Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. If we direct our attention back to the P-4, the P-4 memo that General McChrystal sent out, you said he had become aware, "of suspected reports that POTUS, the President of the United States, and the Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillman's heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in speeches currently being prepared, not knowing the specifics surrounding his death.'' So obviously the objective of that P-4 was to get those specifics, the fact that there was a fratricidal investigation going on, to the appropriate people to the White House.
General Abizaid, you were the primary addressee on the memo, and I think it was not uncommon for the President to direct conversations with the combatant commander such as yourself. Did you take any steps to alert the White House that Corporal Tillman's death was suspected as friendly fire?
General Abizaid. No, sir. I talked directly to the chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Having that direct relationship with the President and knowing that it was specifically put in the P-4, that in fact there was a concern that the President might make a statement about the conditions surrounding that event, why didn't you take it up yourself to make sure that the White House was informed?
General Abizaid. I did not take it upon myself to inform the White House directly nor did I ever when I was in command. When something would come up in our normal meetings with the President, I would have a free flowing conversation, but I usually commented through the chairman or directly with the Secretary.
Mr. Tierney. And that's the case even when there is some immediacy in the memo indicating that the President might be in the position to make an embarrassing statement unless he was warned otherwise?
General Abizaid. First of all, I received the message late, which is clearly a problem within my own headquarters. When I received the message late, I talked to the chairman. I also saw the two other addressees, General Brown and the Army, and after having talked to the chairman, it became clear to me that the chairman knew about it and I presumed that the information flowed in Washington through Army channels as I might have expected. Those assumptions were obviously incorrect.
Mr. Tierney. General Brown, what about you? Did you notify the White House about the possibility that Corporal Tillman was killed by his own unit after you saw that memo?
General Brown. No, sir. I didn't.
Mr. Tierney. And why didn't you do that knowing that there was some immediacy to the memo?
General Brown. Well, sir, first of all on the P-4, I was an info addressee, which is not the primary addressee.
Mr. Tierney. If I could interrupt, I understand. But General Abizaid said the reason that he didn't do it was because you were on the memo. So he must have expected that you would do something. That was ill placed?
General Brown. No, I don't think anybody would expect me to call the President of the United States based on the comment made on an info message where I was an info addressee.
Mr. Tierney. General Myers, at that time you were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You were the principal military adviser to the President and the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense. Did you advise the President or anyone at the White House that there was a fratricide investigation?
General Myers. Bear in mind again I had not seen the P-4. All I knew was that there was potential for fratricide, there was an investigation ongoing. I do not recall and am fully certain I didn't talk to anyone at the White House about that.
Mr. Tierney. Did anybody at your staff talk to anybody at the White House?
General Myers. I can't tell you that. There are some things, by the way, that circulate in public affairs channels that could be like that. But I wasn't aware of that.
Mr. Tierney. Who on your staff would have been in that loop, the public affairs loop?
General Myers. My public affairs officer was then Captain Frank Thorpe, and I do remember talking to him about the potential of fratricide and saying we have to be cautious here; if we make any comments, we have to bear that in mind.
Mr. Tierney. And who would that person's contact at the White House be?
General Myers. I don't know. Routinely he would never talk to the White House. They would talk to the services' public affairs officers. He would also talk to the Office of Secretary of Defense's public affairs folks. But I can't imagine him ever talking to the White House, unless it was on a conference call where he was included.
Mr. Tierney. Secretary Rumsfeld, let me ask you the same question to close things out. Did you advise the President or anyone at the White House that there was evidence that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire at any time?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall. Clearly it would be logical that I would have or someone in my office would have after the information became readily available and the family was notified and it became a subject of interest. Then one would want to know -- make sure that the White House was aware of it and there were daily calls back and forth between the National Security Council and the office.
Mr. Tierney. General Myers indicated at one point there was fairly common knowledge around this. Who in your office or the Secretary's office would have had the kind of contact with the National Security Council staff or the White House on a subject like that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. There are multiple contacts each day and they would happen throughout military assistants, they would happen through the civilian assistants, they would happen through the public affairs. General Myers and I would meet with the President at least once a week.
Mr. Tierney. Setting aside --
Mr. Rumsfeld. Just a second, please, and let me just complete the thought. And in addition, we were in National Security Council meetings and principal committees meetings on a regular basis during the week. Probably five times a week.
Mr. Tierney. You are telling me that neither you or General Myers have any recollection of either of you gentlemen telling anybody, so who on your staff -- who would you suggest on your staff that we could talk to that might have had conversations with the White House on that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I just don't know other than my response to you as to the kind of contacts that took place on a regular basis.
General Myers. I would agree. I wouldn't know who to say.
Mr. Tierney. You don't know who made those contacts on a regular basis?
General Myers. There were multiple people depending on the subject. But on this subject, I wouldn't know of anybody.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Tierney, your time has expired. Mr. Platts.