Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 2:33 am

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 39

REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS
COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY
COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH
ENDORSEMENTS

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

Page ii

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin
North Carolina

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel

Page iii

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part Pages Transcript Hearings
No. pages

1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part Exhibits Nos.

12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.

Page iv

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 ............ 1
2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 ........ 23
3. Appendix No. 1: Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on
phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to
the Pearl Harbor disaster ....................................... 179
4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) ...................... 219
5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board ...................... 220
6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB report ................................ 231
7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation .. 270
8. September 14, 1945, memorandum from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec-
tion with Clausen Investigation ................................. 283

9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 ........ 297
10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact ............. 323
11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 .......... 330
12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of
Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain
information of super secret nature ............................. 332
13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report by CincUS and
CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made
public) ........................................................ 335
14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made
public ......................................................... 345
15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary
of Navy, dated December 1, 1944 ................................ 354
16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report,
and fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary
of Navy (not made public) ...................................... 355
17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945,
made public August 29, 1945 .................................... 371
18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary
of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board ....... 383
19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO
to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 .................... 387
20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for CincUS and CNO. Dated August 10, 1945 ..... 388
21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of
Navy, dated July 25, 1945 ...................................... 389
22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated
July 12, 1945 .................................................. 390
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Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 2:40 am

Page 220

[a]    ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA

1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing certain evidence and documents.

2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor  Board, and recommending further investigation.

3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September  1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board  on the basis of additional evidence.

4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the  Top Secret  Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of additional evidence  and modifications of previous testimony.

Page 221

[b] TOP SECRET REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR  BOARD

[c] Memo: To The Secretary of War:

The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons of security  should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War  is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure  concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.

[1] 1. General. Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the  negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of  the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941.  Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans  and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese  potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States.  Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the  enemy's intentions.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for  resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of  breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the  eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the  Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"   message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent  safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in  Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the  Department on Alert Number 3.

This was not done.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders and this information cannot be  disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent  upon the War Department the [2] to assume the responsibility for  specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to  the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete  responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that  its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The  difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from  the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert  them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly  aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the  right alert.

Page 222

The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.

The details of this information follow:

2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily  information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese offensive  military operations. (R. 86)

2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese'  intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United  States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on  November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the [3]  concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready  for offensive action.

3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United  States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)

As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State the Secretary of War down to the  Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it  was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not  months. (R. 243-244)"

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that  Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was  construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All the information  that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to  the policy making and planning agencies of the government. These  officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff,  and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our  intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office  of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R.  297)

Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans  Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while  they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question  him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies:

"I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General  Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the  Chief [4] of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them. (R. 299)"

4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying  their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war,  Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow  and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending  out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he  could not go over General Gerow's decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton  then went to see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern  Section in ONI, and be concurred in Bratton's judgment that further  warning should be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war  almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making  arrangements

Page 223

with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2,  Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort,  Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from  Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to  be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 283-284) 

All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority  in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go  out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements  in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the  higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was  prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information  of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to  any of this type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its authority.

[5] The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G- 2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When  G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians  ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the  estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight  two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301-302)

Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval  Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into  the Navy during November and December.

Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last  date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On November 26th  specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan  intended to wage of offensive war against the United States. (R. 123- 124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Emperor and  that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum  delivered to him by the Secretary of State.

Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to  Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:

"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding  the tense and strained relations between the two countries and the  number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of  hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November to  such an extent that we were of then opinion that there might be a  declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday  November so. This as you all know proved to be a "dud," and on Monday,  December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began  coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to  reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their  directive."

[6] The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their  codes on December 3. (R. 249-250)

3. The "Winds" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a  message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the  effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with  the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with the  United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The  Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen for such  information.

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On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval  Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the  message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the  one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either  the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised  General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise  wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a  conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler  protested that that would be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to  General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans  Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said,  "No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the  Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same  suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had  been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. [7] It was about the  5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at  Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on December 5 that  Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith,  because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very  quickly." (R. 254)

Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese  weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These  arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel  Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in  relations shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor  disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2  received any such information. (R. 58-59)

He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to  him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was  looking for. (R. 60) Later he learned from the Navy about their  monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they  would probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in  Washington. That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to  Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commander Rochefort to  secure orally information of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this  message has been produced in the record showing that it was sent.  Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact that their  records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71) But Colonel Fielder  said he got no such message. (R. 68) The Navy now admits having received  this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War Department  files show no copy of such message. (R. 89, 281)

[8] From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of  the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of  November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds"  message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December  3, 1941 the Naval Attache at Batavia gave another version of the "winds"  code. All three of these messages indicated the probability of the  breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the  United States or the other nations mentioned.

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On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy  Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the  Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace  with Russia." (R. 132) [1]

This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot  be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected  with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies  were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared. (R.  133-135)

[9] Captain Safford testified:

"General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search  which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original  message?

"Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the  message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the  officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little  harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it.  And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for-  required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of  that; and though the written statements disclosed a of destruction of  other messages and things not messages, but the intercepts; not the  translations nothing ever came to light on that message, either the  carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been  filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the  translation should have been filed under the JD number, which I think is  7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls  very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but  things sometimes got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on  was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the  translation. We had a double file.

"The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about  the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all  important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts  Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for  completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones, and  that "Winds" translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I  do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it  may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never  came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is  the last I have seen of it.

"We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could  run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact  date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down  and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory  of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do districtly [sic] recall it.

*             *             *            *            *          *

"General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

"[10] General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a  place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other  place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I  have just discussed.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

"General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the JD file?

"Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.

"General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order.

"General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it  went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony,  of 7001?

[1] Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the  code employed to transmit the wind messages; that there was no reason  now why they should not be discussed openly.

Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be  dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the  winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the  Japanese.

The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and  treat these messages as Top Secret.

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"Captain SAFFORD. It probably was. 

"General RUSSELL. You don't know that?

"Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.

"General RUSSELL. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?

"Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.

"General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there?

"Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is  present or accounted for except 7001.

"General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place  in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of  those files?

"Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we  couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we  haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked  all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is  missing or unaccounted for.

[11] The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message have  been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that  this message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent  to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated  to the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.

It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received  by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as  December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized.

4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message; the Short  Implementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long reply of the  Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States  began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon of  December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7:00 and 9:00 the  evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section  of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2, was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and to the  Secretary of State copies of messages of this character received from  the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the President and to its own  organization copies of similar messages.

Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p. m., December 6, as follows:

To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in  a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told  General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important  papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the [12] bag and see the contents. (R 307) 

To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing  the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his  presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing about it  as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General  Miles.

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's  executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)

He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State  Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30  p. M. (R. 234, 239)

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had  urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with  General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with

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General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on  the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the  Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following  morning.

In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford shows, the  following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of  the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.

Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the  afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to  the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. This  portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer  consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson,  and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then  delivered a [13] copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the  President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide,  Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house he also  gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He delivered the  final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed  it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner.  Admiral Stark ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9:00 Sunday morning.  Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14  had come in, but it had not. 

When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in  English by 7:15 a. m., December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164, 166)

The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 13  parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took no action on that  until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning of December 7, or about 13  hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indicated the  rupture of relations with the Japanese.

Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts of  the long message until the following events occurred.

Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8:30 and  9:00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English translation  of the 14th part of the long message and the short message of the  Japanese direction the Ambassador to deliver the long message at 1 p. m.  on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately  called General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. (R. 85) [14] General  Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked that he be sent for.  General Marshall called him back between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m. General  Marshall came into his office at 11:25 a. m., of which there is a  contemporaneous written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the  meantime, Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported  what he had done. (R. 77) Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were  in their office on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same  time as General Marshall at 11:25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a  message to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not  sending any further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the  Navy in Hawaii through Short.

The answer to the following question on the record has not been supplied  this Board:

"Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough  by the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the  important Admirals

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of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of  Staff, and his attention called to it so that he could have taken some  sort of action upon it? (R  )" [reference blank, LWJ]

The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith,  Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that  there was an important document and that General Marshall should see it  right away. (R. 242) There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act  except that from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised  of this situation until the following morning when he received a message  from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m., December 7.

The record shows that subordinate officers who were [15] entrusted with  this information were so impressed with it that they strongly  recommended that definite action be taken.

When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this information  to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement with their opposite numbers  in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that the Navy had  this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous telegram was  dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, telling him to see  his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander  Rochefort, to secure information from him of importance.

The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect when  the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge in the War  Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the Chief of Staff  drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew everything that the  Japanese had been proposing between themselves for a long period of time  prior to that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the  prospects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in rough and  which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy,  therefore could have been cast in the clearest sort of language and  direction to the Hawaiian Department.

It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten points on  November 26; that course of events had been well pictured by complete  information of the conversations between the Japanese Government and its  representatives available to the Government of the United States.

[16] 5. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between November  27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information  came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks  indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the  probable exact hour and date of the attack.

To clinch this extraordinary situation we but have to look at the record  to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply  were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely  translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7  and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately  Honolulu  time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far  Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag  to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith and Chief of staff to General  Eisenhower, who was then Secretary the General Staff, and he was told  that the message was of the most

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vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2  General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive Colonel  Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital  importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and  that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer  personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's  duty officer.

General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as  vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date  by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows when the final  part 14 came in [17] on the morning of December 7 and with it the short  message directing the long message be delivered to the Secretary of  State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was then that this same officer,  Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative and went direct to General  Marshall, calling him at his quarters at Fort Myer and sending an  orderly to find him, where he was out horseback riding. When he finally  did reach him on the phone, General Marshall said he was coming to the  War Department. He met him at about 11:25 a .m., after which time the  message of December 7 was formulated by General Marshall in his own  handwriting. It failed to reach its destination due to sending it by  commercial Western Union RCA. It arrived several hours after the attack.

This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was one that  was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broadcasts and  repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate that war  would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the United  States, or all three.

The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the outlook for  these key words through their monitoring stations. Such information was  picked up by a monitoring station. This information was received and  translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents distributed to the same  high authority. The Navy received during the evening of December 3,  1941, this message, which when translated said, "War with the United  States, War with Britain, including the NEI, except peace with Russia."  Captain Safford said he first saw the "winds" message himself about 8 a.  m., on Thursday, December 4, 1941. It had been received the previous  evening, [18] according to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who  had been notified by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who  was the watch officer on the receipt of this message.

It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford  prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering the  destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers  on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted a long  message to be sent to all outlying fleet and naval stations. This was disapproved by higher naval authority. This message was confirmation to  Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communications Intelligence Units  that war was definitely set.

This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy files and  cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was last seen by  Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he collected the papers  together with Commander Kramer and turned

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them over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence  before the Roberts Commission.

There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December  4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and  Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite.

Up the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were  planning to do was known to the United States except the final message  instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with  the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7,  or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.

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[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War

    Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, 25 November 1944

[1]                                                         25 Nov 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.

You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I  have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views.  The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as  pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related  matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs  Committee dated 14 June 1944.

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by  the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311  (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order meet the wishes of  Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June  1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to  witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties  such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest  possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.

Board's Conclusions in General:

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian  Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to  meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of  the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure General Short  adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War  Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to  direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him  adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese  negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate  alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general  conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the  Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short  (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other  conclusions later.

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[2] Board's Conclusion As to General Short:

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:

"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The  information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was  sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and  the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.  This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and  make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and  in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval  District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements  then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services.  One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through  the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.)"

Short's Defenses:

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a  question of the validity of his defenses.

Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed  "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1,  which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat  from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) He did  this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and  without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395.)

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but  only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short  297, 4442.)

[3] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November  wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr.  Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to provide for an  outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming  tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the  destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage  done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short  testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was  any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong."  (Tr. Short 4440.)

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against  an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen  3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron  238: King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151- 152; Powell  3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381.)

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed  the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him  in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55;  Tr., 299 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the  radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of  the alert against sabotage and

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the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him  additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286,  287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would  have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed  his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 12 p. 16-17)  contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was  sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54- 7.)

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the  whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot  excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside  threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to  adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of  sabotage or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming  the civilian population, or interference with his training program.  These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of  a possible air attack.

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient  information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that  what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1,  p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427.)

The Board in its conclusion stated:

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was  sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and  the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.  (Rep. 300.)"

[4] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the  Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the  Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that  hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or  the naval base at Pearl Harbor, (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics  supplied.)"

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major  disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of  the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned

 * * *." 

The letter proceeded:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are  considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack,  (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by  gunfire. (Roberts Report, p. 5.)"

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were  satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged  that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of  joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to  meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5.) Short admitted he received  Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing [sic] Secretary Knox's letter, both  of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369.)

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter  containing the following statement:

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm  is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter  the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an  attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid  by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.  Frankly, I do not see any landing threat

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in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr.,  Marshall 17) (Italics supplied.)"

On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian  Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment  of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end  is a matter of *first priority*. (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.)"

[5] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the  situation at length and stating:

"The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the  vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr.,  Marshall 21.) (Italics supplied.)"

Short further stated:

"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of  warning that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.)"

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy,  sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement  the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the  air force and the *anti- aircraft* defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics  supplied.)"

General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job.  (Tr., Marshall 27.)

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising  him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government  had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive  action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch  could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap  vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1  August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been  suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr.,  Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.)

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent  General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three  alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of  field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not  sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in  Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and  uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without."  It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual  alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further  that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the  earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly  recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5. 64.) (Italics supplied.)

[6] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War  Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the  War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th  Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as  the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence,  and the FBI was most complete, that all such

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data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and  recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to  avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.)

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the  Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace [sic] situation, that the  new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between  Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation  there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers.  The radio concluded:

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including  such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or  constitute provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.)"

Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.)

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to  Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.)

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate  of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely  critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge  militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion  with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an  attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense  against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous  attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest  tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that  a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers

"* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan  considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her  actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide  to strike before our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3688.)"

[7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for  your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains  strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy  seems imminent. (Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264.)"

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25  October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the  situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It  stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific  by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet  "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and  "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap  use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential  enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part  of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not  occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694.)

On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota,  head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that

"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in  February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty  days. [Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.)"

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Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in  his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that

" * * * From all information which had been gathered in our office in  Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the  end of November or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439- 1440.)"

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer Of the Pacific Fleet,  testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 Of the  Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy,  that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving  south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval  attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, British and other  sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the  Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the  vicinity Of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041.)

[8] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the  Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations  with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government  and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion  that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack  on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen  this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP,  COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas.  Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense  situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch. (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C.)" 

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his  estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully  with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said, "I do not think I ever  got that message. * * * I might have I seen it, * * * and I might have  forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.)

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on  special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group  while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is  desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields,  barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they  depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with  ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow 4259.)"

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of  which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical  purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government  might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action  unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities  cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan  commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be  construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize  your defense. Prior to hostile [9] Japanese action you are directed to  undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary  but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm  the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as  far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret  information to minimum  essential officers. (Tr.,  Gerow  4259-4260,   Short 280-281)"

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This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G- 2 as follows:

"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it  appears at the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent  deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that  hostilities may begin*. (Tr., Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.)"

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy  Department, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with  Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have  ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few  days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of  naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the  Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an  appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task  assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar  warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo informed British.  Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures  against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.)"

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.)

"The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long  radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions  be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr.,  Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176. ) Short stated he took this as  tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54)  and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.)  Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions  taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short  294-296.)"

[10] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations,  dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on  the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short also received Admiral  Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated  December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships  southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way  for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates.  (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap  Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given  to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell  1413-1414.) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in  Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret  documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages on  December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice to  certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch  1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy  instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr.,  Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.) Another Navy message of 6 December  "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in  Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential  papers." (Tr.,  Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.)

In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's  G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of  naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather  broadcasts from Tokyo "that you must obtain" and stating categorically  "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds"  intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton
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B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning  papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell  1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel  Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding  General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern  Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-  based on their  intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of  Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then  Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne,  Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan.  (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be  relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian  Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record  does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages  in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General,  Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr.,  O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to  Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.

[11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a   telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in  Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors,  searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code  words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr.  Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr.,  Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and  exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941  he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy,  paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted  to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.)  Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98;  Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:

"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be  using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which  pursuit would be slow to start * * *."

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief,  and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air  raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of  the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his  predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan,  Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),

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testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air  defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and  he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany  1727.)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever  wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had  assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance *  * *." (Tr., Short 4442.)

[12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne  in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of  any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative  action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that  when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds  of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short  281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he  must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which  was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November.  (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short  437.)"

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without  ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he  attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.)

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous  action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the  information I had." (Tr., Short 453.)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be  prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be  confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was  mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in  diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the  imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by  Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and  espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan  would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set  forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal  instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared  for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27  November was as follows:

"[13] * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your  defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)"

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Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be  on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)"

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and  without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision  and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message  which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly  indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be  concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his  report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had  only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to  report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."

He testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have  explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps  particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at  the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine  ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action  taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action  taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much  I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short  437.)"

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:

"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were  doing.

"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance  reconnaissance? 

"[14] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite  agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)"

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message  expressly stated:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task  assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar  warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)"

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this  message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War  Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after  stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that  after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan  will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The  implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance  refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which

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provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr. Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377- 380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy  responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put  into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in  part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War  Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not  recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in  accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian  Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)"

[15] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison  with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further  that

"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure  under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)"

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that  defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan.  There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in  toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as  mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)"

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the  brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War  Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In  any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot  entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7  December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the  report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from  27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted,  which called for his reexamination of his decision. 

Reconnaissance: Means Available:

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the  message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into  operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469- 70) and  primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this  was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance  was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other  measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour  operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did  not have sufficient aircraft

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for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this  schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short  470) 

[16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284,  385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not  perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the  Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being  conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted  reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task  forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also  to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch  157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris  2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and *could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been  submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know  the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have  anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a  search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get  more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied)  Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral  Kimmel stated:

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about  800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full  coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles  visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)"

How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as  the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of  patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately  between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on  the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian  Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel  1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)"

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be  needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494) 

According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance,

"flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * *  This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)"

Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short  testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from  outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a  180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the  task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short  4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have  been

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needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel  1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger  1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for  reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of  the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A- 20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not  the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,

"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)"

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of  a Navy Flying Fortress.

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these  planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from  those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear,  however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were  available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some  extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of  planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be  taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

"[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating  from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7  1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and  maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in  various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such  operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the  operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small  areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700  miles.

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack.

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and  November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with  respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the  Navy."

Information Not Received by Short; In General;

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not  transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The  Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information  cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is  incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for  specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do  not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information  definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance  information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to  many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside

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from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would  have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr.,  Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board,  there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not  transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with  having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also  that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War  Department was not informed.

[19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a  basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These  references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses  consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain  intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and  inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by  the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all  proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received  from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military  concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander  of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning  indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of  information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p.  3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the  War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The  basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War  Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and  elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their  codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2,  Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information  before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise  destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in  the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986;  Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he  believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr.,  Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G- 2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told  Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war.  (Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff,  testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242- 243)  Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of  codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch  1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him  in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted  radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called  "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and  what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of  these various messages:

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24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into  various subdivisions for that purpose. 

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting  Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and  gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

[20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S.  might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three- Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the  Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the  above.

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.

5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and  urging renewed effort.

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and  American power in China.

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a  week."

16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press  negotiations with the U.S.

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of  eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be  secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U.  S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is  absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

26 November translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering the  "proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is  negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already  be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that  rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between  Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military  occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele-

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grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no  progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon  Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a  humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations";  therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after  which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not  to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you  also report even when there are no movements."

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting  proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and  Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others,  makes it impossible to find any basis in the American  proposal for  negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied  nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as  an enemy."

[22] 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured broken" and to give  Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and  the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to  move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by  Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out  and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than  anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in  the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out  negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly  suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States  note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested but  in Washington only.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for  that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders  those lower down.

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1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and  American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein  Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and  expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of  26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy  settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to  new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and  destroy all secret documents.

[23] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great  Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

6 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still  continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine. 

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for. U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to  prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other  Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised  against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final  memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine  and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a  British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would  break out on the 7th."

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the  United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941  in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6  December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret  Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review  of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position,  complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A  radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day,  marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present  this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret  Ex. "B")

[24] The Winds Message:

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre-

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sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the  middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as  follows:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:     HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations:    KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:     NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D.  250; Safford C. 125-126)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 25432) The  Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately  commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message.  On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications. Phoned  Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The  message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not  know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr.,  Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S.,  G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral  Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do  you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel  Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and  had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify  it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General  Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253)  Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested  that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified.  General Gerow replied "I think they have had plenty of notification,"  and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant  General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message  and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not  wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds"  message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great  Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel  Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a  breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D.252) According to  [25] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this  latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36- 38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel  Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating  "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of  Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On  this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who  stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or  Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code  (indicating with whom relations

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would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" Code was  intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl  Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he  discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating  "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain (Tr., Sadtler  D. 251-2a2) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or  second "Winds" message was the Navy.

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4  December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in  teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer,  wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace  with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been  expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It  was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132)  According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department.  (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified  that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army  Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the  Navy. (Tr. Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message  can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments  according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various  high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State  Department and White House. (Tr. Safford C. 133, 136 138, 172) The proof  that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine  distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) the same is true as to its  getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in  the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr. Safford C. 139-140,  152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in  evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do  not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that  Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S.I.S. 25850,  the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00  p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect,  "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a  midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)

[28] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret  papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked  him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out  to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum  finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval  commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,  Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy  their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged  for four additional messages o be sent out to various naval attaches in  the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the  same effect was also

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sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187)  An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,  covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the  Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War  Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the  testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of  the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C.  Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the  Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168)   Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

" "On the 4th of December 1941 Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets  summarizing significant events up to that date quoting the Winds Message  and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."

"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

" "Admiral Wilkinson approved this message" 

"which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely

"  "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it and saw it about three p. m.  Washington time on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do  you thing [sic] of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied 'I think it is an  insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson  stated 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,'   and so forth. (Tr. Russell A. 33-34)"

[27] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved  sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of  codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles  and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton  advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders.  General Gerow felt what sufficient warning had already been given.  General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision.  Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went  over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander  McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out.  McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the  first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the  Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284)  Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which  was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:

"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are  mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D.  283)"

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In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo,  dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence  broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"

(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"

(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHI'
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)"

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr.,  [28] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top  Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This  conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that  Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even  Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051)

There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever  version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19  November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence  broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex.  "B", S. I. S. 25392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The  officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State  the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans  Division (Tr., Bratton D. 297)"

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or  if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these  officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them.  Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted  relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific  recollection of specific occasions cannot be regarded is fairly bringing  home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific  intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific  denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of  having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209- 211)

Discussion of Foregoing Information:

It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war.  Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the  outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts  are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for  example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October from Tokyo to  Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing  Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15  November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu requesting that  the "ships in harbor" [29] report be made

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twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing  Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course  of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November,  translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in  harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to  point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this  inference is in the light of after- events; at that time these radios, to  an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to  keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or  possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from  Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the  agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating  the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November,  translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29  November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to  happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was  not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an  early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As  General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing  happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to  War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain,  not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the  radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3  December, 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction  of codes, code machines and secret papers. There is also the reference  to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel  Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war  was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had  General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view  that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message  clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely the radio of 2  December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there,  whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the  war ships there were provided with antimine nets. But this message was  not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December  1941. (Top Secret Ex. "13", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States.  Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer  told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850  instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.  m., he sent along a [30] note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford C. 167) Action upon this information  if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony  it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis

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by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's  deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of  the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the  time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an  estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light  of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance  which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in  mind that substantially all the definite information received is to Jap  naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast  Asia.

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and  placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of  conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information  he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were  destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's  Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done  if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to  any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which  he should make preparations. To the same effect was he testimony of  General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow  4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr.,  Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D.  253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14;  Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A.  34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18- 21)

Comments on Short's Defenses:

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged  with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there  were threats both from within and from without and that the most  dangerous form of attack which he could expect as a surprise air attack, he cannot now [31] be heard to say at he was led into becoming sabotage- minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing  sabotage. It is obvious at General Marshall's radio of 27 November was  not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly  imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's  assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a  surprise r attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that  Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount  to communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a  new and entirely different estimate of the situation which included a  surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete  and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that  the information given Short continually stressed the pos
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Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

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sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with out. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a  threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have  interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on  Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the  inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to  establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no  chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any  event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the  whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would  have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed  his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the  statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the  policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as  restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense.  But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would  not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It  should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard  against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming  the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities  of an experienced Commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of  readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified  except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was  incomplete and confusing. 

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in  Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is  supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the  effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the  Navy.
 
[32] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense  under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's  various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of  serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the  erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to  the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the  air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to  be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly  improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones,  not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the  circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement  in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as  without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep  72)

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A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain  witnesses were asked as to their *opinion* of Phillips as Chief of  Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr.,  Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified.  (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of  General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with  subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise the average, run- of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief  of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he  did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of  Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel  Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger  Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to  support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The  Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception  of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to  competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of  the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this  findings is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable  interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were  ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of  a Jap landing, of an air attack, [33] what Phillips considered to be his  duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a  "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general  discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr.,  Phillips 1134-1144)

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November, 1941, (Tr.,  Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as Chief of Staff,  for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences.  (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was  inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that  Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way proximate or  concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said  is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully  qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully  investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their  possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3. or  G4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no  substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses  from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst  that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the  importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese consuls  were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this  viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about  these matters.

The Board also stated that

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"While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that  there was a lack requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident  to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident  loyalty to General Short. (Rep. 74)"

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there  was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that  "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a  serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7."  (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony  as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not  justified.

[34] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which  indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war of  which information he ad an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28 1941 when evidently he failed to  realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th which  indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued  the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his  command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th the critical information indicating an  almost immediate break with Japan though there was ample time to have  accomplished this.

"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7 1941, despite the impending  threat of war. (Rep. 298-299)"

Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information  concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short  to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197)

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the  growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) over-looks the  fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the  Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the  information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7  December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the  United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7  December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may  have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of  a peaceful settlement.

[35] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in  carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead  to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

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Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised the  Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he  stated they Were doing their best and that negotiations were to  continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top  Secret Ex. "B")

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:

"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is  anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am  convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.  Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of  our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.  (Top Secret Ex "B")"

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still  continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:

"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were  times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to  prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the  military people did what might be the result of war. * * * Now the  question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and,  as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and  finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213- 4214 )"

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

"[36] I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible  minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it;  and, not being defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war  was inevitable, up to he last minute. So that I cannot mention any  particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was  definitely inevitable. (Tr., Grew 4199)"

With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and  reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the  Prime Minister.

"I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is well, I won't say  confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation  with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister, at half past twelve, half past  midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl  Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that  conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor  was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me  personally that he didn't know. * * *  (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)"

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:  

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it  besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet  some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far  East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we  might, for our part, have relaxed

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some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened.  But it didn't happen. (Tr., Grew 4218)"

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War  Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It  was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti- Comitern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that  possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) "November 29 arrived and  passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other  than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly  well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly  towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 5)

[37] In the light of all the information possessed by the War Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note  breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese  representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p. m. (Washington  time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion  that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and  adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent,  and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

General Marshall's Views on Warning:

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that  "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic  relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr., Marshall A.  45-46) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities  which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to  the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may  have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short,  nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise.  (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what  has happened. * * * the situation might well have been helped by  translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of  his decision at the time, however, he stated:

In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the  later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy  Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great  responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we  were  pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing  everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could  look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the  wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way  we were the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out,  particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii  without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an  unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

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Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a  certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have gained the  necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for  them to act.

"[38] All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that  commercial shipping in taxing the Pacific Fleets resources in providing  convoys. Everything was involved there at the time and I cannot see how- I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear as  expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault suddenly  seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation or it is and I myself have never discussed it. (Tr. Marshall A. 46-47)"

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect  Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A 27) He also was under the belief in late  November and early December of 1941 that Short ad adequate  reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this  regard, he testified:

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the  means to carry out the air functions of that command particularly as  they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and  Admiral Kimmel (Tr. Marshall A. 27)"

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A 26)

The Chief of staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared  that we had." (Tr., Marshall A 25) He stated:

"* * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent and the Philippines about 10 percent and  Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible. (Tr., Marshall A. 23)"

The Chief of staff continued:

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * * (Tr., Marshall A 26)"

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global  perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal  Department:

"[39] * * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable  way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)"

General Marshall's 7 December Message:

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early  morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with pan, the Chief  of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated  such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6)  He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and  wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted ble of the  interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in  accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant  reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to  General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,  was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the  Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It  must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General  Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of  Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this phrase indicated  he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long  distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War  Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the  reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption  that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive  measures in coordination with the

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to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command,  the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command.  (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required for  coding was " a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly  as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the  message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief  of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within  which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The  Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so  he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr.,  Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of  the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr.  Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they  informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the  hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr.  Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff as to  what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy  back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply  confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr.,  Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall  A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to  Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio  was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further  delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the  nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the  message was received in Honolulu it was given to a boy for delivery on a  bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the  message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

[40] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr.,  Marshall A. 13.) The Chief of Staff testified:

"* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience,  my own experiences even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * *  * we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the  telephone (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)."

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's  desire that the message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief  of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for  the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message  center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me  that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in  about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty  minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a.  m.  (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80)  (This would be 6:20 a. m. Honolulu time)

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Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about  30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination (Tr. French  196)."

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a  warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the  morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is  pertinent:

"General RUSSELL. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental  commanders a message which would have told them of these recent  developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of  November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of  December [41] 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the  destruction of the code machines?

"General MARSHALL. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge  of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It  depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff  was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible  the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the  possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to  answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a  great; catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way. (Tr., Marshall  C. 211-212)"

Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short  fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of  which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as  already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27  November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it  continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was  required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief  of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further  information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in  the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary  but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance.  The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall  should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for  his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a  bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that  Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's  Conclusions clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately  pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity  that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without.  The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to  Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is  evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period  of months, hereinbefore referred to. While the War Department was  possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough  to require that he be on the qui vive. That Hawaii had already been  sufficiently alerted was [42]

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the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34),  of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles  (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253)

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages.  (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772.) The Navy messages of 24 and 27  November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short  358, 363.) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed  with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval  Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr. Layton 3058-3059.)

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear  instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from  within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected. 

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional  instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of  Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short  had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his  command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non sequitur. But, in  addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall  ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection  of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen  it." (Tr., Marshal 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is  significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though  initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not  initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the  corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39.) The  reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against  sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the  interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in  accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant  reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to  General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,  was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the  Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It  must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General  Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of  Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they  were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this phrase indicated  he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long  distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War  Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the  reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption  that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive  measures in coordination with the

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Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289.) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely  advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations  against an outside threat.

[43] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications  calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no  time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a  communication to the Chief of staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would  be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to  say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had  replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he was relieved of his  responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon  the Chief of Staff.

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff  testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 3S, 36; Kimmel 1772),  the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to  a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those  from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in- Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department  with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising  the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the  Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and  the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and  training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the  over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of  global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the  United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War  Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent  victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose  records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the  prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus  devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian  Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy.  To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention  would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a  General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation  for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced  from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of  Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is  ineffective. There is a distinction, however, between the personal  performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by  members of his staff.

[44] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon  receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

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As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December  the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan  "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes  entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this  information until late in the morning of 7 December and that he did his  best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances  beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command  between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether  this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already  indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his  subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate  preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated  over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander  in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General  Marshall had been [sic] General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941  which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr.,  Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts  Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

Board's Conclusions as to General Gerow:

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the  substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the  Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he  approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained  confusing statements.

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he  failed to take corrective action.

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of  the two services in the manner contemplated. (Rep. 299)"

[45] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy  beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities  as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of  Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of  the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations  and the situation with Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese  future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no  circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the  messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish  reconnaissance.

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But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had  received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the  Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to  Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but  that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In  retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not  sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative,  checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger.  General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of  imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information  been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial  effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make  the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance, the  message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on  vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various  subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to  Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further  message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there  were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested  to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure  to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type  of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we  have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans  Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the  advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to  Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear  and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers  to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In  my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. It  fails to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented [46] itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the  President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and  delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking  place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had  practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese  might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the  United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of  delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day 27  November 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations  of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United  States, urging him to postpone any action that night precipitate war as  long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this  situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the  Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and  similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other  department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as  possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of  the possibility of an attack at any moment and

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that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would  precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate  problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and  not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the  language. There was no other course except to present this problem just  as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate  situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it  requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly  qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the  Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war  warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4261- 4262)

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer  ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible  for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered  the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300),  nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the  sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow  4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on  the demand in the radiogram of 2, November signed "Marshall", for a  report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other  important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to  follow through, (Tr., Gerow 4290)"

[47] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge  of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific  matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291).

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have  made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans  Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although  its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater  who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant  to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these  agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the  two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow  4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed and had the  right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained  in the 27 November message, the two commanders would put into effect the  Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289), or at least such  portions therefore as would assure adequate reconnaissance

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2  is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified.

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(Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so  far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on  Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree  with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the  27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive.  As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and  adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite  instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that  General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the  existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to  believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves  put these plans into effect.

Miscellaneous Statements of Board:

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure  to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating any  agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider  such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.

[48] Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might  advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in  all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in  order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these  leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the  Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by  an individual officer familiar with the matter

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous. 

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information  that he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November  message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant  disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the  error of his division in not checking short's reply, for which he  frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he  has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command  indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of  readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting alert against  sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to each an agreement  with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy  Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the  effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the  Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in 

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the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a)  above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was  not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of  judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a  neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered his various  alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper  alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take  into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack  was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other  factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove  the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes  simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert.  The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to  establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

[49] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and  Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of  being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now  of record, this question is answered by what has been said above.  Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance  reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as  he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a  Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the  Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as  it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be  made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer  picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was  apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally  no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are  still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted  messages were sent and that information of great military value  continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code  systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these  facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of  high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses  who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the  world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is  out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would  adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of  duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable  defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken  with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should  have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the
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Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

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action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case  of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that  others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p.  21) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President  Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross  error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p.  125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is  tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is  considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than  dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond reprimand.

[50] As on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am  inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by L  trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a  current public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement  be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings And  pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment or  which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a  sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further  investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could  later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

MYRON C. CRAMER,

Major General,

The Judge Advocate General.

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[a] Memorandum for the Secretary of War

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945

[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 194:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl  Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in  the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my  opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November  1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20  October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions  reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army  Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in  no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's  investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my  prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination  of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive,  the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to  Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the  Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:  HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

 (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

 (3) Japan-British relations:  NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around  20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [2]  Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute  "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of  Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24)  that an activating "Winds"

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message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of  the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division,  to the same effect (my Memo. P. 24).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating  breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the  United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel  Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which  was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941,  stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.  (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)"

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid.,  Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick,  Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect.  (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such  message was sent. (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)"

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in he Navy was  Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which  meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral  Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November  1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and  belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War  Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen.  Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section  of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds"  message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were  several [3] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the  execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought  that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941,  it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles,  p. 2)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 941, stated  that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See  Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to  ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the  intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be  transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his  affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after  talking to General Miles and

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Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a  repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According  to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General  Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the  above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl  Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this  testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1).  Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such  conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him.  General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was  "purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the  dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic' " messages (Affid., General  Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel  Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was  not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters  of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been  impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him.  (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message  (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the  "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was  received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2,  or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas  commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter,  denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel  Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had  received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the  exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm"  reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never  returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel  Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to  General Gerow or General Bedell Smith Colonel Bratton never brought  Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff.  (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code."  As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that  two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton  pointed out that not two but six copies of any such

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message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941,  representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false  alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2  ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the  Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus T.  Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior  to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds"  message, [5] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on  the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best  of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col.  Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from  Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow,  p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel  Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic")  messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury,  Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several  occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds  Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel  Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered  it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message  prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top  Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19- 23). He never got the "Winds Code" or any activating or implementing  message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his  headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff,  Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect.  (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby,  assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never  seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated  fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE  to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute  message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

Lieutenant-Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical  assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal  Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present  Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In  the latter capacity, he made a search for an activating "Winds" message,  which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett)

[6] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the

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"Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25, November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any  activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War  Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be  recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col.  Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received  by the Navy."   (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, P. 38.)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4  December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction  of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General  Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further  warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow, felt that  sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he  was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still  feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it  with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as  Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the  Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds"  message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a  radiogram be sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander  Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram signed  "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G- 2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the  above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his  subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and  Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no  recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen.  Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2).

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder  testified:

"[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the  passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and  myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No  information was given to me by anyone m the Navy, which indicated in any  way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or  contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely  strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to  predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen.  Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)"

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the  Pa

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cific Fleet Intelligence section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to  know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I  know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from  intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example captain  Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have  divulged the source but in fact, would have given some different  derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian  Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to  defend the Pearl Harbor Naval base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti- aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops, and the 7th Air Force as the  weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive  action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for  Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7 1941 the Intelligence  Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley was in liaison with and received some  information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence,  but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did  not come to me and I didn't now of the liaison until after the war  started. (Affid. Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8 p. 2.)"

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included he  "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23)  (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very  close [8] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl  Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting  Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned  that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds  Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications  Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not  received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was  again called to the Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on  General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles  to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General  Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel  Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the  pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was  monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to  Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the  Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that  "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had"  (including the "Winds" message), the source of which as Navy personnel  whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were  also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto- analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and  translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this  information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely  as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently,  however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this

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message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was  aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese  relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers  of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information  on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal.  (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

Mr. Shivers testified:

"(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until  after 7 December. ( Affid., Robert L. Shivers )"

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.

[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically  denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I fell [sic] sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from  Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and  not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no  idea that Lt. Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted  Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to  me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)"

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial  of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short  personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the  Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort  message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be  considered.

Other Information Possessed by General Short:

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram  prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to  a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert,  he said:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't  have made much of an impression on me*. But when you destroy your codes  or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have  had this advantage also I could have asked him the significance to him.  But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine could have  been very significant to me*. I would have been very much more alarmed  about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the  destruction of the code machine very seriously. (Italics supplied)"

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly  others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p 10, 19, 30), I referred  to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had  information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu  was [10] "destroying its codes and burning its secret papers," which  information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell

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meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a  conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel  Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated  he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944,  p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3  December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the  Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the  Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers.  About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between  the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during  which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and  destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this  information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise  telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and  destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers'  statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr.  Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States  and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as  anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain  Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received  similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid.,  Robert L. Shivers)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and  papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6  December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter  information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall  J. Fielder, p. 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese  diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore,  Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated  3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,  Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval  District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular  posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London  to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other  important confidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C,  Safford, p. 183)"

[11] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning  the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid.,  Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent formation which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of

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such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and  signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect.  (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel  Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and  General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944 p. 11). Their reaction was  as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be  quite in order and that it was nothing to be excited about. My  conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively  brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts commission. We were alone and at that time he stated  to me words to the effect "Well Bicknell, I want you to know that  whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." (Affid. Col. George w.  Bicknell, p. 3)"

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell,  or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that  the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the  interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by  me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army  Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had  information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes  and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not  mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General  was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people,  this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes,  which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it,  judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See  Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had  received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and  papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel  Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul  was [12] burning his "codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J.  Fielder, p. 3)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying  his codes. As distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was  destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that  juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering  whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese- American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically  different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and  Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as  sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to  an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction  of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the  Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme  significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies

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& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu.  Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was  secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila.  The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3  December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:   

"A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75  mm).

"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages [sic] early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to  attack Russia at present but will act in South.

"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[13] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, canceled a considerable volume of orders  for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to  Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in  Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the  Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the  British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies  Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him  information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his  receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson.  Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine  Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information  contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George  W. Bicknell)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel  Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short in one  form or another. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this  information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was  shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory,  but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to  7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his  attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from  Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from  Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to  getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

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A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information  he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)

[14] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at  Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr.  Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer  of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the  aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension  in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its  way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which  he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W.  Bicknell)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified  to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the  Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force,  Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various  items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December  1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence,  without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code"  message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic  reconnaissance of the Japanese Mandated islands in November, 1941, he  held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From  time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel,  he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid.,  Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USS ) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts  with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him  over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain  Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at  any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view.  He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)

Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional  information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I  said:

"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander  that there was an outside threat against which he should make  preparations. (P. 30)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject  "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

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[15] Short's SOP Against Attack: In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three  alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of  field positions, Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not  sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in  Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and  uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual  alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further  that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the  earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly  recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile  attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)"

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an  hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against  sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In  response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to  "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to  prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13)  Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War  Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. S).  Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently  Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by  radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought  home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5  November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or  around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received  in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen,  A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to  ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He  searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division,  and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquires of those likely to  have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP  was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the  Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29  January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt  dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:

[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation  of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this  place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall,

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General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation.  I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's  investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions.  The  statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon  the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's  report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present  memorandum.

MYRON C. CRAMER

Major General

The Judge Advocate General.

1 Include: Copy memo from TJAG to S/W, "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board."

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[a] Memorandum for The Secretary Of War
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board) 14 September 1945

[1]                                                   14 SEPTEMBER 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was  classified as Top secret and consisted of one volume. I have examined  the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by  Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel  that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top  Secret Report require modification.

In its Top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the  United States and Japan was in possession of the State War and Navy  Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a  reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions and  were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that  were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington  was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for  resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of  breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the  eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the  Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"  message of November 27 1941. It would have been possible to have sent  safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in  Hawaii or positive directives could have been formulated to put the  Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders and [2] this information cannot  be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is  incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for  specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to  the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete  responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that  its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The  difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from  the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert  them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly  aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the  right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp. 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our  State, War, and

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Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of  the attack. (P 16)"

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board  in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they  should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence.  These revisions include the following: 

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as  to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive  military operations. (R. 86) "

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of  volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record  reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document  as follows:

"[3] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations  of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements  for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin  on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June,  1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General  Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A  more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality  the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message  which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese  envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United  States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter  time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically  going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our  minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United  States. (R. 87) (P2)

"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United  States. (R. 123-124) * * * (P 5)"

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123- 124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl  Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of  the information which he mentioned in his testi-
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Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

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mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information  that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United  States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this  information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was  a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to  additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that  what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[4] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November  1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November,  1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese  "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the  execute message. He further testified that his attention was again  called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a  warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking  that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort  immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously  refers to the "Winds code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he  also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert  L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that  Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl  Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message. 

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and  maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he  gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning  intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other  information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly  interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties.  The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of  November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.

The Board found:

"* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff On November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of  the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2  & 3)"

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents"  which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as  follows:

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after  moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air  and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands. (P 87)"

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com-

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mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of  Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence  Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian  Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence  Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the  increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat  Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged  in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese  navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat  Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December,  indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and  concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See  documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's Report.)

The Board found:

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but  would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.)"

This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart examination. General Russell read from this while questioning  Colonel Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General * * * (P. 88.)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the  Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code"  message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance  of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would  notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same  general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State  Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance  to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since  1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite  information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United  States.

[6] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that  Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was  construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P. 3.)"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic  representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and  elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and  that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department dated 3 December 1941,  reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular  posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to  destroy

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most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with  Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence  Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu  had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in  Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was  burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the  morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by  General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this  information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he  was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave  to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu  had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of  Staff, also gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further  testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came  to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the  Chef of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it  was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not  months." (R. 243-244.) (P. 3.)

"[7] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning  agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State,  Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division.  In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was  presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them  abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 3)"

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen. However,  Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his  prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel  Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a  better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously  testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were  contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been  delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of  State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and  the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2. But in testifying before Colonel  Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy  what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and  that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the  material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered  these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to  Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the  deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant  Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel  Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department  did not go out to

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the field with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the  higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given  to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by  Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and  available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese  were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he  asked [8] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders  and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following  this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with  Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a  message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort  concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action  inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his  superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of  Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington  during November and December 1941. This included the information already  mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese  Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25  November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at  Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by  Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any  possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" in toto, and  that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations  would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be  called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and  suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not  necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but  would be followed by military occupation of the Netherlands's Indies by  the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The  proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26  November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to  information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by  Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the  "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of  29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the  information which the War Department sent to General Short. [sic]

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the  Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the  general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and  the United States and warnings of war.

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The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence  reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [9]  which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such  dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4  December 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia  at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese  execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the  Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of  these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel  Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers,  travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other  intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated  by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by  Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are  initialed by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the  probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that  they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and  that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI  was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were  severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his  Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department  did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before  Colonel [10] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of  necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination  to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short  but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be  dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the  information into too many hands. There as been considerable evidence  given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified  before Colonel Clausen,

"* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence  mentioned had been so compromised."

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The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department  information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,

"Dispatches from the war Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in  the Philippines on a war basis which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be  observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the  War Department which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the  Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of  hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts  were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at  Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor  according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of  Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more  frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two  intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December,  were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top  Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the  Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The  two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's  report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's  investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and  transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not  in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and  the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation  until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so,  time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in  readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of  3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in  the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [11]  that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial  traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included  an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of  the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the  same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington  concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just  what commercial traffic was decrypted and transmitted by the Navy at  Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to  Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner,  attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports  from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo  and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency  as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged  division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6 the Board referred to testimony of Colonel  Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of

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Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and  Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that  Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for  the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen  conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having  so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel  Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes  on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else  at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual  intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned. 

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese  "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel  Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever  received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain  Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and  other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or  some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the  British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from  London to Manila, and, in turn from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above.  This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub- agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from  the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian  Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's  query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in  the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to  his report.

[12] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based  on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and  General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel  Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15  June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board  as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.  I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith contained in  the affidavit mentioned are correct statements of fact wherein they set  forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General GEROW: "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was  purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the  dissemination or interpretation of Magic. I would naturally expect that  enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention  and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of  Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my  recollection I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification  from any source of implementing message to the Japanese Winds Code.' If  I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would now  recall the fact in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel  Sadtler told me of an unverified report or that he had received some  tentative information which was subject to confirmation, In any event,  there should be written

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evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this  time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

"General SMITH: "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a  difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S.,  War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of  Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority,  and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to  intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at  that time an 'Ultra' officer, and it would have been impossible for him  to give me any information to support his contention that I should step  out of my rather minor province." P 2— ffidavit of Colonel O. K.  Sadtler.)"

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department  Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [13]  of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel  Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend  this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect  that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The  Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5  December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian  Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel  Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it  over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort  and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval  District Intelligence Officer: particularly since the way the radio was  worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General  Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to  ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander  Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds  Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a  crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct  the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and  consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter  information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was  available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese  message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes: 

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p m., December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told  Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers  and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the  bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

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"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his  presence. (R 239-241.) He stated that [14] General Miles did nothing  about it as far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by  General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238.)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m.

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with  General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General  Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part  of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of  Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning."  (Pp. 11, 12.)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final  reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely  translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7  and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately ____     Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of  the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a  locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of  Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General  Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance  to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with  whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War  Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this  information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at  hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally  delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date  by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. (P. 16.)

"These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel  Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave  the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he  delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the  Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant  Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans  Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets  were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith  on [15] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the  message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how  the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7  December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had  asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of  Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he  received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any  until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury  stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely  received. 

"On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General  Smith and General Miles From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears  that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts  before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became  aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening  of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the  Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide,  brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to  General  Miles.

"The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7  December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the  Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part  message at 1:00 p. M., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines.  The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his  office until 11:25 a. m.

"These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified  before

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Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which [sic] would be in the office of the chief of Staff "between  10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified  before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel  Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and  9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he  conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office  at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen  that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the  United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel  Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m." 

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6 the imminence of war on the following Saturday and  Sunday, December 6 and 7 was [16] clear-cut and definite. (P. 15)"

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information  which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7  December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department  received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part  reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States,  but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at  some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by  war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6  December of significance, in addition to what had already been  transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December  that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed  to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this  information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in  Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be  delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as  heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and  it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would  occur at that time. The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final  message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part  together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock  on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on  Pearl Harbor. (P. 18)"

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is  not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a  statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General  Short has since testified was information he should have received.  General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the  message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7  December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he  would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him  this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a  question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

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"[17] I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there about the destruction of the code machines. _The _other _matter _wouldn't _have _made _much _of _an _impression _on _me. (Underscoring  supplied.)"

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the  Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular  posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code  machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we  do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of  this communication.

My Conclusion:

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its  reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views  expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,

Major General,

The Judge Advocate General.
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