The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:01 am

PART 1 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

The Mikolashek Report

Department of the Army
The Inspector General
Detainee Operations Inspection

21 July 2004

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Chapter 1 - Background and Inspection Concept
• Chapter 2 - Inspection Methodology
• Chapter 3 - Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees
• Chapter 4 - Interrogation Operations
• Chapter 5 - Other Observations
• Chapter 6 - Summary of Recommendations
• Appendix A - References
• Appendix B - Assessment Directive
• Appendix C - Locations Visited
• Appendix D - Inspection Tools
• Appendix E - Standards
• Appendix F- Abbreviations and Acronyms

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

JUL 21, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

SUBJECT: Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection Report on Detainee Operations

I approve the Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection Report on Detainee Operations dated 21 July 2004.

I direct:

a. As an exception to policy, the unclassified portion of this report be released, without redactions, through posting on the Army website.

b. Findings and recommendations concerning Central Command be forwarded through the Joint Staff to Central Command for consideration.

c. The Director of the Army Staff task the appropriate Army Staffs and major Army commands with implementing the recommendations specified in the inspection report and then track their compliance.

d. The Department of the Army Inspector General disseminate the inspection report to the Army leadership.

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

FOREWORD

This inspection report responds to the Acting Secretary of the Army's 10 February 2004 directive to conduct a functional analysis of the Army's conduct of detainee and interrogation operations to identify any capability shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required.

Based on this inspection:

• the overwhelming majority of our leaders and Soldiers understand the requirement to treat detainees humanely and are doing so.
• we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. These incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline.
• the current operational environment demands that we adapt; our Soldiers are adapting; so we must also adapt our doctrine, organization, and training.

We examined the two key components of detainee operations: the capture, security and humane treatment of the detainees; and the conduct of interrogation operations in order to gain useful intelligence. While we did not find any systemic failures that directly led to the abusive situations we reviewed, we have made recommendations to improve the effectiveness of detainee operations.

We found that Soldiers are conducting operations under demanding, stressful, and dangerous conditions against an enemy who does not follow the Geneva Conventions. They are in an environment that puts a tremendous demand on human intelligence, particularly, at the tactical level where contact with the enemy and the people are most intense. They do understand their duty to treat detainees humanely and in accordance with laws of land warfare. These Soldiers understand their obligation to report incidents of abuse when they do occur, and they do so. Our leaders have been developed, trained and educated to adapt to the environment in which they find themselves. They understand their tasks, conditions and standards. The conditions of the current operations have caused them to adapt their tactics, techniques and procedures within their capabilities to accommodate this operational environment.

Expanding our doctrine to provide commanders flexibility and adaptability within well-defined principles will better enable them to conduct these operations. Our training and education systems at the individual, unit, and institutional levels must continue to be thorough and realistically simulate the intensity of the environment in which we now operate.

While the primary purpose of this inspection was not to examine specific incidents of abuse, we did analyze reported incidents to determine their root or fundamental causes. To provide a context for the incidents, we noted that an estimated 50,000 individuals were detained for at least some period of time by U.S. Forces during the conduct of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S. Forces’ contact with the local populace at checkpoints, on patrols, and in other situations increases the number of contacts well in excess of this 50,000 estimate. As of 9 June 2004, there were 94 cases of confirmed or possible abuse of any type, which include, theft, physical assault, sexual assault, and death.

The abuses that have occurred are not representative of policy, doctrine, or Soldier training. These abuses should be viewed as what they are - unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals, and in some cases, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate supervision and leadership. These actions, while regrettable, are aberrations when compared to the actions of fellow Soldiers who are serving with distinction.

Executive Summary: Detainee Operations

1. Background: On 10 February 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to conduct an assessment of detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to satisfy this directive, the DAIG inspected internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inspection focused on the adequacy of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), standards, force structure, and policy in support of these types of operations.

This inspection was not an investigation of any specific incidents or units but rather a comprehensive review of how the Army conducts detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The DAIG did not inspect the U.S. military corrections system or operations at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base during this inspection. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense HUMINT Services (DHS) operations were not inspected.

2. Purpose: Conduct a functional analysis of the Army’s internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures, policies, and practices based on current Department of Defense and Army policies and doctrine. The inspection is to identify any capability and systemic shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required.

3. Concept: Two teams conducted inspections of 26 locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Continental United States (CONUS). The CONUS team consisted of seven personnel, including augmentees, and visited 10 locations while the OCONUS team consisted of nine personnel, including augmentees, and inspected 16 locations. We interviewed and surveyed over 650 leaders and Soldiers spanning the ranks from Private to Major General. We also reviewed 103 reports of allegations of abuse from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and 22 unit investigations that covered the period from September 2002 to June 2004.

4. Objectives: The DAIG Team had four objectives for the inspection: war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures.

b. Determine the standards for Army Forces charged with internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures (e.g., size, equipment, standardization, and training).

c. Assess current and future organizations and structures for Army Forces responsible for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

d. Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

d. Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

5. Synopsis: In the areas that we inspected, we found that the Army is accomplishing its mission both in the capture, care, and custody of detainees and in its interrogation operations. The overwhelming majority of our leaders and Soldiers understand and adhere to the requirement to treat detainees humanely and consistent with the laws of land warfare. Time and again these Soldiers, while under the stress of combat operations and prolonged insurgency operations, conduct themselves in a professional and exemplary manner.

The abuses that have occurred in both Afghanistan and Iraq are not representative of policy, doctrine, or Soldier training. These abuses were unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate monitoring, supervision, and leadership over those Soldiers. These abuses, while regrettable, are aberrations when compared to their comrades in arms who are serving with distinction.

The functional analysis of the Army’s internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures, policies, and practices can be broken down into two main functions: (1) capture, care, and control of detainees, and (2) interrogation operations.

We determined that despite the demands of the current operating environment against an enemy who does not abide by the Geneva Conventions, our commanders have adjusted to the reality of the battlefield and, are effectively conducting detainee operations while ensuring the humane treatment of detainees. The significant findings regarding the capture, care, and control of detainees are:

• All interviewed and observed commanders, leaders, and Soldiers treated detainees humanely and emphasized the importance of the humane treatment of detainees.
• In the cases the DAIG reviewed, all detainee abuse occurred when one or more individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases abuse was accompanied by leadership failure at the tactical level.
• Of all facilities inspected, only Abu Ghraib was determined to be undesirable for housing detainees because it is located near an urban population and is under frequent hostile fire, placing Soldiers and detainees at risk.

We determined that the nature of the environment caused a demand for tactical human intelligence. The demands resulted in a need for more interrogators at the tactical level and better training for Military Intelligence officers. The significant findings regarding interrogation are:

• Tactical commanders and leaders adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures, and held detainees longer than doctrinally recommended due to the demand for timely, tactical intelligence.
• Doctrine does not clearly specify the interdependent, and yet independent, roles, missions, and responsibilities of Military Police and Military Intelligence units in the establishment and operation of interrogation facilities.
• Military Intelligence units are not resourced with sufficient interrogators and interpreters, to conduct timely detainee screenings and interrogations in the current operating environment, resulting in a backlog of interrogations and the potential loss of intelligence.
• Tactical Military Intelligence Officers are not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of the collection and analysis of human intelligence.
• Officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaty obligations and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that policies were not clear and contained ambiguities. The DAIG Team found implementation, training, and oversight of these policies was inconsistent; the Team concluded, however, based on a review of cases through 9 June 2004 that no confirmed instance of detainee abuse was caused by the approved policies.

We reviewed detainee operations through systems (Policy and Doctrine, Organizational Structures, Training and Education, and Leadership and Discipline) that influence how those operations are conducted, and have identified findings and recommendations in each. While these findings are not critical, the implementation of the corresponding recommendations will better enable our commanders to conduct detainee operations now and into the foreseeable future, decrease the possibility of abuse, and ensure we continue to treat detainees humanely.

The findings and observations from this inspection are separated into the following three chapters: Chapter 3 - Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees, Chapter 4 - Interrogation Operations, and Chapter 5 - Other Observations. A summary of the Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees and the Interrogation Operation findings is provided below.

Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees

Army forces are successfully conducting detainee operations to include the capture, care, and control of detainees. Commanders and leaders emphasized the importance of humane treatment of detainees. We observed that leaders and Soldiers treat detainees humanely and understand their obligation to report abuse. In those instances where detainee abuse occurred, individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases individual misconduct was accompanied by leadership failure to maintain fundamental unit discipline, failure to provide proper leader supervision of and guidance to their Soldiers, or failure to institute proper control processes.

We found through our interviews and observations conducted between 7 March 2004 and 5 April 2004 that leaders and Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq were determined to do what was legally and morally right for their fellow Soldiers and the detainees under their care. We found numerous examples of military professionalism, ingrained Army Values, and moral courage in both leaders and Soldiers. These leaders and Soldiers were self-disciplined and demonstrated an ability to maintain composure during times of great stress and danger. With the nature of the threat in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Soldiers are placed in extremely dangerous positions on a daily basis. They face the daily risks of being attacked by detainees, contracting communicable diseases from sick detainees, being taunted or spat upon, having urine or feces thrown upon them, and having to treat a detainee humanely who just attacked their unit or killed a fellow Soldier. Despite these challenges, the vast majority of Soldiers and other U.S. Military personnel continued to do their duty to care for detainees in a fair and humane manner.

Our review of the detainee abuse allegations attempted to identify underlying causes and contributing factors that resulted in abusive situations. We examined these from the perspective of the Policy and Doctrine, Organizational Structures, Training and Education, and Leadership and Discipline systems. We also examined them in terms of location on the battlefield and sought to determine if there was a horizontal, cross-cutting system failure that resulted in a single case of abuse or was common to all of them. Based on this inspection, we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. These incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline. We also found that our policies, doctrine, and training are being continually adapted to address the existing operational environment regarding detainee operations. Commanders adjusted existing doctrinal procedures to accommodate the realities of the battlefield. We expect our leaders to do this and they did. The Army must continue to educate for uncertain environments and develop our leaders to adapt quickly to conditions they confront on the battlefield.

Using a data cut-off of 9 June 2004 we reviewed 103 summaries of Army CID reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries conducted by the chain of command involving detainee death or allegations of abuse. These 125 reports are in various stages of completion. 31 cases have been determined that no abuse occurred; 71 cases are closed; and 54 cases are open or undetermined. Of note, the CID investigates every occurrence of a detainee death regardless of circumstances.

Recognizing that the facts and circumstances as currently known in ongoing cases may not be all-inclusive, and that additional facts and circumstances could change the categorization of a case, the Team placed each report in a category for the purposes of this inspection to understand the overall numbers and the facts currently known, and to examine for trends or systemic issues. This evaluation of allegations of abuse reports is not intended to influence commanders in the independent exercise of their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other administrative disciplinary actions. As an Inspector General inspection, this report does not focus on individual conduct, but on systems and policies.

This review indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 48% (45 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at the point of capture, where Soldiers have the least amount of control of the environment. For this inspection, the DAIG Team interpreted point of capture events as detainee operations occurring at battalion level and below, before detainees are evacuated to doctrinal division forward or central collecting points (CPs). This allowed the DAIG Team to analyze and make a determination to where and what level of possible abuse occurred. The point of capture is the location where most contact with detainees occurs under the most uncertain, dangerous, and frequently violent circumstances.

This review further indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 22% (21 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at Internment/Resettlement (I/R) facilities. This includes the highly publicized incident at Abu Ghraib. Those alleged abuse situations at I/R facilities are attributed to individual failure to abide by known standards and/or individual failure compounded by a leadership failure to enforce known standards, provide proper supervision, and stop potentially abusive situations from occurring. As of 9 June 2004, 20%, (19 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at CPs. For the remaining 10% (9 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse, a location could not be determined based on the CID case summaries.

The Army estimates that over 50,000 detainees have been captured or processed. While even one case of abuse is unacceptable, we conclude that given the volume of detainees and the potential for abuse in these demanding circumstances, the overwhelming majority of our Soldiers and leaders are conducting these operations with due regard for the detainees right to be treated humanely and properly.

Detainee abuse does not occur when individual Soldiers remain disciplined, follow known procedures, and understand their duty obligation to report abusive behavior. Detainee abuse does not occur when leaders of those Soldiers who deal with detainees enforce basic standards of humane treatment, provide oversight and supervision of detainee operations, and take corrective action when they see potentially abusive situations developing. Our site visits, interviews, sensing sessions, and observations indicate that the vast majority of Soldiers and leaders, particularly at the tactical level, understand their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their duty obligation to report infractions.

We inspected I/R facilities at Bagram, Baghdad, and Camp Bucca and found only Abu Ghraib overcrowded, located near a densely populated urban area, on a dangerous main supply route, and subject to frequent hostile enemy fire from enemy mortars or rockets. The physical design of the camps within the prison was not optimal for the mission: towers were not properly placed to support overlapping fields of fire and cover blind spots; entrance/egress routes were hampered by make-shift gates; and sally ports were not used correctly. The supply of fresh water was difficult to maintain and the food quality was sub-standard. Detainees did not have access to bunkers or shelters with overhead cover to protect them from hostile enemy mortar or rocket fire from outside the walls of Abu Ghraib.

Interrogation Operations

The need for timely, tactical human intelligence is critical for successful military operations particularly in the current environment. Commanders recognized this and adapted by holding detainees longer at the point of capture and collecting points to gain and exploit intelligence. Commanders and interrogators also conducted tactical questioning to gain immediate battlefield intelligence. Commanders and leaders must set the conditions for success, and commanders, leaders, and Soldiers must adapt to the ever changing environment in order to be successful.

Of the interviewed point of capture battalion and company leaders, 61% (25 of 41) stated their units established CPs and held detainees at their locations from 12 hours up to 30 days. The primary reason units held detainees at these locations was to conduct screenings and interrogations closer to the point of capture. The result of holding detainees for longer timeframes at all locations was increased requirements in facility infrastructure, medical care, preventive medicine, trained personnel, logistics, and security. Organic unit personnel at these locations did not have the required institutional training and were therefore unaware of or unable to comply fully with Army policies in areas such as detainee processing, confinement operations, security, preventive medicine, and interrogation.

Doctrine does not clearly and distinctly address the relationship between the MP operating I/R facilities and the Military Intelligence (MI) personnel conducting intelligence exploitation at those facilities. Neither MP nor MI doctrine specifically defines the interdependent, yet independent, roles, missions, and responsibilities of the two in detainee operations. MP doctrine states MI may collocate with MP at detention sites to conduct interrogations, and coordination should be made to establish operating procedures. MP doctrine does not, however, address approved and prohibited MI procedures in an MP-operated facility. It also does not clearly establish the role of MPs in the interrogation process. Conversely, MI doctrine does not clearly explain MP internment procedures or the role of MI personnel within an internment setting. Contrary to MP doctrine, FM 34- 2, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, implies an active role for MPs in the interrogation process: "Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings." Subordination of the MP custody and control mission to the MI need for intelligence can create settings in which unsanctioned behavior, including detainee abuse, could occur. Failure of MP and MI personnel to understand each other’s specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and procedures.

Doctrine that addresses the establishment and operation of interrogations contains inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure, and function of these facilities. At the time of the inspection there were facilities in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM that conducted intelligence exploitation as Joint Interrogation Facilities and as a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. The intelligence sections of each were uniquely structured to meet mission requirements.

Shortfalls in numbers of interrogators and interpreters, and the distribution of these assets within the battlespace, hampered human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts. Valuable intelligence—timely, complete, clear, and accurate—may have been lost as a result. Interrogators were not available in sufficient numbers to efficiently conduct screening and interrogations of the large numbers of detainees at collecting points (CPs) and internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, nor were there enough to man sufficient numbers of Tactical Human Intelligence Teams (THTs) for intelligence exploitation at points of capture. Interpreters, especially those Category II personnel authorized to participate in interrogations, were also in short supply. Units offset the shortage of interrogators with contract interrogators. While these contract interrogators provide a valuable service, we must ensure they are trained in military interrogation techniques and policy.

Due to the demand for immediate tactical intelligence, tactical intelligence officers were conducting interrogations of detainees without thorough training on the management of HUMINT analysis and collection techniques. They were not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of HUMINT assets being used in the current operating environment. The need for these officers to understand the management of the full spectrum of HUMINT operations is a key for successful HUMINT exploitation in the current operating environment.

Current interrogation doctrine includes 17 interrogation approach techniques. Doctrine recognizes additional techniques may be applied. Doctrine emphasizes that every technique must be humane and be consistent with legal obligations. Commanders in both OEF and OIF adopted additional interrogation approach technique policies. Officially approved CJTF-180 and CJTF -7 generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaties and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that some interrogators were not trained on the additional techniques in either formal school or unit training programs. Some inspected units did not have the correct command policy in effect at the time of inspection. Based on a review of CID case summaries as of 9 June 2004, the team was unable to establish any direct link between the proper use of an approved approach technique or techniques and a confirmed case of detainee abuse.

6. Conclusion: The Army's leaders and Soldiers are effectively conducting detainee operations and providing for the care and security of detainees in an intense operational environment. Based on this inspection, we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. This report offers 52 recommendations that are designed to improve the ability of the Army to accomplish the key tasks of detainee operations: keep the enemy off the battlefield in a secure and humane manner, and gain intelligence in accordance with Army standards.

Chapter 1: Background and Inspection Concept

1. Background: On 10 February 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to conduct an assessment of detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to satisfy the Acting Secretary of the Army's directive, the DAIG inspected internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The inspection focused on the adequacy of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), standards, force structure, and policy.

2. Inspection Concept: The detailed concept for this inspection is as follows:

a. Purpose: The purpose of this inspection was to conduct a functional analysis of detainee operations based on current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policy and doctrine.

b. Objectives:

(1) Assess the adequacy of DOTMLPF of Army Forces for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures.

(2) Determine the standards for Army Forces charged with internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures (e.g., size, equipment, standardization, and training).

(3) Assess current and future organizations and structures for Army Forces responsible for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

(4) Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

c. Scope: Two teams conducted inspections of 25 locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Continental United States (CONUS). The CONUS team consisted of seven personnel, including augmentees, and visited seven locations while the OCONUS team consisted of nine personnel, including augmentees, and inspected 16 locations. We interviewed and surveyed over 650 leaders and Soldiers spanning the ranks from Private to Major General. We also reviewed 103 reports of allegations of abuse from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and 22 unit investigations that cover the period of September 2002 to June 2004.

d. Focus: The inspection focused on the functional analysis of the Army's internment, enemy prisoner of war, and detention policies, practices, and procedures as the Army executes its role as the DoD Executive Agent for Enemy Prisoners of War and Detention Program. Numerous DoD Policies, Army Regulations, and Army Field Manuals provided the guiding tenets for this inspection.

e. Task Organization: Two teams from the DAIG Inspections Division, with augmentation from the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (USAMANSCEN), U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIC), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) conducted the inspection by traveling to 25 locations in CONUS and OCONUS. The composition of these teams was as follows:

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f. Inspection Process:

(1) Preparation Phase: Research and Training (February - March 2004)

(2) Execution Phase: On-Site Inspections (March - April 2004)

(3) Completion Phase: Final Report Preparation (April - June 2004)

g. Inspection Locations and Schedule: See Appendix C.

h. Inspection Approach: The Inspectors General (IG) for Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), and local IGs served as coordinating agents for all DAIG inspection activities at those locations. These IGs were telephonically and electronically notified by DAIG with the Notification Memorandum and Detailed Inspection Plan that was sent to all affected Commanders/IGs on 20 February 2004.

i. Other Reports: This report mentions the Ryder Report, Miller Report, and Taguba Investigation throughout its inspection results. These two reports and investigation deal with the following: the Ryder Report is an assessment of detention and corrections operations in Iraq; the Miller Report is a classified assessment of the Department of Defense's counterterrorism interrogation and detention operations in Iraq; and the Taguba Investigation is a classified investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 into the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade's detention and internment operations.

j. Definitions: The DAIG used the following definitions throughout the report.

(1) The DAIG defined the term "detainee operations" as the range of actions taken by Soldiers beginning at the point of capture, the movement of detainees through division forward and central collecting points (CPs), to internment at internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, and release. This includes the administrative and medical processing of detainees, medical treatment of detainees, sanitary conditions at I/R facilities and CPs, and interrogation procedures. The term "detainee operations" does not apply to confined U.S. Military personnel.

(2) Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, defines the term detainee as "any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force." The DAIG uses the term as defined by AR 190-8 in this report. The term "detainee" includes enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), retained persons (RP), civilian internees (CIs), and other detainees (ODs). When making a differentiation between the different classifications of detainees, the report will specifically mention EPWs, RPs, CIs, or ODs. The report will also point out the use of non-doctrinal terms sometimes used as detainee classifications.

(3) The battlespace of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) included an enemy that deployed asymmetrically with adaptive tactics; a battlespace in which there was not always a clear forward line of troops, massing of forces, or an identifiable rear area to which detainees could be rapidly evacuated. The battlespace of OEF and OIF was non-linear with combat and stability operations taking place simultaneously throughout the areas of operation. Combatants included both uniformed and non-uniformed state and non-state sponsored forces who fought using conventional and non-conventional methods to include terrorist actions against both military and civilian targets. Detainees were, and continue to be, more than compliant civilian internees and enemy prisoners of war. They are primarily a noncompliant hostile population that requires more intensive screening, interrogation and segregation. The Army is in a new and unique operational environment stemming from the need for immediate tactical level intelligence coupled with the significant numbers of non-traditional combatants/detainees encountered.

(4) We define a problem as systemic if it is widespread and presents a pattern. We attempted through observations, sensing sessions, interviews, site visits, surveys, and reviews of documents, other reports, and investigations to identify failures in the systems that comprise detainee operations.

Chapter 2: Inspection Methodology

The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Team developed a baseline approach to the inspection that focused on gathering information and data from five primary domains: interviews, sensing sessions, document reviews, surveys of commanders, leaders, and Soldiers, and site visits. This approach allowed the Team to glean perceptions and attitudes about detainee operations from selected individuals and populations; to assess detainee operations in doctrinal manuals, unit policies, unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs); and to determine compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policies. The Team visited U.S. Armed Forces-controlled internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities and division central and forward collecting points (CPs), as well as units conducting patrol missions, to gather overall trends and observations on detainee operations from point of capture to the processing conducted at U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities.

This baseline methodology afforded the Team a standard, systematic approach to conducting an inspection at each location, which proved essential since the DAIG Team conducted split operations with two teams that traveled separately to continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) locations. The Team had to tailor their trips to look at units that had already returned from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) as well as those units currently deployed.

The methodology established a three-phase plan for executing the inspection.

a. Phase 1: Preparation. This phase included travel planning, pre-deployment training, administrative requirements, a review of documents the Team requested in advance from the unit IGs, pre-inspection visits to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and development of a detailed inspection plan.

b. Phase 2: Execution. This phase outlined the physical execution of the itinerary developed by the local IG in accordance with the Detailed Inspection Plan. Each visit began with an inbrief to the unit's senior leadership and ended with an outbrief. The DAIG Team conducted interviews, sensing sessions, and a survey of Commanders, leaders and Soldiers currently in the area of responsibility (AOR) and those who recently returned from OEF and OIF to determine detainee operations tactics, techniques, and procedures from point of capture to arrival at the CPs; inspected CPs from receipt of detainees to the transfer of detainees to U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities; inspected U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities and operations; and reviewed policies, plans, records, programs, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and other related documents.

c. Phase 3: Completion. The DAIG Team returned to home station and conducted post-trip data analyses of the information gathered. The Team then crafted detailed trip reports of the visit that captured the critical information gleaned from the trips. These trip reports formed the basis from which the Team developed the findings outlined in the report. Additionally, team members cross-walked information and traveled to the MI and MP schools for coordination and confirmation of information used in the findings.

The following section outlines the baseline methodology in detail to include the specific requirements for interviews and sensing sessions based upon the type of unit visited.

a. Inspection Methodology. The local IG served as the coordinating agent for all DAIG inspection activities. The coordinating agent worked with his or her respective DAIG Team point of contact (POC) to develop an itinerary for a four-day inspection for CONUS units and a 30-day period for OCONUS. The coordinating agent and DAIG Team POC fine-tuned the itinerary to maximize the Team's ability to meet the inspection's baseline requirements.

b. Personnel Interviewed:

(1) OCONUS

(a) The Team conducted interviews at CFLCC, CJTF-7, CJTF-180, U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities, and division CPs. The Team interviewed selected leaders from CFLCC/CJTF/division/brigade/battalion staffs and company level personnel. Individual interviews occurred in the interviewee's office or in a similar location free from interruptions and telephone calls. The coordinating agent scheduled these interviews to last no more than 1.5 hours. The coordinating agent also considered geographical dispersion and travel times between events. The interviews were conducted by one or two DAIG Team members with the unit interviewee.

(b) The DAIG Team conducted sensing sessions at each U.S. Armed Forces controlled I/R facility, division CPs, and at the company level, one for junior enlisted (Private through Specialist, but not including Corporals) and one for junior noncommissioned officers (Sergeant and Staff Sergeant). Units provided eight to twelve Soldiers per session. Each sensing session required a classroom or similar facility that was removed from the unit's normal work location. The area was relatively quiet and free from interruptions and telephone calls. In addition, the room needed no less than 14 chairs or desks formed in a circle or square. The coordinating agent scheduled 1.5-hour time blocks for each sensing session. The sensing sessions were conducted by two DAIG Team members with the unit Soldiers.

(c) The coordinating agent adjusted the interview schedule, in coordination with the Team, based upon the availability of personnel. The Team recognized that only full-time manning personnel might be available in Reserve Component units.

(d) The matrix below was a strawman that was finalized by the DAIG Team POC and the local IG for the OCONUS inspection.

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(2) CONUS

(a) The Team conducted interviews of division, brigade, battalion, and company level personnel. The Team interviewed selected leaders from each of these type units. Individual interviews occurred in the interviewee's office or in a similar location that was free from interruptions and telephone calls. The coordinating agent scheduled these interviews to last no more than 1.5 hours. The coordinating agent considered geographical dispersion and travel times between events. The interviews were conducted by one or two Team members with the unit interviewee.

(b) The DAIG Team conducted sensing sessions with collecting point and I/R facility guards and with Soldiers who captured personnel during OEF and OIF. Sensing sessions included one for junior enlisted (Private through Specialist, but not including Corporals) and one for junior noncommissioned officers (Sergeant and Staff Sergeant). Units provided eight to twelve Soldiers per session. Each sensing session required a classroom or similar facility that was removed from the unit's normal work location. The area was relatively quiet and free from interruptions and telephone calls. In addition, the room needed no less than 14 chairs or desks formed in a circle or square. The coordinating agent scheduled 1.5-hour time blocks for each sensing session. The sensing sessions were conducted by two Team members with the unit Soldiers.

(c) The coordinating agent adjusted the interview schedule, in coordination with the Team, based upon the availability of personnel. The Team recognized that only full-time manning personnel might be available in Reserve Component units.

(d) The matrix below was a strawman that was finalized by the DAIG Team POC and the local IG for the CONUS inspection.

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d. Administrative Support Requirements. The DAIG Team conducted this inspection with minimal disruption to ongoing unit missions. The Team required special arrangements from the field Inspectors General (IGs), including assistance with country clearances, travel in the AOR, in-country travel, sleeping arrangements, convoy security arrangements, body armor, weapons and ammunition, communications, scheduling of inbriefs and outbriefs, interviews and sensing sessions, and an appropriate work space for up to nine personnel conducting DAIG business.

e. Documents Reviewed In Advance (OCONUS Only):

(1) All inspections related to detainee operations, including command products, Inspector General products, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), legal, etc.

(2) All case histories of punishment (judicial and non-judicial) relating to detainee abuse.

(3) Past and current Rules of Engagement (ROE).

f. Documents Reviewed on Site (OCONUS Only):

(1) Unit TACSOPs relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings).

(2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs.

(3) I/R BDE/BN/CO unit manning documentation.

(4) DD Form 2745 (EPW Capture Tag) log.

(5) DD Form 629 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person) log.

(6) DA Form 4137 (Receipt for Evidence/Property Custody Document) log.

(7) DD Form 2708 (Receipt of Inmate/Detained Person) log.

(8) DD Form 1594 (Duty Logs).

(9) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities reporting system database.

(10) Facility maintenance and repair documentation.

(11) Facility security SOP.

(12) Detainee in/out-processing documentation.

g. Documents Reviewed During Inspections (CONUS Only):

(1) Unit Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings).

(2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs.

(3) I/R Brigade (BDE)/Battalion (BN)/Company (Co) unit manning documentation.

h. Inspection Itineraries.

DAIG requested each coordinating agent develop a draft itinerary that met the requirements listed in paragraph b. DAIG requested the coordinating agent include the necessary travel time between scheduled locations. The DAIG Team POC and the coordinating agent developed an itinerary that allows the DAIG Team to meet the objectives listed in Chapter 1 paragraph 2b. The DAIG Team conducted an inbrief with the senior commander/representative at each location.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 2 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Chapter 3: Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees

1. Summary of Findings: Army forces are successfully conducting detainee operations to include the capture, care, and control of detainees. Commanders and leaders emphasized the importance of humane treatment of detainees and, currently, leaders and Soldiers treat detainees humanely and understand their obligation to report abuse. In those instances where detainee abuse occurred, individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases individual misconduct was accompanied by leadership failure to maintain fundamental unit discipline, failure to provide proper leader supervision of and guidance to their Soldiers, or failure to institute proper control processes.

For the purpose of this inspection, we defined abuse as wrongful death, assault, battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, or theft. As of 9 June 2004 we had reviewed 103 summaries of Criminal Investigative Division (CID) reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries conducted by the chain of command involving detainee death or alleged abuse. These 125 reports are in various stages of completion. No abuse was determined to have occurred in 31 cases; 71 cases are closed; and 54 cases are open or undetermined. Of note, the CID investigates every occurrence of a detainee death regardless of circumstances. While recognizing that any abuse incident is one too many, we conducted a review and categorization of the summary reports of the 125 investigations. Based on our review and analysis of reports and case summaries of investigations and our observations and interviews conducted throughout this inspection, we could not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents. The DAIG uses the term "systemic" specifically to describe a problem if it is widespread and presents a pattern. As defined by the DAIG in this report, a systemic issue may be found either horizontally across many various types of units, or vertically through many command levels or within systems. The DAIG determined that incidents where detainees were allegedly mistreated occurred as isolated events. In a few incidents, higher ranking individuals up to Lieutenant Colonel were involved; however, the chain of command took action when an allegation of detainee abuse was reported.

Abu Ghraib had problems with deteriorating infrastructure that impacted the clean, safe, and secure working environment for Soldiers and living conditions for detainees. Poor food quality and food distribution, lack of laundry capability, and inadequate personal hygiene facilities affected the detainees' living conditions. Overcrowding, frequent enemy hostile fire, and lack of in- depth force protection measures also put Soldiers and detainees at risk.

2. Findings:

a. Finding 1:


(1) Finding: All interviewed and observed commanders, leaders, and Soldiers treated detainees humanely and emphasized the importance of the humane treatment of detainees.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team conducted numerous interviews and sensing sessions with leaders and Soldiers that revealed most leaders and Soldiers have treated detainees humanely and would report detainee abuse if they became aware of it.

For OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Message dated 211933Z JAN 02, stated that Al Qaida and Taliban would be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, most detainees were classified as civilian internees (CIs) (sub-classified for OEF by the following non-doctrinal terms: Persons Under U.S. Control (PUC), Enemy Combatant (EC), and Low-level Enemy Combatant (LLEC)). Interviews, sensing sessions, and document reviews revealed that most Soldiers were aware of their requirement to treat detainees humanely. In most cases, the present level of treatment exceeded the Common Article 3 standard of treatment. Notwithstanding, while detainee abuse had occurred in OEF in the past, the DAIG Team observed that units currently conducting detainee operations missions treated detainees humanely.

Many noncommissioned officers (NCOs) stated very clearly that the humane treatment of detainees was paramount to the success of the mission. Another group of junior enlisted Soldiers stated that they received substantial training on detainee treatment. They went on to specifically mention that they were taught to treat detainees with dignity and respect. In another sensing session, the NCOs stated that the minimum standard for treating detainees is protection, respect, and humane treatment. Some went on to say that violations are not tolerated by the command or fellow Soldiers.

Consistent with these statements, the DAIG Team that visited Iraq and Afghanistan discovered no incidents of abuse that had not been reported through command channels; all incidents were already under investigation. The DAIG Team that visited units recently returning from Iraq did receive a total of 5 new allegations of potential abuse that occurred prior to January 2004. The DAIG Team immediately turned these over to the chain of command and Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID). There is no evidence of the cover-up of current detainee abuse by U.S. Soldiers. This is consistent with the results of the teams’ sensing sessions; all currently deployed Soldiers were aware of their responsibility to report abuse and appeared to be willing and able to report any potential abuse.

In OIF, U.S. Forces detained the full spectrum of classes of detainees, but most were classified as EPWs or CIs. Presently, CIs make up the vast majority of the U.S.-controlled detainee population. EPWs are entitled to all the protections in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), and CIs are entitled to relevant protections in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC). The GPW and GC provide detailed levels and standards of treatment for EPWs and CIs that include treatment during armed conflict and occupation. Most leaders and Soldiers treated EPWs and CIs humanely and consistent with the Geneva Conventions (GPW and GC).

The Army estimates that over 50,000 detainees have been captured or processed. While even one case of abuse is unacceptable, we conclude that given the volume of detainees and the potential for abuse in these demanding circumstances, the overwhelming majority of our Soldiers and leaders are conducting these operations with due regard for the detainees right to be treated humanely and properly.

Detainee abuse does not occur when individual Soldiers remain disciplined, follow known procedures and understand their duty obligation to report abusive behavior. Detainee abuse does not occur when leaders of those Soldiers who deal with detainees enforce basic standards of humane treatment, provide oversight and supervision of detainee operations and take corrective action when they see potentially abusive situations developing. Our site visits, interviews, sensing sessions and observations indicate that the vast majority of Soldiers and leaders, particularly at the tactical level, understand their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their duty obligation to report infractions.

The GC and GPW require that copies of the GC be posted in the detainees' language in facilities that contain EPWs and/or CIs. Only 25% (4 of 16) facilities inspected maintained copies of the Geneva Conventions in the detainees' language. No facilities in Afghanistan complied with this Geneva requirement, while only 4 facilities in Iraq were compliant. Other specific details of treatment outlined in the GPW and GC are covered elsewhere in this report.

The DAIG Team observed that units made efforts to comply with the DoD requirement to treat the detainees consistent with the Geneva Conventions. Some of the improvements being made by units and resourceful individuals include: increased training for key noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and small unit leaders; developing standing operating procedures (SOPs); and requesting copies of the Geneva Conventions in the detainees' language for posting.

In general, the Miller Report recognized that detainees should be secured in a humane environment and that greater involvement by judge advocates was required. The DAIG Team did not observe a dedicated judge advocate for interrogation operations, but did note that the MI brigades, assigned to duty at Abu Ghraib, were each assigned at least 1 brigade judge advocate. The Ryder Report stated EPWs and CIs should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions unless the denial of these protections was due to specifically articulated military necessity.

The Taguba Investigation observed that many Soldiers and units upheld the Army Values. The Taguba Investigation also detailed numerous incidents where U.S. Soldiers abused detainees, which the investigation characterized as "systemic." As used in the Taguba Investigation, the term "systemic" deals with a subset of the security and interrogation operations at only one interment /resettlement facility and is not theater-wide. However, MG Taguba testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 11 May 04, narrowing the extent of the term "systemic" by stating that these particular abuses were individual actions not committed at the direction of the chain of command and that the resulting photos were taken with personal cameras. Additionally, the Taguba Investigation recommended detention facilities make several changes that would help ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions. As stated above, the DAIG uses the term "systemic" specifically to describe a problem if it is widespread and presents a pattern. As defined by the DAIG in this report, a systemic issue may be found either horizontally across many various types of units, or vertically through many command levels from squad through division or higher level. Based on our review and analysis of reports and case summaries of investigations and our observations and interviews conducted throughout this inspection, we could not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents.

(4) Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 continue to emphasize compliance with the requirements regarding the humane treatment of detainees.

Recommendation: Commanders continue to stress the importance of humane treatment of detainees and continue to supervise and train Soldiers on their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their responsibility to report abuse.

b. Finding 2:

(1) Finding: In the cases the DAIG reviewed, all detainee abuse occurred when one or more individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases abuse was accompanied by leadership failure at the tactical level.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: As of 9 June 2004, there were 125 reported cases of detainee abuse (to include death, assault, or indecent assault) that either had been, or were, under investigation.

For the purpose of this inspection, we defined abuse as wrongful death, assault, sexual assault, or theft. As of 9 June 2004 we had reviewed 103 summaries of Criminal Investigation Division (CID) reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries conducted by the chain of command involving detainee death or alleged abuse. These 125 reports are in various stages of completion. No abuse was determined to have occurred in 31 cases; 71 cases are closed; and 54 cases are open or undetermined. Of note, the CID investigates every occurrence of a detainee death regardless of circumstances.

Recognizing that the facts and circumstances as currently known in ongoing cases may not be all inclusive, and that additional facts and circumstances could change the categorization of a case, the Team placed each report in a category for the purposes of this inspection to understand the overall numbers and the facts currently known, and to examine for a trend or systemic issue. This evaluation of alleged abuse reports is not intended to, nor should it, influence commanders in the independent exercise of their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other administrative disciplinary actions. As an Inspector General inspection, this report does not focus on individual conduct, but on systems and policies.

We separated these 125 cases into two categories:

(1) no abuse occurred

(2) confirmed or possible abuse

In the first category of no abuse occurring, we further separate the reports into deaths (to include death from natural causes and justified homicide as determined by courts martial) and other instances (to include cases where there was insufficient evidence to determine whether abuse occurred or where the leadership determined, through courts martial or investigation, that no abuse occurred). There were a total of 19 natural deaths and justified homicides, and 12 instances of insufficient evidence or determined that no abuse occurred. Deaths occurred at the following locations: 15 at I/R facilities; 1 at Central Collecting Points (CPs); 1 at Forward CPs; and 2 at the point of capture (POC) for a total of 19. Other instances where it was determined that no abuse occurred were at the following locations: 2 at I/R facilities; 1 at Central CPs; 2 at Forward CPs; 5 at the POC; and 2 at locations which could not be determined or did not fall into doctrinal categories, for a total of 12.

In the second category of confirmed or possible abuse, we further separated the reports into wrongful deaths, deaths with undetermined causes, and other alleged abuse (e.g., assault, sexual assault, or theft). There were a total of 20 deaths and 74 incidents of other alleged abuse. Deaths occurred at the following locations: 10 at I/R facilities; 0 at Central CPs; 5 at Forward CPs; and 5 at the POC, for a total of 20. Other instances of alleged abuse occurred at the following locations: 11 at I/R facilities; 3 at Central CPs; 11 at Forward CPs; 40 at the POC; and 9 at locations which could not be determined or did not fall into doctrinal categories, for a total of 74.

This review indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 48% (45 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at the point of capture. For this inspection, the DAIG Team interpreted point of capture events as detainee operations occurring at battalion level and below, before detainees are evacuated to doctrinal division forward or central collecting points (CPs). This allowed the DAIG Team to analyze and make a determination to where and what level of possible abuse occurred. The point of capture is the location where most contact with detainees occurs under the most uncertain, dangerous and frequently violent circumstances. During the period of April- August 2003 when units were most heavily engaged in combat operations, 56% (29 of 52) of point of capture incidents were reported. Even during this period of high intensity combat operations, Soldiers and leaders identified incidents that they believe to be abuse and the command took action when reported. Most of the allegations of abuse that occurred at the point of capture were the result of actions by a Soldier or Soldiers who failed to maintain their self discipline, integrity, and military bearing, when dealing with the recently captured detainees. There are a few incidents that clearly show criminal activity by an individual or individuals with disregard of their responsibility as a Soldier.

This review further indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 22% (21 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at I/R facilities. This includes the highly publicized incident at Abu Ghraib. Those alleged abuse situations at the I/R facilities are attributed to: individual failure to abide by known standards and/or individual failure compounded by a leadership failure to enforce known standards, provide proper supervision and stop potentially abusive situations from occurring.

While recognizing that any abuse incident is one too many, through a review of the summary reports of the 125 investigations and categorizing them, the DAIG did not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents. The DAIG uses the term "systemic" specifically to describe a problem if it is widespread and presents a pattern. As defined by the DAIG in this report, a systemic issue may be found either horizontally across many various types of units, or vertically through many command levels from squad through division or higher level. The DAIG determined that incidents where detainees were allegedly mistreated occurred as isolated events. In a few incidents, higher ranking individuals up to Lieutenant Colonel were involved; however, the chain of command took action when an allegation of detainee abuse was reported.

Recognizing that the facts and circumstances as currently known in ongoing cases may not be all inclusive, and that additional facts and circumstances could change the categorization of a case, the Team placed each report in a category for the purposes of this inspection to understand the overall numbers and the facts currently known, and to examine for a trend or systemic issue. This evaluation of alleged abuse reports is not intended to influence commanders in the independent exercise of their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other administrative disciplinary actions.

The DAIG Team that visited Iraq and Afghanistan found no incidents of abuse that had not already been reported through command channels; all incidents were already under investigation. The DAIG Team that visited units recently returning from Iraq did receive a total of 5 new allegations of potential abuse that occurred prior to January 2004. In each of these cases, CID and the chain of command were notified of the allegations. There is no evidence of any cover-up of current detainee abuse by U.S. Soldiers. This is consistent with the results of the teams’ sensing sessions that all currently deployed Soldiers were aware of their responsibility to report abuse and appeared to be willing and able to report it.

In studying the actual abuse investigations, the incidents may be broken down into 2 broad categories. The first category will be referred to as isolated abuse, and the second as progressive abuse. The first are those incidents that appear to be a one-time occurrence. In other words, these are incidents where individual Soldiers took inappropriate actions upon the capture of detainees or while holding or interrogating them. The second category of detainee abuse, referred to as progressive abuse because these usually develop from an isolated incident into a more progressive abuse.

There is substantial research on the behavior of guards in prisons and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)/Prisoner of War (POW) camps, in addition to the Department of Defense (DoD) experience of running simulated prisoner of war resistance training. Research indicates that regardless of how good the training and oversight, some inappropriate behavior will occur. (For example, one of the seminal studies of prisoner/guard behavior is Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P., A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison, the Office of Naval Research, 1973. For a more recent review, along with significant commentary, see Philip Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understand How Good People are Transformed into Perpetrators, a chapter in Arthur Miller (Ed.) The social psychology of good and evil: Understanding our capacity for kindness and cruelty. New York: Guilford, 2004. Also worth reviewing are Stanley Milgram’s studies, starting with Obedience to Authority, New York: Harper & Row, 1974.) Because of this, the DoD simulated prisoner of war resistance training that prepares service members to resist exploitation, requires intensive oversight to prevent the abuse of Soldiers by other Soldiers.

Contributing factors to the first category of abuse include poor training (common in the cases the DAIG Team reviewed), poor individual discipline, novel situations (to include the stressors involved in combat operations), and a lack of control processes (specific oversight mechanisms). Commander's addressed the first category of abuse through counseling, administrative action, and UCMJ (up to and including courts-martial).

Below are 4 examples of this first category of detainee abuse from the 125 reported allegations referenced in the first paragraph of the inspection results above.

• One incident occurred at an internment/resettlement (I/R) facility where a Master Sergeant and her 3 subordinates attempted to beat several detainees as they arrived at the camp. Other Soldiers, not in her chain of command, prevented much of the potential abuse and then reported the Master Sergeant to the chain of command who took corrective action. All 4 Soldiers were administratively separated from the Army; 3 of these Soldiers also received nonjudicial punishment.
• In another incident a Specialist was threatening detainees by stating he would shoot them. A guard observed him making these threats and immediately turned the Specialist in to his chain of command. The commander took quick action, administering an Article 15, to prevent a recurrence.
• Another example occurred in an internment facility where a Specialist and a Staff Sergeant began to punish a detainee by using excessive force. Another Soldier from a different company joined them. The Platoon Sergeant discovered the incident and immediately relieved both of the Soldiers in his platoon and pressed charges against all 3. All 3 received field- grade Article 15 punishments.
• Another illustrative incident occurred when an interrogator struck a detainee on the head during questioning. The International Committee of the Red Cross, via the mayor of the detainee's compound, discovered this after the fact. Once he was made aware of the incident, the Soldier’s commander investigated and ultimately issued a field-grade Article 15. The commander then required 2 Soldiers to be present during every interrogation.

In these examples, abuse was discovered immediately by the command, and corrective actions were taken to prevent a recurrence. One comment made by a Noncommissioned officer (NCO) from a unit that did not have any abuse cases was that multiple levels of NCO oversight ensured compliance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the team leaders and Platoon Sergeant maintained strict standards for all Military Police (MP). One interrogator NCO stated that in his unit there would be a number of people in the room during interrogations to ensure that Soldiers did not violate the Interrogation ROE.

The psychological research on abuse (see above) suggests that in similar situations, such as prisons, when some relatively minor abusive behavior occurs and corrective action is not taken, there is an escalation of violence. If there is uncorrected abuse and more people become involved, there is a diffusion of responsibility making it easier for individuals to commit abuse. The research further suggests that a moral disengagement occurs which allows individuals to rationalize and justify their behavior. (See Bandura, A., Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1999.)

In at least 11 of the 125 incidents reviewed by the DAIG Team, immediate corrective action was not taken by the chain of command. The reasons for this leadership failure included either a lack of fundamental unit discipline, ambiguous command and control over the facility or individuals involved, ambiguous guidance from command on the treatment of detainees, no control processes in place to provide oversight and notify the command of the incident, or, in very few cases, leader complicity at the Lieutenant Colonel level and below in the actions. This led to the second category of detainee abuse, referred to as progressive abuse because these usually develop from an isolated incident into a more progressive abuse.

Here are 5 examples of this second category from the 125 reported allegations referenced in the first paragraph of the inspection results above, where actions were not taken until more generalized abuse had occurred.

• The incidents involving Tier 1A at Abu Ghraib began no later than October and continued until December 2003. The degradation of the detainees by the guard force appears to have started out with smaller, less-intensive types of abuse and humiliation, and increased to physical assault and injury. There were no formal control processes, such as a routine inspection of Tier 1A during the night hours or electronic monitoring, in place to easily identify abuse and bring it to the attention of the command. Eventually, a Soldier who knew it was wrong was made aware of the abuse and reported it to CID. Charges were referred on 20 March 2004 against 6 reserve MP Soldiers for detainee abuse, and further investigation continues.
• In a different incident that resulted in a death, 2 Warrant Officers appeared to exhibit a pattern of abusive interrogations. A detainee, who was overweight and in poor physical health, died during an interrogation. The CID investigation contained sworn statements indicating that physical beatings at this site were common during this time and alleged that the two Warrant Officers routinely slapped and beat the detainees they were questioning. There were no control processes in place to review the interrogation techniques used in this facility. There was apparently no oversight on the behavior of the interrogators, and, although many of the guard personnel were aware of the techniques being used, the abusive behavior was not reported. There was a perception among the guard personnel that this type of behavior by the interrogators was condoned by their chain of command. Both Warrant Officers received a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and further disposition of the case is under review.
• In another incident a platoon detained 2 individuals, later released them on a bridge, and made them jump into a river below. One of the detainees drowned. Sworn statements indicated the platoon "as a whole" had previously discussed having detainees jump off the bridge, and the planned action apparently had the support of the Platoon Sergeant. There is no evidence to support any previous incidents by this platoon, but these discussions are indicators that junior leader deficiencies at the platoon level contributed to the death of a detainee. CID continues to investigate this incident.
• There was an incident involving a Sergeant First Class (SFC) telling his subordinates to, "rough them up," referring to 2 detainees in custody. This occurred in the middle of the night without any oversight and at a division collecting point operated by an infantry unit. There are indications that this SFC had given similar guidance earlier. Several of the SFC’s subordinates actually performed most of the subsequent beating. There is no evidence that the SFC had abused detainees previously. This incident was adjudicated by both Special and Summary Courts-Martial, with the SFC receiving a reduction to Staff Sergeant (SSG) and a punitive censure. One SSG was reduced to a Specialist and received 30 days confinement; another SSG pled guilty to one specification of violation of a lawful general order and was reduced to the grade of Sergeant. Finally, a Specialist was found guilty at a summary court-martial and his punishment included forfeiture of $1092 and hard labor without confinement for 45 days.
• One final example is an incident where a Soldier had been talking extensively with others in his unit about wanting to kill an Iraqi. This Soldier later shot and killed an Iraqi detainee who was flexi-cuffed and may have tripped while walking away from the Soldier. This incident is currently under investigation.

Although elimination of all abuse is the goal of the DoD Law of War Training several factors prevent the complete elimination of detainee abuse. These include:

a. The psychological process that increases the likelihood of abusive behavior when one person has complete control over another is a major factor. This is the same process that occurs in prisons, in EPW/POW camps, and in DoD resistance training. Even in well-trained and screened populations, it is a constant threat. This threat can be minimized through individual and unit training on proper procedures and standards of behavior and by leader supervision of actual operations.

b. Poor training in the handling of detainees increases the risk of abuse. Although most personnel interviewed had some training in the Law of Land Warfare, many did not have training specific to detainee handling. It was often the case that individuals conducting interrogations were not school-trained as interrogators.

c. Ambiguous instructions concerning the handling of detainees also greatly increase the risk of abuse. Some Soldiers believed their command encouraged behavior at the harsher end of the acceptable range of behavior in the treatment of detainees. This can very quickly lead to abusive behavior, even if it is not the intent of the command. The Taguba Investigation makes clear that the 800th MP (I/R) Brigade leadership did not properly communicate to its Soldiers the requirements for the treatment of detainees. In order to mitigate the risk of abuse, commanders must give clear, unambiguous guidance, make sure that Soldiers understand the guidance, supervise Soldiers' operations, and then hold their Soldier’s accountable for meeting standards.

d. Criminal behavior among a small percentage of Soldiers.

e. Combat operations, as a new experience for many Soldiers, combined with the above, may lead to Soldiers justifying abusive behavior as a result of their exposure to danger. This leads to a moral disengagement where Soldiers do not take responsibility for their actions.

f. Poor unit discipline, which is a function of poor leader supervision, allows abusive behavior an opportunity to occur. Again, the Taguba Investigation identified a serious lack of discipline among the units involved in detainee abuse.

The last 3 of these factors can be best prevented by making sure Soldiers understand the standards of behavior expected of them, and by leaders who maintain unit and individual discipline and exercise appropriate supervision of Soldiers.

Almost all of the abuse cases studied by the DAIG Team were isolated events. The Soldiers’ chain of command, when notified of the allegation of abuse, took appropriate action and prevented further abusive behavior. The DAIG Team found that most abuse incidents were isolated events that, when discovered, were immediately corrected by commanders at battalion level and lower.

Those cases where corrective action did not occur, usually because the chain of command was not aware of the abuse, resulted in a continuation of abuse or a progression from talking about abuse to actually committing abuse. Factors that influenced this progression of abuse and responsive actions taken by units to mitigate these factors were:

a. Poor oversight and poor control mechanisms to inspect and check on Soldiers’ behavior decreased the likelihood that abuse would be discovered by command. This led to a breakdown in the command and control of Soldiers interacting with detainees. One NCOIC stated that the chain of command did not visit his location very often, and that when they began to receive enemy fire, he did not see the Commander or Command Sergeant Major (CSM). In response, over time, several units developed standing operating procedures that incorporated specific control mechanisms, such as requiring a certain number of personnel to be present during interrogations, having all Soldiers sign a document outlining acceptable behavior, and tasking independent officers to monitor all detainee operations, with the ability to observe anything, anytime, within their facility.

b. A command climate that encourages behavior at the harsher end of the acceptable range of behavior towards detainees may unintentionally, increase the likelihood of abuse. One officer interviewed stated that there is often a "do what it takes" mindset. This appeared to be more prevalent in the early days of the war in Iraq. Among other responses, the CJTF-7 Rules for Detainee Operations, published 30 November 2003, states, "Treat all persons with dignity and respect." In addition, on 12 October 2003, CJTF-7 published a memorandum stating all interrogations would be, "applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations."

c. In the few cases involving the progression to more serious abuse by Soldiers, tolerance of inappropriate behavior by any level of the chain of command, even if minor, led to an increase in the frequency and intensity of abuse. In a few cases, the perception, accurate or not, that Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) conducted interrogations using harsher methods than allowed by Army Regulation, led to a belief that higher levels of command condoned such methods. As noted in paragraph b above, CJTF-7 began to publish specific guidance that emphasized the humane treatment of detainees. At the time of the DAIG Team’s visit to the theater, leaders and Soldiers uniformly understood the need to treat detainees humanely.

It is evident there were Soldiers who knew the right thing to do and reported abuse when they discovered it. Soldiers who believed that abusive behavior was not acceptable reported almost all of the abuse incidents. Some of these Soldiers stopped other Soldiers from hurting detainees, demonstrating moral courage in the face of peer pressure. Others reported serious abuse when it involved their comrades and leaders. This finding on abuse focused on a very small percentage of Soldiers who may have committed abusive behavior, and not on the vast majority that, even under the stress of combat and poor living conditions, and presented with sometimes resistant and hostile detainees, have treated all within their care humanely.

(4) Root Cause: Detainee abuse was an individual failure to uphold Army Values and in some cases involved a breakdown in the leadership supervision of Soldiers' behavior.

(5) Recommendation: Commanders enforce the basic fundamental discipline standards of Soldiers, provide training, and immediately correct inappropriate behavior of Soldiers towards detainees to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

Recommendation: Commanders assess the quality of leadership in units and replace those leaders who do not enforce discipline and hold Soldiers accountable.

Recommendation: TRADOC develop and implement a train-the-trainer package that strongly emphasizes leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

Recommendation: TRADOC integrate training into all Professional Military Education that strongly emphasizes leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

Recommendation: The G3 require pre-deployment training include a strong emphasis on leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure proper treatment of, and prevent abuse of, detainees.

c. Finding 3:

(1) Finding: Of all facilities inspected, only Abu Ghraib was determined to be undesirable for housing detainees because it is located near an urban population and is under frequent hostile fire, placing Soldiers and detainees at risk.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Abu Ghraib was overcrowded, located near a densely populated urban area and on a dangerous main supply route, and subject to frequent hostile enemy fire from enemy mortars or rockets. The facility was located approximately 20 miles west of Baghdad. The entire encampment of Abu Ghraib was quite large, covering 280 acres. This facility has had up to 10,000 persons interned there and was considered the most notorious landmark in all of Iraq, made so by the previous regime under Saddam Hussein.

Abu Ghraib consisted of three distinct separate facilities: the hard site prison complex, Camp Vigilant, and Camp Ganci. Except for Tier 1, the rest of the hard site prison complex (Tiers 2 through 7) was under complete control of Iraqi prison guards under supervision of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Criminals were housed there who had committed crimes against other Iraqis. Camp Vigilant was under complete U.S. Armed Forces control. It was the least populated facility of the three at Abu Ghraib, housing several hundred detainees.

The facility employs over 1500 Soldiers and civilians and there is no Post Exchange (PX) within the walls of Abu Ghraib. This was one of the major complaints from Soldiers. Routine trips for PX runs did not occur because of the danger in traveling to Camp Victory on the main supply route. Soldiers complained that they could not get necessary clothing and uniform items when needed.

On 19 March 2004, the official detainee headcount in Camps Ganci and Vigilant was 5967 detainees under U.S. control. This number frequently fluctuated because of releases, transfers, or additional captures of detainees. Including the hard site, there were 7490 detainees on this date. Only one internment/resettlement (I/R) Military Police battalion was charged with managing, operating, and maintaining security of Camps Ganci and Vigilant. By doctrine an I/R battalion should support the following ratios: up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs; 8,000 dislocated civilians; or 1,500 U.S. Armed Forces prisoners. The Taguba Investigation also addressed the problems of under-manning at Abu Ghraib.

Abu Ghraib also did not have sufficient protection measures in place to protect the detainees from hostile fire. Abu Ghraib was frequently under mortar and small arms fire. Detainees suffered casualties in the past due to enemy hostile fire. Detainees at Camps Vigilant and Ganci did not have access to protective bunkers or shelters, placing them at great risk.

Camp Ganci was overcrowded with a population of over 5000 detainees at the time of the DAIG inspection. Camp Ganci was designed and built as an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) camp, and the camp living environment was not conducive to a criminal or high security population. The population of the camp alone made security and control inherently difficult and dangerous. There were 8 compounds in Camp Ganci, and the capacity for each compound was 500. During the inspection, the average population was from 600 to 700 detainees per compound.

Camp Ganci's 8 compounds inside of Abu Ghraib had similar problems with the guard towers and perimeter triple-standard concertina wire that the old compounds at Camp Bucca suffered. The overcrowding and cramped conditions at Camp Ganci, and the fact that the distance between each compound was only 30 to 40 feet, compounded the safety and security concerns for Soldiers. Detainee rioting had occurred in the past. Lighting at Camp Ganci was poor, especially at compound 6, according to interviewed Soldiers. The physical design of the camps within the facility was not optimal for the mission. The towers, for example, provided limited visibility due to numerous blind spots. Towers supporting Camp Ganci were not placed reasonably well, as they should have been, with good fields of fire. Some towers faced each other, and there were some identified blind spots throughout the compounds according to interviewed Soldiers. Entrance and egress to the compounds were hampered by cumbersome, makeshift gates made of concertina wire and wood that dragged across the ground. This made rapid access very difficult. Sally ports were used primarily as gates or "slow down" barriers.

The Single Channel Ground/Air Radio System (SINCGARS) system used at Abu Ghraib, when operable, was maintained inside the compound for communication with units outside the compound and the roving patrols. Because many units were using the same frequency, crossed radio traffic was common between roving patrols, other outside units, and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) inside the compound. The facility NCOIC at Abu Ghraib stated there was also a shortfall in radios, which hampered communications and security within the compound. In some instances, the guards in the towers had communication with the TOC, but not with the roving guards on the ground. So, in order to communicate with a tower, the roving guards would have to yell up to them. The guards would also have to yell up to the towers when they wanted to pass information to the TOC. Due to the ineffective communication systems at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Soldiers took it upon themselves to purchase handheld commercial radios to communicate within the camps. Because these radios are unsecured, they pose a communications security (COMSEC) problem; frequencies can be easily monitored by outside forces using the same commercially available radios. The commercial radios were also unable to communicate with the military issue radios.

During sensing sessions, NCOs at Abu Ghraib stated there were no standardized procedures for searching Iraqis entering the compound. The DAIG Team's findings are consistent with the Ryder Report that stated, "The lack of policy and standard operating procedures results in inconsistent application of basic security protocols. Visitation is a serious opportunity to introduce security and safety hazards."

Refuse and litter were seen within one of the Ganci compounds. It could not be determined if the trash was actually refuse that had migrated to the surface from an old landfill site on which Camp Ganci was built. There was approximately one portable latrine per 25 detainees, and there was a contract in place to clean the latrines. There was, however, a bad smell throughout the area from sewage because disinfectant chemicals were not replaced in the latrines. According to sensing sessions, there were only 12 showerheads in each Ganci compound for 600 to 700 detainees. The detainees showered every other day, but the guards ran all 600 to 700 detainees through the process in 2 hours. The lack of laundry capabilities or services for the detainees was similar to the situation at Camp Bucca. Detainees had tubs and soap, but there was no accountability on where the tubs were and how many there were. The unit submitted a contract request to start a laundry service for detainees.

The supply of fresh water was difficult to maintain at the required levels for drinking and personal hygiene for both Soldiers and detainees. According to interviews, Abu Ghraib received fresh water from a Baghdad city water main that frequently broke down. A 3-day supply (200K gallons) was required to be on-hand. The day before the DAIG Team arrived, the reserve water supply was down to 50K gallons. Rationing of fresh water was not uncommon for Soldiers and detainees according to leaders and Soldiers from interviews and sensing sessions.

Food quality for detainees was a serious issue at Abu Ghraib. Spoiled and contaminated food (rodent droppings and dirt) had been delivered by the contractor for the detainees in the past. Units at Abu Ghraib had to use unit stocks of Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs) to distribute to detainees instead. The unit was working with the contracting officer to remedy the substandard work of the contractor.

Other problems observed included problems with the existing power generators and lack of ventilation for the detainees.

There were planned and ongoing projects at Abu Ghraib. The new Entry Control Point (ECP) was recently completed. This will allow 200 visitations of detainee family members a day and will provide a stand-off of 100 meters for force protection. The project included a new parking lot. Another ongoing project was the new reception center. Besides the ECP and reception center, other projects planned include: perimeter fencing around Abu Ghraib; completion of Camp Avalanche (recently renamed Camp Redemption), a new facility with a capacity of 3000 detainees; and future plans to upgrade Camps Ganci and Vigilant. Both the Taguba Investigation and Ryder Report mentioned the need for structural improvements and renovations at various facilities. The Taguba Investigation stated the need for structural improvements, including enhancements of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib. One recommendation of the Ryder Report included renovation of all available cells at Abu Ghraib to facilitate consolidation and separation of the different categories of detainees. The Ryder Report also recommended modification of the Abu Ghraib master plan that allowed expansion and increased detainee capacity by means of renovation. All of the improvements mentioned in the Taguba Investigation and Ryder Report are needed at Abu Ghraib if U.S. Forces continue to use it as an I/R facility. However, because of its location in a densely populated urban area and the frequent hostile fire, the DAIG Team found that the facility should be phased out as an I/R facility, with Camp Bucca becoming the primary I/R facility in Iraq.

Abu Ghraib will be the central facility for the Iraqi Prison System after transition to the interim government. However, Abu Ghraib's location near an urban and hostile environment goes against doctrine for setting up I/R facilities. The area lends itself to poor and dangerous living and working conditions. In contrast, Camp Bucca in southern Iraq is isolated from local Iraqi populations, not frequently attacked, and is close to vital supply lines and logistical support (Navistar in Kuwait). Camp Bucca has room to expand if necessary and is already used as an overflow facility for Abu Ghraib. At the time of the DAIG visit, the detainee population of Camp Bucca was just over 1700. The new compounds at Camp Bucca (1 through 6) have a capacity for 4500 detainees. If the old compounds (7 through 11) are renovated in the same manner as the new compounds, Camp Bucca could reasonably expand the population capacity by several thousand if needed. Once the Camp Bucca expansion is completed and the "Iraqi on Iraqi "criminal population at Camp Ganci are segregated from other detainees, a phase out of Abu Ghraib as an I/R facility and complete turnover to the interim Iraqi government can take place.

(4) Root Cause: Units operating the Abu Ghraib facility were overwhelmed by the frequent hostile fire, the overcrowded conditions, and the deteriorating infrastructure.

(5) Recommendation: CJTF-7 expand Camp Bucca as an internment/resettlement facility in order to transfer detainees from Camps Ganci and Vigilant, and phase out U.S. Armed Forces detainee operations at Abu Ghraib completely.

_______________

* Note For the purpose of this inspection, we defined abuse as wrongful death, assault, sexual assault, and theft.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:18 am

PART 3 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Chapter 4: Interrogation Operations

1. Summary of Findings: Commanders recognized the need for timely, tactical human intelligence and adapted to the environment by keeping detainees longer at the point of capture and collecting points to gain and exploit intelligence. Commanders and interrogators conducted tactical questioning to gain immediate battlefield intelligence. Holding detainees longer than 72 hours increased requirements for facility infrastructure, medical care, preventive medicine, trained personnel, logistics, and security.

Doctrine does not clearly and distinctly address the relationship between the Military Police (MP) operating I/R facilities and the Military Intelligence (MI) personnel conducting intelligence exploitation at those facilities. Neither MP nor MI doctrine specifically defines the distinct but interdependent roles and responsibilities of the two in detainee operations. MP doctrine states MI may collocate with MP at detention sites to conduct interrogations, and coordination should be made to establish operating procedures. MP doctrine does not, however, address approved and prohibited MI procedures in an MP-operated facility. It also does not clearly establish the role of MPs in the interrogation process. Conversely, MI doctrine does not clearly explain MP internment procedures or the role of MI personnel within an internment setting.

There is no DoD or Army policy that addresses the establishment and operation of interrogation facilities, including Joint Interrogation Facilities (JIFs) and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centers (JIDCs). Doctrine provided in two field manuals (FMs) dealing with military intelligence, FM 34-52 and FM 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC), 13 December 2001, contains inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure, and function of these facilities.

Shortfalls in numbers of interrogators and interpreters, and the distribution of these assets within the battlespace, hampered human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts. Valuable intelligence—timely, complete, clear, and accurate—may have been lost as a result. Interrogators were not available in sufficient numbers to efficiently conduct screening and interrogations of the large numbers of detainees at collecting points (CPs) and internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, nor were there enough to man sufficient numbers of Tactical Human Intelligence Teams (THTs) for intelligence exploitation at points of capture. Interpreters, especially those Category II personnel authorized to participate in interrogations, were also in short supply.

Interviewed MI leaders and Soldiers indicated that G2s and S2s were conducting interrogations of detainees without the proper training on the management of HUMINT analysis and collection techniques. They were not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of HUMINT assets being used in the current operating environment. The need for these officers to understand the management of HUMINT operations is critical to successful HUMINT exploitation in the current operating environment.

Army doctrine found in Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, lists 17 accepted interrogations approach techniques. It states that those approach techniques are not inclusive of all possible or accepted techniques. The DAIG Team reviewed interrogation approach techniques policy for both OEF and OIF and determined that CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 included additional interrogation approach techniques not found in FM 34- 52. The DAIG Team found that officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under Geneva Convention Relevant to Prisoners of War (GPW), the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the U.S. Torture statute, 18 USC §§2034, 2034A, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that some interrogators may not have received formal instruction from the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center on interrogation approach techniques not contained in FM 34-52. Additionally, the DAIG Team found that while commands published interrogation approach policy, some subordinate units were unaware of the current version of those policies. Content of unit interrogator training programs varied among units in both OEF and OIF. However, no confirmed instance involving the application of approved approach techniques resulted in an instance of detainee abuse.

2. Findings:

a. Finding 4:


(1) Finding: Tactical commanders and leaders adapted to the environment and held detainees longer than doctrinally recommended due to the demand for timely, tactical intelligence.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: In OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), company through division units held detainees longer than the doctrinal timeframes. By doctrine, companies and battalions are to evacuate detainees as quickly as possible to a division forward collecting point (CP). Interviewed point of capture battalion and company leaders stated 61% (25 of 41) of their units established CPs and held detainees at their locations from 12 hours up to 30 days. Of the geographically remote inspected companies and battalions, 3 of 3, established CPs at their locations. By doctrine, division forward CPs are located at maneuver brigades and can hold detainees for up to 12 hours before evacuating to division central CPs.

All interviewed leaders from 11 division forward CPs stated their facilities held detainees from 24 hours up to 54 days. By doctrine, division central CPs are located near the division support area (DSA) and can hold detainees for up to 24 hours before evacuating to the corps holding area (CHA) or internment/resettlement (I/R) facility. All interviewed leaders from 4 central CPs stated their facilities held detainees from 72 hours up to 45 days.

The primary reason units held detainees at these locations was to conduct screenings and interrogations closer to the point of capture. The result of holding detainees for longer timeframes at all locations was increased requirements in facility infrastructure, medical care, preventive medicine, trained personnel, logistics, and security. Organic unit personnel at these locations did not have the required institutional training and were therefore unaware of, or unable, to comply with Army policies in areas such as detainee processing, confinement operations, security, preventive medicine, and interrogation.

Current detainee doctrine is written to apply to a linear battlefield with an identifiable combat zone and rear area, and with the presumption that detainees at the point of capture will normally be enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). EPWs are to be humanely evacuated from the combat zone to internment facilities (normally located in the corps communication zone (COMMZ)). Evacuation is accomplished as quickly as possible for the safety of the EPWs and to ensure operations of the maneuver unit are not hampered. Doctrine assumes EPWs are normally captured forward in the combat zone by company and battalion-sized units. While doctrine does provide for interrogations to be conducted at forward locations, it limits the time detainees should be held at these sites.

By doctrine, EPWs are evacuated from companies and battalions to a division forward CP located in the brigade area of operations. A forward CP is normally a guarded, roped-off area (concertina or razor tape) or a secure fixed facility, with potable water, a latrine, and a trench or cover for protection from indirect fire. A division MP company commander plans for a platoon to operate the forward CP and process EPWs using the STRESS method (search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and safeguard). The MP company medical section provides medical support. Additional medical support can be requested by the brigade medical officer from the forward support battalion (FSB). EPWs doctrinally do not remain at a forward CP for more than 12 hours before being escorted to the division central CP.

By doctrine, the division central CP is established near the division support area (DSA). The central CP is larger than the forward CP, contains some type of tentage or uses an existing shelter/structure to protect detainees from the elements. The central CP may have multiple water and latrine sites. A division MP company operates the CP and continues to process EPWs using the STRESS method. The MP company medical section provides medical support. Units within the DSA provide support as stated in the division operations order. EPWs do not remain at a central CP for more than 24 hours before being escorted to the CHA.

By doctrine, a CHA is usually located near a base or base cluster in the corps rear area with one CHA to support each division conducting operations. Normal hold time at the CHA is 72 hours, but the CHA must be prepared to hold EPWs for extended periods until they are evacuated to an internment facility or until hostilities end. A CHA is a semi-permanent facility. The capture rate and captive categories determine the size of the CHA, and it should be divided into two or more compounds for segregation, security, and ease of control. The CHA has areas designated for EPW reception, processing, storage and accountability of detainee property, interrogation, medical facilities, showers, and protection from direct and indirect fire. A corps MP platoon or corps MP company operates a CHA and may be augmented with additional MPs. Support agreements can be arranged between MP headquarters and a base or base cluster where the CHA is located. Class I through Class IX supplies are requested through logistics channels and Class VIII through medical channels.

Doctrine does not address the unique characteristics of OIF and OEF, specifically operations in non-linear battlespaces and large numbers of detainees whose status is not readily identifiable as combatants, criminals, or innocents. In OIF and OEF, units held detainees at division CPs longer than doctrinal timeframes and established CPs at companies and battalions. Commanders held detainees at forward locations to facilitate more effective initial screenings (to determine detainees' status and disposition) and to obtain more timely intelligence than would be obtained from interrogations at I/R facilities. Interviews and sensing sessions with leaders and soldiers indicated a common perception at the unit level that once a detainee was evacuated, interrogations conducted at higher echelon facilities did not return tactical intelligence to the capturing unit. Furthermore, commanders and MI personnel perceived additional value in holding detainees at CPs where they can be segregated and intelligence is less likely to be compromised. Detainees held at CPs were also available for follow-up interrogations and clarifications of details based on the tactical exploitation of intelligence previously provided. Finally, interrogators at CPs are familiar with the unique local characteristics that enable more effective intelligence exploitation, i.e., religious affiliation, tribal affiliation, and regional politics.

Doctrine does not address how to effectively screen and interrogate large numbers of captured persons of undetermined status. Unlike EPWs, detained persons in OIF and OEF did not have a clear status upon capture. Capturing units were attempting to screen persons close to the point of capture to confer status in a timely manner. By doing so, they could quickly release innocent persons with no intelligence value who would otherwise burden the detention system, or detain combatants or persons of potential intelligence value for continued exploitation. In situations where effective screening couldn't be accomplished at the point of capture, companies and battalions established collecting points and held detainees instead of evacuating them to higher echelons. The time detainees were held at company and battalion locations varied from 12 hours up to 30 days based on the number of detainees and the availability of interrogators.

A result of holding detainees at CPs was company, battalion, brigade and divisional units were being required to meet the standards of CHAs without the organic resources (trained personnel, materials, equipment, and facilities) to do so. The DAIG Team found most personnel, especially at battalion and brigade CPs, did not have the training to perform the humanitarian, security, and administrative requirements for extended holding times. Because most personnel were not trained in detention operations they were unaware of Army doctrinal requirements, policies, and procedures that address the specific responsibilities for confinement, security, preventive medicine, and interrogation. The DAIG Team found most CP operations were conducted using standing operating procedures (SOPs) developed by previous units; internal tactics, techniques, and procedures; common sense; and basic soldier skills and knowledge.

Holding detainees for longer periods of time at CPs increases the infrastructure requirements from those needed for mobile, temporary holding areas to the more substantial demands of semi-permanent facilities. CPs have to provide increased internal and external security to physically contain the detainees. Considerations have to be made for areas designated for detainee reception, processing, storage and accountability of detainee property, interrogation, medical care, latrines, and protection from direct and indirect fire. The medical requirements for the care of detainees increase (e.g., trained personnel, supplies, and equipment), as do the requirements for preventive medicine (e.g., showers, sundry packs, pest control, and facility inspections). Units have increased requirements for logistics (e.g., Class I, Class II (shotguns, restraints, communications, and uniforms), Class III, Class V (non-lethal ammunition), and security (e.g., permanent external guard force and quick reaction force).

Detainee doctrine does not address operations in a non-linear battlespace. Doctrine was written for operations on a linear battlefield on which EPWs were to be quickly evacuated to corps holding areas or I/R facilities. Commanders in OIF and OEF were holding detainees closer to the point of capture to expedite intelligence exploitation. The result of holding detainees forward of I/R facilities was that companies, battalions, brigades and divisions were being required to meet higher standards of detainee humanitarian care when these units are not organically resourced with the trained personnel, materials or equipment to operate semipermanent facilities. The DAIG Team found that battalions, brigades or divisions operating CPs are not trained or resourced to run semi-permanent collection/holding facilities, and no units are fully compliant with Army policy. The DAIG Team also found that the inspected units were treating detainees humanely and in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Units continue to physically improve the facilities of the CPs and obtain external support for personnel and resources.

Although the Ryder Report cited changes are required in doctrine and organizational structure related to detention and correction operations, it did not go into specific details. The report did note the wide variance of standards and approaches at collecting points and recommended assessing the tactical feasibility of decreasing the number of collection points.

(4) Root Cause: Units did not comply with doctrine that requires the quick evacuation of detainees to internment facilities. Units held detainees at CPs closer to the point of capture for longer periods of time to conduct more effective interrogation and intelligence exploitation.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC revise doctrine to address the criteria for establishing and operating collecting points to enable commanders to more effectively conduct intelligence exploitation in a non-linear battlespace.

b. Finding 5:

(1) Finding: Doctrine does not clearly specify the interdependent, and yet independent, roles, missions, and responsibilities of Military Police and Military Intelligence units in the establishment and operation of interrogation facilities.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Doctrine does not provide clear guidance on the relationship between Military Police (MP), responsible for the safekeeping of detainees, and Military Intelligence (MI), responsible for intelligence collection. Neither MP nor MI doctrine clearly defines the distinct but interdependent roles, missions, and responsibilities of the two in detainee operations. MP doctrine states MI may collocate with MP at detention sites to conduct interrogations, and coordination should be made to establish operating procedures. MP doctrine does not, however, address approved and prohibited MI procedures in an MP-operated facility. It also does not clearly establish the role of MPs in the interrogation process. Conversely, MI doctrine does not clearly explain MP internment procedures or the role of MI personnel in an internment setting. Subordination of the MP custody and control mission to the MI need for intelligence can create settings in which unsanctioned behavior, including detainee abuse, could occur. Failure of MP and MI personnel to understand each other’s specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and procedures. Failure of MP and MI personnel to understand each other’s specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and procedures.

MP doctrine explicitly outlines MP roles and responsibilities in operating collecting points (CPs), corps holding areas (CHAs) and internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities. MP doctrine identifies the priorities of detainee operations as the custody and control of detainees and the security of the facility. MP doctrine states detainees may be interrogated at CPs, CHAs and I/R facilities operated by MPs to facilitate the collection of intelligence information. It highlights the need for coordination between MP and MI to establish operating procedures. MPs are responsible for passively detecting and reporting significant information. MPs can assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have information that supports Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). MPs can acquire important information through observation and insight even though they are not trained intelligence specialists. MP interaction with detainees is limited, however, to contact necessary for the management of a safe and secure living environment and for security escort functions during detainee movement. Thus, active participation by MPs in the intelligence exploitation process is not within the doctrinal scope of the MP mission.

MI doctrine clearly states MPs command and operate CPs and CHAs, but it does not address operational authority for I/R facilities. MI doctrine specifies MPs conduct detainee receipt, escort, transport, and administrative processing functions, including document handling and property disposition. MI doctrine in FM 34-52, contrary to MP doctrine in FM 3-19.1, contains a passage that implies an active role for MPs in the screening/interrogation process: "Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings." The implication in FM 34-52 that MPs would have an active role in the screening process is in conflict with MP doctrine that states MPs maintain a passive role in both the screening and interrogation processes. This passage could cause confusion with MI personnel as to the role of MPs in screenings and interrogations. The Ryder Report addressed the issue of MPs maintaining a passive role in interrogations, stating that, "Military police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." The report further states that the active participation of MPs in interrogations could be a source of potential problems: "Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state." The Ryder Report recommends establishing "procedures that define the role of military police soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel."

Additionally, two intelligence oriented field manuals, FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (discussed above), and FM 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC), contain inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure, and function of interrogation facilities. Neither field manual address the relationship of MI and MP personnel within those facilities. FM 34-52 describes a Theater Interrogation Facility (TIF). FM 3-31 describes a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Interrogation facilities in OEF and OIF identified themselves as JIFs and JIDCs. Commanders and leaders structured the organization and command relationships within these JIFs and JIDCs to meet the unique requirements of their operating environments.

The DAIG Team determined MP and MI doctrine did not sufficiently address the interdependent roles of MP and MI personnel in detainee operations in OEF and OIF. Doctrine needs to be updated to clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of MPs in the intelligence exploitation of detainees. It should also clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of MI personnel within MP- operated internment facilities. For example, MP and MI doctrine should address and clarify: (1) command and control relationship of MP and MI personnel within internment facilities; (2) MPs’ passive or active role in the collection of intelligence; (3) interrogation techniques and the maintenance of good order within the detention facility; (4) detainee transfer procedures between MP and MI to conduct interrogations, including specific information related to the safety and well-being of the detainee; and (5) locations for conducting interrogations within I/R or other facilities.

(4) Root Cause: Current doctrine does not adequately address or prepare MP or MI units for collaboratively conducting detainee operations and provides inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure, and function of interrogation facilities.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC develop a single document for detainee operations that identifies the interdependent and independent roles of the Military Police custody mission and the Military Intelligence interrogation mission.

Recommendation: TRADOC establish doctrine to clearly define the organizational structures, command relationships, and roles and responsibilities of personnel operating interrogation facilities.

Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General revise, and the G2 establish, policy to clearly define the organizational structures, command relationships, and roles and responsibilities of personnel operating interrogation facilities.

Recommendation: The G3 direct the incorporation of integrated Military Police and Military Intelligence detainee operations into field training exercises, home station and mobilization site training, and combat training center rotations.

c. Finding 6:

(1) Finding: Military Intelligence units are not resourced with sufficient interrogators and interpreters, to conduct timely detainee screenings and interrogations in the current operating environment, resulting in a backlog of interrogations and the potential loss of intelligence.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Shortfalls in numbers of interrogators (Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 97E and 351E)) and interpreters, and the distribution of these assets within the battlespace, hampered human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts. Valuable intelligence— timely, complete, clear, and accurate—may have been lost as a result. Interrogators were not available in sufficient numbers to efficiently conduct screening and interrogations of the large numbers of detainees at collecting points (CPs) and internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, nor were there enough to man adequate numbers of Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams (THTs) for intelligence exploitation at points of capture. Interpreters, especially those Category II personnel authorized to participate in interrogations, were also in short supply. Interrogations were conducted at locations throughout the battlespace by trained military interrogators, contract interrogators, and, in some forward locations, by leaders and Soldiers with no training in military interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures. Interrogations observed by DAIG Team members were conducted in accordance with Army policy and doctrine. Policy and doctrine clearly reinforce and fully comply with the provisions of the laws of land warfare, and all Army interrogators are trained extensively on approved and prohibited interrogation techniques.

The quantity and distribution of military interrogators were insufficient to conduct timely intelligence exploitation of non- compliant detainees in the current operational environment. 78% (18 of 23) of interviewed S2s and G2s stated the shortage of interrogators at points of capture and company and battalion CPs resulted in untrained combat leaders and soldiers conducting screenings and field interrogations. 89% (17 of 19) of interviewed military interrogators cited a shortage of interrogators, resulting in backlogs of interrogations at I/R facilities. Military interrogators at Abu Ghraib stated there were detainees that had been in custody for as long as 90 days before being interrogated for the first time.

In OEF and OIF, the total number of interrogators varied by unit and location. Each division (1ID, 1AD, 4ID, 1st CAV, 82nd ABN, and 101st ABN) deployed with an MI battalion that was resourced with interrogators. The 519th MI BN of the XVIII ABN Corps, and the 202nd MI BN, echelons above corps, deployed with interrogators. The 30th and 39th Army National Guard (ARNG) Separate Brigades were resourced with interrogators. All of the above units supplemented interrogators with counterintelligence Soldiers (MOS 97B and 351B) to increase interrogation capabilities. The 205th MI Brigade, V Corps; 504th MI Brigade, III Corps; and the 902nd MI Group had no interrogators and therefore conducted all interrogations using counterintelligence Soldiers. The number of interrogators in the above units varied from 4 in the ARNG Separate Brigades to 16 in some divisions, to approximately 60 in the 519th MI BN. Military interrogators in OIF were supplemented by 31 contract interrogators. (12 contract interrogators have re-deployed for personal reasons since the blanket purchase agreement (contract) was issued 14 August 2003). CJTF-180 was preparing to hire contract interrogators for OEF at the time of the inspection.

Because detainees have varying degrees of intelligence value, there is no doctrinal formula to determine the recommended ratio of interrogators and interpreters to detainees. All detainees require initial screening after capture to determine their status and potential intelligence value. The requirement for interrogation of each detainee is unique and based on potential intelligence yield, the characteristics of the detainee, and the information requirements of the unit. Some detainees may only require a single screening to determine their status and be released, while others will be screened, determined to be of intelligence value, and subsequently interrogated a few times, several times over many weeks, or numerous times over many months. The ratio of interrogators to detainees varied at each facility. At Abu Ghraib there were 120 interrogators for 1500 detainees determined to be of intelligence value; at Brassfield-Mora there were 2 interrogators for 50 such detainees; and at Bagram there were 12 interrogators for 192 detainees of intelligence value.

Category II Arabic, Pashtu, and Dari interpreters -- interpreters with U.S. citizenship, but no security clearances -- were also identified as shortages throughout OEF and OIF. As crucial players in every aspect of operations, skilled interpreters were in high demand. The quality of intelligence derived from an interrogation can depend greatly on the ability of the interpreter to work effectively with the interrogator. An effective interpreter must not only convey the accurate meaning of language, he/she must be able to express the implied message in the demeanor of the interrogator. To function together as a successful team requires specific, individualized training prior to employment in the field, as well as time working together to maximize their effectiveness. Category II interpreters should be deployed in sufficient numbers to support the commander's intelligence gathering requirements.

Detainee operations in a non-linear battlespace presented a unique challenge, requiring screening operations to be placed closer to points of capture. Using properly trained HUMINT soldiers to screen detainees in the immediate vicinity of the point of capture reduces the number of innocents detained, produces more timely intelligence, and increases the quality of evidence collection and documentation for use in future judicial proceedings. One senior MI officer indicated that his division only had the manpower to utilize THTs at points of capture approximately 10% of the time. Failure to position trained HUMINT Soldiers close to points of capture puts a burden on units farther up the chain of custody and delayed the collection of timely intelligence. The backlog of unscreened detainees quickly overwhelmed the internment system in OIF, where I/R facilities were unprepared to deal with such large numbers of detainees. This slowed the process of intelligence exploitation and prevented the timely release of detainees who were apprehended and later found to have no intelligence value and to be of no threat to Coalition Forces.

If performed by trained interrogators, front-line interrogations offer other advantages. Recently captured persons are less likely to resist the interrogator. They also have not yet entered the general detainee population where they can conspire with others to resist interrogation techniques. In untrained hands, however, these advantages can be lost. To satisfy the need to acquire intelligence as soon as possible following capture, some officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with no training in interrogation techniques began conducting their own interrogation sessions. Inexperienced and untrained persons using unproven interrogation techniques often yield poor intelligence and can harden detainees against future questioning by trained interrogators. The potential for abuse increases when interrogations are conducted in an emotionally-charged environment by untrained personnel who are unfamiliar with the approved interrogation approach techniques. The quality of these interrogations was further eroded by the absence of Category II interpreters. Category I interpreters—local nationals without security clearances— were the only interpreters available in forward locations, and there was no way to guarantee the accuracy or trustworthiness of their work.

The Military Intelligence (MI) School has internally resourced a mobile training team (MTT) to offset the shortage of interrogators in the field. The MTT trains non-MI personnel in the skills and knowledge required to perform basic questioning techniques and operations in order to enhance ongoing HUMINT collection missions at the tactical level. Tactical questioning (TQ) is a critical element of small unit operations. Tactical Questioning (TQ) is defined as the questioning of the local population (noncombatants and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)/detainees) for information of immediate tactical value. Through TQ, the handling of detainees, and the handling of captured documents, Soldiers serve as the commander's eyes and ears. The information that the Soldiers report as a result of TQ is passed up the chain of command and forms a vital part of planning and operations. The TQ MTT has trained approximately 4000 Soldiers as of March 2004.

Current military interrogation procedures as published in FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, 28 September 1992, and taught at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, remain valid. Interrogation approach techniques, themselves, are addressed in Finding 9. Military interrogators receive 16.5 weeks of intensive training on interrogation procedures and techniques at the Army’s Human Intelligence Collector Course. This training includes collection priority, screening, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, and termination of interrogations. A total of 192 hours of direct and indirect training on the laws of land warfare emphasizes compliance of all military interrogation techniques with the Geneva Conventions and Army policy. Prohibited activities are covered in detail and reinforced in interrogation operation exercises.

Interrogation approach techniques policies were issued for OEF and OIF. The CJTF-7 Commander issued initial interrogation approach techniques policy on 14 September 2003, and amended the interrogation approach techniques policy on 12 October 2003 and 13 May 2004. The CJTF-180 Commander issued approved interrogation approach techniques policy on 16 March 2004.

The DAIG Team observed 2 detainee facilities using digital video recording devices, 1 in Afghanistan and 1 in Iraq. Because interrogations are confrontational, a monitored video recording of the process can be an effective check against breaches of the laws of land warfare and Army policy. It further protects the interrogator against allegations of mistreatment by detainees and provides a permanent record of the encounter that can be reviewed to improve the accuracy of intelligence collection. All facilities conducting interrogations would benefit from routine use of video recording equipment.

In summary, the DAIG Team found the quantity and distribution of military interrogators were insufficient to conduct timely intelligence exploitation of non-compliant detainees in OEF and OIF. Military interrogators observed in OEF and OIF were performing interrogations of detainees in accordance with doctrine.

(4) Root Cause: The shortages of interrogators and interpreters at all echelons caused commanders and other leaders to use untrained personnel to conduct interrogations of detainees. Insufficient numbers of Category II interpreters, especially those with experience working with interrogators, further hampered interrogation operations.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC and G2 ensure documentation of unit organizations meet interrogator personnel manning requirements, authorizations, and capabilities in order to provide commanders with timely intelligence.

Recommendation: The CFLCC contracting officer representative ensure enough Category II interpreters are hired to support timely intelligence exploitation of detainees.

d. Finding 7:

(1) Finding: Tactical Military Intelligence officers are not adequately trained on how to manage the full spectrum of the collection and analysis of human intelligence.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Interviewed Military Intelligence (MI) leaders and Soldiers indicated that G2s and S2s were conducting interrogations of detainees without the proper training on the management of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) analysis and collection techniques. They were not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of HUMINT assets being used in the current operating environment. The counterintelligence team leaders (TL) interviewed expressed a wish that all G2s and S2s were trained on how to manage the collection and analysis of HUMINT. The need for these officers to understand the management of HUMINT operations is the key for successful HUMINT exploitation in the current operating environment. Battalion commanders, company commanders, and platoon leaders were interrogating detainees at the point of capture according to counterintelligence TLs interviewed. They complained about this practice because these leaders were not properly trained in interrogation techniques and quite possibly jeopardized the intelligence gathering process to acquire timely intelligence from detainees. Counterintelligence TLs were told on several occasions by these leaders that they had the interrogations under control and did not require their Military Intelligence (MI) assistance.

Currently, MI officers only receive a general overview of HUMINT during their Professional Military Education (PME) courses. During the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC), MI officers receive a 9 day Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) block of instruction which includes a 6-hour block on: review/reinforcement of counterintelligence/human intelligence principles; counterintelligence organizations; Subversion & Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army & Deliberate Security Violations (SAEDA); and the role of the tactical human intelligence teams (THTs). Furthermore, the MIOBC students receive approximately an hour block of instruction from their Stability and Support Operations (SASO) instructor on displaced civilians/refugees on the battlefield.

MI Captain Career Course (MICCC) officers receive a one-hour block of instruction in their intelligence support to brigade operations (ISBO) on imagery intelligence (IMINT), counterintelligence/human intelligence, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Additionally, during practical exercises the students receive 40 hours of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) training, 32 hours of threat training, and 2 hours of crime link training from their instructor. Also, during intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning the basic principles of counterintelligence/HUMINT are reinforced during practical exercises (30 minutes in length) that addresses IMINT, counterintelligence/HUMINT, and SIGINT being used on the battlefield to collect intelligence information. During the Intelligence Support Course to division, corps, and joint officers, there is one day of counterintelligence/HUMINT training. This training includes an overview, specific training, and a practical exercise for counterintelligence/HUMINT. Additionally, the 35E series (Counterintelligence Officer) course conducts counterintelligence/HUMINT training for 8 hours, and the Strategic Intelligence Officer Course conducts counterintelligence /HUMINT training for 5 hours.

Interviewed career course captains with experience in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) from the Military Intelligence school stated their home station training on detainee operations was limited and concentrated on EPWs or compliant detainee populations. These officers stated the training they received at the MI Basic Course did not provide them with enough training to prepare them to conduct detainee or human intelligence gathering operations.

The G2, in coordination with TRADOC, has created a G2X/S2X Battle Staff Course to begin in July 2004 for MI officers. The G2X/S2X Battle Staff Course will prepare a G2X/S2X staff of a deploying Army division with the capability to synchronize, coordinate, manage and de-conflict counterintelligence and HUMINT sources within the division's area of responsibility (AOR). The G2X/S2X program of instruction (POI) will be tailored for a staff operating within a Joint or multi-national (Coalition) environment which will focus on real world missions, Armycentric, and counterintelligence/HUMINT tool-specific training. The G2X/S2X curriculum is based upon the counterintelligence/HUMINT critical tasks and incorporates J2X/G2X/S2X emerging doctrine/methodology and lessons learned. This course will be hands-on and application based. The G2X/S2X Battle Staff Course provides the critical knowledge and skills required to enable the G2X staff to successfully synchronize and monitor asset management to place sources against the combatant commander's target in support of the mission.

The G2, in coordination with the MI School, is currently revising Field Manual (FM) 34- 52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992. Additionally, the G2 is spearheading a coordinated effort with TRADOC and the U.S. Army Military Police School to synchronize between the 3 disciplines of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, particularly in the area of detainee handling and internment/resettlement facility management.

Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers stated that the Law or War training they received prior to deployment did not differentiate between the different classifications of detainees causing confusion concerning the levels of treatment. Even though this confusion existed, the vast majority of leaders and Soldiers treated detainees humanely.

TRADOC, in coordination with the Office of the Judge Advocate General, is currently determining the feasibility of increasing or adjusting Law of War training in the proponent schools to include procedures for handling civilian internees and other non- uniformed personnel on the battlefield.

(4) Root Cause: The MI School is not adequately training the management of HUMINT to tactical MI officers. The MI School has no functional training course available to teach the management of HUMINT.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC continue the integration of the G2X/S2X Battle Staff Course for all Military Intelligence officers assigned to G2X/S2X positions.

Recommendation: TRADOC integrate additional training on the collection and analysis of HUMINT into the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course program of instruction.

e. Finding 8:

(1) Finding: The DAIG Team found that officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaty obligations and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that policies were not clear and contained ambiguities. The DAIG Team found implementation, training, and oversight of these policies was inconsistent; the Team concluded, however, based on a review of cases through 9 June 2004 that no confirmed instance of detainee abuse resulted from the approved policies.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Interrogation approach techniques policy is identified by several different titles by the different commands of OEF and OIF. For the purpose of standardization of this report those titles will be referred to collectively as interrogation approach techniques policy.

Army doctrine found in Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, lists 17 accepted interrogations approach techniques. It states that those approach techniques are not inclusive of all possible or accepted techniques. The DAIG Team reviewed interrogation approach techniques policy for both OEF and OIF and determined that CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 included additional interrogation approach techniques not found FM 34- 52. The DAIG Team found that officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under Geneva Convention Relevant to Prisoners of War (GPW), the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the U.S. Torture statute, 18 USC §§2034, 2034A, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that some interrogators may not have received formal instruction from the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center on interrogation approach techniques not contained in FM 34-52. Additionally, the DAIG Team found that while commands published interrogation approach policy, some subordinate units were unaware of the current version of those policies. Content of unit interrogator training programs varied among units in both OEF and OIF. However, no confirmed instance involving the application of approved approach techniques resulted in an instance of detainee abuse.

The 17 approved interrogation approach techniques listed in FM 34-52 are direct, incentive, emotional love, emotional hate, fear-up (harsh), fear-up (mild), fear-down, pride and ego-up, pride and ego-down, futility, we know all, file and dossier, establish your identity, repetition, rapid fire, silent, and change of scene. Approach techniques can be used individually or in combination as part of a cohesive, logical interrogation plan. These approach techniques are found in the current training curriculum at the Military Intelligence School. The FM states these approach techniques are "not new nor are all the possible or acceptable techniques discussed. Everything the interrogator says and does must be in concert with the GWS [Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field], GPW, GC and UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]." The FM further states, "Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of the GPW are not violated." Techniques considered to be physical or mental torture and coercion are expressly prohibited, including electric shock, any form of beating, mock execution, and abnormal sleep deprivation.

The FM gives commanders additional guidance in analyzing additional techniques. On page 1-9 it states: "When using interrogation techniques, certain applications of approaches and techniques may approach the line between lawful actions and unlawful actions. It may often be difficult to determine where lawful actions end and unlawful actions begin. In attempting to determine if a contemplated approach or technique would be considered unlawful, consider these two tests: Given all the surrounding facts and circumstances, would a reasonable person in the place of the person being interrogated believe that his rights, as guaranteed under both international and U.S. law, are being violated or withheld if he fails to cooperate. If your contemplated actions were perpetrated by an enemy against U.S. PWs [Prisoners of War], you would believe such actions violate international or U.S. law. If you answer yes to either of these tests, do not engage in the contemplated action. If a doubt still remains as to the legality of the proposed action, seek a legal opinion from your servicing judge advocate."

The FM lists four primary factors that must be considered when selecting interrogation approach techniques:

(1) The person under interrogation's mental or physical state,

(2) The person under interrogation's background and experience,

(3) The objective of the interrogation, and

(4) The interrogator's background and abilities.

The DAIG Team found some interrogation approach techniques approved for use at Guantanamo Bay were used in development of policies in OEF and OIF. As interrogation policy was developed for Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo, the Commander, U.S. Southern Command requested additional approach techniques to be approved. A Working Group on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism was convened. This group was required to recommend legal and effective interrogation approach techniques for collection of strategic intelligence from detainees interned at Guantanamo Bay. The working group collected information on 39 existing or proposed interrogation tactics, techniques and procedures from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Southern Command in a 6 March 2003 report. It recommended approval of 26 interrogation approaches.

A memorandum on 16 April 2003, entitled "Counter-Resistance Techniques" approved 26 specific techniques for use only by JTF Guantanamo. It required the use of 7 enumerated safeguards in all interrogations. The memorandum stated that the use of any additional interrogation techniques required additional approval. The instructions noted that the intent in all interrogations was to use "the least intrusive method, always applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators."

Both CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 developed interrogation policies for intelligence exploitation operations in OEF and OIF. All policies contained additional interrogation approach techniques other than those identified in FM 34-52. The DAIG Team identified this occurred for three reasons: (1) Drafters referenced the JTF Guantanamo policy memorandum as a basis for development for their policy; (2) In two instances, published policy made reference to the 8 May 1987 version of FM 34-52 which listed a technique that was later removed from the 28 September 1992 revision; and (3) Some intelligence personnel believed that additional interrogation techniques would assist in more effective intelligence exploitation of a noncompliant or hardened detainee population. Both OEF and OIF included safeguards in their policy, although they differed from each other and from the 16 April 2003 memorandum applicable to JTF Guantanamo. Reliance on the Guantanamo policy appears to contradict the terms of the memorandum itself which explicitly states it was applicable to interrogations of unlawful combatants at JTF Guantanamo and failed to take into account that different standards applied to JTF Guantanamo, CJTF-180 and CJTF-7.

The DAIG Team found that CJTF-7 issued a series of evolving policy statements, while CJTF-180 only issued one policy. The DAIG Team, however, found evidence of practices that had been in effect in Afghanistan since at least early 2003. The DAIG Team reviewed the officially approved interrogation approach technique policies for both CJTF-7 and CJTF-180, and the record of practices in use in CJTF-180 prior to adoption of a formal policy. The changes in policies and practices, over time, reflect the struggle that commanders faced in developing approach techniques policies that were both effective and complied generally with legal obligations applicable to the theater. In Iraq, in particular, the commander was faced with a group of detainees that ranged from Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW's), to security internees (SI's) to unlawful combatants. In both theaters, commanders were operating under combat conditions, facing the death and wounding of scores of U.S. soldiers, civilians and other noncombatants on a daily basis. Their decisions and decision-making process must be viewed against this backdrop.

The DAIG Team found that officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaty obligations and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The approved policies, however, presented significant risk if not executed in strictest compliance with their own safeguards. In this light, the caution noted in FM 34-52 (above) appears applicable, "It may often be difficult to determine where lawful actions end and unlawful actions begin." In a high-stress, high pressure combat environment, soldiers and subordinate leaders require clear, unambiguous guidance well within established parameters that they did not have in the policies we reviewed.

The DAIG Team found that the established policies were not clear and contained ambiguity. The absence of clarity could have been mitigated by additional training, detailed planning and brief-backs, detailed case-by-case legal analysis and other command and staff execution safeguards. In the absence of the safeguards, however, the commands could have embarked on high risk interrogation operations without adequate preparation or safeguards. Contributing to the ambiguity were command policies that included both approved techniques and security and safety provisions. While some security provisions provide a secondary benefit to an interrogation, it is not proper to use the security provision solely for the purpose of causing this secondary benefit in the interrogation. Both the CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 policies and the known CJTF-180 practices prior to their first published policy, imprudently mixed discussion of security provisions into interrogation techniques. This added to the possible confusion regarding whether a particular action was truly a security provision or an interrogation technique. While the language of the approved policies could be viewed as a careful attempt to draw the line between lawful and unlawful conduct, the published instructions left considerable room for misapplication, particularly under high-stress combat conditions.

Application of the additional techniques involving higher risk of violations required additional training for interrogators. Formal school training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) for both MOS 97E, Enlisted Human Intelligence Collector, and 351E, Warrant Officer Human Intelligence Collection Technician, provides instruction on the interrogation approach techniques identified in FM 34-52. The DAIG Team identified that interrogators only received training on doctrinal approach techniques listed in FM 34-52 from the USAICS, however, some interrogators may have received training on the additional approach techniques at the unit level. Interviewed intelligence personnel stated they were also trained on the additional approaches through mobile training teams. In some organizations, the team found a comprehensive unit training program; in others, the team found no formal or standardized interrogator training program. Inadequately trained interrogators present an increased risk that the approach technique will be improperly applied. The team found no indication that a lack of training resulted in an improper application of any particular technique or techniques; however, it remains critical that units applying any of the additional interrogation approach techniques have a comprehensive training program as a risk mitigation measure for those higher risk techniques.

The DAIG Team observed that although both CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 published interrogation approach technique policies, some inspected units were unaware of the correct command policy in effect at the time of inspection. The differences noted were omission of approved approach techniques and failure to note that a particular approach technique required higher command approval. The team was unable to determine if inspected units with incorrect versions of higher headquarters policy had requested authorization to use, or had used, any of the additional techniques. The unit policies did include safeguards consistent with the higher headquarters policy. As with other sensitive changes in unit mission orders, commanders should ensure that they have an effective feedback mechanism to ensure subordinate units receive, acknowledge and comply with changes in approved approach techniques.

Interviews and sworn statements from personnel in both CJTF-180 and CJTF-7 indicated that some of the approach techniques included in their policies, but not listed in FM 34-52, were used by some interrogators. The DAIG team found no indication of the frequency or consistency with which these additional approach techniques were employed. The DAIG Team conducted a review of 125 case summaries from the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and unit investigations available as of 9 June 2004. Based on a review of case summaries, and despite the significant shortcomings noted in the command policies and practices, the team was unable to establish any direct link between the use of an approved approach technique or techniques and a confirmed case of detainee abuse.

(4) Root Cause: Commanders perceived interrogation approach techniques found in FM 34-52 were insufficient for effective intelligence exploitation of non-compliant detainees in OEF and OIF and published high risk policies that presented a significant risk of misapplication if not trained and executed carefully. Not all interrogators were trained on all approved approach techniques.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC, in coordination with G2 and TJAG, revise doctrine to identify interrogation approach techniques that are acceptable, effective and legal for noncompliant detainees.

Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 ensure that standardized policy on interrogation approach techniques are received, understood, trained and enforced by all units.
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PART 4 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Chapter 5: Other Observations

1. Summary of Findings: We examined seven key systems (Leadership and Discipline, Policy and Doctrine, Military Intelligence/Military Police Relationship, Organizational Structures, Facilities, Resources, and Training and Education) that influence how detainees are handled throughout the detention process, including interrogations. In the course of that examination we identified a number of observations that while not critical, require attention and resolution. None of the findings contributed directly to any specific case of abuse. The recommendations accompanying the 15 following findings are designed to improve our ability to properly conduct detainee operations.

2. Findings:

a. Finding 9:


(1) Finding: Interviewed leaders and Soldiers stated the unit's morale (71%) and command climate (68%) had steadily improved due to competent leadership, caring for Soldiers by leaders, and better working and living conditions as the theater matured.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: We attempted to determine the effect of stress and morale on detainee operations and conducted a Combat/Operational Stress Survey. We interviewed or sensed more than 650 leaders and Soldiers and received 603 of the surveys back. The DAIG Team found that 71% (428 of 603) of leaders and Soldiers surveyed stated the unit's morale, (71%, 428 of 603) and command climate (68%, 410 of 603) had steadily improved in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The survey results found that leaders and Soldiers perceived that morale and the command climate was good. The results of the survey, interviews, and sensing sessions showed that the morale and command climate improved due to competent leadership, caring for Soldiers by leaders, and better working and living conditions as the theater matured. The DAIG Team also found that most perceptions of morale and command climate varied widely between senior leaders, junior leaders, and Soldiers. The morale and command climate perception was higher for those interviewed and surveyed leaders and Soldiers who deployed prior to November 2003 and had redeployed from OEF/OIF than those that were still in country or arrived after the first of the year when living conditions started to improve.

The morale and command climate perceptions varied depending upon the difficulty of the unit’s mission and its location. Soldiers conducting detainee operations in remote and dangerous locations complained of very poor to poor morale and command climate due to the lack of higher command involvement and the perception that their leaders did not care. These Soldiers stated that the leadership from higher commands hardly ever visited their locations, they were living in much worse conditions than other Soldiers, they suffered increased dangers, they were untrained to perform their mission, and the work schedule/lack of personnel depth caused them to "burn out."

Of the Soldiers who arrived in theater since November/December 2003 (61%, 194 of 318), expressed morale as good to excellent, while 51% (145 of 285) of Soldiers who deployed during the initial stages of OEF/OIF complained of poor morale, but also expressed that it seemed to get better with time.

Most Soldiers talked of how morale improved as living and working conditions improved. A majority of Soldiers mentioned the arrival of air conditioning, installation of Internet cafes, rest and recuperation (R&R) trips to Qatar, and environmental leave as some of the things that improved morale. Many engaged in Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities, such as weight lifting, basketball, softball, billiards, and ping-pong. Many enjoyed TV, hot meals, satellite phones, volleyball, and MWR bands in some locations. Soldiers were very pleased with how the leaders helped and listened to them more than they had before. The majority of Soldiers got more downtime or time off when possible. Most leaders expressed a need to continue to obtain more comfort items sooner to speed up improvements in living conditions as a measure to boost the morale.

The survey was given to every leader and Soldier that was interviewed and in sensing sessions both in theater and CONUS. The survey revealed that the majority of leaders and Soldiers agreed that unit members can depend, cooperate, and stand up for each other, which are factors of having good unit morale. In addition, leaders and Soldiers were told when they were doing a good job, were not embarrassed in front of peers, and were not assigned extra missions by leadership to look good for the chain of command, which are some indicators that there is a perception of a good command climate. Although the morale and command climate was poor under certain conditions, it steadily improved as living conditions in the theater improved over time.

(4) Recommendation: CFLCC, CJTF-7, and CJTF-180 continue to stress the importance of positive unit morale and command climate.

b. Finding 10:

(1) Finding: Detainee administration, internment, and intelligence exploitation policy and doctrine does not address detainee operations conducted in the current operating environment, which has a higher demand for human intelligence exploitation at the tactical level and the need for additional classifications of detainees.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results:

POLICY

Although classified detainee operations policy has been issued to address individual situations at specific geographic locations, current published detainee operations policy in AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, does not address additional definitions of detainee designations and related treatment requirements. In addition to enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and compliant, non- hostile civilian internees (CIs) in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OIF, units were faced with capturing, transporting, segregating and controlling other categories of detainees, such as non-state combatants and non-compliant CIs. AR 190-8 also does not address the relationship between mission requirements for reestablishing a civilian prison system and detainee operations. Policy must address requirements for expanded employment of confinement expertise for managing detainee security, custody, and control challenges for a wider array of detainee designations. Policy must also address the confinement expert's role in standing up indigenous prison systems, enabling rapid segregation and transfer of criminal detainee populations from U.S. Forces to indigenous control.

The DAIG Team found the addition of new detainee administrative policy classifications of detainees resulted in inconsistent administrative procedures. Current doctrine, regulations, and policy are based on a linear battlefield and a largely compliant population, with the primary goal of removing individuals from the battlefield. In addition to EPWs and compliant, non-hostile CIs, units in OEF and OIF were confronted with capturing, transporting, processing, and confining other classifications of detainees, such as non-state combatants and non-compliant CIs. The nature of the environment in which we now conduct detainee operations requires a more specific classification of the detainees interned. Instead of compliant, non-hostile detainees, units are capturing and transporting non-state combatants, insurgents, criminals, and detainees who are either known or perceived security threats. Policy needs to be updated to address the management of detainees captured and detained primarily for intelligence exploitation, the potential security threat they may pose, or the pending reestablishment of indigenous prison systems.

Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, accords appropriate legal status using four detainee classifications: EPW, Retained Personnel (RP), CI, and Other Detainees (OD). In OEF and OIF, various fragmentary orders, policy memorandums, and unit standing operating procedures utilized several variations on these classifications, including Enemy Combatants, Under-privileged Enemy Combatant, Security Internee, Criminal Detainee, Person Under U.S. Forces Control (PUC), and Low Level Enemy Combatant (LLEC). In accordance with AR 190- 8, administrative and treatment requirements are based on the classification assigned to a particular detainee. For example, detainees are to be segregated in facilities according to their status. The development of classifications not correlated to one of the four terms defined in AR 190-8 resulted in confusing and ambiguous requirements for those charged with managing detainees and created the potential for inconsistent treatment. From points of capture to internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, there are varying degrees of understanding as to which standards apply to the various classifications of detainees in OEF and OIF. Policy does not specifically address administrative responsibilities related to the timely release of detainees captured and detained primarily for intelligence exploitation and/or the potential security threat they may pose. Administrative processing of detainees by units in OEF and OIF was not standardized or fully compliant with policy and doctrine.

The time between capture and receipt of an Internment Serial Number (ISN) at an I/R facility far exceeded the time specified in policy and doctrine. Once the detainee reached an I/R facility, the required documentation received from collecting points (CPs) was often incomplete. The National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC) did not receive all mandatory data elements, or in a timely manner, as detainee designation was often not determined until long after capture. From points of capture to corps holding areas, detainees are to be moved "as soon as practical" depending on the condition of the detainee, the threat faced in moving them, and military necessity. The non-linear nature of the battlespace and missions dependent on human intelligence made administrative processing a secondary priority to intelligence exploitation of detainees. This had additional second- and third-order effects on accountability, security, and reporting requirements for detainees. Detaining individuals primarily for intelligence collection or because of their potential security threat, though necessary, presented units with situations not addressed by current policy and doctrine.

Administrative processing is further hampered by the absence of the Branch Prisoner of War Information Center (now called the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC)), the central agency in theater required by policy to manage information on all EPW, CI and RP and their personal property. This resulted in missing data on individual detainees, poor detainee and property accountability, and the inability of the NDRC to completely and accurately report all required data elements to the DoD, the Army, and other appropriate agencies. Inadequate property accountability could also result in claims against the U.S. government for losses incurred by detainees while in U.S. custody.

According to Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees, 18 August 1994, the transfer of detainees to or from the custody and control of U.S. Forces requires the approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)). In OEF, oversight of detainee operations policy was transferred from ASD(ISA) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) in a memorandum dated 17 January 2002, SUBJECT: Responsibility for Detainees in Association with the Global War on Terrorism. In OIF, ASD(ISA) maintained transfer authority under DoDD 2310.1 for most detainees, but ASD(SO/LIC) had authority under the 17 January 2002 memorandum for specific classifications of detainees. Release decisions were made by commanders or review boards at multiple echelons of detention in OIF, from points of capture to the Detainee Release Board (DRB) developed by CJTF-7. The DAIG Team did not find evidence of ASD(ISA) oversight of release decisions in OIF.

Complex detainee release mechanisms contributed to overcrowding of I/R facilities. Multiple reviews were required to make release recommendations prior to approval by the release authority. Non-concurrence by area commanders, intelligence organizations or law enforcement agencies resulted in retention of larger numbers of detainees. Interviews with the CJTF-7 Chief Magistrate, Appeal & Review Board members, and Release Review Board members indicated they believed up to 80% of detainees being held for security and intelligence purposes might be eligible for release upon review of their cases with the other 20% either requiring continued detention due to security reasons or continued intelligence requirements. Interviews also indicated area commanders were reluctant to concur with some release decisions out of concern that potential combatants may be re-introduced into their areas of operation. The Ryder Report referenced the overcrowded conditions and recommended holding Iraqi magistrate proceedings at individual facilities, reducing the requirement to manage many detainees centrally. Release of those individuals locally would substantially reduce the detainee population and the related resources and manpower, and would improve the capability to manage the remaining population. The remaining detainee population would be made up of only those criminals awaiting the restoration of the Iraqi prison system, those who are under active or pending interrogation, or those being held for specific security reasons.

During interviews and sensing sessions, the DAIG Team noted all Active Component and Reserve Component leaders indicated that current detainee operations policy was not consistent with the requirements of ongoing operations in OEF and OIF. Detainee operations policy must reflect requirements of the Future Force for strategic and operational versatility— conducting combat and stability operations simultaneously—while operating in a joint environment. As Army Transformation continues, detainee operations policy should be appropriate for and responsive to the requirements of non-linear battlespaces. Policy should provide specific guidance for a wider array of detainees who have significantly varying security requirements. This will reduce confusion in relation to the applicability of these requirements to various categories of detainees.

The Ryder Report points to several areas where current policy is not sufficient for detainee operations. It stated that, ". . . more detailed instructions in areas such as discipline, instruments of restraint, and treatment of prisoners awaiting trial. . ." are needed. The report suggested that the 800th MP Brigade’s challenges in adapting its organizational structure, training, and equipment resources to expand from a purely EPW operation to also managing Iraqi and third country national detainee populations can be attributed to a lack of policy guidance. The Taguba Investigation also points to a lack of sufficient policy and training on existing policy.

The DAIG Team concluded DoD-developed classifications of detainees were different from those found in AR 190-8 and led to inconsistent segregation of these groups as directed by policy. The lack of an adequate system-wide capacity for handling detainees, the lack of specific policy on adequacy of information/evidence collection, and the lack of an operating detainee release process at all echelons, along with the perceived need to conduct interrogations closer to the point of capture, caused units to retain detainees beyond doctrinal time periods and without properly segregating the various classifications of detainees. The decision by capturing units to hold and interrogate detainees also interfered with the policy requirements for accountability of detainees and their property within the system, leading to substantial delays in determining an individual's status and his/her subsequent disposition. Policy must address the appropriate, safe, secure, and humane custody of detainees, the specialized confinement skills required in a high-risk detainee I/R setting, and the need for timely intelligence exploitation of detainees in a non-linear battlespace. Lack of a TDRC contributed to units' failure to administratively process detainees in accordance with all regulations and policy, and the loss of theater-wide detainee and property accountability. Incomplete documentation and a cumbersome review process caused detainees to be held for extended periods of time and contributed to the overcrowding of I/R facilities.

DOCTRINE

Current doctrine was designed to quickly evacuate compliant, non-hostile enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and CIs from point of capture to I/R facilities. It does not envision the demands of gaining immediate, tactical human intelligence, hence the requirement to detain and interrogate at lower levels. The nature of OEF and OIF battlespaces, coupled with the urgent need for human intelligence (HUMINT), compelled many units to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for conducting detainee operations. While the necessary basic skill sets and organizational responsibilities contained in current detainee operations doctrine remain applicable, the procedural timelines for detainee processing and movement from the point of capture to the I/R facilities do not consider current operational needs. Also the unit task organizations for detainee processing and movement are not properly resourced to meet many of the challenges faced in OEF and OIF.

During interviews and sensing sessions, the DAIG Team noted leaders and Soldiers indicated current detainee operations doctrine was not consistent with the requirements of ongoing operations. According to current doctrine, the swift flow of detainees to the rear is critical in getting them to trained interrogators for intelligence exploitation, and to secure them in I/R facilities designed and operated for long-term internment. Under present doctrine, combat units must rely on support elements from other units to perform many mission-related tasks (e.g., MPs to provide escort and guard functions, and Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams (THTs) to screen detainees at points of capture and forward collecting points (CPs)). While current doctrine is meant to relieve combat formations of the significant manpower and logistical requirements for managing detainees before they have a negative impact on combat effectiveness, it has failed to do so in OEF and OIF. Current doctrine does not address a nonlinear battlespace where units at division level and below hold detainees for extended periods of time to provide commanders with intelligence for the conduct of effective tactical operations. Traditional task organizations are not properly resourced to meet the needs of this new operating paradigm.

Standing operating procedures (SOPs) for CPs and I/R facilities that were drafted by units prior to deployment (and in accordance with current doctrine) were found early on to be outdated based on the current operating environment for OEF and OIF. Soldiers were required to perform effectively in a variety of missions across a spectrum of operations. Units quickly found themselves taking on roles in detainee operations which were unanticipated. For example, the need for timely intelligence compelled officers and Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in combat units to conduct tactical questioning even though none had been trained in proper interrogation TTPs. Manpower shortages at CPs and I/R facilities were satisfied by using in lieu of (ILO) units; most received little or no training in detainee operations.

The limitations of current doctrine meant that mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available, and civilian (METT-TC) considerations often drove the design and operations of division CPs and battalion and company CPs. This had negative second- and third-order effects on the accountability, intelligence exploitation, security, and safeguarding of detainees. Instead of capturing and rapidly transporting detainees to doctrinal CPs, battalions and companies were holding detainees for up to 30 days without the training, materiel, or infrastructure for doing so. The desire for timely intelligence, transportation and security concerns, and delays in administrative processing caused units at all echelons to retain detainees for periods of time that exceeded those recommended by doctrine. While adapting and operating outside of established doctrine is necessary and desirable, especially when current doctrine fails to meet the needs of ongoing operations, doing so carries with it a requirement to ensure that mission effectiveness is not hampered while ensuring safeguards are in place to prevent unsanctioned activities and meet other established requirements.

The DAIG Team observed and determined through interviews and sensing sessions that capture information was often incomplete when detainees were processed at detention locations. Capturing units lacked knowledge of procedures for information and evidence collection, critical for the accurate disposition of detainees. This was particularly apparent as OIF 2 units began deploying into theater and new commanders were faced with making release decisions based on insufficient information and documentation. The lack of required information and specificity resulted in an administrative processing backlog at all echelons of internment. CPs and I/R facilities now require capturing units to have complete documentation prior to the transfer of a detainee into their custody.

Current interrogation doctrine for intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the composition and structure of interrogation assets does not adequately cover the current operational environment. Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, describes military interrogation approaches that remain valid, but the FM may not include all acceptable and effective techniques. Army interrogators receive 16.5 weeks of intensive training on interrogation procedures and techniques at the Human Intelligence Collection Course. This training includes collection priority, screening, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, and termination of the interrogation. Specific instruction on the laws of land warfare emphasizes compliance of all Army interrogation TTPs with the Geneva Conventions and Army policy. All Army interrogators interviewed in OEF and OIF stated they were performing interrogations of detainees in accordance with policy and doctrine.

The Ryder Report and Taguba Investigation indicated deficiencies in detainee operations doctrine. The Ryder Report noted significant variances from doctrine and highlighted the need for changes in current doctrine to address the "significant paradigm shift" in detainee operations. The report, however, does not provide information on specific instances where doctrine needs to be revised. (The report did state, "the team will forward suggested doctrinal and organizational changes to the appropriate proponent schools for review and action.") The Taguba Investigation of the 800th MP Brigade found, "basic Army doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units." Procedures were "made up," with "reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience." The relevance of current doctrine to present and future operations was beyond the scope of the Taguba Investigation. The DAIG Team found the statements made in these earlier reports to be consistent with the results of this inspection.

Findings from interviews, sensing sessions, and direct observations of AC and RC units consistently indicated that current doctrine fell short in preparing Soldiers to conduct detainee operations in the fluid and dynamic environment of OEF and OIF. Detainee operations doctrine needs to fulfill the requirement of the Future Force for strategic versatility—conducting combat and stability operations simultaneously—while operating in a joint environment with relative independence and at a high operational tempo. As Army Transformation continues, detainee operations doctrine needs to be appropriate for, and responsive to, the requirements of asymmetric battlespaces, the role of non-State belligerents, and modular force structures.

(4) Root Cause: Current doctrine and policy does not provide adequate guidance for detainee operations in OEF and OIF.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC revise doctrine for the administrative processing of detainees to improve accountability, movement, and disposition in a non-linear battlespace. And further examine processes for capturing and validating lessons learned in order to rapidly modify doctrine and incorporate into training application for Soldiers and units.

Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General revise policy for the administrative processing of detainees to improve accountability, movement, and disposition in a non-linear battlespace.

Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General, in coordination with the G2, update detainee policy to specifically address the administration, internment/resettlement, and intelligence exploitation in a non-linear battlespace, enabling commanders to better manage resources, ensure safe and secure custodial environments, and improve intelligence gathering.

c. Finding 11:

(1) Finding: Shortfalls in both the Military Police and Military Intelligence organizational structures resulted in the tactical unit commanders adjusting their tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct detainee operations.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results:

DOCTRINE

Doctrine indicates that Military Police (MP) units accept detainees from capturing units as far forward and as rapidly as possible. MPs operate divisional forward collecting points (CPs), divisional central CPs, and corps holding areas (CHA). MP units operating CPs and CHAs have the responsibilities to sustain, safeguard and ensure sick and wounded detainees receive medical treatment.

A platoon from the division MP company operates the forward CPs and should hold detainees for no more than 12 hours before transporting detainees to the central CP. The central CP should not hold detainees for more than 24 hours before transporting detainees to the CHA. Units will protect the detainees from enemy attacks and provide medical support, food, potable water, latrine facilities, and shelter. Detainee property is tagged with part C of Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag, and given to the escort guards. The MP leader will request transportation through logistic channels to transfer detainees from the forward CP to the central CP with the same procedures to transport the detainees to the CHA.

The CHA is operated by a platoon or company from a corps MP battalion and should not keep detainees for more than 72 hours. The decision to hold detainees longer is based on mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops available and civilian (METT-TC) considerations and the availability of forces. An MP platoon can guard 500 detainees, while an MP company can guard 2,000 detainees. As the population of the CHA increases, detainee evacuations to the internment/resettlement (I/R) facility also increase. Logistical requirements for food, water, medical care and sanitation must be considered. Locations for use by Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators need to be identified. The MP leader will request transportation through logistic channels to transport detainees from the CHA to the I/R facility.

The I/R facilities provide appropriate segregation, accountability, security, and support of detainees. An I/R facility is semi- permanent and normally consists of one to eight compounds, with each compound capable of interning 500 detainees. The facility is operated by the HHC, MP battalion (I/R) (EPW/CI/DC) which provides command and control, administrative, and logistics functions to operate the facility. The battalion is capable of interning and supporting 4,000 enemy prisoner of war (EPWs) and civilian internees (CIs) or 8,000 dislocated civilians (DCs). An MP company (Guard) is assigned to provide guards for EPWs, CIs, and DCs, at the I/R facility. The company is capable of securing 2,000 EPWs, 2,000 CIs, or 4,000 DCs. The MP company (Escort Guard) provides supervision and security for evacuating and moving EPWs, CIs, DCs and other detained persons via vehicles, trains, aircraft, and road marches. The minimal security requirements for the facility include clear zones, guard towers, lights, sally ports, communications, and patrol roads. The MP and support personnel accepting detainees into the facility will search the detainee, conduct medical screening, perform administrative accountability, photograph and fingerprint as needed, account for personal property, and review records.

Doctrinally the first location an interrogation could take place is at the brigade. The interrogation teams are temporarily attached to the brigade from the division MI battalion interrogation section. The teams at the brigade level are strictly tactical and deal with information of immediate value. Interrogators are not usually assigned below the brigade level unless the combat situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or company. Interrogations below brigade level are brief and concerned with information bearing directly on the combat mission of the capturing unit. This information is immediate tactical intelligence that is necessary for mission accomplishment and permits rapid reaction based on the information obtained.

In addition, MP personnel and MI interrogator teams at CPs and CHAs need to work closely together to determine which detainees, their personal belongings, and completed paperwork will offer intelligence information that would be useful to the command. The MI interrogators must support operations from brigade to theater level. Interrogators have to be highly mobile, and have communication equipment to report timely intelligence information to the supported commander.

Units conducting detainee operations in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures to make up for organizational shortfalls and to fill the void in doctrine resulting from the current operational environment.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

In OEF, units at point of capture processed their detainees at a non-doctrinal company CPs that held the detainees for up to 72 hours before releasing them or transporting them to higher headquarters. Detainees were held longer than 72 hours if required for intelligence purposes. Battalion Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams (THTs) sent to the company were extremely successful in gathering intelligence information from the detainees. If the THT was not available, the commander determined whether to detain or release a detainee after screening. MP personnel were not assigned to these company CPs, so the forward units had to provide their own guard force for the detainees. This additional duty took Soldiers away from performing their combat mission, which decreased the combat effectiveness of the unit. To process a detainee into the CP, the unit had to complete all required paperwork. The unit inventoried and tagged detainee personal property which would accompany the detainee when he was repatriated or transferred to another location. The unit also tracked detainees with a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2708, Receipt of Inmate or Detained Person, when they were transferred to another location. The company CP provided detainees with food, water, shelter, and limited medical treatment.

The battalion CP held anywhere from 11 to 24 detainees for a period of 2 to 30 days. The battalions operating the CPs received sufficient information from the point of capture units to aid in their processing of the detainees. The interrogators examined all evidence before they began interrogating a detainee. When there was no THT present, commanders screened detainees for their intelligence value to determine if they should be released or transferred to the I/R facility. The determination to retain or release detainees at lower levels helped to ease the backlog of detainees requiring screening and questioning at higher locations. There were no MP personnel assigned to the battalions to support the battalion CPs. The battalions drew guards from their subordinate companies to act as a guard force for the detainees. This requirement to guard detainees diverted Soldiers from performing their combat mission and decreased the combat effectiveness of the unit. The unit leadership supervised its Soldiers to ensure detainees were protected, accounted for, and safeguarded. The unit provided detainees with; food, bottled water, shelter, and limited medical treatment. The unit evacuated detainees by air or tactical vehicles to higher level facilities.

The division central CP at Kandahar was operated by platoons from an MP Company. The MP personnel in-processed the detainees, inventoried their personal property on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, placed their items in bags (if they would fit) or large suitcases and other items. A copy of the inventory sheet was placed inside with the property (with the detainee internally generated identification number) and stored the property in a secure area. The detainees were physically searched, checked for injuries, digitally photographed, and if sick or wounded, evacuated to a medical treatment facility (MTF) for treatment. The central CP held anywhere from 23 to 40 detainees. Most detainees were repatriated or transferred within 72 hours of arrival at this location, however detainees could be held longer for intelligence exploitation. MP guards escorted detainees to the interrogators and remained in close proximity during the interrogation. Since the detainees did not leave the facility, there was no custodial transfer of detainees to interrogators. When an interrogator requested to screen detainee personal effects prior to the interrogation, the MP guard would have the interrogator sign for the items prior to releasing them. The unit provided detainees with food, bottled water, shelter, blanket, Qur-an, medical treatment and showers for personal hygiene. CP personnel transported detainees by air to the I/R facility.

Detainees were held at the Bagram I/R facility for an unspecified length of time. The facility could house up to 275 detainees and, at the time of the inspection, housed 175. The I/R facility was operated by an MP battalion. The MP battalion did not deploy with two of its organic MP companies, but was augmented with two Reserve Component (RC) MP companies, one company was an MP company (combat support) and the other was an MP company (guard), to aid them with the internment duties. Upon a detainee's arrival, the MPs in-processed the detainee's personal effects and accounted for the items on a DA Form 4137. The evidence custodian signed for the property and stored it in a secure area. The detainee was photographed, received a medical screening including height and weight, was issued a jumpsuit, showered and shaved, and then was photographed again. The MP guards escorted the detainee to the interrogators and remained in close proximity to the interrogation. Since the detainee did not leave the facility there was no custodial transfer of the detainee to the interrogator. If the detainee was transferred outside the facility, a DD Form 2708, Receipt of Inmate or Detained Person, was completed and signed to maintain accountability. Upon return the detainee received a complete medical exam to check for injuries. When an interrogator requested to screen detainee's personal effects prior to the interrogation, the MP guard would have the interrogator sign for the items. The interrogators used the same screening sites they use for interrogations to review personal effects. One MI Officer felt there was a doctrinal shortcoming pertaining to interrogation operations. He felt there should be a standing operating procedure (SOP) for the operations of a joint interrogation facility (JIF) that is standard Army wide. MP personnel provided the detainees with food, bottled water and access to medical treatment. The detainees slept in cells, received blankets and had access to latrines and showers.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Based on interviews and sensing sessions with leaders and Soldiers in Continental United States (CONUS)/Outside CONUS (OCONUS) the DAIG Team found 50% (13 of 26) of interviewed point of capture company leaders stated that their companies had established and operated non-doctrinal company CPs in OIF. These companies detained individuals during their cordon and search operations and raids. The remaining 50% of interviewed point of capture company leaders transported their detainees to the next higher collecting point. The companies held anywhere from 3 to 15 detainees for a period of 12 hours up to 3 days. This was longer than the recommended doctrinal standard of 12 hours. Doctrine also has the MP operating CPs to temporarily secure EPWs /CIs until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon's holding area. MP personnel are not doctrinally assigned at the company level to collect or guard detainees. The capturing unit had the responsibility to guard their detainees for extended periods of time, which took the Soldiers away from performing their combat mission and adversely impacted the combat effectiveness of the unit. The company CPs were established to interrogate detainees closer to the point of capture prior to evacuating the detainee to the next higher level CP. The unit completed the required detainee paperwork at this location. The required paperwork included 2 sworn statements, the Coalition Provisional Authority Forces Apprehension Form, and DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag. The unit had to complete this process in order to evacuate the detainees to the next higher location. Units inventoried and bagged the detainees' personal property as part of the paperwork process. Of the interviewed company leaders that had established the company CPs, 62% (16 of 26) said they would interrogate the detainee to gather information while holding them at the company CP. This tactical questioning (TQ) was more than just asking the detainee basic questions (name, age, place of residence, etc); it was an attempt to gather intelligence that might aid the unit in locating other potential targets. In a few cases, when available, units had THTs to conduct initial intelligence screening of detainees. Another 15% (4 of 26) of interviewed company leaders that had established the company CPs, asked detainees basic questions to complete the paperwork. The remaining 23% (6 of 26) of interviewed company leaders that had established the company CPs said they did not conduct interrogations or question detainees at all. The unit leadership did not have the proper training in interrogation procedures and techniques to conduct effective interrogations. Without training, individual conducting interrogation could possibly jeopardize vital intelligence information instead of quickly processing and transporting detainees to an area with trained interrogators. The company CP provided detainees with; food, bottled water, limited shelter and limited medical treatment. The unit transported detainees to the battalion CP during re-supply assets operations for unit security.

Of the interviewed combat arms brigade/battalion leaders who performed cordon and search missions and raids 77% (10 of 13), operated their own non-doctrinal battalion CPs. The remaining three interviewed battalion/brigade leaders said they did not operate CPs but would transport the detainee to the division forward CP. Battalions held 12 to 20 detainees at their CPs for 12 hours up to 14 days, relying on their subordinate units to guard the detainees for extended periods of time. This guard requirement took Soldiers away from performing their combat mission and adversely impacted the combat effectiveness of their units. MP personnel are not doctrinally assigned at the company level to collect or guard detainees. The battalions required capturing units to complete all mandatory paperwork (sworn statements, Coalition Provisional Authority Forces Apprehension Form, and DD Form 2745) before accepting the detainees into their battalion CP. The interviewed combat arms brigade/battalion leaders (77%, 10 of 13) said TQ or interrogations of detainees were performed to gather tactical information if there were no trained interrogators at their location. Battalion commanders and S2s did their own interrogations of detainees to ease the backlog of detainees at CPs. Of these battalion commanders 18% (1 of 13) said they had a THT team at their location to conduct interrogation of detainees and 15% (2 of 13) said they did not question detainees. There were not enough interrogators to be pushed down to battalion level to conduct interrogations of detainees. Without trained interrogators at the battalion level and below, the units risked missing intelligence information by holding detainees, instead of quickly processing and transporting them to an area with trained interrogators. The battalion CPs provided detainees with; food, water, shelter, blankets, latrines, and limited medical treatment. Battalions transported the detainees to the division forward CP during re-supply operations.

Based on interviews with leaders in OCONUS/CONUS who said they operated division forward CPs located in a brigade area, the DAIG Team found 45% (5 of 11) were operated by non-MP units during the period of May 03 to April 04. Another 27% (3 of 11) of division MP platoons operating CPs required augmentation from 4 to 14 Soldiers from Infantry units to help them with this mission. The remaining 27% (3 of 11) of CPs were operated by MP platoons. The forward CPs held between 4 to 150 (150 detainees in one incident) detainees from 24 hours up to 54 days. The MP platoon provided trained MP personnel to handle, safeguard, and account for detainees. This included reviewing the point of capture unit's paperwork for each detainee, assigning detainees an internally generated detainee number, and a complete inventory of each detainee's personal belongings on a DA Form 4137. The personal belongings were bagged with the DA Form 4137 to include a matched internally generated detainee number and secured in an evidence room, separate cell, small footlocker, container, or tent. If the unit delivering detainees to the forward CP did not have the required paperwork (sworn statements, Coalition Provisional Authority Forces Apprehension Form, and DD Form 2745), the in-processing personnel would not accept the detainee into the CP until the unit completed the paperwork. The paperwork, to include evidence the unit brought in with the detainee, was a critical source of useful information the interrogator could use during their interrogations. The brigades were using their MI interrogators and contracted interpreters to interrogate detainees and gather tactical intelligence information for their units. Personnel operating CPs had different procedures in place for transferring a detainee to an interrogator. If the detainee was not leaving the CP then the guard did not have the interrogator sign for the detainee. When the interrogator was finished with the detainee he would return the detainee to the guard who would then return the detainee to the cell. However, if a detainee was taken outside the CP then the interrogator would sign for the detainee on a DD Form 2708 or DD Form 629, Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person. Upon the detainee's return, the guards would sign for the detainee and the medic or guard would check the detainee for marks or bruises and then annotate the marks or bruises if any, on an SF 600, Medical Record - Chronological Record of Medical Care. The DAIG Team did a sampling of detainee records to include the SF 600 and the team found no annotations of marks or bruises. The detainees were provided; food, bottled water, shelter, blankets, latrines, and medical treatment. The unit transported detainees to the division central CPs by either ground (wheeled convoy) or air (CH-47 helicopter).

Two of 4 division central CPs were operated by a platoon from the division MP company, which required augmentation of 7 to 15 Soldiers from Infantry or Engineer units to help them with this mission. The remaining two division central CPs were operated by platoons from a different division or from a company from the MP battalion (Corps). MP platoons provided trained personnel to handle, safeguard, account for, and input information into the Detainee Reporting System (DRS) and or Biometric Automated Tool Set (BATS) system. This included a review of point of capture paperwork for each detainee and an inventory of their personal belongings on DA Form 4137. Once the inventory was complete the evidence custodian locked the detainee's personal property in a separate room. The central CPs used both MI interrogators and contract interrogators and interpreters to interrogate detainees. The MP guards did not have the interrogator sign for the detainee if the interrogator was not departing the CP. Division central CP SOP required the guards to have the interrogators sign a DD Form 629 or DD Form 2708, and enter the information on their DA Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log, if the detainee departed the CP. Three Provost Marshals said Other Government Agencies (OGAs) did interrogate detainees, however, this required their approval, and the OGAs had to sign for the detainee. Upon their return they were examined and resigned for to regain custody of the detainee. The division central CP held anywhere between 70 to 200 detainees from 72 hours up to 45 days. The division central CP provided the detainees with food, bottled water, shelter, blankets, latrines, and medical treatment. The division central CP transported detainees by ground convoys or helicopter to I/R facilities.

I/R facilities were operated and controlled by MP battalions, MP companies, and in lieu of units (non-MP units). MP personnel processed the detainees into their facilities, which included checking the detainees against the roster for arrival, obtaining weight and height, issuing an Internment Serial Number (ISN), medical screening, inventorying, and tagging property, and review of paperwork (sworn statement, Coalition Provisional Authority Forces Apprehension Form, completed DD Form 2745 verifying that detainee data was entered into the DRS system, and amending and updating the database information as required. The detainee's personal property was annotated on DA Form 4137 and placed in a bag or a box with the detainee's ISN number. The property was then placed in a controlled access evidence room. Each detainee was issued a blanket, jumpsuit, shoes, and a Qur- n as part of their inprocessing.

There was no specific length of time I/R facilities held detainees. The I/R facilities held anywhere from 1700 detainees up to a maximum of 7000 detainees depending on the facility. Inside each I/R facility were a series of compounds housing from 450 to 700 detainees each. The operations of I/R facilities and compounds were the responsibility of the MP (Combat Support) battalions who were sometimes not properly equipped with specific items necessary for detainee operations and were not trained specifically on detainee tasks in order to perform this mission. Additionally, in lieu of (ILO) units assigned the guard force (tower) and escort mission for I/R facilities received limited MP training at their Mobilization Site.

Interrogators used the screening procedure to identify a detainee who may have intelligence information. The interrogators screened both the detainee paperwork along with his/her personal effects to determine which individual possessed intelligence information. When an interrogator requested to screen a detainee's personal effects prior to the interrogation, the MP guard would have him sign for the items using DA Form 4137. The MP guard escorted the detainee to the interrogators, and since the detainee was not leaving the facility the interrogator was not required to sign for the detainees. If the detainee was leaving the facility a written authorization was required, and the guard had the individual sign for the detainee on a DD Form 2708 or DD Form 629. The MI units used military and contract interrogators and interpreters to interrogate the detainees. MP personnel provided the detainees with food, water (bottled water or 5 gallon cans), and access to medical treatment. Each compound had shelter, mats or cots to sleep on, latrines, and showers.

(4) Root Cause: Division level units are not resourced with sufficient numbers of Military Police personnel and Military Intelligence personnel (interrogators) to conduct detainee operations in a non-linear battlespace. Point of capture units did not comply with doctrine that requires the quick evacuation of detainees to internment facilities. Units held detainees at CPs closer to the point of capture for longer periods of time to conduct more effective interrogation and intelligence exploitation so they could obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 update the Military Police force structure at the division level and below to support the simultaneous execution of detainee operations and other battlefield missions.

Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 update the Military Intelligence force structure at the division level and below to integrate the requirement for detainee operations that allows for timely intelligence exploitation.

Recommendation: TRADOC update doctrine to integrate tactical interrogation at battalion and company level to assist in the intelligence exploitation of detainees immediately upon capture.

d. Finding 12:

(1) Finding: There was no Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC) acting as the central, theater-level agency responsible for detainee accountability, resulting in a lack of detainee personnel and data management.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) has redesignated the doctrinal term Prisoner of War Information Center (PWIC) used in the above standards as the TDRC, and the doctrinal term National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC) as the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC). The following inspection results will refer to these organizations by their redesignated titles.

The DAIG Team found there was no central agency in theater to collect and manage detainee information for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) or OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and no consolidated, comprehensive, and accurate database for detainee accountability. The TDRC that had the doctrinal mission to maintain detainee accountability was not deployed to OIF or OEF during the timeframe of the inspection. In OIF, the TDRC mission of detainee data collection was consolidated at one location in Iraq and was executed as an additional duty by a battalion S1 section. None of the major functions of the TDRC were performed in accordance with policy. Internment facilities were not fully accounting for detainees or property, and they were not meeting policy requirements. There were no procedures to ensure records on detainee disposition, health status, and personal/evidentiary property were adequately accounted for during movement of detainees between collecting points and internment facilities. Capturing units did not have standardized procedures for recording detainee personal and property information or for maintaining accountability. Doctrine and policy for detainee data collection need to be revised to address technological requirements for personnel accountability systems (biometrics) and the processing of non- compliant detainees in the current operating environment.

The TDRC is the specialized unit whose mission is to be the central agency in theater for total detainee and property accountability, from which consolidated detainee data is forwarded to the NDRC. There are two Reserve Component TDRCs, and no Active Component TDRCs, in the Army. TDRCs are structured as 59-Soldier units consisting of a headquarters detachment, operations, record keeping, property accountability, postal operations, public relations, information management, and other staff sections. TDRCs were not used in OIF or OEF. A TDRC was activated and deployed to Kuwait during the mobilization for OIF, but it did not move forward into Iraq in support of detainee operations and was re-deployed to Continental United States (CONUS). However, the large numbers of captured detainees, holding detainees longer for intelligence exploitation, and a slow release process resulted in a significantly higher detainee population and a demonstrated need for the TDRC.

In OIF, the TDRC mission of detainee data collection for Iraq was assigned to the MP battalion at Camp Bucca and overseen by the S1 as an additional duty. Detainee data was consolidated as it was received from locations throughout the country and forwarded to the NDRC. Forwarded data was often incomplete, and the S1 lacked the resources to track down missing data from reporting internment facilities. The TDRC responsibilities for detainee property accountability, tracking, records management, and postal operations were not met. The S1 performed as well as could be expected with limited organic assets, but it was impossible to execute the many mission requirements that would normally be executed by a 59- Soldier TDRC. A TDRC was not deployed in OEF. The internment facility at Bagram performed the mission of detainee data collection, consolidation, and reporting. Although information management and property accountability were more consistent in Afghanistan than in Iraq, most TDRC responsibilities were not being performed.

In the absence of a TDRC there were inefficiencies in accounting, reporting and tracking of detainee information from internment/resettlement facilities to the NDRC. The NDRC developed the automated Detainee Reporting System (DRS) as a standardized, automated data system that the TDRC uses to consolidate data from the internment facilities and forward to the NDRC. With no TDRC to provide oversight, OIF and OEF detainee processing centers often used simple spreadsheets or alternate automated data systems (Joint Automated Booking System (JABS) and Biometric Assessment Tool Set (BATS)) with the ability to capture biometric data (e.g., fingerprints), but these applications did not capture other data required by Army policy. Moreover, the alternate data systems were not compatible with DRS and could not transfer information to the NDRC. At the direction of the NDRC, the DRS became the primary automated database that internment facilities were required to use. Concurrently, internment facilities continued to enter data in JABS and BATS due to the inability of DRS to record biometric data. (Note: The DRS is projected to have the capability to collect and store fingerprints by July 2004.) There is a fourth detainee reporting system in place to collect the same data in Arabic for use by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Because of the use of multiple data systems, incomplete data entry, and the inconsistent implementation of the DRS there are approximately 50,000 missing data points in the NDRC database.

Capturing units did not have standardized procedures for recording detainee personal and property information or for maintaining accountability. In OEF and OIF, units at points of capture and collecting points were not uniformly using DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag. Of the assessed units in Iraq (19%) were using DD Form 2745, compared to 55% in Afghanistan and 30% of units redeploying from both theaters. In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority Forces Apprehension Form was used, a form that is more comprehensive than the EPW Capture Tag. Although the CPA form appears better than DD Form 2745 for the purpose of intelligence exploitation and continued custody determinations, there was no TDRC in theater to manage the use of the form or capture information from the form for forwarding to the NDRC. Units did not uniformly forward documentation (medical, evidence/property, capture, and intelligence documents) when detainees were transferred to other echelons of detention. Furthermore, there was no mechanism during the transfer process to maintain accountability for records that accompanied a particular detainee.

The DAIG concluded the reason for the lack of accountability, standardization and reliability of detainee data is directly related to the absence of the TDRC. The sole purpose of the TDRC, as the field operating agency for the NDRC, is to ensure the accountability of detainees and their property by standardizing practices throughout the theater and implementing DoD and Army policy. An 8-person Camp Liaison Detachment (CLD) was deployed as part of OIF 2 to perform the functions of the TDRC, in addition to numerous other responsibilities. They have received initial training on the DRS, but as a CLD they are not trained on the procedures for executing the other specific TDRC tasks. The CLD may be able to accomplish the TRDC mission if appropriately trained and relieved of additional, unrelated duties, but they lack sufficient manpower to address the backlog of unaccounted-for detainees and property.

(4) Root Cause: The TDRC was not deployed for OEF. In OIF, it was initially deployed and subsequently redeployed without moving forward in the theater.

(5) Recommendation: CFLCC submit a Request For Forces for the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC) to meet the requirements for reporting and accountability of detainees and their property.

Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General review the TRDC process, structure, and employment methods for maintaining information on detainees, their property, and other related requirements within an assigned theater of operations and consider the development of an information technology solution.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 5 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

e. Finding 13:

(1) Finding: The ongoing Military Intelligence Force Design Update is better suited to conduct simultaneous and sustained human intelligence missions in the current and future operating environment.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team found the ongoing Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Update is better suited than the current Military Intelligence force structure to conduct simultaneous and sustained human intelligence collection and counterintelligence/force protection missions in the current and future operating environments.

The current Military Intelligence (MI) force structure lacks the necessary 97E - Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collectors (formerly called interrogators) and 97B - Counterintelligence personnel to conduct simultaneous and sustained HUMINT collection and counterintelligence/force protection missions. The current force structure does not allow the commander to employ the doctrinal concept of conducting both HUMINT and counterintelligence missions simultaneously. Currently the commander must choose which mission is the priority. These items are covered in the Current Military Intelligence Force Structure Section below.

The ongoing Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Force Design Update (FDU), provides the necessary 97E and 97B personnel to conduct simultaneous and sustained HUMINT collection and counterintelligence/force protection missions. Multiple MI initiatives and programs, specifically the Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU, are reshaping the MI force structure in a multi-tiered approach, to include: increasing the 97E authorizations, converting 97Bs to 97Es, converting 97L (Translator/Interpreter) to 97E and 97B, rebalancing the Active Component (AC) to Reserve Component (RC) mix to move more personnel to the AC, increasing the number of MI units and the dispersion of Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams (THTs) in the division and Stryker Brigade force structures, and designing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Teams (HCTs) throughout the Unit of Action (UA), Unit of Employment x (UEx), and Unit of Employment y (UEy) level. These items are addressed in the Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Update Section below.

CURRENT MI FORCE STRUCTURE

The MI mission to gain HUMINT information during detainee operations is performed by the 97E. In contrast, the 97B counters the intelligence gathering of foreign intelligence and security services (FIS). Gathering information from detainees focuses the 97Es on their specialty: gathering and developing intelligence from the local environment. The 97E10 is a highly trained Soldier who has gone through 82 weeks of training. This Soldier has completed language training from the Defense Language Institute, in addition to the required Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training. Developing this asset is a costly and time-consuming process.

The current force structure does not give the commander on the ground the amount of 97E and 97B expertise required. A divisional MI battalion has all of the 97Es in the division (depending on the type of division, approximately 16 are authorized). The DAIG Team visited one division that had six 97Es. In the current operating environment people are the key terrain, but the force structure lacks 97Es and 97Bs at the brigade level.

The average maneuver brigade has an intelligence team consisting of four 97B - Counterintelligence personnel and three 97E - HUMINT personnel (approximately two Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs)). These 97Es come from the division MI battalion. The commander must set the intelligence priorities at either HUMINT (gathering intelligence from the local environment and information exploitation from detainees) or at counterintelligence (denying FIS intelligence on U.S. Forces).

G3 Force Developers stated current rotations in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) require approximately 130 THTs per deployment. There are approximately four personnel per team. The ongoing Counterintelligence/HUMINT Force Design Update has greatly contributed to meeting the current operational needs. Since 2001, the number of THTs has grown from 300 teams to 450 teams. Even with these changes, the current force structure lacks the depth to meet this doctrinal requirement for a sustained period.

There are usually three 97E HUMINT specialists in the current brigade force structure; they come from the division MI battalion. They gather intelligence on threat forces and capabilities. The 97Es, as part of THTs, accompany patrols, visit communities, talk to local leaders, to gather information on how U.S. Forces are being targeted. The 97Es evaluate the internment/resettlement (I/R) population to identify potential intelligence sources. They conduct interviews and interrogations across the range of detainees, gathering information from civilian internees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and high-risk detainees (HRDs).

Information gathered from detainees is critical to meeting the doctrinal mission of the 97E "to conduct focused collection, analysis, and production on the adversary’s composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, personalities, capabilities, and intentions". Exploitation of intelligence gathered from EPWs and HRDs is one of the reasons detainees are kept beyond the doctrinal time standard at the point of capture and brigade level. The current force structure of three 97Es in the brigade (division MI battalion assets) provides limited resources to evaluate, gather, and analyze information from detainees.

The 97B counterintelligence mission requires the intelligence assets of the brigade to cover a large section of the local population. The brigade has a total of 4 counterintelligence specialists who gather information on threat forces and foreign intelligence services and their activities and then develop force protection and information denial measures. The 97B focus on denying intelligence to the enemy is based on their ability to stop the following FIS operations: counter-HUMINT, counter- signals intelligence (C-SIGINT), and counter-imagery intelligence (CIMINT). The 97Bs are not accomplishing their counterintelligence and force protection missions if they are supporting the HUMINT mission of gathering information from detainees.

The current force structure of the MI is a result of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process. The QDR reshaped tactical MI units, relying heavily on the Reserve Component (RC) to carry a large portion of MI personnel. Additionally, in 1994 and 1995, the Army restructured personnel authorizations and sent 97E personnel to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

A substantial number of active component 97Es and 97Bs are in U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Theater Intelligence Brigades (BDEs)/Groups (GPs). Until recently, those personnel were not available to support rotational sourcing.

Some commands were using 97Bs to fill 97E requirements to meet the shortage of personnel who can conduct interrogations of detainees. Commanders who chose the collection and exploitation of information as the priority mission gave up the 97Bs from performing their counterintelligence/force protection mission. However, force protection is still a critical issue due to the non- linear battlefield. Based on the current force structure, the Army has the ability to support either force protection or HUMINT.

Currently, 60% of the 97E and 97B force structure is in the Reserve Component (RC). Deployment of some units as battalions vs. teams in early rotations to OEF followed by OIF artificially reduced the available population to support subsequent rotations. The buildup of RC THTs prior to OIF met the immediate requirement for tactical intelligence but denied a sustained capability. Additionally, the MOS qualification rate in the RC is at 50%. So even if all RC authorized positions were filled, only one-half of the personnel would be deployable.

The TRADOC proponent (U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca) developed the Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/HUMINT Force Design Update and other initiatives to meet the requirements of the current and future operating environments. G3 Force Management is restructuring the force through redesign of current Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) of MI units and creation of new MTOEs. The new force structure increases the authorizations for and distribution of 97E and 97B.

MI - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FORCE DESIGN UPDATE

The Army recognizes the current force structure does not allow the commander to conduct the doctrinal missions of HUMINT and counterintelligence simultaneously. Currently, the commander must choose which mission is the priority. The Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU was approved on 2 August 2001. Some aspects of the Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU and other MI initiatives and programs have assisted the force in current operations, while the majority is still ongoing (as of 21 May 2004). The number of THTs in the Army has increased by 50% since 2001 (300 THTs to 450 THTs).

The main portions of the Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU will occur from 2005 to 2009 Total Army Analysis 09 (TAA 09); additional changes will continue in 2007 through 2011 (TAA 11). The changes to the force structure are being documented in the UA, UEx, UEy, templates and in the Stryker Brigades’ Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment.

The near-term changes include adding one counterintelligence company per Theater at Echelon Above Corps Theater Intelligence Groups/Brigades in Fiscal Year (FY) 05-07. The FDU and other initiatives add a variety of active component Counterintelligence/HUMINT Teams to Theater Intelligence Groups/Brigades for an increase of 400 counterintelligence/HUMINT spaces in FY06. Other changes include revising the MI Corps Support BN (MI-CSB) and changing the MI-CSB allocation from one MI-CSB per Theater to one MI-CSB per Corps. Another Corps-level change is the creation of a "Corps G2X Cell" in the G2 section of the HHC with HUMINT authorizations.

Four counterintelligence and 2 HUMINT companies (U.S. Army Reserve) will activate in FY05-07. Finally, the AC/RC mix will rebalance, resulting in activation of 2 HUMINT companies and 1 counterintelligence company (active component) and deactivation of 2 U.S. Army Reserve counterintelligence companies.

The design of the HUMINT team will change. Previously, Warrant Officers led HUMINT teams; in the future a Sergeant First Class will lead some HUMINT teams. The current force structure can convert to an enlisted-led team by using currently available NCOs.

The Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU is programmed to increase the number of 97E and 97B Soldiers; 97E will increase by 50%. An increase of "in excess of" 1400 97E and 97B personnel is programmed from FY05-07, including an increase in authorizations for 97E and 97B in the AC. Some of these changes will be the result of rebalancing the AC/RC mix of 97E. The 97E personnel increases have been implemented early and continue to occur. Other changes include the conversion of 460 Compo 2 MOS 97L (Translator/Interpreter) to 97E and 97B authorizations in FY05.

MI Branch will restructure the 97E MOS. 97E10 Soldiers will no longer have a language requirement following initial entry training (IET). By removing the language requirement at Skill Level 1 for 97E MOS the MI branch can send 97E10 Soldiers directly to units to gain experience. The language requirement will shift to a 97E20 requirement. Currently the 97E10 Soldier spends up to 82 weeks post-IET meeting the language requirement.

The Counterintelligence/HUMINT FDU and other initiatives will support the design of elements within the UEy, UEx, and UA. (The current design of the UEy, UEx, and UA are the base for this section of the report). This increase of counterintelligence/HUMINT units at each level is significant and is designed to add an intelligence gathering and processing capability at the UA level, as well as at higher levels. The Army's ability to add counterintelligence/HUMINT resources as it transforms into the Modular Design is based on an increase in the number of 97Es authorizations, which go from the FY04 level of 861 authorizations to the FY 11 projection of 3312 authorizations.

The UEy's Theater Intelligence Brigade will add an Exploitation Battalion and a RC Battalion that are in-Theater assets. The Exploitation Battalion and the RC Battalion will each add a counterintelligence company and a HUMINT company to the Theater, providing an additional 2 counterintelligence companies and 2 HUMINT companies to the commander.

The UEx has a G2X cell designed into its Main HQ staff. The G2X is a new organization not in the current division template. The G2X acts as the single point for all counterintelligence/HUMINT data. The G2X is a 6-person team led by an officer (MAJ/CPT) and contains a CW3 HUMINT Technician, one 97B, and three 97Es. Supplying information to the G2X are the Counterintelligence Control Authority (CICA) and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC). The CICA provides the counterintelligence function with 97Bs while the HOC adds 4 more 97Es for the HUMINT function. The G2X also contains a Language Coordination Section which sets up contracts for interpreters. The main HUMINT and counterintelligence gathering capability will exist in the UAs.

There are HUMINT and counterintelligence gathering capability in both Maneuver UAs (MUA) and Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition UAs (RSTA UA). In the MUA and the RSTA UA the main HUMINT collection will be conducted by the HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) which have taken the place of the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). The HCT is made up of four 97E whose mission is to gather HUMINT. This will eliminate the THTs’ requirement of dividing the time among the mission of the 97B and the 97E that made up the THT. The THT currently exists in the division force structure and the Stryker Brigade force structure; THTs are not in the UA or UE force structures.

Each MUA has an S2X in the headquarters, serving the same function as the G2X does at the UEx. The MUA also has an MI company with a robust intelligence gathering capability. The HUMINT platoon contains 26 Soldiers focused on gathering HUMINT. The HUMINT platoon has two Operations Management Teams (OMTs) that each manages two HCT. Each OMT also has the ability to serve as a HCT. At the minimum, each MUA has an organic capability to field four HCTs and, if needed, generate 2 more from the OMTs. This gives the UA commander the ability to put HCTs at the point of capture or where detainees are first encountered.

The RSTA UA has a greater HUMINT capability. The MI battalion in the RTSA UA has a Collection and Exploitation (C&E) company and a counterintelligence/HUMINT company. The C&E Company has 3 HCT platoons (28 Soldiers per platoon) with 1 OMT and 5 HCTs per platoon. The C&E Company has a total of 15 HCTs. The counterintelligence/HUMINT company has 9 OMTs and 27 HCTs. At the minimum, each RSTA UA will have 42 HCTs on the ground.

The significant difference from the current division force structure is that the average division has all 16 Soldiers with MOS 97E in the division MI battalion. The UEx will deploy into theater with a modular capability that is based on the mission requirements. If the UEx deploys with 4 MUAs and a RSTA UA, it will have a total of 20 OMTs and 58 HCTs and a robust HUMINT planning, coordination, and analysis capability.

(4) Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 continue to refine and implement the force structure changes in the Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Update.

Recommendation: TRADOC integrate the Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Updates into the development of Units of Action and Units of Employment.

f. Finding 14:

(1) Finding: The ongoing Military Police Force Design Update provides a force structure for internment/resettlement operations that has the flexibility and is better suited to conduct sustained detainee operations in the current and future operating environment.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team found the ongoing Military Police - Internment/Resettlement Battalion Force Design Update provides a force structure for Military Police internment/resettlement operations that has the flexibility and is better suited than the current Military Police force structure to conduct sustained detainee operations in the current and future operating environments, to include control and internment of high-risk detainees.

The current Military Police force structure lacks the 31E (Internment/Resettlement Specialist) personnel to meet the requirements of manning the current detention facilities and conducting sustained detainee operations in the current and future operating environments, to include control and confinement of high-risk detainees. The 31E is the only Soldier trained to run a detention facility and specifically deals with controlling and confining high value detainees. The Active Component (AC) 31Es are in the Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) that runs the U.S. Military Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), staffs Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO) and other outside the continental United States (OCONUS)-based confinement facilities, and staffs continental United States (CONUS)-based confinement facilities. The Reserve Component (RC) does not have the 31E personnel to provide units to run sustained detainee operations. These items are covered in the Current Military Police Force Structure Section below:

The ongoing Military Police Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Battalion Force Design Update (FDU) standardizes the force structure of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) I/R units, converts AC Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDAs) to I/R Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs), and increases personnel and units throughout the AC and RC force structure. The FDU was approved September 2003, this analysis is based on that data and is current as of 21 May 2004. The increase of deployable 31Es will give Combatant Commanders the flexibility to conduct sustained detainee operations in a non-linear battlefield and the ability to control and confine high-risk detainees (HRDs). The I/R FDU provides the RC force structure necessary to carry out its sustainability mission. Employment of the I/R FDU has been incorporated into the Unit of Employment (UE) design at Unit of Employment y (UEy) level with staff support at Unit of Employment x (UEx) level. These items are covered in the Military Police Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Battalion Force Design Update Section below:

CURRENT MP FORCE STRUCTURE

The current AC TDA organizations, such as the U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) and Regional Correctional Facilities (RCFs) are not deployable, and each has a different force structure. Each facility will convert to at least one I/R company.

The AC 31E population is based out of 4 installations within CONUS TDA units and 2 Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) MP battalions that are OCONUS. In CONUS, the largest population of 31Es is at the USDB at Fort Leavenworth. Large numbers of 31Es are also assigned to the 3 Regional Correctional Facilities (RCFs) at Fort Lewis, Fort Sill, and Fort Knox. These are TDA organizations and not designed to deploy, lacking a rotational base to support the TDA corrections mission and other missions such as GTMO. There are 824 AC MOS 31E authorizations in the Army; of these, 770 are directly related to running the current detention facilities. There are 371 31E authorizations at the USDB. The other 31E authorizations are at Fort Lewis (112), Fort Sill (81), Fort Knox (80), and 24 at Navy/Marine facilities (CONUS and OCONUS). The 2 OCONUS MP battalions contain 31Es in their MTOE, but lack the depth to support rotations; USAREUR has 76 authorizations and USFK has 26 authorizations. The remaining 54 are not directly working with U.S. prisoners or detainees. These Soldiers are at the U.S. Army Military Police School (24), recruiting (12), AC/RC support (6), and 12 others throughout the AC force.

The deployable 31Es are in the RC. The RC has 119 31E authorizations, 90 of which were filled as of 22 April 2004. The RC internment/resettlement (I/R) units' missions are to deploy or provide backfill for the AC's 31Es that deploy. However, the RC I/R units lack the qualified personnel to sustain the mission. Additionally, the RC has the only I/R command and control elements, two I/R brigades.

This force structure does not support the policy or doctrine requirement for a deployable, sustainable, and standardized, modular MP I/R battalion force design package that can meet the I/R operations objective of processing, handling, caring for, accounting for, and securing EPWs, CIs, RPs, ODs, DCs, and U.S. Armed Forces prisoners, as well as supporting the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and controlling and confining high-risk detainees. The I/R doctrine is a revision of the old Enemy Prisoner of War concept, reminiscent of Cold War doctrine applicable to a unit that is modular, capabilities-based, and deployable.

The new I/R doctrine adapts well to the Units of Action concept, however, the 31E force structure does not support I/R doctrine. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001, covers most detainee operations, but at the time the doctrine was written, the MP Corps had not yet developed or defined the term high-risk detainee.

FM 3-19.1 Military Police Operations, Change-1, 31 January 2002, and FM 3-19.40, refer to the MPs as having the responsibility for coordinating sustainment for EPW/CI and that I/R battalions are equipped and trained to handle the EPW/CI mission for the long term. This is not true under the current force structure. By doctrine, an I/R battalion should support up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs, 8000 dislocated civilians, or 1500 U.S. Armed Forces prisoners. This formula does not address confinement of high-risk detainees. The current MP doctrine only focuses on long-term confinement of U.S. Armed Forces personnel.

The 31E Soldier receives his/her MOS training as part of Military Police Advanced Individual Training (AIT). All MP AIT is based on 31B (Military Police) training. There is a split in the MP AIT where 31Es and 31Bs go to different tracks. MOS 31E Soldiers take a 4-week Corrections track while the 31B receive 4 weeks of Law and Order training. The 31B (Military Police) do not receive corrections training. 31Bs receive one day of I/R training in MP AIT. The 31E10 gains MOS experience at a correctional facility or the USDB.

The current Military Police force structure is not designed to support Units of Action. The TDA-based AC units are not flexible, adaptable, or deployable.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponent (U.S. Army Military Police School) developed an I/R Battalion Force Design Update and which was approved September 2003. G3 Force Management is restructuring the force through redesign of current MTOEs of AC and RC MP units and creation of new MTOEs. The new force structure increases the number of I/R units and 31E authorizations and is covered in the next section of this finding.

MP I/R BATTALION FORCE DESIGN UPDATE SECTION

The ongoing Military Police Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Battalion Force Design Update addresses the flexibility and sustainability of the current MP force structure. The current AC TDA organizations, such as the U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) and Regional Correctional Facilities (RCFs) are not deployable, and each has a different force structure. Each facility will convert to at least one I/R company.

The Director of Force Management approved the I/R Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) on 17 May 2004. The I/R FDU will occur from Fiscal Year (FY04) through FY11. The FDU will standardize the I/R force structures in the AC and RC. The distribution of personnel and units will rebalance between the AC and RC, giving the AC the ability to immediately deploy I/R companies. The RC will have the force structure to accomplish the mission of backfilling Army confinement facilities as well as providing a sustained rotation of deployable units.

The I/R FDU will standardize the force structure and increase the MOS 31E expertise within the units conducting the I/R mission. The I/R battalion will be modular in nature, providing a command and control capability that is flexible and tailorable, that by design supports the Units of Action concept. The MP I/R battalion will be a flexible base that can be tailored to the Theater of Operations and the operating environment.

The I/R battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD) is a 74-person unit that provides the command and control function and supports a mix of I/R companies, guard companies, and I/R detachments as required. A standard I/R battalion template for deployment could include the battalion HHD, 1 guard company, 1 I/R company, and 3 I/R detachments.

The I/R company is tailored around accomplishing the 31E mission and is the base of the new force structure. It can operate independently or as part of an I/R battalion. The I/R company will have 124 personnel, with 100 31Es. It has the built-in administrative support to conduct detainee operations as well as 2 internment platoons and a Maximum Security Section. The internment platoons each contain 42 personnel while the Maximum Security Section has 12 personnel. The Maximum Security Section is different from an I/R detachment. The I/R company should have the ability in the short term to control and intern HRDs, a capability that is essential in the current operating environment.

The I/R company can either operate as a stand-alone organization or operate as part of an I/R battalion. In either mission it provides command and control, staff planning, administration and logistical services (for both assigned personnel and the prisoner population). If the I/R company operates as a stand-alone unit, it is limited in the detainee operations functions it can perform. The stand-alone I/R company can operate either a U.S. Armed Forces prisoner confinement facility or a high-risk detainee internment facility.

If the I/R company operates as part of an I/R battalion, it can conduct a wider range of detainee operations due to the support of the I/R battalion's guard company and I/R detachments. When the I/R company operates as part of I/R battalion, it can operate the following types of facilities: high-risk detainee internment facilities; Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee (EPW/CI) internment facilities; or displaced civilian (DC) resettlement facilities.

The I/R company and I/R battalion force structures are focused on the I/R mission. Any I/R unit will require support from the Command it falls under. I/R units will require engineer support to build facilities, medical support for Soldiers and detainees, maintenance support, water purification, and other support as required.

The I/R company's main focus is supporting its 2 internment platoons and 1 Maximum Security Section. The I/R company has different capabilities based on whether it is conducting stand-alone operations or operating as part of an I/R battalion. If operating in the stand-alone function the I/R company has the capability to confine up to 300 U.S. prisoners or detain up to 100 high-risk detainees. If the I/R company is operating as part of an I/R battalion, the I/R company has the capability to detain up to 300 high-risk detainees when supported by 1 MP guard company. The I/R company also has the capability to conduct detainee operations for enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees or resettlement operations for dislocated civilians. In these detainee operations, the I/R company will also require support from one MP guard company.

The Maximum Security Section in the I/R company is responsible for detainees/prisoners who require special supervision, control, and discipline. These detainees/prisoners require close and intense management, special precautions, and more stringent confinement, search, and handling measures. The Maximum Security Section is merged with the internment platoons when conducting high-risk detainee operations.

The MP guard company has personnel and equipment resources to provide a perimeter security function as well as a transportation function. Each guard company has 3 platoons of 31Bs. Each platoon has four 11-man squads. The MP guard company has 3 light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) trucks and 16 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) trucks authorized. This robust guard force and transportation assets will give the I/R battalion the capability to control and transport detainees using internal resources.

The I/R detachment is a 24-person unit that exists only in the RC. The I/R detachment augments an AC or RC I/R battalion HHD. There are no 31Es in an I/R detachment; the detachments support the detainee operations mission by providing 31Bs to act as outside-the-wire security and additional support personnel. The I/R detachment is not designed to detain HRD or U.S. prisoners. The 60 I/R detachments allow a high degree of flexibility in modularizing any organization for a mission. These units are designed to be mobilized and attached to other units as needed.

To meet the requirement for the I/R FDU, G3 plans to increase 31E authorizations through conversion of some 31Bs (Military Police) to 31Es (Internment/Resettlement Specialist), increased recruiting for 31E positions, and a redesignation of RC units to the 31E mission.

The conversion of Active Component MP TDA organizations to an I/R company MTOE has begun. The first AC I/R company will activate in FY04 at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). A total of 10 AC I/R companies will activate by FY11.

The RC will contain the bulk of the 31E units and personnel. The RC currently contains 119 authorizations. When the I/R battalion FDU is completed in FY11, the RC will contain approximately 1720 31E authorizations, a 14-fold increase in personnel.

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) will contain most of the I/R battalions, while the Army National Guard (ARNG) will contain most of the I/R companies. By FY11, the RC will be organized with 20 I/R battalions (17 USAR, 3 ARNG) compared to the AC's 1 I/R battalion. The RC will have 17 I/R companies (7 USAR, 10 ARNG) compared to the AC's 10 I/R companies. The RC will contain all 60 I/R detachments (51 USAR, 9 ARNG). The I/R sustainment mission will be supplemented by this RC build-up of 17 I/R companies and 60 I/R detachments.

Based on the currently proposed MTOE, the standard I/R battalion will deploy with a battalion HHD, 1 guard company, 1 I/R company, and 3 I/R detachments. The template for a deployed I/R battalion will contain 427 personnel; 101 of them will be 31Es. The I/R company contains the 31E personnel in the 2 I/R platoons and the Maximum Security Section. The I/R FDU units contain the following personnel:

• I/R battalion HHDs: 74 total personnel (one 31E)
• I/R companies: 124 total personnel (100 31Es)
• I/R platoons: 42 total personnel (41 31Es)
• Maximum Security Sections: 12 total personnel (12 31Es)
• MP guard companies: 157 total personnel (no 31Es)
• I/R detachments (RC only): 24 total personnel (no 31Es)

The I/R FDU is designed to provide I/R units to the UEy that meet the specific requirements of the commander. The primary employment of 31Es will be at the UEy level. They will deploy in the I/R configuration best suited to the mission, whether it be as I/R brigades or I/R battalions. Current planning calls for two 31E NCOs (E-7s) working on the UEx staff, one in the UEx Main and one in the UEx TAC. Both will act as liaisons to the UEy I/R units and as advisors on I/R capabilities at the UEx level. There are no current plans to place 31Es in the Unit of Action (UA) or Stryker Brigades.

A UA will contain a 41-person MP platoon (31Bs). There will be no 31Bs in the Stryker Brigades. In the UEx and UEy, the 31Bs outside of the I/R units will not be primarily tasked with I/R operations.

(4) Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 continue to refine and implement the force structure changes in the Military Police - Internment/Resettlement Battalion Force Design Update.

Recommendation: TRADOC integrate the Military Police - Internment/Resettlement Battalion Force Design Update into the development of Units of Action and Units of Employment.

g. Finding 15:

(1) Finding: Three of 4 inspected internment/resettlement facilities and many of the collecting points, had inadequate force protection measures, Soldier working conditions, detainee living conditions, and did not meet the minimum preventive medicine and medical treatment requirements.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team inspected 4 internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities and 12 forward and central collecting points (CPs). Three of 4 inspected internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, and 3 of 12 (25%) inspected collecting points (CPs), had problems and shortcomings with deteriorating infrastructure that impacted on having a clean, safe, and secure working environment for Soldiers and living conditions for detainees. Poor food quality and food distribution, lack of laundry capability, and lack of personal hygiene facilities at some of these facilities affected the detainees' living conditions. Overcrowding, safety hazards, frequent enemy hostile fire, and lack of in-depth force protection measures also put both Soldier and detainee at risk.

Four of 16 (25%) inspected facilities (Camp Bucca, Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and Brassfield- Mora) were found to have safety hazards that posed risks to Soldiers and detainees. In addition, there was little evidence that units operating facilities had safety inspection programs in place. Safety programs in just a few facilities amounted to nothing more than detainee fire evacuation plans, weapons clearing procedures, and military working dog safety considerations. At the time of the inspection, Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca, and Abu Ghraib did not have finalized and approved Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for their facilities. At the time, units were busy revising and tailoring their SOPs for the mission. However, during SOP reviews conducted by the DAIG Team, there was no evidence that the risk management process was being incorporated into the working draft SOPs as required. Reviews of finalized SOPs at other facilities yielded the same results as the working drafts—no risk management was incorporated into SOPs.

No units fully complied with the medical treatment of detainees or with the sanitary conditions of the detainee facilities. Not all medical personnel supporting division CPs and I/R facilities were aware of detainee medical treatment requirements or had the proper equipment to treat a detainee population. The medical personnel interviewed stated that they did not receive any specific training in detainee operations and were not aware of Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, although most believed they were required to treat detainees to the same standard of care as Coalition Forces. There was a widespread lack of preventive medicine staffing, supplies, and equipment to meet the needs of CPs and I/R facilities. This shortfall was compounded by the failure of units to deploy appropriately trained and supplied field sanitation teams. Medical leaders responsible for direct oversight of preventive medicine personnel lacked specific training in detainee operations and field sanitation. I/R facility site selection, design and construction decisions did not incorporate preventive medicine considerations. There was significant variance in the hygiene and sanitation conditions at CPs and in I/R facilities throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. While major improvements continue to upgrade conditions at most sites, the process has been hampered by shortages of preventive medicine personnel and materiel, problems with site selection and design, and detainee populations that exceed the current system capacity. Lack of trained preventive medicine personnel and required field sanitation supplies has contributed significantly to deficiencies in hygiene and sanitation at CPs and I/R facilities.

CAMP BUCCA

Soon after the ground conflict began in Iraq, the Camp Bucca I/R facility was designed and established as an internment facility for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs). At the time of the DAIG inspection, Camp Bucca was considered an overflow I/R facility for Abu Ghraib, and all detainees were kept in the old facility, which contained 6 compounds. The new facility, containing six additional compounds, was in the final stages of completion. The old facility housed a non-compliant Civilian Internee (CI) population, third-country nationals, and a very small number of EPWs. Detainees were not segregated according to category (i.e., EPWs and CIs (to include Security Internees) were housed together in compounds 7 through 11). Compound 12 housed the third-country nationals.

The DAIG Team found inadequate security measures at the Camp Bucca. Camp Bucca had 2 controlled entry points leading into the compound, but blind spots along the perimeter made access possible at other points. The facility had a sally port gate, but it was used as a serpentine instead of a true double-gate security mechanism to control the entrance and exit of personnel and vehicles. The perimeter security consisted of roving guards, a gate guard, and a guard in each of the towers. There were 2 vehicular security patrols, but they would consistently take the same route, making them vulnerable to enemy attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) placed on the patrol route. The visitation process at Camp Bucca presented security concerns. During visitation hours Iraqi family members were searched at the exterior entry point, but thereafter they were allowed to mingle around guards who were carrying weapons until they were taken inside the compound to visit detained relatives. This posed a major security concern should one or more of the visitors overtake a guard and seize his weapon.

In numerous places at the old facility, the triple-standard concertina wire was overstretched and not tied down properly, and the short and long U-shaped pickets were not spaced properly. This, and the fact that the detainees vastly outnumbered the guard force, posed a security concern and potentially put Soldiers at risk if detainees rushed the wire. There were 8 perimeter towers that were not mutually supporting, creating dead space and blind spots throughout the old compounds. The towers also did not have effective communications with the roving guards. The facility had good lighting according to leaders and Soldiers due to recently receiving 32 trailer-mounted portable light stands that can be moved around the facility as needed. The acquired light stands significantly improved the lighting around the compounds. At the time of the Taguba Investigation, the perimeter lighting around Camp Bucca was inadequate and needed to be improved to illuminate dark areas that routinely became avenues of escape. Many of the security concerns due to the wire fences were corrected when the detainees were transferred to the 6 new compounds that have been constructed. The chain link fence at the new compounds was not staked to the ground between fence posts to prevent detainees from slipping through the bottom. However, to overcome this shortcoming, the battalion was placing concertina wire around the inside perimeter of the chain-link fence. This is a significant improvement in security over the old compounds. Detainees were transferred to the new compounds after the DAIG visit. These safety and security concerns were resolved once the detainees were transferred and the old compounds phased out.

According to interviews and sensing sessions at Camp Bucca, Soldiers said food is distributed and served in 30 gallon plastic containers, sometimes long after it is prepared. Detainees served themselves by dipping whatever containers they possessed into the food. No utensils were provided, and no portion control measures were in place to ensure that each detainee got the proper amount of food. One leader interviewed stated that serving ladles were on order, but none were on-hand. Food frequently ran out before all detainees had an opportunity to eat. Soldiers stated in sensing sessions that Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs) had to be used to ensure all detainees were fed. The detainees got their drinking water from water spigots at Camp Bucca. It was noted during the walk-through that at least one water source at one of the compounds was located several feet from the human waste dump (septic tank). This problem was eliminated once the detainees were transferred.

There was no laundry service at Camp Bucca to support the detainees so they did their own laundry with the small tubs and soap given them. However, leaders and Soldiers said during interviews that they did not know if there were enough washtubs supplied to the detainees. They were not sure how many detainees actually possessed tubs and soap, and where the tubs were located within the 6 compounds.

Camp Bucca did not routinely receive hostile fire, if at all. However, the compounds did not have adequate force protection measures in place to ensure the safety and protection of detainees and Soldiers from potential hostile indirect and small arms fire. There were no bunkers or shelters constructed with overhead cover for detainees to enter if the compounds came under attack. There were also no such bunkers or shelters constructed in the new compounds where the detainees are scheduled to be transferred.

The Taguba Investigation mentioned Camp Bucca as significantly over its intended maximum capacity, with a guard force that is under-manned and under-resourced. The DAIG Team found that Camp Bucca was not overcrowded nor under-manned because the facility had been scheduled to be discontinued as an I/R facility, and a drawdown in the detainee population had occurred after the investigation was conducted. A decision to use it as an overflow facility for Abu Ghraib kept it operational. The detainee population during the DAIG Inspection was 1769. Capacity for the newly constructed facility is 4500 according to the command briefing given to the DAIG Team.

BAGRAM I/R FACILITY

The Bagram I/R facility was designed and used as a Soviet aircraft maintenance facility that was built in the early 1960s. The DAIG Team found several safety hazards at the facility that posed risks to both Soldiers and detainees. Based on the document review and a thorough walk-through of the Bagram I/R facility, there was little evidence of a unit safety program. However, extensive engineering and environmental surveys of the facility, to include contaminated rooms and roof failures, had been recently conducted. At the time of the DAIG inspection, the infrastructure to support the facility was inadequate. Examples included inadequate ventilation/climate control and lighting on the main floor, the electrical distribution system throughout the facility, and non-existent sanitary facilities at the main floor.

In the Bagram I/R facility, there were no handrails and banisters on many of the steep stairwells and landings. The DAIG Team determined this was particularly dangerous while Soldiers escorted blindfolded detainees up and down the stairs. Team members actually witnessed Soldiers escorting blindfolded detainees on these stairs. Some drop-offs from the second floor landings were 5 to 7 feet.

Potential shock hazards existed at the Bagram I/R facility. There were numerous examples of open and exposed electrical wiring around the facility, to include a major electrical panel located in the vicinity of a known roof leak. Throughout the office areas, uncovered receptacles and light switches were found.

Contaminated soil (evidence of heavy metals) was found in the former metal plating rooms. The rooms were previously used as a metal plating facility as part of the Soviet aircraft maintenance facility. The unit requested and received an environmental survey of the rooms, and the conclusion was that the sampled materials represented a health risk. A rough cost estimate ($3-6 million) to remediate the contaminated rooms was cost-prohibitive, and the decision was made to seal the rooms to protect Soldiers and detainees from exposure.

According to an interview, lead-based paint was procured from the local economy to paint the interior in various locations in the facility. Lead-based paint had been used in the past and was still being used in the Bagram I/R facility, creating a potential risk to Soldiers and detainees.

Concerning the non-existing sanitary system, Soldiers were required to remove modified portable latrines from each detainee group cell by hand. These latrines were dragged to a designated location outside the facility where contractors would empty and clean them. After cleaning the latrines, Soldiers dragged the latrines back into place in each detainee cell. During interviews and sensing sessions, Soldiers stated that human waste spills were frequent on the main floor. There was a project ongoing that will remedy this problem. The project included an installed indoor septic system that consisted of a 4-inch main line running underneath the newly poured concrete pads and along the length of the group cells. Toilets were being installed inside of each cell, and the effluent will flow via gravity to an exterior waste system. The estimated completion date was April or May 2004.

The facility had multiple roof leaks, to include an area that was repaired after damage from aerial bombing. In December 2003, the engineer group conducted a roof inspection and found possible obstructed roof drains and deterioration of parapet walls and flashing. The estimated cost to repair the roof is $350K. This project was not funded at the time of the inspection.

At the time of this inspection, the facility had inadequate personal hygiene facilities for the number of detainees. An ongoing indoor plumbing system project to fix the problem will consist of a newly built shower room with full shower capabilities (10 shower heads) as well as a white water supply system. The fresh water supply will be housed inside of an exterior water system building that must also be designed and built.

The electrical distribution system in place was inadequate, especially to support planned upgrades for the facility that include lighting for new cells and towers and power for the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation room for the Soldiers. Current electrical amperage draw is 1279.7 amps. Amperage draw, once the upgrades are complete, will increase by another 340 amps, beyond the current transformer's capability of 1441 amps. The facility engineer was assessing the electrical load and prioritizing electrical distribution throughout the facility, with office air conditioning units and hot water heaters being shut down first during overloads to the system. There was concern that serious overloads to the system will occur this summer. There is a project planned to replace the transformer and renovate the electrical distribution system for the facility, but at the time of the inspection the project had not been funded.

ABU GHRAIB

Abu Ghraib had problems with deteriorating infrastructure that impacted the clean, safe, and secure working environment for Soldiers and living conditions for detainees. Poor food quality and food distribution, lack of laundry capability, and inadequate personal hygiene facilities affected the detainees' living conditions. Overcrowding, frequent enemy hostile fire, and lack of in-depth force protection measures also put Soldiers and detainees at risk. There is a separate finding concerning Abu Ghraib. See Finding 3 in Chapter 3.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 6 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

COLLECTING POINTS

Detainees were being held at division forward and central CPs from 1 to 54 days for intelligence exploitation before release or transfer based on interviews and sensing sessions of leaders and Soldiers. If detainees are kept longer than doctrinally recommended, then the infrastructure standards for the facilities should be similar to I/R facilities for the security, safety, and wellbeing of the detainee. 3 of the 12 (25%) forward and central CPs inspected (Green Zone in Baghdad, Brassfield-Mora in Samarra, and Khost, Afghanistan) were determined to be inadequate to keep detainees for longer than doctrinally recommended due to not having the needed laundry services, personal hygiene facilities, medical care, and adequate shelter from adverse weather conditions and the elements. The division forward collecting point (CP) at Brassfield-Mora was also located within 100 feet of an ammunition holding area and fuel point. Enemy hostile fire targeting these areas could result in detainee casualties due to the close proximity of these sites to the collecting point. There were plans to fix a majority of these shortcomings at these three facilities.

Many forward and central facilities visited had recent improvements and upgrades made to them because of the inadequate facilities and harsh conditions. These improvements included upgrades to supporting infrastructure and expansions to facilities to relieve overcrowding, enhance security, and to provide for better sanitation conditions. Improvements and upgrades at collecting points included (but are not limited to) a completely new facility (construction ongoing) at the Kandahar division central CP; new roof, new interrogation room, new electrical system, installed personal hygiene facility, and additional security lighting at the division forward CP in the Green Zone; security upgrades at the division forward CP at Ar Ramadi; addition of gravel around latrines at the Brassfield-Mora division forward CP to improve drainage; and a repaired guard tower at the division central CP at the Baghdad International Airport.

Planned upgrades and improvements included (but are not limited to) installation of two 500 gallon water tanks, laundry washers, and shower facility at Ar Ramadi; new cells in a hardened facility that will protect detainees from the elements in Khost; and planned security upgrades and construction of new shower facilities for the CP at Brassfield-Mora. All units inspected were placing a great deal of effort on making improvements and upgrades to existing collecting points for the health and welfare of detainees.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Six of 8 inspected units operated CPs and I/R facilities that did not comply with minimum preventive medicine standards established in policy and doctrine. Two of 8 units met or exceeded minimum preventive medicine standards. The DAIG Team conducted comprehensive preventive medicine inspections at 8 of the 16 (50%) internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities and collecting points (CPs) visited that were interning detainees.

Leaders and Soldiers from 36 units, both continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS), were interviewed concerning preventive medicine practices and procedures in detainee operations. There was a widespread lack of preventive medicine staffing, supplies, and equipment to meet the needs of CPs and I/R facilities. This shortfall was compounded by the failure of units to deploy appropriately trained and supplied field sanitation teams. Medical leaders responsible for direct oversight of preventive medicine personnel lacked specific training in detainee operations and field sanitation. I/R facility site selection, design and construction decisions did not incorporate preventive medicine considerations. The capacity of the detainee system was exceeded early in the operations, leading to prolonged holding times at CPs and other areas not prepared for long-term housing of detainees.

There was significant variance in the hygiene and sanitation conditions at CPs and in I/R facilities throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. While major improvements continue to upgrade conditions at most sites, the process has been hampered by shortages of preventive medicine personnel and materiel, problems with site selection and design, and detainee populations that exceed the current system capacity. As of March 2004, Camp Bucca still had potable water sources within a few feet of exposed fecal material; Abu Ghraib continued to struggle with garbage and rodents in living areas; and Kandahar's food service sanitation was extremely poor. Hand washing stations were still absent from 3 of 8 (38%) locations inspected, and sanitary orders had not been published and posted at any detainee facilities in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997.

Lack of trained preventive medicine personnel and required field sanitation supplies contributed significantly to deficiencies in hygiene and sanitation at CPs and I/R facilities. Units (97%, 35 of 36) did not deploy with properly trained and equipped field sanitation teams in accordance with AR 40-5, Preventive Medicine, 15 October 1990. Preventive medicine technicians (Military Occupational Specialty 91S) were not deployed in sufficient numbers to support detainee operations, with only one assigned to each Military Police (MP) I/R battalion and none available to support units operating CPs. Preventive medicine detachments at the division level provided support to I/R facilities and CPs when distance and security permitted, but the non-linear battlespace precluded support to the majority of CPs forward of brigade. Shortages of supplies and equipment prohibited preventive medicine personnel from providing complete field sanitation services. Holding times at CPs (up to 54 days; doctrinal maximum is 24 hours) required a more robust infrastructure than units were prepared or resourced to provide.

During interviews and sensing sessions, the DAIG Team noted that (86%, 31-36) leaders and Soldiers were unaware of the specific hygiene and sanitation requirements for CPs and I/R facilities. They relied on "common sense" and contractors to establish local, often unwritten, standards. All (16 of 16) of the interviewed battalion, brigade, and division surgeons said they were not trained in detainee operations and/or preventive medicine and therefore lacked the knowledge to provide adequate oversight for hygiene and sanitation of CPs and I/R facilities. There were no theater- or unit-level policies that addressed preventive medicine requirements for detainee operations. Additionally, there was no evidence of specific medical planning for field sanitation/preventive medicine support to detainee operations.

Despite the many obstacles, recent (March 2004 time-frame) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections of the U.S.-operated I/R facilities in OIF have indicated general satisfaction with the efforts underway to address persistent problems in hygiene and sanitation (although the slow pace of improvements was criticized). As of March 2004, contractors have assumed responsibility for many sanitation functions, including food and water supplies, latrines, laundry, and waste disposal. The most significant problems that persist include overcrowding and insect/rodent control.

The Ryder Report and the Taguba Investigation indicated deficiencies in preventive medicine aspects of detainee operations. The Ryder Report stated that "significant variance in the health, hygiene and sanitation conditions were observed in the detention facilities throughout Iraq." The report referred to ICRC reports that indicated "major progress" in all areas, and further stated that "most facilities have adequate water supplies, sewage management and appropriate food services to comply with the United Nations guidelines." The deficiencies observed were attributed in this report to "inadequate logistical support for facility operations." The Ryder Report pointed out major sanitation problems at Camps Ganci and Vigilant (compounds at Abu Ghraib). Camp Ganci was littered with trash, had large amounts of standing water around latrines, lacked laundry facilities, had insufficient cleaning supplies, and housed detainees in tents that did not provide adequate protection from severe weather or hostile fire. Camp Vigilant had problems with water supply and latrines. The Taguba Investigation did not look at hygiene and sanitation, but it noted that Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca were "significantly over their intended maximum capacity", with the overcrowding contributing to "poor living conditions." The DAIG Team's findings are consistent with those of the Ryder Report and the Taguba Investigation, but they were not chartered to perform specific evaluations of preventive medicine conditions at U.S.-operated CPs and I/R facilities. While the Ryder Report found most facilities to be in compliance with United Nations guidelines, the DAIG Team inspected I/R facilities and CPs against Army standards (AR 190-8, AR 40-5, and FM 21- 10).

MEDICAL TREATMENT

No inspected units supporting detainee operations complied with all medical treatment requirements for enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees, such as monthly height/weight screenings, chest x-rays, and tuberculin skin tests. The DAIG Team found none of the inspected units were following all the medical requirements in accordance with AR 190-8. However, at the time of the inspection all units were attempting to provide detainees with the same quality of medical treatment as that provided to Coalition Forces.

AR 190-8 requires an initial medical screening at I/R facilities for both enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian internees (CIs). At the time of the inspection, all I/R facilities and collecting points (CPs) were performing a medical screening upon initial in processing, but not to standards. At least one I/R facility (Camp Bucca) had previously provided no medical screening, relying on sick call to discover detainees who required medical treatment. The regulation also requires a continuing monthly medical screening, to include weight measurements that ensure detainees are properly nourished. Two of the 4 I/R facilities (Camp Bucca and the Bagram Internment Facility) were aware of this requirement, and both stated they had started performing these screenings in December 2003. Only 2 of the 4 I/R facilities (Camp Cropper and Bagram Internment Facility) conducted a routine, follow-up monthly examination for detainees held over one month as required by regulation.

AR 190-8 also requires CIs be administered a "radioscopic chest examination." None of the facilities had performed this examination. At least one facility (Camp Bucca) had no means of diagnosis for tuberculosis until December 2003. At the time of the inspection, all I/R facilities isolated potentially contagious detainees and provided some preventive measures for Soldiers treating these detainees. All I/R facilities and 7 of 12 (58%) inspected collecting points, established medical records for personnel who required medical treatment. At least 3 facilities transferred these records with the detainee when they were medically evacuated. Medical personnel at only one facility stated they would provide detainees with their medical records upon release.

Medical personnel at all facilities stated they provided medical care comparable to that afforded to Coalition Soldiers. The DAIG Team found this to be accurate in most cases, with some diagnosis-specific exceptions. The exceptions occurred when treatment required transportation out of the host nation, the patient required significant psychiatric care, or treatment was of an elective nature. Previously, one unit reported there had been some conflict between AR 190-8 and Coalition Provisional Authority treatment policy, which reportedly dictated that U.S. medical care was only available to detainees to prevent loss of life, limb, or eyesight. In these cases Army medical personnel attempted to maintain the higher standard by providing detainees with all necessary care. All interviewed medical providers stated they did not have the proper equipment for treating a detainee population that included older, chronically ill patients. In one I/R facility a senior medical Noncommissioned officer (NCO) stated that over 50% of his population had diabetes, and he had neither glucometers nor insulin. At another location a medical NCO stated that approximately 75% of his detainees had hypertension, and one-third were diabetics. At least 4 medical personnel and I/R facility commanders described shortfalls in resources to provide adequate psychiatric treatment. At least 2 I/R facilities had severely ill psychiatric patients (detainees who, in the estimation of the facility's medical personnel, required inpatient treatment) who were being treated pharmacologically by nonpsychiatrist physicians.

The medical personnel interviewed stated that they did not receive any specific training in detainee operations or were aware of AR 190-8, although most believed they were required to treat detainees to the same standard of care as Coalition Forces. All requested additional training. At least one provider requested Mobile Training Teams to provide in-theater training.

The Ryder Report also noted medical personnel lacked adequate training and guidance on the treatment of detainees. Specifically, this report recommended that CJTF-7, "Publish and distribute all new Policies and SOPs to all affected parties and re-evaluate the application and adherence to medical practices." It went on to recommend that CJTF-7, "Provide continued inservice training to all newly assigned and/or rotating medical personnel on the provisions, rules and responsibilities stated."

(4) Root Cause: Some units did not have thorough plans to upgrade their facilities and in some cases, were not funded for upgrades. Field sanitation teams were not deployed in compliance with AR 40-5 and did not have adequate supplies to provide the services required. None of the units inspected were fully aware of, or trained on the specific medical requirements for detainees in accordance with AR 190-8. Medical leaders were not adequately trained for detainee operations and were unprepared to provide oversight for preventive medicine functions at collecting points and I/R facilities. Preventive medicine aspects of detainee operations were not appropriately incorporated into medical planning processes. Preventive medicine detachments lacked sufficient personnel on their Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) to adequately inspect all division collecting points and I/R facilities. Units did not have all the necessary medical equipment or supplies to meet the specific requirements contained in AR 190-8.

(5) Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 ensure all units meet the guidelines for minimum infrastructure standards supporting detainee operations to allow for adequate facilities to house detainees.

Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 implement a safety inspection program for all facilities that support detainee operations to identify and eliminate hazards to Soldiers and detainees.

Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 evaluate current living and working conditions at all facilities housing detainees and take corrective actions to improve the current living and working environment.

Recommendation: CJTF-7 review the physical and operations security requirements and policy/doctrinal procedures to ensure units operating internment/resettlement facilities comply with all requirements.

Recommendation: Force Providers require commanders to have trained and equipped field sanitation teams prior to deployment, and deployed commanders ensure field sanitation teams comply with Army policy.

Recommendation: TRADOC review the preventive medicine detachment force structure to ensure support to all collecting points and internment/resettlement facilities in a nonlinear battlespace.

Recommendation: MEDCOM train all medical personnel in the preventive medicine aspects of detainee operations to ensure compliance with policy and the laws of land warfare.

Recommendation: MEDCOM ensure all health care personnel are trained on the medical treatment requirements for detainees in accordance with Army Regulations and ensure that units have the required medical equipment and supplies for treating detainees.

Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 evaluate current detainee medical capabilities and requirements and take corrective action to ensure detainees receive the required medical screening and care.

h. Finding 16:

(1) Finding: Two of 4 internment/resettlement facilities did not segregate enemy prisoners of war from civilian internees in accordance with legal requirements.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team observed that 2 of the 4 inspected internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities did not segregate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) from civilian internees (CIs). Inspections of I/R facilities, leader interviews, Soldier sensing sessions, and document reviews showed that there were 46 documented EPWs in Iraq, few of which were segregated from the CI population. Units did not segregate EPWs for 2 reasons: (1) it was too difficult a task because some of the compounds within the internment facility would only have a few EPWs in them, thus wasting space that could be used to house CIs; and (2) they were comingled to support interrogation requirements. Continued failure to segregate EPWs from CIs in Iraq is in contradiction to the legal requirements of GC, Article 84.

The Ryder Report mentioned, "Currently, due to the lack of Iraqi prison facilities and the ongoing consolidation efforts at the Abu Ghraib complex, Iraqi criminals are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs; though segregated in different cells/compounds. These categories of offenders need to be separated as soon as facility construction and renovation projects permit, especially separating those facilities run by U.S. personnel (for Iraqi criminals). The management of multiple disparate groups of detained persons in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. Absent specific mission constraints, intermingling these categories of detainees should be avoided." Abu Ghraib abided by the Ryder Report recommendation regarding segregation of detainees by either releasing EPWs or moving them to other facilities, as the DAIG Team observed no EPWs at Abu Ghraib. In addition, the Ryder Report mentions segregation, but not specifically in the context of EPWs and CIs: "Initiate procedures for segregating Detainees into separate buildings if and where available, based on category of detainee, sex, untried, or sentenced, and severity of offense."

(4) Root Cause: Leaders at all levels were aware of the legal and regulatory requirement to segregate EPWs from CIs. Units did not comply with the segregation standard because they felt it was too difficult a task or they acted to support intelligence requirements.

(5) Recommendation: CJTF-7 segregate enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations.

i. Finding 17:

(1) Finding: Units operating collecting points (42%, 5 of 12), and units operating internment/resettlement facilities (2 of 4), were not adequately resourced with communications equipment, shotguns, and non-lethal ammunition.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team inspected 12 collecting points and 4 internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities. Five out of 12 (42%) units operating collecting points (CPs), and 2 of 4 (Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib) units operating I/R facilities experienced equipment shortfalls, including hand-held radios for communications between guards, escorts, and towers; weapon systems with non-lethal ammunition; hand and leg restraint devices; and rubber gloves to safely handle detainees.

The Military Police (MP) I/R battalion at Abu Ghraib experienced equipment shortfalls of weapons, radios, and non-lethal ammunition. This problem was compounded because the MP battalion was augmented with in lieu of (ILO) units (a Marine Infantry company and a Field Artillery battery) to perform MP missions. The MP battalion was short radios, so Soldiers at Abu Ghraib purchased their own commercial hand-held radios to overcome their shortages. These radios were used primarily for communication between tower guards, roving guards, and for detainee escort missions. Lack of batteries and working radios in the units compounded the problem. Leaders and Soldiers stated during interviews and sensing sessions that detainee operations placed additional communication burdens on the units. These commercial hand-held radios lacked the range and the communications security (COMSEC) capabilities required to maintain secure communications. According to interviews and sensing sessions, the ILO MP units did not deploy with the authorized number of shotguns, non-lethal ammunition, and radios for guard companies and escort guard companies under the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) of an I/R battalion.

The situation at Camp Bucca was slightly different. The I/R battalion was augmented by two Field Artillery batteries that were ILO MP units. According to interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers, the MP battalion, to include the ILO units at Camp Bucca, was short authorized hand and leg restraint devices, radios, shotguns, and non-lethal ammunition. Soldiers at Camp Bucca also purchased commercial hand-held radios to overcome unit communication shortages. Like the ILO MP units at Abu Ghraib, the Field Artillery batteries experienced shortages before and after deployment due to MTO&E differences with I/R MP Guard and Guard Escort companies and experienced many of same impacts that the units at Abu Ghraib faced.

Based on interviews and sensing sessions, the collecting points at Baghdad (Green Zone), Tikrit, Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Brassfield-Mora, and Ar Ramadi all had equipment shortages. Soldiers at the division forward collecting points at Brassfield-Mora and Ar Ramadi said that they did not have enough radios for detainee operations. The forward and central collecting points at the Green Zone, Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, and BIAP experienced shortages in hand and leg restraint devices. Collecting points at the Green Zone and Brassfield-Mora had difficulties in acquiring identification bracelets. All five of the collecting points mentioned above suffered shortages in rubber gloves for the handling of detainees.

(4) Root Cause: Combat support MPs and in lieu of MP units are not adequately equipped to perform detainee operations.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC identify minimum equipment requirements for detainee operations to ensure successful unit mission accomplishment.

j. Finding 18:

(1) Finding: All inspected point of capture units established ad hoc kits containing necessary items and supplies for detainee field processing, but the items they contained and their quantities varied from unit to unit.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Current operations involving the securing and field processing of detainees require specific equipment and paperwork. A "Detainee Field Processing Kit" would assist all units in processing detainees. Based on leader and Soldier interviews, the DAIG Team found that capturing units had established some type of ad hoc kit, which included a variety of items required for securing and field processing a detainee, however, the contents and quantities varied from unit to unit. Some units had more complete kits than others.

These kits were put together at unit level with no guidance from higher and no standardization except generally for the type of forms required for field processing. Capturing units developed the kits by trial and error over a period of time to streamline the processing of detainees to the forward collecting points. In some units, leaders and Soldiers were not aware of all the processing requirements for detainees for evacuation or transfer to forward collecting points. They expressed concern over not knowing these requirements and felt that if the kit had been established through doctrine, it would have expedited and standardized the field processing of detainees.

Some of the more complete kits contained copies of the required forms from AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, such as DA Form 4137, Receipt for Evidence/Property Custody Document; DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement; and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Forces Apprehension Form (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM only). Other items generally found in the more complete kits were flexi-cuffs, string or wire (to attach the Capture Tag or CPA Form to the detainee), large plastic bags (to hold evidence, personal effects and other large confiscated items), small zip-lock plastic bags (to hold currency or small valuable items), an instant or digital camera, hearing protection, sandbags, bandages, or blacked-out goggles (to cover eyes), and in times of cold weather, blankets for the detainees.

(4) Root Cause: Capturing units did not have doctrinal guidance to follow in preparing or funding detainee kits that enabled units to safely and efficiently field process detainees.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC establish and identify resource requirements for a standardized "Detainee Field Processing Kit" that will enable capturing units to properly secure and process detainees quickly, efficiently, and safely.

k. Finding 19:

(1) Finding: All inspected units had adequate transportation assets to evacuate and/or transfer detainees from points of capture to collecting points, and eventually to internment/resettlement facilities.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team determined that inspected units had adequate transportation assets to evacuate, transfer, or repatriate detainees. Only a few units experienced minor difficulties arranging transportation, usually during surge periods. These transportation shortages were usually temporary problems that were resolved through coordination with supporting units.

Leaders and Soldiers stated that supporting units, such as forward support and main support battalions, were able to assist in providing transportation assets if capturing units were hampered due to other ongoing missions when required.

Capturing units typically transported detainees to the battalion or division forward collecting points in the back of High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles or Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Guard ratios and the numbers of accompanying security vehicles were generally well planned out. Most units took advantage of resupply assets to move detainees across the battlefield.

(4) Root Cause: Units were planning for and using transportation assets efficiently to move detainees across the battlefield and through the system.

(5) Recommendation: Commanders continue to stress the importance of planning and providing for adequate transportation assets to support continuing detainee operations.

l. Finding 20:

(1) Finding: Common leader training in professional military schools contains only one detainee operations task.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team found that leaders and Soldiers from 87% (53 of 61) of the units that commented on Professional Military Education (PME) indicated that their PME common core does not train them to conduct detainee operations. The only PME courses that cover detainee operations training in their common core are during pre-commissioning, Warrant Officer Candidate School and the Primary Leadership Development Course. The Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) interviewed and sensed said they received little detainee operations training in their PME courses. These same NCOs talked more specifically about the Situational Training Exercises (STX) that are conducted at the end of each level of NCOES through the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). Their STX training was force-on-force play using Multi-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), and detainee operations training ceased after the point of capture.

The NCOs experienced difficulty in filling out and completing the required detainee apprehension forms correctly, which included witness statements. They also experienced difficulty in creating a detailed list and accounting for captured detainee property and evidence. The NCOs agreed that there is a training shortfall dealing with detainee classification, and status and treatment afforded to each classification under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. STXs did not cover the classifying of detainees or the paperwork involved in field processing detainees. Their PME training for detainee operations only covered the processing of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). Leaders and Soldiers interviewed and sensed indicated a need to incorporate detainee operations tasks into their PME common core programs of instruction (POI). The current operating environment has evolved and Soldiers at all levels must have a clear understanding of and how to execute detainee operations in a non-linear battlespace. The PME must apply lessons learned quickly to adjust their training to what is occurring in the current operating environment. Interviewed leaders and Soldiers all said that PME is a very important training base, but that it must keep up with current operational lessons learned and evolving tactics, techniques and procedures.

Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers stated that the Law or War training they received prior to deployment did not differentiate between the different classifications of detainees causing confusion concerning the levels of treatment. Even though this confusion existed, most leaders and Soldiers treated detainees humanely.

Currently, TRADOC has integrated one detainee operations task into the PME common core: Process Captives, (191-000- 001) . The pre-commissioning course, Warrant Officers Candidate School and NCOs at the Primary Leadership Development Course are only courses receiving training on this task.

The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) has several ongoing initiatives that began in December 2003. USAMPS is currently in the process of creating and revising their detainee operations programs of instruction and training support packages using lessons learned from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Military Police (MP) NCOs attending the MP NCO Academy receive training on the following new and revised detainee operations tasks:

• Introduction to Detainee operations
• Communication with detainees
• Use of Force and Detainees
• Detainee Frisk, Undress, Cell and area search operations
• Restraint procedures and Detainees
• The Geneva Conventions and detainee operations

USAMPS has currently revised the tasks to provide updated programs of instruction and training support packages to support detainee operations training at all PME schools and colleges.

(4) Root Cause: There are currently not enough programs of instruction and training support packages available to the Professional Military Education schools and colleges that support detainee operations training.

(5) Recommendation: TRADOC integrate standardized detainee operations training into all Army proponent school common core programs of instruction and training support packages.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:29 am

PART 7 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

m. Finding 21:

(1) Finding: Leaders and Soldiers assigned to 69% (46 of 67) of inspected units stated they desired additional home station training; and pre- and post mobilization training to assist them in performing detainee operations.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: The DAIG Team found that leaders and Soldiers assigned to 27 of 39 (69%) of inspected Active Component (AC) units indicated their home station training did not prepare their units to perform detainee operations. Individual and collective training at home station was concentrated on fighting an enemy on a linear battlefield, according to interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers. Their units did little in the way of training on detainee operations. All inspected units did execute the Common Military Training (CMT) as outlined in Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Education, 9 April 2003. However, the CMT classes on the Law of War, the Geneva Conventions, and Code of Conduct were generic and did not address the specific application of detainee operations in the current operating environment. These same leaders and Soldiers said their detainee operations training only covered field processing of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and not other classifications of detainees. The training these units received on field processing of detainees was comprehensive when dealing with EPWs only.

Once deployed in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), leaders and Soldiers identified a training shortfall dealing with the handling of the different classifications of detainees and their special handling procedures. Units did not have established tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) or standing operating procedures (SOPs) to cover the handling and processing of different classifications of detainees. This lack of training by point of capture units placed a burden on their resources (manpower, logistics and medical). To compound the problem, a number of leaders and Soldiers were unaware of the specific Army regulation or field manuals that govern detainee operations.

Soldiers assigned to division MP units told the DAIG Team that they did not train at home station on the five MP functional areas that were assigned to the units in theater. One example concerned a division MP platoon conducting maneuver and mobility support training at home station and then being assigned the internment/resettlement (I/R) function after deployment. These Soldiers said that their training at home station should include all 5 of the MP battlefield functions. This agrees with the Taguba Investigation finding that states, "Those military units conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies."

Reserve Component (RC) leaders and Soldiers assigned to 64% (14 of 22) of inspected RC units stated the training they received at their mobilization sites did not prepare them to conduct detainee operations. OEF and OIF experienced RC career course captains, interviewed at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), also said their units did not receive adequate training at their mobilization sites to prepare them to conduct detainee operations. Training at some mobilization sites concentrated on improving combat soldiering skills and to pass the Common Task Test (CTT). Leaders and Soldiers were not required to attend deployment briefings at these mobilization sites, also these units maintained no tracking systems to ensure that every Soldier received mandatory training.

Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers said they were not given enough time at the mobilization sites to conduct collective unit level training. Some units had just enough time to complete their central issue facility (CIF) draw, and complete the Soldier readiness checks (SRC) before deploying overseas. Training was considered and treated like a "revolving door" at some mobilization sites. Interviewed leaders and soldiers assigned to 64% (14 of 22) of inspected RC stated they were not given a clear mission statement prior to mobilization and were not notified of their MP mission until after deploying. The units received their MP mission upon their arrival in theater. Interviewed Soldiers gave examples of being placed in stressful situations in internment/resettlement (I/R) facility with thousands of non-compliant detainees and not being trained to handle them. The lack of a mission statement limited units in support of OEF 4 and OIF 1 from training on mission essential tasks at their mobilization site. This is also supported by the findings in the Taguba Investigation.

Once deployed, these MP units had no means to gain access to the necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to train their Soldiers on the MP essential tasks based on their new missions. Regulations and field manuals were digitized, but unit leaders and Soldiers had no access to computers or the internet. It was very difficult to train Soldiers on MP missions early in their deployment. Interviewed leaders and Soldiers assigned to 64% (14 of 22) of inspected RC units stated they were assigned battlefield missions that they had never received training on at their home station or at their mobilization site. Soldiers provided examples of unit training primarily as an escort or guard MP company, but once deployed the unit was assigned I/R or law and order missions. A consensus among leaders and Soldiers was that their units should have concentrated their training on all 5 of the MP functional areas. They also agreed that all MP units should be resourced to conduct all 5 MP functional areas.

Interviewed leaders and Soldiers assigned to 5 of 6 inspected in lieu of (ILO) Military Police (MP) units did not receive detainee operations training at their mobilization site. These ILO units deployed into theater with little post-mobilization training on detainee operations and were assigned the ILO MP Security missions. Soldiers assigned to these units had little knowledge on what to do, but just trusted in their leaders to provide them good guidance. The ILO MP units inspected that deployed in support of OIF 1 were not given a clear mission statement prior to mobilization and were not notified of their ILO MP mission until after deploying. The units received their ILO MP mission upon their arrival in theater and were given a just few days to conduct a battle-handover with the outgoing units.

Once deployed, the ILO MP units had difficulty in gaining access to the necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to train their Soldiers on the MP essential tasks based on their new missions. Army regulations and field manuals were digitized and unit leaders and Soldiers had no access to computers or the internet. It was very difficult to train Soldiers on MP missions early in their deployment. During OIF 1 there were no training programs in theater to train units designated ILO MP before they assumed their ILO MP Security missions. Leaders and Soldiers interviewed and assigned to these ILO MP units were assigned battlefield missions that they had never received training on at their home station or at their mobilization site.

Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers stated that the Law or War training they received prior to deployment did not differentiate between the different classifications of detainees, causing confusion concerning the levels of treatment. Even though this confusion existed, most leaders and Soldiers treated detainees humanely. Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers said the Army has the necessary training tools in place, but doctrine and/or policy needs to address and apply lessons learned more quickly to incorporate changes coming from OEF and OIF. The Common Task Test (CTT) was identified by these leaders and Soldiers as an excellent training tool, but the tasks require updating to comply with changes evolving from the current operating environments in OEF and OIF. CTT would be an excellent tool to integrate detainee operations into the force by using a multi- echelon training approach. The CMT tasks outlined in AR 350-1 should be updated to address the different classifications of detainees and how to apply the Geneva Conventions and the Law of War to each type of detainee. Interviewed Soldiers complained about the lack of detainee operations training their units received during their respective rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Soldiers said detainee operations during their rotation at NTC or JRTC was not evaluated beyond the point of capture and lacked realism.

Post-mobilization training for units that deployed in support of OEF 5 and OIF 2 consisted of a comprehensive training program ending in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) to assess units' ability to execute wartime missions. Leaders and Soldiers interviewed said that all Soldiers were required to sign-in for all mandatory training received at the mobilization site. Soldiers deploying in support of OEF 5 and OIF 2 were required to sign a statement acknowledging the training they received at their mobilization site. These Soldiers were being tracked by name and by unit. This process ensured that all mobilized leaders and Soldiers were accounted for and trained. Mobilization site training was broken down into 7 Modules culminating in a Simulation Exercise (SIMEX):

Module 1: Soldier Readiness Packet, Central Issue Facility, Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training briefings

Module 2: NBC survival tasks, Land Navigation, Communications

Module 3: Crew and Individual Basic and Advanced Weapons Qualification Skills, Leader Training & New Equipment Training

Module 4: Specialty Training

Module 5: Squad and Platoon Training

Module 6: Platoon Training

Module 6.1: Combat Support/Combat Service Support training

Module 7: Multi-Echelon Training / Support and Stability Operations Training (CAPSTONE)

Brigade SIMEX that covers Battalion and Brigade level collective tasks.

Modules 1 and 2 are augmented with a series of leader and Soldier concurrent training on Common Task Test supporting tasks. Leaders and Soldiers, deployed in support of OIF 2 and OEF 5, were very complimentary of the training they received at their respective mobilization sites. These training modules provided unit commanders the ability to execute detainee operations training during Modules 4, 5, 6, and 7. Interviewed leaders and Soldiers that deployed in support of OIF 2 said that post- mobilization training helped them once they deployed into theater. Forces Command (FORSCOM) issued specific guidance on the collective and individual tasks units must train on prior to deploying in support of OEF and OIF. These tasks did not prepare units to conduct detainee operation in the current operating environment.

The Combat Training Centers (CTC) are using an internal After Action Review (AAR) process in order to continue making improvements to their detainee operations scenario and to include the synchronization and integration of detainee operations into every unit's rotation. NTC's current focus is on conducting detainee operations to the doctrinal standard and by incorporating approved procedures used in OIF. Both JRTC and NTC have incorporated detainee operations into their Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) and Contemporary Operational Environment High Intensity (COE HI) rotations.

In the future, the Combat Training Centers' (CTCs) detainee operations training during MRX scenarios will be based upon reports and lessons learned from OIF and/or OEF, to include 1st Armored Division SOPs/TTPs, and doctrinal guidelines. All rotating units will be required to establish and operate a collecting point of some kind as part of their rotations. The CTCs are striving to replicate the best scenarios for the current operating environment. The G3, in coordination with TRADOC, the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and the Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) has initiated a training integration assessment for improving detainee handling from point of capture to repatriation, to include a review of CTT and specialized MP training across the Army during Combat Training Center (CTCs) rotations, MRXs and TRADOC institutional training. This assessment began in December 2003 and is currently ongoing with no projected completion date.

The G3, in coordination with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Office of the Provost Marshal General, and the Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), has initiated a training integration assessment for improving detainee handling from point of capture to repatriation, to include a review of CTT and specialized MP training across the Army during CTCs rotations, MRXs and TRADOC institutional training. This assessment began in December 2003 and is currently ongoing with no projected completion date.

TRADOC's institutional training assessment is focusing on the Law of War and the 5Ss and T (Search, Silence, Segregate, Safeguard, Speed, and Tag) regarding EPWs throughout the proponent schools. USAMPS has formed an MP subject matter expert team to develop a process to analyze, identify, evaluate, and integrate lessons learned from all CONUS/OCONUS MP operations. TRADOC, in coordination with OTJAG, is currently determining the feasibility of expanding or adjusting Law of War training in the proponent schools to include procedures for handling of detainees.

In January 2004, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) sent a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to JRTC to conduct "train-the-trainer" education for their observer controllers (O/Cs) on detainee operations. The MTT training covered detainee operations, personal safety, forced cell movements, restraint procedures, communication with detainees, and case studies. USAMPS is also coordinating with the NTC for a MTT to conduct the same training.

Currently, the USAMPS MTT mission is to train identified CONUS/OCONUS units performing detainee operations or I/R missions in support of OIF 2 on select and approved tasks to enhance their capabilities of mission accomplishment. The 31E detainee operations support and MTT is comprised of a total of 29 (31E) Soldiers. The MTT has trained leaders and Soldiers from the following units: 160th MP Battalion (BN), 107th FA Battery, 172nd FA Battery, 391st MP BN, 152nd FA Battery, K 3/24 INF-USMC, 439th CLD, MEK: 336th MP BN, 579th FA Battery, and the 1/124th AR SQ. A total of 565 leaders and Soldiers have been trained as of 7 May 2004. The following units are scheduled: 1st INF DIV (9 May-11 Jun), 1st CAV DIV (24 May-12 JUN), 1st MEF (6-30 Jun), and MNB-N (TF-Olympia) (14-30 June).

(4) Root Cause: There is no prescribed detainee operations training program for units to train at home station. A majority of Reserve Component MP Units who deployed in support of OIF 1 were not told of their missions until they arrived into theater and their area of responsibility.

(5) Recommendation: The G3 integrate a prescribed detainee operations training program into unit training.

Recommendation: CFLCC and Force Providers coordinate to ensure, where possible, units are aware of their assigned mission upon mobilization so they can train for their specific mission.

Recommendation: FORSCOM integrate a standardized detainee operations training package as part of pre- and post-mobilization training.

Recommendation: CFLCC ensure that ILO MP units are trained before they assume their ILO MP missions.

n. Finding 22:

(1) Finding: To offset the shortage of interrogators, contractors were employed, however, 35% (11 of 31) of contract interrogators lacked formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: 35% (11 of 31) Of the contract interrogators in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), 35% (11 of 31) had not received formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, and doctrine. These personnel conducted interrogations using skill sets obtained in previous occupational specialties such as civilian police interrogator or Military Intelligence (MI) officer. The lack of specific training in military policies and techniques has the potential of placing these interrogators at a higher risk of violating Army policies and doctrine, and decreasing intelligence yield. 65% (20 of 31) of contract interrogators in OIF had previous experience as Army or Marine interrogators (Army 97E military occupational specialty or Marine Corps 0211) where they received formal school training in military interrogation techniques and procedures. These individuals had received formal military interrogation training an average of 9.5 years prior to employment as interrogators in OIF. The range of time from having completed basic military interrogation training was 1 to 25 years. Field Manual (FM) 34- 52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, is the base document for Army interrogation doctrine. Persons trained in interrogation techniques prior to publication of the current version of the FM would have been trained on some doctrinal techniques that are no longer valid.

Contract interrogators were a force multiplier in OIF, supplementing a shortage of military interrogators. Contract interrogators were used to perform screenings and interrogations at collecting points (CPs) and in internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities to free military interrogators and counterintelligence agents to perform tactical missions at points of capture and CPs.

CACI International, Inc. is the civilian company contracted through the Department of the Interior to provide civilian interrogators for OIF. CACI has provided a total of 31 contract interrogators since the blanket purchase agreement (contract) was issued on 14 August 2003. As of 17 May 2004, 19 contract interrogators were deployed in support of OIF, and 12 contract interrogators have returned to the United States citing personal or family reasons.

The CJTF-7 Statement of Work (SOW) required contract interrogators to be the civilian equivalent of military occupational specialty 97E (Human Intelligence Collector) or 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician), strategic debriefer (completed the DoD Strategic Debriefing Course), or an individual with a similar skill set. Contract interrogators that only meet the requirements of "strategic debriefer" or "similar skill sets" may not have training in military-specific interrogation techniques and procedures as taught in the 97E and 351E qualification courses. This training is specific to human intelligence exploitation and includes collection priority, battlefield screening, planning and preparation, authorized approaches, methods of questioning, and termination of interrogations. It also includes 192 hours of direct and indirect training on the laws of land warfare, emphasizing compliance of all military interrogation techniques with the Geneva Conventions and Army policy.

The DAIG Team inspected the resumes of all 31 individuals hired as contract interrogators by CACI. 65% (20 of 31) were prior service military interrogators who had been awarded the Army 97E MOS or Marine Corps 0211 MOS. These individuals had received formal military interrogation training an average of 9.5 years prior to employment by CACI (range: 1-25 years). Of the contractors without prior military service, 35% (11 of 31) had "similar skill sets" acquired in related military or civilian experience (e.g., military intelligence/counterintelligence agent, police interrogator, intelligence analyst, and police officer).

Prior to May 2004, there was no CACI or CJTF-7 requirement for all contract interrogators to receive formal, comprehensive, military-specific interrogator training prior to performing interrogations in OIF. While in Iraq the DAIG Team did not find evidence of a formal training program for contract interrogators. The DAIG Team requested from the J2, CJTF-7, both in Iraq and upon return to the United States, a training plan or program of instruction (POI) outlining a formal training program. On 19 May 2004, the Chief, CJ2X, CJTF-7 provided an email message to the DAIG Team stating that prior to February 2004, new contract interrogators working at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) received familiarization training, consisting of briefings on the approved interrogation approach techniques and the Geneva Conventions, "left seat-right seat ride" training, and evaluation by experienced interrogators prior to conducting interrogations. On 21 May 2004, the Chief, CJ2X, CJTF-7 provided an email message stating that in February 2004, the JIDC began a two-part newcomer's training/orientation for all contract interrogators deployed to OIF. This training consisted of an organizational overview, interrogation policy briefing, tour of the facilities, and "left seat-right seat ride" training on interrogation duties and responsibilities. The message stated that documentation of this training began in May 2004.

In interviews conducted during the inspection, when four contract interrogators were asked about in-theater training, there were three different responses. One stated he received no in-theater training of any kind. Two stated training was provided on the Geneva Conventions and the interrogation approach techniques, with some additional time spent observing experienced interrogators. One stated he received 2 weeks of "right seat" training at Abu Ghraib, followed by 1 week performing supervised interrogations. Two military interrogators interviewed stated, "While some contract interrogators were fine, some lacked understanding of proper interrogation policies and procedures." In contrast, the DAIG Team interviewed 5 leaders and Soldiers who found contract interrogators to be adequate to very good.

Two specific incidents were described to the DAIG Team where Army personnel stated they saw contract interrogators using techniques and procedures inconsistent with Army policy and doctrine (e.g., pouring water over detainees’ heads while in stress positions); the chain of command was already aware of this incident. In one of these incidents military interrogators at that location were reportedly using the same techniques. The DAIG Team did not observe any improper interrogation techniques during the inspection. A DAIG Team member observed two contract interrogators performing interrogations; both interrogations were conducted using tactics, techniques, and procedures in accordance with Army policy and doctrine.

The Taguba Investigation cited a contract interrogator who gave an MP non-doctrinal guidance that violated Army policy in order to facilitate conditions for interrogation. The contract interrogator has since requested to return to the United States. A lawyer representing CACI International stated that the Army has not requested, and no contract interrogators in OIF have received, administrative or disciplinary action as a result of improper performance of duties.

At the time of the inspection there were no contract interrogators employed in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). In March 2004, CJTF-180 contracted with SYTEX, Inc. for 4 contract interrogators, all of which were assigned to the I/R facility at Bagram, Afghanistan. Two of the 4 contract interrogators have military interrogation training, and the other 2 are former police officers. The senior Army interrogator assigned to CJTF-180 stated that upon arrival at Bagram the contract interrogators were provided training on interrogation planning and preparation, interrogation approaches, Geneva Conventions, questioning methods, report writing, and the CJTF-180 interrogation approach techniques. They also underwent left/right seat interrogation training. CJTF-180 provided the DAIG Team with a training plan that outlines the above.

In summary, contract interrogators in OIF met the requirements of the CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell SOW. The SOW did not mandate military interrogation training as a prerequisite for employment. While some training may have occurred at Abu Ghraib, there is no evidence of a formalized POI for contract interrogators. All contract interrogators should receive training on specific theater and Army techniques, policies, and doctrine for conducting military interrogations. This requirement should be reflected in the CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell SOW.

(4) Root Cause: The CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell SOW did not require contract interrogators to be trained in military interrogation procedures, policy, and doctrine. Predeployment and in-theater training for contract interrogators on military interrogation techniques, policy, and doctrine did not occur or was inconsistent.

(5) Recommendation: The CFLCC contracting officer representative modify the CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell Statement of Work to require civilian interrogators to be former military interrogators trained in current interrogation policy and doctrine or receive formal training in current military interrogation policy and doctrine.

o. Finding 23:

(1) Finding: Interviewed leaders and Soldiers indicated their Law of War refresher training was not detailed enough to sustain their knowledge obtained during initial and advanced training.

(2) Standard: See Appendix E.

(3) Inspection Results: Leaders and Soldiers from inspected units who commented on Law of War training stated they did receive some Law of War training prior to deploying, but 57% (272 of 474) of leaders and Soldiers indicated that the training was generic and did not prepare them for the current operating environment. The Level B Law of War training was normally given by the brigade legal advisor. Law of War training is required for leaders and Soldiers throughout their military careers commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. There are currently 3 levels of training for the Law of War. Level A training is conducted during Initial entry training (IET) for all enlisted personnel and during basic courses of instruction for all warrant officers and officers. Level B training is conducted in units for officers, warrant officers noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted personnel and incorporates the missions of the unit. Level C training is conducted in Professional Military Education (PME).

Currently in IET, Level A Law of Land warfare training is designed to advise the Soldier on his rights, duties, and obligations under the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the customary Law of War. The program of instruction used for this training is dated 1 October 1998, and is scheduled for one hour, which includes 36 minutes of classroom instruction on the principles, spirit, and intent of the Hague and Geneva Conventions; the laws of war prohibiting unnecessary destruction; and the laws of war requiring humane treatment of prisoners of war (PWs), other captured and detained persons, and civilians. In this portion of the training, Soldiers become familiar with their obligations not to commit war crimes and to report all violations of the laws of war, and the significant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (EPWs). The other 24 minutes consists of a television tape covering the Law of Land Warfare, and emphasizes "honor" and the Army's Values. The tape stresses that each Soldier has a personal stake in knowing about these conventions and in understanding how they work. Soldiers are taught to comply with these provisions and that failure may subject them to provisions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This program of instruction is given to all IET Soldiers who enter the Army.

Level B Law of War training is designed to sustain the training received in IET and PME. Unit commanders are responsible for planning and executing Level B Law of War training. Level B training should reinforce the basic principles set forth in "The Soldiers' Rules." Level B training should be designed around current missions and contingency plans, including anticipated geographical areas of deployment or rules of engagement. Commanders ensure that Law of War training is integrated into unit training activities, field training exercises, and unit external evaluations. There are no Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) programs of instructions for Level B training. Level B training is designed to be refresher training, used to reinforce previous training and/or to sustain/regain previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experiences. Commanders determine the need for refresher training based on assessment of individual and unit proficiency. Leaders and Soldiers complained about the content and quality of their unit level B Law of War training during interviews and sensing sessions. All agreed that their Level B Law of War training needed more structure as part of Common Military Training (CMT) to help them to better function in the current operating environment.

Level C Law of War training is conducted in The Army School System (TASS); TASS is a composite school system consisting of Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and Active Army institutional training systems. TASS conducts IET; functional training (Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), Area of Concentration (AOC), Additional Skill Identifier (ASI), and Language Identification Code (LIC)); reclassification; and officer, warrant officer, NCO, and DA civilian professional development training and education through both standard resident and distance learning courses. Level C Law of War training emphasizes officer, warrant officer, and NCO responsibilities for their performance of duties in accordance with the Law of War obligations of the United States; Law of War issues in command planning and execution of combat operations; and measures for the reporting of suspected or alleged war crimes committed by or against U.S. or allied personnel. There are currently 2 PME common core Law of War tasks:

1. Conduct small unit combat operations according to the law of war (Task #181-431- 1001) – taught at the Pre-commissioning Course (PRE), the Officer Basic Course (OBC), the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), and the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC). This task helps leaders identify key provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and those acts that constitute violations and war crimes against noncombatants, property, POWs, and medical transports/facilities, and prevent the engagement of unlawful targets and the excessive use of force. This task is designed to be programmed training, with specific learning objectives and an evaluation for proficiency. The task is trained by an instructor/trainer in a structured manner and serves as the foundation for other training. Normally the task is a qualification requirement and is presented and evaluated using the prescribed training conditions and performance standards. This task takes 100 minutes to train.

2. Conduct company level combat operations consistent with the laws of war and laws affecting peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations, rules of engagement, and other legal constraints (Task # 181-433-1001) – taught at the Captain's Career Course (CCC) and the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC). This task helps leaders prevent law of war violations and war crimes against protected noncombatants, property, POWs, and medical transports/facilities, and prevent engagement of unlawful targets and excessive use of force. This task is designed to be programmed training. This task has specific learning objectives and an evaluation for proficiency; is conducted by an instructor trainer in a structured manner; serves as the foundation for other training; normally is a qualification requirement; and is presented and evaluated using the prescribed training conditions and performance standards. This task also takes 100 minutes to train.

Interviewed and sensed leaders and Soldiers stated that the Law or War training they received prior to deployment did not differentiate between the different classifications of detainees, causing confusion concerning the levels of treatment. Even though this confusion existed, most leaders and Soldiers treated detainees humanely.

TRADOC, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, is currently determining the feasibility of increasing or adjusting Law of War training in the proponent schools to include procedures for handling civilian internees and other non- uniformed personnel on the battlefield.

(4) Root Cause: Level B Law of War training is a CMT task, coded "R" (Refresher), that does not require the training to have specific learning objectives and taught by an instructor/trainer in a structured manner.

(5) Recommendation: The G3, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, mandate that Level B Law of War training have specific learning objectives, be conducted by an instructor/evaluator in a structured manner, and be presented and evaluated annually using the established training conditions and performance standards.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:34 am

PART 8 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Chapter 6: Summary of Recommendations

1. Purpose: The purpose of this chapter is to list all of the recommendations proffered in the report. Some recommendations may be similar to others; however, all recommendations are included here.

2. Recommendation for Implementation: Director, Army Staff task out appropriate recommendations and track compliance to Department of the Army Staffs and Major Commands. The Acting Secretary of the Army submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Staff for consideration and implementation as appropriate by units deployed in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

3. Chapter 3, Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees:

a. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 continue to emphasize compliance with the requirements regarding the humane treatment of detainees.

b. Recommendation: Commanders continue to stress the importance of humane treatment of detainees and continue to supervise and train Soldiers on their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their responsibility to report abuse.

c. Recommendation: Commanders enforce the basic fundamental discipline standards of Soldiers, provide training, and immediately correct inappropriate behavior of Soldiers towards detainees to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

d. Recommendation: Commanders assess the quality of leadership in units and replace those leaders who do not enforce discipline and hold Soldiers accountable.

e. Recommendation: TRADOC develop and implement a train-the-trainer package that strongly emphasizes leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

f. Recommendation: TRADOC integrate training into all Professional Military Education that strongly emphasizes leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure the proper treatment of detainees.

g. Recommendation: The G3 require pre-deployment training include a strong emphasis on leaders’ responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure proper treatment of, and prevent abuse of, detainees.

h. Recommendation: CJTF-7 expand Camp Bucca as an internment/resettlement facility in order to transfer detainees from Camps Ganci and Vigilant, and phase out U.S. Armed Forces detainee operations at Abu Ghraib completely.

4. Chapter 4, Interrogation Operations:

a. Recommendation: TRADOC revise doctrine to address the criteria for establishing and operating collecting points to enable commanders to more effectively conduct intelligence exploitation in a non-linear battlespace.

b. Recommendation: TRADOC develop a single document for detainee operations that identifies the interdependent and independent roles of the Military Police custody mission and the Military Intelligence interrogation mission.

c. Recommendation: TRADOC establish doctrine to clearly define the organizational structures, command relationships, and roles and responsibilities of personnel operating interrogation facilities.

d. Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General revise, and the G2 establish, policy to clearly define the organizational structures, command relationships, and roles and responsibilities of personnel operating interrogation facilities.

e. Recommendation: The G3 direct the incorporation of integrated Military Police and Military Intelligence detainee operations into field training exercises, home station and mobilization site training, and combat training center rotations.

f. Recommendation: TRADOC and G2 ensure documentation of unit organizations meet interrogator personnel manning requirements, authorizations, and capabilities in order to provide commanders with timely intelligence.

g. Recommendation: The CFLCC contracting officer representative ensure enough Category II interpreters are hired to support timely intelligence exploitation of detainees.

h. Recommendation: TRADOC continue the integration of the G2X/S2X Battle Staff Course for all Military Intelligence officers assigned to G2X/S2X positions.

i. Recommendation: TRADOC integrate additional training on the collection and analysis of HUMINT into the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course program of instruction.

j. Recommendation: TRADOC, in coordination with G2 and TJAG, revise doctrine to identify interrogation approach techniques that are acceptable, effective and legal for noncompliant detainees.

k. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 ensure that standardized policy on interrogation approach techniques are received, understood, trained and enforced by all units.

5. Chapter 5, Other Observations

a. Recommendation: CFLCC, CJTF-7, and CJTF-180 continue to stress the importance of positive unit morale and command climate.

b. Recommendation: TRADOC revise doctrine for the administrative processing of detainees to improve accountability, movement, and disposition in a non-linear battlespace. And further examine processes for capturing and validating lessons learned in order to rapidly modify doctrine and incorporate into training application for Soldiers and units.

c. Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General revise policy for the administrative processing of detainees to improve accountability, movement, and disposition in a non-linear battlespace.

d. Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General, in coordination with the G2, update detainee policy to specifically address the administration, internment/resettlement, and intelligence exploitation in a non-linear battlespace, enabling commanders to better manage resources, ensure safe and secure custodial environments, and improve intelligence gathering.

e. Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 update the Military Police force structure at the division level and below to support the simultaneous execution of detainee operations and other battlefield missions.

f. Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 update the Military Intelligence force structure at the division level and below to integrate the requirement for detainee operations that allows for timely intelligence exploitation.

g. Recommendation: TRADOC update doctrine to integrate tactical interrogation at battalion and company level to assist in the intelligence exploitation of detainees immediately upon capture.

h. Recommendation: CFLCC submit a Request for Forces for the Theater Detainee Reporting Branch Center (TDRC) to meet the requirements for reporting and accountability of detainees and their property.

i. Recommendation: The Provost Marshal General review the TDRC process, structure, and employment methods for maintaining information on detainees, their property, and other related requirements within an assigned theater of operations and consider the development of an information technology solution.

j. Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 continue to refine and implement the force structure changes in the Military Intelligence - Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Update.

k. Recommendation: TRADOC integrate the Military Intelligence-Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence Force Design Updates into the development of Units of Action and Units of Employment.

l. Recommendation: TRADOC and G3 continue to refine and implement the force structure changes in the Military Police - Internment/Resettlement Battalion Force Design Update.

m. Recommendation: TRADOC integrate this Force Design Update into the development of Units of Action and Units of Employment.

n. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 ensure all units meet the guidelines for minimum infrastructure standards supporting detainee operations to allow for adequate facilities to house detainees.

o. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 implement a safety inspection program for all facilities that support detainee operations to identify and eliminate hazards to Soldiers and detainees.

p. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 evaluate current living and working conditions at all facilities housing detainees and take corrective actions to improve the current living and working environment.

q. Recommendation: CJTF-7 review the physical and operations security requirements and policy/doctrinal procedures to ensure units operating internment/resettlement facilities comply with all requirements.

r. Recommendation: Force Providers require commanders to have trained and equipped field sanitation teams prior to deployment, and deployed commanders ensure field sanitation teams comply with Army policy.

s. Recommendation: TRADOC review the preventive medicine detachment force structure to ensure support to all collecting points and internment/resettlement facilities in a non-linear battlespace.

t. Recommendation: MEDCOM train all medical personnel in the preventive medicine aspects of detainee operations to ensure compliance with policy and the laws of land warfare.

u. Recommendation: MEDCOM ensure all health care personnel are trained on the medical treatment requirements for detainees in accordance with Army Regulations and ensure that units have the required medical equipment and supplies for treating detainees.

v. Recommendation: CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 evaluate current detainee medical capabilities and requirements and take corrective action to ensure detainees receive the required medical screening and care.

w. Recommendation: CJTF-7 segregate enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations.

x. Recommendation: TRADOC identify minimum equipment requirements for detainee operations to ensure successful unit mission accomplishment.

y. Recommendation: TRADOC establish and identify resource requirements for a standardized "Detainee Field Processing Kit" that will enable capturing units to properly secure and process detainees quickly, efficiently, and safely.

z. Recommendation: Commanders continue to stress the importance of planning and providing for adequate transportation assets to support continuing detainee operations.

aa. Recommendation: TRADOC integrate standardized detainee operations training into all Army proponent school common core programs of instruction and training support packages.

bb. Recommendation: The G3 integrate a prescribed detainee operations training program into unit training.

cc. Recommendation: CFLCC and Force Providers coordinate to ensure, where possible, units are aware of their assigned mission upon mobilization so they can train for their specific mission.

dd. Recommendation: FORSCOM integrate a standardized detainee operations training package as part of pre- and post- mobilization training.

ee. Recommendation: CFLCC ensure that ILO MP units are trained before they assume their ILO MP missions.

ff. Recommendation: The CFLCC contracting officer representative modify the CJTF-7 C2 Interrogation Cell Statement of Work to require civilian interrogators to be former military interrogators trained in current interrogation policy and doctrine or receive formal training in current military interrogation policy and doctrine.

gg. Recommendation: The G3, in coordination with the Office of the Judge Advocate General, mandate that Level B Law of War training have specific learning objectives, be conducted by an instructor/evaluator in a structured manner, and be presented and evaluated annually using the established training conditions and performance standards.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:39 am

PART 9 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Appendix A: References

Image

Appendix B: Acting Secretary of the Army

Directive for Assessment of Detainee Operations

10 February 2004

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

February 10, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Directive for Assessment of Detainee Operations

You are hereby directed to establish an Assessment Team to complete a Functional Analysis of the Department's internment, enemy prisoner of war, and detention policies, practices, and procedures as the Army executes its role as DOD Executive Agent for Enemy Prisoners of War and Detention Program.

When conducting this assessment, the following terms of reference apply. Use all potential Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) approaches to identify any capability shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required.

The assessment will focus on the following objectives:

a. Assess the adequacy of DOTMLPF of Army Forces for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures.

b. Determine the standards for Army Forces charged with internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures (e.g., size, equipment, standardization, and training).

c. Assess current and future organizations and structures for Army Forces responsible for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

d. Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.

You are authorized to task the Army Staff and subordinate headquarters for those resources needed to ensure accomplishment of the detainee operations assessment. You are further authorized access to locations, documents, and personnel across the Army in order to complete your assessment. Coordinate with other Services for assistance, documentation, and information that may assist in completing this assessment.

You will provide me with a report at the conclusion of the assessment.

This assessment is exempt for the HQDA Short Notice Tasking Policy Message, dated 031353Z Jan 01, requiring units to be notified 180 days from execution of tasking and the HQDA memorandum dated January 27, 2004, subject: Travel [Restriction] to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Qatar which requires my approval to travel to these countries.

R.L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Appendix C: Locations Visited

February 2004 (CONUS)

JRTC MRX (39th Separate Brigade) (Pre-Inspection)
NTC MRX (81st Separate Brigade) (Pre-Inspection)

March 2004 (Afghanistan)

Bagram (CJTF 180 and 237th MP BN)
Khandahar (274th MP CO, 805th MP CO, and 1/10th MTN DIV)
Gheresk (ODA 312)
Khost (1/501st Parachute Infantry Regiment)

March-April 2004 (Iraq)

Baghdad (CJTF 7, Camp Cropper, Camp Slayer, 1st AD Division Collecting
Point, 2/1st AD Brigade Collecting Point)
Camp Bucca (160th MP BN)
Abu Ghraib (504th MI BDE)
Ar Ramadi (1/1st ID Brigade Collecting Point)
Brassfield-Mora (2/1st ID Brigade Collecting Point)
Tikrit (1st ID Division Collecting Point)
Mosul (MND-N Collecting Point and 3/2nd ID Brigade Collecting Point, Battalion
Collecting Point)

March-April 2004 (Kuwait)

Camp Doha (CFLCC)
Arifjan (2/4th ID)

March-April 2004 (CONUS)

Fort Dix (310th MP BN and 320th MP BN; at two different times)
Fort Hood (4th ID and 720th MP BN)
Fort Bragg (2/82nd ABN DIV and USASOC SERE Course)
Fort Campbell (3/101st ABN DIV)
Fort Meade (HHC 400th MP BDE)
Owings Mill, MD (433rd MP CO)

June 2004 (CONUS)

Fort Leonard Wood (MP School)
Fort Huachuca (MI School)
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 3:43 am

PART 10 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)

Appendix D: Inspection Tools

1. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:

a. C-4/J-4/G-4


1). Concerning logistical operations, what is your role in the support of (Theater/Division) Detainee Operations?

2). Describe priority of support for Detainee Operations. How does this compete with your other mission requirements? Is the Priority of Support in SOPs, OPORDs/FRAGOs?

3). Describe how subordinate units plan and procure logistical support for Detainee Operations. (Include: transportation, sundry items, subsistence, organizational, and NBC clothing and equipment items, mail collection and distribution, laundry, and bath equipment) Have you ever coordinated for transportation to evacuate Detainees out of the AOR? Who approved the transfer?

4). What are some of the services being contracted out/outsourced to support Detainee Operations in Theater? Are there any issues concerning contracting or budget that you are aware of that impact Detainee Operations? If so, what are they? Who oversees the contracts that support Detainee Operations and where can we find out who the Army Representatives are (CORs)?

5). Are you aware of any Home Station Training that subordinate Combat Service Support units conducted prior to deployment to help them prepare for Detainee Operations? (To include collection point activities, etc) Can you describe it?

6). Have you had the opportunity to personally visit each of the Internment Facilities to determine if units have the necessary support and supplies to run their facilities? If so, what did you find? How about division and brigade Collection Points?

7). What are your challenges/issues in providing daily food rations in sufficient quantity, quality and variety to keep Detainees in good health and IAW with their cultural requirements? What is the schedule for feeding and what are they being fed? Please elaborate.

8). How do Detainees receive fresh potable water in your area of responsibility? (Bottled water, Lister bags, running water--if so, is it potable)

9). What procedures are in place to account for and dispose of captured enemy supplies and equipment?

10). What are your biggest issues concerning adequate facilities for Detainees (tents, cots, etc)?

11). What are your biggest issues concerning logistical support for Detainee Operations?

12). What do you perceive to be doctrinal logistic shortcomings pertaining to Detainee Operations and how would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine/accomplish differently? How about Force Structure of logistical units that ensures Detainee Operations can be successfully accomplished? What are the shortcomings and how do we fix at the Army-level?

13). Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

14). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

15). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

16). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater

17). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

18). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

19). I am _______ (grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

20). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

21). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

22). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

23). How could the incident have been prevented?

24). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

25). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

26). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

b. PROVOST MARSHAL

1). What references/standards/publications/SOPs do you use to conduct Detainee Operations?

2). What is the C2 structure/organization of internment facilities across Theater? How many internment facilities under U.S. Military Control, do you oversee? How many divisional Central Collection Points? How about Brigade Forward Collection Points? What MP units in Theater operate internment facilities and where are they positioned? (Battalion and Above) Describe the essential organizational requirements to run an internment facility. (Organizational Elements, Manning, Facilities, Equipment) Do you have what you need to accomplish the mission? If not, explain?

3). How do you ensure the units operating these locations/facilities are complying with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and AR 190-8?

4). Are detainees being employed to work? What are the General policy and procedures for the Employment and Compensation of Detainees?

5). Is there a policy on the ratio of guards to Detainees in Theater? If so, what is it? Is this standard being met? If not, what is the shortfall and how are units meeting the challenge to overcome the shortfall?

6). What is your detainee segregation policy? ((EPWs, Females, Juveniles, Civilian Internees (to include those that are security threats, those that are hostile to coalition forces, and possible HTD/HVD, and Retained Persons, Criminals, etc.)) What can you tell me about the categories of Detainees that you are holding? What are they and what are the definitions of the different categories that your organizations detain? How are you organized to handle the different categories of Detainees (EPW, CI, HVD, OD, and refugees?)

7). What is the minimum living space standard for each Detainee? How is it determined and who set the provisions of minimum living space for internment facilities? (when possible, consult the preventative medicine authority in theater for provisions of minimum living space and sanitary facilities). Has a preventative medicine expert given advice on this?

8). Do you use Military Working Dogs (MWD) within internment facilities?

9). How does the command ensure that Detainee Operations is conducted is in compliance with the international Law of war? (OPORD/FRAGO, ROE, Interrogation Techniques, general orders, humane treatment, etc)

10). What is the current policy to grant conditional access to the International Red Cross/Crescent to Detainees? Has this always been the policy? Are they the only NGOs that have conditional access? If not, who are the other organizations?

11). What is your responsibility to the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC)? What is your relationship with the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC)? To the best of your knowledge, when were these centers stood up? Describe the Detainee Reporting System? (Software used, Data Base Management, Data Validation, Contingencies, Security and Privacy, etc.) Who has access?

12). What are the policies and procedures for US Forces transferring detainees to other Coalition Forces/Host Nation Forces? Has this been done?

13). What are the procedures that allow other United States Government Agencies (OGA) access and control to Detainees for the purpose of interrogations? What is the process for transfer and accountability of the Detainee? Does the commander of each internment facility have approval authority to transfer to OGAs? How much notice do they have to provide the chain of command for access or request for transfer? Do the same procedures apply when Military Intelligence personnel request access and control?

14). Describe the screening /background checks required prior to hiring interpreters. Are they trusted by U.S. Soldiers?

15). What are your biggest issues concerning adequate facilities for Detainees?

16). Since you have been in your position, what Detention facilities/locations have you visited and inspected for compliance with law, policy, and regulations? What were the results and findings? Can we get copies of your results?

17). What procedures are in place when a detainee in U S custody dies?

18). What do you perceive to be doctrinal Military Police shortcomings pertaining to Detainee Operations and how would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine/accomplish differently? How does your doctrinal law enforcement mission suffer? How about Force Structure of Military Police units that ensures Detainee Operations can be successfully accomplished? What are the shortcomings and how do we fix at the Army-level?

19). Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

20). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

21). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

22). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater

23). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

24). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial

25). I am _______ (grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

26). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

27). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

28). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

29). How could the incident have been prevented?

30). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

31). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

32). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

c. RED CROSS

1). Which US Military Controlled Internment Facilities have you visited? What did you find?

2). Have you visited any Collection Points in US Army areas? Which ones and what did you find?

3). How often are the US Army collection points/internment facilities inspected? What is the make-up of the team? (Prev Med, Doctors, Psychiatrists/Psychologists, etc) What, specifically do you inspect? What do you do with the results of the inspections? Are the appropriate commanders taking the necessary actions to correct the shortcomings noted during your monthly medical inspections? Have you observed any recurring deficiencies during your inspections? Have you noted improvements and if so, what are the improvements? In what areas can we make improvements and what are those?

4). How often do you or your staff conduct routine medical inspections (examinations) of detainees under US Military control? What does the medical evaluation consist of? What is the purpose of the medical examination? How are the results recorded/reported?

5). Does every US Military Controlled Internment Facility have an infirmary? How adequate is the medical care to the detainees? (Are Retained Persons used?) Do you know of any detainees being denied medical treatment or delayed medical attention? If so, why?

6). Do detainees at US Military Controlled Internment Facilities have access to personal hygiene products?

7). Have you noticed any markings and/or injuries on a detainee at a US Military Controlled Internment Facility that might lead you to believe the detainee was being abused? Did you bring this to the attention of the Facility Commander? Do you know what he did with the information?

8). Are detainees in US Military Controlled Internment Facilities segregated by nationality, language, rank, and sex? Do detainees have the ability to practice their religion? Are detainees able to send and receive mail?

9). Can you describe the living conditions at US Military Controlled Internment Facilities? (Sanitary conditions, heat during the winter, shelter for rain, fire prevention measures, latrines, sleep areas, etc)

10). How do the detainees get fresh water? What kind of meals are they being fed? Do they get enough food?

11). Overall, how do you feel detainees are being treated at US Military Controlled Internment Facilities? What systemic weaknesses have you identified?

d. SJA

1). What specific measures has the commander/unit taken to ensure compliance with the Law of War regarding detainee operations? Individual training events? When? Collective/unit training events? When?

2). What is the minimum standard of treatment that the US must provide any detainee? What policies/procedures do units have in place to support the U. S. General Protection policy relative to the treatment of Detainees in the custody of the US forces?

3). What specific measures did the unit take prior to arrival in the AOR to ensure that subordinate leaders and soldiers know and understand how to treat, handle, and process detainees properly? Do leaders and Soldiers know and understand how to apply Detainee Operations doctrine and standards when they arrive in the AOR? Can you provide some examples.

4). How is the issue of classification of detainees being handled? Are any Article 5 tribunals being held or is there a presumption that the insurgents clearly do not meet the Article 4 GC III EPW criteria (commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, wearing fixed distinctive sign, carrying arms openly, conducting operations in accordance with the laws of war)?

5). Did units receive training on the reporting of Detainee abuse? When did this training occur last and how often is it conducted by the units? Are units reporting Detainee abuse? What is happening to individuals who abuse Detainees? How many cases of detainee abuse have you heard of and or processed since you have been in country? At what point in the detention process are most of the abuses occurring? (point of capture, initial collection point, by guards at internment facility, by interrogators)

6). What control measures are units using to maintain detainee discipline and security in each internment facility/collection point?

7). What are the procedures you follow if you personally notice or if it is reported to you that a detainee is injured and you suspect the detainee has been abused? What training has the unit received regarding reporting procedures for detainee abuse?

8). What are the procedures if a detainee in U.S. custody dies?

9). What are the Theater guidelines for any EPW, CI, and RP claims against the U.S. Government?

10). (Internment facility Judge Advocate only) What is the procedure if an EPW or detainee wants to make a complaint or requests to the camp commander regarding conditions of their internment? How are Detainees complaints and requests to the camp commander processed?

11). Have any detainees refused repatriation? If so, what happened to them?

12). What happens when a detainee is suspected of, or is known to have committed a serious offense while they are being interned at either the collection point or detention facility? Describe the due process available to detainees and rights of the detainee suspected of committing a serious offense. Have you or any Staff Judge Advocate provided legal advice to a detainee who might have committed an offense?

13). What is your feeling on how Detainees are being treated? What do you feel is the primary focus/purpose of detainee operations. (force protection, punishment, rehabilitation, protection, merely a regulatory/legal requirement) No standard. Personnel observations and feelings.

14). What AARs or lessons learned have you written or received regarding detainee operations? Can I get a copy?

15). What do you perceive to be doctrinal legal shortcomings pertaining to Detainee Operations and how would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine/accomplish differently? How about Force Structure of Staff Judge Advocate to ensure Detainee Operations can be successfully accomplished? What are the shortcomings and how do we fix the problem at the Army- level?

16). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

17). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

18). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater?

19). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

20). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

21). I am _______(grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

22). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

23). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

24). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

25). How could the incident have been prevented?

26). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

27). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

28). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

e. STAFF ENGINEER (DIVISION & ABOVE)

1). Describe facilities' infrastructure overall that support Detainee Operations. (Sewer, water distribution, storm drainage, electrical distribution, HVAC systems, and lighting, etc.) What are the problems concerning existing facilities and what is being done to fix?

2). What program is in place in Theater that allows for the maintenance and repair of facilities that house Detainees and their supporting facilities?

3). Are the Corps of Engineers involved in any facility upgrades/improvements in Theater for Detainees? If so, what are some ongoing projects? Can I get a list by Project Number? Who is your POC in USACE? What do you know of the Engineer Corps’ Theater Construction Management System (TCSM). Were you aware that they have plans, specifications, and materiel requirements for Internment Facilities based on Detainee population?

4). Do you have any knowledge as to why U.S. Forces chose existing facilities rather than to use the Theater Construction Management System (TCSM) and build facilities elsewhere? (How and why were facilities picked as Long Term Detention Facilities?)

5). What is your role in determining provisions of minimum living space for Detention Facilities across the AOR? (when possible, consult the preventative medicine authority in theater for provisions of minimum living space and sanitary facilities). What is the minimum living space standard for each Detainee? Has a preventative medicine expert given advice on this?

6). Do engineer officers train and supervise internal and external labor for Detention Facilities? (construction and repair of detention facilities)? If so, describe the work ((construction, maintenance, repair, and operation of utilities (water, electricity, heat, and sanitation.))

7). Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

8). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

9). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

10). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater?

11). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

12). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

13). I am _______(grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

14). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

15). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents

16). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

17). How could the incident have been prevented?

18). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

19). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

20). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

f. MI BDE/BN CDR/S-3/CO CDR/1SG

1). (All) What is your overall role in detainee operation process? What involvement do you have in the interrogation process of detainee operations? Do you provide a means to validate detainee's information? Do you provide input as to the disposition of the detainee?

2). (All) What references/standards/publications/SOPs do you use to conduct interrogation Operations?

3). (All) Did your soldiers undergo Level B Law of War training prior to deployment? Explain what training occurred. Is there a plan to train new Soldiers (replacements) to the unit? Did this training include the treatment of Detainees? Explain.

4). (All) What training have you received to ensure your knowledge of DO is IAW the provisions under the Geneva Convention?

5). (All) What Home Station/Mob Site Training did your unit conduct prior to deployment to help your unit prepare for Detainee/interrogation Operations? Describe it. How did the training prepare you to conduct Detainee/interrogation Operations for this deployment? How did this training distinguish between the different categories of Detainees (EPWs, RPs, CIs, etc.)?

6). (All) What training did your unit receive on the established Rules of Engagement (ROE)? How often does this occur? Does this training include Rules of Interaction (ROI)?

7). (All) What procedures are in place to ensure your Soldiers do not violate the rules of engagement for the interment facility/collection point?

8). (All) What guidance or policies are there to ensure fraternization is not taking place between U.S. military personnel and the detainees?

9). (All) How does the command ensure that interrogation Operations is conducted in compliance with the international Law of war? (OPORD/FRAGO, ROE, Interrogation Techniques, general orders, humane treatment, etc)

10). (All) Have you personally visited each of the interrogation Facilities to determine if your unit has the necessary support and supplies to run their facilities? If so, what did you find?

11). (All) What control measures are you using to maintain discipline and security within the interrogation facility?

12). (BN/CO Cdr) Are you receiving sufficient information from the capture paperwork to properly conduct screenings and interrogations? Are the current requirements for documentation of a captured person sufficient or excessive? Did the changes in procedures as far as documenting captured person improve your ability to gather intelligence?

13). (BN/CO Cdr) What are the procedures for the transfer of custody of Detainees from the MP/Guard personnel to Military Intelligence personnel? When the detainee is returned to the guard force, what procedures occur?

14). (CO Cdr/BN S3) Describe the screening /background checks required prior to hiring interpreters. Are they trusted by U.S. Soldiers?

15). (All) Do counterintelligence agents conduct interrogations of detainees? What training have they received for conducting interrogations? What is their understanding of the laws of war as it pertains to interrogating detainees?

16). (All) What do you perceive to be doctrinal shortcomings pertaining to Interrogation Operations? How would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine/accomplish differently? How about Force Structure to ensure Interrogation Operations can be successfully accomplished? What are the shortcomings and how do we fix the problem at the Army-level?

17). (All) What are the procedures if a detainee in U.S. custody dies?

18). (All) Do you know of the procedures to get stress counseling (Psychiatrist, Chaplain, Medical)? Do your Soldiers know of the procedures to get counseling (Psychiatrist, Chaplain, Medical)?

19). (All) Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

20). (All) Do your subordinates know the reporting procedures if they observe or become aware of a Detainee being abused?

21). (All) What steps would you take if a subordinate reported to you an incident of alleged Detainee abuse?

22). (All) Do you feel you can freely report an incident of alleged Detainee abuse outside Command channels (IG, CID)

23). (All) What procedures do you have to report suspected detainee abuse (IG, CID, Next Level Commander)

24). (All) What procedures are in place for Detainees to report alleged abuse?

25). (All) What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

26). (All) Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

27). (All) Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater?

28). (All) Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

29). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

30). I am _______(grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

31). (All) Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

32). (All) Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

33). (All) Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

34). (All) How could the incident have been prevented?

35). (All) Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

36). (All) What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

37). (All) What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

g. MP BDE COMMANDER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1). What references/standards/publications/SOPs do you require your subordinates to use for Detainee Operations?

2). What MP units under your command operate US military controlled Internment Facilities? (Battalion and Company) How many Internment Facilities under U.S. Military Control, do you operate? Where are they positioned across the Theater? Have you visited any of DIV /BDE Collection Points?

3). What are the policies on the establishment of Internment facilities? How do you ensure the units are operating these locations/facilities under the provisions of the Geneva Convention and AR 190-8(ROE, Interrogation Techniques, general orders, humane treatment, etc)?

4). Are your operations employing detainees for work? If so, what are the General policy and procedures for the Employment and Compensation of Detainees?

5). Is there (or do you have) a policy on the ratio of guards to Detainees? If so, what is it? Is this standard being met? If not, what is the shortfall and how are your units managing the challenge?

6). What is your detainee segregation policy?

7). What is the minimum living space standard for each Detainee? Who set the provisions of minimum living space for Internment Facilities? (when possible, consult the preventative medicine authority in theater for provisions of minimum living space and sanitary facilities). Has a preventative medicine expert given advice on this?

8). Are the Corps of Engineers involved in any facility upgrades/improvements in Theater for Detainees? If so, what are some ongoing projects? What do you know of the Engineer Corps’ Theater Construction Management System (TCSM). Were you aware that they have plans, specifications, and materiel requirements for Internment Facilities based on Detainee population?

9). Do you use Military Working Dogs (MWD) within detention facilities?

10). What is the current policy to grant conditional access to the International Red Cross/Crescent to Detainees? Has this always been the policy? Are they the only NGOs that have conditional access? If not, who are the other organizations?

11). Explain how medical information is kept on each individual Detainee?

12). What is your responsibility to the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC)? What is your relationship with the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC)? To the best of your knowledge, when were these centers stood up? Describe the Detainee Reporting System? (Software used, Data Base Management, Data Validation, Contingencies, Security and Privacy, etc.) Who has access?

13). When are Detainees assigned Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) (from point of capture to internment? Are there any reasons why Detainees would not be assigned ISNs?

14). What are the policies and procedures for US Forces transferring detainees to other Coalition Forces/Host Nation Forces? Has this been done?

15). What are the procedures that allow other United States Government Agencies (OGA) access to Detainees? Who is the approval authority? How much notice do they have to provide the chain of command? Do Detainees ever leave U.S. Military Control for interrogation? How about U.S. Military Police control to MI control? What is the process for turnover and accountability of the Detainee? What happens if a detainee is returned to U.S. Military Control from an OGA, and it is determined that abuse has occurred?

16). How are interpreters (linguists/translators) integrated within the Detainee Detention system (within each facility)?

17). What are your biggest issues concerning logistical, contractor, and interpreter support for Detainee Operations?

18). What are your biggest issues concerning adequate facilities for Detainees?

19). Can you describe the in-processing actions required for Detainees? What are some of the reasons that Detainees are not accepted to the internment facility? Are capturing units/subordinate units properly processing Detainees? If not, what are they doing wrong? Is it administrative in nature or in the physically handling of Detainees?

20). What is the process to account for and dispose of weapons and contraband confiscated from Detainees? What happens to personal property? (Is it disposed of/tagged along with the Detainee and is it stored properly and accounted for?) Why is the DD Form 2745 (Capture Tag) not being used? What are units using in lieu of (if any)? ((Detainee Capture Card found in draft MTTP, Detainee Ops—this card does not require near as much data as DD 2745 (). The CPA Apprehension Form helps offset the lack of info on the Detainee, however it is usually filled out in a single copy (not the 3 required))) Who decided on the use of the Coalition Provisional Authority Apprehension Form and why?

21). Does the current force structure meet the requirements to run Internment Facilities? If not why? What recommendations can you can you provide? Do your units have what they need to accomplish the mission (personnel/equipment) without additional support? If not, explain? What do you perceive to be doctrinal shortcomings pertaining to Detainee Operations and how would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine and accomplish differently?

22). What is the ROE concerning Detainees? How do you ensure that this ROE is being followed and understood by all Soldiers in your command that have any contact with Detainees? What is the policy to train on the established Rules of Engagement (ROE)? How often does this occur? Does this training include Rules of Interaction (ROI)?

23). What procedures are in place when a detainee in U S custody dies?

24). What are the procedures for repatriation?

25). What religious activities are permitted?

26). Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

27). Do your subordinates know the reporting procedures if they observe or become aware of a Detainee being abused?

28). What steps would you take if a subordinate reported to you an incident of alleged Detainee abuse?

29). Do you feel you can freely report an incident of alleged Detainee abuse outside Command channels (IG, CID)?

30). What procedures do you have to report suspected detainee abuse (IG, CID, Next Level Commander)?

31). What procedures are in place for Detainees to report alleged abuse?

32). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

33). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

34). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater?

35). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

36). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

37). I am _______(grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

38). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

39). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

40). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

41). How could the incident have been prevented?

42). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

43). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

44). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?

h. CDR/OIC & SGM/NCOIC INTERNMENT FACILITY

1). Can you tell me what basic publications you use for Detainee Operations (doctrine and standards)?

2). What standards were used in establishing this facility?

3). What procedures do you have in place to ensure Soldiers and leaders understand the use of force and rules of engagement for the interment facility?

4). How did you prepare yourself and your junior leaders to become familiar with and understand the applicable regulations, OPORDS/FRAGOs, directives, international laws and administrative procedures to operate an I/R facility?

5). How did Home Station/Mob Site Training prepare you to conduct Detainee Operations at this facility? What training have you and your Soldiers received to ensure your knowledge of DO is IAW the Geneva Convention and DoD/Army policy? (Did this include Law of War and treatment of Detainees training.)?

6). Describe the training the guard force received to prepare them for their duties.

7). How does your unit conduct sustainment training for Detainee Operations or training for newly assigned personnel? When did your unit last conduct this training?

8). Describe some of the basic operations of the camp relating to detainee segregation, captured medical/religious personnel, feeding, sanitation, etc? Where do you maintain copies of the Geneva Convention around the facility? (Is it posted in the detainee’s home language within the facilities)? Are camps segregating Detainees by nationality, language, rank, and sex? How are captured Medical personnel and Chaplains being used in the camps? What provisions are in place for the receipt and distribution of Detainee correspondence/mail? Are the daily food rations sufficient in quantity or quality and variety to keep detainees in good health? Are personal hygiene items and needed clothing being supplied to the Detainees? Are the conditions within the camp sanitary enough to ensure a clean and healthy environment free from disease and epidemics? Is there an infirmary located within the camp?

9). How are you organized to handle the different categories of personnel (EPW, CI, OD, females, JVs, and refuges)? How about female Detainees? How and where do you house them? Do you maintain a separate site for sick or wounded Detainees? If so where is it and how does your unit maintain the security and safeguarding of Detainees there?

10). Describe the procedures you use when you inprocess a detainee. (CPA Forces Apprehension Form, two sworn statements, EPW tag, where do you store Detainees' confiscated personal affects (if any) and how are they accounted for (are they tagged with DD Form 2745)? How is evidence tagged? What procedures are in place to dispose of captured enemy supplies and equipment?) How is the transfer of Detainees handled between different services and Other Governmental Organizations?

11). Where do you store Detainees' confiscated personal affects (if any) and how are they accounted for? (Are they tagged with DD Form 2745)?

12). What are the procedures for the interrogation/questioning of Detainees?

13). What are the procedures for the transfer of custody of Detainees from the MP/Guard personnel to Military Intelligence personnel? When the detainee is returned to the guard force, what procedures occur? (what info is passed on to the Guard Force (type of reward?)?…Observation report, paper trail audit)

14). What control measures do you use to maintain discipline and security in the facility?

15). What MP units (guards, escort, detachments) do you have at your disposal to operate and maintain this internment facility? Do you have any shortages? How do these shortages impact your mission? What non-MP units are you using to help operate this facility? Do you have any shortages? How do these shortages impact your mission?

16). What kind of security lighting do you have that ensures you have a safe and secure operation at night? How do you provide heat to detainees during the winter? What fire prevention/safety measures do you have?

17). Are you employing detainees for work? What are the General policy and procedures for the Employment and Compensation of Detainees?

18). What type of Medical assets are present in support of medical treatment of detainees?

19). What kind of stress counseling do you provide to Soldiers/Guards?

20). Are Detainees allowed to practice their religion? Is there a chaplain available to minister to the detainees? Is the chaplain a Retained Personnel, US Forces, or a civilian?

21). Describe the latrine facilities for Detainees' use (do they have access to it day and night and does it conform to the rules of hygiene and do females have separate facilities). How are they cleaned and how often and by whom? Where do they bathe and conduct other personal hygiene (this will depend how long it takes to evacuate Detainees to U.S. Military Controlled Detention Facilities--12 hours is the standard)?

22). Describe how the unit plans and procures logistical support to include: transportation, subsistence, organizational, and NBC clothing and equipment items, mail collection and distribution, laundry, and bath equipment ISO DO. What logistical support do you receive to run this Facility? What types of supplies is greater in-demand for the unit during detainee operations? What are your shortfalls?

23). How do the Detainees receive fresh water (Bottled water or Lister bag)?

24). What personnel or equipment USR shortages are affecting your ability to perform detainee operations?

25). What do you perceive to be doctrinal shortcomings pertaining to Detainee Operations and how would you fix/incorporate into updated doctrine/accomplish differently? How about Force Structure to ensure Detainee Operations can be successfully accomplished? What are the shortcomings and how do we fix the problem at the Army-level?

26). What are the procedures if an EPW or RP in U.S. custody dies?

27). What AARs or lessons learned have you written or received regarding detainee operations? Can I get a copy?

28). Are you aware of your requirement to report abuse or suspected abuse of detainees?

29). Do your subordinates know the reporting procedures if they observe or become aware of a Detainee being abused?

30). What steps would you take if a subordinate reported to you an incident of alleged Detainee abuse?

31). Do you feel you can freely report an incident of alleged Detainee abuse outside Command channels (IG, CID)?

32). What procedures do you have to report suspected detainee abuse (IG, CID, Next Level Commander)?

33). What procedures are in place for Detainees to report alleged abuse?

34). What do you perceive as the mission of your unit? Describe the importance of your role in that mission.

35). Describe your working environment and living conditions since being in Theater.

36). Describe the unit command climate and Soldier morale. Has it changed or evolved since you have been in Theater?

37). Are you aware of any incidences of detainee or other abuse in your unit?

38). ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS (For military personnel)

The text of Article 31 provides as follows a. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. b. No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. c. No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. d. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement, may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

39). I am _______(grade, if any, and name), a member of the (DAIG). I am part of a team inspecting detainee operations, this is not a criminal investigation. I am reading you your rights because of a statement you made causes me to suspect that you may have committed ________________. (specify offense, i.e. aggravated assault, assault, murder). Under Article 31, you have the right to remain silent, that is, say nothing at all. Any statement you make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. You have the right to consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You have the right to military legal counsel free of charge. In addition to military counsel, you are entitled to civilian counsel of your own choosing, at your own expense. You may request a lawyer at any time during this interview. If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights? Do you want a lawyer? (If the answer is yes, cease all questions at this point). Are you willing to answer questions?

40). Describe what you understand happened leading up to and during the incident(s) of abuse.

41). Describe Soldier morale, feelings and emotional state prior to and after these incidents?

42). Was this incident reported to the chain of command? How, when & what was done? What would you have done?

43). How could the incident have been prevented?

44). Describe any unit training or other programs that you are aware of that teach leaders and Soldiers how to recognize and resolve combat stress.

45). What measures are in place to boost morale or to relieve stress?

46). What measures could the command enact to improve the morale and command climate of your unit?
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