The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 4:23 am

PART 18 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

i. Finding 9:

(1) Finding: Interviewed leaders and Soldiers stated the unit's morale (71%) and command climate (68%) had steadily improved due to competent leadership, caring of Soldiers by leaders, and better working and living conditions as the theater matured.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation (AR) 600–20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-5, subparagraph c (1) and (4)(c), prescribes the policies and responsibilities of command. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"c. Characteristics of command leadership.

(1) Commanders and other leaders committed to the professional Army ethic promote a positive environment. If leaders show loyalty to their soldiers, the Army, and the Nation, they earn the loyalty of their soldiers. If leaders consider their soldiers’ needs and care for their wellbeing, and if they demonstrate genuine concern, these leaders build a positive command climate.

"(4) Professionally competent leaders will develop respect for their authority by-

"(c) Properly training their soldiers and ensuring that both soldiers and equipment are in the proper state of readiness at all times. Commanders should assess the command climate periodically to analyze the human dimension of combat readiness. Soldiers must be committed to accomplishing the mission through the unit cohesion developed as a result of a healthy leadership climate established by the command. Leaders at all levels promote the individual readiness of their soldiers by developing competence and confidence in their subordinates. In addition to being mentally, physically, tactically, and technically competent, soldiers must have confidence in themselves, their equipment, their peers, and their leaders. A leadership climate in which all soldiers are treated with fairness, justice, and equity will be crucial to development of this confidence within soldiers. Commanders are responsible for developing disciplined and cohesive units sustained at the highest readiness level possible."

j. Finding 10:

(1) Finding: Detainee administration, internment, and intelligence exploitation policy and doctrine does not address detainee operations conducted in the current operating environment, which has a higher demand for human intelligence exploitation at the tactical level and the need for additional classifications of detainees.

(2) Standard: Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) message dated 211933Z JAN 02 states that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of US Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949 is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the US would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied. Additionally, the United States was an occupying power and has acted in accordance with the obligations of an occupying power described in the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (H.IV), Oct. 18, 1907, including, but not limited to Articles 43-46 and 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949. The GC supplements H.IV, providing the general standard of treatment at Article 27 and specific standards in subsequent Articles.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows:

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

The following specific provisions of GPW and GC apply:

"Article 18 – All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents, shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment. At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none. Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war. Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner’s request, shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner’s account as provided in Article 64. The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money impounded shall apply. Such objects, likewise sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.

Article 19 – Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger. Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone. Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone."

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees, 18 August 1994, Paragraph 3.3, requires the application of appropriate legal status, transfer and release authority and authorization. Paragraph 3.4 directs the handing over of detainees to Military Police and provides for intelligence collection. Paragraph 4.4 assigns responsibility for treatment, classification, administrative processing, and custody for detainees. The specific language in the directive follows:

"3.3 Captured or detained personnel shall be accorded an appropriate legal status under international law. Persons captured or detained may be transferred to or from the care, custody, and control of the U.S. Military Services only on approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) and as authorized by the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (references (d) and (e) .

3.4 Persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military Services shall normally be handed over for safeguarding to U.S. Army Military Police, or to detainee collecting points or other holding facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police as soon as practical. Detainees may be interviewed for intelligence collection purposes at facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police."

"4.4. The Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands shall:

4.4.2. Provide for the proper treatment, classification, administrative processing, and custody of those persons captured or detained by the Military Services under their command and control. "Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees, 18 August 1994, Paragraph 1.1, reissues responsibility, specifically assigning the Army as Executive Agent for the DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees. The specific language in the directive follows:

"1.1. Reissues reference (a) to update policy and responsibilities within the Department of Defense for a program to ensure implementation of the international law of war, both customary and codified, about EPOW, to include the enemy sick or wounded, retained personnel, civilian internees (CIs), and other detained personnel (detainees). Detainees include, but are not limited to, those persons held during operations other than war."

Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, SUBJECT: Responsibility for Detainees in Association with the Global War on Terrorism, 17 January 2002, assigns the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) responsibility for DoD policies and plans related to persons detained in the Global War on Terrorism. The specific language in the memorandum follows:

"Effective immediately, ASD(SO/LIC) assumes responsibility for overall development, coordination, approval and promulgation of major DoD policies and plans related to persons detained in association with the Global War on Terrorism. This includes development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of major DoD policies, and new courses of action with DoD Components and other Federal Agencies as necessary.

DoD Directive 2310.1 will be adjusted to reflect this decision."

Army Regulation (AR) 25-30, The Army Publishing Program, 16 March 2004, Glossary, defines the term "Army regulation." And field manual The specific language in the regulation follows:

"Army regulation

A directive that sets forth missions, responsibilities, and policies, delegates authority, sets objectives, and prescribes mandated procedures to ensure uniform compliance with those policies. Mandated procedures in Army regulations are required and authoritative instructions that contain the detail needed to make sure basic policies are carried out uniformly throughout the Army. These mandated procedures also ensure uniform implementation of public law, policy guidance, and instructions from higher headquarters or other Government agencies such as the JCP, OMB, or Department of Defense."

"Field manual.

A DA publication that contains doctrine and training principles with supporting tactics, techniques, and/or procedures and describes how the Army and its organizations function in terms of missions, organizations, personnel, and equipment. FMs implement ratified international standardization agreements. FMs may also contain informational or reference material relative to military operations and training and may be used to publish selected alliance doctrinal publications that are not readily integrated into other doctrinal literature."

AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-1, subparagraphs a and b, implement DoDD 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304. It establishes policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other Detainees and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"Summary. This regulation implements Department Of Defense Directive 2310.1 and establishes policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other Detainees. This regulation is a consolidation of Army Regulation 190-8 and Army Regulation 190-57 and incorporates SECNAV Instruction 3461.3 and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304. Policy and procedures established herein apply to the services and their capabilities to the extent that they are resourced and organized for enemy prisoner of war operations.

Applicability. This is a multi-service regulation. It applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to their Reserve components when lawfully ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10 United States Code.

"a. This regulation provides policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the administration, treatment, employment, and compensation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI) and other detainees (OD) in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces. This regulation also establishes procedures for transfer of custody from the United States to another detaining power.

b. This regulation implements international law, both customary and codified, relating to EPW, RP, CI, and ODs, which includes those persons, held during military operations other than war. The principal treaties relevant to this regulation are:

(1) The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).

(2) The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).

(3) The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

(4) The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), and In the event of conflicts or discrepancies between this regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions take precedence." Field Manual (FM) 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 31 January 2002, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4-42 to 4-45, describe the role of MP units in detainee operations. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"4-42. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) executive agent for all EPW/CI operations. Additionally, the Army is DOD’s executive agent for longterm confinement of US military prisoners. Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MP are tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for EPWs/CIs. The I/R function addresses MP roles when dealing with EPWs/CIs, dislocated civilians, and US military prisoners.

4-43. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving US forces, safe and humane treatment of EPWs/CIs is required by international law. Military actions on the modern battlefield will result in many EPWs/CIs. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and can significantly reduce the capturing unit's combat effectiveness. The MP support the battlefield commander by relieving him of the problem of handling EPWs/CIs with combat forces. The MP perform their I/R function of collecting, evacuating, and securing EPWs throughout the AO. In this process, the MP coordinate with MI to collect information that may be used in current or future operations.

4-44. Although the CS MP unit initially handles EPWs/CIs, modular MP (I/R) battalions with assigned MP guard companies and supporting MWD teams are equipped and trained to handle this mission for the long term. A properly configured modular MP (I/R) battalion can support, safeguard, account for, guard, and provide humane treatment for up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs; 8,000 dislocated civilians; or 1,500 US military prisoners.

EPW/CI HANDLING

4-45. The MP are tasked with collecting EPWs/CIs from combat units as far forward as possible. The MP operate collection points and holding areas to temporarily secure EPWs/CIs until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon’s holding area. The MP escort-guard company assigned to the MP brigade (I/R) evacuate the EPWs/CIs from the corps’s holding area to the COMMZ’s internment facilities. The MP safeguard and maintain accountability, protect, and provide humane treatment for all personnel under their care."

FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 2 August 2002, Preface, addresses detainee operations doctrine at the platoon level. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"This field manual (FM) addresses military police (MP) maneuver and mobility support (MMS), area security (AS), internment and resettlement (I/R), law and order (L&O), and police intelligence operations (PIO) across the full spectrum of Army operations. Although this manual includes a discussion of corps and division MP elements, it primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to accomplish its mission."

FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Preface, establishes this FM as the doctrinal foundation for detainee operations. Chapter 2, paragraph 2-1, provides explains the role of the MP battalion commander. Chapter 3, paragraphs 3-1 to 3-3, 3-5, and 3-6, describes the basic requirements for the handling, securing, and accounting for EPWs and CIs; paragraphs 3-14 to 3-17 describe the procedures for handling property and tagging EPWs and CIs. Chapter 4 describes detailed administrative procedures for enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), including evacuation, receiving, processing, personnel files, internment serial number (ISN) issuance, information flow, facility assignment, classification, control and discipline, transfer between facilities, host nation or allied forces, and repatriation; the introduction outlines this content. Chapter 5 describes procedures for civilian internees (CIs), including specifying who is a CI, general protection requirements, authorization to intern, administrative responsibilities, receiving, processing, flow of information, security, control and discipline; the introduction explains the difference between CIs and EPWs. The specific language in the field manual follows The specific language in the field manual follows:

"Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40 depicts the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that MP will employ when dealing with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), civilian internees (CIs), US military prisoner operations, and MP support to civil-military operations (populace and resource control [PRC], humanitarian assistance [HA], and emergency services [ES])."

"2-1. An MP battalion commander tasked with operating an I/R facility is also the facility commander. As such, he is responsible for the safety and well-being of all personnel housed within the facility. Since an MP unit may be tasked to handle different categories of personnel (EPW, CI, OD, refugee, and US military prisoner), the commander, the cadre, and support personnel must be aware of the requirements for each category.

3-1. The MP units accept captives from capturing units as far forward as possible, and captives are held in CPs and CHAs until they are removed from the battlefield. Normally, CPs are operated in the division AO and CHAs are operated in the corps AO; but they can be operated anywhere they are needed. The CPs and CHAs sustain and safeguard captives and ensure a minimum level of field processing and accountability. Wounded and sick captives receive medical treatment, and captives who require lifesaving medical attention are evacuated to the nearest medical facility.

3-2. The MP establishes listening posts (LPs), observation posts (OPs), guard posts, and fighting positions to protect captives and prevent their escape. Captured soldiers are trained to believe that escape from captivity is their duty; therefore, they must be closely guarded. Consider the morale and physical condition of captives when determining the number of guards needed. Guards must be prepared to use and maintain firm control and security.

3-3. The MP work closely with military intelligence (MI) interrogation teams at CPs and CHAs to determine if captives, their equipment, and their weapons have intelligence value. This process is accelerated when MI interrogation teams can observe captives during arrival and processing, and interrogators can also be used as interpreters during this phase. Before a captive is interviewed by MI personnel, he must have a Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745 (Figure 3-1) attached to him and be accounted for on DD Form 2708.

3-5. Processing begins when US forces capture or detain an individual. The processing is accomplished in the CZ for security, control, intelligence, and the welfare of captives in evacuation channels. This is referred to as field processing. The capturing unit begins field processing by using the Five Ss and T procedure (search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag). At the CP or the CHA, MP continue processing with the principles of STRESS (search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and safeguard).

3-6. After receiving a captive from a capturing unit, MP are responsible for safeguarding and accounting for the captive at each stage of his removal from the battlefield. The processing procedure begins upon capture and continues until the captive reaches the I/R facility and is released. The process of identifying and tagging a captive helps US forces control and account for him as they move rearward from the battlefield. Before a captive is interned, repatriated, or released, MP at the I/R facility must provide full-scale processing.

3-14. Property Accountability. When seizing property from a captive—

• Bundle it or place it in a bag to keep it intact and separate from other captives’ possessions.
• Prepare DA Form 4137 for confiscated and impounded property.
• Prepare a receipt for currency and negotiable instruments to be signed by the captive and the receiver. Use cash collection vouchers so that the value can be credited to each captive’s account. List currency and negotiable instruments on the captive’s personal-property list, but treat them as impounded property.
• Keep the original receipt with the property during evacuation. Give the captive a copy of the receipt, and tell him to keep it to expedite the return of his property.
• Have MI sign for property on DA Form 4137 and for captives on DD Form 2708.
• Return confiscated property to supply after it is cleared by MI teams. Items kept by MI because of intelligence value are forwarded through MI channels.
• Evacuate retained items with the captive when he moves to the next level of internment.
• Maintain controlled access to confiscated and impounded property.
• 3-15. Tag each captive with a DD Form 2745. The MP at CPs and CHAs check each tag for the—
• Date and time of capture.
• Capturing unit.
• Place of capture.
• Circumstances of the capture.

The remaining information on the tag is included as it becomes available.

3-16. A DD Form 2745 is a perforated, three-part form that is individually serial-numbered. It is constructed of durable, waterproof, tear-resistant material with reinforced eyeholes on Parts A and C. Part A is attached to the captive with wire or string, Part B is maintained by the capturing unit for their records, and Part C is attached to confiscated property so that the owner can be identified later.

3-17. The MP at division CPs ensure that a DD Form 2745 is placed on each captive who arrives at the CP without one. They may direct the capturing unit to complete a capture tag before accepting the prisoner into the CP. The MP—

• Make a statement on the tag if the captive arrived without it.
• Instruct the captive not to remove or alter the tag.
• Annotate the tag’s serial number and the captive’s name on a locally developed manifest."

Chapter 4, Introduction – "The MP are responsible for evacuating EPWs from division CPs to CHAs and then to internment facilities (normally located in the COMMZ). This chapter addresses procedures for properly handling, processing, and safeguarding EPWs. The procedures outlined in this chapter are also applicable to RPs.

Chapter 5, Introduction – "A CI internment facility runs parallel to an EPW internment facility, with some differences.

A CI—

• Is protected under the provisions of the GC.
• Does not meet the criteria for classification as an EPW or an RP.
• Is considered a security risk.
• Needs protection because he committed an offense against the detaining power (insurgents, criminals, or other persons)."

FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, Preface, establishes this FM as the doctrinal foundation for interrogations of detainees. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing employment of interrogators as human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets in support of the commander's intelligence needs. It outlines the interrogator's role within the intelligence collection effort and the supported unit's day-to-day operations.

This manual is intended for use by interrogators as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence (MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the interrogation collection effort."

ARTEP 19-546-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement), 10 April 1999, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, subparagraph a, outlines training doctrine for I/R battalions. The specific language in the ARTEP follows:

"1-4. Mission and Tasks.

a. The battalion's critical mission is to provide command, staff planning, administration, and logistical support for the operation of an Internment/Resettlement facility for either Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internees (EPW/CI), or US Military Prisoners. It also provides direct supervision of battalion functions: Personnel, Medical, Supply, and Food Services. This MTP is composed of major activities that the unit must execute to accomplish the mission."

k. Finding 11:

(1) Finding: Shortfalls in both the Military Police and Military Intelligence organizational structures resulted in the tactical unit commanders adjusting their tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct detainee operations.

(2) Standard: Field Manual (FM) 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 31 January 2002, Chapter 7, paragraph 7-9, requires corps augmentation for sustained operations and for special operations such as dealing with dislocated civilians, and refugee internment or resettlement. Paragraphs 7-13, 7-14, 7-17, 7-21, and paragraph 7-26 discusses the employment of the different division Military Police companies, by the type of division to which they are assigned. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"7-9. In the division (where flexible support of an austere force is crucial), the division PM must have a clear understanding of situational awareness. To obtain current information for projecting MP needs in the division area, he must be mobile and be able to conduct split-cell operations. The assets available to the PM include the division MP company and at least one corps MP company. Corps augmentation is required for sustained operations and for special operations such as river crossings, dealing with dislocated civilians, and refugee internment or resettlement. The division PM coordinates with the corps PM and the MP brigade or CID commanders for— • Evacuating and guarding EPWs/CIs from division to corps."

"7-13. The Army of Excellence (AOE) heavy division MP company has six platoons. Three platoons provide support to each maneuver brigade and are designated as DS. The other three platoons are designated as GS platoons. One MP platoon provides security for the division main CP; one provides security for the division’s EPW central collection point; and one performs other MP operations within the division rear.

7-14. The GS MP platoons’ AOs are configured based on METT-TC and the availability of MP augmentation from the corps. The DS MP platoons’ AOs coincide with the supported maneuver brigade’s boundary. Each platoon headquarters locates within its brigade’s support area or any other area where it can best provide and receive support. To accomplish its mission, each DS platoon requires a minimum of two squads, each with three teams. One squad operates the EPW/CI collection point. The other squads perform MMS and AS operations. All MP platoons are capable of performing all five MP functions. However, performance of these functions is prioritized based on METT-TC and the division commander’s concept of operations. The division PM, the company commander, and METT-TC dictate how these platoons should be tasked-organized to accomplish the mission."

"7-17. The company has three GS platoons to support the division. No platoons are provided to the maneuver brigade. One platoon is normally located in the vicinity of the division main CP so that its resources can help support CP security. Another platoon locates in the DSA and operates the division EPW/ CI collection point. The last platoon has an AO configured according to METT-TC and the commander’s priority of MP missions. Each GS MP platoon has a headquarters and three squads, each with two teams. The PM section is located in the vicinity of the division main CP. The exact location is based on the current operational status and on METT-TC.

"7-21. The nature of airborne operations makes the capture of EPWs likely. Therefore, during the first stage of the assault phase, the priority of MP support is given to EPW operations. After assembling the DZ or LZ, the MP collect EPWs captured during the assault. Combat elements are relieved of EPWs as far forward as possible. In airborne operations, EPWs are held for later movement to a central collection point. During the first stage of the assault, the MP perform limited straggler and refugee control and undertake AS operations, when possible.

"7-26. When possible, habitually aligned platoons remain with their brigades, and corps assets perform GS missions. However, when no corps assets are available and two division platoons are employed as stated above, the two remaining platoons conduct division EPW collection-point operations and other MP functions based on METT-TC. Normally, the EPW platoon and the MP company headquarters colocate in the DSA. As required (and based on METT-TC), airflow planning includes EPW/CI evacuation from the AATF/FOB collection point back to the DSA. The PM section operates from the division rear CP to facilitate I/R operations and to coordinate MMS and AS with key logistical staff. Due to potentially extreme distances on the air assault battlefield, the DPM normally locates with the division main CP to serve as a key G3 battle-staff member and to coordinate PIO with the G2."

FM, 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Chapter 3, addresses the responsibility of division Military Police (MP) units to operate collecting points and to assist maneuver units as they move through the battlefield and perform their mission. Paragraph 3-1 assigns MP units the responsibility to accept captives from capturing units as far forward as possible, but allowing them to operate anywhere they are needed. Paragraph 3-3 describes how MP personnel work closely with the Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators to determine if detainees and their possessions have any intelligence value. Paragraph 3-5 outlines the beginning of detainee processing when U.S. Armed Forces detain an individual in the combat zone. Paragraph 3-64 provides information to facilitate collecting enemy tactical information and how MI may collocate interrogation teams at collecting points and Corps Holding Area to collect intelligence information. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"A large number of captives on the battlefield hampers maneuver units as they move to engage and destroy an enemy. To assist maneuver units in performing their mission—

• Division MP units operate CPs in the division AO.
• Corps MP units operate holding areas in the corps AO."

"3-1. The MP units accept captives from capturing units as far forward as possible, and captives are held in CPs and CHAs until they are removed from the battlefield. Normally, CPs are operated in the division AO and CHAs are operated in the corps AO; but they can be operated anywhere they are needed. The CPs and CHAs sustain and safeguard captives and ensure a minimum level of field processing and accountability. Wounded and sick captives receive medical treatment, and captives who require lifesaving medical attention are evacuated to the nearest medical facility."

"3-3. The MP work closely with military intelligence (MI) interrogation teams at CPs and CHAs to determine if captives, their equipment, and their weapons have intelligence value. This process is accelerated when MI interrogation teams can observe captives during arrival and processing, and interrogators can also be used as interpreters during this phase. Before a captive is interviewed by MI personnel, he must have a Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745 (Figure 3-1) attached to him and be accounted for on DD Form 2708."

"3-5. Processing begins when US forces capture or detain an individual. The processing is accomplished in the CZ for security, control, intelligence, and the welfare of captives in evacuation channels. This is referred to as field processing. The capturing unit begins field processing by using the Five Ss and T procedure (search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag). At the CP or the CHA, MP continue processing with the principles of STRESS (search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and safeguard)."

"3-64. To facilitate collecting enemy tactical information, MI may collocate interrogation teams at CPs and CHAs. This provides MI with direct access to captives and their equipment and documents. Coordination is made between MP and MI to establish operating procedures that include accountability. An interrogation area is established away from the receiving/processing line so that MI personnel can interrogate captives and examine their equipment and documents. If a captive or his equipment or documents are removed from the receiving/processing line, account for them on DD Form 2708 and DA Form 4137."

FM, 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, Chapter 1, definition of Interrogation, pages 1-6 and 1-7, Objective, pages 1-7, discuss the interrogator should not concentrate on the objective to the extent he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. Chapter 2, page 2-1, Composition and Structure, discusses that the interrogation architecture is a seamless system that supports operations from brigade to theater level. Page 2-2, Interrogation below division, addresses the first interrogation could take place at brigade level to receive tactical information that will provide immediate value to the unit on the ground. Page 2-3, Division interrogation assets, provides an overview of the capabilities a division Military Intelligence battalion provides to a division. Page 2-4, Interrogation Teams, provides the composition of an interrogation team and is normally employed as part of the MI company teams. Page 2-12, Interrogation at Brigade and Below, describes that an MI battalion interrogator can be attached temporarily to the committed battalion to assist in exploiting information immediately from the enemy prisoner of war (EPW). Page 2-22, Theater Interrogation Facility, describe the purpose of the Theater Interrogation Facility and that it is staffed by U.S. Army interrogators, with support from Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and other U.S. national agencies as required. Page 3-1, provides the criteria for selecting personnel to be interrogated. Page 3-2, Screening, explains the screening to select a source to interrogate. Page 3-2, Prepare to conduct screenings, describe the coordination and roles between the screeners and MP holding area guards. Page 3-2, Document Screening, outlines when examining documents, the screener should identify topics on which EPWs and detainees have pertinent information that may contain indications of pertinent knowledge and potential cooperation. Page 3-2, Personnel Screening, recommends if time permits, that screeners should question holding area personnel about the EPWs and detainees who might identify sources or answer the supported commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR). Page 3-29, Interrogation with an Interpreter, provides what needs to take place before, during, and after an interrogation. Page 3-30 Conduct the Interrogation, outlines the steps the interrogators need to take when an interpreter does not follow the guidance of the interrogator during an interrogation. The specific language in the field manual follows:

Page 1-6. "Definition of Interrogation. Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of time, and satisfy intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be - civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents or suspected agents, other non-US personnel. A good interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. An interrogation involved the interaction of two personalities - the source and the interrogator."

Page 1-7. "Objective. Each interrogation must be conducted for a definite purpose. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he proceeds to obtain usable information to satisfy the assigned requirement, and thus contribute to the success of the unit's mission..... In either case, the interrogator must use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should attempt to prevent the source from becoming aware of the true objective of the interrogation. The interrogator should not concentrate on the objective to the extent he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source."

Page 2-1. "Composition and Structure. The interrogation architecture (interrogators and interrogation units) is a seamless system that supports operations from brigade to theater level. The dynamic warfighting doctrine requires interrogation units be highly mobile and have automation and communication equipment to report information to the supported commander. The MI commander must ensure interrogators have the necessary equipment to accomplish their wartime mission. The MI commander retains overall responsibility for interrogators assigned to his unit. The manner in which these interrogators are controlled depends on how the MI unit is task organized for combat."

Page 2-2, "Interrogation Below Division. The first interrogation could take place at brigade. Interrogation teams are attached temporarily to brigades in enemy contact when determined appropriate by the division G2. These teams come from the interrogation section of the parent division. Interrogation personnel are organic to separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments (ACRs). Interrogation at brigade level is strictly tactical and deals with information of immediate value.

Interrogation personnel in DS to brigade will be collocated or immediately adjacent to the division forward EPW collecting point in the brigade support area (BSA). For MI units to receive S2 support, the collecting point and interrogation site will be collocated and accessible to the command post (CP)."

Page 2-3, "Division Interrogation Assets. An MI battalion is organic to each division. It provides combat intelligence, EW, and OPSEC support to light or heavy infantry and airborne or air assault division. The MI battalion provides special support the G2 needs to produce combat intelligence. Interrogation personnel organic to the MI battalions compose the interrogation support element."

Page 2-4, "Interrogation Teams. Each interrogation team consists of a team leader (warrant officer), NCO assistant team leader, and three team members. Teams are normally employed as part of the MI company teams which provide IEW support to the brigades."

Page 2-12. "Interrogation at Brigade and Below. Interrogators are not usually attached below brigade level unless the combat situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or lower. In this event, skilled interrogators from the MI battalion will be attached temporarily to committed battalions. They will assist in exploiting EPW immediately upon capture to extract information needed in support of the capturing unit.

Interrogations at battalion or lower are brief and concerned only with information bearing directly on the combat mission of the capturing unit. The following are examples of circumstance warranting an interrogation:

• A unit or landing force assigned an independent mission in which the S2 is primarily responsible for collecting information necessary to fulfill the unit's mission. Immediate tactical intelligence is necessary for mission accomplishment.
• There is a definite need for interrogation at the lower level to permit rapid reaction based on information obtained.
• It is advantageous to have an EPW point out enemy defense and installation from observation points in forward areas."

Page 2-22. "Theater Interrogation Facility. The EAC interrogation facility will normally be designated as the TIF. A TIF is staffed by US Army interrogators and analysts, with support from Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and other US national agencies as required. In a multinational operation, a combined interrogation facility may be established with allied interrogators augmentation. In addition to conventional theater Army operations, a TIF may be established to support a joint or unified command to meet theater requirements during crisis or contingency deployments.

MI battalion companies, MI brigade (EAC) provide US Army interrogation support to the EAC TIF. The mission of the TIF is to-

• Interrogate PWs, high-level political and military personnel, civilian internees, defectors, refugees, and displace persons."

"A TIF is organized into a headquarters section, operations section, and two interrogation and DOCEX sections. It will normally have an attached TSA section from Operations Group, and a liaison team from the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC). The JCMEC liaison team assists in exploiting sources who have knowledge of captured enemy weapons and equipment.

• Provost marshal for location of theater EPW camps, and for procedures to be followed by interrogators and MP for processing, interrogating, and internment."

Page 3-1. "Interrogation Process. Criteria for selecting personnel to be interrogated vary with the - commander's collection requirements. Time limitations. Number and types of potential sources available. Exact circumstance surrounding the employment of US Forces. In this regard, source selection is important in conducting interrogation at tactical echelons of command because of the proximity to enemy elements, number and conditions of detainees, and time restrictions."

Page 3-2. "Screening. Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation. It must be conducted at every echelon to- etermine source cooperativeness and knowledgeability. Determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner."

Page 3-2. "Prepare to Conduct Screenings. Screeners coordinate MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs, and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screening."

Page 3-2. "Document Screening. If time permits, screeners should go to the holding area and examine all available documents pertaining to the EPWs and detainees. They should look for signs that certain EPWs and detainees are willing, or can be induced, to cooperate with the interrogators. Previous screening and interrogation reports and EPW personnel records are important."

Page 3-2. "Personnel Screening. If time permits, screeners should question holding area personnel about the EPWs and detainees. Since these personnel are in almost constant contact with the EPWs and detainees, their descriptions of specific ones can help identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. Screeners should identify and note those EPWs and detainees whose appearance and behavior indicate they are willing to cooperate immediately or are unlikely to cooperate ever."

Page 3-29. "Interrogation With an Interpreter. Interrogation through an interpreter is time consuming because the interpreter must repeat everything said by the interrogator and source.

The interrogator must brief the interpreter before the interrogation can begin. An interrogation with an interpreter will go through all five phases of the interrogation process. After the interrogation is over, the interrogator will evaluate the interpreter."

Page 3-30. "Conduct the Interrogation. During the interrogation, the interrogator corrects the interpreter if he violates any standards on which he was briefed. For example, if the interpreter injects his own ideas into the interrogation, he must be corrected.

"Corrections should be made in a low-key manner. At no time should the interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the source. The interrogator should never argue with the interpreter in the presence of the source. If a major correction must be made, the interrogator and the interpreter should leave the interrogation site temporarily, and only when necessary."
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 19 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

l. Finding 12:

(1) Finding: There was no Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC) acting as the central, theater-level agency responsible for detainee accountability, resulting in a lack of detainee personnel and data management.

(2) Standard: Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) message dated 211933Z JAN 02 states that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of US Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949 is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the US would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied. Additionally, the United States was an occupying power and has acted in accordance with the obligations of an occupying power described in the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (H.IV), Oct. 18, 1907, including, but not limited to Articles 43-46 and 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949. The GC supplements H.IV, providing the general standard of treatment at Article 27 and specific standards in subsequent Articles.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows: CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

The following specific provisions of GPW and GC apply:

"Article 18 – All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents, shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment. At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none. Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war. Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner’s request, shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner’s account as provided in Article 64. The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money impounded shall apply. Such objects, likewise sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.

Article 19 – Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger. Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone. Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone."

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD), 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees, 18 August 1994, Paragraph 1.2, designates the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent for detainee operations; paragraph 4.2.5 establishes information coordination requirements for the Executive Agent for detainee operations. The specific language in the directive follows:

"1.2. Designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for the administration of the DoD EPOW Detainee Program.

"4.2.5. Provide, in coordination with the ASD(ISA), appropriate reports to the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and information or reports to other U.S. Government Agencies or Components, to include the Congress of the United States, or to the International Committee of the Red Cross."

Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-7, subparagraph b, requires specific data elements to be collected and stored by the National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC, now called the National Detainee Recording Center (NDRC)). Paragraph 1-8, subparagraphs a and b, assigns the Branch Prisoner of War Information Center (Branch PWIC, now called the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC)) as the field agency for maintaining information on persons and property within an assigned theater of operations or in Continental United States (CONUS) and outlines the Branch PWIC's primary responsibilities. Chapter 2, paragraph 2-1, subparagraph a (1) (b), explains how prisoners are to be tagged. Paragraph 2-2, subparagraph b (1), requires the use of DA Form 4137 for accounting for large sums of money and property taken from captured persons. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190- 7 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

1-7. b. – "Obtain and store information concerning EPW, CI and RP, and their confiscated personal property. Information will be collected and stored on each EPW, CI, and RP captured and detained by U.S. Armed Forces. This includes those EPW, RP, who were captured by the United States but are in custody of other powers and those who have been released or repatriated. EPW, CI and RP cannot be forced to reveal any information however they are required to provide their name, rank, serial number and date of birth. The Geneva Convention requires the NPWIC to collect and store the following information for EPW, RP:

(1) Complete name.
(2) ISN.
(3) Rank.
(4) Serial number.
(5) Date of birth.
(6) City of birth.
(7) Country of birth.
(8) Name and address of next of kin.
(9) Date of capture.
(10) Place of capture.
(11) Capturing unit.
(12) Circumstances of capture.
(13) Location of confiscated personal property.
(14) Nationality.
(15) General statement of health.
(16) Nation in whose armed services the individual is serving.
(17) Name and address of a person to be notified of the individual’s capture.
(18) Address to which correspondence may be sent.
(19) Certificates of death or duly authenticated lists of the dead.
(20) Information showing the exact location of war graves together with particulars of the dead.
(21) Notification of capture.
(22) List of personal articles of value not restored upon repatriation."

1-8. a. – "The Branch PWIC functions as the field operations agency for the NPWIC. It is the central agency responsible to maintain information on all EPW, CI and RP and their personal property within an assigned theater of operations or in CONUS.

1-8. b. – The Branch PWIC serves as the theater repository for information pertaining to:

(1) Accountability of EPW, CI, and RP and implementation of DOD policy.

(2) Providing initial and replacement block ISN assignments to theater EPW, CI and RP processing organizations, and requests replacement ISN's from the NPWIC.

(3) Obtaining and storing information concerning all EPW, CI and RP, in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces, those captured by U.S. Armed Forces and transferred to other powers for internment (either temporarily or permanently), those EPW and RP transferred to CONUS for internment, and EPW, CI and RP released or repatriated. Obtaining and storing information about CI kept in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces within its assigned theater of operations who are subjected to assigned residence, interned, or released."

2-1. a. (1) (b) – "All prisoners of war and retained persons will, at the time of capture, be tagged using DD Form 2745.

2-2. b. (1) – Appropriate intelligence sources will be notified when EPW and RP are found in possession of large sums of U.S. or foreign currency. A receipt DA Form 4137 will be prepared to account for all property that is taken from the EPW. Copies of DD Form 629 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person) and DA Form 4137 will be maintained to establish positive accountability of the EPW and their property and can be used to substantiate proper care and treatment at a later time. DA Form 4137 will be used to account for property released before final disposition is ordered. Records of disposition of property will be evacuated with prisoners for inclusion in their personnel records."

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3-45 and 3-54, establish the 12-hour forward collecting point and 24-hour central collecting point doctrine. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"3-45. Captives should not remain at a forward CP more than 12 hours before being escorted to the central CP.

3-54. Captives should not remain at the central CP more than 24 hours before being evacuated to the CHA."

m. Finding 13:

(1) Finding: The ongoing Military Intelligence Force Design Update is better suited to conduct simultaneous and sustained human intelligence missions in the current and future operating environment.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation (AR) 71-32, Force Development and Documentation— Consolidated Policies, 3 March 1997, Paragraph 2-1, subparagraph f, establishes the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) responsibility for The Army Authorization Documents System-Redesign (TAADS-R) systems, which provides Army Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units with authorization documents containing the HQDA-approved organizational structure, personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations. Paragraph 2-2, subparagraph x, directs the Commander of U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) to act as executive agent for TAADS-R and review, develop, and publish MTOEs and TDAs. Paragraph 2-26, subparagraphs a-c, requires the Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop and validate battlefield requirements and use the force design update process to document needed changes. TRADOC develops organizational concepts and designs. TRADOC provides USAFMSA the approved organization designs for the development of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Paragraph 4-1, subparagraphs b, c, and e, describe the TOE as the result of the combat development process and documents wartime capabilities, organizational structure, personnel and equipment. Paragraph 4-4 describes the concept for TOE review and revision. In this case the TOE revision documents a more effective organizational design. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"2–1. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) The DCSOPS will—

"f. Have HQDA responsibility for TAADS-R and, after appropriate HQDA coordination, will—

"(2) Develop and manage the Army force structure.

"(4) In coordination with the DCSPER and the DCSLOG publish and enforce policy and procedures to document requirements for and authorization of, organizations, personnel, and equipment.

"(6) Serve as the final HQDA approval authority for authorization documents.

"2–2. CDR, U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) CDR, USAFMSA will—

"x. Act as executive agent for the operation of the TAADS-R and perform the following:

"(9) Perform technical review of Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) MTOE and TDA.

(10) Develop MTOEs for all Active Army and RC MTOE organizations under the CENDOC concept.

(11) Provide a foundation for manning the force, quantitatively and qualitatively, principally through detailed manpower requirements determination programs such as MARC, manpower staffing guides, organizational and manpower studies, and the MS3.

"(17) Maintain and distribute current files of all authorization documents (MTOEs and TOEs). Furnish authorization documentation data to HQDA and agencies/activities using TAADS.

"2–26. CG, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

In addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 2–19, the CG, TRADOC will—

a. Lead the Army in developing and validating battlefield requirements and use the force design update (FDU) process as the semiannual Army process to update organizational concepts and designs.

b. Develop organizational concepts and designs.

c. Provide USAFMSA completed unit reference sheets for FDU approved organization designs as the basis for TOE development.

"4–1. Concepts

"b. The TOE is the end product document of the Army’s combat development process. It merges, in one document, the results of the requirements determination process…

"c. TOEs are the primary basis for stating Army requirements. This document heavily impacts the budget, the training base, efficiency, operational readiness, and overall management of Army resources.

"e. The TOE system is characterized by incremental TOEs that prescribe the wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and minimum mission essential personnel and equipment requirements for military units. They portray the doctrinal modernization path (MODPATH) of a unit over time from the least modernized configuration to the most modernized.

"4–4. TOE review and revision

TOEs are normally revised as required to accommodate changes to doctrine, introduction of new equipment, or to incorporate more effective designs. Some TOEs are replaced by new organizations. Those TOEs that do not fall into the above categories will be reviewed not less than every three years from the date of approval."

AR 381–20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993, Glossary, defines the terms counterintelligence, counterintelligence operations, and counterintelligence special agent. The term Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) refers to the type of training and skills of a Soldier in a specific specialty. In this report the DAIG Team uses the abbreviation CI to refer to Civilian Internees; the Military Intelligence mission of counterintelligence will not be abbreviated as CI except when quoted directly from Military Intelligence policy/doctrine paragraph(s) referring to counterintelligence, as in the following. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"counterintelligence

1. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs. Synonymous with foreign counterintelligence. (ICS Glossary)

2. Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by foreign intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversion or terrorism.

"counterintelligence operations

Activities taken to hinder the multidisciplinary activities of foreign intelligence and security services, and to cause FIS to doubt the validity of its own analysis.

"counterintelligence special agent

Soldiers holding the SSI 35E, MOS 351B or 97B, and civilian employees in the GS–0132 career field, who have successfully completed a CI [counterintelligence] officer/agent course, who are authorized USAI badges and credentials, and who are assigned to conduct CI [counterintelligence] investigations and operations. Also known as CI [counterintelligence] agent or MI agent."

Field Manual (FM) 34-60, Counterintelligence, 3 October 1995, Chapter 1, describes the Army counterintelligence mission as preventing other organizations and agencies from gathering information on Army organizations and agencies. Counterintelligence operations is a force protection factor and includes counter-human intelligence (C-HUMINT), counter-signals intelligence (C- IGINT), and counter-imagery intelligence (C-IMINT) functions. In this report the DAIG Team uses the abbreviation CI to refer to Civilian Internees; the Military Intelligence mission of counterintelligence will not be abbreviated as CI except when quoted directly from Military Intelligence policy/doctrine paragraph(s) referring to counterintelligence, as in the following. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"MISSION

The CI [counterintelligence] mission is authorized by Executive Order (EO) 12333, implemented by AR 381-20. The Army conducts aggressive, comprehensive, and coordinated CI [counterintelligence] activities worldwide. The purpose is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit threat intelligence collection efforts. This mission is accomplished during peacetime and all levels of conflict. Many CI [counterintelligence] functions, shown in Figure 1-1, are conducted by echelons above corps (EAC); some by echelons corps and below (ECB); and some are conducted by both. Those CI [counterintelligence] assets found at ECB respond to tactical commanders. EAC assets respond primarily to commanders of intelligence units while supporting all commanders within their theater or area of operations (AO).

"The essence of the Army's CI [counterintelligence] mission is to support force protection. By its nature, CI [counterintelligence] is a multidiscipline (C-HUMINT, C-SIGINT, and C-IMINT) function designed to degrade threat intelligence and targeting capabilities. Multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) is an integral and equal part of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW). MDCI operations support force protection through OPSEC, deception, and rear area operations across the range of military operations. For more information on IEW operations, see FM 34-1."

ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, 11 April 2002, Paragraphs 1-1 and 1-7, describe the relationship between human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence and the function of Tactical HUMINT. Paragraph 1-10 defines the term HUMINT Collector. Additionally, the unit's counterintelligence mission is a force protection factor. In this report the DAIG Team uses the abbreviation CI to refer to Civilian Internees; the Military Intelligence mission of counterintelligence will not be abbreviated as CI except when quoted directly from Military Intelligence policy/doctrine paragraph (s) referring to counterintelligence, as in the following. The specific language in the manual follows:

"1-1. HUMINT and CI [counterintelligence] have distinctly different missions. HUMINT collectors gather information to answer intelligence and information requirements while CI [counterintelligence] personnel help protect the force from an adversary’s intelligence collection efforts. HUMINT collectors and CI [counterintelligence] personnel bring unique sets of skills to any mission. At times each discipline may uncover information relating to the other’s primary mission. Although HUMINT collectors and CI [counterintelligence] personnel appear to have similar functions, because the common denominator is human interaction, each discipline has its own area of expertise.

"1-7. Tactical HUMINT is the task organization of HUMINT collection assets and CI [counterintelligence] assets into combined teams to accomplish the mission of both disciplines at the tactical level (echelon corps and below). This task organization supports the force protection plan and answers the commander’s intelligence requirements by employing -

"CI [counterintelligence] agents to conduct focused identification, collection, analysis, recommendation of countermeasures, and production against FISS technical means and other adversary intelligence collection threats.

"HUMINT collectors to conduct focused collection, analysis, and production on the adversary’s composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, personalities, capabilities, and intentions.

"1-10. HUMINT collectors are personnel who, by training or in certain specific positions, are tasked with collecting information for intelligence use from people or related documents. A HUMINT source is any person who can provide information to answer collection requirements. [Unless otherwise noted in this manual, the term "HUMINT collector" refers to personnel in MOSs 351E and 97E. The term "CI [counterintelligence] collector" or "CI [counterintelligence] agent" refers to 35E, 351B, and 97B personnel.] The HUMINT and CI [counterintelligence] force is organized, trained, and equipped to provide timely and relevant answers to information requirements at each echelon. While HUMINT and CI [counterintelligence] have a different focus, in most deployment scenarios they work best in a collaborative effort."

n. Finding 14:

(1) Finding: The ongoing Military Police Force Design Update provides a force structure for internment/resettlement operations that has the flexibility and is better suited to conduct sustained detainee operations in the current and future operating environments.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation (AR) 71-32, Force Development and Documentation— Consolidated Policies, 3 March 1997, Paragraph 2-1, subparagraph f, establishes the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) responsibility for The Army Authorization Documents System-Redesign (TAADS-R) systems, which provides Army Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units with authorization documents containing the HQDA-approved organizational structure, personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations. Paragraph 2-2, subparagraph f, requires Commander of U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) to review, evaluate, and coordinate all changes to force structure documents with effected Major Commands (MACOMs) and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponent. Paragraph 2-26, subparagraphs a-c, requires the Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop and validate battlefield requirements and use the force design update process to document needed changes. TRADOC develops organizational concepts and designs. TRADOC provides USAFMSA the approved organization designs for the development of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Paragraph 4-1, subparagraphs b, c, and e, describe the TOE as the result of the combat development process and documents wartime capabilities, organizational structure, personnel and equipment. Paragraph 4-4 describes the concept for TOE review and revision. In this case the TOE revision documents a more effective organizational design. Paragraph 8-4, Table 8-1, gives the characteristics of an MTOE: a unit or organization with the ability to perform sustained Combat, Combat Support (CS), or Combat Service Support (CSS) missions; and the characteristics of a TDA: a unit or organization performing a mission at a fixed location. The Active Component (AC) units qualified to conduct internment/resettlement (I/R) operations are organized in TDAs and are not designed for deployment. Reserve Component (RC) units conducting I/R operations are organized in MTOEs for deployment. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"2–1. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) The DCSOPS will—

"f. Have HQDA responsibility for TAADS-R and, after appropriate HQDA coordination, will—

"(2) Develop and manage the Army force structure.

"(4) In coordination with the DCSPER and the DCSLOG publish and enforce policy and procedures to document requirements for and authorization of, organizations, personnel, and equipment.

"(6) Serve as the final HQDA approval authority for authorization documents.

"2–2. CDR, U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) CDR, USAFMSA will—

"f. Review and evaluate all proposed TOE changes. Coordinate requests for TOE changes with the affected MACOM and proponent schools. Recommend approval to HQDA if appropriate.

"2–26. CG, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) In addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 2–19, the CG, TRADOC will—

a. Lead the Army in developing and validating battlefield requirements and use the force design update (FDU) process as the semiannual Army process to update organizational concepts and designs.

b. Develop organizational concepts and designs.

c. Provide USAFMSA completed unit reference sheets for FDU approved organization designs as the basis for TOE development.

"4–1. Concepts

"b. The TOE is the end product document of the Army’s combat development process. It merges, in one document, the results of the requirements determination process…

"c. TOEs are the primary basis for stating Army requirements. This document heavily impacts the budget, the training base, efficiency, operational readiness, and overall management of Army resources.

"e. The TOE system is characterized by incremental TOEs that prescribe the wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and minimum mission essential personnel and equipment requirements for military units. They portray the doctrinal modernization path (MODPATH) of a unit over time from the least modernized configuration to the most modernized.

"4–4. TOE review and revision

TOEs are normally revised as required to accommodate changes to doctrine, introduction of new equipment, or to incorporate more effective designs. Some TOEs are replaced by new organizations. Those TOEs that do not fall into the above categories will be reviewed not less than every three years from the date of approval.

"8–4. Type of organization

Criteria in Table 8–1 will be used to determine whether an organization should be documented as a MTOE, TDA, or AUGTDA.

"MTOE – The unit or organization is required to perform combat, CS, or CSS missions on a continuing basis.

"TDA – The unit or organization is part of a fixed support establishment, for example, installation, garrison."

AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Paragraph 1- 1, subparagraph a, establishes the regulation as the source for policy for enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI) and other detainees (OD). The policy (written in 1997) is based on the Cold War model of an organized EPW population that is cooperative. The policy does not address the confinement of high-risk detainees. Paragraph 1-4, subparagraph g, establishes that EPW, RP, CI, and OD will be handed over to the Military Police (MP) or facilities run by the MPs. The regulation states that MPs have units specifically organized to perform the long-term functions associated with EPW/CI internment. The force structure of MP units does not support this requirement. The Glossary, Section II, defines the following terms: EPW, RP, CI, OD, and Detainee. The MP Corps has not yet developed or defined the term High Risk Detainee. This regulation is a multiservice regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of EPWs, RPs, CIs, and ODs and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"1–1. Purpose

a. This regulation provides policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the administration, treatment, employment, and compensation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI) and other detainees (OD) in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces. This regulation also establishes procedures for transfer of custody from the United States to another detaining power.

"1–4. Responsibilities

"g. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders have the overall responsibility for the EPW, CI and RP program, operations, and contingency plans in the theater of operation involved to ensure compliance with international law of war. DOD Directive 2310.1 provides that persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military Services shall normally be handed over for safeguarding to U.S. Army Military Police, or to detainee collecting points or other holding facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police as soon as practical. U.S. Army Military Police have units specifically organized to perform the long- erm functions associated with EPW/CI internment.

"Glossary

"Section II Terms

"Civilian Internee(s). A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power.

"Detainee. A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force.

"Enemy Prisoner of War. A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant’s privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.

"Other Detainee (OD). Persons in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces who have not been classified as an EPW (article 4, GPW), RP (article 33, GPW), or CI (article 78, GC), shall be treated as EPWs until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority."

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 31 January 2002, Paragraph 1-3, describes the doctrine review process the MP Corps underwent in 1996 and establishes and separates the internment and resettlement (I/R) function from the EPW mission. Paragraph 4- 42 requires the Army to act as the Department of Defense's (DoD) Executive Agent for longterm confinement of U.S. Armed Forces prisoners. The paragraph goes on to address the MPs role in I/R functions, but does not address long-term confinement as an I/R function. The MP Corps does not address the doctrinal requirement for long-term I/R confinement or confinement of high-risk detainees. Paragraph 4-44 states the ratios by type of detainee that an MP (I/R) Battalion can support. This formula does not address confinement of high-risk detainees. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"1-3. In 1996, the MP Corps went through a doctrinal review process to determine if it was properly articulating its multiple performance capabilities in support of US forces deployed worldwide (see Appendix B). The review process identified the need to restructure and expand the EPW mission to include handling US military prisoners and all dislocated civilians. This new emphasis transformed the EPW mission into the internment and resettlement (I/R) function. The review process also identified the need to shift from missions to functions. In the past, the four battlefield missions adequately described MP capabilities in a ature theater against a predictable, echeloned threat. However, that landscape is no longer valid. Accordingly, the four MP battlefield missions have become the following five MP functions:

• Maneuver and mobility support (MMS).
• AS.
• L&O.
• I/R.
• Police intelligence operations (PIO).

"4-42. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) executive agent for all EPW/CI operations. Additionally, the Army is DOD’s executive agent for longterm confinement of US military prisoners. Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MP are tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for EPWs/CIs. The I/R function addresses MP roles when dealing with EPWs/CIs, dislocated civilians, and US military prisoners.

"4-44. Although the CS MP unit initially handles EPWs/CIs, modular MP (I/R) battalions with assigned MP guard companies and supporting MWD teams are equipped and trained to handle this mission for the long term. A properly configured modular MP (I/R) battalion can support, safeguard, account for, guard, and provide humane treatment for up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs; 8,000 dislocated civilians; or 1,500 US military prisoners."

FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Paragraph 1-13, states the objectives of I/R operations and the types of detainees expected. The terms refer to EPW, CI, RP, OD, dislocated civilian (DC), and U.S. Armed Forces prisoners. At the time this doctrine was written (August 2001) the MP Corps had not yet developed or defined the term high-risk detainee. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"1-13. The objectives of I/R operations are to process, handle, care for, account for, and secure—

• EPWs.
• CIs.
• RPs.
• ODs
• DCs.
• US military prisoners."
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 4:44 am

PART 20 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

o. Finding 15:

(1) Finding: Three of 4 inspected internment/resettlement facilities, and many of the collecting points, had inadequate force protection measures, Soldier working conditions, detainees living conditions, and did not meet the minimum preventive medical treatment requirements.

(2) Standard: Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): CJCS message dated 211933Z JAN 02 states that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of U.S. Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949, is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the U.S. would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied. Additionally, the United States was an occupying power and has acted in accordance with the obligations of an occupying power described in the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (H.IV), Oct. 18, 1907, including, but not limited to, Articles 43-46 and 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949. The GC supplements H.IV, providing the general standard of treatment at Article 27 and specific standards in subsequent Articles.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows:

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (H.IV.), Oct. 18, 1907, Articles 43-46 and 50; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), Aug 12, 1949, Articles 81, 83, 85, 88, 89, and 91 discuss the requirement to accommodate detainees in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard regarding health and hygiene and the effects of war. The specific language in the GC follows:

GC Article 81 – "Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance, and to grant them also the medical attention required by their state of health. No deduction from the allowances, salaries or credits due to the internees shall be made for the repayment of these costs."

GC, Article 83 – "The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war. ..."

GC, Article 85 – "The Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigors of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be situated in unhealthy areas or in districts, the climate of which is injurious to the internees. In all cases where the district, in which a protected person is temporarily interned, is an unhealthy area or has a climate which is harmful to his health, he shall be removed to a more suitable place of internment as rapidly as circumstances permit. The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, and the age, sex, and state of health of the internees. Internees shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene, and are constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. They shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities necessary for this purpose shall be granted to them. Showers or baths shall also be available. The necessary time shall be set aside for washing and for cleaning. Whenever it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate women internees who are not members of a family unit in the same place of internment as men, the provision of separate sleeping quarters and sanitary conveniences for the use of such women internees shall be obligatory."

GC, Article 88 – "In all places of internment exposed to air raids and other hazards of war, shelters adequate in number and structure to ensure the necessary protection shall be installed. ..."

GC, Article 89 – "Daily food rations for internees shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of health and prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the customary diet of the internees. Internees shall also be given the means by which they can prepare for themselves any additional food in their possession. Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees. ... "

GC Article 91 – "Every place of internment shall have an adequate infirmary, under the direction of a qualified doctor, where internees may have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall be set aside for cases of contagious or mental diseases. Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition requires special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any institution where adequate treatment can be given and shall receive care not inferior to that provided for the general population. Internees shall, for preference, have the attention of medical personnel of their own nationality. Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The medical authorities of the Detaining Power shall, upon request, issue to every internee who has undergone treatment an official certificate showing the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and nature of the treatment given. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the Central Agency provided for in Article 140 Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of internees in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances and spectacles, shall be free of charge to the internee."

GPW, Article 29 – "The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.

Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.

Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for that purpose."

Army Regulation (AR) 40-5, Preventive Medicine, 15 October 1990, Chapter 14, paragraph 14-3, subparagraph a, requires field sanitation teams at all company-level units. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"a. Functions. As a minimum, units deploying to the field will—

(1) Before deployment, appoint a field sanitation team with responsibilities defined in b below.

(2) Before deployment, incorporate PMM into SOPs.

(3) Have the capability to use pesticides and vegetation controls.

(4) Bury and/or burn wastes to prevent the breeding of insects and rodents. Consult the environmental coordinator or PVNTMED personnel to ensure compliance with local environmental regulations and laws during field exercises.

(5) Protect food during storage and preparation to prevent contamination (TB MED 530).

(6) Monitor unit water sources to assure adequate supplies and disinfection.

(7) Arrange for maintenance of immunizations and prophylaxis.

(8) Use other appropriate measures under FM 21–10 / AFM 161–10.

(9) Assure command supervision of individual PMM.

(10) Request assistance for problems exceeding unit capabilities.

(11) Deploy to the field with field sanitation equipment listed in table 14–1."

Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, subparagraph g (6) (a), discusses sanitary aspects of food service and the need to provide potable water and vector control. Chapter 3, paragraph 3-2, subparagraph b, requires internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities and collecting points (CPs) to operate under the same standards of hygiene and sanitation. Paragraph 3-4, subparagraph e, requires enemy prisoners of war/retained personnel (EPW/RP) to be housed under the same conditions as US forces residing in the same area; subparagraph i requires EPW/RP facilities to ensure a clean and healthy environment for detainees. Chapter 5, paragraph 5-2, subparagraph a, states that a safety program for civilian internees (CIs) will be established. Chapter 6, paragraph 6-1, subparagraph b, discusses minimum standards to house (CIs). Paragraph 6-5 discusses subsistence requirement for CIs, and paragraph 6-6 covers medical care and sanitation. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DoD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

3-2. b. – "Prisoners will not normally be interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate proves to be injurious to them, and will be removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate. Transit camps or collecting points will operate under conditions similar to those prescribed for permanent prisoner of war camps, and the prisoners will receive the same treatment as in permanent EPW camps.

3-4. e. – "EPW/RP will be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the force of the detaining power billeted in the same area. The conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health. The forgoing shall apply in particular to the dormitories of EPW/RP as it regards both total surface and minimum cubic space and the general installation of bedding and blankets. Quarters furnished to EPW/RP must be protected from dampness, must be adequately lit and heated (particularly between dusk and lights-out), and must have adequate precautions taken against the dangers of fire. In camps accommodating both sexes, EPW/RP will be provided with separate facilities for women.

3-4. i. – "Hygiene and medical care:

(1) The United States is bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure clean and healthy camps to prevent epidemics. EPW/RP will have access, day and night, to latrines that conform to the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women EPW/RP are accommodated, separate latrines will be provided for them. EPW/RP will have sufficient water and soap for their personal needs and laundry. "(6) Identify requirements and allocations for Army Medical units in support of the EPW, CI and RP Program, and ensure that the medical annex of OPLANs, OPORDs and contingency plans includes procedures for treatment of EPW, CI, RP, and ODs. Medical support will specifically include:

(a) First aid and all sanitary aspects of food service including provisions for potable water, pest management, and entomological support.

"5–2. Civilian Internee Safety Program

a. Establishment. A safety program for the CI will be established and administered in accordance with the policies prescribed in AR 385-10 and other pertinent safety directives.

"6–1. Internment Facility

a. Location. The theater commander will be responsible for the location of the CI internment facilities within his or her command. The CI retained temporarily in an unhealthy area or where the climate is harmful to their health will be removed to a more suitable place of internment as soon as possible.

b. Quarters. Adequate shelters to ensure protection against air bombardments and other hazards of war will be provided and precautions against fire will be taken at each CI camp and branch camp.

(1) All necessary and possible measures will be taken to ensure that CI shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigors of the climate and the effects of war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be placed in unhealthy areas, or in districts the climate of which is injurious to CI.

(2) The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, and the age, sex and state of health of the internees.

(3) Internees shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. They shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal hygiene and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities necessary for this purpose shall be provided. Showers or baths shall also be available. The necessary time shall be set aside for washing and for cleaning.

(4) CI shall be administered and housed separately from EPW/RP. Except in the case of families, female CI shall be housed in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision of women.

"6–5. Supplies.

"b. Food.

(1) Subsistence for the CI will be issued on the basis of a master CI menu prepared by the theater commander. Preparation of the menu will include the following:

(a) The daily individual food ration will be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to maintain the CI in good health and to prevent nutritional deficiencies.

"6–6. Medical Care and Sanitation.

a. General

"(2) A medical officer will examine each CI upon arrival at a camp and monthly thereafter. The CI will not be admitted into the general population until medical fitness is determined. These examinations will detect vermin infestation and communicable diseases especially tuberculosis, malaria, and venereal disease. They will also determine the state of health, nutrition, and cleanliness of each CI. During these examinations, each CI will be weighed, and the weight will be recorded on DA Form 2664-R."

AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program, 29 February 2000, Chapter 1, paragraph 1–4, paragraph n, subparagraph (1) (a), discusses commanders' responsibilities in implementing the Army Safety Program. Paragraph 1-5, subparagraph b, states that all decision makers will employ the risk management process. Chapter 2, paragraph 2–2, subparagraph b, states that the risk management process will be incorporated into SOPs. Paragraph 2-3, subparagraph d, discusses that, as a minimum requirement, annual inspections or surveys will be conducted on facilities—more inspections may be required based on risk. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"n. MACOM commanders will—(1) Ensure the full and effective implementation of the Army safety and OH program throughout their MACOM. This includes—(a) Providing a safe and healthful workplace and environment.

"b. Decision makers at every level will employ the risk management process, as specified in paragraph 2-3d of this regulation, to avoid unnecessary residual risk to missions, personnel, equipment, and the environment.

"2–2. Operational procedures. Leaders and managers are responsible for integrating risk management into all Army processes and operations. Safety and occupational health staffs will provide risk management training, tools and other related assistance. Leaders and managers will—

"b. Ensure that the risk management process is incorporated in regulations, directives, SOPs, special orders, training plans, and operational plans to minimize accident risk and that SOPs are developed for all operations entailing risk of death, serious injury, occupational illness or property loss.

"2–3. Prevention program procedures. a. Inspections and surveys. Inspections and surveys of operations and facilities will be conducted annually or more often (chap 4).

"d. Risk management. Risk Management is the Army’s principal risk reduction process to assist leaders in identifying and controlling hazards and making informed decisions. (1) Every commander, leader and manager is responsible for protecting the force and persons affected by Army operations. The five-step process is the commander’s principal risk reduction process to identify and control hazards and make informed decisions. (a) Identify hazards. (b) Assess hazards. (c) Develop controls and make risk decisions. (d) Implement controls. (e) Supervise and evaluate."

AR 420-70, Buildings and Structures, 10 October 1997, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-10, subparagraph a, states that lead based paint will not be used in Army facilities. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"a. Lead-based paint (LBP). LBP will not be applied to any Army facility."

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002, Chapter 7, paragraph 7-8, states that detainees do not remain at forward collecting points more than 12 hours before moving to the central collecting point. Paragraph 7-9 states that existing structures should be used when possible. Paragraph 7-29 discusses safeguarding and protecting detainees from attack. Paragraph 7-30 discusses GS MPs and their role in establishing division central collecting points. Paragraph 7-33 discusses MP roles in escorting detainees from forward collecting points to division central collecting points within 12 hours. Paragraph 7-58, discusses the physical criteria for collecting points. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"7-8. ... Units needed to support the division forward collecting point should be specifically tasked in the brigade OPORD. MP leaders operating the division forward collecting point will—

• Ensure that captives do not remain at the division forward collecting point more than 12 hours before being escorted to the division central collecting point.

7-9. A forward collecting point (Figure 7-1, page 7-6) should not be set up near local inhabitants. Existing structures like vacant schools, apartments, or warehouses should be used when possible. This reduces construction requirements and minimizes logistical requirements. If existing structures are not used, detainees, except officers, can be tasked to help construct the collecting point. Prisoners may dig or build cover to protect themselves from artillery, mortar, or air attack. There is no set design for a forward collecting point. It can be anything from a guarded, roped off area to a secured, existing structure. The collecting point is built to suit the climate, the weather, and the situation. When selecting a collecting point, consider the following:

• The security of the detainees. The perimeters of the enclosure must be clearly defined and understood by the detainees.
• First aid. Injured or ill detainees require the same treatment that would be given to US casualties.
• Food and water. Detainees may have been without food or water for a long time before capture.
• Latrine facilities.
• Field sanitation. If possible, have detainees wash with soap and water to reduce the likelihood of disease.
• Shelter and cover.
• Language barriers. Provide interpreters and/or instructional graphic training aids (GTAs) in the EPW native language to compensate for the language differences.

"7-29. Protecting detainees from attack, preventing their escape, and quickly removing them from the battle area further safeguards them. Detainees should not remain at the division forward collecting point more than 12 hours, if possible. MP from the division central collecting point move forward to escort detainees back to the central collecting points.

7-30. MP in GS are responsible for establishing and maintaining the division central collecting point. They collect detainees from the forward collecting points, then process and secure them until corps MP come forward to evacuate them to the rear. Detainees should be transferred to the corps holding area or directly to an internment facility within 24 hours, if possible. One or more GS MP platoons operate the division central collecting point. The MP platoons are augmented by the division band and/or by the corps MP. Augmentation is based on the number and rate of captives expected.

"7-33. The MP platoon charged with operating the division central collecting point sends MP forward to the division forward collecting point to escort detainees back to the central collecting point. EPWs or CIs must be evacuated from the division forward collecting point as soon as possible, preferably within 12 hours. Before evacuating the detainees, MP checks with MI interrogation teams for any property to be returned to, or evacuated with, the detainees before they are moved.

"7-58. The size of the facility is based on the number of prisoners being detained. It may be room or a tent, as long as it provides shelter equal to that offered to other soldiers in the combat zone. The physical criteria for permanent and temporary structures are the same. MP use existing structures if you can. Otherwise, they use tents. ...

FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-1, discusses the Military Police Battalion Commander's responsibilities. Paragraph 2-1 states the role of the MP battalion commander, paragraph 2-17 discusses the requirement for a safety program for I/R facilities, and paragraph states the engineer officer's responsibilities. Paragraph 2-37 states the responsibility of the engineer officer. Chapter 6, paragraphs 6-2 and 6-3 discuss the considerations of choosing sites for Internment/Resettlement (I/R) facilities. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"2-1. An MP battalion commander tasked with operating an I/R facility is also the facility commander. As such, he is responsible for the safety and well-being of all personnel housed within the facility. Since an MP unit may be tasked to handle different categories of personnel (EPW, CI, OD, refugee, and US military prisoner), the commander, the cadre, and support personnel must be aware of the requirements for each category.

"2-17. Set up and administer a safety program for housed personnel in each I/R facility. Follow the procedures outlined in AR 385-10 and associated circulars and pamphlets to establish the safety program. Maintain records and reports for the internee safety program separate from those for the Army safety program.

"2-37. The engineer officer is a captain in a brigade and a lieutenant in a battalion. He trains and supervises internees who perform internal and external labor (construction and repair of facilities). The engineer officer is responsible for—

• Construction, maintenance, repair, and operation of utilities (water, electricity, heat, and sanitation).
• Construction support.
• Fire protection.
• Insect and rodent control and fumigation.

"6-2. The MP coordinate the location with engineers, logistical units, higher headquarters, and the HN. The failure to properly consider and correctly evaluate all factors may increase the logistical and personnel efforts required to support operations. If an I/R facility is improperly located, the entire internee population may require movement when resources are scarce. When selecting a site for a facility, consider the following:

• Will the interned population pose a serious threat to logistical operations if the tactical situation becomes critical?
• Is there a threat of guerrilla activity in the area?
• What is the attitude of the local population?
• What classification of internees will be housed at the site?
• What type of terrain surrounds the site, and will it help or hinder escapes?
• What is the distance from the MSR to the source of logistical support?
• What transportation methods are required and available to move internees, supplies, and equipment?

6-3. In addition, consider the—

• METT-TC.
• Proximity to probable target areas.
• Availability of suitable existing facilities (avoids unnecessary construction).
• Presence of swamps, mosquitoes, and other factors (including water drainage) that affect human health.
• Existence of an adequate, satisfactory source of potable water. The supply should meet the demands for consumption, food sanitation, personal hygiene, and sewage disposal.
• Availability of electricity. Portable generators can be used as standby and emergency sources of electricity.
• Distance to work if internees are employed outside the facility.
• Availability of construction material.
• Soil drainage."

p. Finding 16:

(1) Finding: Two of 4 internment/resettlement facilities did not segregate enemy prisoners of war from civilian internees in accordance with legal requirements.

(2) Standard: Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): CJCS message dated 211933Z JAN 02 states that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of U.S. Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war), and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949, is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the U.S. would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied. Additionally, the United States was an occupying power and has acted in accordance with the obligations of an occupying power described in the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (H.IV), Oct. 18, 1907, including, but not limited to, Articles 43-46 and 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949. The GC supplements H.IV, providing the general standard of treatment at Article 27 and specific standards in subsequent Articles.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows:

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), Article 84; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), Article 17. The specific language in the Geneva Conventions follows:

GC, Article 84 – "Internees shall be accommodated and administered separately from prisoners of war and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason."

GPW, Article 17 – "Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status. Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him. No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph. The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand."

q. Finding 17:

(1) Finding: Units operating collecting points (42%, 5 of 12), and 2 of 4 units operating internment/resettlement facilities, were not adequately resourced with communications equipment, shotguns, and non-lethal ammunition.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, subparagraph e, states that the G4 is responsible for logistics. Paragraph 1-4, subparagraph g (2), states that Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders, and Joint Task Force Commanders have overall responsibility for civilian internee (CI) programs and in the planning and procuring for logistical support. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190- 7 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"e. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). The DCSLOG will ensure logistical resources are available to support EPW operations."

"g. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders have the overall responsibility for the EPW, CI and RP program, operations, and contingency plans in the theater of operation involved to ensure compliance with international law of war."

"(2) Plan and procure logistical support to include: transportation, subsistence, personal, organizational and Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) clothing and equipment items, mail collection and distribution, laundry, and bath for EPW, CI and RP." Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Chapter 6, paragraph 6-7, discusses the importance of good communication within a facility. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"6-7.

• Communications. Ensure that communication between towers and operation headquarters is reliable. Telephones are the preferred method; however, ensure that alternate forms of communication (radio and visual or sound signals) are available in case telephones are inoperable."

r. Finding 18:

(1) Finding: All inspected point of capture units established ad hoc kits containing necessary items and supplies for detainee field processing, but the items they contained and their quantities varied from unit to unit.

(2) Standard: There is no regulatory standard for a detainee field processing kit for capturing units. Army Regulation (AR) 190- 8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, subparagraph g (2), states that Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders, and Joint Task Force Commanders have overall responsibility for civilian internee (CI) programs and in the planning and procuring for logistical support. Chapter 2, paragraph 2-1, subparagraph a (1) (a) & (b), requires a capturing unit to document confiscated currency and to tag all captured prisoners. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"g. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders. Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders have the overall responsibility for the EPW, CI and RP program, operations, and contingency plans in the theater of operation involved to ensure compliance with international law of war."

"(2) Plan and procure logistical support to include: transportation, subsistence, personal, organizational and Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) clothing and equipment items, mail collection and distribution, laundry, and bath for EPW, CI and RP."

"a. Each EPW/RP will be searched immediately after capture. ... Currency will only be confiscated on the order of a commissioned officer and will be receipted for using a DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document).

b. All prisoners of war and retained persons will, at the time of capture, be tagged using DD Form 2745. They will be searched for concealed weapons and items of intelligence. All equipment, documents, and personal property confiscated during the search must be tagged and administratively accounted for by the capturing unit. Capturing units must provide the: date of capture, location of capture (how the EPW was captured). The remaining information will be included on the tag as it becomes available."

s. Finding 19:

(1) Finding: All inspected units had adequate transportation assets to evacuate and/or transfer detainees from points of capture to collecting points, and eventually to internment/resettlement facilities.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, subparagraph g (2) and (5), states that Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders, and Joint Task Force Commanders have overall responsibility for civilian internee (CI) programs and in the planning and procuring for logistical support, to include transportation. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"(2) Plan and procure logistical support to include: transportation, subsistence, personal, organizational and Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) clothing and equipment items, mail collection and distribution, laundry, and bath for EPW, CI and RP."

"(5) Establish guidance for the use, transport, and evacuation of EPW, CI, RP, and ODs in logistical support operations."

Field Manual 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-7, states that the basic principle of speed is the responsibility of the capturing unit, who moves the detainee to the collecting point (CP). Paragraph 3-18 states that the number of detainees at the CP must be reported through MP channels to assist in the transportation planning. Paragraph 3-26 states who is responsible for moving detainees from CPs to the internment/resettlement facility. Paragraph 3-33 states the ratio of MP guards to detainees for movement. Paragraph 3-34 states that detainees cannot be moved with MP organic assets. Paragraph 3-35 states that the preferred method of detainee movement is by using the backhaul system. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"3-7. The Five Ss and T procedure is performed by the capturing unit. The basic principles are search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag."

"3-18. Report the number of captives at each CP through MP channels. This aids in the transportation and security planning processes."

"3-26. Remove captives from the CZ as quickly as possible. The intent is to move them from division CPs to an I/R facility. The goal is for higher-level echelons to go forward to lower echelons and evacuate captives to the rear as follows:

• Division MP move forward to the forward CP to escort captives to the central CP.
• Corps MP move forward to the central CP to escort captives to the CHA.
• Echelons above corps (EAC) MP move forward to the CHA to escort captives to the I/R facility."

"3-33. The MP guard able-bodied captives during movement to prevent escape, liberation, or injury. A general planning consideration when determining the number of MP necessary is one for every five to ten captives.

3-34. When moving forward to escort captives to the rear area, MP responsibilities begin at the CP or the CHA where custody is accepted. Verify the method of moving captives, the location and time of pick-up, and the number of captives contained in orders from higher headquarters. The MP units cannot transport captives with organic assets.

3-35. The preferred method for moving captives through a battlefield is the backhaul system. This transportation system relies on assets that have delivered their primary cargo and are available to move personnel and materials to another location. The availability of vehicles will vary, depending on the cargo delivered to the area. The command and control (C2) element of MP unit tasked with evacuation arranges transportation through the local MCO."

t. Finding 20:

(1) Finding: Common leader training in professional military school contains only one detainee operations task.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Education, 9 April 2003, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-2, requires that TRADOC establish training and education goals and objectives for all Army personnel. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"Training proponents. These would include TRADOC schools and colleges, USAJFKSWC&S and AMEDDC&S and would perform the following:

(a) Develop courses based on established training and education goals and objectives as well as the duties, responsibilities, and missions their graduates will be assigned.

(b) Develop, evaluate, and train leader, technical, and tactical tasks that focus on missions for the size or type units to which graduates will be assigned.

(c) Provide progressive and sequential training.

(d) Provide personnel serving at the same organizational level with training consisting of the same tasks, conditions, and standards.

(e) Provide leader, technical, and tactical training that affords soldiers and DA civilians an opportunity to acquire the skills and knowledge needed to perform more complex duties and missions of greater responsibility."

Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, 22 October 2002, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-29, provides overall guidance for the implementation of Professional Military Education (PME). The specific language in the field manual follows:

"Professional Military Education - PME develops Army leaders. Officer, warrant officer, and NCO training and education is a continuous, career-long, learning process that integrates structured programs of instruction—resident at the institution and non- resident via distributed learning at home station. PME is progressive and sequential, provides a doctrinal foundation, and builds on previous training, education and operational experiences. PME provides hands-on technical, tactical, and leader training focused to ensure leaders are prepared for success in their next assignment and higher-level responsibility.

• Officer Education System (OES). Army officers must lead and fight; be tactically and technically competent; possess leader skills; understand how the Army operates as a service, as well as a component of a joint, multinational, or interagency organization; demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility; operate in a complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing environment; build effective teams amid continuous organizational and technological change; and solve problems creatively. OES develops officers who are self-aware and adaptive to lead Army units to mission success.
• Warrant Officer Education System (WOES). Warrant officers are the Army's technical experts. WOES develops a corps of highly specialized experts and trainers who are fully competent and proficient operators, maintainers, administrators, and managers of the Army's equipment, support activities, and technical systems.
• NCO Education System (NCOES). NCOES trains NCOs to lead and train soldiers, crews, and subordinate leaders who work and fight under their leadership. NCOES provides hands-on technical, tactical, and leader training focused to ensure that NCOs are prepared for success in their next assignment and higher-level responsibility.
• Functional Training. In addition to the preceding PME courses, there are functional courses available in both resident and non-resident distributed learning modes that enhance functional skills for specific duty positions. Examples are Battalion S2, Battalion Motor Officer, First Sergeant, Battle Staff NCO, and Airborne courses."
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 4:49 am

PART 21 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

u. Finding 21:

(1) Finding: Leaders and Soldiers assigned to 69% (46 of 67) of inspected units stated they desired additional home station training; and pre- and post mobilization training to assist them in performing detainee operations.

(2) Standard: Training on standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Guidance was provided stating that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of U.S. Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely and if the corresponding training was consistent with this obligation. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war), and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949, is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the U.S. would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment and corresponding training, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows:

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

GPW Article 127 and GC Article 144 establish a requirement for signatories to the treaties to train their military on the obligations under the conventions. The specific standards follow:

"GC Article 127 – The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population. Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.

GC Article 144 – The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population. Any civilian, military, police or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions."

Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Education, 9 April 2003, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-8, subparagraph 2d, establishes Home Station Training priorities for all Army personnel. Chapter 4, paragraph 4-5, outlines training requirements for Common Military Training for all Army personnel. Appendix G, paragraph G-1, subparagraph(s) b-c, outlines an overview of the Common Military Training program. Table G-1, provides examples of military training requirements in units. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"2d. Training will be the top priority for all commanders - To prepare individuals and units for immediate deployment and organizations for employment in support of operational missions, Army individual, collective, and modernization training provides for—

(1) Unit training that develops the critical components of combat readiness. These include development of—

(a) Soldiers, leaders, and units capable of deploying, executing assigned missions, and redeploying.

(b) Effective combined arms teams consisting of integrated combat, combat support (CS), combat service support, and close air support.

(2) An individual training system that—

(a) Produces initial entry soldiers who are highly motivated, disciplined, physically fit, and skilled in common soldier and basic branch tasks.

(b) Provides a training base of Army schools that prepares soldiers and DA civilian employees for more complex duties and progressively higher positions of responsibility.

(c) Produces soldiers capable of performing military occupational specialty (MOS), Area of Concentration (AOC), additional skill identifier (ASI), skill identifier (SI), special qualification identifier (SQI), and language identification code (LIC) tasks. Prior service Reserve Component (RC) and Active Army personnel receive required training through The Army Training System courses (TATS-C) or proponent-approved formal on-the-job training (OJT). TATS courses are designed to train the same MOS, AOC, skill level, SQI, ASI, LIC, and SI within the Army. TATS also includes MOS qualification (reclassification), Army leadership, and professional development courses.

(d) Provides reclassification training for changing an enlisted or warrant officer MOS, or to qualify an officer in a new branch. Reclassification training will be accomplished in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 140–1, AR 614–200, and AR 611–1.

(3) Active Army, Department of the Army civilians, and RC forces able to mobilize rapidly, deploy, and perform their operational missions.

(4) Standardization of tasks and performance standards across the Army. Units and soldiers performing the same tasks will be trained to the same standard.

(5) Efficient and effective internal and external evaluation procedures that improve training, sustain required readiness levels, and control or reduce costs.

(6) A training system that supports peacetime requirements and transitions smoothly at mobilization."

"4-5. Common military training and common task training -

(a) CMT program identifies common military training requirements for unit commanders’ planning and training programs because of their importance to individual soldier and unit readiness. Common military training is required for all leaders and soldiers at specific organizational levels, and proficiency in those subject areas is necessary, regardless of branch or career field or rank or grade. Common military training requirements are limited to those subject areas directed by law and HQDA. The HQDA, DCS, G–3, maintains centralized control over CMT directed training requirements and validates these requirements biennially."

"G-1. Overview -

(b) MACOM commanders have a degree of latitude in adding to or emphasizing certain training requirements; however, care should be taken not to degrade battle-focused training.

(c) Successful CMT programs are measured by performance to standard and not adherence to rosters or hours scheduled."

"Table G-1, Common military training requirements in units - eapons Qualification, Civil disturbance, Antiterrorism and Force Protection, Code of Conduct/ SERE, Law of War..."

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, outlines the 5 Military Police Functional Areas. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"b. Military Police Functional Areas -

(1-4) with the old battlefield missions, the term "operations" was used extensively and carried too broad of a meaning. To clarify the specific tasks of the MP, the battlefield missions have been redefined into the following five functional areas:

• MMS (Maneuver and Mobility Support)
• AS (Area Security)
• I/R (Internment and Resettlement)
• L&O (Law and Order)
• PIO (Police Intelligence Operations)"

FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-1, FORSCOM MOBILIZATION and DEPLOYMENT PLANNING SYSTEM (FORMDEPS), Volume 1, FORSCOM MOBILIZATION PLAN (FMP), 15 April 1998, Annex O, paragraph 2.4.4, defines additional training requirements at mobilization sites. The specific language in the regulation follows: "Mobilized Unit Commanders --

(2) Commanders will additionally concentrate on training on soldier/leader skills. This training will be designed to make best use of time available after unit equipment is shipped and will include the following as a minimum:

(a) Physical fitness. Its importance cannot be overstated. Training should be conducted in accordance with AR 350-15 and FM 21-20.

(b) Common Task Test. Testing is most often practiced in a sterile, "round robin" setting using the tasks, conditions and standards provided in the STP 21-series Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks Testing should include an element of tactical realism to cause soldiers, as members of teams, crews, sections, and squads to think and react instinctively.

(c) The NBC Training. The following tasks are of paramount importance:

1. Recognize/react to chemical/ biological hazards.

2. Don Mission-Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) gear.

3. Detect and identify chemical agents using M8/M9 paper.

4 Administer nerve agent antidote to self (self aid) and to a nerve agent casualty (buddyaid).

5. Decon skin and personal equipment using the M258A1 decon kit, the M291 skin decon kit, and the M295 equipment decon kit.

6. Drink from a canteen while wearing a protective mask.

7. Maintain and use the M40 series protective mask with hood.

(d) Care and maintenance of CTA 50-900 series and MTO&E equipment.

(e) Force protection to include terrorist threat. (See Appendix 1)

(f) Hazards and survival.

(g) Individual and crew served weapons proficiency.

(h) First Aid - Combat Lifesavers.

(i) Rules of Engagement.

(j) Personal hygiene.

(k) Threat and allied equipment recognition

(l) An orientation on the area of probable operations to include language, customs, courtesies, etc."

v. Finding 22:

(1) Finding: To offset the shortage of interrogators, contractors were employed, however, 35% (11 of 31) of contract interrogators lacked formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques.

(2) Standard: Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-1, provides the regulatory guidance for interrogation of detainees in a combat zone. This regulation is a multi-service regulation implementing DOD Directive 2310.1 and incorporates Army Regulation 190-8 and 190-57 and SECNAV Instruction 3461.3, and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304 and outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for treatment of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retained personnel (RP), civilian internees (CI), and other detainees (OD) and implements international law for all military operations. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"(d) Prisoners may be interrogated in the combat zone. The use of physical or mental torture or any coercion to compel prisoners to provide information is prohibited. Prisoners may voluntarily cooperate with PSYOP personnel in the development, evaluation, or dissemination of PSYOP messages or products. Prisoners may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disparate treatment of any kind because of their refusal to answer questions. Interrogations will normally be performed by intelligence or counterintelligence personnel."

Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956 (change 1, 15 July 1976), Chapter 3, section IV, paragraph 93, describes guidelines for the questioning of EPWs. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."

FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, Chapter 1, defines and explains the purpose of interrogation. The specific language in the field manual follows:

"Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of time, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any echelon of command.

A good interrogation produces needed information, which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate." CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell Statement of Work, CACI International, Inc., 14 August 2003, Paragraphs 7 (c) and 9 (c) describe the requirements for contract interrogators hired to man the theater and division interrogations support cells in OIF. The specific language in the statement of work follows:

"Identified interrogators should be the civilian equivalent to one of the following: 97E, 351E, Strategic Debriefer or an individual with a similar skill set, and US Citizens with a Secret clearance."

w. Finding 23:

(1) Finding: Interviewed leaders and Soldiers indicated their Law of War refresher training was not detailed enough to sustain their knowledge obtained during initial and advanced training.

(2) Standard: Training on standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Guidance was provided stating that members of the Taliban militia and members of Al Qaida under the control of U.S. Forces would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DAIG has therefore used the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as a benchmark against which to measure the treatment provided to detainees by U.S. Forces to determine if detainees were treated humanely and if the corresponding training was consistent with this obligation. The use of these standards as benchmarks does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, provides the determination regarding the humane treatment of Al Qaida and Taliban detainees. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW) is the international treaty that governs the treatment of prisoners of war), and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), August 12, 1949, is the international treaty that governs the treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

As the guidance did not define "humane treatment" but did state that the U.S. would treat members of the Taliban militia and Al Qaida in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, the DAIG determined that it would use Common Article 3 of the GCs as its floor measure of humane treatment and corresponding training, but would also include provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) as other relevant indicia of "humane treatment." The use of this standard does not state or imply a position for the United States or U.S. Army on the legal status of its operations in OEF.

Standard of treatment for detainees in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): OIF was an international armed conflict and therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied.

The minimum treatment provided by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is: (1) No adverse distinction based upon race, religion, sex, etc.; (2) No violence to life or person; (3) No taking hostages; (4) No degrading treatment; (5) No passing of sentences in absence of fair trial, and; (6) The wounded and sick must be cared for.

The specific language in the CJCS Message for OEF and the GPW/GC and H.IV follows:

CJCS Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, "Paragraph 3. The combatant commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

GPW/GC, Article 3 (Common Article 3) – "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

GPW Article 127 and GC Article 144 establish a requirement for signatories to the treaties to train their military on the obligations under the conventions. The specific standards follow:

"GC Article 127 – The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population. Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.

GC Article 144 – The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population. Any civilian, military, police or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions."

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees, 18 August 1994, Section 3. provides DoD policy for training on the Geneva Conventions. The specific language in the directive follows:

"3. Policy, It is DoD policy that:

3.1. The U.S. Military Services shall comply with the principles, spirit, and intent of the international law of war, both customary and codified, to include the Geneva Conventions (references (b) through (e)).

3.2. The U.S. Military Services shall be given the necessary training to ensure they have knowledge of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions (references (b) through (e)) and as required by DoD Directive 5100.77 (reference (f)) before an assignment to a foreign area where capture or detention of enemy personnel is possible.

3.3. Captured or detained personnel shall be accorded an appropriate legal status under international law. Persons captured or detained may be transferred to or from the care, custody, and control of the U.S. Military Services only on approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) and as authorized by the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (references (d) and (e)).

3.4. Persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military Services shall normally be handed over for safeguarding to U.S. Army Military Police, or to detainee collecting points or other holding facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police as soon as practical. Detainees may be interviewed for intelligence collection purposes at facilities and installations operated by U.S. Army Military Police."

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, 9 December 1998, Section 5.5, provides DoD policy for Law of War policy and training. The specific language in the directive follows:

"5.5. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall develop internal policies and procedures consistent with this Directive in support of the DoD Law of War Program to:

5.5.1. Provide directives, publications, instructions, and training so that the principles and rules of the law of war will be known to members of their respective Departments, the extent of such knowledge to be commensurate with each individual’s duties and responsibilities.

5.5.2. Ensure that programs are implemented in their respective Military Departments to prevent violations of the law of war, emphasizing any types of violations that have been reported under this Directive.

5.5.3. Provide for the prompt reporting and investigation of reportable incidents committed by or against members of their respective Military Departments, or persons accompanying them, in accordance with directives issued under paragraph 5.8.4., below.

5.5.4. Where appropriate, provide for disposition, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (reference (i)), of cases involving alleged violations of the law of war DODD 5100.77, December 9, 1998 4 by members of their respective Military Departments who are subject to court-martial jurisdiction.

5.5.5. Provide for the central collection of reports and investigations of reportable incidents alleged to have been committed by or against members of their respective Military Departments, or persons accompanying them.

5.5.6. Ensure that all reports of reportable incidents are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army in his or her capacity as the DoD Executive Agent under subsection 5.6., below." Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Education, 9 April 2003, Section 4-14, sets the guidelines for Law of War training. The specific language in the regulation follows:

"4–14. Law of war training

a. Soldiers and leaders require law of war training throughout their military careers commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. Prescribed subject matter for training at the following levels is specified in paras 4–14b-d of this regulation.

(1) Level A training is conducted during IET for all enlisted personnel and during basic courses of instruction for all warrant officers and officers.

(2) Level B training is conducted in units for officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel commensurate with the missions of the unit.

(3) Level C training is conducted in The Army School System (TASS).

b. Level A training provides the minimum knowledge required for all members of the Army. The following basic law of war rules (referred to as "The Soldier’s Rules," which stresses the importance of compliance with the law of war) will be taught during level A training:

(1) Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.

(2) Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.

(3) Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.

(4) Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.

(5) Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.

(6) Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.

(7) Soldiers treat civilians humanely.

(8) Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.

(9) Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.

(10) Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.

c. Unit commanders will plan and execute level B law-of-war training based on the following:

(1) Training should reinforce the principles set forth in The Soldier’s Rules.

(2) Training will be designed around current missions and contingency plans (including anticipated geographical areas of deployment or rules of engagement).

(3) Training will be integrated into unit training activities, field training exercises and unit external evaluations (EXEVAL). Maximum combat realism will be applied to tactical exercises consistent with good safety practices.

d. Army schools will tailor law of war training to the tasks taught in those schools. Level C training will emphasize officer, warrant officer, and NCO responsibilities for:

(1) Their performance of duties in accordance with the law of war obligations of the United States.

(2) Law of war issues in command planning and execution of combat operations.

(3) Measures for the reporting of suspected or alleged war crimes committed by or against U.S. or allied personnel."
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 4:56 am

PART 22 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Appendix F: Abbreviations and Acronyms

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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 1:48 am

PART 1 OF 4 (The Schlesinger Report)

The Schlesinger Report

Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations

The Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations

August 2004

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Introduction - Charter and Methodology
• The Changing Threat
• The Policy Promulgation Process
• Public Release of Abuse Photos
• Command Responsibilities
• Military Police and Detention Operations
• Interrogation Operations
• The Role of Military Police and Military Intelligence in Detention Operations
• Laws of War/Geneva Conventions
• The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross
• Recommendations
• Appendices
o Appendix A: Glossary
o Appendix B: Secretary of Defense Memorandum appointing the Independent Panel
o Appendix C: President of the United States Memorandum, February 7, 2002
o Appendix D: Interrogation Policies
o Appendix E: Evolution of Interrogation Techniques
o Appendix F: Timeline, Major Detention Events
o Appendix G: Psychological Stresses
o Appendix H: Ethical Issues
• Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations
o Research Staff
o Support Staff

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW


The events of October through December 2003 on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib prison were acts of brutality and purposeless sadism. We now know these abuses occurred at the hands of both military police and military intelligence personnel. The pictured abuses, unacceptable even in wartime, were not part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets. They represent deviant behavior and a failure of military leadership and discipline. However, we do know that some of the egregious abuses at Abu Ghraib which were not photographed did occur during interrogation sessions and that abuses during interrogation sessions occurred elsewhere.

In light of what happened at Abu Ghraib, a series of comprehensive investigations has been conducted by various components of the Department of Defense. Since the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military and security operations have apprehended about 50,000 individuals. From this number, about 300 allegations of abuse in Afghanistan, Iraq or Guantanamo have arisen. As of mid-August 2004, 155 investigations into the allegations have been completed, resulting in 66 substantiated cases. Approximately one-third of these cases occurred at the point of capture or tactical collection point, frequently under uncertain, dangerous and violent circumstances.

Abuses of varying severity occurred at differing locations under differing circumstances and context. They were widespread and, though inflicted on only a small percentage of those detained, they were serious both in number and in effect. No approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities. Still, the abuses were not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed the members of the Independent Panel to provide independent professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them and what actions should be taken to preclude their repetition. The Panel reviewed various criminal investigations and a number of command and other major investigations. The Panel also conducted interviews of relevant persons, including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, other senior Department of Defense officials, the military chain-of command and their staffs and other officials directly and indirectly involved with Abu Ghraib and other detention operations. However, the Panel did not have full access to information involving the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in detention operations; this is an area the Panel believes needs further investigation and review. It should be noted that information provided to the Panel was that available as of mid-August 2004. If additional information becomes available, the Panel's judgments might be revised.

POLICY

With the events of September 11, 2001, the President, the Congress and the American people recognized we were at war with a different kind of enemy. The terrorists who flew airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were unlike enemy combatants the U.S. has fought in previous conflicts. Their objectives, in fact, are to kill large numbers of civilians and to strike at the heart of America's political cohesion and its economic and military might. In the days and weeks after the attack, the President and his closest advisers developed policies and strategies in response. On September 18, 2001, by a virtually unanimous vote, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. initiated hostilities in Afghanistan and the first detainees were held at Mazar-e-Sharrif in November 2001.

On February 7, 2002, the President issued a memorandum stating that he determined the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, and although they did apply in the conflict with Afghanistan, the Taliban were unlawful combatants and therefore did not qualify for prisoner of war status (see Appendix C). Nonetheless, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were all in agreement that treatment of detainees should be consistent with the Geneva Conventions. The President ordered accordingly that detainees were to be treated "... humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." Earlier, the Department of State had argued the Geneva Conventions in their traditional application provided a sufficiently robust legal construct under which the Global War on Terror could effectively be waged. The Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many of the military service attorneys agreed with this position.

In the summer of 2002, the Counsel to the President queried the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for an opinion on the standards of conduct for interrogation operations conducted by U.S. personnel outside of the U.S. and the applicability of the Convention Against Torture. The OLC responded in an August 1, 2002 opinion in which it held that in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain and suffering that is difficult to endure.

Army Field Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52), with its list of 17 authorized interrogation methods, has long been the standard source for interrogation doctrine within the Department of Defense (see Appendix D). In October 2002, authorities at Guantanamo requested approval of stronger interrogation techniques to counter tenacious resistance by some detainees. The Secretary of Defense responded with a December 2, 2002 decision authorizing the use of 16 additional techniques at Guantanamo (see Appendix E). As a result of concerns raised by the Navy General Counsel on January 15, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded the majority of the approved measures in the December 2, 2002 authorization. Moreover, he directed the remaining more aggressive techniques could be used only with his approval (see Appendix D).

At the same time, he directed the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel to establish a working group to study interrogation techniques. The Working Group was headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker and included wide membership from across the military legal and intelligence communities. The Working Group also relied heavily on the OLC. The Working Group reviewed 35 techniques and after a very extensive debate ultimately recommended 24 to the Secretary of Defense. The study led to the Secretary of Defense's promulgation on April 16, 2003 of a list of approved techniques strictly limited for use at Guantanamo. This policy remains in force at Guantanamo (see Appendix E).

In the initial development of these Secretary of Defense policies, the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates General and General Counsels were not utilized to their full potential. Had the Secretary of Defense had a wider range of legal opinions and a more robust debate regarding detainee policies and operations, his policy of April 16, 2003 might well have been developed and issued in early December 2002. This would have avoided the policy changes which characterized the Dec 02, 2002 to April 16, 2003 period.

It is clear that pressures for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum, resulted in stronger interrogation techniques that were believed to be needed and appropriate in the treatment of detainees defined as ''unlawful combatants." At Guantanamo, the interrogators used those additional techniques with only two detainees, gaining important and time-urgent information in the process.

In Afghanistan, from the war's inception through the end of 2002, all forces used FM 34-52 as a baseline for interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, more aggressive interrogation of detainees appears to have been on-going. On January 24, 2003, in response to a data call from the Joint Staff to facilitate the Working Group efforts, the Commander Joint Task Force-I 80 forwarded a list of techniques being used in Afghanistan, including some not explicitly set out in FM 34-52. These techniques were included in a Special Operation Forces (SOF) Standard Operating Procedures document published in February 2003. The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, a company of which was later sent to Iraq, assisted in interrogations in support of SOF and was fully aware of their interrogation techniques.

Interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq. During July and August 2003, the 519th Military Intelligence Company was sent to the Abu Ghraib detention facility to conduct interrogation operations. Absent any explicit policy or guidance, other than FM 34-52, the officer in charge prepared draft interrogation guidelines that were a near copy of the Standard Operating Procedure created by SOF. It is important to note that techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated and were not adequately safeguarded.

Following a CJTF-7 request, Joint Staff tasked SOUTHCOM to send an assistance team to provide advice on facilities and operations, specifically related to screening, interrogations, HUMINT collection, and inter-agency integration in the short and long term. In August 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller arrived to conduct an assessment of DoD counter-terrorism interrogation and detention operations in Iraq. He was to discuss current theater ability to exploit internees rapidly for actionable intelligence. He brought the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 policy guidelines for Guantanamo with him and gave this policy to CJTF-7 as a possible model for the command-wide policy that he recommended be established. MG Miller noted that it applied to unlawful combatants at Guantanamo and was not directly applicable to Iraq where the Geneva Conventions applied. In part as a result of MG Miller's call for strong, command-wide interrogation policies and in part as a result of a request for guidance coming up from the 519th at Abu Ghraib, on September 14, 2003 LTG Sanchez signed a memorandum authorizing a dozen interrogation techniques beyond Field Manual 34-52 -- five beyond those approved for Guantanamo (see Appendix D).

MG Miller had indicated his model was approved only for Guantanamo. However, CJTF-7, using reasoning from the President's Memorandum of February 7, 2002 which addressed ''unlawful combatants," believed additional, tougher measures were warranted because there were ''unlawful combatants" mixed in with Enemy Prisoners of War and civilian and criminal detainees. The CJTF-7 Commander, on the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, believed he had the inherent authority of the Commander in a Theater of War to promulgate such a policy and make determinations as to the categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions. CENTCOM viewed the CJTF-7 policy as unacceptably aggressive and on October 12, 2003 Commander CJTF-7 rescinded his September directive and disseminated methods only slightly stronger than those in Field Manual 34-52 (see Appendix D). The policy memos promulgated at the CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned.

DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

From his experience in Guantanamo, MG Miller called for the military police and military intelligence soldiers to work cooperatively, with the military police "setting the conditions" for interrogations. This MP role included passive collection on detainees as well as supporting incentives recommended by the military interrogators. These collaborative procedures worked effectively in Guantanamo, particularly in light of the high ratio of approximately 1 to 1 of military police to mostly compliant detainees. However, in Iraq and particularly in Abu Ghraib the ratio of military police to repeatedly unruly detainees was significantly smaller, at one point 1 to about 75 at Abu Ghraib, making it difficult even to keep track of prisoners. Moreover, because Abu Ghraib was located in a combat zone, the military police were engaged in force protection of the complex as well as escorting convoys of supplies to and from the prison. Compounding these problems was the inadequacy of leadership, oversight and support needed in the face of such difficulties.

At various times, the U.S. conducted detention operations at approximately 17 sites in Iraq and 25 sites in Afghanistan, in addition to the strategic operation at Guantanamo. A cumulative total of 50,000 detainees have been in the custody of U.S. forces since November 2001, with a peak population of 11,000 in the month of March 2004.

In Iraq, there was not only a failure to plan for a major insurgency, but also to quickly and adequately adapt to the insurgency that followed after major combat operations. The October 2002 CENTCOM War Plan presupposed that relatively benign stability and security operations would precede a handover to Iraq's authorities. The contingencies contemplated in that plan included sabotage of oil production facilities and large numbers of refugees generated by communal strife.

Major combat operations were accomplished more swiftly than anticipated. Then began a period of occupation and an active and growing insurgency. Although the removal of Saddam Hussein was initially welcomed by the bulk of the population, the occupation became increasingly resented. Detention facilities soon held Iraqi and foreign terrorists as well as a mix of Enemy Prisoners of War, other security detainees, criminals and undoubtedly some accused as a result of factional rivalries. Of the 17 detention facilities in Iraq, the largest, Abu Ghraib, housed up to 7,000 detainees in October 2003, with a guard force of only about 90 personnel from the 800th Military Police Brigade. Abu Ghraib was seriously overcrowded, under-resourced, and under continual attack. Five U.S. soldiers died as a result of mortar attacks on Abu Ghraib. In July 2003, Abu Ghraib was mortared 25 times; on August 16, 2003, five detainees were killed and 67 wounded in a mortar attack. A mortar attack on April 20, 2004 killed 22 detainees.

Problems at Abu Ghraib are traceable in part to the nature and recent history of the military police and military intelligence units at Abu Ghraib. The 800th Military Police Brigade had one year of notice to plan for detention operations in Iraq. Original projections called for approximately 12 detention facilities in non-hostile, rear areas with a projection of 30,000 to 100,000 Enemy Prisoners of War. Though the 800th had planned a detention operations exercise for the summer of 2002, it was cancelled because of the disruption in soldier and unit availability resulting from the mobilization of Military Police Reserves following 9/11. Although its readiness was certified by U.S. Army Forces Command, actual deployment of the 800th Brigade to Iraq was chaotic. The "Time Phased Force Deployment List," which was the planned flow of forces to the theater of operations, was scrapped in favor of piecemeal unit deployment orders based on actual unit readiness and personnel strength. Equipment and troops regularly arrived out of planned sequence and rarely together. Improvisation was the order of the day. While some units overcame these difficulties, the 800th was among the lowest in priority and did not have the capability to overcome the shortfalls it confronted.

The 205th MI Brigade, deployed to support Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), normally provides the intelligence capability for a Corps Headquarters. However, it was insufficient to provide the kind of support needed by CJTF-7, especially with regard to interrogators and interpreters. Some additional units were mobilized to fill in the gaps, but while these MI units were more prepared than their military police counterparts, there were insufficient numbers of units available. Moreover, unit cohesion was lacking because elements of as many as six different units were assigned to the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. These problems were heightened by friction between military intelligence and military police personnel, including the brigade commanders themselves.

ABUSES

As of the date of this report, there were about 300 incidents of alleged detainee abuse across the Joint Operations Areas. Of the 155 completed investigations, 66 have resulted in a determination that detainees under the control of U.S. forces were abused. Dozens of non-judicial punishments have already been awarded. Others are in various stages of the military justice process.

Of the 66 already substantiated cases of abuse, eight occurred at Guantanamo, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq. Only about one-third were related to interrogation, and two-thirds to other causes. There were five cases of detainee deaths as a result of abuse by U.S. personnel during interrogations. Many more died from natural causes and enemy mortar attacks. There are 23 cases of detainee deaths still under investigation; three in Afghanistan and 20 in Iraq. Twenty-eight of the abuse cases are alleged to include Special Operations Forces (SOF) and, of the 15 SOF cases that have been closed, ten were determined to be unsubstantiated and five resulted in disciplinary action. The Jacoby review of SOF detention operations found a range of abuses and causes similar in scope and magnitude to those found among conventional forces.

The aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell Block 1 at Abu Ghraib would have been avoided with proper training, leadership and oversight. Though acts of abuse occurred at a number of locations, those in Cell Block 1 have a unique nature fostered by the predilections of the noncommissioned officers in charge. Had these noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the day shift, these acts, which one participant described as "just for the fun of it," would not have taken place.

Concerning the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the impact was magnified by the fact the shocking photographs were aired throughout the world in April 2004. Although CENTCOM had publicly addressed the abuses in a press release in January 2004, the photographs remained within the official criminal investigative process. Consequently, the highest levels of command and leadership in the Department of Defense were not adequately informed nor prepared to respond to the Congress and the American public when copies were released by the press.

POLICY AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

Interrogation policies with respect to Iraq, where the majority of the abuses occurred, were inadequate or deficient in some respects at three levels: Department of Defense, CENTCOM/CJTF-7, and Abu Ghraib Prison. Policies to guide the demands for actionable intelligence lagged behind battlefield needs. As already noted, the changes in DoD interrogation policies between December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003 were an element contributing to uncertainties in the field as to which techniques were authorized. Although specifically limited by the Secretary of Defense to Guantanamo, and requiring his personal approval (given in only two cases), the augmented techniques for Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded.

At the operational level, in the absence of specific guidance from CENTCOM, interrogators in Iraq relied on Field Manua1 34-52 and on unauthorized techniques that had migrated from Afghanistan. On September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 signed the theater's first policy on interrogation, which contained elements of the approved Guantanamo policy and elements of the SOF policy (see Appendix D). Policies approved for use on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, who were not afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions, now applied to detainees who did fall under the Geneva Convention protections.

CENTCOM disapproved the September 14, 2003 policy, resulting in another policy signed on October 12, 2003 which essentially mirrored the outdated 1987 version of the FM 34-52 (see Appendix D). The 1987 version, however, authorized interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation, ''to include lighting and heating, as well as food, clothing, and shelter given to detainees." This was specifically left out of the current 1992 version. This clearly led to confusion on what practices were acceptable. We cannot be sure how much the number and severity of abuses would have been curtailed had there been early and consistent guidance from higher levels. Nonetheless, such guidance was needed and likely would have had a limiting effect.

At the tactical level we concur with the Jones/Fay investigation's conclusion that military intelligence personnel share responsibility for the abuses at Abu Ghraib with the military police soldiers cited in the Taguba investigation. The Jones/Fay Investigation found 44 alleged instances of abuse, some which were also considered by the Taguba report. A number of these cases involved MI personnel directing the actions of MP personnel. Yet it should be noted that of the 66 closed cases of detainee abuse in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq cited by the Naval Inspector General, only one-third were interrogation related.

The Panel concurs with the findings of the Taguba and Jones investigations that serious leadership problems in the 800th MP Brigade and 205th MI Brigade, to include the 320th MP Battalion Commander and the Director of the Joint Debriefing and Interrogation Center (JDIC), allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The Panel endorses the disciplinary actions taken as a result of the Taguba Investigation. The Panel anticipates that the Chain of Command will take additional disciplinary action as a result of the referrals of the Jones/Fay investigation.

We believe LTG Sanchez should have taken stronger action in November when he realized the extent of the leadership problems at Abu Ghraib. His attempt to mentor BG Karpinski, though well-intended, was insufficient in a combat zone in the midst of a serious and growing insurgency. Although LTG Sanchez had more urgent tasks than dealing personally with command and resource deficiencies at Abu Ghraib, MG Wojdakowski and the staff should have seen that urgent demands were placed to higher headquarters for additional assets. We concur with the Jones findings that LTG Sanchez and MG Wojdakowski failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations.

We note, however, in terms of its responsibilities, CJTF-7 was never fully resourced to meet the size and complexity of its mission. The Joint Staff, CJTF-7 and CENTCOM took too long to finalize the Joint Manning Document (JMD). It was not finally approved until December 2003, six months into the insurgency. At one point, CJTF-7 had only 495 of the 1,400 personnel authorized. The command was burdened with additional complexities associated with its mission to support the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Once it became clear in the summer of 2003 that there was a major insurgency growing in Iraq, with the potential for capturing a large number of enemy combatants, senior leaders should have moved to meet the need for additional military police forces. Certainly by October and November when the fighting reached a new peak, commanders and staff from CJTF-7 all the way to CENTCOM to the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have known about and reacted to the serious limitations of the battalion of the 800th Military Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib. CENTCOM and the JCS should have at least considered adding forces to the detention/interrogation operation mission. It is the judgment of this panel that in the future, considering the sensitivity of this kind of mission, the OSD should assure itself that serious limitations in detention/interrogation missions do not occur.

Several options were available to Commander CENTCOM and above, including reallocation of U.S. Army assets already in the theater, Operational Control (OPCON) of other Service Military Police units in theater, and mobilization and deployment of additional forces from the continental United States. There is no evidence that any of the responsible senior officers considered any of these options. What could and should have been done more promptly is evidenced by the fact that the detention/interrogation operation in Iraq is now directed by a Major General reporting directly to the Commander, Multi-national Forces Iraq (MNFI). Increased units of Military Police, fully manned and more appropriately equipped, are performing the mission once assigned to a single under-strength, poorly trained, inadequately equipped and weakly-led brigade. In addition to the already cited leadership problems in the 800th MP Brigade, there were a series of tangled command relationships. These ranged from an unclear military intelligence chain of command, to the Tactical Control (TACON) relationship of the 800th with CJTF-7 which the Brigade Commander apparently did not adequately understand, and the confusing and unusual assignment of MI and MP responsibilities at Abu Ghraib. The failure to react appropriately to the October 2003 ICRC report, following its two visits to Abu Ghraib, is indicative of the weakness of the leadership at Abu Ghraib. These unsatisfactory relationships were present neither at Guantanamo nor in Afghanistan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Department of Defense reform efforts are underway and the Panel commends these efforts. They are discussed in more detail in the body of this report. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services are conducting comprehensive reviews on how military operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. The Military Services now recognize the problems and are studying force compositions, training, doctrine, responsibilities and active duty/reserve and guard/contractor mixes which must be adjusted to ensure we are better prepared to succeed in the war on terrorism. As an example, the Army is currently planning and developing 27 additional MP companies.

The specific recommendations of the Independent Panel are contained in the Recommendations section, beginning on page 87.

CONCLUSION

The vast majority of detainees in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq were treated appropriately, and the great bulk of detention operations were conducted in compliance with U.S. policy and directives. They yielded significant amounts of actionable intelligence for dealing with the insurgency in Iraq and strategic intelligence of value in the Global War on Terror. For example, much of the information in the recently released 9/11 Commission's report, on the planning and execution of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, came from interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo and elsewhere.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld on June 28, 2004, pointed out that "The purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again." But detention operations also serve the key purpose of intelligence gathering. These are not competing interests but appropriate objectives which the United States may lawfully pursue.

We should emphasize that tens of thousands of men and women in uniform strive every day under austere and dangerous conditions to secure our freedom and the freedom of others. By historical standards, they rate as some of the best trained, disciplined and professional service men and women in our nation's history.

While any abuse is too much, we see signs that the Department of Defense is now on the path to dealing with the personal and professional failures and remedying the underlying causes of these abuses. We expect any potential future incidents of abuse will similarly be discovered and reported out of the same sense of personal honor and duty that characterized many of those who went out of their way to do so in most of these cases. The damage these incidents have done to U.S. policy, to the image of the U.S. among populations whose support we need in the Global War on Terror and to the morale of our armed forces, must not be repeated.

INTRODUCTION-CHARTER AND METHODOLOGY

The Secretary of Defense chartered the Independent Panel on May 12, 2004, to review Department of Defense (DoD) Detention Operations (see Appendix A). In his memorandum, the Secretary tasked the Independent Panel to review Department of Defense investigations on detention operations whether completed or ongoing, as well as other materials and information the Panel deemed relevant to its review. The Secretary asked for the Panel's independent advice in highlighting the issues considered most important for his attention. He asked for the Panel's views on the causes and contributing factors to problems in detainee operations and what corrective measures would be required.

Completed investigations reviewed by the Panel include the following:

• Joint Staff External Review of Intelligence Operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, September 28, 2002 (Custer Report)
• Joint Task Force Guantanamo assistance visit to Iraq to assess intelligence operations, September 5, 2003 (Miller Report)
• Army Provost Marshal General assessment of detention and corrections operations in Iraq, November 6, 2003 (Ryder Report)
• Administrative investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 (AR 15-6) regarding Abu Ghraib, June 8, 2004 (Taguba Report)
• Army Inspector General assessment of doctrine and training for detention operations, July 23, 2004 (Mikolashek Report)
• The Fay investigation of activities of military personnel at Abu Ghraib and related LTG Jones investigation under the direction of GEN Kern, August 16, 2004
• Naval Inspector General's review of detention procedures at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the Naval Consolidated Brig, Charleston, South Carolina (A briefing was presented to the Secretary of Defense on May 8, 2004.)
• Naval Inspector General's review of DoD worldwide interrogation operations, due for release on September 9, 2004
• Special Inspection of Detainee Operations and Facilities in the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan AOR (CFC-A), June 26, 2004 (Jacoby Report).
• Administrative Investigation ofAlleged Detainee Abuse by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force -- Arabian Peninsula (Formica Report) Due for release in August, 2004. Assessment not yet completed and not reviewed by the Independent Panel
• Army Reserve Command Inspector General Assessment of Military Intelligence and Military Police Training (due for release in December 2004)

Panel interviews of selected individuals either in person or via video-teleconference:

June 14, 2004:

• MG Keith Dayton, Director, Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Baghdad, Iraq
• MG Geoffrey Miller, Director, Detainee Operations, CJTF-7, Baghdad, Iraq
• Hon Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
• Hon Steve Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
• MG Walter Wojdakowski, Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, USAREUR and 7th Army
• MG Donald Ryder, Provost Marshal, U.S. Army/Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Washington, D.C.
• COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, V Corps, USAREUR and 7th Army

June 24, 2004:

• LTG David McKiernan, Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Coalition Forces Land Component Command
• MG Barbara Fast, CJTF-7 C-2, Director for Intelligence, Baghdad, Iraq
• MG Geoffrey Miller, Director, Detainee Operations, CJTF-7, Baghdad, Iraq
• LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General, CJTF-7, Commanding General, V Corps, USAREUR and 7th Army in Iraq
• Mr. Daniel Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, DoD
• LTG Keith Alexander, G-2, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.
• LTG William Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
• Hon Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

July 8, 2004:

• COL Marc Warren, Senior Legal Advisor to LTG Sanchez, Iraq
• BG Janis Karpinski, Commander (TPU), 800th Military Police Brigade, Uniondale, NY
• Hon Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Hon William Haynes, General Counsel DoD
• Mr. John Rizzo, CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel
• GEN John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command
• MG George Fay, Deputy to the Army G2, Washington, D.C.
• VADM Albert Church III, Naval Inspector General

July 22, 2004

• Hon Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

The Panel did not conduct a case-by-case review of individual abuse cases. This task has been accomplished by those professionals conducting criminal and commander-directed investigations. Many of these investigations are still on-going. The Panel did review the various completed and on-going reports covering the causes for the abuse. Each of these inquiries or inspections defined abuse, categorized the abuses, and analyzed the abuses in conformity with the appointing authorities' guidance, but the methodologies do not parallel each other in all respects. The Panel concludes, based on our review of other reports to date and our own efforts that causes for abuse have been adequately examined.

The Panel met on July 22nd and again on August 16th to discuss progress of the report. Panel members also reviewed sections and versions of the report through July and mid-August.

An effective, timely response to our requests for other documents and support was invariably forthcoming, due largely to the efforts of the DoD Detainee Task Force. We conducted reviews of multiple classified and unclassified documents generated by DoD and other sources.

Our staff has met and communicated with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and with the Human Rights Executive Directors' Coordinating Group.

It should be noted that information provided to the Panel was that available as of mid-August 2004. If additional information becomes available, the Panel's judgments might be revised.

THE CHANGING THREAT

The date September 11, 2001, marked an historic juncture in America's collective sense of security. On that day our presumption of invulnerability was irretrievably shattered. Over the last decade, the military has been called upon to establish and maintain the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, eject the Taliban from Afghanistan, defeat the Iraqi Army, and fight ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Elsewhere it has been called upon to confront geographically dispersed terrorists who would threaten America's right to political sovereignty and our right to live free of fear.

In waging the Global War on Terror, the military confronts a far wider range of threats. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces are fighting diverse enemies with varying ideologies, goals and capabilities. American soldiers and their coalition partners have defeated the armored divisions of the Republican Guard, but are still under attack by forces using automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, roadside bombs and surface-to-air missiles. We are not simply fighting the remnants of dying regimes or opponents of the local governments and coalition forces assisting those governments, but multiple enemies including indigenous and international terrorists. This complex operational environment requires soldiers capable of conducting traditional stability operations associated with peacekeeping tasks one moment and fighting force-on-force engagements normally associated with war-fighting the next moment.

Warfare under the conditions described inevitably generates detainees -- enemy combatants, opportunists, trouble-makers, saboteurs, common criminals, former regime officials and some innocents as well. These people must be carefully but humanely processed to sort out those who remain dangerous or possess militarily-valuable intelligence. Such processing presents extraordinarily formidable logistical, administrative, security and legal problems completely apart from the technical obstacles posed by communicating with prisoners in another language and extracting actionable intelligence from them in timely fashion. These activities, called detention operations, are a vital part of an expeditionary army's responsibility, but they depend upon training, skills, and attributes not normally associated with soldiers in combat units.

Military interrogators and military police, assisted by front-line tactical units, found themselves engaged in detention operations with detention procedures still steeped in the methods of World War II and the Cold War, when those we expected to capture on the battlefield were generally a homogenous group of enemy soldiers. Yet this is a new form of war, not at all like Desert Storm nor even analogous to Vietnam or Korea.

General Abizaid himself best articulated the current nature of combat in testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on May19, 2004:

Our enemies are in a unique position, and they are a unique brand of ideological extremists whose vision of the world is best summed up by how the Taliban ran Afghanistan. If they can outlast us in Afghanistan and undermine the legitimate government there, they'll once again fill up the seats at the soccer stadium and force people to watch executions. If, in Iraq, the culture of intimidation practiced by our enemies is allowed to win, the mass graves will fill again. Our enemies kill without remorse, they challenge our will through the careful manipulation of propaganda and information, they seek safe havens in order to develop weapons of mass destruction that they will use against us when they are ready. Their targets are not Kabul and Baghdad, but places like Madrid and London and New York. While we can't be defeated militarily, we're not going to win this thing militarily alone. ... As we fight this most unconventional war of this new century, we must be patient and courageous.


In Iraq the U.S. commanders were slow to recognize and adapt to the insurgency that erupted in the summer and fall of 2003. Military police and interrogators who had previous experience in the Balkans, Guantanamo and Afghanistan found themselves, along with increasing numbers of less-experienced troops, in the midst of detention operations in Iraq the likes of which the Department of Defense had not foreseen. As Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) began detaining thousands of Iraqis suspected of involvement in or having knowledge of the insurgency, the problem quickly surpassed the capacity of the staff to deal with and the wherewithal to contain it.

Line units conducting raids found themselves seizing specifically targeted persons, so designated by military intelligence; but, lacking interrogators and interpreters to make precise distinctions in an alien culture and hostile neighborhoods, they reverted to rounding up any and all suspicious-looking persons -- all too often including women and children. The flood of incoming detainees contrasted sharply with the trickle of released individuals. Processing was overwhelmed. Some detainees at Abu Ghraib had been held 90 days before being interrogated for the first time.

Many interrogators, already in short supply from major reductions during the post-Cold War drawdown, by this time, were on their second or third combat tour. Unit cohesion and morale were largely absent as under-strength companies and battalions from across the United States and Germany were deployed piecemeal and stitched together in a losing race to keep up with the rapid influx of vast numbers of detainees.

As the insurgency reached an initial peak in the fall of 2003, many military policemen from the Reserves who had been activated shortly after September 11, 2001 had reached the mandatory two-year limit on their mobilization time. Consequently, the ranks of soldiers having custody of detainees in Iraq fell to about half strength as MPs were ordered home by higher headquarters.

Some individuals seized the opportunity provided by this environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges. Moreover, many well-intentioned professionals, attempting to resolve the inherent moral conflict between using harsh techniques to gain information to save lives and treating detainees humanely, found themselves in uncharted ethical ground, with frequently changing guidance from above. Some stepped over the line of humane treatment accidentally; some did so knowingly. Some of the abusers believed other governmental agencies were conducting interrogations using harsher techniques than allowed by the Army Field Manual 34-52, a perception leading to the belief that such methods were condoned. In nearly 10 percent of the cases of alleged abuse, the chain of command ignored reports of those allegations. More than once a commander was complicit.

The requirements for successful detainee operations following major combat operations were known by U.S. forces in Iraq. After Operations Enduring Freedom and earlier phases of Iraqi Freedom, several lessons learned were captured in official reviews and were available on-line to any authorized military user. These lessons included the need for doctrine tailored to enable police and interrogators to work together effectively; the need for keeping MP and MI units manned at levels sufficient to the task; and the need for MP and MI units to belong to the same tactical command. However, there is no evidence that those responsible for planning and executing detainee operations, in the phase of the Iraq campaign following the major combat operations, availed themselves of these "lessons learned" in a timely fashion.

Judged in a broader context, U.S. detention operations were both traditional and new. They were traditional in that detainee operations were a part of all past conflicts. They were new in that the Global War on Terror and the insurgency we are facing in Iraq present a much more complicated detainee population.

Many of America's enemies, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have the ability to conduct this new kind of warfare, often referred to as "asymmetric" warfare. Asymmetric warfare can be viewed as attempts to circumvent or undermine a superior, conventional strength, while exploiting its weaknesses using methods the superior force neither can defeat nor resort to itself. Small unconventional forces can violate a state's security without any state support or affiliation whatsoever. For this reason, many terms in the orthodox lexicon of war-e.g., state sovereignty, national borders, uniformed combatants, declarations of war, and even war itself, are not terms terrorists acknowledge.

Today, the power to wage war can rest in the hands of a few dozen highly motivated people with cell phones and access to the Internet. Going beyond simply terrorizing individual civilians, certain insurgent and terrorist organizations represent a higher level of threat, characterized by an ability and willingness to violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of sovereign nations.

Essential to defeating terrorist and insurgent threats is the ability to locate cells, kill or detain key leaders, and interdict operational and financial networks. However, the smallness and wide dispersal of these enemy assets make it problematic to focus on signal and imagery intelligence as we did in the Cold War, Desert Storm, and the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The ability of terrorists and insurgents to blend into the civilian population further decreases their vulnerability to signal and imagery intelligence. Thus, information gained from human sources, whether by spying or interrogation, is essential in narrowing the field upon which other intelligence gathering resources may be applied. In sum, human intelligence is absolutely necessary, not just to fill these gaps in information derived from other sources, but also to provide clues and leads for the other sources to exploit.

Military police functions must also adapt to this new kind of warfare. In addition to organizing more units capable of handling theater-level detention operations, we must also organize those units, so they are able to deal with the heightened threat environment. In this new form of warfare, the distinction between front and rear becomes more fluid. All forces must continuously prepare for combat operations.

THE POLICY PROMULGATION PROCESS

Although there were a number of contributing causes for detainee abuses, policy processes were inadequate or deficient in certain respects at various levels: Department of Defense (DoD), CENTCOM, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), CJTF-7, and the individual holding facility or prison. In pursuing the question of the extent to which policy processes at the DoD or national level contributed to abuses, it is important to begin with policy development as individuals in Afghanistan were first being detained in November 2001. The first detainees arrived at Guantanamo in January 2002.

In early 2002, a debate was ongoing in Washington on the application of treaties and laws to al Qaeda and Taliban. The Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) advised DoD General Counsel and the Counsel to the President that, among other things:

• Neither the Federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions would apply to the detention conditions of al Qaeda prisoners,
• The President had the authority to suspend the United States treaty obligations applying to Afghanistan for the duration of the conflict should he determine Afghanistan to be a failed state,
• The President could find that the Taliban did not qualify for Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) status under Geneva Convention III.

The Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, in part relying on the opinions of OLC, advised the President to determine the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Panel understands DoD General Counsel's position was consistent with the Attorney General's and the Counsel to the President's position. Earlier, the Department of State had argued that the Geneva Conventions in their traditional application provided a sufficiently robust legal construct under which the Global War on Terror could effectively be waged.

The Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and many service lawyers agreed with the State Department's initial position. They were concerned that to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with past practice and policy, jeopardize the United States armed forces personnel, and undermine the United States military culture which is based on a strict adherence to the law of war. At the February 4, 2002 National Security Council meeting to decide this issue, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that all detainees would get the treatment they are (or would be) entitled to under the Geneva Conventions.

On February 7, 2002, the President issued his decision memorandum (see Appendix B). The memorandum stated the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and therefore they were not entitled to prisoner of war status. It also stated the Geneva Conventions did apply to the Taliban but the Taliban combatants were not entitled to prisoner of war status as a result of their failure to conduct themselves in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The President's memorandum also stated: "As a matter of policy, United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

Regarding the applicability of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment, the OLC opined on August 1, 2002 that interrogation methods that comply with the relevant domestic law do not violate the Convention. It held that only the most extreme acts, that were specifically intended to inflict severe pain and torture, would be in violation; lesser acts might be "cruel, inhumane, or degrading" but would not violate the Convention Against Torture or domestic statutes. The OLC memorandum went on to say, as Commander in Chief exercising his wartime powers, the President could even authorize torture, if he so decided.

Reacting to tenacious resistance by some detainees to existing interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army Field Manual 34-52 (see Appendix E), Guantanamo authorities in October 2002 requested approval of strengthened counterinterrogation techniques to increase the intelligence yield from interrogations. This request was accompanied by a recommended tiered list of techniques, with the proviso that the harsher Category III methods (see Appendix E) could be used only on "exceptionally resistant detainees" and with approval by higher headquarters.

This Guantanamo initiative resulted in a December 2, 2002 decision by the Secretary of Defense authorizing, "as a matter of policy," the use of Categories I and II and only one technique in Category III: mild, non-injurious physical contact (see Appendix E). As a result of concern by the Navy General Counsel, the Secretary of Defense rescinded his December approval of all Category II techniques plus the one from Category III on January 15, 2003. This essentially returned interrogation techniques to FM 34-52 guidance. He also stated if any of the methods from Categories II and III were deemed warranted, permission for their use should be requested from him (see Appendix E).

The Secretary of Defense directed the DoD General Counsel to establish a working group to study interrogation techniques. The working group was headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker and included wide membership from across the military, legal and intelligence communities. The working group also relied heavily on the OLC. The working group reviewed 35 techniques, and after a very expansive debate, ultimately recommended 24 to the Secretary of Defense. The study led to the Secretary's promulgation on April 16, 2003 of the list of approved techniques. His memorandum emphasized appropriate safeguards should be in place and, further, "Use of these techniques is limited to interrogations of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." He also stipulated that four of the techniques should be used only in case of military necessity and that he should be so notified in advance. If additional techniques were deemed essential, they should be requested in writing, with "recommended safeguards and rationale for applying with an identified detainee."

In the initial development of these Secretary of Defense policies, the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates and General Counsels were not utilized to their fullest potential. Had the Secretary of Defense had the benefit of a wider range of legal opinions and a more robust debate regarding detainee policies and operations, his policy of April 16, 2003 might well have been developed and issued in early December 2002. This could have avoided the policy changes which characterized the December 2, 2002 to April 16, 2003 period.

It is clear that pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in stronger interrogation techniques. They did contribute to a belief that stronger interrogation methods were needed and appropriate in their treatment of detainees. At Guantanamo, the interrogators used those additional techniques with only two detainees, gaining important and time urgent information in the process.

In Afghanistan, from the war's inception through the end of 2002, all forces used FM 34-52 as a baseline for interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, more aggressive interrogation of detainees appears to have been ongoing. On January 24, 2003, in response to a data call from the Joint Staff to facilitate the Secretary of Defense-directed Working Group efforts, the Commander Joint Task Force-180 forwarded a list of techniques being used in Afghanistan, including some not explicitly set out in FM 34-52. These techniques were included in a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Standard Operating Procedures document published in February 2003. The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, a Company of which was later sent to Iraq, assisted in interrogations in support of SOF and was fully aware of their interrogation techniques.

In Iraq, the operational order from CENTCOM provided the standard FM 34-52 interrogation procedures would be used. Given the greatly different situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not surprising there were differing CENTCOM policies for the two countries. In light of ongoing hostilities that monopolized commanders' attention in Iraq, it is also not unexpected the detainee issues were not given a higher priority.

Interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq. During July and August 2003, a Company of the 519th MI Battalion was sent to the Abu Ghraib detention facility to conduct interrogation operations. Absent guidance other than FM 34-52, the officer in charge prepared draft interrogation guidelines that were a near copy of the Standard Operating Procedure created by SOF. It is important to note that techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated and were not adequately safeguarded.

In August 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller arrived to conduct an assessment of DoD counterterrorism interrogation and detention operations in Iraq. He was to discuss current theater ability to exploit internees rapidly for actionable intelligence. He brought to Iraq the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 policy guidelines for Guantanamo -- which he reportedly gave to CJTF-7 as a potential model -- recommending a command-wide policy be established. He noted, however, the Geneva Conventions did apply to Iraq. In addition to these various printed sources, there was also a store of common lore and practice within the interrogator community circulating through Guantanamo, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

At the operational level, in the absence of more specific guidance from CENTCOM, interrogators in Iraq relied on FM 34-52 and on unauthorized techniques that had migrated from Afghanistan. On September 14, 2003, Commander CJTF-7 signed the theater's first policy on interrogation which contained elements of the approved Guantanamo policy and elements of the SOF policy. Policies approved for use on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees who were not afforded the protection of EPW status under the Geneva Conventions now applied to detainees who did fall under the Geneva Convention protections. CENTCOM disapproved the September 14, 2003 policy resulting in another policy signed on October 12, 2003 which essentially mirrored the outdated 1987 version of the FM 34-52. The 1987 version, however, authorized interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation, ''to include lighting and heating, as well as food, clothing, and shelter given to detainees." This was specifically left out of the 1992 version, which is currently in use. This clearly led to confusion on what practices were acceptable. We cannot be sure how much the number and severity of abuses would have been curtailed had there been early and consistent guidance from higher levels. Nonetheless, such guidance was needed and likely would have had a limiting effect.

At Abu Ghraib, the Jones/Fay investigation concluded that MI professionals at the prison level shared a "major part of the culpability" for the abuses. Some of the abuses occurred during interrogation. As these interrogation techniques' exceeded parameters of FM 34-52, no training had been developed. Absent training, the interrogators used their own initiative to implement the new techniques. To what extent the same situation existed at other prisons is unclear, but the widespread nature of abuses warrants an assumption that at least the understanding of interrogations policies was inadequate. A host of other possible contributing factors, such as training, leadership, and the generally chaotic situation in the prisons, are addressed elsewhere in this report.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 2 OF 4 (The Schlesinger Report)

PUBLIC RELEASE OF ABUSE PHOTOS

In any large bureaucracy, good news travels up the chain of command quickly; bad news generally does not. In the case of the abuse photos from Abu Ghraib, concerns about command influence on an ongoing investigation may have impeded notification to senior officials.

Chronology of Events

On January 13, 2004, SPC Darby gave Army criminal investigators a copy of a CD containing abuse photos he had taken from SPC Graner's computer. CJTF-7, CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense were all informed of the issue. LTG Sanchez promptly asked for an outside investigation, and MG Taguba was appointed as the investigating officer. The officials who saw the photos on January 14, 2004, not realizing their likely significance, did not recommend the photos be shown to more senior officials. A CENTCOM press release in Baghdad on January 16, 2004 announced there was an ongoing investigation into reported incidents of detainee abuse at a Coalition Forces detention facility.

An interim report of the investigation was provided to CJTF-7 and CENTCOM commanders in mid-March 2004. It is unclear whether they saw the Abu Ghraib photos, but their impact was not appreciated by either of these officers or their staff officers who may have seen the photographs, as indicated by the failure to transmit them in a timely fashion to more senior officials. When LTG Sanchez received the Taguba report, he immediately requested an investigation into the possible involvement of military intelligence personnel. He told the panel that he did not request the photos be disseminated beyond the criminal investigative process because commanders are prohibited from interfering with, or influencing, active investigations. In mid-April, LTG McKiernan, the appointing official, reported the investigative results through his chain of command to the Department of the Army, the Army Judge Advocate General, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command. LTG McKiernan advised the panel that he did not send a copy of the report to the Secretary of Defense, but forwarded it through his chain of command. Again the reluctance to move bad news farther up the chain of command probably was a factor impeding notification of the Secretary of Defense.

Given this situation, GEN Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unprepared in April 2004 when he learned the photos of detainee abuse were to be aired in a CBS broadcast. The planned release coincided with particularly intense fighting by Coalition forces in Fallujah and Najaf. After a discussion with GEN Abizaid, GEN Myers asked CBS to delay the broadcast out of concern the lives of the Coalition soldiers and the hostages in Iraq would be further endangered. The story of the abuse itself was already public. Nonetheless, both GEN Abizaid and GEN Myers understood the pictures would have an especially explosive impact around the world.

Informing Senior Officials

Given the magnitude of this problem, the Secretary of Defense and other senior DoD officials need a more effective information pipeline to inform them of high-profile incidents which may have a significant adverse impact on DoD operations. Had such a pipeline existed, it could have provided an accessible and efficient tool for field commanders to apprise higher headquarters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, of actual or developing situations which might hinder, impede, or undermine U.S. operations and initiatives. Such a system could have equipped senior spokesmen with the known facts of the situation from all DoD elements involved. Finally, it would have allowed for senior official preparation and Congressional notification.

Such a procedure would make it possible for a field-level command or staff agency to alert others of the situation and forward the information to senior officials. This would not have been an unprecedented occurrence. For example, in December 2002, concerned Naval Criminal Investigative Service agents drew attention to the potential for abuse at Guantanamo. Those individuals had direct access to the highest levels of leadership and were able to get that information to senior levels without encumbrance. While a corresponding flow of information might not have prevented the abuses from occurring, the Office of the Secretary of Defense would have been alerted to a festering issue, allowing for an early and appropriate response.

Another example is the Air Force Executive Issues Team. This office has fulfilled the special information pipeline function for the Air Force since February 1998. The team chief and team members are highly trained and experienced field grade officers drawn from a variety of duty assignments. The team members have access to information flow across all levels of command and staff and are continually engaging and building contacts to facilitate the information flow. The information flow to the team runs parallel and complementary to standard reporting channels in order to avoid bypassing the chain of command but yet ensures a rapid and direct flow of relevant information to Air Force Headquarters.

A proper, transparent posture in getting the facts and fixing the problem would have better enabled the DoD to deal with the damage to the mission of the U.S. in the region and to the reputation of the U.S. military.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

Although the most egregious instances. of detainee abuse were caused by the aberrant behavior of a limited number of soldiers and the predilections of the non-commissioned officers on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib, the Independent Panel finds that commanding officers and their staffs at various levels failed in their duties and that such failures contributed directly or indirectly to detainee abuse. Commanders are responsible for all their units do or fail to do, and should be held accountable for their action or inaction. Command failures were compounded by poor advice provided by staff officers with responsibility for overseeing battlefield functions related to detention and interrogation operations. Military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility.

Commanders

The Panel finds that the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib. There were serious lapses of leadership in both units from junior non-commissioned officers to battalion and brigade levels. The commanders of both brigades either knew, or should have known, abuses were taking place and taken measures to prevent them. The Panel finds no evidence that organizations above the 800th MP Brigade -- or the 205th MI Brigade -- level were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib. Accordingly, the Panel concurs in the judgment and recommendations of MG Taguba, MG Fay, LTG Jones, LTG Sanchez, LTG McKiernan, General Abizaid and General Kern regarding the commanders of these two units. The Panel expects disciplinary action may be forthcoming.

The Independent Panel concurs with the findings of MG Taguba regarding the Director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (NDC) at Abu Ghraib. Specifically, the Panel notes that MG Taguba concluded that the Director, NDC made material misrepresentations to MG Taguba's investigating team. The panel finds that he failed to properly train and control his soldiers and failed to ensure prisoners were afforded the protections under the relevant Geneva Conventions. The Panel concurs with MG Taguba's recommendation that he be relieved for cause and given a letter of reprimand and notes that disciplinary action may be pending against this officer.

The Independent Panel concurs with the findings of MG Taguba regarding the Commander of the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib. Specifically, the Panel finds that he failed to ensure that his subordinates were properly trained and supervised and that he failed to establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency and accountability. He was not able to organize tasks to accomplish his mission in an appropriate manner. By not communicating standards, policies and plans to soldiers, he conveyed a sense of tacit approval of abusive behavior towards prisoners and a lax and dysfunctional command climate took hold. The Panel concurs with MG Taguba's recommendation that he be relieved from command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 promotion list.

The Independent Panel finds that BG Karpinski's leadership failures helped set the conditions at the prison which led to the abuses, including her failure to establish appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs) and to ensure the relevant Geneva Conventions protections were afforded prisoners, as well as her failure to take appropriate actions regarding ineffective commanders and staff officers. The Panel notes the conclusion of MG Taguba that she made material misrepresentations to his investigating team regarding the frequency of her visits to Abu Ghraib. The Panel concurs with MG Taguba's recommendation that BG Karpinski be relieved of command and given a General Officer Letter of Reprimand.

Although LTG Sanchez had tasks more urgent than dealing personally with command and resource deficiencies and allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib, he should have ensured his staff dealt with the command and resource problems. He should have assured that urgent demands were placed for appropriate support and resources through Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and CENTCOM to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was responsible for establishing the confused command relationship at the Abu Ghraib prison. There was no clear delineation of command responsibilities between the 320th MP Battalion and the 205th MI Brigade. The situation was exacerbated by CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on November 19, 2003 that appointed the commander of the 205th MI Brigade as the base commander for Abu Ghraib, including responsibility for the support of all MPs assigned to the prison. In addition to being contrary to existing doctrine, there is no evidence the details of this command relationship were effectively coordinated or implemented by the leaders at Abu Ghraib. The unclear chain of command established by CJTF-7, combined with the poor leadership and lack of supervision, contributed to the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib that allowed the abuses to take place.

The unclear command structure at Abu Ghraib was further exacerbated by the confused command relationship up the chain. The 800th MP Brigade was initially assigned to the Central Command's Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) during the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When CFLCC left the theater and returned to Fort McPherson Georgia, CENTCOM established Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7). While the 800th MP Brigade remained assigned to CFLCC, it essentially worked for CJTF-7. LTG Sanchez delegated responsibility for detention operations to his Deputy, MG Wojdakowski. At the same time, intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib reported through the CJTF-7 C-2, Director for Intelligence. These arrangements had the damaging result that no single individual was responsible for overseeing operations at the prison.

The Panel endorses the disciplinary actions already taken, although we believe LTG Sanchez should have taken more forceful action in November when he fully comprehended the depth of the leadership problems at Abu Ghraib. His apparent attempt to mentor BG Karpinski, though well-intended, was insufficient in a combat zone in the midst of a serious and growing insurgency.

The creation of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib was not an unusual organizational approach. The problem is, as the Army Inspector General assessment revealed, joint doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations contains inconsistent guidance, particularly with regard to addressing the issue of the appropriate command relationships governing the operation of such organizations as a JIDC. Based on the findings of the Fay, Jones and Church investigations, SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM were able to develop effective command relationships for such centers at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan, but CENTCOM and CJTF-7 failed to do so for the JIDC at Abu Ghraib.

Staff Officers

While staff officers have no command responsibilities, they are responsible for providing oversight, advice and counsel to their commanders. Staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations for CJTF-7 was dispersed among the principal and special staff. The lack of one person on the staff to oversee detention operations and facilities complicated effective and efficient coordination among the staff.

The Panel finds the following:

• The CJTF-7 Deputy Commander failed to initiate action to request additional military police for detention operations after it became clear that there were insufficient assets in Iraq.
• The CJTF-7 C-2, Director for Intelligence failed to advise the commander properly on directives and policies needed for the operation of the JIDC, for interrogation techniques and for appropriately monitoring the activities of Other Government Agencies (OGAs) within the Joint Area of Operations.
• The CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate failed to initiate an appropriate response to the November 2003 ICRC report on the conditions at Abu Ghraib.

Failure of the Combatant Command to Adjust the Plan

Once it became clear in July 2003 there was a major insurgency growing in Iraq and the relatively benign environment projected for Iraq was not materializing, senior leaders should have adjusted the plan from what had been assumed to be a stability operation and a benign hand-off of detention operations to the Iraqis. If commanders and staffs at the operational level had been more adaptive in the face of changing conditions, a different approach to detention operations could have been developed by October 2003, as difficulties with the basic plan were readily apparent by that time. Responsible leaders who could have set in motion the development of a more effective alternative course of action extend up the command chain (and staff), to include the Director for Operations, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7); Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7; Commander CJTF-7; Deputy Commander for Support, CFLCC; Commander, CFLCC; Director for Operations, Central Command (CENTCOM); Commander, CENTCOM; Director for Operations, Joint Staff; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In most cases these were errors of omission, but they were errors that should not go unnoted.

There was ample evidence in both Joint and Army lessons learned that planning for detention operations for Iraq required alternatives to standard doctrinal approaches. Reports from experiences in Operation Enduring Freedom and at Guantanamo had already recognized the inadequacy of current doctrine for the detention mission and the need for augmentation of both MP and MI units with experienced confinement officers and interrogators. Previous experience also supported the likelihood that detainee population numbers would grow beyond planning estimates. The relationship between MP and MI personnel in the conduct of interrogations also demanded close, continuous coordination rather than remaining compartmentalized. "Lessons learned" also reported the value of establishing a clear chain of command subordinating MP and MI to a Joint Task Force or Brigade Commander. This commander would be in charge of all aspects of both detention and interrogations just as tactical combat forces are subordinated to a single commander. The planners had only to search the lessons learned databases (available on-line in military networks) to find these planning insights. Nevertheless, CENTCOM's October 2002 planning annex for detention operations reflected a traditional doctrinal methodology.

The change in the character of the struggle signaled by the sudden spike in U.S. casualties in June, July and August 2003 should have prompted consideration of the need for additional MP assets. GEN Abizaid himself signaled a change in operations when he publicly declared in July that CENTCOM was now dealing with a growing "insurgency," a term government officials had previously avoided in characterizing the war. Certainly by October and November when the fighting reached a new peak, commanders and staffs from CJTF-7 all the way to CENTCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew by then the serious deficiencies of the 800th MP Brigade and should have at least considered reinforcing the troops for detention operations. Reservists, some of whom had been first mobilized shortly after September 11, 2001, began reaching a two-year mobilization commitment, which, by law, mandated their redeployment and deactivation.

There was not much the 800th MP Brigade (an Army Reserve unit), could do to delay the loss of those soldiers, and there was no individual replacement system or a unit replacement plan. The MP Brigade was totally dependent on higher headquarters to initiate action to alleviate the personnel crisis. The brigade was duly reporting readiness shortfalls through appropriate channels. However, its commanding general was emphasizing these shortfalls in personal communications with CJTF-7 commanders and staff as opposed to CFLCC. Since the brigade was assigned to CFLCC, but under the Tactical Control (TACON) ofCJTF-7, her communications should been with CFLCC. The response from CJTF-7's Commander and Deputy Commander was that the 800th MP Brigade had sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission and that it needed to reallocate its available soldiers among the dozen or more detention facilities it was operating in Iraq. However, the Panel found the further deterioration in the readiness condition of the brigade should have been recognized by CFLCC and CENTCOM by late summer 2003. This led the Panel to conclude that CJTF-7, CFLCC and CENTCOM failure to request additional forces was an avoidable error.

The Joint Staff recognized intelligence collection from detainees in Iraq needed improvement. This was their rationale for sending MG Miller from Guantanamo to assist CJTF-7 with interrogation operations. However, the Joint Staff was not paying sufficient attention to evidence of broader readiness issues associated with both MP and MI resources.

We note that CJTF-7 Headquarters was never fully resourced to meet the size and complexity of its mission. The Joint Staff, CJTF-7 and CENTCOM took too long to finalize the Joint Manning Document (JMD) which was not finally approved until December 2003-six months into the insurgency. At one point, CJTF-7 Headquarters had only 495 of the 1,400 personnel authorized. The command was burdened with additional complexities associated with its mission to support the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Finally, the Joint Staff failed to recognize the implications of the deteriorating manning levels in the 800th MP Brigade; the absence of combat equipment among detention elements of MP units operating in a combat zone; and the indications of deteriorating mission performance among military intelligence interrogators owing to the stress of repeated combat deployments.

When CJTF-7 did realize the magnitude of the detention problem, it requested an assistance visit by the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Ryder. There seemed to be some misunderstanding of the CJTF-7 intent, however, since MG Ryder viewed his visit primarily as an assessment of how to transfer the detention program to the Iraqi prison system.

In retrospect, several options for addressing the detention operations challenge were available. CJTF-7 could have requested a change in command relationships to place the 800th MP Brigade under Operational Control of CJTF-7 rather than Tactical Control. This would have permitted the Commander ofCJTF-7 to reallocate tactical assets under his control to the detention mission. While other Military Police units in Iraq were already fully committed to higher-priority combat and combat support missions, such as convoy escort, there were non-MP units that could have been reassigned to help in the conduct of detention operations. For example, an artillery brigade was tasked to operate the CJTF-7 Joint Visitors Center in Baghdad. A similar tasking could have provided additional troop strength to assist the 800th MP Brigade at Abu Ghraib. Such a shift would have supplied valuable experienced sergeants, captains and lieutenant colonels sorely lacking in both the MI and MP units at Abu Ghraib. A similar effect could have been achieved by CENTCOM assigning USMC, Navy and Air Force MP and security units to operational control ofCJTF-7 for the detention operations mission.

Mobilization and deployment of additional forces from CONUS was also a feasible option. A system is in place for commands such as CJTF-7, CFLCC, and CENTCOM to submit a formal Request for Forces (RFF). Earlier, CJTF-7 had submitted a RFF for an additional Judge Advocate organization, but CENTCOM would not forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps this experience made CJTF-7 reluctant to submit a RFF for MP units, but there is no evidence that any of the responsible officers considered any option other than the response given to BG Karpinski to "wear her stars" and reallocate personnel among her already over-stretched units.

While it is the responsibility of the JCS and services to provide adequate numbers of appropriately trained personnel for missions such as the detention operations in Iraq, it is the responsibility of the combatant commander to organize those forces in a manner to achieve mission success. The U.S. experience in the conduct of post-conflict stability operations has been limited, but the impact of our failure to conduct proper detainee operations in this case has been significant. Combatant commanders and their subordinates must organize in a manner that affords unity of command, ensuring commanders work for commanders and not staff.

The fact that the detention operation mission for all of Iraq is now commanded by a 2-star general who reports directly to the operational commander, and that 1,900 MPs, more appropriately equipped for combat, now perform the mission once assigned to a single under-strength, poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and weakly-led brigade, indicate more robust options should have been considered sooner.

Finally, the panel notes the failure to report the abuses up the chain of command in a timely manner with adequate urgency. The abuses at Abu Ghraib were known and under investigation as early as January 2004. However, the gravity of the abuses was not conveyed up the chain of command to the Secretary of Defense. The Taguba report, including the photographs, was completed in March 2004. This report was transmitted to LTG Sanchez and GEN Abizaid; however, it is unclear whether they ever saw the Abu Ghraib photos. GEN Myers has stated he knew of the existence of the photos as early as January 2004. Although the knowledge of the investigation into Abu Ghraib was widely known, as we noted in the previous section, the impact of the photos was not appreciated by any of these officers as indicated by the failure to transmit them in a timely fashion to officials at the Department of Defense. (See Appendix A for the names of persons associated with the positions cited in this section.)

MILITARY POLICE AND DETENTION OPERATIONS

In Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanders should have paid greater attention to the relationship between detainees and military operations. The current doctrine and procedures for detaining personnel are inadequate to meet the requirements of these conflicts. Due to the vastly different circumstances in these conflicts, it should not be surprising there were deficiencies in the projected needs for military police forces. All the investigations the Panel reviewed highlight the urgency to augment the prior way of conducting detention operations. In particular, the military police were not trained, organized, or equipped to meet the new challenges.

The Army IG found morale was high and command climate was good throughout forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan with one noticeable exception. Soldiers conducting detainee operations in remote or dangerous locations, complained of very poor morale and command climate due to the lack of higher command involvement and support and the perception that their leaders did not care. At Abu Ghraib, in particular, there were many serious problems, which could have been avoided, if proper guidance, oversight and leadership had been provided.

Mobilization and Training

Mobilization and training inadequacies for the MP units occurred during the various phases of employment, beginning with peacetime training, activation, arrival at the mobilization site, deployment, arrival in theater and follow-on operations.

Mobilization and Deployment

Problems generally began for the MP units upon arrival at the mobilization sites. As one commander stated, "Anything that could go wrong went wrong." Preparation was not consistently applied to all deploying units, wasting time and duplicating efforts already accomplished. Troops were separated from their equipment for excessive periods of time. The flow of equipment and personnel was not coordinated. The Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade indicated the biggest problem was getting MPs and their equipment deployed together. The unit could neither train at its stateside mobilization site without its equipment nor upon arrival overseas, as two or three weeks could go by before joining with its equipment. This resulted in assigning equipment and troops in an ad hoc manner with no regard to original unit. It also resulted in assigning certain companies that had not trained together in peacetime to battalion headquarters. The flow of forces into theater was originally planned and assigned on the basis of the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). The TPFDL was soon scrapped, however, in favor of individual unit deployment orders assigned by U.S. Army Forces Command based on unit readiness and personnel strength. MP Brigade commanders did not know who would be deployed next. This method resulted in a condition wherein a recently arrived battalion headquarters would be assigned the next arriving MP companies, regardless of their capabilities or any other prior command and training relationships.

Original projections called for approximately 12 detention facilities with a projection of 30,000 to 100,000 enemy prisoners of war. These large projections did not materialize. In fact, the initial commanding general of the 800th MP brigade, BG Hill, stated he had more than enough MPs designated for the Internment/Resettlement (I/R-hereafter called detention) mission at the end of the combat phase in Iraq. This assessment radically changed following the major combat phase, when the 800th moved to Baghdad beginning in the summer of 2003 to assume the detention mission. The brigade was given additional tasks assisting the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in reconstructing the Iraqi corrections system, a mission they had neither planned for nor anticipated.

Inadequate Training for the Military Police Mission

Though some elements performed better than others, generally training was inadequate. The MP detention units did not receive detention-specific training during their mobilization period, which was a critical deficiency. Detention training was conducted for only two MP detention battalions, one in Afghanistan and elements of the other at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The 800th MP Brigade, prior to deployment, had planned for a major detention exercise during the summer of 2002; however, this was cancelled due to the activation of many individuals and units for Operation Noble Eagle following the September 11, 2001 attack. The Deputy Commander of one MP brigade stated "training at the mobilization site was wholly inadequate." In addition, there was no theater-specific training.

The Army Inspector General's investigators also found that training at the mobilization sites failed to prepare units for conducting detention operations. Leaders of inspected reserve units stated in interviews that they did not receive a clear mission statement prior to mobilization and were not notified of their mission until after deploying. Personnel interviewed described being placed immediately in stressful situations in a detention facility with thousands of non-compliant detainees and not being trained to handle them. Units arriving in theater were given just a few days to conduct a handover from the outgoing units. Once deployed, these newly arrived units had difficulty gaining access to the necessary documentation on tactics, techniques, and procedures to train their personnel on the MP essential tasks of their new mission. A prime example is that relevant Army manuals and publications were available only on-line, but personnel did not have access to computers or the Internet.

Force Structure Organization

The current military police organizational structure does not address the detention mission on the nonlinear battlefield characteristic of the Global War on Terror.

Current Military Police Structure

The present U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard system worked well for the 1991 Gulf War for which large numbers of reserve forces were mobilized, were deployed, fought, and were quickly returned to the United States. These forces, however, were not designed to maintain large numbers of troops at a high operational tempo for a long period of deployment as has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Comments from commanders and the various inspection reports indicated the current force structure for the MPs is neither flexible enough to support the developing mission, nor can it provide for the sustained detainee operations envisioned for the future. The primary reason is that the present structure lacks sufficient numbers of detention specialists. Currently, the Army active component detention specialists are assigned in support of the Disciplinary Barracks and Regional Correctional Facilities in the United States, all of which are non-deployable.

New Force Structure Initiatives

Significant efforts are currently being made to shift more of the MP detention requirements into the active force structure. The Army's force design for the future will standardize detention forces between active and reserve components and provide the capability for the active component to immediately deploy detention companies.

The Panel notes that the Mikolashek inspection found significant shortfalls in training and force structure for field sanitation, preventive medicine and medical treatment requirements for detainees.

Doctrine and Planning

Initial planning envisaged a conflict mirroring operation Desert Storm; approximately 100,000 enemy prisoners of war were forecast for the first five days of the conflict. This expectation did not materialize in the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a result, there were too many MP detention companies. The reverse occurred in the second phase of Iraqi Freedom, where the plan envisaged a reduced number of detention MPs on the assumption the initial large numbers of enemy prisoners of war would already have been processed out of the detention facilities. The result was that combat MPs were ultimately reassigned to an unplanned detention mission.

The doctrine of yesterday's battlefield does not satisfy the requirements of today's conflicts. Current doctrine assumes a linear battlefield and is very clear for the handling of detainees from the point of capture to the holding areas and eventually to the detention facilities in the rear. However, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, both occurring where there is no distinction between front and rear areas, forced organizations to adapt tactics and procedures to address the resulting voids. Organizations initially used standard operating procedures for collection points and detention facilities. These procedures do not fit the new environment, generally because there are no safe areas behind "friendly lines" -- there are no friendly lines. The inapplicability of current doctrine had a negative effect on accountability, security, safeguarding of detainees, and intelligence exploitation. Instead of capturing and rapidly moving detainees to secure collection points as prescribed by doctrine, units tended to retain the detainees and attempted to exploit their tactical intelligence value without the required training or infrastructure.

Current doctrine specifies that line combat units hold detainees no longer than 12 - 24 hours to extract immediately useful intelligence. Nonetheless, the Army IG inspection found detainees were routinely held up to 72 hours. For corps collection points, doctrine specifies detainees be held no longer than three days; the Army IG found detainees were held from 30 to 45 days.

Equipment Shortfalls

The current force structure for MP detention organizations does not provide sufficient assets to meet the inherent force protection requirement on battlefields likely to be characteristic of the future. Detention facilities in the theater may have to be located in a hostile combat zone, instead of the benign secure environment current doctrine presumes.

MP detention units will need to be equipped for combat. Lack of crew-served weapons, e.g., machine guns and mortars, to counter external attacks resulted in casualties to the detainee population as well as to the friendly forces. Moreover, Army-issued radios were frequently inoperable and too few in number. In frustration, individual soldiers purchased commercial radios from civilian sources. This improvisation created an unsecured communications environment that could be monitored by any hostile force outside the detention facility.

Detention Operations and Accountability

Traditionally, military police support the Joint Task Force (JTF) by undertaking administrative processing of detention operations, thereby relieving the war-fighters of concern over prisoners and civilian detainees. The handling of detainees is a tactical and operational consideration the JTF addresses during planning to prevent combat forces from being diverted to handle large numbers of detainees. Military police are structured, therefore, to facilitate the tempo of combat operations by providing for the quick movement of prisoners from the battle area to temporary holding areas and thence to detention facilities.

However, the lack of relevant doctrine meant the design and operation of division, battalion, and company collection points were improvised on an ad hoc basis, depending on such immediate local factors as mission, troops available, weather, time, etc. At these collection points, the SOPs the units had prior to deployment were outdated or ill-suited for the operating environment of Afghanistan and Iraq. Tactical units found themselves taking on roles in detainee operations never anticipated in their prior training. Such lack of proper skills had a negative effect on the intelligence exploitation, security, and safeguarding of detainees.

The initial point of capture may be at any time or place in a military operation. This is the place where soldiers have the least control of the environment and where most contact with the detainees occurs. It is also the place where, in or immediately after battle, abuse may be most likely. And it is the place where the detainee, shocked by capture, may be most likely to give information. As noted earlier, instead of capturing and rapidly transporting detainees to collection points, battalions and companies were holding detainees for excessive periods, even though they lacked the training, materiel, or infrastructure for productive interrogation. The Naval IG found that approximately one-third of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at the point of capture.

Detention

The decision to use Abu Ghraib as the primary operational level detention facility happened by default. Abu Ghraib was selected by Ambassador Bremer who envisioned it as a temporary facility to be used for criminal detainees until the new Iraqi government could be established and an Iraqi prison established at another site. However, CJTF-7 saw an opportunity to use it as an interim site for the detainees it expected to round up as part of Operation Victory Bounty in July 2003. CJTF-7 had considered Camp Bucca but rejected it, as it was 150 miles away from Baghdad where the operation was to take place.

Abu Ghraib was also a questionable facility from a standpoint of conducting interrogations. Its location, next to an urban area, and its large size in relation to the small MP unit tasked to provide a law enforcement presence, made it impossible to achieve the necessary degree of security. The detainee population of approximately 7,000 out-manned the 92 MPs by approximately a 75:1 ratio. The choice of Abu Ghraib as the facility for detention operations placed a strictly detention mission-driven unit one designed to operate in a rear area-smack in the middle of a combat environment.

Detainee Accountability and Classification

Adequate procedures for accountability were lacking during the movement of detainees from the collection points to the detainee facilities. During the movement, it was not unusual for detainees to exchange their identification tags with those of other detainees. The diversity of the detainee population also made identification and classification difficult. Classification determined the detainee assignment to particular cells/blocks, but individuals brought to the facility were often a mix of criminals and security detainees. The security detainees were either held for their intelligence value or presented a continuing threat to Coalition Forces. Some innocents were also included in the detainee population. The issue of unregistered or "ghost" detainees presented a limited, though significant, problem of accountability at Abu Ghraib.

Detainee Reporting

Detainee reporting lacked accountability, reliability and standardization. There was no central agency to collect and manage detainee information. The combatant commanders and the JTF commanders have overall responsibility for the detainee programs to ensure compliance with the international law of armed conflict, domestic law and applicable national policy and directives. The reporting system is supposed to process all inquiries concerning detainees and provide accountability information to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The poor reporting system did not meet this obligation.

Release Procedures

Multiple reviews were required to make release recommendations prior to approval by the release authority. Nonconcurrence by area commanders, intelligence organizations, or law enforcement agencies resulted in retention of ever larger numbers of detainees. The Army Inspector General estimated that up to 80 percent of detainees being held for security and intelligence reasons might be eligible for release upon proper review of their cases with the other 20 percent either requiring continued detention on security grounds or uncompleted intelligence requirements. Interviews indicated area commanders were reluctant to concur with release decisions out of concern that potential combatants would be reintroduced into their areas of operation or that the detainees had continuing intelligence value.

INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

Any discussion of interrogation techniques must begin with the simple reality that their purpose is to gain intelligence that will help protect the United States, its forces and interests abroad. The severity of the post-September 11, 2001 terrorist threat and the escalating insurgency in Iraq make information gleaned from interrogations especially important. When lives are at stake, all legal and moral means of eliciting information must be considered. Nonetheless, interrogations are inherently unpleasant, and many people find them objectionable by their very nature.

The relationship between interrogators and detainees is frequently adversarial. The interrogator's goal of extracting useful information likely is in direct opposition to the detainee's goal of resisting or dissembling. Although interrogators are trained to stay within the bounds of acceptable conduct, the imperative of eliciting timely and useful information can sometimes conflict with proscriptions against inhumane or degrading treatment. For interrogators in Iraq and Afghanistan, this tension is magnified by the highly stressful combat environment. The conditions of war and the dynamics of detainee operations carry inherent risks for human mistreatment and must be approached with caution and careful planning and training.

A number of interrelated factors both limited the intelligence derived from interrogations and contributed to detainee abuse in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. A shortfall of properly trained human intelligence personnel to do tactical interrogation of detainees existed at all levels. At the larger detention centers, qualified and experienced interrogators and interpreters were in short supply. No doctrine existed to cover segregation of detainees whose status differed or was unclear, nor was there guidance on timely release of detainees no longer deemed of intelligence interest. The failure to adapt rapidly to the new intelligence requirements of the Global War on Terror resulted in inadequate resourcing, inexperienced and untrained personnel, and a backlog of detainees destined for interrogation. These conditions created a climate not conducive to sound intelligence-gathering efforts.

The Threat Environment

The Global War on Terror requires a fundamental reexamination of how we approach collecting intelligence. Terrorists present new challenges because of the way they organize, communicate, and operate. Many of the terrorists and insurgents are geographically dispersed non-state actors who move across national boundaries and operate in small cells that are difficult to surveil and penetrate.

Human Intelligence from Interrogations

The need for human intelligence has dramatically increased in the new threat environment of asymmetric warfare. Massed forces and equipment characteristic of the Cold War era, Desert Storm and even Phase I of Operation Iraqi Freedom relied largely on signals and imagery intelligence. The intelligence problem then was primarily one of monitoring known military sites, troop locations and equipment concentrations. The problem today, however, is discovering new information on widely dispersed terrorist and insurgent networks. Human intelligence often provides the clues to understand these networks, enabling the collection of intelligence from other sources. Information derived from interrogations is an important component of this human intelligence, especially in the Global War on Terror.

The interrogation of al Qaeda members held at Guantanamo has yielded valuable information used to disrupt and preempt terrorist planning and activities. Much of the 9/11 Commission's report on the planning and execution of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon came from interrogation of detainees. In the case of al Qaeda, interrogations provided insights on organization, key personnel, target selection, planning cycles, cooperation among various groups, and logistical support. This information expanded our knowledge of the selection, motivation, and training of these groups. According to Congressional testimony by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, we have gleaned information on a wide range of al Qaeda activities, including efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, sources of finance, training in use of explosives and suicide bombings, and potential travel routes to the United States.

Interrogations provide commanders with information about enemy networks, leadership, and tactics. Such information is critical in planning operations. Tactically, detainee interrogation is a fundamental tool for gaining insight into enemy positions, strength, weapons, and intentions. Thus, it is fundamental to the protection of our forces in combat. Notably, Saddam Hussein's capture was facilitated by interrogation-derived information. Interrogations often provide fragmentary pieces of the broader intelligence picture. These pieces become useful when combined with other human intelligence or intelligence from other sources.

Pressure on Interrogators to Produce Actionable Intelligence

With the active insurgency in Iraq, pressure was placed on the interrogators to produce "actionable" intelligence. In the months before Saddam Hussein's capture, inability to determine his whereabouts created widespread frustration within the intelligence community. With lives at stake, senior leaders expressed, forcibly at times, their needs for better intelligence. A number of visits by high-level officials to Abu Ghraib undoubtedly contributed to this perceived pressure. Both the CJTF-7 commander and his intelligence officer, CJTF-7 C2, visited the prison on several occasions. MG Miller's visit in August/September, 2003 stressed the need to move from simply collecting tactical information to collecting information of operational and strategic value. In November 2003, a senior member of the National Security Council Staff visited Abu Ghraib, leading some personnel at the facility to conclude, perhaps incorrectly, that even the White House was interested in the intelligence gleaned from their interrogation reports. Despite the number of visits and the intensity of interest in actionable intelligence, however, the Panel found no undue pressure exerted by senior officials. Nevertheless, their eagerness for intelligence may have been perceived by interrogators as pressure.

Interrogation Operations Issues

A number of factors contributed to the problems experienced in interrogation operations. They ranged from resource and leadership shortfalls to doctrinal deficiencies and poor training.

Inadequate Resources

As part of the peace dividend following the Cold War much of the human intelligence capability, particularly in the Army, was reduced. As hostilities began in Afghanistan and Iraq, Army human intelligence personnel, particularly interrogators and interpreters, were ill-equipped to deal with requirements at both the tactical level and at the larger detention centers. At the tactical level, questioning of detainees has been used in all major conflicts. Knowledge of the enemy's positions, strength, equipment and tactics is critical in order to achieve operational success while minimizing casualties. Such tactical questioning to gain immediate battlefield intelligence is generally done at or near the point of capture. In Iraq, although their numbers were insufficient, some of the more seasoned MIs from the MI units supporting Abu Ghraib were assigned to support the Army Tactical HUMINT teams in the field.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, tactical commanders kept detainees longer than specified by doctrine in order to exploit their unique local knowledge such as religious and tribal affiliation and regional politics. Remaining with the tactical units, the detainees could be available for follow-up questioning and clarification of details. The field commanders were concerned that information from interrogations, obtained in the more permanent facilities, would not be returned to the capturing unit. Tactical units, however, were not properly resourced to implement this altered operating arrangement. The potential for abuse also increases when interrogations are conducted in an emotionally charged field environment by personnel unfamiliar with approved techniques.

At the fixed detention centers such as Abu Ghraib, lack of resources and shortage of more experienced senior interrogators impeded the production of actionable intelligence. Inexperienced and untrained personnel often yielded poor intelligence. Interpreters, particularly, were in short supply, contributing to the backlog of detainees to be interrogated. As noted previously, at Abu Ghraib for instance, there were detainees who had been in custody for as long as 90 days before being interrogated for the first time.

Leadership and Organization Shortfalls at Abu Ghraib

Neither the leadership nor the organization of Military Intelligence at Abu Ghraib was up to the mission. The 205th MI Brigade had no organic interrogation elements; they had been eliminated by the downsizing in the 1990s. Soldiers from Army Reserve units filled the ranks, with the consequence that the Brigade Commander had to rely on disparate elements of units and individuals, including civilians, which had never trained together. The creation of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) introduced another layer of complexity into an already stressed interrogations environment. The JIDC was an ad hoc organization made up of six different units lacking the normal command and control structure, particularly at the senior noncommissioned officer level. Leadership was also lacking, from the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade in charge of Abu Ghraib, who failed to ensure that soldiers had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees, to the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade, who failed to ensure that soldiers under his command were properly trained and followed the interrogation rules of engagement. Moreover, the Director of the JIDC was a weak leader who did not have experience in interrogation operations and who ceded the core of his responsibilities to subordinates. He failed to provide appropriate training and supervision of personnel assigned to the Center. None of these leaders established the basic standards and accountability that might have served to prevent the abusive behaviors that occurred.

Interrogation Techniques

Interrogation techniques intended only for Guantanamo came to be used in Afghanistan and Iraq. Techniques employed at Guantanamo included the use of stress positions, isolation for up to 30 days and removal of clothing. In Afghanistan techniques included removal of clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, use of stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs, and sleep and light deprivation. Interrogators in Iraq, already familiar with some of these ideas, implemented them even prior to any policy guidance from CJTF-7. Moreover, interrogators at Abu Ghraib were relying on a 1987 version of FM 34-52, which authorized interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation to include light, heating, food, clothing and shelter given to detainees.

A range of opinion among interrogators, staff/judge advocates and commanders existed regarding what techniques were permissible. Some incidents of abuse were clearly cases of individual criminal misconduct. Other incidents resulted from misinterpretations of law or policy or confusion about what interrogation techniques were permitted by law or local SOPs. The incidents stemming from misinterpretation or confusion occurred for several reasons: the proliferation of guidance and information from other theaters of operation; the interrogators' experiences in other theaters; and the failure to distinguish between permitted interrogation techniques in other theater environments and Iraq. Some soldiers or contractors who committed abuse may honestly have believed the techniques were condoned.

Use of Contractors as Interrogators

As a consequence of the shortage of interrogators and interpreters, contractors were used to augment the workforce. Contractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib. The Army Inspector General found that 35 percent of the contractors employed did not receive formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or doctrine. The Naval Inspector General, however, found some of the older contractors had backgrounds as former military interrogators and were generally considered more effective than some of the junior enlisted military personnel. Oversight of contractor personnel and activities was not sufficient to ensure intelligence operations fell within the law and the authorized chain of command. Continued use of contractors will be required, but contracts must clearly specify the technical requirements and personnel qualifications, experience, and training needed. They should also be developed and administered in such as way as to provide the necessary oversight and management.

Doctrinal Deficiencies

At the tactical level, detaining individuals primarily for intelligence collection or because they constitute a potential security threat, though necessary, presents units with situations not addressed by current doctrine. Many units adapted their operating procedures for conducting detainee operations to fit an environment not contemplated in the existing doctrinal manuals. The capturing units had no relevant procedures for information and evidence collection, which were critical for the proper disposition of detainees.

Additionally, there is inconsistent doctrine on interrogation facility operations for the fixed detention locations. Commanders had to improvise the organization and command relationships within these elements to meet the particular requirements of their operating environments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Doctrine is lacking to address the screening and interrogation of large numbers of detainees whose status (combatants, criminals, or innocents) is not easily ascertainable. Nor does policy specifically address administrative responsibilities related to the timely release of detainees captured and detained primarily for intelligence exploitation or for the security threat they may pose.

Role of CIA

CIA personnel conducted interrogations in DoD detention facilities. In some facilities these interrogations were conducted in conjunction with military personnel, but at Abu Ghraib the CIA was allowed to conduct its interrogations separately. No memorandum of understanding existed on interrogations operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and the CIA was allowed to operate under different rules. According to the Fay investigation, the CIA's detention and interrogation practices contributed to a loss of accountability at Abu Ghraib. We are aware of the issue of unregistered detainees, but the Panel did not have sufficient access to CIA information to make any determinations in this regard.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 1:58 am

PART 3 OF 4 (Schlesinger Report)

THE ROLE OF MILITARY POLICE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN DETENTION OPERATIONS

Existing doctrine does not clearly address the relationship between the Military Police (MP) operating detention facilities and Military Intelligence (MI) personnel conducting intelligence exploitation at those facilities. The Army Inspector General report states neither MP nor MI doctrine specifically defines the distinct, but interdependent, roles and responsibilities of the two elements in detainee operations.

In the Global War on Terror, we are dealing with new conditions and new threats. Doctrine must be adjusted accordingly. MP doctrine currently states intelligence personnel may collaborate with MPs at detention sites to conduct interrogations, with coordination between the two groups to establish operating procedures. MP doctrine does not; however, address the subject of approved and prohibited MI procedures in an MP-operated facility. Conversely, MI doctrine does not clearly explain MP detention procedures or the role of MI personnel within a detention setting.

GUANTANAMO

The first detainees arrived at Guantanamo in January 2002. The SOUTHCOM Commander established two joint task forces at Guantanamo to execute the detention operations (JTF-160) and the interrogation operations (JTF-170). In August of that year, based on difficulties with the command relationships, the two JTFs were organized into a single command designated as Joint Task Force Guantanamo. This reorganization was conceived to enhance unity of command and direct all activities in support of interrogation and detention operations.

On November 4, 2002, MG Miller was appointed Commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo. As the joint commander, he called upon the MP and MI soldiers to work together cooperatively. Military police were to collect passive intelligence on detainees. They became key players, serving as the eyes and ears of the cellblocks for military intelligence personnel. This collaboration helped set conditions for successful interrogation by providing the interrogator more information about the detainee-his mood, his communications with other detainees, his receptivity to particular incentives, etc. Under the single command, the relationship between MPs and MIs became an effective operating model.

AFGHANISTAN

The MP and MI commands at the Bagram Detention Facility maintained separate chains of command and remained focused on their independent missions. The Combined Joint Task Force-76 Provost Marshal was responsible for detainee operations. He designated a principal assistant to run the Bagram facility. In parallel fashion, the CJTF-76 Intelligence Officer was responsible for MI operations in the facility, working through an Officer-in-Charge to oversee interrogation operations. The two deputies worked together to coordinate execution of their respective missions. A dedicated judge advocate was assigned full time to the facility, while the CJTF-76 Inspector General provided independent oversight.. Based on information from the Naval Inspector General investigation, this arrangement in Afghanistan worked reasonably well.

ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ

The Central Confinement Facility is located near the population center of Baghdad. Abu Ghraib was selected by Ambassador Bremer who envisioned it as a temporary facility to be used for criminal detainees until the new Iraqi government could be established and an Iraqi prison established at another site. Following operations during the summer of 2003, Abu Ghraib also was designated by CJTF-7 as the detention center for security detainees. It was selected because it was difficult to transport prisoners, due to improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and other insurgent tactics, to the more remote and secure Camp Bucca, some 150 miles away.

Request for Assistance

Commander CJTF-7 recognized serious deficiencies at the prison and requested assistance. In response to this request, MG Miller and a team from Guantanamo were sent to Iraq to provide advice on facilities and operations specific to screening, interrogations, HUMINT collection and interagency integration in the short- and long- term. The team arrived in Baghdad on August 31, 2003. MG Miller brought a number of recommendations derived from his experience at Guantanamo to include his model for MP and MI personnel to work together. These collaborative procedures had worked well at Guantanamo, in part because of the high ratio of approximately one-to-one of military police to mostly compliant detainees. However, the guard-to-detainee ratio at Abu Ghraib was approximately 1 to 75, and the Military Intelligence and the Military Police had separate chains of command.

MG Ryder, the Army Provost Marshal, also made an assistance visit in mid-October 2003. He conducted a review of detainee operations in Iraq. He found flawed operating procedures, a lack of training, an inadequate prisoner classification system, understrength units and a ratio of guard to prisoners designed for "compliant" prisoners of war and not for criminals or high-risk security detainees. However, he failed to detect the warning signs of potential and actual abuse that was ongoing during his visit. The assessment team members did not identify any MP units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. The Ryder report continues that "Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence-supervised interrogation sessions. The 800th MP Brigade has not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews, nor participate in those interviews."

Prevailing Conditions

Conditions at Abu Ghraib reflected an exception to those prevailing at other theater detainee facilities. U.S. forces were operating Tiers 1A and 1B, while Tiers 2 through 7 were under the complete control of Iraqi prison guards. Iraqis who had committed crimes against other Iraqis were intended to be housed in the tiers under Iraqi control. The facility was under frequent hostile fire from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Detainee escape attempts were numerous and there were several riots. Both MI and MP units were seriously under-resourced and lacked unit cohesion and mid-level leadership. The reserve MP units had lost senior noncommissioned officers and other personnel through rotations back to the U.S. as well as reassignments to other missions in the theater.

When Abu Ghraib opened, the first MP unit was the 72nd MP Company, based in Henderson, Nevada. Known as "the Nevada Company," it has been described by many involved in investigations concerning Abu Ghraib as a very strong unit that kept tight rein on operational procedures at the facility. This company called into question the interrogation practices of the MI brigade regarding nakedness of detainees. The 72nd MP Company voiced and then filed written objections to these practices.

The problems at Abu Ghraib intensified after October 15, 2003, when the 372nd Military Police Company took over the facility. The 372nd MP Company had been given the most sensitive mission: control of Tier 1A and Tier 1B, where civilian and military intelligence specialists held detainees identified for interrogations as well as "high-risk" detainees. An "MI hold" was anyone of intelligence interest and included foreign and Iraqi terrorists, as well as individuals possessing information regarding foreign fighters, infiltration methods, or pending attacks on Coalition forces. The "high-risk" troublemakers were held in Tier 1B. The prison cells of Tiers 1A and 1B were collectively known as ''the hard site." The 372nd soldiers were not trained for prison guard duty and were thinly stretched in dealing with the large number of detainees. With little experience to fall back on, the company commander deferred to noncommissioned officers who had civilian correctional backgrounds to work the night shift. This deference was a significant error in judgment.

Leadership Shortfalls

At the leadership level, there was friction and a lack of communication between the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade through the summer and fall of 2003. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands and little coordination at the command level. Both the Director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) and the Commander of the 320th MP Battalion were weak and ineffective leaders. Both failed to ensure their subordinates were properly trained and supervised. They failed to establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. Neither was able to organize tasks to accomplish their missions in an appropriate manner. By not communicating standards, policies, and plans to soldiers, these leaders conveyed a sense of tacit approval of abusive behaviors toward prisoners. This was particularly evident with respect to prisoner-handling procedures and techniques, including unfamiliarity with the Geneva Conventions. There was a lack of discipline and standards of behavior were not established nor enforced. A lax and dysfunctional command climate took hold.

In November 2003, the 205th MI Brigade Commander was assigned as the Forward Operation Base Commander, thus receiving responsibility for Abu Ghraib. This assignment was made as a result of CJTF-7 Commander's concern over force protection at the prison. The Fay investigation found this did not change the relationship of MP and MI units in day-to-day operations at the facility, although the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade says she was denied access to areas of Abu Ghraib for which she was doctrinally responsible. Key leaders did not seem to recognize or appreciate psychological stressors associated with the detention mission. MG Taguba concluded these factors included "differences in culture, soldiers' quality of life, and the real presence of mortal danger over an extended time period. The failure of commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to the pervasive atmosphere existing at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility."

Military Working Dogs at Abu Ghraib

The Military Police directives give guidance for the use of military working dogs. They are used to provide an effective psychological and physical deterrent in the detention facility, offering an alternative to using firearms. Dogs are also used for perimeter security, inspections and patrols. MG Miller had recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control during his visit in August/September 2003. However, he never recommended, nor were dogs used for interrogations at Guantanamo. The working dog teams were requested by the Commander 205th MI Brigade who never understood the intent as described by MG Miller. It is likely the confusion about using dogs partially stems from the initial request for dog teams by military intelligence and not military police.

The working dogs arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid-November 2003. The two Army teams were assigned primarily to security of the compound while the three Navy teams worked inside at the entry control point. The senior Army and Navy dog handlers indicated they had not previously worked in a prison environment and received only a one-day training session on scout and search for escaped Enemy Prisoners of War. The Navy handler stated that upon arrival at Abu Ghraib he had not received an orientation on what was expected from his canine unit nor what was authorized or not authorized. He further stated he had never received instruction on the use of force in the compound, but he acknowledged he knew a dog could not be used on a detainee if the detainee posed no threat.

Guidance provided by the CJTF-7 directive of September 14, 2003 allowed working dogs to be used as an interrogation technique with the CJTF-7 Commander's approval. This authorization was updated by the October 12, 2003 memorandum, which allowed the presence of dogs during interrogation as long as they were muzzled and under control of the handler at all times but still required approval. The Taguba and Jones/Fay investigations identified a number of abuses related to using muzzled and unmuzzled dogs during interrogations. They also identified some abuses involving dog-use unrelated to interrogations, apparently for the sadistic pleasure of the MPs involved in these incidents.

MP/MI Relationship

It is clear, with these serious shortfalls and lack of supervision, the model MG Miller presented for the effective working relationship between MI and MP was neither understood nor could it have been successfully implemented. Based on the Taguba and Jones/Fay investigations, "setting favorable conditions" had some basis in fact at Abu Ghraib, but it was also used as an excuse for abusive behavior toward detainees.

The events that took place at Abu Ghraib are an aberration when compared to the situations at other detention operations. Poor leadership and a lack of oversight set the stage for abuses to occur.

LAWS OF WAR/GENEVA CONVENTIONS

American military culture, training, and operations are steeped in a long-held commitment to the tenets of military and international law as traditionally codified by the world community. Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, describes the law of war as:

That part of International law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict. The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.


The law of war includes, among other agreements, the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Geneva Conventions set forth the rights and obligations which govern the treatment of civilians and combatants during periods of armed conflict. Specifically, Geneva Convention III addresses the treatment of prisoners of war; and Geneva Convention IV addresses the treatment of civilians.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01B, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program, reiterates U.S. policy concerning the law of war: "The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized...."

The United States became engaged in two distinct conflicts, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq. As a result of a Presidential determination, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Quaeda and Taliban combatants. Nevertheless, these traditional standards were put into effect for OIP and remain in effect at this writing. Some would argue this is a departure from the traditional view of the law of war as espoused by the ICRC and others in the international community.

Operation Enduring Freedom

On October 17, 2001, pursuant to the commencement of combat operations in OEF, the Commander, CENTCOM, issued an order instructing the Geneva Conventions were to be applied to all captured individuals in accordance with their traditional interpretation. Belligerents would be screened to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner of war status. If an individual was entitled to prisoner of war status, the protections of Geneva Convention III would apply. If armed forces personnel were in doubt as to a detained individual's status, Geneva Convention III rights would be accorded to the detainee until a Geneva Convention III Article 5 tribunal made a definitive status determination. If the individual was found not to be entitled to Geneva Convention III protections, he or she might be detained and processed under U.S. criminal code, a procedure consistent with Geneva Convention IV.

A policy debate concerning the application of treaties and laws to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees then began taking shape. The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided opinions to Counsel to the President and Department of Defense General Counsel concluding the Geneva Conventions did not protect members of the al Qaeda organization, and the President could decide that Geneva Conventions did not protect Taliban militia. Counsel to the President and the Attorney General so advised the President.

On February 7, 2002 the President issued a memorandum stating, in part,

...the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm. . .. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm -- ushered in not by us, but by terrorists -- requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.


Upon this premise, the President determined the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda, and that Taliban detainees did not qualify for prisoner of war status. Removed from the protections of the Geneva Conventions, al Qaeda and Taliban detainees have been classified variously as "unlawful combatants," "enemy combatants," and "unprivileged belligerents."

The enemy in the Global War on Terror is one neither the United States nor the community of nations has ever before engaged on such an extensive scale. These far-reaching, well-resourced, organized, and trained terrorists are attempting to achieve their own ends. Such terrorists are not of a nation state such as those who are party to the agreements which comprise the law of war. Neither do they conform their actions to the letter or spirit of the law of war.

The Panel accepts the proposition that these terrorists are not combatants entitled to the protections of Geneva Convention III. Furthermore, the Panel accepts the conclusion the Geneva Convention IV and the provisions of domestic criminal law are not sufficiently robust and adequate to provide for the appropriate detention of captured terrorists. The Panel notes the President qualified his determination, directing that United States policy would be "consistent with the principles of Geneva." Among other things, the Geneva Conventions adhere to a standard calling for a delineation of rights for all persons, and humane treatment for all persons. They suggest that no person is "outlaw," that is, outside the laws of some legal entity.

The Panel finds the details of the current policy vague and lacking. Justice Sandra Day O'Connnor, writing for the majority in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, June 28, 2004 points out ''the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as [enemy combatants]." Justice O'Connor cites several authorities to support the proposition that detention "is a clearly established principle of the law of war," but also states there is no precept of law, domestic or international, which would permit the indefinite detention of any combatant.

As a matter of logic, there should be a category of persons who do not comply with the specified conditions and thus fall outside the category of persons entitled to EPW status. Although there is not a particular label for this category in law of war conventions, the concept of "unlawful combatant" or ''unprivileged belligerent" is a part of the law of war.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom is wholly different from Operation Enduring Freedom. It is an operation that clearly falls within the boundaries of the Geneva Conventions and the traditional law of war. From the very beginning of the campaign, none of the senior leadership or command considered any possibility other than that the Geneva Conventions applied.

The message in the field, or the assumptions made in the field, at times lost sight of this underpinning. Personnel familiar with the law of war determinations for OEF in Afghanistan tended to factor those determinations into their decision-making for military actions in Iraq. Law of war policy and decisions germane to OEF migrated, often quite innocently, into decision matrices for OEF. We noted earlier the migration of interrogation techniques from Afghanistan to Iraq. Those interrogation techniques were authorized only for OEF. More important, their authorization in Afghanistan and Guantanamo was possible only because the President had determined that individuals subjected to these interrogation techniques fell outside the strict protections of the Geneva Conventions.

One of the more telling examples of this migration centers around CJTF-7's determination that some of the detainees held in Iraq were to be categorized as unlawful combatants. "Unlawful combatants" was a category set out in the President's February 7, 2002 memorandum. Despite lacking specific authorization to operate beyond the confines of the Geneva Conventions, CJTF-7 nonetheless determined it was within their command discretion to classify, as unlawful combatants, individuals captured during OIF. CJTF-7 concluded it had individuals in custody who met the criteria for unlawful combatants set out by the President and extended it in Iraq to those who were not protected as combatants under the Geneva Conventions, based on the OLC opinions. While CJTF-Ts reasoning is understandable in respect to unlawful combatants, nonetheless, they understood there was no authorization to suspend application of the Geneva Conventions, in letter and spirit, to all military actions of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, CJTF-7 had no means of discriminating detainees among the various categories of those protected under the Geneva Conventions and those unlawful combatants who were not.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Since December 2001, the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) has visited U.S. detention operations in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan numerous times. Various ICRC inspection teams have delivered working papers and reports of findings to U.S. military leaders at different levels. While the ICRC has acknowledged U.S. attempts to improve the conditions of detainees, major differences over detainee status as well as application of specific provisions of Geneva Conventions III and IV remain. If we were to follow the ICRC's interpretations, interrogation operations would not be allowed. This would deprive the U.S. of an indispensable source of intelligence in the war on terrorism.

The ICRC is an independent agency whose activities include observing and reporting on conditions in wartime detention camps and facilities. During visits, it attempts to register all prisoners, inspect facilities, and conduct private interviews with detainees to discuss any problems concerning detainee treatment or conditions; it also provides a means for detainees to contact their families. While the ICRC has no enforcing authority and its reports are supposedly confidential, any public revelation regarding standards of detainee treatment can have a substantial effect on international opinion.

The ICRC seeks to handle problems at the lowest level possible. When a team conducts an inspection, it provides a briefing, and sometimes a report, to the local commander. Discrepancies and issues are presented to the detaining authorities, and follow-up visits are made to monitor compliance with recommendations. The commander may or may not implement the recommendations based on either resource constraint or his interpretation of applicable law. These constraints can make complete implementation of ICRC recommendations either difficult or inappropriate. If recommendations are not implemented, the ICRC may address the issue with higher authorities. The ICRC does not expect to receive, nor does the DoD have a policy of providing, a written response to ICRC reports. However, DoD elements do attempt to implement as many of the recommendations as practicable, given security and resource constraints.

One important difference in approach between the U.S. and the ICRC is the interpretation of the legal status of terrorists. According to a Panel interview with CJTF-7 legal counsel, the ICRC sent a report to the State Department and the Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2003 citing lack of compliance with Protocol I. But the U.S. has specifically rejected Protocol I stating that certain elements in the protocol, that provide legal protection for terrorists, make it plainly unacceptable. Still the U.S. has worked to preserve the positive elements of Protocol I. In 1985, the Secretary of Defense noted that "certain provisions of Protocol I reflect customary international law, and others appear to be positive new developments. We therefore intend to work with our allies and others to develop a common understanding or declaration of principles incorporating these positive aspects, with the intention they shall, in time, win recognition as customary international law." In 1986 the ICRC acknowledged that it and the U.S. government had "agreed to disagree" on the applicability of Protocol 1. Nevertheless, the ICRC continues to presume the United States should adhere to this standard under the guise of customary international law.

This would grant legal protections to terrorists equivalent to the protections accorded to prisoners of war as required by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 despite the fact terrorists do not wear uniforms and are otherwise indistinguishable from noncombatants. To do so would undermine the prohibition on terrorists blending in with the civilian population, a situation which makes it impossible to attack terrorists without placing noncombatants at risk. For this and other reasons, the U.S. has specifically rejected this additional protocol.

The ICRC also considers the U.S. policy of categorizing some detainees as "unlawful combatants" to be a violation of their interpretation of international humanitarian law. It contends that Geneva Conventions III and IV, which the U.S. has ratified, allow for only two categories of detainees: (1) civilian detainees who must be charged with a crime and tried and (2) enemy combatants who must be released at the cessation of hostilities. In the ICRC's view, the category of ''unlawful combatant" deprives the detainees of certain human rights. It argues that lack of information regarding the reasons for detention and the conditions for release are major sources of stress for detainees.

However, the 1949 Geneva Conventions specify conditions to qualify for protected status. By logic, then, if detainees do not meet the specific requirements of privileged status, there clearly must be a category for those lacking in such privileges. The ICRC does not acknowledge such a category of ''unprivileged belligerents," and argues that it is not consistent with its interpretation of the Geneva Conventions.

Regarding the application of current international humanitarian law, including Geneva Conventions III and IV, the ICRC has three concerns: (1) gaining access to and ascertaining the status of all detainees in U.S. custody; (2) its belief that linking detention with interrogations should not be allowed which follows from its refusal to recognize the category of unprivileged combatants and (3) they also worry about losing their effectiveness.

Although the ICRC found U.S. forces generally cooperative, it has cited occasions when the forces did not grant adequate access to detainees, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of particular concern to the ICRC, however, has been the existence of "ghost detainees," detainees who were kept from ICRC inspectors. While the Panel has not been able to ascertain the number of ghost detainees in the overall detainee population, several investigations cite their existence. Both the Taguba and Jones/Fay reports cite instances of ghost detainees at Abu Ghraib. Secretary Rumsfeld publicly declared he directed one detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence.

On balance, the Panel concludes there is value in the relationship the Department of Defense historically has had with the ICRC. The ICRC should serve as an early warning indicator of possible abuse. Commanders should be alert to ICRC observations in their reports and take corrective actions as appropriate. The Panel also believes the ICRC, no less than the Defense Department, needs to adapt itself to the new realities of conflict, which are far different from the Western European environment from which the ICRC's interpretation of Geneva Conventions was drawn. The Department of Defense has established an office of detainee affairs and should continue to reshape its operational relationship with the ICRC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Department of Defense reform efforts are underway and the Panel commends these efforts. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services are conducting comprehensive reviews on how military operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. The military services now recognize the problems and are studying how to adjust force compositions, training, doctrine and responsibilities for active/reserve/guard and contractor mixes to ensure we are better prepared to succeed in the war on terrorism.

The Panel reviewed various inspections, investigations and assessments that produced over 300 recommendations for corrective actions to address the problems identified with DoD detention operations. For the most part the Panel endorses their recommendations. In some areas the recommendations do not go far enough and we augment them. We provide additional recommendations to address relevant areas not covered by previous analyses.

The Independent Panel provides the following additional recommendations:

1. The United States should further define its policy, applicable to both the Department of Defense and other government agencies, on the categorization and status of all detainees as it applies to various operations and theaters. It should define their status and treatment in a way consistent with U.S. jurisprudence and military doctrine and with U.S. interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. We recommend that additional operational, support and staff/judge advocate personnel be assigned to appropriate commands for the purpose of expediting the detainee release review process.

2. The Department of Defense needs to address and develop joint doctrine to define the appropriate collaboration between military intelligence and military police in a detention facility. The meaning of guidance, such as MPs "setting the conditions" for interrogation, needs to be defined with precision. MG Taguba argued that all detainee operations be consolidated under the responsibility of a single commander reporting directly to Commander CJTF-7. This change has now been accomplished and seems to be working effectively. Other than lack of leadership, training deficiencies in both MP and MI units have been cited most often as the needed measures to prevent detainee abuse. We support the recommendations on training articulated by the reports published by the various other reviews.

3. The nation needs more specialists for detention/interrogation operations, including linguists, interrogators, human intelligence, counter-intelligence, corrections police and behavioral scientists. Accompanying professional development and career field management systems must be put in place concurrently. The Panel agrees that some use of contractors in detention operations must continue into the foreseeable future. This is especially the case with the need for qualified interpreters and interrogators and will require rigorous oversight.

4. Joint Forces Command should chair a Joint Service Integrated Process Team to develop a new Operational Concept for Detention Operations in the new era of warfare, covering the Global War on Terror. The team should place special and early emphasis on detention operations during Counter-Insurgency campaigns and Stability Operations in which familiar concepts of front and rear areas may not apply. Attention should also be given to preparing for conditions in which normal law enforcement has broken down in an occupied or failed state. The Panel recommends that the idea of a deployable detention facility should be studied and implemented as appropriate.

5. Clearly, force structure in both MP and MI is inadequate to support the armed forces in this new form of warfare. Every investigation we reviewed refers to force structure deficiencies in some measure. There should be an active and reserve component mix of units for both military intelligence and military police. Other forces besides the Army are also in need of force structure improvements. Those forces have not been addressed adequately in the reports reviewed by the Panel, and we recommend that the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force undertake force structure reviews of their own to improve the performance of their Services in detention operations.

6. Well-documented policy and procedures on approved interrogation techniques are imperative to counteract the current chilling effect the reaction to the abuses have had on the collection of valuable intelligence through interrogations. Given the critical role of intelligence in the Global War on Terror, the aggressiveness of interrogation techniques employed must be measured against the value of intelligence sought, to include its importance, urgency and relevance. A policy for interrogation operations should be promulgated early on and acceptable interrogation techniques for each operation must be clearly understood by all interrogation personnel.

7. All personnel who may be engaged in detention operations, from point of capture to final disposition, should participate in a professional ethics program that would equip them with a sharp moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral obligations. The development of such a values-oriented ethics program should be the responsibility of the individual services with assistance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined.

9. The United States needs to redefine its approach to customary and treaty international humanitarian law, which must be adapted to the realities of the nature of conflict in the 21st Century. In doing so, the United States should emphasize the standard of reciprocity, in spite of the low probability that such will be extended to United States Forces by some adversaries, and the preservation of United States societal values and international image that flows from an adherence to recognized humanitarian standards.

10. The Department of Defense should continue to foster its operational relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Panel believes the International Committee of the Red Cross, no less than the Defense Department, needs to adapt itself to the new realities of conflict which are far different from the Western European environment from which the ICRC's interpretation of Geneva Conventions was drawn.

11. The assignment of a focal point within the office of the Under Secretary for Policy would be a useful organizational step. The new focal point for Detainee Affairs should be charged with all aspects of detention policy and also be responsible for oversight of DoD relations with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

12. The Secretary of Defense should ensure the effective functioning of rapid reporting channels for communicating bad news to senior Department of Defense leadership without prejudice to any criminal or disciplinary actions already underway. The Panel recommends consideration of a joint adaptation of procedures such as the Air Force special notification process.

13. The Panel notes that the Fay investigation cited some medical personnel for failure to report detainee abuse. As noted in that investigation, training should include the obligation to report any detainee abuse. The Panel also notes that the Army 10 found significant shortfalls in training and force structure for field sanitation, preventive medicine and medical treatment requirements for detainees. As the DoD improves detention operations force structure and training, it should pay attention to the need for medical personnel to screen and monitor the health of detention personnel and detainees.

14. The integration of the recommendations in this report and all the other efforts underway on detention operations will require further study. Analysis of the dynamics of program and resource implications, with a view to assessing the trade-offs and opportunity costs involved, must be addressed.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Glossary


Army Regulation 15-6, AR 15-6: Army regulation which specifies procedures for command investigations. The common name for both formal and informal command investigations.

Active Component, AC: Active military component of the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines.

Abuse Cases: An incident or allegation of abuse, including, but not limited to death, assault, sexual assault, and theft, that triggers a CID investigation, which may involve multiple individuals.

Behavioral Science Coordination Team, BSCT: Team comprised of medical and other specialized personnel that provides support to special operations forces.

Civilian Internees, CI: Designation of civilians encountered and detained in the theater of war.

Criminal Investigation Command, CID: Investigative agency of the U. S. Army responsible for conducting criminal investigations to which the Army is or may be a party.

Collection Points, CP: Forward locations where prisoners are collected, processed and prepared for movement to the detention center.

Coalition Provisional Authority CPA: Interim government of Iraq, in place from May 2003 through June 2004.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment, CPA: An international treaty brought into force in 1987 which seeks to define torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and provides a mechanism for punishing those who would inflict such treatment on others.

Enemy Prisoner of War, EPW: International Committee of the Red Cross term for prisoners of war; this status bestows certain rights to the individual in the Geneva Conventions.

Force Design Update, FDU: The Army process to review and restructure forces.

Fragmentary Order, FRAGO: An abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written or digital) usually issued on a day-to- ay basis that eliminates the need for restarting information contained in a basic operation order.

Army Field Manual 34-52 "Intelligence Interrogation", FM 34-52: Current manual for operations and training in interrogation techniques. The edition dated 1987 was updated in 1992.

Geneva Conventions, GC: The international treaties brought into force in August 1949. These conventions extend protections to, among others, prisoners of war and civilians in time of war.

Global War on Terror, GWOT: Worldwide operation to eradicate individuals and groups that participate in and sponsor terrorism.

Internment/Resettlement, I/R: Internment/resettlement mission assigned to specific US Army Military Police units who are responsible for the detention of Enemy Prisoners of War during armed conflict.

International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC: Nongovernmental organization that seeks to help victims of war and internal violence.

In Lieu Of, ILO: When used in reference to manning, indicates that forces were used in a manner other than originally specified.

Initial Point of Capture, IPOC: Location where an enemy prisoner or internee is captured. Iraq Survey Group, ISG:

Iraq Survey Group, ISG: Organization located in Iraq with the mission to find weapons of mass destruction.

Joint Manning Document, JMD: Master document covering personnel requirements for the joint theater.

Navy Criminal Investigative Service, NCIS: Investigative service for the US Navy and Marine Corps.

National Detainee Reporting Center, NDRC: Agency charged with accounting for and reporting all EPW, retained personnel, civilian internees and other detainees during armed conflict.

Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF: Military operation in Afghanistan

Other Government Agencies, OGA: Refers to non-Department of Defense agencies operating in theaters of war.

Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF: Military operation in Iraq.

Office of Legal Counsel, OLC: Refers to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel.

Operation Noble Eagle, ONE: Operation to activate and deploy forces for homeland defense and civil support in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Operation Victory Bounty, OVB: CJTF-7 operation to sweep Baghdad area for remaining elements of the Saddam Fedayeen in 2003.

Operational Control, OPCON: Command authority over all aspects of military operations.

Republican Guard, RG: Elite Iraqi military forces under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Reserve Component, RC: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Reserves and Army and Air National Guard

Request for Forces, RFF: Commanders request for additional forces to support the mission.

Standing Operating Procedure, SOP: A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedures without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise.

Tactical Control, TACON: Command authority to control and task forces for maneuvers within an area of operations.

Tactical Human Intelligence Team, THT: Forward deployed intelligence element providing human intelligence support to maneuver units.

Time Phased Force Deployment List, TPFDL: Identifies the units needed to support an operational plan and specifies their order and method of deployment.

Army Regulation 15-6, AR 1506: Army regulation which specifies procedures for command investigations. The common name for both formal and informal command investigations.

Active Component, AC: Active military component of the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines.

Abuse Cases: An incident or allegation of abuse, including, but not limited to death, assault, sexual assault, and theft, that triggers a CID investigation, which may involve multiple individuals.

Behavioral Science Coordination Team, BSCT: Team comprised of medical and other specialized personnel that provides support to special operations forces.

Civilian Internees, CI: Designation of civilians encountered and detained in the theater of war.

Criminal Investigation Command, CID: Investigative agency of the U. S. Army responsible for conducting criminal investigations to which the Army is or may be a party.

Collection Points, CP: Forward locations where prisoners are collected, processed and prepared for movement to the detention center.

Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA: Interim government of Iraq, in place from May 2003 through June 2004.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment: An international treaty brought into force in 1987 which seeks to define torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and provides a mechanism for punishing those who would inflict such treatment on others.

Enemy Prisoner of War, EPW: International Committee of the Red Cross term for prisoners of war; this status bestows certain rights to the individual in the Geneva Conventions.

Force Design Update, FDU: The Army process to review and restructure forces.

Fragmentary Order, FRAGO: An abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restarting information contained in a basic operation order.

Army Field Manual 34-52 "Intelligence Interrogation", FM 34-52: Current manual for operations and training in interrogation techniques. The edition dated 1987 was updated in 1992.

Geneva Conventions, GC: The international treaties brought into force in August 1949. These conventions extend protections to, among others, prisoners of war and civilians in time of war.

Global War on Terror, GWOT: Worldwide operation to eradicate individuals and groups that participate in and sponsor terrorism.

Internment/Resettlement, I/R: Internment/resettlement mission assigned to specific US Army Military Police units who are responsible for the detention of Enemy Prisoners of War during armed conflict.

International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC: Nongovernmental organization that seeks to help victims of war and internal violence.

In Lieu Of, ILO: When used in reference to manning, indicates that forces were used in a manner other than originally specified.

Initial Point of Capture, IPOC: Location where an enemy prisoner or internee is captured.

Iraq Survey Group, ISG: Organization located in Iraq with the mission to find weapons of mass destruction.

Joint Manning Document, JMD: Master document covering personnel requirements for the joint theater.

Navy Criminal Investigative Service, NCIS: Investigative service for the US Navy and Marine Corps.

National Detainee Reporting Center, NDRC: Agency charged with accounting for and reporting all EPW, retained personnel, civilian internees and other detainees during armed conflict.

Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF: Military operation in Afghanistan

Other Government Agencies, OGA: Refers to non-Department of Defense agencies operating in theaters of war.

Operation: Iraqi Freedom, OIF: Military operation in Iraq.

Office of Legal Counsel, OLC: Refers to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel.

Operation Noble Eagle, ONE: Operation to activate and deploy forces for homeland defense and civil support in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Operation Victory Bounty, OVB: CJTF-7 operation to sweep Baghdad area for remaining elements of the Saddam Fedayeen in 2003.

Operational Control, OPCON: Command authority over all aspects of military operations.

Republican Guard, RG: Elite Iraqi military forces under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Reserve Component, RC: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Reserves and Army and Air National Guard

Request for Forces, RFF: Commanders request for additional forces to support the mission.

Standing Operating Procedure, SOP: A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedures without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise.

Tactical Control, TACON: Command authority to control and task forces for maneuvers within an area of operations.

Tactical Human Intelligence Team, THT: Forward deployed intelligence element providing human intelligence support to maneuver units.

Time Phased Force Deployment List, TPFDL: Identifies the units needed to support an operational plan and specifies their order and method of deployment.

Guantanamo

United States Southern Command, USSOUTHCOM: One of nine Unified Combatant Commands with operational control of U.S. military forces. Area of responsibility includes Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Commander GEN James Hill

Joint Task Force 160, JTF-160, Initially responsible for detention operations at Guantanamo, merged in JTF-G 11/4/02.

Joint Task Force 170, JTF-170: Initially responsible for interrogation operations at Guantanamo, merged in JTF-G 11/4/02.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo, JTF-GL Joint task force for all operations at Guantanamo Guantanamo, formed 11/4/02.

Afghanistan

United States Central Command, USCENTCOM: One of nine Unified Commands with operational control of U.S. military forces. Area of responsibility includes Afghanistan and Iraq. Commander GEN John Abizaid

Coalition Forces Land Component Command, CFLCC, Senior headquarters element for multi- LTG David national land forces in both Iraq and McKiernan Afghanistan.

Combined Joint Task Force 180, CJTF-180: Forward deployed headquarters for Afghanistan.

Iraq

United States Central Command, USCENTCOM: One of nine Unified Commands with operational control of U.S. military forces. Area of responsibility includes Afghanistan and Iraq. Commander GEN John Abizaid

Coalition Forces Land Component Command, CFLCC: Senior headquarters element for multi-national land forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Commander LTG David McKiernan

Combined Joint Task Force 7, CJTF-7: Forward deployed headquarters for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Replaced in May 04 by Multi National Force - Iraq and Multi National Corps -- Iraq. Commander LTG Ricardo Sanchez

Combined Joint Task Force 7 Intelligence Staff, CJTF-7 C2: Intelligence staff support to CJTF-7. Commander MG Barbara Fast

800th Military Police Brigade, 800thMP BDE: U.S. Army Reserve Military Police Brigade, responsible for all internment facilities in Iraq, and assistance to CPA Minister of Justice. Commander BG Janis Karpinski

Joint Interrogation and Detention Center, JDIC: Element of CJTF-7 for interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. Commander LTC Steven Jordan

320th Military Police Battalion, 320thMP BN: Element of 800th Bde; assigned to Abu Ghraib. Commander LTC Jerry Phillabaum

372nd Military Police Company, 372nd MP CO: Element of 320th Bn; assigned to Abu Ghraib in October 2003. Commander CPT Donald Reese

72nd Military Police Company, 72nd MP CO: Nevada National Guard MP Company, assigned to Anu Ghuraib prior to 372nd MP Co.

205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 205th MI BDE: Military Intelligence Brigade responsible for multiple Army intelligence missions throughout Iraq. Commander COL Thomas Pappas

519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 519th MI BN: Tactical exploitation element of 525 MI Bde; Company A was located at Abu Ghraib. Commander MAJ Michnewicz

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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 4 OF 4 (Schlesinger Report)

Appendix B: Secretary of Defense Memorandum appointing the Independent Panel

United States Army Forces Command, FORSCOM: U.S. Army major command responsible for training, readiness and deployment.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
CHAIRMAN
THE HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN
THE HONORABLE TILLIE K. FOWLER
GENERAL CHARLES A. HORNER, USAF (RET.)

SUBJECT: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations

Various organizations of the Department of Defense have investigated, or will investigate, various aspects of allegations of abuse at DoD Detention Facilities and other matters related to detention operations. Thus far these inquiries include the following:

• Criminal investigations into individual allegations
• Army Provost Marshal General assessment of detention and corrections operations in Iraq
• Joint Task Force Guantanamo assistance visit to Iraq to assess intelligence operations
• Administrative Investigation under AR 15-6 regarding Abu Ghraib operations
• Army Inspector General assessment of doctrine and training for detention operations
• Commander, Joint Task Force-7 review of activities of military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib
• Army Reserve Command Inspector General assessment of training of Reserve units regarding military intelligence and military police
• Naval Inspector General review of detention procedures at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the Naval Consolidated Brig, Charleston, South Carolina

I have been or will be briefed on the results of these inquiries and the corrective actions taken by responsible officials within the Department.

It would be helpful to me to have your independent, professional advice on the issues that you consider most pertinent related to the various allegations, based on your review of completed and pending investigative reports and other materials and information. I am especially interested in your views on the cause of the problems and what should be done to fix them. Issues such as force structure, training of regular and reserve personnel, use of contractors, organization, detention policy and procedures, interrogation policy and procedures, the relationship between detention and interrogation, compliance with the Geneva Conventions, relationship with The International Committee of the Red Cross, command relationships, and operational practices may be contributing factors you might wish to review. Issues of personal accountability will be resolved through established military justice and administrative procedures, although any information you may develop will be welcome.

I would like your independent advice orally and in writing, preferably within 45 days after you begin your review. DoD personnel will collect information for your review and assist you as you deem appropriate. You are to have access to all relevant DoD investigations and other DoD information unless prohibited by law. Reviewing all written materials relevant to these issues may be sufficient to allow you to provide your advice. Should you believe it necessary to travel or conduct interviews, the Director of Administration and Management will make appropriate arrangements.

I intend to provide your report to the Committees on Armed Services, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and others as appropriate. If your report contains classified information, please also provide an unclassified version suitable for public release.

By copy of this memorandum. I request the Director of Administration and Management to secure the necessary technical, administrative and legal support for your review from the Department of Defense Components. I appoint you as full-time employees of this Department without pay under 10 U.S.C. §1583. I request all Department of Defense personnel to cooperate fully with your review and to make available all relevant documents and information at your request.

cc: SECRETARIES of the MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN of the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

Appendix C: President of the United States Memorandum, February 7, 2002

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS .
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees confirm that the application of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva) to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm -- ushered in not by us, but by terrorists -- requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.

2. Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of the United States; and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, 1 hereby determine as follows:

a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.

b. I accept the legal conclusion of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts.

c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban "detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character."

d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.

3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.

5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

6. I hereby direct the Secretary of State to communicate my determinations in an appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach.

Appendix D: Interrogation Policies

Interrogation Policies in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq

Image
1 Some techniques specifically delineated in this memo are inherent to techniques contained in FM 34-52, e.g. Yelling as a component of Fear Up
2 Five Approved Techniques require SOUTHCOM approval and SECDEF notification.
3 Figure includes techniques that were not in current use but requested for future use.
4 Figure includes one technique which requires CG approval.
5 Memorandum cited for Afghanistan and Iraq are classified.
6 Figure includes the 17 techniques ofFM-34-52, although they are not specified in the Memo.
Appendix D
Source: Naval IG Investigation


Appendix E: Evolution of Interrogation Techniques

Evolution of Interrogation Techniques - GTMO

Image
*Techniques require SOUTHCOM approval and SECDEF notification.
Source: Naval IG Investigation
Appendix E


Appendix F: Timeline, Major Detention Events

Image

Major Detention Events

Sep 2001
Sep 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks on U.S. Homeland

Oct 2001
Oct 7, 2001: Operation Enduring Freedom Begins

Nov 2001
Nov 10, 2001: First detainees secured at Mazar-e-Sharrif. CIA officer M. Spann killed.

Nov 13, 2001:
President's Military Order re: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.

Dec 2001
Bagram Detention Facility Opened.

Jan 2002:
ICRC visits Bagram.

Jan 11, 2001:
First detainees arrive in GTMO.

Jan 25, 2002:
First ICRC visit to Guantanamo Bay prison comp.

Feb 7, 2002:
President issues memorandum re: treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.

Oct 23, 2002:
SOUTHCOM forwarded the 11 October JTF GTMO request for the use of 20 additional interrogation techniques to CJCS for approval. The SOUTHCOM request to the CJCS included 20 techniques.

Dec 2, 2002:
SECDEF approves "tiered" techniques.

Jan 15, 2003:
SECDEF rescinds "tiered" techniques.

Mar 19, 2003:
Invasion of Iraq begins.

Apr 16, 2003:
SECDEF approves interrogation techniques based on DoD Working Group recommendations.

May 1, 2003:
President Bush declared major ground combat over in Iraq.

Jun 30, 2003:
800 MP Bde. BG Karpinski assumes command.

Jul 24, 2003 to ?? ??, 2003:
Operation VICTORY BOUNTY. Focused effort to round up mid-level Baathists, Sadaam Fedayeen, and others. 1800 detainees anticipated.

Aug 4, 2003:
Abu Ghraib prison re-opened by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Aug 31, 2003 to Sep 9, 2003:
MG Miller leads a survey team on intelligence, interrogation, and detention operations in Iraq. Miller's report on 6 Sep recommends that MP detention operations support intelligence interrogation operations.

Sep 14, 2003:
CJTF-7 issues interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy for Iraq.

Oct 9, 2003 to Oct 12, 2003:
ICRC Visit to Abu Ghraib.

Oct 11, 2003 to Nov 6, 2003:
MG Ryder assesses detention and correction operations in Iraq. Recommends that MP detention operations be kept separate from MI interrogation operations.

Oct 12, 2003:
CJTF-7 issues NEW "Interrogation and Counter-resistance Police." Superseded policy dated 14 Sep 03.

Oct 21, 2003 to Oct 23, 2003:
ICRC Visits to Abu Ghraib.

Oct 2003 to Dec 2003:
Abu Ghraib. Dates of photos for abuse triggered series of investigations.

Nov 19, 2003:
205th MI Bde Cdr designated as overall commander of Abu Ghraib.

Jan 13, 2004:
Abu Ghraib. 372 MP Co. SPC Darby turns in a CD-ROM showing abuse photos.

Jan 21, 2004 to Mar 12, 2004:
MG Taguba conducts 15-6 investigation of the 800 MP Bde.

Feb 14, 2004:
ICRC submits "Report on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during Arrest Internment and Interrogation" to General Sanchez.

Mar 20, 2004:
Charges filed against 6 Soldiers seen in the photos.

Apr 29, 2004:
60 Minutes II airs the piece on Abu Ghraib.

Appendix G: Psychological Stresses

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESSES


The potential for abusive treatment of detainees during the Global War on Terrorism was entirely predictable based on a fundamental understanding of the principle of social psychology principles coupled with an awareness of numerous known environmental risk factors. Most leaders were unacquainted with these known risk factors, and therefore failed to take steps to mitigate the likelihood that abuses of some type would occur during detainee operations. While certain conditions heightened the possibility of abusive treatment, such conditions neither excuse nor absolve the individuals who engaged in deliberate immoral or illegal behaviors.

The abuse the detainees endured at various places and times raises a number of questions about the likely psychological aspects of inflicting such abuses. Findings from the field of social psychology suggest that the conditions of war and the dynamics of detainee operations carry inherent risks for human mistreatment, and therefore must be approached with great caution and careful planning and training.

The Stanford Prison Experiment

In 1973, Haney, Banks and Zimbardo (1) published their landmark Stanford study, "Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison." Their study provides a cautionary tale for all military detention operations. The Stanford Experiment used a set of tested, psychologically sound college students in a benign environment. In contrast, in military detention operations, soldiers work under stressful combat conditions that are far from benign.

The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) attempted to "create a prison-like situation" and then observe the behavior of those involved. The researchers randomly assigned 24 young men to either the "prisoner" or "guard" group. Psychological testing was used to eliminate participants with overt psychopathology, and extensive efforts were made to simulate actual prison conditions. The experiment, scheduled to last two weeks, was cancelled after only six days due to the ethical concerns raised by the behaviors of the participants. The study notes that while guards and prisoners were free to engage in any form of interpersonal interactions, the "characteristic nature of their encounters tended to be negative, hostile, affrontive and dehumanizing."

The researchers found that both prisoners and guards exhibited "pathological reactions" during the course of the experiment. Guards fell into three categories: (l) those who were "tough but fair," (2) those who were passive and reluctant to use coercive control and, of special interests, (3) those who "went far beyond their roles to engage in creative cruelty and harassment." With each passing day, guards "were observed to generally escalate their harassment of the prisoners." The researchers reported: "We witnessed a sample of normal, healthy American college students fractionate into a group of prison guards who seemed to derive pleasure from insulting, threatening, humiliating, and dehumanizing their peers."

Because of the random assignment of subjects, the study concluded the observed behaviors were the result of situational rather than personality factors:

The negative, anti-social reactions observed were not the product of an environment created by combining a collection of deviant personalities, but rather, the result of an intrinsically pathological situation which could distort and rechannel the behaviour of essentially normal individuals. The abnormality here resided in the psychological nature of the situation and not in those who passed through it.

The authors discussed how prisoner-guard interactions shaped the evolution of power use by the guards:

The use of power was self-aggrandizing and self-perpetuating. The guard power, derived initially from an arbitrary label, was intensified whenever there was any perceived threat by the prisoners and this new level subsequently became the baseline from which further hostility and harassment would begin. The most hostile guards on each shift moved spontaneously into the leadership roles of giving orders and deciding on punishments. They became role models whose behaviour was emulated by other members of the shift. Despite minimal contact between the three separate guard shifts and nearly 16 hours a day spent away from the prison, the absolute level of aggression as well as the more subtle and "creative" forms of aggression manifested, increased in a spiraling function. Not to be tough and arrogant was to be seen as a sign of weakness by the guards and even those "good" guards who did not get as drawn into the power syndrome as the others respected the implicit norm of never contradicting or even interfering with an action of a more hostile guard on their shift.

In an article published 25 years after the Stanford Prison Experiment, Haney and Zimbardo noted their initial study ''underscored the degree to which institutional settings can develop a life of their own, independent of the wishes, intentions, and purposes of those who run them." They highlighted the need for those outside the culture to offer external perspectives on process and procedures. (2)

Social Psychology: Causes of Aggression and Inhumane Treatment

The field of social psychology examines the nature of human interactions. Researchers in the field have long been searching to understand why humans sometimes mistreat fellow humans. The discussions below examine the factors behind human aggression and inhumane treatment, striving to impart a better understanding of why detainee abuses occur.

Human Aggression

Research has identified a number of factors that can assist in predicting human aggression. These factors include:

• Personality traits. Certain traits among the totality of an individual's behavioral and emotional make-up predispose to be more aggressive than other individuals.
• Beliefs. Research reveals those who believe they can carry out aggressive acts, and that such acts will result in a desired outcome, are more likely to be aggressive than those who do not hold these beliefs.
• Attitudes. Those who hold more positive attitudes towards violence are more likely to commit violent acts.
• Values. The values individuals hold vary regarding the appropriateness of using violence to resolve interpersonal conduct.
• Situational Factors. Aggressive cues (the presence of weapons), provocation (threats, insults, aggressive behaviors), frustration, pain and discomfort (hot temperatures, loud noises, unpleasant odors), and incentives can all call forth aggressive behaviors.
• Emotional factors. Anger, fear, and emotional arousal can heighten the tendency to act out aggressively.

The personality traits, belief systems, attitudes, and values of those who perpetrated detainee abuses can only be speculated upon. However, it is reasonable to assume, in any given population, these characteristics will be distributed along a bell curve, which will predispose some more than others within a group to manifest aggressive behaviors. These existing traits can be affected by environmental conditions, which are discussed later.

Abusive Treatment

Psychologists have attempted to understand how and why individuals and groups who usually act humanely can sometimes act otherwise in certain circumstances. A number of psychological concepts explain why abusive behavior occurs. These concepts include:

Deindividuation. Deindividuation is a process whereby the anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion provided in a crowd allows individuals to participate in behavior marked by the temporary suspension of customary rules and inhibitions. Individuals within a group may experience reduced self-awareness which can also result in disinhibited behavior.

Groupthink. Individuals often make very uncharacteristic decisions when part of a group. Symptoms of groupthink include: (1) Illusion of invulnerability-group members believe the group is special and morally superior; therefore its decisions are sound; (2) Illusion of unanimity in which members assume all are in concurrence, and (3) Pressure is brought to bear on those who might dissent.

Dehumanization. Dehumanization is the process whereby individuals or groups are viewed as somehow less than fully human. Existing cultural and moral standards are often not applied to those who have been dehumanized.

Enemy Image. Enemy image describes the phenomenon wherein both sides participating in a conflict tend to view themselves as good and peace-loving peoples, while the enemy is seen as evil and aggressive.

Moral Exclusion. Moral exclusion is a process whereby one group views another as fundamentally different, and therefore prevailing moral rules and practices apply to one group but not the other.

Abuse and Inhumane Treatment in War

Socialization to Evil and Doubling. Dr. Robert Jay Lifton has extensively examined the nature of inhumane treatment during war. Dr. Lifton suggested that ordinary people can experience "socialization to evil," especially in a war environment. Such people often experience a "doubling." They are socialized to evil in one environment and act accordingly within that environment, but they think and behave otherwise when removed from that environment. For example, doctors committed unspeakable acts while working in Auschwitz, but would go home on weekends and behave as "normal" husbands and fathers.

Moral Disengagement. Moral disengagement occurs when normal self-regulatory mechanisms are altered in a way that allows for abusive treatment and similar immoral behaviors. Certain conditions, identified by Bandura and his colleagues (3), can lead to moral disengagement, such as:

• Moral Justification. Misconduct can be justified if it is believed to serve a social good.
• Euphemistic Language. Language affects attitudes and beliefs, and the use of euphemistic language such as "softening up" (and even "humane treatment") can lead to moral disengagement.
• Advantageous Comparison. "Injurious conduct can be rendered benign" when compared to more violent behaviors. This factor is likely to occur during war. Essentially, abusive behaviors may appear less significant and somehow justifiable when compared to death and destruction.
• Displacement of Responsibility. "People view their actions as springing from the social pressures or dictates of others rather than as something for which they are socially responsible." This is consistent with statements from those under investigation for abuses.
• Diffusion of Responsibility. Group decisions and behaviors can obscure responsibility: "When everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible."
• Disregarding or Distorting the Consequences of Actions. Harmful acts can be minimized or ignored when the harm is inflicted for personal gain or because of social inducements.
• Attribution of Blame. "Victims get blamed for bringing suffering on themselves."

Detainee and interrogation operations consist of a special subset of human interactions, characterized by one group which has significant power and control over another group which must be managed, often against the will of its members. Without proper oversight and monitoring, such interactions carry a higher risk of moral disengagement on the part of those in power and, in turn, are likely to lead to abusive behaviors.

Environmental Factors

The risk of abusive behaviors is best understood by examining both psychological and environmental risk factors. A cursory examination of situational variables present at Abu Ghraib indicates the risk for abusive treatment was considerable. Many of the problematic conditions at Abu Ghraib are discussed elsewhere in this report, to include such factors as poor training, under nearly daily attack, insufficient staffing, inadequate oversight, confused lines of authority, evolving and unclear policy, and a generally poor quality of life. The stresses of these conditions were certainly exacerbated by delayed troop rotations and by basic issues of safety and security. Personnel needed to contend with both internal threats from volatile and potentially dangerous prisoners and external threats from frequent mortar fire and attacks on the prison facilities.

The widespread practice of stripping detainees, another environmental factor, deserves special mention. The removal of clothing interrogation technique evolved into something much broader, resulting in the practice of groups of detainees being kept naked for extended periods at Abu Ghraib. Interviews with personnel at Abu Ghraib indicated that naked detainees were a common sight within the prison, and this was understood to be a general part of interrogation operations.

While the removal of clothing may have been intended to make detainees feel more vulnerable and therefore more compliant with interrogations, this practice is likely to have had a psychological impact on guards and interrogators as well. The wearing of clothes is an inherently social practice, and therefore the stripping away of clothing may have had the unintended consequence of dehumanizing detainees in the eyes of those who interacted with them. As discussed earlier, the process of dehumanization lowers the moral and cultural barriers that usually preclude the abusive treatment of others.

(1) Haney, C., Banks, C., and Zimbardo, P., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1973, 1,69-97.

(2) Haney, C. and Zimbardo, P., The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy, Twenty-Five Years after the Stanford Prison Experiment, American Psychologist, July 1998, 709-27.

(3) Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G., and Pastorelli, C., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 71(2), August 1996, 364-74.

Appendix H: Ethical Issues

ETHICAL ISSUES

Introduction


For the United States and other nations with similar value systems, detention and interrogation are themselves ethically challenging activities. Effective interrogators must deceive, seduce, incite, and coerce in ways not normally acceptable for members of the general public. As a result, the U.S. places restrictions on who may be detained and the methods interrogators may employ. Exigencies in the Global War on Terror have stressed the normal American boundaries associated with detention and interrogation. In the ensuing moral uncertainty, arguments of military necessity make the ethical foundation of our soldiers especially important.

Ethical Foundations of Detention and Interrogation

Within our values system, consent is a central moral criterion on evaluating our behavior toward others. Consent is the manifestation of the freedom and dignity of the person and, as such, plays a critical role in moral reasoning. Consent restrains, as well as enables, humans in their treatment of others. Criminals, by not respecting the rights of others, may be said to have consented -- in principle -- to arrest and possible imprisonment. In this construct -- and due to the threat they represent -- insurgents and terrorists "consent" to the possibility of being captured, detained, interrogated, or possibly killed.

Permissions and Limits on Detentions

This guideline of implied consent for the U.S. first limits who may be detained. Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained to prevent them from conducting further attacks and to gather intelligence to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from conducting attacks. This suggests two categories of persons who may be detained and interrogated: (1) persons who have engaged in or assisted those who engage in terrorist or insurgent activities; and (2) persons who have come by information regarding insurgent and terrorist activity.

By engaging in such activities, persons in the first category may be detained as criminals or enemy combatants, depending on the context. Persons in the second category may be detained and questioned for specific information, but if they do not represent a continuing threat, they may be detained only long enough to obtain the information.

Permissions and Limits on Interrogation Techniques

For the U.S., most cases for permitting harsh treatment of detainees on moral grounds begin with variants of the "ticking time bomb" scenario. The ingredients of such scenarios usually include an impending loss of life, a suspect who knows how to prevent it -- and in most versions is responsible for it -- and a third party who has no humane alternative to obtain the information in order to save lives. Such cases raise a perplexing moral problem: Is it permissible to employ inhumane treatment when it is believed to be the only way to prevent loss of lives? In periods of emergency, and especially in combat, there will always be a temptation to override legal and moral norms for morally good ends. Many in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were not well prepared by their experience, education, and training to resolve such ethical problems.

A morally consistent approach to the problem would be to recognize there are occasions when violating norms is understandable but not necessarily correct -- that is, we can recognize that a good person might, in good faith, violate standards. In principle, someone who, facing such a dilemma, committed abuse should be required to offer his actions up for review and judgment by a competent authority. An excellent example is the case of a 4th Infantry Division battalion commander who permitted his men to beat a detainee whom he had good reason to believe had information about future attacks against his unit. When the beating failed to produce the desired results, the commander fired his weapon near the detainee's head. The technique was successful and the lives of U.S. servicemen were likely saved. However, his actions clearly violated the Geneva Conventions and he reported his actions knowing he would be prosecuted by the Army. He was punished in moderation and allowed to retire.

In such circumstances interrogators must apply a "minimum harm" rule by not inflicting more pressure than is necessary to get the desired information. Further, any treatment that causes permanent harm would not be permitted, as this surely constitutes torture. Moreover, any pain inflicted to teach a lesson or after the interrogator has determined he cannot extract information is morally wrong.

National security is an obligation of the state, and therefore the work of interrogators carries a moral justification. But the methods employed should reflect this nation's commitment to our own values. Of course the tension between military necessity and our values will remain. Because of this, military professionals must accept the reality that during crises they may find themselves in circumstances where lives will be at stake and the morally appropriate methods to preserve those lives may not be obvious. This should not preclude action, but these professionals must be prepared to accept the consequences.

Ethics Education

The instances of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan do indicate a review of military ethics education programs is needed. This is not to suggest that more adequate ethics education will necessarily prevent abuses. Major service programs such as the Army's "core values," however, fail to adequately prepare soldiers working in detention operations.

While there are numerous ethics education programs throughout the services, almost all refer to certain "core values" as their foundation. Core-values programs are grounded in organizational efficacy rather than the moral good. They do not address humane treatment of the enemy and noncombatants, leaving military leaders and educators an incomplete tool box with which to deal with "real-world" ethical problems. A professional ethics program addressing these situations would help equip them with a sharper moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral obligations.

Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations

Chairman
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger

Panel Members
The Honorable Harold Brown
The Honorable Tillie K. Fowler
General Charles A. Horner (USAF-RET)

Executive Director
Dr. James A. Blackwell, Jr.

INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS

CHAIRMAN
THE HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

PANEL MEMBERS
THE HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN
THE HONORABLE TILLIE K. FOWLER
GENERAL CHARLES A. HORNER (USAF-RET.)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DR. JAMES A. BLACKWELL. JR.

August 24. 2004

To U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

We, the appointed members of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, pursuant to our charter do hereby submit the results of our findings and offer our best recommendations.

Sincerely.

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Chairman

The Honorable Harold Brown
Panel Member

The Honorable Tillie K. Fowler
Panel Member

General Charles A. Horner
(USAF -Ret.)
Panel Member

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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 2:56 am

May 12, 2004

Vice Admiral Church’s Brief

Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III’s briefing on his investigation into allegations of abuse of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

United States Department of Defense News Transcript, May 12, 2004

United States Department of Defense News Transcript
Presenter: Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, Naval Inspector General
Wednesday, May 12, 2004
Media Availability with Vice Admiral Church

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I'm Vice Admiral Albert T. I usually go by Tom Church, I'm the Naval Inspector General. Okay, let's start. I was directed by the Secretary of Defense last week to go down to Guantanamo Bay, and my specific direction task was to ensure that his orders, DoD orders with respect to detainees at GTMO and Charleston were being carried out. Let me emphasize a couple things as I start out here. As I told the secretary, this was a review. We were on the ground for about two days. So this was not an inspection, either by length of time or by scope. Neither was it an investigation because we had no allegation for investigating any incident or any person. On second thing was this -- this was a snapshot of current existing conditions. There was insufficient time to do what I'll call reach-back, which is to look at all the things that might or might not have happened since 9-11. And I'll talk to you about most of the large for example, we've been here nine or 10 months. So, this is just a snapshot. I think I did enough to give him a high degree of confidence of what I found.

What I also told him is you can't be 100% confident of what your findings are when you have that little time to do the job. Finally, this is a compliance look I did not, it was not my charter to look at Geneva as it applies to GTMO and try to determine how that applies. It was not my idea to review all the interrogation phone calls and see if those were wrecked [phonetic]. My job was to see if the orders specific, specifically directed to JTF Commander in GTMO and to Charleston were being carried out. So, having listened to the previous conversation, I think it's important you understand that what this is and what it was not.

Okay, the [inaudible] line was received by direction the night of 3 May. I assembled a team of about 15 on Tuesday, the 4th of May. We traveled onto Wednesday the 5th. Got a command brief. I was on station Thursday/Friday 6 to 7. My military assistant Brigadier General Dwayne Deeson [phonetic] drove up on Thursday, went into Charleston to take a look at the brig there. We got back on Saturday and started analyzing the results of our visit.

MALE VOICE: You didn't go to prison [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I did not have, we just didn't have the time to [inaudible]. I did talk about the team compositions. Had a number of lawyers, I had a doctor, I had some folks to take foreign testimony. I had some folks who served there before from the previous X.O., a member of Naval Criminal Investigative Service, I had a former interrogator. So I had a as good a cross- section of folks I could get to [inaudible]. Here's what we did our two days. We observed interrogations, we watched the detainee movements, we observed the M.P. force and their procedures. We reviewed as much documentation as we could absorb, including the standard operating procedures. All incident reports, all unit punishment logs. We got a hold of some ICRC reports and records of meetings with General Miller, during the outbriefs. We looked very closely at all detainee medical records -- excuse me -- 100 detainee medical records to see if that would shed any light on any potential abuse. We did over 100 interviews, and we did 43 selected at random testimonies under oath. Forty-three under oath testimonies, including interrogators, guards, military civilians, contractor, and we asked them a pretty full range of questions. Have you seen any abuse, have you heard of any abuse, do you know anybody who has seen abuse, would you report abuse if you saw it, would you feel free to come forward if you see anything that doesn't look right. So that's the nature of the questions that we asked those 43 people.

MALE VOICE: [Inaudible] military civilians.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: We did a range of some military civilians, contractors, some analysts, I think there were nine interrogators and nine military police if I remember. I'm not sure of those numbers exact but they're approximate. This is a summation of what I told the Secretary I found. There is a very, we have a very professional organization in place. With very detailed and understood roles and responsibilities. Strong leadership, strong chain of command, and a very positive command climate. The directions to the Secretary of Defense with respect to humane treatment of detainees and the interrogation techniques were being carried out as best we could determine. We found minor infractions involving contact with detainees, and we documented eight of those.

MALE VOICE: Physical contact?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Some with physical contact. Let me come back to that in the Q & A. Cover that and make sure I get that correct. And we found some of minor items that require some follow-on resolution, and I think it's supposedly a matter of interpretation primarily. We looked at the training records in depth. And I said we looked at standard operating procedures. And I found those to be in my view, very effective. I covered the eight minor infractions, as I like to call them. I also asked the JTF GTMO commander to tell me what the amount of abuse that the guards were taking, and he told me there were about an average of 14 a week. Abuse against the guards, incidents against a guard, verbal harassment, throwing of excrement, that type of thing. We noted that there are a number of outstanding ICRC issues. I also noticed General Miller seemed to take those seriously and appeared to be working on those.

MALE VOICE: General Miller?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Previously General Miller, General Hood currently.

MALE VOICE: Who is General Hood?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: General Hood, Jeff Hood is -- I'm sorry, Jay Hood, is currently the JTF GTMO commander. That's a good question. He was wearing one star. He may be a selectee, I don't know. We found no evidence of current abuse in our underlying currents because the people we talked to had been there nine, 10 months. They're ending their rotations. Specifically we recommend areas of follow-up based on the fact that we really didn't have a great deal of time on station. The first of those would be the reach-back, if you want better assurance that there were no incidents early on, you need to probably go back in and look at the, talk to people who have since rotated out. But based on what I saw, the people who were currently there, I wasn't able to [inaudible].

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] abuse [inaudible] administrative punishment there have been two, there were two prison guards [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [inaudible] the eight. There's actually more than two.

MALE VOICE: Who actually were punished and reduced in rank and what-not.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: There's more than eight. There's more than two.

MALE VOICE: How many?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Well, let's do that now. There was documented eight, eight minor infractions going back as far as we can get the records, I think to 2002. The, as I remember, four were, involved guards, three involved interrogators, and one involved a barber. Those numbers are from my memory. They're roughly correct.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: A barber. And, the specific incident was an unauthorized haircut. To a detainee.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]. A haircut?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: It was, it was a haircut. Now. What I know Secretary's...

MALE VOICE: [interposing] [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I think it was a Mohawk. I guess I'm on the record, so I don't have that in front of me.

FEMALE VOICE: Unauthorized haircut?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I would phrase it as an unauthorized haircut. Now I characterized this to the Secretary as generally good news, because it was clear to me that the incidents are being reported, number one. Number two, the chain of command was taking swift and effective action. And in every case, the punishments ranged from admonishment to reduction in rate, and some cases maybe more. In fact, one individual went to Court-Martial.

MALE VOICE: So all eight have been acted on already?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: All eight were acted on very swiftly.

MALE VOICE: Inaudible.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I'm not sure. But all of these were reported through the chain of command.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Oh yeah, I'd say, you know, roughly two years. A year and a half to two years.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]

ADMIRAL CHURCH: No, and in fact, that's what gives me a great deal of confidence in my findings, is the 43 people taken under oath and specifically asked the kinds of questions we asked them, given that combined with the reports, the incidents we've seen reported and acted on, I'm pretty confident that there's no abuse currently going on, or that there's been any in recent past that has gone unreported.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] allegations [inaudible).

ADMIRAL CHURCH: With a high level of confidence, but I'll take you back to my initial statement. When you interview 43, there's still a low probability that something's slipped through the cracks.

MALE VOICE: Clearly, you didn't interview 100 detainees, you looked at their medical records.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: We looked at over just over 100 medical records.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: We did not interview detainees, no. No.

MALE VOICE: Did you say that you recommended it to the Secretary that a more in depth look be looked, be taken as to what happened [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I made, I said he should consider several things for follow-up. Should he decide to do that, one would be to look a little bit more at the ICRC reports. Apparently there's a new one forthcoming we tried to get. We were not able to get that. And the resolution process for that, that they might go back and take some more sworn testimony, in case there were some gaps. Although we feel pretty confident that with 43, we hit a pretty wide range of personnel. And the third thing that he might want to reach back and talk to people who were there at the earlier stages of Task Force 160 and 170, before they combined them into JTF GTMO, see if there may have been prior incidents that either did or did not go reported. We just didn't have the capabilities to talk to them, to re-track that far.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] characterize in some way.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I'll give you one. I think this was in the press. We had a guard, they had to do what they call an IRF, Immediate Response Force for a disturbance in a cell, one of the guards was bitten. In order to free himself, he hit the detainee with his walkie-talkie. They were able to free him. Subsequent to that, the detainee was cuffed. After he was cuffed, the detainee-I'm sorry, the military police punched the detainee. He was taken to Article 15. Not the first incident, which was determined to be self-defense, but the follow-on incident, which was a violation of standard operating procedures, and a standard operating procedures are unambiguous and adhered to. And he was reduced in rate.

MALE VOICE: Rate? Or rank?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Rank.

MALE VOICE: Rank.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Rating, or rank.

MALE VOICE: Oh, I see, sorry. [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: There was, I don't know if I'd characterize it as more serious. That was probably about as serious I could think.

MALE VOICE: Is there a way to characterize the pending issues with the first ICRC report? What are the things that need to be solved from the first one?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: The reason I said that they need to do little more in depth look at the ICRC, we didn't have the time. Really to get that involved in it, or to, I mean I read, I read the transcripts of the minutes that General Miller had the last two visits. It was clear to me that they're working on the issues. But there's a wide range of issues dealing with, you know, the relatively, let's say lesser important from the speed of which mail was processed, up to the more lasting issues, which are things like the whole legal framework, the long-term and uncertain duration of the [inaudible], some of which we talked about earlier today, and some of which, obviously I wasn't involved. I think the, I think the Secretary may already be looking at a process.

FEMALE VOICE: [inaudible] parameters on these eight incidences. I mean, is that haircut, is that a violation because the detainee was humiliated, or does this run from humiliation to minor physical abuse but that didn't result in severe injuries?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [interposing] That's a good characterization. Humiliation to mild physical contact. There is one issue ...

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] humiliation described by [inaudible]?

FEMALE VOICE: That is a clear violation of [inaudible].

STAFF MALE VOICE: I know, but in the current context, humiliation has a new standard, and it's important to see description that Admiral will provide and the context was understood at the time.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Not in the last 35 years.

MALE VOICE: What about another incident where a guard had sprayed a detainee with a water hose?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Well, [inaudible] coming back to me, that was, as I, I won't recall the details exactly, but as I remember, the guard was passing through, and I'm not certain what was thrown on him, whether it was toilet water or excretement (phonetic), and he did a shot of pepper spray, which was determined to be premature and in violation to standard operating procedures, and military justice was swift.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] military police and military intelligence, and what is the [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: What I saw was...

MALE VOICE: Did you investigate this incident or element?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I looked at the organization. It's very clear to me that CJTF GTMO, who is General Hood, previously General Miller, as a very tight organization where everybody reports to and through him. So military police, it's called JDOG, Detention Operations Group, and the Joint Intelligence Group must report directly to him, for all matters relating to what goes on in the camp.

MALE VOICE: Sorry. I wanted to get his name for, and his name and rank?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Brigadier General Jay Hood. He was [inaudible].

MALE VOICE: J-A-Y?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: J-A-Y? Like [inaudible]. He was our -- I'm sorry. There may have been a second part to the question.

MALE VOICE: As far as the organization [inaudible] at the top, but if there's any interaction. what's the organizational interaction between the MPs and [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: They, they do what I would call a coordinating role. Military police, it's very clearly laid out in standard operating procedures. It's all passive. They monitor the detainees, they monitor their behavior, they monitor who the leaders are, who the followers are, they monitor what is said and they ask for an interpreter it there's a lot of conversation going on. They'll know eating habits, and they'll record this in a management information system, which could be useful to the intelligence group, during the interrogations. The only physical thing they do is they escort the detainees to the interrogation. They escort them back, and they monitor the interrogations in a side room. So you have interrogators, the analysts, linguists, the guards are monitoring outside the room what's going on, in case they need to get in there.

MALE VOICE: All [inaudible] interrogation [inaudible] present, sir?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I was inside the room. I watched [inaudible].

FEMALE VOICE: [interposing] [inaudible] one-way glass?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Yes, there's a, on the one-way glass.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]

ADMIRAL CHURCH: That wasn't my charter.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible]

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [inaudible] the Secretary of Defense go down to see if my orders are being carried out. I don't need to interview detainees to do that in my view.

MALE VOICE: What's the approximate number of hours in a week that a detainee might get interrogated?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I don't know that. It varies. I know the interrogation protocol varies based on what their intelligence value is. It's all laid out in a plan. Here's a good point of clarification. I didn't look at the plan. It wasn't my job to see whether I agree or disagree with the plan. I wanted to make sure the plans were done, they were approved by proper authority procedures involved.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] taped incidents?

MALE VOICE: Most are hall guards, not interrogators.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: No. As I remember, there were four guards, three interrogators, and a barber.

MALE VOICE: Oh, I'm sorry. You went through that.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Yeah, it may be three or four the other way, but it's split about even.

MALE VOICE: What does it say about this critical Red Cross report that the Secretary referred to?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Not much because first of all, it's classified as far as I know. Secondly, I haven't seen it. We tried to get it when we were down there, and we couldn't get it.

MALE VOICE, What do you mean you couldn't get it?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Well, it hadn't, it hadn't been made available to us.

STAFF MALE VOICE, [interposing] [inaudible] recently, it was our understanding that they've been provided to some officials of the State Department. State Department officials shared it just last night, yesterday, and there's been no opportunity to get it this way.

FEMALE VOICE: Total number of guards on the staff, total? Do you have a ballpark [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Well, there's, depends on how you define staff.

FEMALE VOICE, Well, I was told that you interviewed 43 out of how large a sample?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Oh, actually, that's a very small sample. There are six MP companies there are probably close to 600 guards. There is a battalion guarding the exterior perimeter, but they're not involved in the process. The number of interrogators I have to get back to.

MALE VOICE, A hundred?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I have to get back you. I don't think it's quite that high.

FEMALE VOICE: [inaudible]?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I learned it on Monday night. I think he learned of it, about the same time I did. [inaudible] we arranged travel [inaudible].

MALE VOICE: Eight guards have received reductions in rank? There were two guards that. ..

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [interposing] No, no, no, no.

MALE VOICE: How many guards received...

ADMIRAL CHURCH: I documented eight minor infractions during my visit, all of which have been reported to higher authority.

MALE VOICE: Over a period of time.

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Over a period of between 18 months and two years. As I remember there were four guards, three interrogators, and a barber. All were investigated. Disciplinary action was taken quickly. All were reported through the chain of command. And in my view, that was good news because obviously people felt free to report, which is what I was looking for. And there was swift disciplinary action taken by a strong chain of command, which is another thing I was looking for.

MALE VOICE: It ranged from reprimands [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [inaudible].

MALE VOICE: Yeah. Reprimands to reductions in rank. [inaudible]

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [interposing] Yeah, there were reductions in rank to admonitions. Let's say that.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] Court-Martials [inaudible] Court-Martial result?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: He was acquitted.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] punish [inaudible].

ADMIRAL CHURCH: [inaudible] yeah, but you see the, you see the stress regards work under and the discipline and the whole procedures down there, I think I was very impressed, particularly when you look at the other side, the 14 incidents against the guards weekly.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] recommend any substance [inaudible] Secretary in treatment or procedure?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: No. It wasn't my job to do that. I did recommend some follow-up areas where he might consider looking into. My job was to see that his orders were being carried out. I did that to the best of my ability.

FEMALE VOICE: You feel that they are?

ADMIRAL CHURCH: Yes. With a high level of confidence, based on what I was able to do in 48 hours.

MALE VOICE: [inaudible] with respect to ...

ADMIRAL CHURCH: With respect to specific areas of interrogation, orders on humane treatment that were passed down, as you mentioned, reviewed by the lawyers and passed down to the commander on the scene.

MALE VOICE: Thanks a lot [inaudible].

MALE VOICE: Thank you.
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