United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Sat Dec 19, 2015 1:08 am

APPENDIX B-16

Phosgene Oxime

CX

Image

Standard NATO agreement (STANAG) code: CX

Chemical name: dichloroform oxime

Common name: phosgene oxime

Formula: CCl2NOH

Family: casualty agent

Type: blister agent (oxime)

In pure form a white solid. When melted, burned, or dissolved it emits a clear musty, pepperish vapor causing violent irritation to the eyes and nasal membranes.

History

Nothing of this compound exists in any of the standard chemical or pharmaceutical texts. Passing references are made to it in chemical warfare literature in terms of its effects, and to the fact that samples were taken in central and northern Laos in the 1980s.

Commonly confused with phosgene in some popular sources, although that compound (COC12) is probably the aldehyde from which this compound is formed (see below).

Phosgene oxime has developed a reputation for being a very nasty systemic poison whose effects are prone to reoccur up to a year after exposure. It produces ulcerating sores which feel like elongated bee stings. One wag has put it that the "bees" that dropped "yellow rain" in Laos also left some of this, their venom.

Structure

Oximes are compounds containing an NOH+2 radical, formed as a condensation product of hydroxylamine (N3OH) with aldehydes or keytones. Phosgene (carbonyl chloride, COC12) fits the category of a keytone by virtue of its (C:O) bond, so the following would seem feasible:

Image

The result would be an anhydrous solid, phosgene oxime.

Pathology

Phosgene oxime represents an entirely new concept in blister agents. The previous agents in this chapter all attack the human system to produce toxic effects under the skin with the result that oxidation-reduction reactions in living tissue produce water blisters containing concentrations of unutilized chemical agent form on the surface. In this manner the body attempts to detoxify a systemic poison which has entered through the skin.

Phosgene oxime acts a bit different. It simply attacks whatever tissue it conies in contact with, skin, muscle and nerve alike. Its neuro-destructiveness can cause intense, unremitting pain. The human body detoxifies this agent very slowly. The mechanism of expulsion appears to be through the skin, hence the reappearance of initial symptoms. Being anhydrous in nature, this compound even prevents water-blisters common to the other blister agents. Instead, CX forms hard tissue masses like beesting wheals in which expelled CX may collect under scab materials, and may re-enter the body via adjacent tissue.

Initially, CX comes into contact with the skin and leaves a blanched area within 30 seconds where it is absorbed into the skin. A red, rash-like, ring immediately forms surrounding a forming wheal. Within a day the blanched area and rash will turn dark as broken down skin pigment pools near the surface. A scab will form over the whole in about a week, which may fall off after another three weeks. Depending on the total dosage received, total healing may take a week to about a year (severe cases).

Immediate death from systemic shock or trauma is possible.
Effects from inhalation are little known in the west. This agent is readily water soluble (even though it precipitates), which might be an ameliorating factor.
This agent will dissolve in human sweat. A particularly insidious effect must be avoided through use of protective overclothing: if mixed in sweat, phosgene oxime would flow into the more tender parts of the body, to include the armpits, the hollows behind the elbows and knees, and to the area of the buttocks and crotch.

Phosgene oxime 's effects are INSTANTANEOUS. Even immediate decontamination would do little to ease pain. Treatment may involve neuro blocking drugs.

Field behavior

Phosgene oxime in pure form is a colorless, crystalline solid which would probably be micropulverized into a fine powder or dust. It may also be encountered as a water based aerosol.

CX melts at about 40°C (104°F). Thus, below that temperature its pure compound would create no vapor pressure of its own. Contamination would be either by aerial or ground contamination.

CX would probably exist in the environment until fully diminished through rain, fog, or snow. In desert areas it would be expected to evaporate where exposed to direct sunlight when temperatures rise above 104°F.

Specific data

median lethal dosage (LCt50)

Unknown.

median incapacitating dosage (LCt50)

Minimal exposure causes acute discomfort.

skin toxicity

See Pathology.

eye toxicity

Highly toxic. Severe injury possible.

rate of action

Immediate. See Pathology.

protection required

Protective mask/respirator and full protective overclothing.

rate of detoxification

Not fully studied. Many cases last from between two months and a year for full recovery. Reoccurrences can be as painful as initial contact.


decontaminants

Warm water effectively dissolves CX. Bleaches and strong oxidizers will break down the compound. Strong alkalai solutions (such as sodium hydroxide, NaOH) with live steam should be used on large ground and structural areas of contamination.

vapor density

None below 40°C(104°F). CX is normally a solid.

vapor pressure

None below 40°C (104°F). Temperature/pressure curve not fully studied.

solid density

Probably between 1.40 and 1.50 g/cc at 20°C( 68°F).

persistency

See Field Behavior.

volatility

None below 40°C (104°F). See Vapor Pressure, above.

latent heat of vaporization

Indeterminate.

melting point

About 40°'C (104°F)

boiling point

About 54°C (129.2°F), with decomposition.

decomposition point

At boiling point.

flash point

None.

rate of hydrolysis

Data not available.

hydrolysis products

Data not available.

stability in storage

Stable in steel containers when dry.

action on metals and other materials

Slightly acidic and corrosive when mixed with water.

molecular weight

113.92
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Sun Dec 20, 2015 11:11 pm

APPENDIX B-17

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 1700 ARMY PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

29 July 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters (OASD(CBM))

SUBJECT: Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991.

1 . REFERENCES a. OASD Letter, undated, no subject, from Mr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy ASD for Chemical/Biological Matters to Senator Donald H. Riegel Jr., (designating himself as POC for all Operation DESERT STORM chemical /biological weapons matters and discussing information concerning the suspect chemical container found in Kuwait city. Kuwait in August 1991).

b. British Ministry of Defense Letter, Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, 14 July 1994, Subject: Suspect Chemical Container: Kuwait city; August 1991 (Draft).

c. Memorandum For Director, CATD, 4 January 1994, Subject: Iraqi Chemical agents -Information Paper.

d. Task Force Victory Memorandum, AETSBGC-V, 7 August 1991, Subject: Tasking Number 91-047.

e. British EOD Squadron GP Document, 7 August 1991, Subject: Initial Report Suspected Chemical container.

1. PURPOSE. At the request of the OASD(CBM), to present information concerning the suspect chemical container fund in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991.

2 . BACKGROUND

a. I served as Division Chemical Officer (DCMLO) for the Third Infantry Division (3ID) Weurtzburg, Germany from April 1989 until December 1991.

b. As the DCMLO I had Command and Control of the Division Chemical Company (the 92d) . For example, I rated the Company Commander. The 92d's Reconnaissance (Recon) Platoon was one of two chemical platoons in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) assigned to deploy to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM (OpDS/S) , receive training on the FOX NBC Recon Vehicle (at the Germany NBC School in Sonthofen, Germany), and receive the FOX NBC Recon Vehicles. The 92d Chemical Company Recon Platoon was the first USAREUR unit to deploy in support of OpDS/S.

c. The 3ID was also assigned the mission to coordinate FOX NBC Recon Vehicle training at the Germany NBC School. Our Division Chemical Section received that mission. As a result of the Recon Platoon deployment and our coordination of training at Sonthofen, I was thoroughly familiar with the FOX's employment, capabilities, and peculiarities.

d. In about early 1990, at the request of the 3ID Commander (MG Wilson A. Shoffner), I began serving as the acting Division Chief of Staff (CofS) when the CofS was not available for duty.

e. Once OpDS/S began and Seventh U.S. Corp, First Armored Division, and Third Armored Division were deployed in support, 3ID was assigned the mission of rear support (3ID was attached to Fifth U.S. Corp) for USAREUR Army units in Germany.

f . Along with the mission of rear support, came many "new" mission requirements. The 3ID Commander assigned me the title of Deputy CofS for Rear Operations and the mission to coordinated numerous aspects of that mission.

g. In spring 1991, a decision was made to relieve First Brigade, Third Armored Division in Kuwait City with the Eleventh Armored Cavalry Regiment (11ACR), Fulda, Germany. The deployment of the 11ACR included a General Officer (GO) Headquarters (HQ) to act as a command level between the 11ACR and Army Central Headquarters (ARCENT) Forward and provide coordination with the Kuwaiti Military, Gulf Coalition forces, Kuwaiti Ministers, and the U.S. Embassy (de facto).

h. 3ID was given the mission to provide that GO HQ. The GO HQ plus the 11ACR, an Evacuation Hospital, and 18 tenant activities became Task Force Victory (TFV). The 3ID Commander assigned BG Robert A. Goodbarry as TFV Commander. I was assigned as TFV CofS.

i. I (and other 3ID staff officers) was sent TDY to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in mid May 1991 to coordinate the deployment of TFV. I returned to 3ID for a few days, briefed the Division Commander, proposed a staff, and returned to Kuwait as part of the forward deployment on 2 June 1991. The rest of the TFV staff followed in about two weeks. I remained in Kuwait City (as TFV CofS) until otir 3ID GO HQ was relieved. I redeployed to 3ID on 9 September 1991. I returned on Permanent Change of Station (PCS) to the Department of the Amy Inspector General (DAIG) around 16 December 1991.

j . Although I was the senior chemical branch officer in Kuwait during this time frame, I was the TFV CofS, not chemical officer. The TFV chemical officer was the 11ACR chemical officer.

3. SITUATION.

a. Pre 8 August 1991.

(1) On about 6 August 1991 (evening), I received a telephone call from Col Macel, the U.S. Army Liaison Officer, Kuwait (USALOK). Col Macel informed me that a British Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team had found what they thought might be a container of chemical agent near a Kuwaiti school south of Kuwait City. Col Macel stated that there was going to be a meeting at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (MOD) the next morning and would I attend. I said yes.

(2) The meeting was attended by Kuwaiti personnel, British personnel, Col Macel, and myself. These were the major players. Others may have been represented but I can not state for fact they were.

(3) The British EOD personnel stated what they had found an approximately one ton container immediately behind the rear fence (wall) of the Sabbaniyah High School for girls. This High School is south of Kuwait City, outside Seventh Ring Road. They further stated:

(a) That the container had been found by their EOD personnel but that a caretaker at the school had stated that the container had been there since he returned after the war.

(b) That the container had been struck by a 7.62 mm round (approximately) which had penetrated the container.

(c) That they had gotten positive readings for mustard agent (H) with their chemical agent monitors (CAM), positive color changes with their detector paper (although not always exactly as they expected), and positive readings from their detector kits (however, there was a shelf life concern with some components).

(d) That the container was "leaking" a noticeably brown colored vapor.

(e) That during the sampling process one soldier had received some apparent burns on his wrist and that the injury appeared to be more of a burn than the result of vesication.

(f) That their protective gloves appeared to have been "softened" by the material from the container.

(g) That they had sealed the container with silicon and a plaster of paris patch and that the container was not presently leaking.

(4) The British further proposed that the container be removed from the city (out in the desert) and destroyed (blown up). Either Col Macel or I stated that this may be premature since a United Nations (UN) Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team was currently in Iraq attempting to determine the Iraqi chemical posture. Destroying a container that might contain Iraqi chemical agent might not be wise. I suggested that we use the FOX NBC Recon Vehicles (assigned to the 11ACR) to see if the FOX could confirm or deny the presence of agent in the container. If we could confirm that there was no agent, then the situation became much "easier".

(5) All agreed that this was the best course of action and agreed to resample the container and analyze the materiel with the FOX vehicles. I stated that we would employ two FOXs in order to confirm their readings. The British stated that they would handle the area set up, hot line, decon support, medical, and all sampling.

(6) Col Macel stated that he would inform the Ambassador and attempt to contact the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team.

(7) I returned to TFV HQ, briefed BG Goodbarry, and suggested that we support the operation and be prepared to provide security for the site if we confirmed the presence of chemical agent. BG Goodbarry agreed. I told our G3 to task the 11ACR to provide two Fox vehicles to support the analysis operation and be prepared for follow on missions should we confirm the presence of chemical agent. I contacted our Provost Marshall and told him to be prepared to provided site security should it be required. I called the 11ACR and briefed the Executive Officer and Chemical Officer of the situation and their mission requirements.

(8) Later that evening Col Hacel called and stated that the mission was "a go" for tomorrow and that we would meet at the British EOD compound south of Kuwait City. I informed BG Goodbarry, the 11ACR, and our staff.

b. 8 August 1991.

(1) All parties met at the British EOD compound. Participants included Col Macel, British EOD personnel, 11ACR personnel (two FOX vehicle crews and their company commander), a TFV security representative, and myself.

(2) We proceeded to Sabbaniyah High School and established the operation (i.g. the command post, hot line, decon operations, medical support, FOX vehicle operations, sampling operations, and contingencies), and executed "practice runs".

(3) Medical support was a major concern. By the time we were prepared to commence operations, it was approaching 1100 hours. The weather conditions were approximately 140 degrees Fahrenheit, 30 knot winds, and fine blowing sand. Since we would have soldiers in full protective gear, heat stress was a high priority. The FOX crews were not a particular concern since the vehicles were air conditioned.

(4) The operation proceeded as the FOX vehicles were positioned; British EOD personnel proceeded beyond the hot line, unsealed the container, obtained samples, presented the samples to the FOX vehicles, obtained backup samples in glass containers, resealed the suspected agent container, and returned to the hot line. The FOX vehicles returned to the hot line, were checked for contamination, deconed if required, and cleared through the hot line. All British personnel were checked for contamination, deconed if required, and cleared through the hot line.

(5) The FOX vehicles both indicated the presence of H agent and Phosgene (CX). During the sampling operation the first sample presented to the first Fox vehicle evaporated prior to introduction to the FOX. Additional samples (of more volume) were successfully analyzed by both FOXs. The harsh weather conditions did bring into question the accuracy of the FOX vehicle's Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) analysis because the rate of evaporation could realistically effect the indicated volumes of components in the sample (i.g. not all components in the sample would evaporate at the same rate, the "lighter" components could evaporate first).

(6) It was my original intention to maintain custody of at least one set of samples (I had access to a walk-in freezer at TFV) ; however, after the indication of possible CX, I felt it was unwise to transport the samples back to TFV in my vehicle. The British EOD personnel maintained the samples. I instructed the FOX crews to give me the GCMS tapes from their analyses. They did.

(7) The operation had occurred without incident. The only incident was one British EOD soldier who was processed through the hot line early because of heat stress. The soldier was "cooled off" and was not a casualty. There were no other casualties.

(8) We established our TFV security forces to secure the area. Col Macel stated he would contact the Kuwaiti MOD in order to get them to assume the security mission. This occurred in a "couple of days". The operation ended and I returned co TFV.

(9) I briefed BG Goodbarry and suggested that I contact the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC) Aberdeen, MD and relay the situation to them. He agreed. I contacted CRDEC by telephone (I do not remember the point of contact), briefed the situation, and suggested I fax them the FOX GCMS tapes for analysis. They agreed. I prepared a brief paper describing the operation and faxed the paper with copies of the FOX tapes to chem. I do not have copies of the paper or the tapes.

(10) Later that evening Col Macel called to state that he had contacted the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team (they were in Bahrain for rest), that they would be at the British EOD compound tomorrow morning, and would I attend the meeting. I agreed.

c. Post August 1991. (1) All parties met at the British EOD compound. Participants included Col Hacel, five (or six) members of the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team, British EOD personnel, and myself . The UN team was composed of officers and civilians with the civilians being from the British Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down, UK.

(2) The situation was briefed to the UN team. The UN team stated that the UN would take custody of the container, container materiel samples, and provide any further analysis required. I think the UN team and British EOD personnel returned to the container and resampled in order to maintain custody of the samples; however I do not know that for a fact. I told the UN team that I had contacted CRDEC and provided them copies of the FOX GCHS tapes. I think I provided the UN team the original FOX GCMS tapes; however, I can not remember for sure. If not the original tapes, they did receive copies. I do not currently know the status or location of the original tapes. The meeting ended.

(3) After the meeting. Col Hacel stated that the container was now in custody of the UN and that we did not have to "worry" about it any more. I returned to TFV, briefed GB Goodbarry, and called CRDEC and told them that the UN team had custody of the container and samples. I told CRDEC that the samples were going to Porton Down and suggested that CRDEC contact Porton Down for further consultation. CRDEC agreed.

(4) I continued my mission as TFV CofS, redeployed to 3ID, PCSed to DAIG. and did not hear any more about the suspect chemical materiel until I was contacted by the OASD(CBM) in July 1994.

4. ADDITIONAL FACTS

a. U.S. Army soldiers did not sample the materiel in the container at Sabbaniyah High School. No U.S. Army soldiers were downwind of the hot line other than the FOX vehicle crews who remained inside their vehicles.

b. The FOX GCMS tapes (of the materiel in question) were not clean tapes (i.g. there was not a pure materiel in the container). I was not sure what the materiel was: however, I did know that it was a complex materiel and that it was "nasty".

c. I did not see the injury to the British soldier. Although his injury was related as more of a burn than a vesication injury, the weather conditions in Kuwait City in August are harsh and could effect the action of any materiel.

d. I did not see the "softened" rubber gloves; however, their deterioration from agent (or agent degradation products) could not be absolutely disregarded.

e. The brown vapors from the container were not characteristic of pure H agent; however, I knew that whatever the materiel was, it was not pure. If it were some agent, I felt it might be a mixture of materiel (H and CX) and degradation products.

f. I thought it odd that the Iraqi would "mix" H and CX agent and that this one container was found where it was; however, many things the Iraqi did were odd.

g. The configuration of the container was interesting. The container had one large blind flange on top with three small blind flanges exiting the large flange. The container did not resemble any bulk chemical agent container I had ever heard about. The use of the three flanges could only be guessed at.

h. I can confirm (from personal photographs) that one FOX vehicle (involved in the operation) was 11ACR vehicle CML 23.

5. OPINION

a. One of the high priority Essential Elements of Information (EEI) in the U.S. Army is the first use of chemical agent. Where it is first used, how it is employed, against whom it is employed, and at what level it is employed by our adversary is extremely important to the defensive posture of our troops. There is a U.S. Amy system (the NBC Warning System) specifically designed to provide this information as fast as possible. Troops are trained to initiate this system automatically if a chemical attack occurs on their position or is observed in their area. NATO conducts exercises in Europe to specifically assess how fast the notification of a chemical attack can be relayed to Army level and higher. If an Iraqi chemical attack had occurred, the information would have been relayed to all command levels as soon as possible. Every Commander, Chemical Officer, and staff would have known about the attack quickly. That never happened in OpDS/S.

b. An attempt by the military to "cover up" a chemical attack would have been adverse to our training, tactically illogical, a disaster for our troops, and virtually impossible to do.

c. There appears to have been no political reason why an Iraqi chemical attack would need to be "covered up". The use of chemicals by Iraq would have further justified our mission and strengthened the coalition.

d. Prior to my deployment to Kuwait City I was privileged to receive Top Secret Special Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) Intelligence briefings as the 3ID Deputy CofS. I know of no use of chemicals by Iraq based on the above.

e. After my deployment to TFV, I was privileged to the same level of U.S. military information as well as information from the American Embassy (and their assets), Kuwaiti military, Gulf Coalition of Forces, and the significant EOD and oil well fire fighting efforts. I know of no use of chemicals by Iraq based on the above. To my knowledge, the container found at Sabbaniyah High School, was the only incident related to chemical agent or munitions that occurred in Kuwait from June until early September 1991.

f . During the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq held chemical agent release authority at a high level (normally the Corp). There is no reason to assume that release authority would have been at a lower level for OpDS/S.

g. In my opinion. Iraq never made the decision to deploy chemical munitions forward of depot level storage prior to the initiation of the air war. After the air war, deployment of these munitions became impossible.

h. In my opinion, Iraq did not employ chemical agents during OpDS/S.

6. DISCLAIMER. The information in this paper is as I remember the situation in August 1991 and is supported by the references at paragraph one.

7. CONCLUSION. A container of chemical materiel (approximately one ton in size) was found at Sabbaniyah High School, Kuwait City, Kuwait in summer 1991. In August 1991, chemical materiel from that container was subjected to field tests for chemical agent. Although some test results may have been questionable, the materiel did produce positive field tests for H and CX chemical agent. There was no confirmation of the materiel as chemical agent in Kuwait in August 1991. Custody of the container and contents were transferred to United Nation's control around 9 August 1991.

DON W. KILLGORE LTC, IG Technical Inspections Branch

CF: HQDA, DAMO-FDB
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 12:02 am

APPENDIX B-18

From: Dr. Graham S. Pearson, CB, Director General

Ministry of Defence
CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT
Porton Down, Salisbury, Wilts. SP4 OJQ
Telephone: (0980) 61 3100
Facsmile: (0980)611963

Ptn/TG 1090/18/1894/94

Lt Col Vicki Merriman
Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defence (Chemical and Biological Matters)
The Pentagon
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3050
United States of America

14 July 1994

Dear Col. Merriman,

SUSPECT CHEMICAL CONTAINER: KUWAIT CITY: AUGUST 1991

1. In August 1991, a member of CBDE Porton Down staff led a team into Kuwait to obtain samples from the suspect chemical container located by a British EOD team outside the walls of the Sabbaniyah High School for Girls and advise on short-term control of the problem.

2. The team consisted of three CBDE scientists. The team visited Kuwait City and then the 21 EOD Headquarters. The report of the team leader dated 11 August 1991 shows that following discussions with other CBDE personnel the possibility was identified that the material may be fuming nitric acid as this was consistent with the use of these containers in Iraq and this chemical may account for some of the indications of mustard obtained by various chemical detection equipments.

3. A subsequent note from CBDE Porton Down to the Ministry of Defence dated 23 August 1991 stated that the brown fumes associated with the material, the destruction of the NBC suit material and the burns produced on skin suggests that the material may be fuming nitric acid, a highly corrosive oxidising add which may be used as a rocket propellant, The damage to the NBC suit material and the brown fumes showed that the material was not liquid mustard.


4. Samples on resin were received at CBDE Porton Down on 13 September 1991. The samples had a definite yellow/brown colour compared to the original white of the resin and were labelled Sample 1 dated 10 August 1991 and Sample 3 dated 10 August 1991. Analytical results showed that there was a high concentration of nitrate in the sample and a pH that was extremely acidic. Extraction of the resin with dichloromethane and analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry showed the presence of no material of CW interest The samples were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric add and there was no evidence of any CW agent being present. CBDE gave advice that the tank may contain up to two tonnes of nitric acid and the best option identified for its disposal was to give or sell the material to the local chemistry industry to utilise in any chemical process or to pay them to neutralise the nitric acid under controlled conditions.

5. The UK view is that the tank discovered by the EOD unit in Kuwait City in August 1991 contained fuming nitric acid. It did not contain any CW agent although various detectors responded giving indications of mustard. These indications were not, however, confirmed in the subsequent laboratory analyses.  
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 12:15 am

APPENDIX B-19

RANDALL L. VALLEE
8001-E N. MESA
EL PASO, TEXAS 79932

(505) 589-4522

during the month of may i was contacted by lt. col. vicky marryman [Vicki merriman] at my home in santa teresa n.m. by phoenix.

lt. col. marryman stated she was calling on behalf of the under secretary of defence, and was with the o.d.s. taskforce, reviewing and conducting their own investigation reguarding the claims of chemical and biological warfare in the persian gulf.

lt. col. marryman started asking questions, in what seemed to be concerned motives. she started by asking me my m.o.s., my family and what i did in the gulf war. after a short time of small talk lt. col. marryman began to get to the true nature of thE conversation.

lt. col. marryman stated she would like to ask me some questions reguarding the may 25, 1994 senate report put out by senator riegle and my statement therein.

lt. col. marryman asked me to tell her what happened again even though she had a copy of the report in front of her.

to the best of my ability i recounted the statement.

after complying with the lt. col., marryman's attitude changed from being concerned to a form of interrogation.

LT. COL. MARRYMAN STARTED USEING TACTICS OF DOUBT REGUARDING MY STATEMENT. ALTHOUGH SHE DID SUBSTANTIATE THE SCUD ATTACKS THAT I HAD MENTIONED IN THE REPORT, IN REGUARDS TO MY STATEMENT OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICALS, SHE FLATLY DENIED THEIR USE IN ANY FORM DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.

I STATED TO LT. COL. MARRYMAN THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT TO BE THE CASE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF MY FAILING HEALTH BUT THE DETERIORATING HEALTH OF FRIENDS WHO HELPED DESTROY THE MUSTARD GAS FOUND IN IRAQUI BUNKERS.

LT. COL. MARRYMAN STATED THAT "IF" CHEMICALS OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAD BEEN USED, THEN WHY WEREN'T ANY OF THE ALLIED FORCES AFFECTED IN ANY WAY. THAT THERE ARE NO COMPLAINTS OF ANY ILLNESS FROM ANYONE, BUT U.S. SOLDIERS, WHINING ABOUT BEING SICK AND ONLY A FEW OF THEM AT THE MOST.

I ASKED LT. COL. MARRYMAN ABOUT THE CZECHS WERE KNOWN TO USE AND CONDUCT CHEMICALS ON THEMSELVES, AND THIS WAS THE REASON FOR THEIR DETECTION. AND AS TO THE SO CALLED FROG MISSILES ... WE HAVE FOUND THROUGH INTERVIEWS LIKE THIS THAT MOST OF THE STATEMENTS ARE BEING CHANGED BECAUSE PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED HAVE NO PROOF OF WHAT THEY SAW OR PHYSICAL PROOF TO SUBSTANTIATE THE EXISTENCE OF FROG MISSILES BEING USED AT THAT TIME.

I STATED TO MARRYMAN THAT I WOULD NOT CHANGE MY STATEMENT ON WHAT I SAW OR KNEW TO BE TRUE.

MARRYMAN BECAME FORCEFULL IN HER APPROACH TO CONVINCE THAT NO CHEMICAL AGENTS, OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAD BEEN USED.

BECAUSE THE CONVERSATION WAS GOING NO PLACE AND I WAS BECOMING VERY UPSET I STATED TO MARRYMAN WE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO DISCUSS.

THIS IS THE CONVERSATION TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTANCE. EVERY THING I HAVE STATED WAS FACT.

SGT. RANDALL L. VALLEE U.S. ARMY
HONORABLY DISCHARGED.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 12:31 am

APPENDIX C-1

ANNEX 1

INFORMATION PAPER
CHEMICAL AGENT EXPOSURE
OPERATION DESERT STORM

SGRD-UV-ZA
5 March 91

1. PFC David Allen Fisher, 263-78-6470, is assigned to Scout Platoon, HHT, 4/8 Cavalry, 2nd Bde, 3d Armored Division, as a cavalry scout, MO6 13D. His exposure to mustard liquid occurred on 1 March 91 on the objective of 4/8 Cav in northwestern Kuwait (grid reference reported separate by LTC Adams, 3AD Chemical Officer). PFC Fisher's mission on 1 March included exploring enemy bunker complexes for intelligence materiel and personnel, and demolition of enemy fighting vehicles. On that date he wore Nomex tanker coveralls and a ballistic protective vest. While exploring numerous bunkers he remembers coming into contact with many surfaces in tight passages, resulting in the soiling of his clothing and equipment. He participated in demolition of Z6U-23 antiaircraft systems, BRDM vehicle4s, and T-55 tanks only. He specifically states that he was not in contact with tube or rocket field artillery systems.

2. PFC Fisher completed his mission at about 1700 on 1 March, returned to his platoon area, and experienced no symptoms for 8 hours until he started radio watch at 0100 on 2 March. At that time he felt stinging pain on the skin of his left upper arm, saw that the skin had a red sunburned appearance without blisters, and thought that it felt like a spider bite. He slept from 0300 to 044, woke for stand-to, and felt more stinging pain on his arm. At this time there were blisters on the upper arm and more reddened skin on the lower arm. At 0800 his company medic checked him, thought he might have a heater burn, and had him return at 1600, when more blisters had formed on the lower arm. At that time he was seen by CW3 Ahmed and CW3 Wildhelm at the 4/8 Cav aid station. They suspected he might be a blister agent casualty, decontaminated him with 0.5% chlorine solution, applied a local dressing and evacuated him to C co., 45th Support Battalion. During evaluation, they were assisted by chemical personnel who monitored PFC Fisher's clothing and equipment with the spectrometer of a Fox NBC recon vehicle. Initial readings of soiled areas of clothing gave weak positive spectra suggesting possible lewisite or phosgene oxide contamination. A later reading of a soiled area of the left upper shoulder pad of the ballistic vest gave a strongly positive reading for HQ, a mustard compound. A subsequent Fox survey of the bunker complex was positive for mustard, HD.

3. At C Co. 45th Support Bn, PFC Fisher was treated by MAJ DuClaw, who confirmed the clinical diagnosis of blister agent exposure, photographed the blisters, applied a topical antibiotic and gauze dressing, and returned him to duty with follow-up at his unit. PFC Fisher remains in full duty status. I examined him and interviewed CW3 Ahmed and DW3 Weldheim on 3 March at 1100. PFC Fisher had two blisters, about 2 cm diameter each on the left upper arm, and another 2 blisters, 1 to 2 cm diameter, on the lateral left forearm, each surrounded by a narrow margin of erythema. The roof of one upper arm blister had broken and the other three remained fluid-filled. PFC Fisher felt fine except for mild local pain that did not interfere with his duty performance. The skin area was photographed and a urine sample was saved in preservative for later analysis for thiodiglyocol, a mustard breakdown product. For spectra printouts and samples of the coverall sleeve and ballistic vest were retained by 3AD chemical personnel for transport and analysis via technical intelligence channels.

4. I conclude the PFC Fisher's skin injury was caused by exposure to liquid mustard chemical warfare agent. The complete sequence of events is consistent with this conclusion. In particular, the latent period of 8 hours between exposure and first symptoms is characteristic of mustard [gas] exposure. No other corrosive or skin-toxic chemical compound that could reasonably be expected to have been present on the battlefield shows this latent period. The confirmatory Fox spectra findings are also consistent. It seems more likely that PFC Fisher's exposure occurred during bunker exploration rather than during vehicle demolition because of the positive Fox result in the bunker complex and the lack of established chemical capability of the vehicle types he encountered. MAJ DuClaw, CW3 Wildhelm, and CW3 Ahmed are all recent graduates of the Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Course. Their accurate diagnosis and appropriate decontamination and treatment procedures reflect well on their professional capability.

Prepared and authenticated by COL. Michael A. Dunn

[Obtained under Freedom of Information Act by the Gulf War Veterans of Georgia through the U.S. Army on August 15, 1994.]
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 12:41 am

APPENDIX C-2

[Handwritten Note: Q & A SHEET USED BY USCENTCOM PAO (JOINT INFORMATION BU IN MARCH 1991.]

RESPONSE TO QUERIES: MUSTARD AGENT EXPOSURE

Q1: Can you confirm that a soldier (PFC David A. Fisher) was exposed to a chemical agent during OPERATION DESERT STORM?

A1: Clinical evidence strongly indicted a mild mustard agent exposure.

Q2: What was this chemical agent?

A2: Mustard is classified as a blister agent.

Q3: When did the event occur?

A3: As best as can be determined he was exposed to the agent sometime prior to 1700 on 1 March 1991. He experienced the first symptoms, those being discomfort and erythema of the skin, at 0100 on 2 March 1991.

Q4: Can you tell us the circumstances leading to his exposure?

A4: While on a mission to explore enemy bunker complexes in SE Iraq, he came into contact with many surfaces in tight passages, resulting in the soiling of his clothing and equipment.

-- He experienced no symptoms until March 2, when he said he felt a stinging pain on the skin of his upper left arm. There were small blisters and reddened skin on the lower portion of his arm.

-- He was treated at the unit aid station where they suspected he may have come in contact with a chemical agent. PFC Fisher was then evaluated at a Medical Clearing Company by a Chemical Casualty Specialist that supported the clinical diagnosis of mustard exposure.

Q5: What did this further diagnosis show?

A5: This further medical evaluation showed fluid filled blisters surrounded by a red margin typical of mustard agent blistering.

Q6: How serious was the exposure to PFC Fisher?

A6: The exposure was characterized as "mild" and the patient lost no duty time as a result of the incident. He was returned to duty after treatment.

Q7: Are there any other cases?

A7: There are no other reported cases.

Q8: Can we assume that the bunker complex was used by the Iraqis as a chemical storage site?

A8: We can't conform this. We can only state that the bunker contained evidence of a mustard agent (as indicated by a mass spectrometer on the "Fox" NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle. It's important to keep in mind that mustard is a very persistent chemical. There is evidence from other conflicts (i.e., WWI, that mustard can persist for decades. If this bunker had been used as a storage site, it may have been for its previous conflict with Iran.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 12:55 am

APPENDIX C-3

Medical Chemical Defense in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

The Journal of the U.S. Army Medical Department PB 8-92-1/2. January/February 1992

Lt. Col. John V. Wade, VC *
Maj. Robert M. Gum, MC *
Col Michael A. Dunn, MC **

The authors give a brief overview of how the Chemical Institute prepared for Desert Shield/Storm. Numerous refresher courses dealing with chemical warfare were held, and 800 deploying health professionals graduated from these courses. The center assisted medical facilities in assessing their clinical efficacy and safety of medical countermeasures and provided consultation to the USCENTCOM Surgeon in medical-casualty care and other related issues.

Introduction

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) has historically played a crucial role in any successful combat operation. The advent of highly sophisticated and automated weapons systems has in no way lessened the significance of our most critical asset -the soldier. Operation Desert Storm's execution required US forces to operate in a potential chemical threat environment for the first time since World War II, not having actually experienced chemical warfare (CW) agent use since World War I. Chemical warfare poses problems for the soldier which are uniquely medical in nature. Whereas most weapons systems are hardware oriented, and thus somewhat foreign to many AMEDD personnel, CW agent effects are based on fundamental principles of physiology and pharmacology. To some degree we should all be CW subject matter experts.

As soldiers, it is imperative that we also remain focused on the ultimate goal of the AMEDD. which is to "conserve the fighting strength." Our research and clinical efforts must therefore provide the soldier in the field with knowledge or products which improve his combat effectiveness and enhance his ability to fight and win. Our responsiveness to all aspects of this mission was tested during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as we faced an adversary who possessed a modern, offensive CW capability. We weren't as ready as we could have been, but we rose to the challenge admirably.

Before the Crisis

All AMEDD personnel receive individual skill training in the detection, decontamination, signs, symptoms and treatment of CW agent exposure. We have all practiced donning our masks and chemical protective overgarments. Many have experienced life at MOPP 4 (chemical gear) for extended periods of time. Yet, all too often, we have failed to fully appreciate the difficulties inherent in accomplishing our mission in a chemical environment. This is borne out in numerous after action reviews from the National Training Center, which clearly demonstrate a lack of training with realistically integrated CW agent employment for medical and non-medical units alike. This issue, which has been the subject of two Department of the Army IG readiness assessments and periodic General Officer Medical Chemical Defense Reviews, was briefed to the Army Surgeon General in July 1990. This timing was fortuitous in that it set the stage for a series of events which culminated in the highest degree of medical-chemical readiness the Army has ever seen.

The US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the lead laboratory conducting research on medical defense measures against CW agents. Its mission includes elucidating the mechanism of action of threat CW agents, identifying promising candidate pretreatment, therapeutic and decontamination compounds, testing their efficacy, and supporting those organizations tasked with their development, testing and evaluation. It also has responsibility for the postgraduate education of medical personnel in the management of chemical casualties, through the Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Course (M2C31. a professional short-course under the co-sponsorship of the Office of the Army Surgeon General and the US Army Academy of Health Sciences.

Training and Readiness in Desert Shield

With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug 2, 1990, it became clear that our research efforts over the past several decades might be put to the test under fire. It was also apparent that the greatest contribution that USAMRICD could make to Operation Desert Shield was to rapidly share our experience in medical-chemical defense with the largest number of people possible. Teams gave pre-deployment familiarization lectures to health professionals of all services at US locations in August and September. In September, at the request of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). an initial cell of three officers from USAMRICD arrived in Saudi Arabia to provide staff support and training in chemical casualty care during Operation Desert Shield. The mission of the USAMRICD Forward Detachment and the USCENTCOM Chemical Casualty Officer was threefold:

(1) To conduct refresher and supplementary training of US and coalition forces medical personnel in chemical casualty care, initially as formal M2C3, and subsequently on an as-needed/ as-available basis.

(2) To assess the clinical efficacy and safety of medical countermeasures and treatments directed against chemical agent exposure, formulate needed treatment modifications and disseminate new information in the theater as rapidly as possible to ensure optimal chemical casualty care.

(3) To provide consultation to the USCENTCOM Surgeon in medical-chemical defense, chemical casualty care and other related issues.

From September through December 1990, this team conducted 16 three-clay M2C3s in theater, training over 1,450 medical personnel from all four services and seven allied nations in CW agent detection, in the recognition of signs and symptoms, the decontamination and treatment. These sessions included an intensive field training exercise with triage, decontamination and treatment of mock chemical and mixed chemical/conventional casualties. Other USAMRICD teams conducted M2C3 courses in Europe and the United States that graduated another 800 deploying health professionals. In spite of the challenging "classroom" conditions, attentiveness to course material and performance on the final examinations were exceptional. Many M2C3 graduates provided further instruction to their entire unit, assisted by a series of USAMRICD Technical Memoranda. These publications, which were developed to provide up-to-date information on selected medical issues relevant to CW agents, were provided during or soon after the M2C3. All in all, medical personnel took optimal advantage of the five months before the start of the war by enhancing their knowledge of CW agent effects and preparing for possible CW agent use.

Operation Desert Storm: Continued Training and Clinical Assessment

The CW threat and chemical casualty potential were assessed as greatest for Army (ARCENTl and Marine Corps (MARCENT) units within the range of tube artillery and short-range multiple launch rocket systems. The possible use of SCUD missiles carrying chemical warheads, while extensively covered in the press and of great concern to the civilian population, was determined to be a much lower risk. Although medical personnel had been well-trained in the medical management of chemical casualties, the relevant doctrine and its clinical concepts were largely based on historical data, laboratory research and medical intelligence derived from the chemical casualty care experience of non-allied forces. While our doctrine and concepts were soundly based, they could likely have been improved upon with first-hand experience in chemical casualty management. The nature of the anticipated ground combat and the challenge posed by timely dissemination of information in theater required an agile and expert capability to capture, evaluate and disseminate clinical lessons learned. Thus, upon the initiation of hostilities, with the threat of actual US and allied chemical casualties, USCINCCENT requested deployment of a detachment of clinical experts in chemical casualty care and the continued support of a dedicated Chemical Casualty Officer. USAMRICD's total in-theater end-strength of eight soldiers was deployed from January to March 1991. It included four physicians, three clinical scientists (AN, VC, MS), and one noncommissioned officer (91T).

Additional mini-courses and refresher/ updates were provided to over 40 field hospitals and medical units during the initial phases of Operation Desert Storm, the target audience being approximately 3,000 physicians, physician assistants (PAs), nurses and medics. By the onset of ground operations, over 90% of the physicians and PAs assigned to divisional units were M2C3 graduates. For corps-level units and echelons above corps, the figure was about 50%.

The process of designating selected M2C3 graduates as "Medical Chemical Casualty Officers," begun in December, and was completed prior to the initiation of ground operations. For the first time since World War I, Army units designated medical-chemical casualty officers for each hospital. The other services participated on an informal basis. This network was used extensively in January to communicate the perceived medical-chemical threat, to disseminate the US Food and Drug Administration's recommended soldier information on Nerve Agent Pyridostigmine Pretreatment (NAPP), to collect data on the use and acceptance of NAPP in the field and to clarify the doctrinal use of the Convulsant Antidote Nerve Agent (CANAl upon introduction to the theater.

A specific message format, the Medical Chemical Update (MCU), was initiated to allow rapid dissemination of relevant information to Medical Chemical Casualty Officers. MCUs were used to recommend initiation and cessation of NAPP to the component services. A subsequent review of how these messages were received in the field suggests that this was a worthwhile endeavor, and would have been extremely beneficial in the face of actual chemical agent use.

Medical-chemical related staff actions and policies were proposed and managed at USCENTCOM and subordinate unit levels. These included. for example, restriction of insecticide use that would potentially impair cholinesterase reserve; consideration of chemical casualty recovery times and the impact on theater evacuation plans and policy; implementation of plans to load all medical evacuation vehicles with decontamination solution to permit far-forward decontamination of patients whenever possible; distribution and accountability for CANA, the diazepam autoinjector; and guidance on chemical decontamination of human remains. Requirements for public information presentations to the American and allied civilian communities and to the press were recurring actions.

Clinical Assessment During Desert Storm

Soon after initiation of hostilities in January 1991, three chemical assessment cells, each composed of two experts in chemical casualty management, were placed under operational control of the Corps Surgeons of the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps of ARCENT, and of the MARCENT Surgeon. The Army Corps and MARCENT Surgeons' sections were tasked and staffed to perform medical threat estimates, battle tracking and information gathering on the occurrence of conventional and chemical casualties. USCENTCOM also had a strong NBC threat assessment capability. Upon anticipation of CW use, or identification of actual chemical casualties, the chemical assessment cells were to deploy forward to the most appropriate medical element, depending on the predominant threat agent. For example, nerve agent vapor exposures would be best evaluated at a forward support or clearing company, while mustard casualties would be best evaluated at a Corps-level evacuation hospital. This was put to the test on the second day of the ground war when a cavalry scout of the 3d Armored Division was treated for blister lesions on his arm which were presumptively identified as clinically similar to those produced by sulfur mustard (HD). This individual was seen at his battalion aid station by one of the assessment teams, the lesions were examined and photographed, and the soldier was treated symptomatically after which he returned to duty.· Definitive identification of vesicant agent exposure was not confirmed. Relevant data was to be captured on a standardized form with subsequent entry into an automated database on a portable computer. In addition, targeted data needs or opportunities which arose from special circumstances (eg, the use of pyridostigmine by a large unit before the onset of major ground combat) were exploited.

The USCENTCOM Surgeon's Chemical Casualty Officer was to serve as the hub for data evaluation. He was best positioned to communicate as needed with the scientific e)!:perts in all three cells and with resources at USAMRICD and other laboratories. Also, depending on the nature of the clinical lessons learned, he could rapidly disseminate this information to all component services and allied forces as appropriate. As a hypothetical example, an evaluation of our initial experience with severe nerve agent casualties treated with CANA might have indicated that some hallmark findings could guide further therapy: ie, convulsions breaking through the first CAN A may be a reliable sign that atropine requirement over the first day would likely exceed 50mg. The officer at USCENTCOM was well positioned to sound out this interference quickly with the neuroscience community and immediately formulate new management guidelines. The Commander, USAMRICD, has DoD teaching authority to promulgate such guidelines as part of his chemical casualty professional education mission. The Medical Chemical Casualty Officer network was to be used for rapid dissemination of evaluated information and new management concepts and guidelines. The cells at each Corps level assisted, as time permitted, with reinforcement and explanation of information regarding the management of chemical casualties.

Specific Medical-Chemical Countermeasures

Over 41,000 soldiers from the XVIII Airborne Corps took NAPP for one to seven days in January 1991 under a nerve agent threat. Clinical information of the physiologic changes attributable to NAPP that resulted in need for medical attention, discontinuation, hospitalization and/or evacuation from theater were captured (Keeler et al: JAMA, vol. 266, Aug 1991). In summary, the NAPP regimen as practiced by soldiers under wartime conditions caused more frequently noticed physiologic responses than reported in earlier peacetime evaluations; however, these non-incapacitating symptoms did not impair military mission performance. The known effects of pyridostigmine on postsynaptic acetylcholine receptors and cholinergic transmission suggest that special attention to muscle relaxant management may be important during anesthesia. This information was reviewed with the anesthesia staffs of theater medical units, and the appropriate data capture management approaches were widely disseminated.

CONCLUSION

The Army Medical Department made a strong response to the chemical threat in the Persian Gulf. Guided by the Surgeon General's staff, it provided doctrine and training packages from the Academy of Health Sciences that supported new products such as NAPP and CANA. The US Army Medical Materiel Development Activity and Medical Materiel Agency both worked closely with the US Food and Drug Administration to ensure delivery and appropriate safety and efficacy monitoring of medical chemical countermeasures. Scientists at USAMRICD and other laboratories supported the effort with critical confirming and monitoring studies. Collectively. US forces achieved an unprecedented level of readiness to cope with the potential for enemy CW agent use. Timely M2C3 training. prior to deployment or in theater, allowed medical personnel to focus their attention on the mission at hand-treatment and conservation of the fighting strength-with less concern about the uncertainties of CW agent use. The competence and confidence that medical personnel acquired as a result of these efforts cannot be overestimated. The immediate presence of medical-chemical experts in the theater allowed for rapid dissemination of information, prompt answers to the questions of field commanders and continued reassurance that we were the best equipped and prepared medical force in the world.

_______________

Notes:

*US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5425.

** Formerly. Commander US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5425; now, US Army MEDDAC, Ft. Meade, MD 20755.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 1:31 am

APPENDIX C-4

Veteran's Story Counters Official One On Gas War
By THOMAS D. WILLIAMS
Courant Staff Writer
September 21, 1994

A U.S. Army Persian Gulf War veteran who was injured by a form of mustard gas said Tuesday that the Iraqi bunker he searched contained crates marked with skulls and crossbones.

But although former Sgt. David Allen Fisher, now 25, said he told U.S. Defense Department investigators about the crates, no mention of them appeared in a 1991 report, prepared by Army Col. M.A. Dunn, on gulf war exposure to chemical agents, Fisher said Tuesday.

Dunn, former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, who treated Fisher for what Dunn said were chemical wounds, did not say in his report how Fisher received those wounds.

The Defense Department continues to claim more than 3-1/2 years after the war that no chemical weapons were used by the Iraqis, none were found and no soldiers were seriously injured by them.

Fisher, who now lives in Albuquerque, N.M., said he was searching the Iraqi bunker for weapons on March 1, 1991, when he brushed up against some wooden crates inscribed with skull and crossbones warnings.

Within a couple of hours, Fisher said, his arms were covered with painful blisters. Subsequent tests with battlefield detection equipment determined that Fisher's protective clothing and the bunker itself contained mustard compound, a warfare chemical, Dunn's report shows.

But, when Fisher's tanker overalls and protective gear were sent for testing at the U.S. Army testing facility in Edgewood, Md., they were found to contain no signs of the compound, published test results say.

Last month, Lt. Col. Douglas Hart, a Pentagon spokesman, cited the 1991 Edgewood test to play down the initial report of Fisher's chemical exposure in March 1991 in Iraq.

But Hart said Tuesday that he was not aware that any chemical crates were discovered by Fisher in the bunker. And despite Fisher's statement, Hart said, it still is the Defense Department's belief that no chemical or biological weapons were used during the Persian Gulf War.

Fisher said he was sent to Germany with his injury five days after he entered the bunker, and was given 30 days of free leave. Subsequently, Fisher said, he was awarded the Purple Heart for injuries from the chemicals, which have scarred his arms slightly.

Hart and Dunn said last month they believe whatever chemical exposure Fisher experienced in the bunker must have come from chemicals left over from fighting in the earlier war between Iraq and Iran.

Fisher said he was told the chemicals in the bunker were checked out by an Army chemical unit, a fact confirmed in Dunn's report. No report from that chemical defense unit has surfaced.

Paul Sullivan, president of the Gulf War Veterans of Georgia, called for an investigation of Fisher's statements. He said all reports on the episode should be released immediately, and investigators should visit Iraqi bunkers as soon as possible to check for signs of chemical warfare.

To be fair and objective, Sullivan said, the inquiry should be conducted simultaneously by the Defense Department, independent scientists and a veterans' service organization.

Sullivan said that Defense Department denials of chemical-weapons use have hindered attempts by sick gulf war veterans to find out what is wrong with them.

U.S. Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr., a Michigan Democrat whose inquiry into mysterious gulf war illnesses has spearheaded efforts to get help to veterans, said Tuesday he was distressed by Fisher's statements.

``I think it is further proof that gulf war troops were exposed to chemical, and possibly biological, agents, and they are a likely factor in what's causing Gulf War syndrome.

``Sgt. Fisher's experience is not an isolated incident. We will continue our fight to dig out the truth,'' Riegle said.

About 20 percent of all troops who fought in the Persian Gulf War have complained of one kind of sickness or another. At least 2,200 have died since the war, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs says. Doctors have been unable to diagnose the sicknesses of many veterans, and they have dubbed those illnesses Gulf War syndrome.

About 127,000 retired servicemen and women have sought care at U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals. Twenty-one thousand of those have complained of more serious illnesses. Meanwhile, 4,896 active-duty servicemen and women have registered health complaints with the Defense Department.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 1:36 am

APPENDIX D-1

WITH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

Situation within Kuwait G-Day 0530-1400 24 February 1991

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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

Postby admin » Mon Dec 21, 2015 1:41 am

APPENDIX D-2

WITH THE 2ND MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

shape prevented easy removal, so the best way to dispose of them was to blow them in place. [148]

Gunnery Sergeant Mart J. Culp, the noncommissioned officer in charge of a demolitions team, was therefore especially busy this morning. His expertise was required at several of the lanes where unexploded mines or line charges which had failed to detonate were preventing the clearance of the lanes and the movement of the assault battalions. Time and again he entered the minefields, supervising the setting of demolitions charges and personally activating the fuzes. In spite of occasional Iraqi artillery and mortar fire. Gunnery Sergeant Culp and his team helped to clear three lanes and allow the assault to continue. [149]

The use of chemical munitions by the Iraqis had been expected, but happily had not yet occurred. At approximately 0656, the "Fox" chemical reconnaissance vehicle at lane Red 1 detected a "trace" of mustard gas, originally thought to be from a chemical mine. [150] The alarm was quickly spread throughout the division. Since everyone had been required to don his protective outer garments and boots the previous evening, it was only necessary to hurriedly pull on a gas-mask and protective gloves to attain MOPP level 4. A second "Fox" vehicle was sent to the area, and confirmed the presence of an agent which had probably been there a long time. Unknown in origin, it was still sufficiently strong to cause blistering on the exposed arms of two AAV crewmen. [151] Work continued on the clearance of the lanes, and the MOPP level was reduced to 2 after about a half-hour.

The first lanes to be opened were Red 1 and 2 through which the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines pushed. At 0724, the battalion reported it had passed

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Marines don full chemical protective equipment (MOPP level 4) during general chemical alert on 24 February 1991. Photograph by author
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