inhuman systems. Bedaux and the Windsors were very upset.

By 1940, while Bedaux was busy undermining France in preparation for Vichy and the establishment of full- scale collaboration with Hitler, Windsor had become a member of the British Military Mission with the French Army Command. Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill were aware that Windsor's Nazi connections were far more serious than a mere confused sympathy would indicate.

On May 3, 1941, J. Edgar Hoover sent a memorandum to Roosevelt's secretary, Major General Watson, which read as follows:

Information has been received at this Bureau from a source that is socially prominent and known to be in touch with some of the people involved, but for whom we cannot vouch, to the effect that Joseph P. Kennedy, the former Ambassador to England, and Ben Smith, the Wall Street operator, sometime in the past had a meeting with Goring in Vichy, France, and that thereafter Kennedy and Smith had donated a considerable amount of money to the German cause. They are both described as being very anti-British and pro-German.

This same source of information advised that it was reported that the Duke of Windsor entered into an agreement which in substance was to the effect that if Germany was victorious in the war, Hermann Goring through his control of the army would overthrow Hitler and would thereafter install the Duke of Windsor as the King of England. This information concerning the Windsors is said to have originated with Allen McIntosh, a personal friend of the Duke of Windsor, who made the arrangements for the entertainment of the Windsors when they were in Miami recently. It is further reported that it is the intention of the Windsors to visit in Newport, Rhode Island, and also in Canada during the coming summer.


When Windsor asked Chamberlain for a more important job, the Duke was frozen out. Mortified, he committed himself to the appeasement group in England which remained part of The Link and still included Montagu Norman of the Bank of England and the BIS, and Sir Harry McGowan of ICI.** In January 1940, Count Julius von Zech-Burkersroda, Nazi minister to The Hague, sent a special emissary to London to ask Windsor to tell the British government that it was useless to change Germany politically and that Windsor should help bring about a negotiated peace. Windsor was fascinated.

On February 18, according to German foreign office records, Windsor actually disclosed to Zech's emissary the details of a secret meeting of the Allied War Council. Windsor revealed that the Council had discussed in detail the situation that would arise if Germany invaded Belgium. The Council members had discussed the discovery of a German invasion plan found in an airplane that had made a forced landing in Belgium. The Council had decided that the best scheme was to set up a resistance effort behind the Belgian-French border. Some members of the Council were unwilling to surrender Belgium and the Netherlands after the humiliation of the defeat of Poland. They did not feel that a resistance plan was sufficient, and they urged the other members to defend Belgium to the last. The entire message was of such importance to the German government that it was shown to Hitler in person. Baron Ernst von Weizsacker of the Foreign Office in Berlin wrote to Count Julius on March 2, 1940, that the report supplied by the Duke had been of interest to the Fuhrer. He added, "If you can without inconvenience obtain further information of this nature, I should be grateful if you would pass it on to me; please do so preferably in the form of a report ... directing it to me personally."

Had these letters slipped into the hands of British Intelligence, there is no question that the Duke of Windsor would have been arrested and subjected to a court-martial by Churchill. As it was, he proceeded to France at the time of the German take-over, with British Intelligence agents following him. By now it was much too dangerous for him to be seen with Charles Bedaux, who was busy setting up the Vichy take-over and having daily meetings at the Worms Bank. The Windsors proceeded into Spain via Port Bou, that favorite crossing place of people under suspicion.

After a desperate effort by Walter Schellenberg to have them returned to Germany prior to their taking over the British throne, the couple yielded to pressure from Churchill via their old friend Sir Walter Monckton and sailed to the Bahamas, where Windsor was made governor.

In their absence Winston Churchill personally made the curious move on April 7, 1941, of having U.S. Ambassador William Bullitt pay the Nazi government 55 thousand francs' annual rental on their property in Occupied Paris and 10 thousand francs' insurance plus payment to their servants and 15 thousand francs for the rent of the strong room at the Bank of France, despite the fact that the bank was directly under Hitler's control. Bedaux acted as a go-between in the arrangements since he was close to Bullitt and Nazi Ambassador Otto Abetz.

The Windsors stayed in touch with Bedaux until 1943, a fact that infuriated Morgenthau, Ickes, and Adolf Berle as well as the liberals in Congress headed by John M. Coffee and Jerry Voorhis. Bedaux schemed with Admiral Jean Darlan in North Africa in planning to destroy the British Empire; he helped to pledge Syria as a Nazi supply base for a prospective battle of Suez; and he collaborated with the Nazis in Spain, working with the Vichy leader Marshal Petain in securing 300,000 tons of steel for Germany. Ambassador Bullitt rewarded him by making him a special attache at a time when Bullitt was already publicly criticizing the Nazi government. Bedaux was put in charge of American property in Occupied France as a special economic advisor to Abetz and German Administrator H-J Caesar. Thus, he enabled The Fraternity to function more easily and was instrumental in approving the establishment of the Chase and Morgan banks and the Ford Motor Company in Occupied France even after Pearl Harbor.

In October 1940 he went to Africa at Petain's request to undertake developments including railroads, power plants, water and coal production, in alliance with the Vichy General Maxime Weygand, then governor general of Africa. Bedaux presented to the German government his plans for camouflaging refineries at Abadan against Allied bombing; in return for his services he arranged for the transference of his confiscated Dutch corporation to Paris just before Pearl Harbor.

After Pearl Harbor, Bedaux was automatically arrested as an American citizen, but he was released after a month through the intercession of Abetz and the Gestapo. Because of pressure from those Germans who, like Postminister Ohnesorge, objected to dealings with the enemy, Bedaux was arrested again, on September 27, 1942. The elegant American traitor was surprised to find himself, along with his attractive wife, in the Paris Zoo, where he languished for one night in a cage normally used by monkeys.

Bedaux and his wife were released from imprisonment on the basis that he persuaded General Otto von Stulpnagel, who was in command of the German forces in Occupied France, of the necessity for France to build a strong French Africa. He was given full governmental powers to execute his plan for the construction of a pipeline from Colomb-Bechar in southern Algeria to Bourem on the Niger River in the French Sudan in French West Africa. The purpose was two-fold: The pipeline would carry 200,000 tons of water annually to different points in the Sahara for use by Rommel's army, and it would convey 200,000 tons of peanut oil from French West Africa to Colomb-Bechar for shipping by rail for reshipment by boat to Vichy. Fifty-five thousand tons of steel had been assigned by the German authorities for the construction of the pipeline, and the financing was undertaken by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.

Bedaux was authorized to hire 240 people initially, many of them from the crews engaged in the construction of the ill-fated Trans-Saharan Railway. The whole culture of peanuts in French West Africa was to be reorganized and the center of industry transferred from Dakar to Ouagadougou; and the vast and fertile area in the bend of the Niger River including parts of the Ivory Coast, French Sudan, and the Niger Colony, were to be exploited on a vast scale. Rafts constructed in French Guinea would carry hundreds of thousands of tons of peanuts a year from western Sudan via the Niger to Bourem, where presses would be erected for the extraction of the oil.

On July 22, 1942, Bedaux went to see S. Pinkney Tuck, charge d'affaires for the United States government in Vichy. He had just had lunch with Pierre Laval. He left with the embassy a photostatic copy of the release order of the German authorities in Paris, designating him the leading expert in economic matters in France. He said he had just returned from a survey of the coal mines in the Sahara Desert, which he expected to yield 1,200 tons of coal a day; he said that the present output was 800 tons a day and that he was responsible for all the cities in North Africa having electric power. He said he was concerned with building a New Europe that would end the misery of the world; when Tuck asked him about the German attitude toward the war's future, he supplied intelligence on German problems. He said he had assisted as a technical advisor at a number of gatherings in which French and German technicians gathered. He talked of the strides the Gestapo was making in France, Major General Karl Oberg's treatment of the Jews, and execution of hostages. He suggested that the United States should trade more with Laval, pretending that Laval was unhappy with the German government. He said to Tuck, "If the American press and public opinion could be persuaded to modify their present critical attitude towards Laval, it might be possible for our Government to make good use of him."

Tuck concluded,

I believe that this astonishing person can be classified as mentally unmoral. He apparently lacks the tradition and background which should make him realize that there is anything wrong, as an American citizen, in his open association with our declared enemies. ... By such opportunistic tactics -- which are not unmindful of Laval's -- he may be attempting to find for himself a safe place in the New Order. Should this New Order fail to materialize, he evidently imagines that he will be able to justify his association with the Germans by his refusal to accept their pay.


This curious document indicates a very peculiar attitude on the part of Pinkney Tuck. Knowing full well that Bedaux was American and that he was collaborating with the enemy, Tuck nevertheless made no attempt whatsoever as charge d 'affaires to have him arrested.

On October 29, 1942, Charles Bedaux arrived at the American Consulate General in Algiers and told Minister Robert Murphy that he was bent on his mission to aid the German government. This was almost a year after the United States was at war with Germany. It might well be asked whether a traitor would volunteer such information to an American representative if he were not assured of immunity from arrest.

In a memorandum to Cordell Hull dated October 30, 1942, Murphy gave a remarkable account of the visit. Bedaux said that he had been granted freedom to perform his mission in French Africa and "it was in that connection that he called upon me in Algiers." Unhesitatingly, Bedaux handed Murphy his German authorizations and a special set of instructions signed by Pierre Laval.

On April 12, 1943, Hoover wrote to Harry Hopkins telling him of Bedaux's arrest. Hoover revealed that Eisenhower had specifically asked the two FBI men to go to North Africa to conduct the investigation into Bedaux's activities. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no authorization to handle North Africa, since its provenance was restricted to the American continent, Biddle conferred with Hoover, and as a result two prominent FBI agents were sent to Algiers by plane to interrogate Bedaux. The plane carrying them crashed. Two other agents were flown over in their place.

Acting on instructions from Hoover and Biddle, the agents, again acting entirely outside their legal and authorized provenance, showed themselves anxious to protect Bedaux from Army Intelligence. It was painfully obvious that strings had been pulled with Biddle once again. The agents went to see the officers of the French police, who produced the critical evidence of the Bedaux-Schroder Nazi conspiracy. Instead of accepting this material as evidence of treason, the FBI men accused the French detectives of planting the evidence, and they tried to have the charges against Bedaux officially withdrawn. Yet that same evidence can today be seen in U.S. Military Intelligence files.

The U.S. Army under Eisenhower was keen on having action taken, but an Executive Order of the Army Intelligence dated January 4, 1943, shows that pressure from high places was such on the Army that all plans for a tribunal were suspended. The excuse given was that the case against Bedaux "had to be watertight," while in fact it was already conclusive.

Bedaux was held for a full year in prison while nothing whatsoever was done about him. He continually protested that he had aided and abetted American businesses in Occupied Europe, a mistake since this was the last fact that anybody in high command wanted to have made public. At long last, on December 16, 1943, Bedaux was turned over to Lieutenant Colonel Herndon for military escort to the United States, arriving on December 23 at Miami, Florida. The same day, Lieutenant Colonel Crabtree of the Army Air Force suddenly released Bedaux from Herndon's custody, gave Bedaux twenty-seven hundred confiscated dollars and took all of the Bedaux papers to Washington. Army officials ordered the Customs officials (who were not normally under their provenance) to pass papers without examination by censors or Customs, then took Bedaux to the Colonial Hotel in Miami. From there, instead of going to a state prison, he was placed in a comfortable detention home in charge of Immigration, with special consideration from the authorities.

On December 28, one of Biddle's agents suddenly turned up at the Immigration station and asked the authorities to lighten what minimal restrictions Bedaux was experiencing. On December 29, Biddle ordered the War Department to withdraw completely from the case.

The cover-up continued. Bedaux gave FBI men a list of very prominent figures of commerce who could be expected to testify in his behalf in the event that he should ever come to trial. Biddle immediately suppressed the list. However, it fell into the hands of the liberal weekly, The Nation, which revealed the names on the list as those of "industrialists who had recently been involved in anti-Trust cases"! That meant, of course, the American figures of The Fraternity.

On February 14, 1944, Bedaux was advised by an Immigration agent that a board of special inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service had "concluded that he was a citizen of the United States" and had never surrendered that citizenship. Further, the INS would order his admission into the United States as soon as certain minor formalities had been complied with. The INS man also told Bedaux that "a grand jury would be convened to inquire into his relations with high officials of the German government and the Vichy French government, and that the grand jury would consider whether he should be indicted for treason and for communicating with the enemy."

Major Lemuel Schofield had only recently stepped down as head of Immigration and members of his immediate staff were still in office, so it was unlikely that anything would have come of the grand jury hearing. However, Bedaux had become distinctly inconvenient to The Fraternity. There was a strict rule in the Immigration station that sleeping pills must not be given to prisoners, but Bedaux was allowed the special privilege of using them. On February 14, 1944, Bedaux retired to bed and swallowed all of the pills he had hoarded since his arrival on December 23. Max Lerner and I. F. Stone disclosed in PM and in The Nation that they were convinced that Bedaux was encouraged to take the easy way out. It is impossible to differ with that opinion.

_______________

Notes:

*Social Justice was the title of an inflammatory fascist magazine then in circulation in the United States.
** Later, Lord McGowan.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:10 am

Chapter 11: The Diplomat, the Major, the Princess, and the Knight

Throughout World War II, Max Ilgner of I.G. Farben ran the organization known as the AO. Financed by I.G. Farben, the organization of Germans Abroad was not officially but in fact actually under Walter Schellenberg's direct control. * The leading agents for the AO in he hemisphere were Hitler's former commanding officer Fritz Wiedemann and Hitler's beloved treacherous Princess Stefanie Hohenlohe. With I.G. money and direct approval from Himmler, Wiedemann and Stefanie were the most peripatetic members of the American-Nazi international fellowship. They schemed along with Schellenberg for the downfall of Hitler and the advent of Himmler and the Schmitz Council of Twelve. They, like Himmler, dreamed of the restoration of the German monarchy. They visited the Kaiser in Doom, Holland, until 1941, the year of his death.

Wiedemann and Stefanie entered the United States telling the FBI privately that they had fallen out of favor with Hitler. This was true, since Hitler in fact was gravely suspicious of both of them because of their connections to both the official plot to dislodge him and to the ambiguous Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, German Military Intelligence, who himself was suspected of being a double agent. As consul general in San Francisco, Wiedemann was head of the Orient Gruppe, the SD network that encompassed the whole Pacific basin including the North and South American coastal states, Thailand, Malaya, Hong Kong, mainland China, Formosa, and Japan while at the same time collaborating with the British and Americans. The Princess Hohenlohe, a widow, was his mistress, with unlimited connections in society.

The princess was half Jewish. She had been given the title of Honorary Aryan by Dr. Goebbels along with General Erhard Milch of the air force in return for her services to the Third Reich. She and Wiedemann had become romantically involved at the time of Hitler's rise to power.

Wiedemann was handsome, with black wavy hair, chiseled features, a powerful jaw, and a boxer's physique. Fluent in many languages, shrewdly intelligent, he was the toast of society on both sides of the Atlantic. The princess had been quite pretty as a young woman but had not aged well. The addition of years had filled out her figure and rendered her features far less attractive. Nevertheless, she had immense charm and vivacity; she was witty, sparkling, high-strung, and wonderful company. She was also one of the most dangerous women in Europe.

In the early 1930s, Wiedemann and Stefanie were entirely devoted to Hitler and I.G. Farben's AO. They were friendly with Lord Rothermere, British millionaire-owner of the London Daily Mail, who gave the princess a total of $5 million in cash to assist in Hitler's rise to power. She was less successful in France, which deported her in 1934 for scheming against an alliance between France and Poland that might have helped protect Europe from Nazi encroachment. She formed a close friendship with Otto Abetz, the smooth Nazi representative in Paris who later became ambassador and was so helpful in the fall of France. In 1938 the princess arranged a meeting between Wiedemann and Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, in London, the purpose of which was to determine Halifax's and Chamberlain's attitude to Hitler. The mission was successful. As the princess had promised, Halifax told Wiedemann that the British government was in sympathy with Hitler and that he had a vision that "Hitler would ride in triumph through the streets of London in the royal carriage along with King George VI."

Wiedemann and the princess were credited by Hitler with helping to pave the way to his annexation of European territories. The Fuhrer rewarded her with the gift of Leopoldskron Castle near Salzburg, former property of the great Jewish theatrical producer Max Reinhardt. Beginning in 1933, Wiedemann made several visits to the United States, chiefly to direct the rabid Nazi organization known as the Friends of New Germany. He aided Ribbentrop in negotiating an anti-Comintem pact with Japan, and in the spring of 1938 traveled to the Balkans to bring them closer into the realm of the Axis.

Stefanie also spent much time in Switzerland, where she linked up with German Intelligence nets, many of them connected to her former husband, Prince Hohenlohe, who had been head of Austro-Hungarian intelligence in that country in World War I.

During the British abdication crisis of Edward III, Lord Rothemere sent the princess from London to Berlin with a Gobelin tapestry as a Christmas present for Hitler. After Edward abdicated, Hitler cabled Ribbentrop in London, "Now that the king has been dethroned, there is certainly no other person in England who is ready to play with us. Report to me on what you've been able to do. I shan't blame you if it amounts to nothing." The princess arrived at Berchtesgaden for a tete-a-tete just after this telegram. Hitler flirted with her and touched her hair; she had always wondered if he was a homosexual and was delighted to discover that he was attracted to her. She reminded him cheerfully that there were many in Britain who would indeed "play" with the Fuhrer even if Edward would no longer be able to do so in his new position as Duke of Windsor. She was soon to learn that the Duke of Windsor was still able to "play."

In the late 1930s, Princess Stefanie traveled continuously to London, Paris, Berlin, Salzburg, Madrid, and Rome. She was usually on Rothermere's payroll, and accepted a swastika-shaped diamond clip from Hitler and a photograph on which Hitler wrote "To my esteemed Princess." She and Wiedemann visited the United States in 1937, where they linked up to Fraternity friends such as Sosthenes Behn, Walter Teagle, and Edsel Ford. Their social position gave them great influence over prominent figures who could affect others in the Nazi cause. Hermann Schmitz rewarded the princess with a parcel of I.G. shares. At the Ritz Hotel in London a week after war broke out in September 1939, several lady aristocrats denounced her as a spy and insisted that she leave the restaurant at once. She proceeded calmly with her meal.

Later that year she was busy fighting an unsuccessful lawsuit in the London courts against Lord Rothermere for nonpayment of the amounts due to her in her travels on behalf of the Nazi cause. The case tied her up in London. Wiedemann went ahead to New York with the understanding that she would follow soon afterward. Now that Europe was plunged into conflict, their purpose was to help keep America out of the war and to unite German-Americans in business to the Fatherland. Wiedemann set up the German-American Business League, which had as its rules purchase from Germans only, a boycott of Jewish firms, and the insistence that all employees be Aryans. Financed by Max Ilgner through General Aniline and Film, Wiedemann developed the Business League while pretending to denounce the Associated Bunds organization. Among the members were the owners of 1,036 small firms, including numerous import-export companies, fuel services, dry goods stores, meat markets, and adult and children's dress shops. The League stirred up anti-Jewish feeling, financed secret Nazi military training camps, paid for radio time for Nazi plays, and publicized German goods. It ran lotteries without licenses and sold blue candles to aid its brethren in Poland and Czechoslovakia before those countries were annexed.

On September 10, just after war broke out in Europe, Wiedemann told the German-American Business League in San Francisco: "You are citizens of the United States, which has allied itself with an enemy of the German nation. The time will come when you may have to decide which side to take. I would caution that I cannot advise you what to do but you should be governed by your conscience. One duty lies with the Mother country, the other with the adopted country. Blood is thicker than ink ... Germany is the land of the fathers and regardless of consequences, you should not disregard the traditional heritage which is yours."

The Princess Stefanie's arrival in California in 1940 was not as trivial or absurd in purpose as it seemed, accompanied as it was by a great deal of publicity including seemingly endless column mentions. Given her glamour and notorious reputation, she was asked to many social events in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The idea of a Nazi rincess electrified society, even those members of it who delighted in stating their fondness for England. She was quizzed, gushed over, and interviewed incessantly. Meanwhile, she talked with the wives of business leaders, to try to influence their husbands toward the Nazi cause. She warned of the dangers of communism, and the possibility that Hitler might attack America if America were not friendly. She mentioned the wealth and prosperity of Germany.

She was a perfect agent for Nazi philosophy. She helped bring about many deals between businessmen and the I.G. Farben cartels. She continued her romantic liaison with Wiedemann. FBI agent Frank Angell and a special team tracked the two down to the Sequoia National Forest where Wiedemann and the princess spent the night together in a log cabin while the G-men lurked among the trees.

J. Edgar Hoover became so obsessed with the princess and her doings that he had squads of men following the wrong woman: the Princess Mabel Hohenlohe, an innocent American who had married into the family. Mabel and her friend, the socialite Gurnee Munn, were dogged futilely for months when they had in fact done nothing more serious than acquire a Palm Beach parking ticket.

At the beginning of 1940 the Princess Stefanie met Sir William Wiseman, baronet and Cambridge boxing Blue. Plump, with a bristling mustache and dignified air, he had been head of British Intelligence in World War I. He had become a partner in the Jewish banking company Kuhn, Loeb. Treasury documents assert that the company was aligned with the dominant group of companies in Latin America that had entered into agreement with Nazi trusts to divide up the Latin American communications business.

According to A Man Called Intrepid, the well-known biography of Sir William Stephenson, head of British Security Coordination in the United States, Wiseman was a member of Stevenson's staff in World War II and was delegated to spy on Wiedemann and Hohenlohe with the authorization of J. Edgar Hoover and the British government.

The FBI files contradict this assertion. Indeed, they show that Wiseman was under suspicion and investigation. Army Intelligence chiefs' memoranda show that Wiseman was unauthorized by the British or American governments to act in any negotiations whatsoever. Indeed, his activities were neither condoned nor supported by any government.

In a note dated December 14, 1940, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, wrote to J. Edgar Hoover: "I suppose it is possible [Wiseman] is another of the same group of Englishmen that has negotiated with the Nazis in the past through men like Axel Wenner-Gren, Torkild Rieber and James D. Mooney."

According to A Man Called Intrepid, a most inaccurate work, Wiseman was authorized by the FBI to hold a private meeting on November 26, 1940, at the Mark Hopkins Hotel in San Francisco with Wiedemann and Hohenlohe to discuss a negotiated peace with Hitler. The FBI records and Hoover's notes to Roosevelt on the matter show that the FBI's San Francisco representative N.J.L. Pieper simply got wind of the meeting and, highly suspicious of Wiseman, decided independently to monitor it.

The meeting represented the essence of Fraternity thinking. Wiseman, as the FBI reported later, made it clear that he was acting as the mediator, not for the government of Great Britain, as he later claimed, but for the appeasement group in London headed by Lord Halifax, who was soon to become ambassador to Washington. Winston Churchill had clearly defined in speech after speech, memorandum after memorandum, his position on the war: total surrender of Germany without compromise. Wiseman made clear at the meeting that Halifax and he thought differently.

The princess said she would, as a Hungarian subject, bring Hitler the peace offer from Halifax, obtaining a fake visa in Switzerland in order to enter Germany. She would intercede directly with the Fuhrer, using his affection for her, and if that failed, she would assist in the ill-conceived Royalist/Schellenberg/I.G. Farben coup d'etat in which Himmler would take over and permanently restore the monarchy. A representative of Himmler's Gestapo would then meet with Halifax in London to confirm the arrangements for an alliance with Great Britain. Wiseman irresponsibly said that now that France was out of the way, the British could offer more favorable peace terms to Germany: "The French are always the difficult ones to satisfy, and we've had to consider France in the past. France will not have to be considered now except from the standpoint that she will be reestablished like Poland."

Wiseman supplied Wiedemann at this meeting with intelligence about the way in which the Royal Navy had intercepted Hitler's plans for the invasion of England. Simultaneously, Wiedemann gave Wiseman intelligence on the workings of the German High Command. Wiseman said, "If I were advising Hitler as a friend, I would say he amount of damage you could do to America is nothing compared to the damage that can be done if you make the Americans mad. They get mad slowly but it takes them a long time to get unmad. They get hysterical and look for a spy under every sofa, and from that point of view it just takes America more into the war. From my point of view, I do not want them to do it, because I do not want to see more killing. ... I would say that I do not want a lot of sabotage in America because it just makes the feeling so much more bitter and things so much more difficult." These words are almost identical to those found in Wiedemann's and Charge d'Affaires Hans Thomsen's memoranda to Berlin.

Hoover kept a tight scrutiny on the three communicants from that moment on. On December 18, 1940, the FBI tapped the princess's telephone. She was calling Wiseman in New York City from California to beg him to assist her in extending her visa and avoiding deportation. Wiseman, clearly embarrassed, told her, "Please don't talk any more about it over the phone. ... Don't say any more." The princess told him, "You know I will be eternally indebted to you. You know you will never have to regret this." Wiseman went on, "I will send you a telegram telling you when to call me and will do all I can for you."

She kept on calling Wiseman, begging him to do everything in his power to stop the newspapers from printing anything concerning her deportation. He contacted Ingram Fraser of the British Purchasing Commission, trying to pull strings in Whitehall.

On January 3, 1941, Wiseman had a meeting with Herbert Bayard Swope, a wealthy politician, who conveyed a message from Lord Beaverbrook that Wiseman was to meet Lord Halifax soon thereafter "to negotiate peace." Wiseman had a series of discussions with high-level diplomats including figures of the Australian Embassy. A useful contact in the State Department was none other than Cordell Hull's cousin, Lytle Hull. Indeed, when World War II ended, Wiedemann asserted that Lytle Hull supplied him with inside intelligence on the State Department.

Another conspirator was the United States director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Major Lemuel Schofield, an enormously fat man with a head like a football and large, ugly features. When there was a public outcry for the princess to leave the United States in 1940, Schofield announced that no nation would take her, thereby preventing her deportation. He became more and more deeply involved in a romance with her when Wiedemann jilted her in favor of a general's divorced wife, Alice Crockett.

Wiedemann sent Mrs. Crockett to Berlin to meet with Hitler and Himmler and determine if the German government was satisfied with his efforts. This ordinary San Francisco housewife found herself in a whirlwind of high-level meetings. She was astonished to discover that Himmler gave her a special reception. But when she returned, she turned on Wiedemann and reported him and his secret activities to the FBI. She also sued him for several thousand dollars for unpaid fees in connection with her journey to Germany. She charged that Wiedemann was in concert with I.G. Farben, General Aniline and Film, Henry Ford, and Charles Lindbergh to bring about "subversion and sabotage in the interests of the Nazi government. " She said that many American government officials, as well as plant superintendents, workers, and foremen in industries, particularly the steel and munitions industries, were in Wiedemann's pay. She claimed he "employed ruffians to stir racial hate ... and paid such ruffians from funds of the German government." Despite the fact that Mrs. Crockett was telling the truth, and that her husband had been a prominent figure in the U.S. Army, her case was thrown out of court and she was not even granted public recognition for her efforts.

Meanwhile, Sir William Wiseman was still working hard to prevent the Princess Stefanie from being shunted off to Nazi Germany, where she might reveal too much. His guilty collusion with her is as clear as Major Schofield's in the numerous documents that have recently been declassified.

Wiseman, in a conversation one midnight with a British person whom the FBI could not identify, said that he had "done everything possible to keep the threatened deportation quiet" but he was "drastically concerned with Steffi's habit of blowing her cover."

He said in a conversation with Ingram Fraser of the British Purchasing Commission that he was concerned "to keep that hysterical creature from going off the deep end ... from losing her head and spilling all the beans on the table." Fraser said, "This may spoil a very beautiful friendship." Wiseman said, "If the friendship spoils, we'll just have to go out and pick up another one." He added, "This gives an opportunity for a scandal on a really big scale. That's what I'm afraid of. "

FBI men followed Wiseman everywhere by car, train, and plane. There was a flurry of meetings between Wiseman and Ingram Fraser. Wiseman and the Hohenlohes strongly welcomed the appointment of Lord Halifax as ambassador for Great Britain in the United States.

Lord Beaverbrook in London cabled that he wanted Wiseman to contact Lord Halifax "as soon as Halifax arrived." There were a series of mysterious meetings between Wiseman, former President Herbert Hoover, Herbert Bayard Swope, and others, apparently on the matter of the negotiated peace.

On May 20, 1941, Schofield came through. He dropped the deportation proceedings and gave an interview to newspapermen at San Francisco Immigration headquarters explaining why: "While in custody the Princess Stefanie has cooperated with the Department of Justice and has furnished information of interest. The Department believes her release from custody will not be adverse to the interests and welfare of this country. Arrangements have been made for her continued cooperation, and her whereabouts and activities will be known at all times."

The major personally conducted the princess to her luxurious apartment in Palo Alto. Dressed in a chic black crepe dress with frothy white collar, white gloves, and a black and white hat, the Nazi princess was in a good mood on May 25, 1941, as she drove around San Francisco with the Director of Immigration at the wheel. Asked by reporters wherever he went if he would explain the "interesting information" Hohenlohe had given him, the major said with a smile, "Obviously not."

Although Walter Winchell, President Roosevelt, and seemingly everybody in Washington knew that the head of Immigration and the Nazi's favorite agent were involved in an affair, her release passed without significant public protest of any kind. The strongest statement appeared in the New York Sun. It was: "If 130 million people cannot exclude one person with no legal right to remain here, something seems wrong."

Hoover tried very hard to obtain from the Attorney General the "important information" to which Schofield referred, but there was no reply to his or his assistant's many phone calls. In fact, FBI memoranda show the FBI couldn't even interview the princess. When Percy Foxworth of the New York FBI headquarters sent a memorandum on June 1 to Hoover saying, "It appears desirable to have Princess Hohenlohe interviewed in order that complete information which she can furnish may be available for consideration in connection with our national defense investigations ... regarding German espionage activities," Hoover scribbled a note at the foot of the memo, "Not until we get from McGuire [Matthew F. McGuire, assistant to Attorney General Jackson] a copy of what she told Schofield, then we should ask McGuire for clearance ** to talk to her."

Next day at a congressional committee hearing in Washington, author Jan Valtin testified that Wiedemann's consulate was a clearinghouse for the Gestapo.

By early June, McGuire had still not yet yielded up Hohenlohe's statement to Schofield. The applications went on and on. Wiedemann was still out of town by early June, filming bridges and roads and dams from Colorado to Florida.

On June 15, 1941, McGuire sent a memo to Hoover saying that the princess's statement was "in the personal possession of Lemmy Schofield and was being typed." The same day, Drew Pearson in his Washington Times-Herald column said that Hohenlohe had paid for her freedom with "some amazing revelations about subversive operations in this country and Britain." Hoover wrote on the article photocopy sent to his office, "Have we gotten this statement yet? Maybe if the Dept. won't give it to us we might get Pearson to supply us with a copy!"

Pearson's article went on to say that the princess had told Schofield that Wiedemann was in bad odor with Hitler because of his friendship with Himmler's friend Hess, who had just flown to England on his famous peace mission; that she had given Immigration officials a list of Nazi sympathizers in Britain who had been trying to effect a negotiated peace with Hitler; that she had specifically named Rothermere; that she had named other German Nazi agents.

By June 20, Hoover had become exasperated by the Department of Justice's seemingly endless delays in supplying Steffi's revelations. McGuire was stalling and refused to disclose why Drew Pearson had information the FBI did not. "This is the worst pushing around we have gotten yet," Hoover wrote at the foot of a memorandum from Edward A. Tamm of his staff on the latest delaying tactic.

Meanwhile, Hoover was tireless in ordering reports on Steffi's Nazi connections.

Agent N.J.L. Pieper in San Francisco tapped several telephones to learn that Wiedemann had had a falling-out with Steffi. An informant called Pieper to say that he was a German friend of Wiedemann's who felt he owed something to the American government. He leaked the contents of a conversation he had had with Wiedemann, who said, "There is nothing the Princess could have said that would harm me. She wouldn't. Indeed, she gave nothing to Immigration. It was a blind so that Schofield could let her out. And there's another element. Cordell Hull's cousin, Lytle Hull, was together with Schofield in this matter. He wanted her released."

This disclosure could not be acted on by Hoover, because of his limited powers.

In mid-June 1941, under enormous pressure from Roosevelt, the government dropped a bombshell. All Nazi consulates in America were ordered closed.

Wiedemann was under orders to leave the country by July 10. He had only been in the consulate for a few weeks. Several people walked by the building and were heard by reporters to say "Good riddance." Two American sailors climbed to the roof of the consulate and pulled down the swastika flag.

The night after orders came from Washington, Wiedemann's neighbors reported smoke pouring from the chimney of the consulate with flakes of ash. Papers were being stuffed into the consulate fires while others were loaded into the official Mercedes-Benzes to be put aboard German ships bound for their homeland. There were rumors that Wiedemann had offered to tell the Hearst organization everything he knew about Nazis in America in return for being allowed to remain in the United States. But this turned out to be false.

By June 26, Hoover still did not have Steffi's report. When Wiedemann and three friends went to the Stairway to the Stars nightclub in San Francisco, patrons at surrounding tables asked to be moved away. On July 3, Edward Tamm of the FBI reminded Hoover in a memo that after two months McGuire had still failed to come up with the promised report.

On July 8, Wiedemann traveled to Los Angeles to give all of his espionage reports in person to local Consul George Gyssling. Gyssling was leaving for Germany on the S.S. West Point; Wiedemann was to travel to China to continue with his work linking up the German and Japanese intelligence nets. He would also meet there Ludwig Ehrhardt, Steffi's second cousin by marriage, who was to become espionage chief for the Abwehr in the Orient two years later.

On July 9 it was announced that Wiedemann and Dr. Hans Borchers, new consul general in New York, would be leaving on the Japanese liner Yawata Maru. The British government had failed to give assurance of the safety of agents on the Japanese shipping lines, and this made Wiedemann extremely nervous.

Suddenly the British announced that Wiedemann would be exempt from seizure under his diplomatic immunity. For some reason Wiedemann didn't believe this. Possibly he thought it was a trick, because at the last minute he chartered three planes for himself and his staff and flew via Omaha and Chicago to New York.

Hoover had them followed. Meanwhile, Steffi was in Washington at the Wardman Park Hotel. It became the talk of the town that she was continuing her affair with Schofield. On July 31, Steffi's reports still not yielded up, Schofield sent to Attorney General Biddle (who had replaced Jackson) that in order to help America, she would supply a series of articles criticizing Hitler: domestic broadcasts; shortwave broadcasts to the Axis; replies to pro-German speeches by Lindbergh, Senator Wheeler, and so on; lectures. And all these would include the following: She would attack Hitler violently, describing his "treachery, deceit and cunning," adding that he was a "sly and cunning trickster" and "doesn't shrink from murder to achieve his purposes." In August 1941 the FBI apparently gave up hope of ever receiving Hohenlohe's report. With incredible boldness, the major moved from the Raleigh Hotel to the Wardman Park on the same floor as the princess.

Princess Stefanie was in bad form, screaming constantly at the staff. Schofield had to pay enormous tips to pacify the maids. On August 9 it was announced in the Washington Times-Herald that the princess would publish a book in six weeks containing the "secret information" she had allegedly handed to Schofield. The FBI's Harry M. Kimball sent a memo to agent Foxworth next day saying rather plaintively, "It might be as well to yet again request this information from Mr. McGuire, pointing out the indication mentioned in the article that the press intends to fully publicize this matter within the next six weeks and that it would be most advantageous for the Bureau to have available this information prior to the time it becomes public."

At long last, on August 18, 1941, the Princess Hohenlohe was asked to leave Washington. The scandal of her affair with Schofield was such that acting Attorney General Biddle asked him to have her returned to California immediately. When Edward Tamm of the FBI got wind of this, he called Biddle. Where was the princess's statement? Biddle stated he knew nothing whatsoever about it.

At the end of August, Wiedemann was in Berlin, reporting to Himmler on his many findings. In September he was on his way by L.A.T.I. airlines to Argentina, where Nazi activities were extensive. He arrived in Rio in September, to confer with the Gestapo leader Gottfried Salldstede, who had just escaped from Buenos Aires. The Brazilian newspaper O Globo had a photograph of Wiedemann on the front page with the headline "Number One Nazi of the Americas." The article stated bluntly that Wiedemann was responsible only to Hitler and had left $5 million in America to finance Nazi espionage rings.

Throughout August the Princess Hohenlohe moved to the homes of various friends of Schofield's in his native state of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, in Rio, local police searched Wiedemann's belongings and found a list of Nazi agents in California. They also determined that he was headed for the Orient, a fact he himself confirmed the following day.

Wiedemann sailed for Kobe on the Manila Maru via Chile on September 8. Violent demonstrations outside the embassy caused him to leave on the first available vessel. Two small bombs exploded as he drove in an armed car to the Buenos Aires wharves.***

Meanwhile, the princess was staying in a house (described as a "lovenest" by Walter Winchell) in Alexandria, Virginia. FBI men saw Schofield arriving at the house in the evenings and leaving in the mornings. She was still using the name "Nancy White. "

In the days just before Pearl Harbor the princess was in Philadelphia with Schofield. Her address book was examined by the FBI during her absence from the hotel and was found to include the name of Francis Biddle's wife. Hoover made a special note of the fact.

The moment the Japanese bombed Hawaii on December 7, Hoover wasted no time. As the Princess Hohenlohe left a Philadelphia theater with her mother at 10:20 P.M. on the night of December 8, FBI agents seized her. They bundled her into a car, leaving her eighty-nine-year-old mother screaming imprecations at them on the sidewalk. Hohenlohe was fingerprinted and photographed. She tried in vain to call Schofield by telephone. She was taken to the Gloucester Immigration station in New Jersey and put into solitary confinement, later changed to dormitory accommodations where she joined four Japanese girls and a woman from New Jersey who had trampled on the American flag and who spent much of her time doing double somersaults while the princess read the reminiscences of Madame de Pompadour.

It was now confirmed by Hoover that the supposed confession the princess had made out in order to be released from deportation had never existed. McGuire's and Jackson's statements that the important document was being typed amounted to little more than a lie. Precisely why the Attorney General chose to become involved in this deception remains undisclosed.

The plot thickened in mid-January. In a report of January 15, 1942, to Hoover by Special Agent D. M. Ladd, it was made clear that the princess had "a very influential friend in the State Department whose mistress she had been; the Princess had stated that this friend had the authority to permit Axis aliens to enter the country and to keep anti-Axis aliens out of the country." The name to this day is blacked out in the report. Since Schofield's name appears in all the other reports, the reference presumably is to Breckinridge Long. To this day, the FBI refuses to declassify it.

During February 1942, Hohenlohe was writing letters to her mother at the Philadelphia YWCA, full of instructions on what Schofield was to do. He was to tell reporters not to molest her, check everything before it was published, and find some way out of prison for her on the pretense she was Hungarian, not Austrian. Hoover kept careful note of all these correspondences.

The princess gave the performance of a lifetime at the camp, faking a stroke and invoking her friendship with Sir William Wiseman. Biddle proved to be most helpful, insisting that the princess should be transferred from Gloucester to a place of "the alien's choice" where she could get proper treatment.

The local inspector and the head of the Immigration station conferred with the Philadelphia U.S. Assistant Attorney who fortunately for national security evaded the order that, he pointed out, could result in the princess choosing any hospital she liked, "even though the hospital or members of its staff were suspected of German activities."

The "stroke" changed to a fit of temperament and the princess stayed where she was.

Schofield dared to make a couple of visits. He saw to it the princess was given considerate treatment. Her mother spent many hours with Schofield in offices in downtown Philadelphia, followed constantly by FBI agents. But it proved impossible to bug Schofield's office.

Roosevelt wrote to Hoover on November 28, 1941, "I spoke to the Attorney General about the Hohenlohe case and he assures me that he has broken up the romance. Also, he thinks it best not to change the present domicile as the person in question is much easier to watch at that place. Please do a confidential recheck for me."

On June 17, 1942, Roosevelt wrote again to Hoover: "Once more I have to bother you about that Hohenlohe woman. I really think that this whole affair verges not merely on the ridiculous but on the disgraceful. Is the woman really at Ellis Island?"

On July 11, it was clear nothing had been done. The President wrote to Biddle, "Unless the Immigration Service cleans up once and for all the favoritism shown to that Hohenlohe woman, I will have to have an investigation made and the facts will not be very palatable, going all the way back to her first arrest and continuing through her intimacy with Schofield. ... Honestly, this is getting to be the kind of scandal that calls for very drastic and immediate action."

The princess had her problems. She was being threatened with a legal action for the recovery of funds paid out and legal services supplied by her London lawyers, Theodore Goddard and Company. She tried to finance the repayment by pressing several publishers to take her memoirs; the ever-reliable Schofield managed to get her a special pass to travel to New York to discuss the matter with her agents in March. The President was getting more and more restless.

An interesting episode took place on July 16, 1942. An FBI special agent went to the visiting room of the prison on the pretext of interviewing one of the inmates. He noticed the lax conditions: a Nazi spy who had recently been arrested was speaking on the pay telephone in German without being monitored. The princess was perched on a desk; she seemed to be in good spirits and taking a letter cheerfully from a prison staff member. Apparently her skills included a mastery of shorthand. Or she may have been making a translation.

The prison staff man said boldly in conversation to the agent, "The princess has to have personal attention, and I like to keep her company. Sometimes she helps me censor the mail!"

What this did to national security can only be guessed at. Not surprisingly, Hoover ordered an "all-out effort to discreetly obtain information concerning the activities of the princess."

It was reported by several plants at Gloucester that employees received raises via Schofield because of their kindness to the princess. Every effort was made to survey the princess's activities from adjoining windows; Hoover had ordered the use of "a rooming house" for the purpose. Unfortunately, there was no such building and "the main street in front of the station is patrolled by Coast Guards who are suspicious of any individuals who may pass by. It would not be feasible to park a car in the proper position to observe activities without being detected by the Coast Guard."

Hoover was drastically concerned and sent a message to his New York office reading (August 3, 1942), "In view of the interest which has been shown in this matter by the President of the United States and the Attorney General, you are directed to obtain all developments concerning it immediately and submit the same to the bureau for the attention of the espionage section."

The princess's luck was remarkable: it proved difficult for the law firm in London to pursue their case against her because her attorney, David Brooks, was missing in action in Singapore. This caused a delay in the case.

She began turning to the church when Schofield proved understandably cool. She asked the priest to contact Cardinal Doherty, but he declined, perhaps in part because she wasn't a Catholic as she pretended.

In order to allay or smother the President's suspicions, Attorney General Biddle decided to transfer the princess to Seagoville, Texas, a convenient distance from Washington. Schofield made sure that a contact man was planted in the camp as his stooge. At last one of the FBI men took a chance and advised the Coast Guard of his purpose in watching Gloucester station. The Coast Guard was under special instruction to watch every move the princess's mother made in case she tried to spring Stefanie loose.

Stefanie became violent at the thought of being transferred to Texas and, in the words of a report, "acted like a tigress." She said that if her captors wanted to take her out of Gloucester, "they would have to carry her." As a result, an American Legion ambulance arrived at the center with two men carrying a restraining sheet and a strait-jacket. When she saw these, she announced she felt better and proceeded to the railway station in an Immigration car. As she sailed out of the camp's gate, someone was heard to say, "Is Schofield in Texas?"

The answer was in the affirmative. In fact, Schofield had preceded her there by two days. Suddenly the reason for her going to Texas became clear: She could try to escape across the Mexican border.

The princess left the train station in style. She demanded the Coast Guard carry her suitcases, and when they declined, she castigated them, accusing them of being physically weak. Stung to the quick, they obliged. When she arrived on the train, she expressed astonishment that she had not been given a drawing room but was compelled to sit in the day coach with an officer on either side of her. But she soon flirted with the two men so outrageously that they brought her a glass of white wine and some peanuts.

The baroness, her mother, was already installed at the Hotel Adolphus in Dallas. The princess arrived at Seagoville only to dash off a telegram to an Immigration official that read: IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOTHER. PLEASE DISCARD ALL CONSIDERATION OR ETIQUETTE, PURSUE AND INSIST THAT B [her code for Schofield] DOES WHAT YOU WISH. UNBEARABLE HURRY. STEFANIE.

The telegram was no problem to understand; it meant that the official, firmly in Hohenlohe's pocket, was to abandon his own caution and make sure that Schofield got her back to Gloucester with no further ado. Apparently, the heat had already proved more than a counterbalance to the chances of escape to Mexico.

The princess began threatening everybody at Seagoville, saying that she would be out of Texas in a very short time. Whether that meant she intended to go to Mexico or New Jersey was far from clear.

To confuse matters further, the same day she arrived in Seagoville, Wiedemann was reported to have arrived by submarine near Seattle.

It is scarcely surprising that Schofield was in fact in Seagoville when Princess Hohenlohe came off the train on a stretcher and was carried to the hospital for ten days despite the fact there was nothing wrong with her. She demanded use of the telephone, extended hours for visits from her mother, and sleeping powders. However, the major's influence was limited at Seagoville. The inspector in charge of Immigration, Joseph O'Rourke, ignored Schofield's pleas and made sure she had no privileges at all. He also added a couple of guards to the cyclone fence. The princess announced that no fence would hold her and she would escape and go to Mexico at the slightest opportunity. Stefanie's mother announced that she wished to be interned with her daughter as she had nowhere else to stay. Biddle conveniently placed an order for her arrest.

Desperation set in by the end of November. The princess had given Schofield some jewelry to sell for additional favors and he had failed to return it. On an impulse she called the local FBI man in Dallas and said she would personally give Hoover a full account of her activities with Lord Rothermere, her association with Fritz Wiedemann, and particularly her contact with Major Schofield. She asked to be assured that this information would not be furnished to INS. She was warned that Biddle and Schofield were very close personal friends and Biddle would ignore her. She then said that her mother had told Schofield that Stefanie was being framed and that Stefanie was about ready to go to Hoover about the case when Schofield became alarmed and paid the baroness's way back to Texas. As a last ditch stand Stefanie offered to throw in personal information about Hitler and Goebbels to insure her release. Edward Tamm of the Washington FBI, in his memo to Hoover, said that the "Princess is a very clever and, consequently, a very dangerous woman, and that she is maneuvering now to play the Bureau against the Immigration Service so she will get something out of it."

In January 1943 the princess wrote a heavily reworked version of her life and sent it off to the FBI. She told the Dallas agent John Little as she handed over this scrambled document, "What I have to tell will be as sensational as [any] saboteur's trial. What I have to tell is a 50-50 proposition. You will never regret it as long as you live. If you help my story to receive the proper attention, you will be reimbursed many, many times. I also have means in Washington where a person giving the right word will see that your career is furthered!"

She claimed she was railroaded into internment to protect Schofield's name. She said, "Anyone who comes in contact with me -- it is his lucky day. This interview will make your career. My story will make headlines." She demanded to be sent to Hoover and Roosevelt "about matters which I can only relate to the President."

She became hysterical several times and then admitted, "I am a spoiled brat." She insisted that Agent Little promise to release her. She said that she knew of "secret misunderstandings" between Hoover and Schofield. She said Schofield was dreadfully afraid of Walter Winchell. She said Schofield had her jewels and she would report him to Hoover. She said, "I always tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. And only lie when I have to."

She asked for a special board to sit on her case comprised of Hoover, Schofield, Biddle, "and anybody else who should be present."

"That is beyond imagination," Little replied.

She continued. "Ask Mr. Hoover to come here in person. I won't always be a nobody. I have friends. You'll do what you can?" She sent a letter to Hoover, grossly flattering to John Little. She then said, mysteriously, "I have something to tell you, Mr. Hoover, of a personal nature. As a result, I will be cleared!"

With blackmail in the air, Little left.

Her last words to him were, "You will make headlines!"

In a further statement she pretended that she had not been intimate with a man since 1920. ("Where some women take pleasure in giving themselves, I take pleasure in denying myself.")

The material was the mixture as before: a blend of truth and fantasy and veiled threats. It seems to have impressed somebody in Washington, because efforts were made to arrange a new hearing of the Princess Hohenlohe's case. She sent several letters to Hoover that indicated clearly she had given up on Hitler because of the news of his failures in the war. Meanwhile, her mother posed as an insane person and asked for commitment to a mental institution. She was judged mad at a state court at Dallas. She was put in a pauper's ward.

Another agent went to see the Princess Hohenlohe in November 1943 and found her extremely distraught and in an emotional condition. He described her as "a consummate actress," "her emotion ... artificial and designed to win my sympathy."

On March 1, 1944, the Princess Hohenlohe finally got her hearing. Those present on the board were two members of the Department of Justice and one member of the FBI. The board concluded she was innocent of everything and that she should be paroled at once. She sailed triumphantly out of Seagoville -- but not at once. Hoover held up the matter for some weeks. Roosevelt personally overruled the board and saw to it that the princess was not released for the duration.

In late January 1945, Stefanie tried to kill herself with an overdose of pills. How she obtained them is a mystery. The princess sent a harsh letter to Biddle and a long rambling note to Eleanor Roosevelt.

The princess was finally released a few days after V-E Day. She appeared to have suffered little from her ordeal, and Major Schofield welcomed her back with open arms. They moved to his farm near Philadelphia and lived there as man and wife. The princess reconquered New York society. Seen dancing at the Stork Club, she provoked columnist Robert Ruark into writing that soon Ribbentrop would be observed in similar circumstances.

Wiedemann was equally fortunate. During the war years he had successfully run Nazi intelligence in Occupied China from the consulate in Tientsin, guarding his safety by claiming diplomatic immunity when the American troops moved in and by pointing out that he had protected Jews there.

Arrested in China in 1945, Wiedemann turned state's evidence at Nuremberg, providing familiar information in a melange that secured him immunity from the Nuremberg Trials. Wiedemann breezed through denazification. He was credited with being part of the plot whereby Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, had hoped to remove Hitler -- not, more accurately, with the Himmler plot. The FBI never sent the huge file on him and the princess to Nuremberg. They were not asked to so do. Once again, The Fraternity had closed its ranks.

_______________

Notes:

* Its nominal chief was Ernst Wilhelm Bohle.
** Author's italics.
*** Wiedemann's movements are erroneously reported in A Man Called lntrepid.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:13 am

Chapter 12: The Fraternity Runs for Cover

The Nuremberg Trials successfully buried the truth of The Fraternity connections. Schacht, who was more privy to the financial connections than most German leaders, gave an extraordinary performance, mocking, hectoring, and pouring contempt upon his chief prosecutor -- Biddle's predecessor, Robert H. Jackson. Charged with engineering the war when he had only wanted to serve the neutralist policies of Fraternity associates, he was understandably acquitted. Had he chosen to do so, he could have stripped bare the details of the conspiracy, but only once in his entire cross-examination, when he admitted to complicity in the shipment to Berlin of the Austrian gold,* did he indicate any knowledge of such matters. Never in those days on the witness stand was he asked about the Bank for International Settlements or Thomas H. McKittrick. Not even in his memoirs was there an inkling of what he knew.

Conveniently for The Fraternity, Goring and Himmler committed suicide, carrying with them the secrets that Charles Bedaux, William Rhodes Davis, William Weiss of Sterling, and William S. Farish had carried to their graves. James V. Forrestal also ended his life by suicide. In 1949 he hanged himself from the window of the Bethesda Naval Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he was suffering from advanced paranoid schizophrenia. Newspapers reported him screaming that the Jews and the communists were crawling on the floor of his room seeking to destroy him.

The rest of the conspirators lived out full life-spans.

When Germany fell, Hermann Schmitz fled from Frankfurt to a hiding place in a small house near Heidelberg. Shuffled around between the lines in a railroad carriage, this powerful man cowered in terror as bombs exploded about him. But he was softly handled when the U .S. Army moved in. He was imprisoned, but well treated, thanks to the influence of his great and powerful friends. Despite the fact that he and his colleagues had been responsible for the deaths of four million Jews at Auschwitz, they were not tried for mass murder as war criminals. Instead, they were tried for preparing and planning aggressive war, and other related counts. Since they had intended to form a world fascist state without war if possible, and since their whole purpose was simply to render Germany equal in a United States of Fascism, they were acquitted on the first charge. The lesser charges resulted in insignificant sentences.

Thinner now and equipped with a distinguished Vandyke beard, Schmitz cleverly decided not to give evidence at the trial. He claimed illness but in fact was seldom absent. His only statement came at the end of the hearings when he had the audacity to quote St. Augustine and, for good measure, Abraham Lincoln, to the judges. He spent only eight more months in prison.

Max Ilgner was equally cunning. He told the prosecutors he would become a priest after he left prison. He did.

Espionage was not an issue in the case; no summoning of transatlantic figures was considered. Dietrich Schmitz, now on a chicken farm in Connecticut, and Rudolph Ilgner went unpunished. In various court hearings of the 1940s, Schmitz and Ilgner had been indicted but the cases against them were never prosecuted.

On September 8, 1944, Roosevelt had sent a letter to Cordell Hull that was front page in many newspapers. It included the bold statement, "The history of the use of the I.G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. Defeat of the Nazi army will have to be followed by the eradication of those weapons of economic warfare."

The powers of the Allied Military Government who favored The Fraternity disagreed and insisted upon I.G. Farben being retained after light punishment for its leaders. Morgenthau protested to Roosevelt, who summoned him to a discussion at the Quebec Conference in September 1944.

Morgenthau laid out his idealistic and impractical Morgenthau Plan -- actually the creation of Harry Dexter White. Based upon his profound knowledge of collusion, White wanted a total elimination not only of I.G. Farben but of all German armaments and chemical and metallurgical industries. He wanted Germany to become a strictly agrarian economy; Roosevelt seemed to agree. In December 1944, Roosevelt, taking his cue from Morgenthau, made a statement via John G. Winant in which he called for an abolition of the Nazi industrial war machine. But already there were some compromises in the plan. Morgenthau came under a storm of abuse from the right wing, and the ailing President was now yielding to some minor pressures and starting to back away. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt, by now grievously ill, strove to follow Morgenthau's reasoning by making the much criticized arrangements to divide Germany down the middle into eastern and western zones.

When Truman became President, Eisenhower, as commander in chief of European forces, continued to follow Morgenthau's attitude with severe edicts, calling for disruption of any Nazi source of a possible World War III. But Truman disagreed. He was convinced that to render Germany agrarian was to leave an open path for Bolshevist conquest. General George S. Patton agreed with him and began to put Nazis back in office in Germany after the war.

Those who, with ideals held high, arrived in Germany from the United States to try to disrupt the cartels were severely handicapped from the start. One of these was a promising young lawyer, Russell A. Nixon, a liberal member of the U.S. Military Government Cartel Unit. He was handicapped from the start. He came directly under Brigadier General William H. Draper, who was, along with James V. Forrestal, a vice-president of Dillon, Read, bankers who had financed Germany after World War I. Nixon quickly realized that Draper, director of the economics division, and Robert Murphy, who had moved from North Africa to become ambassador to the new Germany, were going to block his every move.

When he arrived in Germany in July 1945, Nixon found his position was virtually untenable. He had been asked to explore a tunnel that had already been bricked up.

He asked Colonel E. S. Pillsbury, Special Control Officer in charge of I.G. Farben, what had been done these several months after V-E day to carry out Eisenhower's directives on dismantling Farben. Pillsbury failed to give any information and seriously questioned whether Nixon had any jurisdiction to investigate the cartel. Nixon turned in desperation to several members of Draper's staff, only to discover that Draper had failed to give them written directives to close I.G. plants.

One man, Joseph Dodge, told Nixon he had instructed his team to dismantle an I.G. poison gas plant but that Draper had canceled the order. Again, Dodge tried to wreck the I.G. underground plant at Mannheim and again Draper intervened. Soon afterward, Dodge told Nixon, Draper arranged for both plants to obtain added business.

Frustrated, Nixon went over Draper's head. He reported to General Lucius D. Clay on December 17, 1945, that Eisenhower's orders had been deliberately violated. He charged that, contrary to Draper's statements in the press that every I.G. plant had been bombed or dismantled, none had been. He said that General Henry H. Arnold of the Army Air Force had protected I.G. and he added that despite the pleas of the Jewish councils the installations and communications systems of Auschwitz had not been destroyed.

Clay listened to Nixon's charges but did nothing about them. Nixon found that scientific and mechanical equipment in I.G. plants had been saved from removal on specific orders from Washington. Searching through files on January 15, 1946, Nixon found a letter written by Max Ilgner that gave the game away. Dated May 15, 1944, and addressed to the I.G. Central Finance Department, the letter instructed the staff to keep "in constant touch" in defeated Germany since the American authorities "would surely permit resumption of I.G. operations." Thus, the head of the N.W.7. I.G. espionage unit looked forward confidently to the future. He of all people knew the Americans he was dealing with.

Nixon was handicapped not only by the American military government, but by the British. The Labour government in England was in severe financial difficulties and wanted to make sure it had good industrial connections in Germany. Like the American government, it was busy reconstituting I.G. When Russell A. Nixon pleaded with Sir Percy Mills at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use his influence with Clay and Draper, Mills simply held matters up further. As a result, scarcely any Nazi industrial leader was in custody by 1946.

Nixon did manage to have a few people brought in. These included Paul Denker, I.G.'s chief accountant in the poison gas division; Carl von Heider, sales director of inorganic chemicals; Hans Kugler, director of dyestuff sales; Gunther Frank-Fahle and Kurt Kreuger of Ilgner's espionage group; and Gustave Kupper, head of the dyestuffs, legal division. None of these spent any time in custody. Nixon also wanted to bring in directors of the banks that had been deeply involved with I.G., including the Deutsche Bank, the Deutsche Landersbank, the Reichsbank, and the Dresdnerbank. He wanted to ask them about the whereabouts of German looted gold and cash including the Austrian and Czech gold transferred through the BIS. Again he was blocked: Draper told Counter-Intelligence not to make the arrests. Nixon pleaded directly to Washington, and after a considerable delay Draper was overruled. But no sooner had the bank officials been taken to Army headquarters than a Major General Adcock, representing Draper, brought orders for their release. Nixon was told he had been insubordinate in going over Draper's head and should be court-martialed as a radical.

Nixon later reported to the Senator Owen Brewster War Committee in Washington that by the spring of 1946 only 85,000 of 200,000 industrial and Gestapo leaders had been arrested. He was particularly annoyed by the exemption accorded to the major Nazi industrialist Richard Freudenberg, who had worked with Goring and Carl Krauch on the Four Year Plan and had been on the board of the Schroder Bank. When Nixon took the bold step of ordering Freudenberg arrested under mandatory arrest provision JCF 1067, the denazification board in Frankfurt voted four to one to exempt him from the provision, and Ambassador to Germany Robert Murphy ordered his release. Murphy made a statement that proved to be significant: "It is not in conformity with American standards to cut away the basis of private property." Apparently it was in conformity with American standards to restore high-ranking Nazis to their previous positions. With unconscious humor a member of the Industry Division of the Occupying Forces confirmed Murphy's position by saying, "This man Freudenberg is an extremely capable industrialist: a kind of Henry Ford." No one could quarrel with that.

Draper sent an official to take charge of Nixon's operation in the winter of 1946. Carl Peters was in charge of Foreign Economic Administration under Leo Crowley. He was also a director of the Advanced Solvents Corporation, a subsidiary of General Aniline and Film. He had been indicted for dealing with the enemy but had pleaded nolle prosequi and had been awarded the position of colonel in the Pentagon. No sooner was he in charge of Nixon than he began securing the release of German industrialists and set up the old Norwegian plant Noramco as an I.G. subsidiary once more.

Nixon had had enough. He returned to the United States and condemned the entire protection of Nazis to Senator Kilgore's investigative committee. He charged that elements in the United States, British, and French foreign offices had consciously maneuvered to prevent the Allies from being involved in the search for Nazi assets in neutral countries, because that search would lay bare the fascist regimes in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, and Argentina "and would reveal all the elements of collaboration of certain industrialists in the Allied countries with these regimes."

The young, very sharp lawyer James Stewart Martin of the Department of Justice's investigative team came to Europe from Washington. He arrived at U.S. Military Command at Bushy Park, London, only to find that Graeme K. Howard of General Motors was colonel over him. Martin protested to G-2 about the General Motors-Nazi connection, and nothing was done. But he managed to find a copy of Howard's book America and a New World Order. Fearful of a public outcry, the Army shipped Howard home.

Martin investigated the whereabouts of Gerhardt Westrick. In the last year of the war Westrick had played an increasingly difficult and dangerous role in Germany. After Generals Fellgiebel and Thiele were hanged for treason, Westrick managed to hang on almost to the end of the conflict. He fled when Berlin was bombed and his home was destroyed. He hid out in a castle in southwest Germany. Behn, clearly afraid of the consequences if his association with Westrick became known, refused to answer his old friend's pleading letters. Instead, he arranged for Westrick to be brought by his Army associates to Paris to give a full report to ITT's Colonel Alexander Sanders at the Hotel Claridge on the status of the ITT companies in Germany.

Westrick was given a light prison sentence and released -- deeply embittered that Behn had let him be punished at all.

Martin found out that Leo T. Crowley and Ernest K. Halbach, those custodians of General Aniline and Film, when asked to supply the truth of GAF's actual ownership through I.G. Chemie, had simply referred the matter to Allen Dulles. The head of the OSS had failed to supply the required information.

At the I.G. headquarters in Frankfurt, Martin discovered files that confirmed earlier beliefs that Schmitz had laid out plans for a conquered world in which America would join in triumph. He began to understand why Schmitz and the others of I.G. had turned against Hitler. It was clear that Hitler wanted to attack the United States with Goring's bombers when sufficiently long-distance aircraft were developed. But Schmitz was loyal to his American colleagues, preferring to maintain the alliances in perpetuity. These alliances could be sustained if Himmler and/or the German generals ran the Third Reich. They would be content with Schmitz 's dream of a negotiated peace.

Further evidence came to light showing the continuing connection between Schmitz and the United States during the war. In 1943 a magazine article by R.T. Haslam of Standard Oil appeared in The Petroleum Times. It stated that the relationship with I.G. Farben had proved to be advantageous to the United States government. A special report of I.G. Farben emphatically denied this, pointing out the innumerable benefits that Germany had obtained from her American friends, including the use of tetraethyl, without which the war effort would have been impossible, and the supply of which had been approved by the U.S. War Department. The report said, "At the outbreak of war we were completely prepared from a technical point of view. We obtained standards not only from our own experiences but also from those of General Motors and other big manufacturers of automobiles." The report also revealed that Standard had sold $20 million worth of mineral oil products including airplane benzene to I.G. The report concluded: "The fact that we actually succeeded ... in buying these quantities demanded by the German government from Standard Oil Co. and the Royal Dutch Shell group and importing them into Germany was only because of the support of Standard Oil Company." Even more damning, Martin found that I.G. had placed a 50 million mark credit to Karl Lindemann's Standard subsidiary in Germany in the Deutsch Landersbank, wholly owned by I.G. with Hermann Schmitz as chairman, in 1944.

Thus, it was clear that Standard's business in Nazi Germany was open as usual and that its German subsidiary was being paid handsomely for prewar agreements.

Martin and his team were hampered at every turn. He wrote in his book All Honorable Men:

We had not been stopped in Germany by German business. We had been stopped in Germany by American business. The forces that stopped us had operated from the United States but had not operated in the open. We were not stopped by a law of Congress, by an Executive Order of the President, or even by a change of policy approved by the President ... in short, whatever it was that had stopped us was not "the government." But it clearly had command of channels through which the government normally operates. The relative powerlessness of governments in the growing economic power is of course not new ... national governments stood on the sidelines while bigger operators arranged the world's affairs.


These operators were among the obstacles faced by James Stewart Martin and his team as they began work in the fall of 1945. A year after they began rummaging through documents, many of the Nazis in Schmitz's and Hitler's immediate circle were untouched by defeat. Schmitz's fellow director of the Deutsche Bank, Hermann Abs, was now financial advisor in the British zone. Heinrich Dinkelbach, also a partner of Schmitz, was in charge of the administration of all iron and steel industries in the British zone. Yet another director of the Steel Union, Werner Carp, the closest friend of Baron von Schroder's, was released from detention and became Dinkelbach's partner.

So much for Eisenhower's orders to denazify industry. Schmitz in his prison could afford to smile. "The Nazi chieftains," Raymond Daniell wrote in The New York Times on September 20, 1945, "[are] in positions where they can continue to control to a large degree the machinery whereby Germany made war." Daniell continued,

The effect of the breakdown of the denazification program ... preserves the power of men whose nationalistic and militaristic ideas were the very antithesis of democracy ... in industry, in the fields of transportation and communication, the flouting of General Eisenhower's order is particularly flagrant ... in avoiding compliance with [that] order, Army and Military government officials have shown considerable versatility. Where they have not ignored the order completely, they have got around it by reclassifying important jobs under other names and leaving the Nazi incumbent alone.


Daniell continued:

Nor has there been any known development on the plan for the disposition of the property of active Nazis, as must have been contemplated when their accounts were blocked. At present a proposal is being circulated to provide for the payment of their old salaries to executives who have been arrested and who are giving evidence to the Occupation authorities. In other words, it is proposed that those who helped the Nazis be treated as employees whose services are worth to us approximately what the Nazis paid them.


Martin made a serious discovery in October 1945. He reported that General Patton literally had sabotaged the Potsdam Agreement calling for a destruction of I.G. and that in fact it was simply being split into components and allowed to continue with several of Schmitz's minor executives continuing in higher positions. Simultaneously, the Kilgore Committee reported in Washington on November 15, 1945, that the Swiss banks led by the BIS and its member bank, the Swiss National Bank (which shared directors and staff members), had violated agreements made at the end of the war not to permit financial transactions that would help the Nazis dispose of their loot. Senator Harley Kilgore stated, "Despite ... the assurances of the Swiss government that German accounts would be blocked, the Germans maneuvered themselves back into a position where they could utilize their assets in Switzerland, could acquire desperately needed foreign exchange by the sale of looted gold and could conceal economic reserves for another war. These moves were made possible by the willingness of the Swiss government and banking officials, in violation of their agreement with the Allied Powers, to make a secret deal with the Nazis." Martin's team, working with a special Treasury group of T-men, unraveled much of this information for Kilgore. They found a letter from Emil Puhl to Dr. Walther Funk dated March 30, 1945, which said: "Above all I have insisted [to the National Bank] on our receiving Swiss francs in return for Reichsmarks which the Reichsbank might release for any reason. That is important as it will enable us to use these francs to transfer funds into a third country."

It was agreed by the mission to Switzerland headed by U.S. economics advisor Lauchlin Currie in 1945 that gold might be used for embassy expenses. Puhl made the Swiss buy the German gold. A further letter, dated April 6, 1945, from Puhl to Funk read: "All in all, I believe that we can be satisfied that we have succeeded in obtaining ... arrangements for German-Swiss payments. Whatever form events will take, such connections will always exist between our countries, and the fact that there exists a contract agreement may be of considerable importance in the future. Anyway, the contrary, the breaking off of the innumerable connections, would have been a rubble pile which would have presented immense difficulties."

The day after the Kilgore Committee made these disclosures, the Treasury team along with Martin's was drastically restricted from further activities. Raymond Daniell wrote in The New York Times on November 16 that the experts who came to hunt down the Reich's hidden assets were suddenly relegated to obscure roles. "As a result," Daniell wrote, "140 Treasury employees are wondering tonight whether they are going to be recalled or ordered to stay on here compiling reports and making recommendations that other departments can use or ignore as they choose. Many of them feel that their usefulness here has been ended."

All through those difficult weeks Martin, his team, and the T-men clashed with Brigadier General Draper and Charles Fahey of Draper's legal division, both of whom flagrantly ignored Eisenhower's policy and the mandatory terms of the Potsdam Agreement. Russell Nixon sympathized with their largely hopeless efforts to smash Nazi economic power in Germany and overseas. He said, "Treasury experts are in the doghouse at the office of Military government." Most devastating of all, he stated that Draper had flatly refused to denazify any financial institution in Germany.

In Washington, Colonel Bernard Bernstein of the Treasury squad was delivering a powerful series of blows to I.G. before the Kilgore Committee. He denounced Standard's synthetic rubber agreements, its $20 million contract for aviation gasoline, its $1 million supply of tetraethyl. He named Ernest K. Halbach and Hugh Williamson of GAP as organizers of direct deliveries to I.G.'s South American subsidiaries after Pearl Harbor. He charged that Du Pont owned 6 percent of I.G.'s common stock throughout World War II and that Swiss banks had uniformly refused to yield up details of I.G. Chemie. Kilgore, commenting on these statements, said, "I am profoundly disturbed by a number of recent events pointing to an attitude on the part of some of our key officials which countenances and even bolsters Nazism in the economic and political life of Germany." He said that Draper had ignored directives of six months earlier to destroy I.G.'s plants. He added that the State Department blatantly supported Draper's policy. Kilgore made clear that State Department policy did not have President Truman's concurrence.

A U.S. Military Government spokesman, who was not named, denied Kilgore's charges in The New York Times on Christmas Day 1945. He said it was untrue that the I.G. organization had not been broken up: that in fact "the entire I.G. question has been placed on a four-power level." He was pointing to the fact that the United States, Britain, France, and Russia all had parts of Farben because of its diffuse character; he neglected to point out that only Russia of the four powers had tried to shatter I.G.'s structure.

In July 1946, James Stewart Martin was still struggling to expose the full truth of Nazi-American business arrangements. He was not helped by the fact that Brigadier General Draper hired the adventurous Alexander Kreuter, Charles Bedaux's partner in the Worms Bank, as his economic aide.

Gordon Kern of ITT also turned up on the scene. Kern, ostensibly there to be in an advisory capacity, spent most of his time transferring the Focke Wulf factories from the Russian to the American zone. He also arranged for ITT's Nazi factory to be used by the Army Signal Corps, which prevented its dissolution, and had Westrick brought to Switzerland to disentangle ITT's Nazi patents held in Swiss banks.

In October 1946, Senator Kilgore arrived in Germany with the Senate War Investigating Committee to try to determine why attempts to decartelize the Nazis were being obstructed at every turn. George Meader, counsel for the committee, prepared a thousand pages of testimony from scores of U.S. Army officers. A few weeks later, when the investigations were continuing, Averell Harriman (of Brown Brothers, Harriman), Jesse Jones's successor as Secretary of Commerce, sent Philip D. Reed, head of General Electric, which had suppressed tungsten carbide in favor of Krupp and financed Hitler, on an urgent mission to Berlin to confer with Draper. Simultaneously, General Lucius Clay was questioned for two hours secretly by Kilgore in Washington. The results of the questionnaire were never disclosed.

In December, Clay was back in Germany, smarting at criticisms of his activities. He arranged a meeting between Draper and Philip D. Reed at the office of his finance chief, Jack Bennett. At the meeting Richard Spencer of Clay's legal division attacked President Truman's policy on denazification and breaking up I.G. Reed reported to Harriman that the investigation of I.G. and the Americans, which was still struggling feebly along under Martin's guidance, was a symptom of Martin's "extremism" and should be brought to an immediate end.

Meader's detailed report, damning in detail and forceful in execution, was too strong even for Kilgore. He said, inter alia, "I will put it this way: that men, some men, if the Germans had ever invaded this country and conquered us, would have been the first to collaborate with the conquerors, and have been influential in decisions being made in Germany."

Secretary of War Robert B. Patterson said that he was of the opinion that Meader's statement "gave a distorted and frequently erroneous picture of the American Zone." Lieutenant General Dan I. Sultan, Inspector General of the Army, also denounced Meader, saying his charges were "unverified." Yet Meader had based his report on thoroughly reliable sources. Military officer after officer was disclosed as corrupt, unsavory, and in collusion with the Nazis.

Among the testimonies was that of Colonel Francis P. Miller who had been executive officer of Army Intelligence under Clay and had formerly been with the OSS. He charged that "Officials selected for influential economic positions in the military government had business connections at home that might influence their outlook and acts." He called for an intensified use of Army Intelligence to expose malfeasances in high office.

That December the Kilgore Committee uncovered more and more scandals. Meader introduced documents showing how Draper had told a visiting party of newspaper editors that the program of purging Nazis was holding back economic development.

There were efforts made to obtain a reversal of Truman's policy of removing patents from German hands. The leader of this attempted reversal was an executive of the U.S. Steel Corporation, who remained unnamed because of the connections to the Schmitz and Krupp steel empire. This personage called for a reopening of the German Patent Office immediately and charged that the President had jeopardized it by his policy declarations. The steel executive also wanted an outright prohibition of inspections of German plants. Phillips Hawkins pointed out that the reestablishment of patent systems and prohibition of search would be disastrous for decartelization.

General Clay had, the committee revealed, sent a stern memorandum to Draper telling him that denazification was beneficial and that the failure to denazify industry would have created major labor-management problems. He rebuked Draper loudly and clearly for opposing the removal of Nazis.

Several letters were read from James Stewart Martin showing how he had been forced into retreat. He named -- but the name was not made public -- an American industrialist who was trying to obtain a penicillin monopoly in Germany by buying up one American corporation after another with Nazi links, including I.G. He also charged that lobbying in Washington was allowing ITT, National Cash Register, and Singer sewing machine company to enter Germany on special licenses in defiance of presidential orders.

Kilgore was infuriated by Meader's charges and denounced him to the press.

James Stewart Martin resigned his position in frustration. His replacement, Phillips Hawkins, married General Draper's daughter.

In February 1947, Richardson Bronson, formerly Martin's deputy control officer, fired one quarter of his staff and announced that there would no longer be any decartelization of I.G. or any other heavy industry in Germany. Only small consumer-goods firms would be affected. The decision was approved by former President Herbert Hoover, who had received Hermann Schmitz at the White House in 1931. Hoover's report at the end of an investigative trip urged that I.G. and Krupp should be enabled to rebuild Germany.

Those few who raised voices against such goings-on were dismissed by the military arm as "commies." Draper still had some critics. Alexander Sacks, formerly of James Stewart Martin's staff, charged before the Ferguson Commission on decartelization in 1948 that in every way "the policies of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations have been flagrantly disregarded by the very individuals who were charged with the highest responsibility for carrying them out." Sacks was dismissed.

As for General Aniline and Film, that indestructible organ of The Fraternity, all efforts against it by Morgenthau and his successors in the Treasury proved futile. Robert F. Kennedy as Attorney General protected the company from dissolution -- in his father's tradition. On March 9, 1965, GAF was sold in the largest competitive auction in Wall Street history. The buyer, offering $340 million, was an affiliate of I.G. Farben in Germany.

Those who had opposed The Fraternity were not so fortunate. In 1948 the House Un-American Activities Committee, in one of its unbridled smear campaigns, named Morgenthau's trusted associates Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie as communist agents. Based on the uncorroborated testimony of one Elizabeth Bentley, a self-confessed Soviet spy who was turning state's evidence, the Morgenthau Treasury administration was smeared in the eyes of the public. White and Currie, those deeply loyal enemies of fascism, those investigators of the Bank for International Settlements, of Standard, the Chase, the National City Bank, the Morgans, William Rhodes Davis, the Texas Company, ITT, RCA, SKF, GAF, Ford, and General Motors, were effectively destroyed by the hearings. Currie disappeared into Colombia, his U.S. citizenship canceled in 1956, and White died of a heart attack on August 16, 1948, aged fifty-six, after returning home from an investigative session. While the surviving Fraternity figures flourished again, helping to form the texture of postwar technology, those who had dared to expose them were finished. The Fraternity leaders who had died could sleep comfortably in their graves -- their dark purpose accomplished.

_______________

Notes:

* But not the Czech, Belgian, or Dutch.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

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Selective Bibliography

Allen, Gary. None Dare Call It Conspiracy. Waukesha, Wis.: Country Beautiful Corporation, Concord Press, 1971.
Ambruster, Howard W. Treason's Peace. New York: The Beechhurst Press, 1947.
Angebert, Jean, and Angebert, Michel. The Occult and the Third Reich. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
Archer, Jules. The Plot to Seize the White House. New York: Hawthorn Books,1973.
Biddle, Francis. In Brief Authority. New York: Doubleday, 1962.
Blum, John Morton. From the Morgenthau Diaries. Years of Crisis, 1928 1938; Years Of Urgency, 1938- 1941; and Years of War, 1941 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959-1967.
Borkin, Joseph. The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. New York: The Free Press, 1978.
Dodd, William E., Jr., and Dodd, Martha, Eds. Ambassador Dodd's Diary. 1933-1938. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1941.
DuBois, Josiah E. , Jr. The Devil's Chemists. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952.
Dulles, Eleanor. The Bank for International Settlements at Work. New York: Macmillan, 1932.
Farago, Ladislas. The Game of the Foxes. New York: David McKay, 1971.
Gellman, Irwin. Good Neighbor Diplomacy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979.
Guerin, Daniel. Fascisme Et Grand Capital. Paris: Francois Maspero, 1965.
Hargrave, John. Montagu Norman. London: Greystone Press, n.d. [1942].
Hexner, Ervin. International Cartels. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945.
Hirszowicz, Lukasz. The Third Reich and the Arab East. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
Hoke, Henry R. It's a Secret. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, n.d.
Howard, Graeme K. America and a New World Order. New York: Scribner's, 1940.
Johnson, Arthur M. Winthrop W. Aldrich: Lawyer, Banker, Diplomat. Boston: Harvard University Business School, 1968.
Langer, W. L., and Gleason, S. Everett. The Challenge to Isolation. New York: Harper Brothers, 1952.
Lee, Albert. Henry Ford and the Jews. Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.: Stein and Day,1980.
Martin, James Stewart. All Honorable Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950.
Nevins, Allan, and Hill, Frank Ernest. Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933 1962. New York: Scribner's, 1962.
Peterson, Edward Norman. Hjalmar Schacht. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1954.
Quigley, Carroll. Tragedy and Hope. New York: Macmillan, 1966.
Rees, David. Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox. New York: Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan, 1973.
Reiss, Curt. The Nazis Go Underground. New York: Doubleday, 1944.
Rogge, 0. John. The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration 1924-1942. Pan-Arabism 1939-Today. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961.
Rogow, Arnold A. James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
Root, Waverley. The Secret History of the War. 3 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1945.
Sampson, Anthony. The Sovereign State of ITT. New York: Stein and Day, 1973.
Sayers, Michael, and Kahn, Albert E. The Plot Against the Peace: A Warning to the Nation! New York: The Dial Press, 1945.
Schacht, Hjalmar. Confessions of the "Old Wizard." Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1956.
Schloss, Henry H. The Bank for International Settlements. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1958.
Seldes, George. Iron, Blood and Profits. New York: Harper Brothers, 1934. Facts and Fascism. New York: In Fact, Inc., 1943.
Stocking, George W., and Watkins, Myron W. Cartels in Action. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1946.
Sutton, Antony C. Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler. Seal Beach, Calif.: '76 Press, 1976.
"Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10," Volume VIII, I.G. Farben case, Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.
United States Army Air Force, Aiming point report No.1. E. 2 of May 29, 1943.
United States Congress. House of Representatives. Special Committee on Un-American Activities and Investigation of Certain Other Propaganda Activities. 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings No. 73-DC-4. Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 1934.
United States Congress. House of Representatives. Special Committee on Un-American Activities (1934). Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda Activities. 74th Congress, 1st Session, Report No.153. Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 1934.
United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Finance. Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States. 72nd Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 19, Part 1, December 18,19, and 21,1931. Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 1931.
United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. Scientific and Technical Mobilization. 78th Congress, 2nd Session, S. Res. 107, Part 16, August 29 and September 7, 8, 12, and 13, 1944. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.
United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. Scientific and Technical Mobilization. 78th Congress, 1st Session, S. 702, Part 16, Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 1944.
United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. Elimination of German Resources of War. Report pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, July 2, 1945, Part 7. 78thCongress and 79th Congress. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.
United States Group Control Council (Germany), office of the Director of Intelligence, Field Information Agency. Technical Intelligence Report No. EF/ME/1. September 4, 1945.
United States Congress. Senate. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Committee on the Judiciary. Morgenthau Diary (Germany). Volume 1, 90th Congress, 1st Session, November 20, 1967. Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 1967.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Aeg-Ostlandwerke GmbR, by Whitworth Ferguson. May 31, 1945.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Plant Report of A .E ,G , (Allgemeine Elektrizitats Gesellschaft). Nuremberg, Germany: June 1945.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. German Electrical Equipment In dustry Report. Equipment Division, January 1947.
Wall, Bennett H., and Gibb, George S, Teagle of Jersey Standard, New Orleans: Tulane University, 1974.

Magazines and Newspapers Consulted

The Nation; The New Republic; The Hour; Friday; In Fact; The Protestant; The New York Times; The Washington Post; The Washington Times-Herald; PM; The (London) Times; The New Statesman and Nation; Time and Tide; The Wall Street Journal.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

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Select Documentary Sources

Bank for International Settlements [1]


Telegrams from Merle Cochran to Henry Morgenthau, Jr.: February 14, March 14, May 9, 1939.
Memoranda from Merle Cochran to Henry Morgenthau, Jr.: April 27, May 9, May 15, 1940.
Reports on meetings of the Bank for International Settlements. 1940-1945. U.S. Consulate, Basle, Switzerland.
Resolution. H. Res. 188. 78th Congress. March 26, 1943.
Bretton Woods Conference, New Hampshire. Minutes of meetings of the U.S. delegates. July 10, July 17, July 18, July 19, July 20, 1944.
Memorandum from Orvis A. Schmidt to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. March 23, 1945.
Reports on Currie Mission to Switzerland. Minutes of meetings, memoranda to the President. April 12, May 2, May 21, 1945.

Bedaux, Charles [2]

Embassy of the United States of America. Confidential Report. Vichy, May 4, 1942.
Interview with Charles E. Bedaux. Report by American Consulate, Algiers. October 30, 1942.
War Department Message. Secret. January 4, 1943.
War Department. Military Intelligence Service. Washington. Report. January 15, 1943.
Headquarters North African Theater of Operations. U.S. Army Inquiry. September 5, 1944.
Allied Force Headquarters. U.S. Army. G2. Report. February 14, 1945.

The Chase Bank-Paris [3]

Morgenthau Minutes. Meeting with Dr. Benjamin Anderson. April 28, 1937.
Department of State Memoranda. June 19, 1940.
Minutes of Treasury Meetings. August 26, 27, 1940.
Correspondence between Chase Bank, Paris and Chateauneuf, France, Au gust 5, October 15, October 24, November 17, 1940.
Memoranda from Winthrop W. Aldrich to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. May 12, May 25, 1941.
Correspondence between Chase Bank, Paris, German banks, Vichy Head- quarters and New York, December 30, 1941, January 3, 10, 15, 23, and 30, 1942; February 2, March 3, March 6, March 24, March 25, March 30, 1942; April 16, May 7, May 23, June 1, June 4, June 18, June 22, July 20, August 3, September 18, October 9, October 28, and December 31, 1942.
Accounts of Chase Bank, Paris, 1941-1942.
Memorandum from Randolph Paul to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. January 13, 1943.
Accounts, Transactions, German Military Government Orders. Nazi Embassy, Paris. 1943.
Minutes of Meetings. Treasury, January 4, 13, 1944.
Report. Treasury Investigative Team, Paris, 1944.
Memoranda from Randolph Paul to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. February 3, 4, 1944.
Correspondence, Transaction List, Accounts, Memoranda between Nazi Embassy, Paris, and Chase Bank, May 22, May 30, June 8, June 29, July 3, August 10, August 16, 1944.
Memorandum from J. J. O'Connell, Jr., and Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. September 12, 1944.
Various memoranda, J. J. O'Connell, Jr., and Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. October 20, 27, 1944.
Henry Saxon to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Memoranda. December 20, 1944.
Treasury Investigative Reports. December 30, 1944.
Harry Dexter White to Henry Morgenthau, Jr. February 12, 1945.

William Rhodes Davis [4]

Chapter drawn in its entirety from Davis Main File, FBI, 1937-1941, Washington, D.C.

Ford Motor Company [5]

Letters from Maurice Dollfus to Edsel B. Ford, September 19, October 31, November 27, 1940. October 13, 1941. January 28, February 11, August 15, 1942.
Report by Felix Cole, American Consulate, Algiers, July 11, 1942.
Telegram from John G. Winant, U.S. Embassy, London, to Cordell Hull, October 20, 1942.
Telegrams from Leland Harrison, U.S. Minister in Berne, Switzerland, to Cordell Hull, October 29, December 4, 1942.
Reports by John J. Lawler to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., December 9, 10, 11, 1942 (includes transcripts of Edsel Ford's letters to Maurice Dollfus in Occupied France).
Accounts reports and details of transactions, Ford Motor Company, Dear- born and Poissy, December 11-12, 1942.
Report by Randolph Paul to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., May 25, 1943.
Report by Leland Harrison to Cordell Hull, December 13, 1943.
Report by John G. Winant to Cordell Hull, April 3, 1944.

General Motors [6]

Report by James D. Mooney to Adolf Hitler, n.d. (presumably January 1940).
Letter from James D. Mooney to Adolf Hitler, February 16, 1940.
Summarized statement of Hitler's conversation with James D. Mooney, March 4, 1940.
Notes covering James D. Mooney's visit to Goring, March 7, 1940.
Letters from James D. Mooney to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rome, Italy, March 11, 15, 1940.
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to James D. Mooney, April 2, 1940.
Detailed program of meetings in Berlin and London in 1939 by James D. Mooney, January 24, 1941.
Letter from James D. Mooney to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 21, 1941.
Report by J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., May 1, 1941.
FBI Reports, Various, 1942.
Report by Leland Harrison t6 Cordell Hull, March 21, 1942.
Report of U.S. Embassy, Panama, June 26, 1942.
Report by U.S. Embassy, Buenos Aires, July 20, 1942.
Reports by John A. Winant to Cordell Hull, October 20, 1942.
Report by Jacques Reinstein to General Motors, April 2, 1943.
Telegram from U.S. Embassy, London, to Cordell Hull, May 18, 1944.
Report from U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia, to Cordell Hull, February 10, 1944.
Report from John A. Winant to Cordell Hull, April 11, 1944.

Princess Stefanie Hohenlohe, Fritz Wiedemann, and Sir William Wiseman [7]

Chapter drawn in its entirety from FBI Main Files on these individuals, Washington, D.C., 1940-1945.

ITT and Radio Corporation of America [8]

Telegram from American Legation, Bucharest, Rumania, to the Treasury, January 3, 1941.
Notes and Memoranda by E. H. Foley, Jr. and Herbert Feis to Sumner Welles, March 24, 25,26, 1941, and October 9, 1941.
Undated draft on unification of Mexican telephone systems. Treasury files. 1941.
Censored conversation intercept. Hans Sturzenegger and Hugh Williamson, Basle and New York, June 24, July 3, 1941.
Memorandum from E. H. Foley, Jr., to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., September 8, 1941.
Memoranda from Breckinridge Long to Harry Hopkins, January 5, January 12, 1942.
Seized records, January-March 1942. ITT, South America.
Detailed reports of TTP, South America, State Department File, 1941-1942.
Staff memorandum for members of the interdepartmental advisory committee on hemisphere communications, Allen W. Sayler, January 13, 1942.
Intercepted conversation. Cia Radio International of Brazil, February 11, 1942.
FBI report. February 14, 1942.
Memo to Thurman Arnold from Robert Wohlforth, February 20, 1942.
Memo from R. T. Yingling to Breckinridge Long, February 26, 1942.
Censorship reports, January-May 1942.
Memoranda to Sumner Welles, from Breckinridge Long, April 2l, 1942.
Memoranda of Breckinridge Long on meetings on ITT and RCN Consortium, June 26, July 13, July 14, July 20, August 10, August 11, 1942. Also August 25 and September 21, 1942.
Censorship reports May-December 1942.
Special report on Mexican telephone merger, State Department, 1942.
Special report, State Department, August 20, 1942.
Minutes of meetings of the IHCAC, September-December 1942.
Intercepted communications, 1942-1943.
Report on leakage of shipping information. Office of Censorship. July 24, 1942.
Report on evasions of communications regulations and cable communications with the Axis. December 7, 11, 14, and 15, 1942.
Report on Axis pressure on ITT. November 18, 1942 (no source given).
Questionnaire, responses, and reports. U.S. Commercial Company to Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1943.
Breckinridge Long memoranda to the State Department, 1943.
FBI reports. ITT. Main File, 1943.
Censorship intercepts. ITT. April 14, 1943.
Minutes of meeting between W. A. Winterbottom and Breckinridge Long, August 16, 1943.
ITT. Intelligence report. Bartholomew Higgens to Wendell Berge, September 20, 1943.
Memorandum to Secret Intelligence Service, Berlin, FBI. September 12, 1945.
Interrogations of Baron Kurt von Schroder, November 20-25, 1945.
Interrogatory reports: numerous. Gerhardt Westrick. 1945 (no day or month).

SKF [9]

Memorandum re SKF. Heinrich Kronstein. March 6, 1942.
Secret memorandum. Foreign Economic Administration. Lauchlin Currie to Oscar Cox, February 4, 1944.
Memorandum for Foreign Economic Administration. Control groups in Sweden and their German tie-ups, 1944.
Memorandum from Captain W. D. Puleston to Lauchlin Currie. Foreign Economic Administration, March 15, 1944.
SKF Industries, Inc. report, 1944.
Jean Pajus draft report. Swedish ball-bearing business, May 1944.
Foreign Economic Administration. Memorandum for the files of the Economics Intelligence Division, May 1, 1944.
Miscellaneous telegrams from Ambassador Herschel Johnson in Stockholm to the Department of State. Encoded, May 1944.
Memorandum by Franklin S. Judson. Foreign Economic Administration, May 11, 1944.
Telegram. Stockholm Legation to Foreign Economic Administration and Secretary of State, May 13, 1944.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Memorandum covering interviews with E. Austin and Ernest Wooler. Foreign Economic Administration file, May 19, 1944.
Memorandum of interview with J. W. Tawresey. Franklin S. Judson. June 7, 1944.
SKF. Introduction and summary. Jean Pajus, Foreign Economic Administration, September 15, 1944.
Telegrams received. American Legation, Stockholm, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., October 9, 1944.
Memorandum by Jean Pajus to Lauchlin Currie and Frank Coe, Foreign Economic Administration, November 2, 1944.
Complete summary of SKF wartime activities. Jean Pajus, 1945.

Standard Oil of New Jersey [10]

Report to Sumner Welles by Herbert Feis, March 31, 1941.
Report by John J. Muccio, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Consulate, Panama, to Cordell Hull, May 5, 1941.
Report by H. E. Linam, Standard Oil, Caracas, Venezuela, to Nelson Rockefeller, July 9, 1941.
Report by Major Charles A. Burroughs, G-2, Columbus, Ohio, to Head- quarters, July 15, 1941.
Report from American Legation, Bucharest, Hungary, to State Department, August 5,1941.
Report from E. H. Foley, Jr., Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to Cordell Hull, October 30, 1941.
Report by E. H. Foley, Jr., to the Senate Special Committee on Defense, April 30, 1942.
Letter from H. E. Linam, Standard Oil, to Dr. Frank P. Corrigan, U.S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, June 8, 1942.
Report from Samuel F. Gilbert to Donald Hiss, State Department Foreign Funds Control, July 14, 1942.
Letter from John J. Muccio, U.S. Embassy, Panama, to Cordell Hull, Au- gust 24, 1942.
Report by Leland Harrison, U!S. Embassy, Berne, to Cordell Hull, October 3, 1942.
Report by Daniel J. Reagan, Commercial Attache, Beme, November 6, 1942.
Telegram in code from Leland Harrison to Cordell Hull, December 8, 1942.
Report by Jacques Reinstein to John N. Bohannon, Standard Oil, December 26, 1942.
Report from U.S. Embassy, London, to Cordell Hull, December 29, 1942.
Cable in code from Jacques Reinstein to U.S. Legation, Berne, January 20, 1943.
Telegrams from Leland Harrison, U .S. Legation, Berne, to Cordell Hull, January 28, 1943.
Report from Adolf Berle to U.S. Legation, Berne, February 27, 1943.
Telegrams from Leland Harrison, U.S. Legation, Berne, April 15, 21, 1943.
Telegrams from John A. Winant to Cordell Hull, May 5, 15, 17, and 18, 1943.
Reports from C. F. Sabourin to F. P. Corrigan, U.S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, June 9, 1943.
Report from Frank P. Corrigan to A. T. Proudfit, Standard Oil of Venezuela, June 24, 1943.
Licenses permitting trading with enemy nationals. Various. 1943.

Sterling Products, Inc./General Aniline and Film [11]

Reports. Foreign Economic Administration, 1942, 1943.
Memorandum. Charles Henry Lee to John E. Lockwood. Foreign Economic Administration. July 19, 1941.
Memorandum. Dean Acheson to Jefferson Caffrey. n.d. [1942]
Memorandum. J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle. Alleged German agents in Brazil. May 26, 1942.
Memorandum. E. Schellnebergger. Chief, Commercial Intelligence. Department of Commerce. June 9, 1942.
Memorandum. Dean Acheson to the American Ambassador, Paraguay. June 29, 1942.
Memorandum. George Messersmith to Cordell Hull. July 14, 1942.
Memorandum. J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle. July 28, 1942.
State Department Memorandum to the Charge d'Affaires, Buenos Aires. September 11,1942.
Memorandum. Frederick B. Lyon for Adolf Berle to J. Edgar Hoover. September 16, 1942.
Memorandum. Robert A. Scot ten to State Department. September 21, 1942.
Memorandum. J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle. September 28, 1942.
Memorandum. J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle. October 3, 1942.
Memorandum. Frederick B. Lyon to J. Tannenwald. January 12, 1943.
Correspondence. Philip W. Thayer to State Department. August 1943.
Memorandum. Flemming T. Liggett, FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover. December 30, 1943.

Texas Company [12]

Enclosure to Dispatch No. 10008 of February 12, 1940, from U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, to State Department.
Memorandum from U. S .Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay, to Lawrence Duggan, State Department, June 5, 1940.
Report of the U.S. Legation, Costa Rica, to Cordell Hull, June 13, 1941.
Military Intelligence Division Report, October 9, 1940.
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle. February 10, 1942.
Report by A. R. Randolph, Acting Commercial Attache, Guatemala. December 8, 1942.
Division of the American Republics Report. December 28, 1942.
Miscellaneous authorizations. A. R. Randolph. 1943.
Memorandum from Leland Harrison, U.S. Legation, Berne, Switzerland, to State Department. January 27, 1944.
Memorandum from Leland Harrison, U.S. Legation, Berne, Switzerland, to State Department. January 30, 1944.

_______________

Notes:

1. Files available from Roosevelt Memorial Library, Hyde Park, New York.
2. Files available from Department of the Army. Fort Meade, Maryland.
3. Files available from the Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
4. File available from Freedom of Information Office. FBI Headquarters, Washington. D.C.
5. Files available from Charles Higham Collection, Doheny Library, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
6. Files available from Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C., FBI, and National Archives Diplomatic Records Room.
7. Files available from FBI.
8. Files available from National Archives and Records Service: Social and Industrial Records Room, Washington, DC.
9. Records available from National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland.
10. Records available from National Archives and Records Service. Diplomatic Records Room
11. Records available from FBI and from National Archives Diplomatic Records Room and Records Service, Washington, D.C.
12. Records available from National Archives and Records Service, Diplomatic Records Room.
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:23 am

Selected Documents

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CORPS AREA
OFFICE OF THE CORPS AREA COMMANDER
FORT HAYES, COLUMBUS, OHIO
WAR DEPARTMENT
G-2
July 15, 1941
SUBJECT: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Ships Under Panamanian Registry.
TO: A. C. of S., G-2,
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. A report has been received from Cleveland, Ohio, in which it is stated that the source of this information is unquestionable, to the effect that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey now ships under Panamanian registry, transporting oil (fuel) from Aruba, Dutch West Indies to Teneriffe, Canary Islands, and is apparently diverting about 20% of this fuel oil to the present German government.

2. About six of the ships operating on this route are reputed to be manned mainly by Nazi officers. Seamen have reported to the informant that they have seen submarines in the immediate vicinity of the Canary Islands and have learned that these submarines are refueling there. The informant also stated that the Standard Oil Company has not lost any ships to date by torpedoing as have other companies whose ships operate to other ports.

For the A. C. of S., G-2,
CHAS. A. BURROWS,
Major, Military Intelligence,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2
________________________________________

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Ernst Weber, Zurich -- Chairman

Dott. V. Azzolini, Rome
Y. Breart de Boisanger, Paris
Baron Brincard, Paris
Walther Funk, Berlin
Alexandre Galopin, Brussels
Prof. Francesco Giordani, Rome
Hisaakira Kano, Tokio
Sir Otto Niemeyer, London
Montagu Collet Norman, London
Ivar Rooth, Stockholm
Dr. Hermann Schmitz, Berlin
Kurt Freiherr Von Schroder, Cologne
Dr. L. J. A. Trip, The Hague
Marquis de Vogue, Paris
Yoneji Yamamoto, Berlin

Alternates

Dott. Giovanni Acanfora
Dott. Mario Pennachio
Cameron F. Cobbold, London
Emir Puhl, Berlin

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Thomas H. McKittrick, President
Roger Auboin, General Manager
Paul Hechler, Assistant General Manager
Dott. Raffaele Pilotti, Secretary General
Marcel van Zeeland, Manager

Dr. Per Jacobsson, Economic Adviser
Dr. Felix Weiser, Legal Adviser

16th June 1943.

________________________________________

Memorandum from R.T. Yingling, State Department attorney, to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long

February 26, 1942.

Mr. Long:

It seems that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation which has been handling traffic between Latin American countries and Axis controlled points with the encouragement or concurrence of the Department desires some assurance that it will not be prosecuted for such activities. It has been suggested that the matter be discussed informally with the Attorney General and if he agrees the Corporation can be advised that no prosecution is contemplated.

This office feels that no formal opinion of the Attorney General for its future guidance is necessary in view of Resolution XL on telecommunications adopted at the Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Rio de Janeiro in January of this year. If the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation feels that activities of the nature indicated above which it maybe carrying on at the present time in Latin America are within the purview of the Trading with the Enemy Act it should apply to the Treasury Department for a license to engage in such activities.

Le:RTYingling: LEY: SS

________________________________________

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
DATE: September 9, 1942.
SUBJECT: Telecommunication Circuits With the Axis Maintained by Argentina and Chile.
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary (later); Assistant Secretary Long; Mr. Hackworth, Legal Adviser (later); Mr. Bonsal, RA; Mr. Daniels, RA; Mr. Halle, RA; Mr. Reinstein, A.A.; Mr. Tannenwald, FF; Mr. deWolf, IN.
COPIES TO: A-L, A-A, FF, Le, IN

Memorandum of a Meeting in Mr. Long's Office (Later Adjourned to the Secretary's Office)

Mr. Long pointed out that after months of conversation the American interests in the Consortium Trust (Radio Corporation of America) had done nothing actually to bring about a closure of the circuits maintained with the Axis by the Consortium companies in Argentina and Chile. He said they had proved what degree of control they could exercise over these companies by what had been accomplished in the course of General Davis' visit to Buenos Aires and Santiago, and that consequently he had no doubt but what they could order the companies to suspend the operation of the undesirable circuits. He said that the RCA representatives were coming to see him at 3 p.m. today, and that he had in mind telling them to do what was necessary in order to shut down the circuits by midnight tomorrow (September 10).

Mr. Bonsal suggested the advisability of informing the Argentine and Chilean Governments in advance of the contemplated action, pointing out that the political consequences of doing otherwise might have wide ramifications involving the basic policy governing our relations with the two republics. Specifically, he said, action taken by the companies in response to an initiative from this Government to close the circuits might raise the whole question of control by national governments over public utilities operating within their own jurisdiction. He felt that one of the consequences might be that nationalistic interests would point out that the public services in these countries were controlled by Washington, rather than by the national governments which should properly have jurisdiction.

Mr. Long expressed the view that, should the Governments be notified of the proposed action in advance, they would immediately call in the Axis representatives and that then we would have a fight on our hands. Mr. Bonsal felt that, in any case, we should be much better informed than we were of what the legal and political consequences of such action would be before we embarked on it.

The suggestion was advanced by Messrs. Daniels and Halle that it might be sufficient to have the RCA representatives be prepared to issue the necessary orders immediately when the Department gives them word to go ahead. This suggestion was based especially on the possibility that the Chilean Government might cut the circuits in the near future on its own initiative, and that since such initiative would lead the country nearer to a complete diplomatic break with the Axis, it would be preferable to company initiative.

The meeting thereupon adjourned to the Secretary's Office, where Mr. Long placed the problem and various considerations that had been advanced before the Secretary. The Secretary, citing the vital economic assistance that we were extending to Argentina, especially in the way of iron and steel shipments, said that we had a right to expect a good deal more cooperation in return than we were getting. He said that, while he had not been in close touch with the situation in Argentina over the past few months, he felt the time had come when we should deal more severely with the Argentine Government. Consequently, he favored Mr. Long's proposal to ask RCA to have the circuits abandoned by midnight tomorrow. Mr. Bonsal expressed his view that we should have more information on the provisions of the franchises under which the companies were operating before proceeding further. The Secretary said that he felt the question of what the franchises provided concerned the Consortium and the Consortium companies rather than this Government. It was agreed that, because of indications that the Chilean Government would not oppose company initiative in this matter, the Chilean authorities should be notified in advance: In the case of Argentina, the Secretary expressed no objection to our having the company take the action forthwith.

RA: LHalle: MM

________________________________________

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: May 24, 1943.
SUBJECT: Communications.
PARTICIPANTS: Colonel Sarnoff, RCA
Mr. Long.
COPIES TO: RA, IN

I talked to Colonel Sarnoff on the telephone and explained to him that we had reason to believe that more messages than the agreed 700 code-groups a week were being sent from B.A. by the Axis powers to their Governments. I told him I could not disclose down there the source of our information. In an effort to obtain additional information our representatives down there had approached Hayes. Hayes had seemed to them noncooperative. There may have been very sound reasons why he refused to disclose the exact number of messages sent in code-groups by each of the Axis representatives to their Government. However, there didn't seem to be any reason why the managership should not request a report on all code-groups being sent over a period of time, day by day, and to include a report on all belligerents, and that if he would obtain that information through confidential channels we would be appreciative. I suggested it be not done by telegraph or telephone and suggested the mail, but offered to make the pouch available.

Colonel Sarnoff replied that he would talk to Mr. Winterbottom but he saw no reason why we should not do it and that he would communicate with us if they wanted to use the pouch.

After receipt of this information we will be in a better position to judge what our policy should be.

B. L.

A-L: BL: lag

________________________________________

May 25 1943

Secretary Morgenthau
Randolph Paul

A short time ago a brief investigation was made of the files of the Ford Motor Company of Dearborn, Michigan, in order to determine the extent of its relationship and its control over its French subsidiary. Since the investigative report is rather lengthy, I have attached hereto a summary thereof which discloses that from the fall of France to July 1942 -- the date of the last letter in the files from Ford of France to Ford of America: (1) the business of the Ford subsidiaries in France substantially increased; (2) their production was solely for the benefit of Germany and the countries under its occupation; (3) the Germans have "shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interests" because of the attitude of strict neutrality maintained by Henry and Edsel Ford; and (4) the increased activity of the French Ford subsidiaries on behalf of the Germans received the commendation of the Ford family in America.

I am sure you will want to read the attached report. We propose to submit informally copies of the investigative report to Military Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and other similar investigative agencies.

If you are in agreement, please so indicate below.

(Initialed) H.E.P.

Attachment.

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Approved:

RRShwartz: rhb 5/22/43

________________________________________

By Jean Pajus-June 1944

Memorandum by Jean Pajus. Foreign Economic Administration

June 1944.

MEMORANDUM ON SKF

In the current investigation on SKF the following points are important:

1. The important foreign files, including the correspondence between SKF in this country and SKF Sweden, and other foreign countries have been destroyed by order of the American SKF officials. According to an interview with Mr. William Batt it is the custom of the American SKF to destroy its files every seven years. It is extremely significant that Mr. Batt ordered the destruction of all foreign correspondence for the years prior to 1941 and 1942. Orders to destroy these files came down three days after Sweden was blocked by the United States Treasury in 1941.

2. Ever since the war began the Swedish company has been giving orders to its American affiliate with respect to volume of production, prices, and other matters of major policy. At one time it appears that the Swedish company deliberately withheld the shipment of necessary machinery to curtail production in this country for about eight months. All ball bearing machinery for SKF companies must be imported from Sweden and, consequently, the parent company can dictate changes in ball bearing production in foreign countries.

3. All of these orders from the Swedish parent company came through the Swedish Legation in Washington, thus escaping the normal channels of censorship.

4. There is a very considerable investment of German capital in the Swedish company. At the time of the merger of the German companies into the VKF Combine, under control of the Swedish SKF, a very substantial block of shares in the Swedish company was given to Germany. The shares received by the Germans were so-called B shares -- those without voting rights -- but the evidence is clear that the Germans have a very important position in the determination of all major matters of policy. In fact, the former manager of the German ball bearing is now manager of the Swedish company.

5. The largest share of SKF's production is located in Axis-controlled Europe, 52% in Germany and 64% in Germany and France.

6. There is considerable evidence of a direct German interest in the United States Company. Just prior to the last war the Hess-Bright Company, owned by the German Munitions Trust was purportedly sold to the Swedish SKF. The Investigation made by the Alien Property Custodian at that time indicated great doubt in the validity of the sale to the Swedes. A cash transaction of $2,800,000 reported paid to the Germans by the Swedish Company for the property was never traced. In fact the whole investigation was a fraud, since the final report submitted by the United States Secret Service was written by the vice president of SKF. Other evidence indicates that the Swedish company merely acted as a front for the German company and that that situation still exists.

7. Further evidence to show how the German and Swedish interests are inextricably linked is the fact that in 1912 SKF Sweden purchased 50% of the Norma Ball Bearing Company, Cannstadt, Germany. This purchase was necessary in order to secure access to German patents and to make sales in the German market from which it was previously excluded by the German Ball Bearing Cartel. In 1912 they joined the German cartel and became a licensee under the Conrad Patent. In 1929 the Norma Company was merged into VKF and a further German interest in the Swedish Company took place.

The Norma Company of America, a branch of the German Norma Company, was taken over by the Alien Property Custodian upon our entering into the war and, subsequently, was sold to American interests in 1919. At that time William Batt acted as an attorney in fact for the Norma Company. This indicates how closely knit Mr. Batt's interests with the Germans have been in the past.

8. Until 1940 Mr. Batt was a member of the board of directors of the American Bosch Company which has since been seized by the U.S. Alien Property Custodian. This company attempted to cloak its German ownership under a purported sale of the properties to Swedish interests affiliated with SKF just prior to our entrance into the present war. The Alien Property Custodian nevertheless seized the properties on the ground that the transfer was fraudulent. It is reported that, at the time of the American Bosch investigation, a memorandum was prepared by the Treasury Department on Mr. Batt's connections with German companies, which was sent to the White House. The memorandum raised the question of the desirability of allowing Mr. Batt to hold a prominent position in the War Production Board in the light of his business affiliations.

9. Numerous letters in the SKF files indicated that Mr. Batt was under orders from the Swedish company to supply the Latin American market, irrespective of current war orders in the United States; and that all sales in the United States should be based primarily on the long-term business interests of the company rather than the needs of the war effort.

At the present time an FEA representative is in Sweden attempting to purchase the SKF production in Sweden for $30,000,000. In the light of the above facts it would seem that action other than that of purchase could be effected to get the results desired.

The following steps are suggested:

a. Declare null and void the voting trust agreement now placed by Swedish SKF in the hands of Mr. Batt.

b. Seize the SKF properties in the United States, placing them under the Alien Property Custodian.

c. Place on the U.S. Proclaimed List all SKF companies in Sweden and Latin America.

d. Encourage American firms to export ball bearings to Latin America to compete with the SKF monopoly in those countries.

e. Place on the U.S. Proclaimed List all major Swedish companies affiliated with SKF., i.e., Asea, Atlas Diesel, Separator, Etc.

f. Block all transfers of funds from Latin American subsidiaries to Sweden.

g. Eliminate the Swedish cartel in ball bearings in Germany after the war.

h. Eliminate the Swedish monopoly in France and Japan.

i. Seize all patents belonging to SKF Sweden and SKF Germany and other patents held by SKF subsidiaries in Europe.

________________________________________

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE FEB 12 1945
TO: Secretary Morgeuthau
FROM: Harry White HDW
Information re Case Bk activities in Paris.

You will recall that on September 12, 1944, we reported to you that a study of an exchange of correspondence in New York between Chase, Paris, and Chase, New York, from the date of the fall of France to May 1942 disclosed that (1) the Paris branch collaborated with the Germans; (2) Chase was held in "very special esteem" by the Germans; (3) the Paris manager was "very vigorous" in enforcing restrictions unnecessarily against Jewish property; and (4) the home office took no direct steps to remove the Paris manager as it might "react" against their interests. We were then aware that the Paris branch of Chase acceded to the demands of the Germans to continue normal operations, even though both the Guaranty and National City had refused and substantial liquidation ensued.

On the basis of this report, you agreed with our recommendation to investigate Chase in France. As of the present date our investigation of the Chase records in France confirms the above mentioned findings, and discloses the following additional information:

1. S. P. Bailey, an American citizen who was in charge of the Paris office in June 1940, felt that it was desirable to, and actually commenced to, liquidate the Paris office. Some time thereafter and certainly by June 1941 his powers were revoked when the home office conferred authority on Niedermann who thereafter successfully ran the Paris office during German occupation, and Bertrand who remained at Chateauneuf in then unoccupied France.

2. Although Chase in New York did not, so far as is presently known, send instructions for the Paris branch after February 4, 1942, there is thus far no evidence that Chase even attempted to veto any transactions of the Paris office or between the office in the Free Zone and the office in Paris even when such contemplated transactions were the subject of requests for instructions.

3. Between May 1942 and May 1943, deposits in the Paris office virtually doubled. Almost half of the increase in deposits took place in two German accounts.

4. About a month after United States' entry into the war, the Chase attorney in Paris advised that it was a matter of "the most elementary prudence" to block American accounts notwithstanding that no such instructions had been issued by the occupying authorities. We are awaiting further reports as to whether the suggested action was taken.

5. In May 1942 the Paris branch advised a Berlin bank that certain instructions of the latter had been carried out and that the Paris branch "are at your disposal to continue to undertake the execution of banking affairs in France for your friends as well as for yourselves ***."

I will keep you advised of further developments in the investigation of Chase and the other American banks in Paris. In this connection you might be interested in reading the attached cable received yesterday from Hoffman in Paris which describes a meeting he held with Mr. Larkin who was apparently sent to Paris by Aldrich to try to straighten up the Chase offices. Larkin reported that Aldrich and the New York board of Chase were very much concerned over the situation in the Paris office of Chase, and that it was Larkin's job "to get to the bottom of the situation and make the necessary adjustments in personnel." It is significant that Larkin emphasized the fact that Chase, New York, had been cut off from the Paris branch since the United States entered the war. This does not agree with our findings which disclose that between the date of the fall of France and May 1942, Chase, New York, was kept advised about activities in Chase, Paris.

Attachment.

________________________________________

6
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT Of STATE

Ref: 1634/21/43
No: 366

1943 JUN 1 PM 3.21

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF
JUN 21 1943
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to state that His Royal Highness, the Duke of Windsor, Governor of the Bahamas, has enquired whether the United States Government would be so good as to grant exemption from United States censorship to the correspondence of the Duchess of Windsor. Lord Halifax would be grateful for such sympathetic consideration as can properly be given to this enquiry.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
31st May, 1943.

________________________________________

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

June 18, 1943

Memorandum

I believe that the Duchess of Windsor should emphatically be denied exemption from censorship.

Quite aside from the more shadowy reports about the activities of this family, it is to be recalled that both the Duke and Duchess of Windsor were in contact with Mr. James Mooney, of General Motors, who attempted to act as mediator of a negotiated peace in the early winter of 1940; that they have maintained correspondence with Bedaux, now in prison in North Africa and under charges of trading with the enemy, and possibly of treasonable correspondence with the enemy; that they have been in constant contact with Axel Wenner-Gren, presently on our Blacklist for suspicious activity; etc. The Duke of Windsor has been finding many excuses to attend to "private business" in the United States, which he is doing at present.

There are positive reasons, therefore, why this immunity should not be granted -- as well as the negative reason that we are not according this privilege to the wife of any American official.

A.A.B., Jr.
A-B: AAB: ES
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:25 am

Index

Abetz, Otto, 11, 25-28, 183-184, 190
Abs, Hermann, 217
Acheson, Dean: at Bretton Woods, 12-15: Davis Oil and, 68; Ford Company and, 161: ITT and, 100: SKF and, 123, 125, 128: Standard Oil and, 40-41,55-57,60-61
Adam-Opel (GM subsidiary), 168,171, 175
Admiral Graf Spee (battleship), 149
Agfa company, 133-134
Agricultura1 Advisory Commission, 3
Aguirre, Ernesto, 108-109
Alba, Duke of, 94
Alba Pharmaceutical Company, 142
Albert, Dr. Heinrich, 95,142,154-160
Aldrich, Winthrop (of Chase National Bank), 20,22-23,25,28-31: BIS and, 12,18-19: SS and, 132
Algiers, BIS in, 10-11
Alien Property Custodian, Office of (see also Crowley, Leo T.): GAF and, 137-139: SKF and, 118,127, 140: Sterling and, 141-142, 151
All-American Cables Office, 104
All Honorable Men (Martin), 217
Allied Military Government, 211-,-212
Allied War Council, 182
Almazan, Juan, 77
Alpa (Nazi firm), 175
Ambruster, Howard, 144-145, 151 152
America and a New World Order (Howard), 166, 215
America First movement, 72, 157
American Agriculturist, The (journal), 3
American Chemical Society, 162
American Cyanamid, 140
American 1.G. Chemical Corp.: Edsel Ford and, 156;GAFand, 131, 133, 134; Standard Oil and, 33-34, 36; succeeded by General Aniline and Film, 36
American Liberty League, 162, 165
American Magazine, 35
American Nazi party, 165
American Red Cross, 18,125
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), 94
Anderson, Sir John, 15
Angell, Frank, 193
Ansco,133
antiblack and ant-communist movements, Du Pont involvement in, 162,165
anti-Semitism (see also Auschwitz; Jews): at Ford Motor Company, 154-155, 157-158; among German-Americans, 192; at GM, 162, 165, 167-168; at SKF, 121; in U.S. State Department, 85
Antonescu, General Ion, 37
AO (Organization of Germans Abroad), 133,135,189-190
Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco), 82-85,88-92
Arab Legion, 80
Arab world, Hitler and, 80-81
Aramco, see Arabian-American Oil Company
Armanda Capriles and Company, 104
Arnold, General Henry H. (.'Hap"), 122,213
Arnold, Thurman, 44-53, 152
Asea, 122
Asia and the Americas (journal), 84
Associated Bunds organization, 192
Associated Press, 6
AT&T, 94
Auboin, Roger, 5
Auer, Erhard, 155
Auschwitz: BIS and, 18; GAF and, 131; postwar treatment of, 211, 213
Austria National Bank, gold looted from, 4-5, 210n, 214
Austrian State Opera, 37
aviation fuel, wartime trade in, 34 -36, 52-53,220
Axis powers: Ford and, 159-161; 1TT and, 111-112, 113; Standard Oil and, 43
Azzolini, Vincenzo, 3

Backer, Mrs. Dorothy S. 89
Bahrein, Sheikh of, 84
Bailey, S. P. 28-29
ball bearings, international wartime trade in, 116-129
Banca Commerciale Italiana, 24
Banco Aleman Transatlantico, 26, 122, 150
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 1-19; at Bretton Woods, 12-19; Bank of England and, 2, 5-9; Bank of France and, 2, 3, 5, 8, 6; Chase Bank and, 2, 12, 17, 18-19, 20; Davis Oil and, 63, 72; Farben and, 145; Ford Motor Company and, 159-160; GAP and, 131-132; GM and, 168-169; ITT and, 95, 96; postwar role of, 210, 214, 218; Standard Oil and, 18, 59
Bankhead, William, funeral of, 86
Bank of Belgium, gold looted from, 1, 8,16-17, 210n
Bank of England, BIS and, 2, 5-9; Czech gold transfer and, 6, 7; Standard Oil and, 59
Bank of France: BIS and, 2, 3, 5, 8, 16; Ford Motor Company and, 160; Hitler and, 183; Standard Oil and, 59; Windsor and, 183
Bank of Italy, 2, 3
Bank of Sweden, 9
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 22, 24, 184
Banque Francaise et Italienne pour l'Amerique du Sud, 24
Barco pipeline, 76
Barth, Alfred W., 23, 30
Baruch, Bernard, 51
Batt, William L, (of SKF), 116-122, 125-129
Bayer Company, 141-142, 145, 147, 149-152
Beacon Research Laboratory , 78
Beaverbook, Lord, 195, 197
Bedaux, Charles (systems inventor), 165-166, 177, 178-188, 220
Bedaux, Fern Lombard, 179-181,184
Beekrnan, Gustave, 88-89
Beer Business (Germany), control of, 67
Behn, Nando, 107
Behn, Sosthenes (of ITT), 93-96, 98,104,109, 111-115; AO and, 191; GAF and, 137; GM and, 167,171; National City Bank and, 20; post-war role of, 215-216; SKF and, 116-117,121-122; SS and, 132; Standard Oil and, 36
Bennett, Jack, 221
Bensmann, Nikolaus, 77-78, 178
Bentley, Elizabeth, 223
Berge, Wendell, 152
Berger, Bernard, 82
Berle, Adolf A. (of U.S. State Department): Davis Oil and, 68 70; Farben and, 148-149; GM and, 174, 177; Standard Oil and, 39; Windsors and, 183
Bernstein, Colonel Bernard, 219-220
Bertrand, Albert, 25-27, 31
Beyen, J. W., 5,6-7, 12, 13
Beyond Our Shores the World Shall Know Us (RCA), 112
Biddle, Francis (attorney general): AO and, 200-208; Bedaux and, 186-187; Chase Bank and, 28; GAP and, 137-139; Proclaimed List and, 40; Standard Oil and, 40, 45, 48; Sterling and, 151-153; Welles and, 87
BIS, see Bank for International Settlements
Black Legion, 165
Black Luftwaffe, 64
Blair, Frank A., 142
Blume, Hans, 105-106, 108-109
Blume, Kurt, 109
Board of Economic warfare, 43-44, 82, 101
Board of Trade for German-American Commerce, 134
Bofors munitions empire, 117
Bohle, Ernst-Wilhelm, 189n
Boisanger, Yves Breart de, 3, 10
Bone, Senator Homer T., 48-53, 151
Borchers, Dr. Hans, 200
Borchers, Heinrich, 172
Bormann, Martin, 189
Bosch, Carl, 142, 15'5
Bosch company, 118
Brady, William G., Jr., 53
Brasol, Boris, 155
Braun, Miguel, 54
Bretton Woods, 1nternational Monetary Conference at, 12-19
Bretton Woods Act, 15
Brewster, Senator Owen, 87, 89 -90, 214
British-American Chamber of Commerce, 7
British Cable and Wireless, 104-106, 108, 110-111
British 1ntelligence, 35
British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 123
British Purchasing Commission, 120,195, 196-197
Bronson, Richardson, 222
Broun, Heywood, 43
Brown, Edward E. (Ned), 12, 14-15
Brown Brothers, Harriman, 221
Buchman, Frank, 180
Bullitt, William C. (U.S. ambassador to France): Aramco and, 82-83, 85-87; BIS and, 4; GAP and, 138; Standard Oil and, 37; Welles and, 85-87; Windsors and, 180, 183
Burke, Thomas, 106-107
Burrows, Major Charles A., 40-41
Butler, General Smedley, 163-164

Caesar, Hans-Joachim: Bedaux and, 183; Chase Bank and, 20-21, 25-28; Davis and, 67; ITT and, 95
Cahill, John T., 30
California Standard, 76, 84
Caltex, 80-82, 85, 89-92
Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm, 189, 209
Capehart, Senator Homer, 115
Cardenas, Lazaro, 66 -67
Carillo, Alejandro, 66
Carp, Werner, 217
Chamberlain, Neville (British prime minister), 5-6, 181-182, 190
Chase Manhattan Bank (formerly Chase National Bank), 20
Chase National Bank. Bedaux and, 183; BIS and, 2, 12, 17, 18-19, 20; Ford Motor Company and, 160; GAP and, 20, 132, 134; Nazi account of, 20 -31; Rockefeller ownership of, 18-19,20; Standard Oil and, 32, 57; Sterling and, 20
Chemical Company (Farben subsidiary), 133
Chemie (I.G.) (Farben subsidiary), 34, 134, 216,220
Chemnyco (parben subsidiary), 54, 137
Chicago Tribune, Hitler interview in, 155
Churchill, Winston (British prime minister): BIS and, 6: Ibn Saud and, 83, 84; war policy of, 194; Windsor and, 181, 183
Cia Argentinia Comercial de Pesqueria, 54
CIDRA, 103
CIO, 66, 68-69,71-72, 74
Circle of Friends (financiers of the Gestapo), 20, 84, 94, 132
Clark, Bennett C , 88-89
Clark, Charles, 62
Clark, Edward Terry, 143
Clark, Thomas C. (Tom), 75
Clark's Crusaders, 162
Clauson, Pete, 77
Clay, General Lucius D., 213-214, 221-222
Clayton, Will, 98
Clemm, Karl von, 63-65, 67, 71-74
Clemm, Werner von, 63-65, 67, 71-72,74
Cochran, Merle, 4-9
Coffee, John M., 11-12, 168, 183
Cole, Felix, 159-160
Collier, Harry D. (of California Standard), 36, 44, 84 -85; Caltex and, 83; Davis Oil and, 74; Texas Company and, 79
Compagnie Generale, 104
Compania Veracruzana, 72
Condor airline, 39, 41
Coolidge, Calvin, 142-143
Corcoran, David, 146
Corcoran, Thomas (Tommy), 145-146, 151-152
Coudert, Frederic, 8
Council of Twelve, 132, 189
Crockett, Alice, 196
Crowley, Leo T. (alien property custodian): GAF and, 137-140, 215, 216; SKF and, 118; Sterling and, 143, 151
Cuba, GM in, 173
Cummings, Homer S. (attorney general), 79, 135
Currie, Lauchlin (of White House Economic Staff): at Bretton Woods, 18; denounced by HUAC, 223; Ford Motor Company and, 160-161; postwar mission of, 219; SKF and, 119-121, 123-125, 128-129
Curtis Wright Aviation Corporation, 120
Czech National Bank, gold looted from, 1,5-9, 16-17, 210n, 214

Daniell, Raymond, 217-218, 219
DAPG (Standard Oil German subsidiary), 56
Darlan, Jean, 183
Davis, General Robert C., 18, 104, 107-110
Davis, William Rhodes (of Davis Oil Company), 63 74
Davis Oil Company, 63 74; Acheson and, 68; Berle and, 68 70; BIS and, 63,72; Farben and, 63, 65; GM and, 63; ITT and, 95; Texas Company and, 77
Day, Stephen A., 136
Dearborn, Richard J., 51-52,77
Dearborn Independent (Ford news paper), 155
Death's Head Brigade, 132
de Gaulle, General Charles A., 113, 172
Denker, Paul, 214
Deterding, Sir Henri, 33, 65
Deutsche Bank, 214
Deutsche Obersseeische Bank, 26
Deutsche Landersbank, 214,217
De Wolf, Francis, 102-103 diamond trade: Chase Bank and, 24, 28, 30; von Clemms and, 63-65, 67, 71-74
Dickson, George, 97
Dicto (cargo ship), 124
Diesel company, 122
Dillon, Read (bankers), Hitler and, 135, 212
Dinkelbach, Heinrich, 217
Dodd, Thomas E., 17
Dodd, William E., 167
Dodge, Joseph, 213
Dollfuss, Maurice, 157-161
Donovan, William, 98
Draper, Brigadier General William H., 129, 212-215, 219-223
Dresdnerbank, 132, 175, 214
Dulles, Allen (of Sullivan and Cromwell law firm): Chase Bank and, 22; Farben and, 143: Ford and, 154; ITT and, 112-113; postwar role of, 216
Dulles, John Foster (secretary of state; member of Sullivan and Cromwell law firm): Belgian Bank and, 8; Chase Bank and, 22; Farben and, 8, 143; Ford and, 154; GAP and, 139 -140; ITT and, 95; SKF and, 118
Dunnington, Walter G., 79
du Pont, Irenee, 162-163, 165-166
du Pont, Lammot, 142, 162, 165, 179
du Pont, Pierre, 162
Du Pont family: Farben and, 220; FDR overthrow plotted by, 163-165; GAF and, 131; GM and, 162-66; Hitler and, 171, 174; Standard Oil and, 34
Durr, C. J., 102-103, 110
Duvoisin, David, 55, 58
Dwyre, Dudley G., 150

Eastman Kodak. GAP and, 140; ITT and, 98
Eden, Anthony, 12
Edward VIII of England, see Windsor, Duke of
Einzig, Paul, 5 7; In the Center of Things, 7
Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: Bedaux and, 186; North African invasion planned by, 10; postwar policies of, 212-213, 217, 218, 219
Electrolux: Goring and, 67; SKF cand, 117,122
Emanuel, Victor, 139 -140
Epoca (journal), 39
Erca (Nazi firm), 175
Erhardt, Ludwig, 200
Erickson, P. E., 104
Ericsson Company, 102
Esso 4 (Standard Oil's Rhine barge), 56
Ethyl company, 34 -35
European Standard Corporation (ITT in
Europe),101
Eurotank, 63,65, 66, 70, 72, 73
Export-Import Bank, 104

Fahey, Charles, 219
Farben (I.G.) industrial trust (see also Ilgner, Max; Schmitz, Hermann), 130-153; AO and, 189, 193, 196; Auschwitz and, 131; Bedaux and, 178; Berle and, 148-149; B1S and, 145; Chamberlain and, 6; Davis Oil
and, 63,65; Dulles and, 8, 143;
Ford Motor Company and, 33, 142-143, 159; GAP and, 130-141,142,148, 149; GM and, 162, 176, 216; Hitler overthrow plotted by, 194; intelligence network, see N.W.7; ITT and, 96, 113; postwar treatment of, 211-223; Roosevelt letter on, 211; SKF and, 118; Standard Oil and, 33-38, 46-50, 52, 54,56,58,61-62, 216-217,220; 'Statistical Branch', of, 133; Sterling Products and, 135, 141-153; systems of, 178; Texas Company and, 76, 78
Farish, William S., 32, 35-39, 42-53, 55
Farish family, 52-53
Fath, Creekmore, 21-22, 52
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation; see also Hoover, J. Edgar): AO and, 189, 193-209; Aramco and, 88-1; Bedeaux and, 186-187; Chase Bank and, 24-25; Davis Oil and, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74; GAP and, 134; GM and, 172-174, 176; ITT and, 108,109, 112; sexual deviants pursued by, 86-89
Federal Communications Commission, 102-130, 108-110
Federal Reserve Bank. B1S and, 1-2, 10,11; Belgian gold and, 8; Chase Bank and 31; New York Post financed by, 89; Standard Oil and, 59
Fellgiebel, General Erich, 112-113, 215
Ferguson Commission, 223
Fezandie and Sperrle, 136
Fifth Column, 82, 89
Financial News, 5
First National Bank of Boston, 63
First National Bank of New York, 2
Flack, Joseph, 59
Flynn, Errol, 180
Focke Wulf company: ITT and, 93, 95; postwar disposition of, 220; SKF and, 116
Foley, Edward H., Jr., 41
Ford, Edsel, 154, 156-161; American I.G. and, 156; Farben and, 33; GAP and, 131, 135; ITT and, 97-98; Sterling Products and, 142; trucks sold to enemy by, 55, 159 -60
Ford, Henry, 154-157, 159, 161; AO and, 191,196; BIS and, 159-160;
Farben and, 142-143; Hitler and, 154 -156, 168, 172; International Jew, The, 155; ITT and, 97-98; Standard Oil and, 33
Ford Motor Company, 154-161; Acheson and, 161; anti-Semitism at, 154-155; 157-158; Bank of France and, 160; Bedaux and, 183; Chase Bank and, 160; Farben and, 159; ITT and, 95,97-98; SKF and, 116; systems of, 178
Foreign Economic Administration: GAF and, 139; postwar operation of, 215; SKF and, 121, 127-128
Forrestal, James V.: GAF and, 135; ITT and, 114; postwar policies of, 212: Standard Oil and, 39; suicide of, 210 -211; Texas Company and, 78, 80,83, 85
Fortune magazine, 118
Foxworth, Percy, 198, 201
Franco, Generalissimo Francisco: Chase Bank and, 21; ITT and, 94, 95, 100; Standard Oil and, 59-61; Texas Company and, 76
Frank-Fahle, Gunther, 214
Fraser, Ingram, 195, 196-197
Fraser, Leon, 2, 11, 12, 13
Fraternity, The, defined, xiii-xiv
Freon, GM and, 176
Freudenberg, Richard, 214-215
Friends of New Germany, 191
Funk, Dr. Walther (Reichsbank president): BIS and, 1-2, 4-5, 14, 17, 18; Chase Bank and, 22, 25; Ibn Saud and, 80; ITT and, 96; postwar findings on, 219

GAF, see General Aniline and Film
Gallagher, Ralph W., 53, 58, 59, 61-62
Galopin, Alexandre, 3,8
Gantt, Robert A., 101
General Aniline and Film (GAF); American I.G. and, 36-38, 131, 133, 134; AO and, 192, 196; Auschwitz and, 131; BIS and, 131-132; Chase Bank and, 132, 134; Farben and, 130-141, 142, 148, 149; Ford Motor Company and, 131,135,154,156; GM and, 131, 162; ITT and, 137; postwar status of, 215,216,220, 223; SKF and, 118; Standard Oil and, 139-140; Texas Company and, 78
General Dyestuffs, 137, 139
General Electric, 221
General Motors (see also Mooney, James D.), 162-177; anti-Semitism at, 162, 165, 167-168; Berle and, 174, 177; BIS and, 168-169; in Cuba, 173; Davis Oil and, 63; Farben and, 162, 176, 216; GAF and, 131, 162; ITT and, 95, 97, 167, 170, 171; Standard Oil and, 34; systems of, 178
Georgetown University, Mooney diaries at, 170
Gerard, James W., 58
German-American Bund, 165
German-American Business League, 192
German-American Commerce Association Bulletin, The, 25, 174
German Americans, anti-Semitism among, 192
German Economics Ministry, 130
German Import-Export Corporation, 67
German Secret Service, 135
German TransOcean News Agency, 84
Germany (see also Nazi Germany), postwar reconstruction of, 15-16, 212
Gestapo (see also Himmler, Heinrich; Schellenberg, Walter): AO and, 194, 198, 201;"Bedaux and, 184; BIS and, 2, 7, 17; financing of, 20, 84, 94, 132; Chase Bank and, 20, 23, 27; Davis Oil and, 63; GM and, 174- 75; ITT and, 93, 98-99; postwar treatment of, 214; Schroder (of GAF) and, 132; Texas Company and, 78, 84
GM, see General Motors
Goddard (Theodore) and Company, 204
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph, 38, 190 gold: financiers' emphasis on, 178; Nazi looting of, 1-19, 210, 214, 218-219 good neighbor policy, Standard Oil violation of, 47
Goring, Hermann: art collection of, 27; BIS policy opposed by, 10; Davis
Goring, Herman (Cont.) Oil and, 63-64, 67 72; Ford and, 156; Four-Year Plan of, 131,137;
GM and, 162-163,170-171, 174; ITT and, 94 -95; quoted, 144; SKF and, 116,117, 126; Standard Oil and 33, 37-38: Texas Company and, 76; Windsors and, 181
Gorman, Francis J., 181
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, 80-82, 84
Grasselli company, 142
Gray, William Steele, Jr., 79
Great Britain and the World (journal), 84
Griffis, Stanton, 125-126, 129
Grobba, Dr. Fritz, 84
Grube, Colonel Wilhelm, 101
Guernsey, diamond smuggling in, 24
Guffey, Senator Joseph F., 66,72
Gunther, Christian E., 123
Gyssling, George, 200

Hackworth, Green H., 41-42
Hague Memorandum, 36-37
Halbach, Ernest K., 136-141, 216, 220
Halifax, Lord, 177,190, 194-195, 197
Hallauer, Martin, 110
Hamberg, Harald, 125-126
Hamilton, Duke of, 180
Hardy Bank, 71
Harriman, Averell, 221
Hams, Henry Upham, 79
Hamson, Earl G., 152
Harrison, Leland (U.S. minister to Switzerland): Davis Oil and, 74; GM and, 176; Standard Oil and, 55, 57-58
Haslam, R. T., 61, 216
Havero Trading Company, 104
Hawkins, Phillips, 222
Hayes, Carlton J. H., 59-60, 100
Hayes, George W., 109-111
Healey, James E, Jr., 30-31
Hefferich, Emil, 20
Heider, Carl von, 214
Hemisphere Communications Committee, 101-102
Henggler, Henri, 55
Hertslet, Joachim G. A., 67-70
Hess, Rudolf, 180, 198-199
Hill, James J., 79, 147-148
Himmler, Heinrich (Gestapo chief): AO and, 189, 194, 196, 198, 201; Bedaux and, 179-180; BIS and, 17; Chase Bank and, 20; Davis Oil and, 63,65,68,69: GAP and, 132: GM and, 168, 175: ITT and, 98-99,113
Hitler, Adolf. AO and, 189-91, 194, 196, 198-199; B1S and, 2, 10; Chase Bank and, 21,25; Davis Oil and, 65, 68-69; Du Ponts and, 171, 174; Farben and, 194; Ford and, 154-156, 168, 172; France and, 181, 183: GAP and, 132; GE and, 221; GM and, 162,166,170-171, 173; Hohenlohe and, 200-201; Ibn Saud and, 80- 3, 85; ITT and, 94-95, 98-99, 112-113; Jewish financial aid to, 135: Jewish power as viewed by, 80-81; Lindbergh and, 157: Mein Kampf, 155; plots against, 9-10, 113, 189, 194; Standard Oil and, 34-35; Windsors and, 178, 180,182
Hoagland, Warren E., 41-42
Hoefken-Hempel, Anny, 180
Hohenlohe, Princess Mabel, 193
Hohenlohe, Princess Stefanie, 189 208: husband of, 191
Holland National Bank, gold looted from, 1, 16-17, 210n
Holt, Senator Rush D., 73, 136 homosexuality, public officials charged with, 86-89
Hoover, Herbert: AO and, 197; Farben and, 142, 143; GAF and, 131; postwar report of, 222-223
Hoover, J. Edgar (See also FBI): AO and, 193-195, 198-209; Aramco and, 86-89: Bedaux and, 186; Chase and, 24-25; Davis Oil and, 68 70; Farben and, 148-149; GM and, 172-174; homosexuality imputed to, 86; ITT and, 97, 112; Windsor and, 181-182
Hopkins, Harry L, 81, 138
hops, German franchise in, 67
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 223
Howard, Frank A., 36-38,45, 47, 52, 53, 54, 61
Howard, Graeme K., 166, 174,215
Hubbard, Father Bernard R., 133-134
Hudek, Karel, 96-97
Hull, Cordell (secretary of state): Bedaux and, 186; BIS and, 4,8,14; Chase and, 29; Davis Oil and, 69; Farben and, 211; GM and, 172, 176-177; ITT and, 96, 98, 109; Standard Oil and, 38, 39, 41, 43, 54, 57-61; Welles and, 87
Hull, Lyttle, 195, 199
Hungary, BIS loans to, 9

lbn Saud, Abdul-Aziz, 80-85, 90
Ickes, Harold L. (secretary of the interior): Aramco and, 83-85;GM and, 172; Standard Oil and, 42-49, 53- 54, 60-61; Texas Company and, 78; Windsors and, 183
I.G., See American I.G. Chemical Corp.; Chemie (I.G.); Farben
(I.G.) industrial trust
llgner, Max (of Farben): AO and, 189, 192; GAF and, 131, 133, 141, 143-144; postwar role of, 211, 213; Texas Company and, 77-78
Ilgner, Rudolf, 133-134, 136, 137, 211
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 187-188, 195-197, 199, 203-207
Imperial Chemical Industries, 6
Industria Electre-Ace Palngt, 103
In Fact (newsletter), 168
1ngles, Major General Harry C., 115
Inglessi, Jean, 56-58
International Jew, The (Henry Ford), 155
International Monetary Conference (Bretton Woods, 1944), 12-19
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT; see also Behn, Sosthenes; Westrick, Gerhardt), 93- 95; Acheson and, 100; B1S and 95, 96; Chase Bank and, 20; Davis Oil Company and, 95; Farben and, 96, 113; Ford Motor Company and, 95, 97-98; GAP and, 137; GM and, 95,97, 167, 170, 171; Nazi arrangement with, 98; postwar role of, 216, 220, 222; SKF and, 116, 122; SS and, 132; Standard Oil and, 36, 95, 113; Sterling and, 95, 97; systems of, 178; U.S. arrangement with, 100
International Trading Company, 24
In the Center of Things (Einzig), 7
Inverforth, Lord, 65
Iran, Hitler and, 81
Iraq, Hitler and, 81-85
Italcable, 104, 107
ITT, see International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation Jackson, Robert H. (attorney general): AO and, 198, 200, 202; Davis Oil and, 69; GAP and, 137; at Nuremberg,210

Jacobs, John R., Jr., 50.52
Japan: American and British wartime trade with, 11-12, 34-35; BIS in, 11, 96; ITT in, 113; RCA in, 113; Standard Oil in 34-35, 47
Jews (see also anti-Semitism; Auschwitz); Arab and German hatred for, 80-81; Chase Bank and, 25, 27; gold looted from, 1, 16- 18; Hitler's financial aid from, 135; Hitler view on power of, 80-85
Johnson, Herschel, 123, 125, 128-129
Jones, Jesse H. (secretary of commerce): Davis Oil and, 74,81, 90-92; ITT and, 101c-Roosevelt and, 81; SKF and, 120; Standard Oil and, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47
Jones, Walter A., 66
Judson, Franklin S., 121
Junkers propulsion systems, GM and, 175
Justiano, Mario, 149-150

Kaufman, Samuel H., 91-92
Keilhau, Wilhelm, 12
Kennedy, Joseph J. (U. S .ambassador to England). GM and, 168-170; Standard Oil and, 36; Windsors and, 181
Kennedy, Robert F., 223
Keppler, William, 84, 94, 132
Kern, Gordon, 220
Keynes, John Maynard, 12, 14-15
Keynes, Lydia Lopokova, 12, 14
Khalid Al-Hud Al Qarqarni, 80
Kilgore, Senator Harley, 215, 218-222
Killinger, Baron Manfred von, 167-168
Kimball, Harry M., 201
Kirby, John Henry, 166
Knapp, Lawrence, 103
Knieren, August von, 61
Knowlton, Hugh, 102-103, 109-110
Knox, Franklin (secretary of the navy), 45-46
Knudsen, William S (GM president), 163,165-166
Kohn, Charles, 143
Krauch, Carl (of Farben), 130; Ford and, 155-158; GM and, 162
Kreuger, Kurt, 214
Kreuter, Alexander, 220
Krupp Works: early Nazi financing by, 162; GE and, 221; Goring's Four Year Plan and, 131; postwar influence of, 222, 223; Standard Oil and, 56
Kugler, Hans, 214
Ku Klux Klan, 165
Kupper, Gustave, 214

Ladd, D. M., 202-203
La Follete, Senator Robert M. , Jr., 49-50
Lamont, Thomas, 164
Landon, Alfred M., 165
Langer, Senator William, 90
Lapham, John H., 79
Larkin, Joseph J. , 20-31
L.A.T.I. airline, 38-39, 52, 71, 201
Laval, Pierre, 185-186
La Varre, William, 38-39, 140
Lee, Higginson and Co., 7
Lee, Ivy, 33-34
Lee, Senator Josh, 72-73
Leibowitz, Samuel, 88-89
Lend-Lease program, 47, 73, 81
Leopoldskron Castle, 191
Lerner, Max, 188
Lesto, George, 158-159
Les Trois Rois, 9
Levinson, Charles, 175-176, 177
Lewis, John L., 66, 68-69, 71-72, 74
Liberty magazine, 178
Life magazine, 77
Lilienfeld company, 161
Lindbergh, Charles, 72, 157, 196, 200
Lindemann, Karl, 20, 93, 113, 217
Lindsay, Sir Ronald, 1 81
Link, The, 179, 182
Lionel (cargo ship), 124
Lipkowitz, Irving, 49 -50
Littell, Norman, 45, 146, 151-153
Little, John, 207-208
London bombing, Standard Oil and, 34 -35
London New Chronicle, 122
Long, Breckinridge ( assistant secretary of state): AO and, 203; Ford Motor Company and, 158, 160; ITT and, 99-100, 106-111
Lublin company, 18
Luer, Carl, 175
Luftwaffe: SKF and, 116; Standard Oil and, 34-36
Lundeen, Ernest, 136

MacArthur, General Douglas, 164
MacGuire, Gerald, 163-164
Mack, John E., 138
Maloney, William Power, 91-92
Man Called Intrepid, A (Stevenson), 73-74, 193-194
Manchester Guardian, The, 157
Mann, Henry, 94
Mann, Rudolf, 144, 146
Mann, Wilhelm, 141
Markham, James E., 140
Marks, U.S. wartime sale of, 23, 30
Marshall, Verne, 72
Martin, James Stewart, 215-223; All Honorable Men. 217
McClintock, Earl, 141-142, 145-146, 148, 150
McGarrah, Gates W., 2
McGohey, John F. X., 30
McGowan, Sir Harry, 182
McGuire, Matthew F., 198-202
Mc1ntyre, Marvin, 87
McKittrick, Thomas H., 1-2, 7-20, 210; family of, 7, 13
McLarin, H. M., 54
Meader, George, 220-222
Meili, E. H., 23
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 155
Messersmith, George S., 70,166-167, 173 methanol, wartime restrictions on, 52
Mexican Telephone and Telegraph, 101-102
Mexico, Davis Oil Company of, 63-75
Meyer, Emil, 7
Meyer, Julius P., 134
Middle East Supply center, 82
Milch, General Erhard, 190
Miles, Sherman, 194
Miller, Colonel Francis P., 221
Mills, Sir Percy, 214
Mitchell, Charles E., 131
Moffett, James, 79 -81, 89 -92
Moll, Alfredo E., 136, 139, 143
Moll, Jose O., 161
Monckton, Sir Walter, 183
money world community, Schacht's concept of, 130
Montgomery, General Bernard, 54
Mooney, James D. (GM European head), 97, 166-177, 194
Moral Rearmament Movement, 180
Morgan, Grenfell, 168
Morgan, J.P., 94
Morgan Bank, 27, 163-164, 168, 183
Morgan family, 2
Morgenthau, Elinor, 3, 14
Morgenthau, Henry (secretary of the treasury): BIS and, 3-8, 11; at Bretton Woods, 13-15; Chase Bank and, 24-25, 28-30; Davis Oil and, 68, 71, 74; Farben and, 147-149; Ford Motor Company and, 160-161; GAF and, 137
Morgenthau, Henry (Cant.) 139; GM and, 176; ITT and, 99, 101; postwar work of, 212, 223; SKF and, 119- 21, 128; Standard Oil and, 36, 40, 41, 42, 55, 57; Windsors and, 183
Morgenthau Plan, 212
Mouvement Synarchique Revolutionnaire, 27
Muccio, John J., 39, 54
Munn, Gurnee, 193
Murphy, Robert D., 10, 186, 212, 214-215
Mussolini, Benito, 69, 80

Nation, The, 89,139,187, 188
National Cash Register, 222
National City Bank of New York (NCB). Chase and, 20, 25: Davis Oil and, 63; Farben and, 141, 146-147; GAF and, 131,134,137, 139; ITT and, 20,94, 106, 110; SKF and, 121
National Council of Clergymen and Laymen, 166
National War Labor Board, 48
Nazi Germany (See also Germany): American and British wartime trade with, 11-12; Chase Bank and, 20- 31; ITT and, 98, 110-113: marks sold in U.S. by, 22-24; RCA in, 113
Nazi Winter Help Fund, 104
NBC, 104-105
NCB, see National City Bank of New York
Nelson, Donald, 118
Neutrality Act, 69
Newcomer, Dr. Mabel, 13
Newsom, Earl, 53
New York Daily News, 97
New York Evening Mail, 142
New York Guaranty Trust Bank, 27
New York Post, 88-89
New York Sun, 198
New York Times, The, 31,47, 59,60, 61, 96-97, 111, 151, 161
New York World, 2
Niedermann, Carlos, 25-29
Niemeyer, Sir Otto, 7-9
Nippon Electric Company, 102
Nixon, Russell A., 212-215, 219
No Foreign Wars Committee, 72-73
Noramco, 215
Norman, Montagu, 5-8, 182
North African invasion, B1S and, 10-11
Norway: at Bretton Woods, 12, 18; SKF strike in, 128
Nuremberg trials, 17-18, 153, 209, 210
N.W.7. (Farben spy network), 39, 133-131, 141, 213
Nye, Gerald P., 88

Oberg, Major General Karl, 185
O'Dwyer, William, 88
Office of Economic Programs, 120
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 22, 125, 216
O Globo (Brazilian newspaper), 201
Ohnesorge, Wilhelm, 98-99, 112-113, 175,184
oil, international wartime trade in. by Davis Oil Company, 73; by Standard Oil, 37-38, 52-62; by Texas Company, 77-85
OKW (Nazi armed forces high command), 112
Opel works (GM subsidiary), 162, 167-168, 171, 175
Oppenheimer, Waldemar, Baron von, 84
Organization of Germans Abroad, See AO
Orient Gruppe, 190
O'Rourke, Joseph, 206
OSS, see Office of Strategic Services
Oursler, Fulton, 178
Ozalid company, 133

Pajus, Jean, 120,122,128-129
Panama: Chase Bank in, 24, 30-31; SKF vessels registered in, 121-122; Standard Oil German ships registered in, 39
Pan American Airways, 71, 76-77
Papen, Franz von, 84,132
Paramount Studios, 125
Patents for Hitler (Reimann), 21
Patterson, Robert P., 124, 127-128, 221
Patton, General George S., 212, 218
Paul, Randolph, 11
peanut oil, North African pipeline for, 184
Pearson, Drew, 97, 198-199
Pease, H. M., 104
Pell, Hamilton, 74
penicillin, trading of, 222
Perkins, Milo R., 40
Petain, Marshal Henri, 85, 183-184
Peters, Carl, 215
Petrola (Swiss syndicate), 56
Petroleum Times, The, 216
Phillips Milk of Magnesia, Farben and, 141
Pico I and Pico II (Danube barges), 56
Pieper, N.J.L., 194, 199
Pillsbury, Colonel E. I., 213
Pincemin, Henri, 108
Pinkerton Agency, 166
pipeline, North African, 184
PM, 13,126-127,139, 188
Poland, BIS loans to, 9
police power, financiers' emphasis on, 178-179
Poole, Charles, 165
Portugal, wartime trading in, 25
Poteat, Douglas, 125-126
Potsdam Agreement, sabotage of, 218-219
Pratt-Whitney, SKF and, 121
Probst, Otto, 66-67
Proclaimed List: ITT and, 103-104; SKF and, 116, 119, 126, 128; Standard Oil and, 40, 59; Sterling and,149- 152
Pucheu, Pierre, 10, 159-160
Puhl, Emil (of BIS), 1-2,4-5,7,8,11, 16-19; Chase.:Ind, 20-22,25-26, 29; Davis Oil and, 67; GM and, 168- 169; Ibn Saud and, 80-81; ITT and, 94, 95; postwar findings on, 219 Puleston, Lieutenant James, 124-125
PYL (Chile radio station), 105-106

Quebec Conference, 212

Rachid Ali El-Kilani, 84
Radiobras, 106, 110
Raeder, Admiral Erich, 67
Raskob, John Jacob, 162
RCA (Radio Corporation of America), 101, 104-105, 107-115; Beyond Our Shores the World Shall Know Us, 112
Reagan, Daniel, 55-57
Redman, Joseph R., 114-115
Reed, Philip D., 221
Reichsbank: BIS and, 1-2, 4, 7, 8-9, 11, 16-17; Chase Bank and, 20-23, 25, 29; Davis Oil and, 65; Ibn Saud and, 80; ITT and, 96; postwar treatment of, 214, 219; SKF and, 117
Reimann, Gunther, Patents for Hitler, 21
Reinhardt, Max, 191
Remington company, 165
Ribbentrop, Joachim von (Nazi foreign minister): AO and, 191; Arab world and, 80; Davis Oil and, 63; GAF and, 135-136; GM and, 168, 172; ITT and, 95-96
Richter, George, 108
Riddleberger, John, 174
Rieber, Torkild "Cap" (of Texas Company), 76-79; GM and, 171; 1TT and, 95-97; as Nazi-English go between, 194
Riefter, Winfield, 123
Ringer, Fritz, 36-37
Rio Conference, 107
Rios, Fernando de los, 21
Rockefeller, Avery, 22
Rockefeller, John D., 20,32
Rockefeller, John D. II, 48-49, 53
Rockefeller, Nelson, 39-40, 59n, 101
Rockefeller family: BIS and, 2; Chase National Bank and, 18-20; corporations owned by, 20; Nazi government and, 20-31; Standard Oil and, 32, 45,49
Rodd, Francis, 16&-169
Rodgers, William Starling Sullivant, 79-80, 83-85, 91-92
Rogers, Edward S., 143
Rogge, O. John, 74 75
Rommel, General Erwin (German commander in Africa), 81; Ford trucks used by, 159-160; pipeline for use of, 184
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 3, 181,208
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: AO and, 197, 203-204, 208; Aramco and, 78, 81, 83, 84, 86-87, 88, 90-91; Baruch and, 51; Davis Oil and, 66, 68-72; Farben and, 211; GAF and, 135, 137-138, 140; GM and, 163-164, 169- 72; Ickes and, 42-44; 47-48; ITT and, 101, 113: Morgenthau and, 3; Nazi consulates and, 199; plots against, 71-72,163-165; postwar plans of, 211-212, 223; SKF and, 121; Sterling and, 152-153; Welles and, 86-87; Windsors and, 181-182
Rooth, Ivar, 9
Rosen, Hugo von (Goring cousin), 116-122, 126, 128-129
Rothermere, Lord, 190-192, 199, 206
Royal Air Force (RAF). Ford Motor Company bombed by, 158-160; royalties paid to Nazi Germany by, 35
Royal Dutch Shell Group, 33, 216
Royalist party, Hitler overthrow planned by, 194
Ruark, Robert, 208
rubber, international wartime trade in, 36, 51-52, 220
Rubber Reserve Company, 51-52
Rubinstein, Serge, 72, 74
Riickwanderer scheme, 23, 30
Rumanian Iron Guard, Farben and, 37
Rumely, Edward A., 142

Sacks, Alexander, 223
Sahara, plans for development of, 184-185
Sanders, Alexander, 216
Sandstede, Gottfried, 201
Sarnoff, Colonel David, 105, 107-110
Saudi Arabia, oil deals with, 80-85, 90
Savourin, C. F., 59
Schacht, Hjalmar Horace Greeley (Nazi minister of economics; Reichsbank president). B1S and, 1-2; Davis Oil and, 65; GAF and, 130; GM and, 167; Hitler overthrow plotted by, 9-10; at Nuremberg, 210; policies and beliefs of, 10, 13-14; world money community concept of, 130
Schecklin, Commander George, 108
Schellenberg, Walter (SD head): AO and, 189; GAP and, 132-133; Hitler overthrow plotted by, 194; Ibn Saud and, 84; ITT and, 93,98-99,112-113; Windsors and, 183
Schmidt, Orvis A., 15-18
Schmitz, Dietrich, 97, 131, 133-134, 137, 211
Schmitz, Hermann (Farben joint chairman), 141-142, 145-146; AO and, 189, 191; Bedaux and, 179; BIS and, 2, 4, 5, 11; Davis Oil and, 63, 65; Ford and, 157; GAP and, 130-134, 136-137; GM and, 162-163; Hitler and, 216; postwar status of, 211, 217-218, 222;
Standard Oil and, 33-35, 37-38; Texas Company and, 77
Schofield, Major Lemuel, 188, 195-208
Schroder, Baron Bruno von, 20, 22
Schroder, Baron Kurt von: Arab oil and, 84; Bedaux and, 180, 186; BIS and, 2, 4, 7, 10-11, 16; Chase Bank and, 22; Davis Oil and, 65; Farben and, 145; Ford and, 155; GAF and, 131-132; GM and, 163; ITT and, 93-95, 98-99
Schroder, Rockefeller and Company, Investment Bankers: Bedaux and, 180; Chase and, 22-24; Davis Oil and, 63; Ford Motor Company and, 159; Standard Oil and, 49
Schroder (1. Henry) Bank: Chase Bank and, 22-24; Davis Oil and, 63; Farben and, 145; GAF and, 139-140
SD (Gestapo counterintelligence service; See also Schellenberg, Walter), 132-133, 190
Sears, Roebuck, 118
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), 34-35, 121, 145
(SECC) Securities and Exchange Control Commission, 149-150
Selbourne, Lord, 123-124
Seldes, George, 168
Separator company, 122
SFI (Farben subsidiary), 147
SGE, see Standard Gas and Electric
Shell Oil Company, 33, 65
Siemens company, 104, 108, 122
Siering, Werner, 148-149
Siling, Phillip, 108
Simon, Sir John, 5-6, 10
Singer sewing machine company, 222
SKF (Swedish Enskilda Bank), 116, 129; Acheson and, 123, 125, 128; anti-Semitism at, 121; Chase Bank and, 20; Farben and, 118; Ford and, 116; GAP and, 118; ITT and, 116, 122
Sloan, Alfred P., 53, 162, 166, 174
Smit, Leonard J., 24, 28-30
Smith, Congressman Al (of Wisconsin), 152-153
Smith, Ben, 181
Smith, Gerald L. K., 166
Smith, Lawrence, 102
Social Justice magazine, 179n
Sorenson, Charles E., 159, 161
South America, international wartime trade in: by ITT, 101-111; by SKF, 121-122; by Standard Oil, 39-54; by Sterling Products, 142; Welles's knowledge of, 85
Spaatz, General Carl, 122-123
Spain, Chase Bank in, 21, 25
Spencer, Richard, 221
SS, 18, 132, 168
Standard Electrica, 100
Standard Gas and Electric (SGE), 139, 140
Standard Oil, 32-63 Acheson and, 40-41, 55-57, 60-61; American
Standard Oil (Cont.) I.G. and, 33-34,36: Bank of England and, 59; Bank of France and, 59: Berie and, 39: B1S and, 18, 34, 59; Chase Bank and, 32, 57: Farben and, 33-38, 46-50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61-62, 216-217, 220: GAF and, 139-140; Hitler plot and, 113: ITT and, 36, 95, 113; SS and, 132: systems of, 178
Standard Oil of California, 76, 131
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 20, 22, 25, 131
Starnes, C R., 51
Stein (J. H.) Bank of Cologne, 2, 63, 131-132, 145
Stephenson, Sir William, A Man Called Intrepid, 73-74, 193
Sterling Dyestuffs, 142
Sterling Products. Chase Bank and, 20: Farben and, 135, 141-153: Ford family and, 142: ITT and, 95, 97: systems of, 178
Stewart, James B., 172-173
Stimson, Henry L. (secretary of war), 124, 134, 145-146
Stockholm Enskilda, 117
Stockton, Kenneth, 113
Stone, I.F., 58, 139-140, 151, 188
Strakosch, Sir Henry, 6
Strauss, George, 5-6, 10
Strezlin, Harvey, 88
Stuart, Sir Campbell, 108-109
Stulpnagel, General Otto von, 184
Sullivan and Cromwell law firm, 8, 22, 154
Sulton, Lt. General Dan 1,221
Sweden: GM in, 176; SKF and government of, 116-117
Swedish Enski1da Bank, See SKF
Swint, Wendell R., 162
Swiss National Bank, 13, 16-18, 218-220
Swiss Standard, 54-59
Swope, Herbert Bayard, 195, 197 synthetic rubber agreements, postwar findings on, 220

Talmade, Eugene D., 166
Tamm, Edward A., 199-201, 207
Tawresey, J S., 121
Teagle, Walter C. (Standard Oil chairman), 32-35, 37, 43-45, 47-50, 53, 59: AO and, 191; Bedaux and, 179- 180: family of, 52-53; Farben and 142: GAF and, 131, 135: Schacht and, 65; ship named for, 36; SS and, 132
Telefunken, 104
Telegrafica y Telefonica del Plata
(TTP), 104-105
Telephone and Radio (ITT Swiss and Spanish subsidiary), 100-101
tetraethyl lead, international trading in, 34-35, 216, 220
Texas Company, 76 79, 84, 95, 97, 178
Texas Oil of Arizona, 77
Thayer, Phillip W., 149
Thiele, General Fritz, 99, 113, 215
Thomsen, Hans, 97, 135, 172, 195
Thornburg, Max, 44
time and motion study, effects of, 178
Time magazine, 22
Tippleskirsch, Baron von, 167-168
Titanic, Sarnoff and, 105
T-men (U .S. Treasury agents), 218-220
Tobey, Charles W., 13
Toledano, Vincente Lombardo, 66
Trading with the Enemy Act, 30, 42., 100, 158
Transradio Consortium, 18, 104-110
Trans-Saharan Railway, 184
Truman, Harry S: Aramco and, 90: Farben and, 146: postwar policies of, 212, 220, 221, 222, 223; Standard Oil and, 46-49, 53; Welles and, 87; Wheeler and, 75
TTP, See Telegrafica y Telefonica del Plata
Tuck, S. Pinkney, 185
Tungsten, international trade in, 60-61, 221
Tyler, L. L., 173-174

U-boats, SKF and, 116
Underwood company, 98
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR): Farben postwar status in, 220; Hitler and, 80-81
United River Plate Telephone Company, 103
U.S. Army Signal Corps, 220
U.S. Censorship Office, 120
U.S. Coast Guard, 204-205
U.S. Commerce Department (see also Jones, Jesse H.): GAF and, 140; Standard Oil and, 40
U.S. Commercial Company, 98, 101, 103,109-110
U.S. House of Representatives: GAF and, 135-136; Un-American Ac tivities Committee of, 223
U.S. Interior Department (see also Ickes, Harold L.), 42-49, 53-54, 60-61
U.S. Justice Department (see also Ar- nold, Thurman; Biddle, Francis; Cummings, Homer S.): AO and, 197- 198; Chase Bank and, 28; Standard Oil and, 44-49; Texas Company and, 90
U.S. Military Government Cartel Unit (.5ee also Nixon, Russell), 212, 220
U.S. Military Intelligence: FBI and, 186; GAP and, 132;ITTand, 112; Standard Oil and, 39
U.S. Naval Intelligence, homosexual brothel raided by, 88
U.S. Navy Department (see also Knox, Franklin): SKF and, 127; Texas Company and, 90
U.S. Senate, 135-136; Antitrust Committee, 49-50; Defense Committee, 146; Military Affairs Committee, 18; Patents Committee, 48-53, 151; War Investigation Committee, see Kilgore, Harley
U.S. State Department (see also Acheson, Dean; Berle, Adolf; Dulles, John Foster; Hull, Cordell; Welles, Sumner): anti-Semitism in, 85; GAP and, 134; postwar role of, 220; SKF and, 127; Standard Oil and,41-42
U.S. Steel Corporation, postwar influence of, 222
U.S. Treasury Department (see alsoMorgenthau, Henry): BIS and, 18; Chase Bank and, 28; GAP and, 137- 38; postwar activities of, 218-220, 223; SKF and, 127; Standard Oil and, 40-41
U.S. War Department (see also Stimson, Henry L.): SKF and, 127; Standard Oil and, 40-41

Valtin, Jean, 198
Vanderbilt, Harold S., 2
Vatican: North African invasion and, 11; Roosevelt and, 170
Vichy Algiers, Ford plant in, 159 160
Vichy France, Hitler and, 181
Vodka-Cola (Levinson), 175-176
Volkswagen, GM and, 168
Voorhis, Congressman Jerry: BIS and, 11; Sterling and, 152-153; Windsors and, 183

Wachter, W. B., 176
Waldman, Henry, 60
Wallace, Henry, 44,82-83, 101
Wallenberg, Jacob, 102, 117, 122, 124-125, 129
Wallenheim, Baroness Ingrid von, 96
Wall Street Journal, The, 118
Walsh, David I, 82-83, 88-89
War Petroleum Board, 43, 48, 49, 55
War Production Board, 116, 118-121
Warren, Fletcher, 172-173
Washington Post, The, 126
Washington Times Herald, 201
Watson, Major General Edwin M. ("Pa"), 68, 87, 181-182
Weber, Ernst, 13, 16
Webster, Edwin S. , 157
Wehrle, Erna, 67-68, 70, 74
Weiss, William E., 33, 97, 135, 141, 148
Weizsucker, Baron Ernst von, 182
Welles, Sumner (of State Department) GM and, 171,174; policies of, 85; at Rio Conference, 107; sex problems of, 86-87; Standard Oil and, 39,60
Wenner-Gren, Axel (of Electrolux): Goring and, 67, 74; 1TT and, 102; as Nazi-English go-between, 194; SKF and, 117, 122; Windsors and, 177
Western Electric, 114
West India Oil Company, 54
Westrick, Gerhardt (ITT chief in Germany), 93-99, 103, 113, 115; Ford and, 154-156, 158; GM and, 171- 172; postwar activities of, 215-216, 220; Texas Company and, 79
Weygand, Maxime, 184
Wheeler, Senator Burton K.: GM and, 168; isolationism of, 88-90; ITT and, 113-115; Nazi sympathies of, 71-73, 75 ,200
White, Harry Dexter (assistant secretary of the treasury): B1S and, 4, 12, 13, 15; Chase Bank and, 25-26, 28, 30; HUAC and, 223; 1TT and, 101; Morgenthau Plan and, 212; Standard Oil and, 42
White, William Allen, 136
Wiedemann, Fritz (Nazi diplomat): AO and, 189-202, 206, 209; Bedaux and, 178,180; GAP and, 133; ITT and, 96
Wilkinson, H. A., 82
Williamson, Hugh, 137, 220
Willkie, Wendell, 2, 72
Winant, John G. (U.S. ambassador to England): BIS and, 8; Ford Motor Company, 161; GM and 176; ITT and, 100-101; postwar role of, 212; SKF and, 122-123; Standard Oil and, 57
Winchell, Walter, 97, 197, 202
Windsor, Duke and Duchess of, 117, 177, 178-183, 191
Wingquist, Sven, 117, 122
Winter, Eduard, 172, 174-175
Winterbottom, W. A., 108-111
Winthrop Chemical, 140, 141-142
Wiseman, Sir William, 193-197, 203
Witty, Fred C., 31
Wohlthat, Helmuth, 67, 70, 168-171
Wojahn, Max, 143-144, 147
wolfram, international trade in, 60 61
Wolverine Republican League, 165
Wood, Sir Kingsley, 10, 57
Worms Bank: Bedaux and, 180, 183; BIS and, 10; Chase and, 22; Ford and, 157, 159-160; postwar activities of, 220
Wyzanski, Charles E., 61-62

Yalta Conference, 212
Yingling, R.T., 99-100
Young, Owen D., 2

Zech-Burkersroda, Count, 182
Zingg, Gustav, 40, 59
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:26 am

In 1932, Schmitz joined forces with Kurt von Schroder, director of the BIS and the enormously wealthy private bank, J.H. Stein, of Cologne, Germany. Schroder was a fanatical Nazi. On the surface he was suave, elegant, impeccably dressed, with a clean-cut face. In private he was a dedicated leader of the Death's Head Brigade. During the war he could be seen driving from his office in his sober pinstripe, changing into a black and silver uniform covered in decorations, and continuing to a meeting by torchlight of his personal storm troopers. It was this SS man who was most closely linked to Winthrop Aldrich of the Chase Bank, Walter Teagle of Standard Oil, Sosthenes Behn of ITT, and the other American members of The Fraternity. In 1933, at his handsome villa in Munich, Schroder arranged the meeting between Hitler and von Papen that helped lead to Hitler's accession to power in the Reichstag.

Also in 1932, Hitler's special economic advisor Wilhelm Keppler joined Schroder in forming a group of high-ranking associates of The Fraternity who could be guaranteed to supply money to the Gestapo. They agreed to contribute an average of one million marks a year to Himmler's personally marked "S" account at the J. H. Stein Bank, transferable to the secret "R" Gestapo account at the Dresdnerbank in Berlin.


______________________________________

Librarian's Comment:

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Dr. Strangelove Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, directed by Stanley Kubrick
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Re: Trading With the Enemy, by Charles Higham

Postby admin » Wed Nov 27, 2013 3:26 am

On March 29, 1933, Farben's Max Ilgner -- by now a Nazi officer in Gestapo uniform -- sent a message to Max Wojahn, Sterling export manager for South America, which read, in part: "You are asked to refrain from objecting to 'indecencies' committed by our [Nazi] government. ... Immediately upon receipt of this letter, you are to contribute to the spread of information best adapted to the conditions of your country and to the editors of influential papers, or by circulars to physicians and customers; and particularly to that part of our letter which states that in all the lying tales of horror [about Germany] there is not one word of truth."
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