CHAPTER 19: The Cheka — spelled Ceca or Ovra
POWER RESTS ON FEAR AS WELL AS THE CONSENT OF THE Governed. The corner policeman still plays a part in our lives. We, the fortunate who are governed by a President, a Congress or a parliament whom we elect and who are not dictated to by a man in absolute power, frequently may protest actions by the forces of law and order as terroristic, but we cannot, even when we go touring in foreign lands, completely realize the state of fear that exists under a political system which employs terror as an instrument.
Even in time of war, when an enemy occupies a country, the very necessary mass terrorism which frees the rulers from the alternative of appointing one policeman for every inhabitant is mild in comparison to the dictatorial system.
Terrorism is the finest and cheapest weapon of the modern tyrant. But if he wishes to avoid the ignominious fate of a weakling, a Primo de Rivera for example, the tyrant of our day must be ruthless, unsentimental, unswerving; he must have little regard for human life; he must be implacable and he must remain fixed on the idea of survival.
To meet that problem Mussolini found that the methods of his predecessors were useless. After he had dispersed all the organized elements of opposition, from the political parties to the comparatively unimportant Mafia in the south, he realized that he had to employ the same terroristic organizations which the rulers of Russia forced upon Lenin in 1918 when leniency with enemies of the regime resulted in many plots and the attempted assassination of the head of the government.
Mussolini already had his bodyguard, his little group of men who carried out the secret orders. He now began to build a powerful organization. At the same time he made public and press statements denying its existence and one day had the courage to repeat them to the Chamber of Deputies.
"Gentlemen," he said, "I am the one who brings forth in this hall the accusations against myself.
"It has been said that I would have founded a 'Cheka.'
"Where? When? In what way? Nobody is able to say. Russia has executed without trial from 150,000 to 160,000 people, as shown by statistics almost official. There has been a Cheka in Russia which has exercised terror systematically over all the middle classes and over the individual members of those classes, a Cheka which said it was the red sword of revolution. But an Italian Cheka never had a shadow of existence.
"Nobody has ever denied that I am possessed of these three qualities: a discreet intelligence, a lot of courage, and an utter contempt for the lure of money.
"If I had founded a Cheka I would have done it following the lines of reasoning that I have always used in defending one kind of violence that can never be eliminated from history.
"I have always said — and those who have always followed me in these five years of hard struggle can now remember it — that violence, to be useful in settling anything, must be surgical, intelligent, and chivalrous. Now, all the exploits of any so-called Cheka have always been unintelligent, passionate, and stupid.
"Can you really think that I could order — on that day following the anniversary of Christ's birth when all saintly spirits are hovering near — can you think that I could order an assault at ten o'clock in the morning? . . . Please do not think me such an idiot."
Yet despite his calling on all saintly spirits that Christmas day, 'despite his disavowal of violence, a Cheka which, it is true, still had no name or definite organization, was already flourishing in Italy in the Year One, Era Fascista. The Saint-Just of the Italian terror system was that same Rossi who was so prominent in the Matteotti case. He himself was a great admirer of Djerdzinsky of Russia, and commonly among themselves, Mussolini, Rossi, Dumini, and the others referred to their little group as the "Ceca" which in Italian is pronounced Cheka.
Following the threatened uprising in 1924 it was nationalized. According to its chief, "Several days before the Matteotti tragedy, facing the acts, gestures of indisciphne, and nonchalance of Fascist Deputies, such as Rocca and Ravazzola, Mussolini before me and others of the National Directorate, expressed his astonishment that the party police, the famous 'Ceca,' had given no sign of life. On that occasion he said in absolute tranquillity, 'Action against these parliamentary gentlemen cannot be taken by any legal arm; we deplore, we expel, we demand the resignations, but they do not give a darn. . . . There is nothing to do but beat them without mercy. This Ceca, does it function or not?'
"The mother-idea of this Ceca was Mussolini's alone. . . . The necessity of an organ for defense and for vengeance was explained by Mussolini as follows: 'The regime does not yet dispose of legal means for beating its enemies. Laws which exist represent the liberal spirit against which Fascism has arisen. To fill in this gap all governments in a state of transition have need of illegal powers to put their adversaries in place.'
"If as a result, in the activity of the Cheka there were committed acts which were arbitrary and inopportune, this does not diminish the responsibility of its author, Mussolini. To attribute them solely to Rossi and Marinelli is the height of audacity and puerility."
Several years ago, when the Cheka was still a mystery, Paolo Valera made the declaration that this organization was a part of the Ministry of the Interior and "appears to be a society of criminals and assassins. Its chief ... is said to be Cesare Rossi, head of the press bureau of the Ministry. ... Its agents are famous for their crimes." Prezzolini, one of the rare intellectuals who have spoken in favor of the regime, admits that "the Matteotti and preceding crimes force the admission that there existed a veritable criminal association preparing and executing the attacks and destruction inspired by Cesare Rossi."
So long as the censorship flourished and foreign correspondents were afraid to write anything which might offend Mussolini or were covetous of his good will, the Cheka was never mentioned. But on July 13, 1925, came the supreme test for honest journalists. It was on that day that of the 140 members of parliament who had seceded more than 100 signed an indictment against the Cheka. The signatories were not only Socialists who were mourning their secretary-general and leader, but also the representatives of the Catholic, Republican, Democratic, and Liberal Parties. Said this document:
"The conclusion is that the inquiry conducted by the High Court has brought out evidence more than sufficient to show that under the auspices of the Head of the Government (Mussolini), men in confidence sharing the functions if not the real and proper responsibilities of government, organized crimes to punish Deputies for their opposition to the regime; and that for the preparation of these crimes there was a special collective organization (Cheka) of which several members are known."
Journalists who cabled the above became persona non grata with the Fascist government and were expelled.
On the 29th of May, 1923, Misuri, member of parliament, who had quit the Fascist Party and therefore earned the undying hatred of its leader, made a speech of criticism to which the Duce replied by a public threat of punishment. Almost immediately Misuri was attacked by Cheka men and beaten up. In a statement to the press [1] Misuri charged Mussolini with giving orders for the assault to several gangsters, but there was no contradiction to this statement, no libel suit.
"The Misuri incident," reported James Murphy, "is a definite landmark and probably marks the first official operation of the Cheka in its official functioning as a normal organ of the government."
The complete exposure of the Cheka as a murder organization and also as a racket was made before the Senate of Rome by Dr. Donati, editor of the Catholic newspaper Il Popolo, during the trial of General De Bono. The evidence states in part:
"The criminal association — or the Cheka, as it is more commonly called— bound together under a pact of mutual common action in crime the highest leaders of Fascism (Rossi, Marinelli, and so forth), the professional assassins (Dumini, Volpi, and so forth), and the non-official coadjutors (Corriere Italiano, Filippelli, and so forth). It had its headquarters in a government building, the Viminal, where Senator De Bono also had his dual headquarters, as Director-General of Police and Chief of the Militia.
"The Cheka, which had already existed in embryonic form, was endowed with a regular constitution of its own at a meeting held in the private residence of the Premier, in the Via Rasella. Among those present was General De Bono, who had already been appointed Director-General of Police and First Commander-General of the Militia. There is explicit mention of this meeting in the affidavit drawn up by Finzi, which was submitted to three gentlemen who can give evidence as to its contents. These are Signor Schiff Giorgini, Commendatore Guglielmo Emmanuel head of the Roman office of the Corriere della Sera, and the journalist Carlo Silvestri. This is also borne out by the evidence which these gentlemen have already given before the Crown Prosecutor and confirmed by Finzi himself in a recent conversation which he had with Silvestri. Therefore the Cheka represented a constitutional organ of the Fascist Party and the Fascist Government.
"As we shall see, the Cheka was entrusted with a two-fold task: (i) to spy attentively on all movements of political parties and persons opposed to Fascism, also on lukewarm friends and open dissenters; (2) to suppress the more dangerous adversaries by violence in style, [2] under an astute system of protection which ensured the immunity of the assassins and their paymasters.
"The executive of the Cheka is identical with the General Command of the militia. The General Command recruited the hired assassins, furnished the material and financial means, arranged the plans, gathered information, provided — through the office of the Premier's press agency (Cesare Rossi) — for the 'working up' of public opinion, and made arrangements with the police authorities to guarantee the immunity of the direct culprits.
"The Cheka was considered as an instrument necessary for the government of the country, according to the literal expression used by Finzi in his affidavit. To this Cheka organization we are to attribute the well-known acts of violence committed against the Deputies Mazzolani, Misuri, Buffoni, Amendola, Forni, Bergamini, Nitti, and the journalist Giannini; also the murder of Father Giovanni Minzoni at Argenta, the murder of the laborer Antonio Piccinini, Socialist candidate in Reggio Emilia, and the murder of Matteotti."
While the Fascist Senate failed to indict General De Bono for complicity in the murder of Matteotti "for lack of sufficient evidence," it did not deny Donati's charges that there was a Cheka functioning in Italy and even referred to it as "the committee which has been organized against the enemies of Fascism." In corroboration of Donati's charges there were General Balbo's letter about the Minzoni murder, the confessions of Rossi and Filippelli, and other sworn statements, most of which the Senate refused to read. Threatened with immediate death, the Catholic editor fled to France the day the Senate report was issued.
In January, 1926, the French government discovered how vast and international the Fascist Cheka had become when Ricciotti Garibaldi, one of the grandsons of the founder of Italian liberty, who seemingly was active in France in the struggle for restoration of freedom in his native land, was arrested by the police of Nice.
At the trial, in November, testimony was given that there was a conspiracy in southern France to organize two armies, one of Spaniards, the other of Italians, and march against the dictators. Garibaldi had involved Colonel Francesco Macia, the ardent Catalonian patriot (and after the Spanish revolution, governor of Catalonia) in gun-running to Spain, and had furnished the information to Mussolini directly, so that the Italian dictator could retail it to his Spanish colleague De Rivera and thus further their secret treaty of cooperation and good-will. Moreover, Garibaldi had conspired with gunmen in Paris, with leading Freemasons and republicans, and with labor leaders and patriots who saw in him the possible liberator of Italy. So cleverly did he do his work that even Fascist agents were fooled. Thus Luigi Villari at the time wrote that the "neo-Garibaldian movement was being prepared under the leadership of Ricciotti Garibaldi, Junior . . . with the support of Italian and French Freemasonry. The aim was actually to attempt an armed invasion of Italy. . . ."
Villari indignantly reports meetings between the Paris Freemasons, Garibaldi and Torrigiani, head of the Grand Orient of Italy, and connects them all with the conspiracy of Tito Zaniboni to assassinate Mussolini. The fact is that Garibaldi was sent by Mussolini to do several jobs as an agent provocateur, but his main purpose in going to France was twofold: to earn 2,000,000 lire for stealing the documents signed by Mussolini [3] from Signer Fasciolo, one-time secretary to the Duce, and to earn another 2,000,000 if he succeeded in putting Fasciolo "out of circulation." He succeeded in neither of these things, but he did earn 645,000 lire for what he did accomplish.
On November 6th it was reported that "Garibaldi confessed to being an agent provocateur, a stool pigeon in the pay of Mussolini. Mussolini's government is exposed as deliberately fomenting plots; as sending its secret agents to France to play the spy and traitor; as paying 100,000 francs in a single sum for a mean piece of work done on French territory in violation of the French laws." [4]
The official criminal-court record at the Paris trial shows Garibaldi confessing that he had intrigued with a man named Scevoli to go on a mission to Rome; having obtained Scevoli's passport. Garibaldi sent it to Lapolla, chief of the Fascist police, who used it for secret trips between Garibaldi and Mussolini.
Of the 645,000 lire received. Garibaldi confessed, 400,000 came from Federzoni. Papers and letters from Federzoni and from Gino Lucetti, one of the would-be assassins of Mussolini, were introduced and read. At the close of the first day's hearings there was more than a suspicion that Garibaldi might have been involved in a plot to assassinate the Duce for the benefit of dissenting Fascist leaders, of whom the most notable in 1926 was Federzoni, the nationalist and royalist.
The second day's hearings, which coincided with reports from Rome of 100 dead and 1,000 wounded in the three-day riots which the Fascists carried out as reprisals for the Zaniboni shooting, Ricciotti was confronted by Sante Garibaldi.
"There is not one among us who would not have gone blindly to death at the bidding of this man, because of the name he bears," said Sante Garibaldi, pointing at Ricciotti; and then addressing the latter: "If you have the lightest sense of honor left, there is but one thing remaining for you to do. What are you waiting for? Why don't you beat out your brains against a wall?"
"I am a victim of fatality," muttered Garibaldi. He had come to court wearing his monocle and his Legion of Honor ribbon; he had tried for a few minutes to deny and to brave it out, but now he was almost in tears. "It was Mussolini who led me into a trap," he concluded.
"Traitor," shouted Sante Garibaldi; "you have dragged the name of our family, glory, and honor into the mire."
"I am a victim of an awful fatality," mumbled Ricciotti, "I have taken money, it is true, but I have not betrayed the cause of liberty." He fell on his knees, clasped the hand of his young brother to his lips, and asked forgiveness.
Macia and Garibaldi were found guilty. Mussolini apologized to France.
Altogether there were nineteen conspirators on trial. Maitre Torres defended Colonel Macia.
"It is true. I admit," said the Catalonian patriot to the court. "It was my duty as a patriot. When I am free I will begin again." He confessed that the Catalonian arms were shipped as "brooms" to sweep out Catalonia; bayonets were marked "toothpicks," and rifles "flutes."
Garibaldi, Macia, and sixteen others were given short terms in prison for possessing firearms; as the seventeen men came up for sentence, each in turn dramatically walked past Garibaldi, pointed at the chest full of hero medals, and uttered the word "Traitor."
The trial also brought out the following facts:
That there existed in Europe and America a large organization of spies and agents provocateurs in the pay of Fascism.
That acts of violence committed in Paris, New York, Buenos Aires, and other big Italian centers against Fascists are frequently instigated by Fascist agents themselves for the purpose of furnishing pretexts for prosecutions and protests from the Italian government.
That Italian state functionaries did not hesitate to "sequester" persons, steal documents in foreign countries, and instigate attempts at assassination.
That all such actions were developed with the assistance of the Italian embassies, Ricciotti, for example, received his money and instructions in the diplomatic mail-bag to France.
All the foregoing is legal testimony; the French government has acted upon it, the Italian government has made amends, yet in Mussolini's autobiography there is only this reference: "The maneuver of the former Premiers definitely failed and became ridiculous, just as did other artificial structures attempted about that time. One was a movement inspired by Benelli, under the name of the Italian League, to create secession from Fascism, and another an underhand maneuver by some short-weight grandchildren of Garibaldi." Apparently the employee was not worthy of his hire.
It is of course possible for the head of a government, the founder of a secret police, to remain ignorant of its ramifications, its plottings, and its assassinations. Perhaps Mussolini never knew that the "short-weight grandchildren of Garibaldi" were employees of his own Cheka.
That the consulates abroad have been filled with Fascist squadrist leaders or former racketeers is generally admitted. Some of these young men now occupying diplomatic positions have never been anything but leaders of the "reprisal" gangs which terrorized small towns, administered castor oil, burned, looted, beat up those adversaries pointed out to them by Fascist political leaders. Street fights, political assassinations, and espionage trials have proven that everywhere the Italian embassies and consulates are centers of Fascist intrigue.
Several high Fascist officials were some time ago recalled from Brazil to explain numerous "incidents." There have been demonstrations against the embassy and consulates in which not only anti-Fascisti, but native Brazilians, have taken part as retaliation for Fascist racketeering. In San Paulo the police had to rescue the Fascist consul from an infuriated mob. In Buenos Aires a Fascist consul tried by force to shanghai an anti-Fascist engineer who was visiting an Italian warship; the result was a fist fight and a public scandal; another consul to Brazil was accused of plotting the murder of a rich man in order to marry the widow; in Argentine a Fascist consul was arrested for dealing in obscene post cards. Almost all the consuls were members of the former squadristi.
In a more recent international scandal, in Brussels, it was testified in court that the Fascist agent Menapace, who planted the dynamite, revolver, and incriminating papers in the home and pockets of the anti-Fascist journalist, Cianca, was an employee of the Italian embassy. Menapace was exposed by the liberal paper Le Soir, but the embassy succeeded in helping him to escape the country. Some time later the pro-Fascist newspaper of Switzerland, Suisse, demanded the withdrawal of the Italian consul at St. Gall and eight other Fascist spies, so flagrant had become the racketeering in that canton. The Swiss government easily expelled the eight gangsters, but had to negotiate with the Italian ambassador because the Fascist gangster-consul claimed diplomatic immunity.
After four years of officially denying the existence of a Ceca, or Cheka, Mussolini, by virtue of Article 8 of the law of November 25, 1926, "legalized" the organization by establishing exceptional tribunals "for the defense of the State," a euphemism which the French used during the Commune, and the Soviets in 1918. The law provided that it was to remain active until December 6, 1931, Mussolini expressing the hope that within five years he would extirpate all opposition. Meanwhile a new penal code was written, which went into effect July 1, 1931. But the Fascist Party, realizing that its strength of a little more than 1,500,000 was not enough to intimidate the majority, held a special session of the Grand Council on March 6, 1931, which decided that "political crimes, as comprehended by the new penal code, must be submitted to the special tribunal for the defense of the State, whose functions are prolonged until 1936." The special tribunal is the O. V. R. A., Organizzazione Vigilanza Repressione Antifascismo; [5] it is the terroristic arm of Fascism and Mussolini's personal vengeance; it is the old bastard child of Fascism, the Ceca, grown up and legitimatized by its brilliant father.
Today the work of the O. V. R. A. is international; it employs thousands if not several hundred thousand agents; in fact, Bolitho believed that every tenth man in Italy is at least a part-time worker of the organization.
Ever since its emergence from secrecy, the activities of the Cheka have received notice in the official press, usually a few lines like the following:
"The special section O. V. R. A. of the department of public safety, a part of the Ministry of the Interior, has discovered a clandestine organization. . . ."
"The O. V. R. A. has likewise identified a Communist organization in Emilia and has made arrests, denouncing the chiefs to the special tribunal."
"The O. V. R. A. has discovered in Rome an anti-Fascist group developing criminal activity by the clandestine distribution of defamatory literature. The chiefs have been arrested: Mario Vinciguerra, Renzo Rendi, and Madame Widow De Bosis."
Thus, many years after Mussolini had officially denied that in the Ministry of Interior, the Viminale, he had under him a branch of government commonly called Cheka, it is officially announced that the O. V. R. A. of the Viminale Palace, where Mussolini still presides, is functioning excellently.
It was the third of these announcements which interested America because Signora De Bosis was born Lillian Vernon, of Springfield, Missouri. Her father was dean of a college in upper New York State, and her son, Dr. Lauro De Bosis, of Columbia University, was head of the National Alliance which the O. V. R. A., through an agent provocateur, succeeded in crushing. This Alliance had three objectives: to tell the news which the press suppressed, to form a union of the constitutional parties, and to prepare the "men of order" to take over the government when Fascism collapsed and a Bolshevik reaction followed. The Alliance sent out circulars written by Lauro De Bosis; Vinciguerra and Rendi were sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on the charge that they mailed the circulars. Both are journalists, the former once on the liberal Mondo, the latter occasional and literary correspondent of the New York Evening Post and New York Times.
Another plot netted twenty-four intellectuals. The O. V. R. A. always had an able instrument. From the time of Rossi and Dumini, Mussolini has always had some important, usually quite intelligent, man in his Cheka who carried out personal orders and pursued personal enemies.
This agent was sent by the O. V. R. A. to visit prominent leaders abroad who were Mussolini's enemies. In October, 1929, for example, he came to Brussels to interest Count Sforza in a little dynamiting. He began by asking the former Minister of Foreign Affairs if ideas were enough and whether violence were not better; he had some nice chemical plans for bombs and believed it would be a fine gesture to throw one at the Pope, or at least blow up Saint Peter's, as a sign to the world that there was anti-Fascist activity. Count Sforza asked the agent to leave the house, so the agent went after smaller game.
Returning to Milan, he trafficked with numerous professional men; one of them, the chemist Umberto Ceva, member of the old Republican party, liberal and democrat, he tried to interest in his bomb schemes. Ceva answered he would not care to play the game of violence. However, on leaving the house, he placed a piece of paper with the design for a bomb, on Ceva's table, and it was found in the place indicated to them, by the O. V. R. A. agents and militia who made the arrest the next morning.
Given the third degree in the prison, Ceva, believing the agent an honest if too violent anti-Fascist, refused to admit the origin of the paper with the bomb design. He committed suicide rather than betray the betrayer, A few days later the press officially announced the agent of the O. V. R. A. Ceva's suicide was kept secret by the Fascist government until a protest from groups of British intellectuals asking for a fair trial was sent to Mussolini.
Another of the agent's victims was Mussolini's personal enemy, Ferruccio Parri, who with Carlo Rosselli aided Filippo Turati, for many years head of the anti-Fascist movement in France, to escape from Italy. Parri, major of the general staff during the war, liberal-democrat-republican, was sentenced to a year in prison, then "forced domicile," then to the island of Ponza, then Lipari, and finally, having expiated not only his original crime, but every charge the O. V. R. A. could bring, he returned to Milan. Here the agent attempted to get his consent for a dynamite plot, and despite Parri's being declared not guilty by the Special Tribunal, he was in 1931 sent to an African colony for five years.
Another personal enemy of Mussolini's, Camillo Berneri, professor of philosophy, was the victim of the O. V. R. A. agent Menapace, who placed a false passport and a quantity of an explosive called cheddite in Eerneri's pockets, then informed the Brussels police. As this occurred at the time the Italian Crown Prince was shot at in Belgium, Berneri was arrested, deported, then arrested in France and in Luxembourg and in France again. The professor to this day doesn't know what all the political intrigue is about.
An American journalist of many year's residence in Rome, one who is forced by circumstances to send glowing reports via the daily cables, and one of many who has smuggled true reports to the present writer, thus sums up the situation:
"The Fascist system has given modern Italy the atmosphere in which the Medici and the Borgias would find themselves perfectly at home. After years of Fascist rule and consolidation, the Italian people are still deprived of all liberties. They accept this as a measure of force majeure, silently, but they suffer from a sense of slavery to an oligarchy which does not represent the best elements in Italian life. The right to keep silent is practically the only one left.
"The opposition is watched, tracked down like wild beasts. No one can find out how many unfortunates are imprisoned in the unhealthy isles or in the prisons of the mainland. The special tribunals have condemned wholesale, large groups. One tribunal in one year condemned 400 persons to 2,000 years' imprisonment. . . . All these events are carefully concealed so that no indignation may be aroused abroad. . . . The Duce admits 100,000 professional policemen. There are even more in plainclothes. . . . Amateur spies are daily denouncing persons they suspect according to the best traditions of a reign of terror. Petty and private tyranny takes the most exasperating and minor forms. . . . All this is never felt nor suspected by the visiting tourists. . . .
"All this is accepted supinely and in silence by the Italian people, who are waiting for something to happen which will deliver them from a domination and a fate which they do not think they deserve and from a system which is entirely alien to their civilization and beliefs. ... It would require too much space to recall the incidents revealing the miasma of oppression and repression under which Italians live. . . . The special revolutionary tribunal functions with harshness and ferocity. . . . Families of persons sent to confino (island exile) and of those who are fuorusciti or exiles, are subject to reprisals and held almost as hostages. . . . The secret police and system of national espionage penetrate every corner of Italian life. Persons are careful in talking to anyone. Everyone, accordingly, lives in an atmosphere of submission, without open expression.
"General Capello, hero of Gorizia and friend of the King, is in confino. No one except Mussolini knows how many Italians are there. The estimate is as high as 200,000, but Mussolini put it at 1,500 and the truth is somewhere between these two extremes. With hundreds of persons being sentenced monthly to the islands, the figure is certainly not Mussolini's. Hundreds are in the Mediterranean Siberia without trial.
"The regime has gained little hold on the majority of the upper and educated classes. . . . The surveillance of Benedetto Croce and Professor Ferrero is no longer kept secret. Fascism's hold today is sustained by military dominance of the Black Shirts and the secret police."
No one knows how many persons have been killed by the Fascisti. Labriola, former Minister of Labor, announced that from the time Mussolini went into the employ of the employers' associations in 1920, until he entered Rome in 1922, his squadristi murdered 4,100 non-Fascists of which full case records exist. There are also lists of thousands of victims in the ensuing years of Fascist rule. Mussolini's one reply has been that the Bolsheviki in Russia killed more.
Mussolini defends not only violence as his means to power and means of maintenance in power, but terrorism as well. "In the creation of a new State," he says, "which is authoritarian but not absolutist, hierarchial, and organic — namely, open to the people in all its classes, categories, and interests — lies the revolutionary originality of Fascism, and a teaching, perhaps, for the whole modern world, oscillating between the authority of the State and that of the individual, between the State and the anti-State. Like all other revolutions, the Fascist revolution has had a dramatic development, but this in itself would not suffice to distinguish it. The reign of terror is not a revolution: it is only a necessary instrument in a determined phase of the revolution."
This phase of the Fascist revolution has now officially been extended for almost ten years.
_______________
Notes:
1. Il Popolo, Rome, December 21, 1924.
2. '"Bastonatura in stile" (bastinadoing in style) is the technical phrase used in the orders sent out from the headquarters of the National militia. It stands for a distinct type of cudgeling, and those who are entrusted with the task have been specially trained in the barracks, where they have a dummy figure on which they practise. The weapon used is a specially made bludgeon which is rather heavy towards the end and is somewhat flexible. Most of the blows are inflicted on the lower part of the face, for the purpose of breaking the jawbone and thus laying up the victim for months. Care is taken not to fracture the skull, lest death may ensue.
3. Gobetti telegram, etc., and letters relative to the American oil deal of 1924.
4. New York World, November 6, 1926.
5. Also called Opera Volontaria Repressione Antifascista.