B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)
On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A- based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.
 Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)
Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:
"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *."
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)
General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),
testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany 1727.)
General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 4442.)
 Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.
Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified:
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short 437.)"
Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.)
Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453.)
The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.)
Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:
" * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)"
Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*.
Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)"
As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short 437.)"
When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were doing.
"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
" General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)"
Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)"
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which
provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr. Kimmel 1745)
Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377- 380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)
General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:
"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)"
 General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that
"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)"
Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:
"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)"
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his reexamination of his decision.
Reconnaissance: Means Available:
Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469- 70) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft
for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)
 Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)
According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and *could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:
"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)"
How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:
"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel 1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)"
Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)
According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance,
"flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)
"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)"
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been
needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A- 20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,
"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)"
General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.
Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.
I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):
" Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7 1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.
"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack.
"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the Navy."
Information Not Received by Short; In General;
Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.
It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside
from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.
 An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G- 2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242- 243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)
The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages:
24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose.
14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.
 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three- Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above.
22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.
5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.
14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and American power in China.
15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."
16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U.S.
18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor.
19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off.
19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.
22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."
26 November translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering the "proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.
26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele-
grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.
26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no progress.
26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.
28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.
29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements."
29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.
30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy."
30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.
1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested but in Washington only.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose.
1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders those lower down.
1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.
2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals.
2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents.
 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.
4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.
6 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.
6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for. U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed.
6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war.
7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.
7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th."
The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B")
 The Winds Message:
The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre-
sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126)
A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 25432) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications. Phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)
It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D.252) According to  Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36- 38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations
would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" Code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-2a2) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy.
The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr. Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr. Safford C. 133, 136 138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)
Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr. Safford C. 139-140, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S.I.S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)
 Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages o be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also
sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)
One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:
"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:
" "On the 4th of December 1941 Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date quoting the Winds Message and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."
"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:
" "Admiral Wilkinson approved this message"
"which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely
" "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it and saw it about three p. m. Washington time on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you thing [sic] of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,' and so forth. (Tr. Russell A. 33-34)"
 Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)
Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt what sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:
"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283)"
In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:
"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHI'
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)"
There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr.,  Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051)
There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)
Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:
"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Bratton D. 297)"
Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions cannot be regarded is fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209- 211)
Discussion of Foregoing Information:
It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu requesting that the "ships in harbor"  report be made
twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after- events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December, 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with antimine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. "13", S. I. S. 27065)
It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., he sent along a  note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford C. 167) Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.
The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis
by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received is to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.
As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.
As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was he testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18- 21)
Comments on Short's Defenses:
The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect as a surprise air attack, he cannot now  be heard to say at he was led into becoming sabotage- minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious at General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise r attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which included a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.
As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the pos