PART 1 OF 22 (The Mikolashek Report)
The Mikolashek Report
Department of the Army
The Inspector General
Detainee Operations Inspection
21 July 2004
Table of Contents
• Executive Summary
• Chapter 1 - Background and Inspection Concept
• Chapter 2 - Inspection Methodology
• Chapter 3 - Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees
• Chapter 4 - Interrogation Operations
• Chapter 5 - Other Observations
• Chapter 6 - Summary of Recommendations
• Appendix A - References
• Appendix B - Assessment Directive
• Appendix C - Locations Visited
• Appendix D - Inspection Tools
• Appendix E - Standards
• Appendix F- Abbreviations and Acronyms
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310
JUL 21, 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
SUBJECT: Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection Report on Detainee Operations
I approve the Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection Report on Detainee Operations dated 21 July 2004.
I direct:
a. As an exception to policy, the unclassified portion of this report be released, without redactions, through posting on the Army website.
b. Findings and recommendations concerning Central Command be forwarded through the Joint Staff to Central Command for consideration.
c. The Director of the Army Staff task the appropriate Army Staffs and major Army commands with implementing the recommendations specified in the inspection report and then track their compliance.
d. The Department of the Army Inspector General disseminate the inspection report to the Army leadership.
R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army
FOREWORD
This inspection report responds to the Acting Secretary of the Army's 10 February 2004 directive to conduct a functional analysis of the Army's conduct of detainee and interrogation operations to identify any capability shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required.
Based on this inspection:
• the overwhelming majority of our leaders and Soldiers understand the requirement to treat detainees humanely and are doing so.
• we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. These incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline.
• the current operational environment demands that we adapt; our Soldiers are adapting; so we must also adapt our doctrine, organization, and training.
We examined the two key components of detainee operations: the capture, security and humane treatment of the detainees; and the conduct of interrogation operations in order to gain useful intelligence. While we did not find any systemic failures that directly led to the abusive situations we reviewed, we have made recommendations to improve the effectiveness of detainee operations.
We found that Soldiers are conducting operations under demanding, stressful, and dangerous conditions against an enemy who does not follow the Geneva Conventions. They are in an environment that puts a tremendous demand on human intelligence, particularly, at the tactical level where contact with the enemy and the people are most intense. They do understand their duty to treat detainees humanely and in accordance with laws of land warfare. These Soldiers understand their obligation to report incidents of abuse when they do occur, and they do so. Our leaders have been developed, trained and educated to adapt to the environment in which they find themselves. They understand their tasks, conditions and standards. The conditions of the current operations have caused them to adapt their tactics, techniques and procedures within their capabilities to accommodate this operational environment.
Expanding our doctrine to provide commanders flexibility and adaptability within well-defined principles will better enable them to conduct these operations. Our training and education systems at the individual, unit, and institutional levels must continue to be thorough and realistically simulate the intensity of the environment in which we now operate.
While the primary purpose of this inspection was not to examine specific incidents of abuse, we did analyze reported incidents to determine their root or fundamental causes. To provide a context for the incidents, we noted that an estimated 50,000 individuals were detained for at least some period of time by U.S. Forces during the conduct of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S. Forces’ contact with the local populace at checkpoints, on patrols, and in other situations increases the number of contacts well in excess of this 50,000 estimate. As of 9 June 2004, there were 94 cases of confirmed or possible abuse of any type, which include, theft, physical assault, sexual assault, and death.
The abuses that have occurred are not representative of policy, doctrine, or Soldier training. These abuses should be viewed as what they are - unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals, and in some cases, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate supervision and leadership. These actions, while regrettable, are aberrations when compared to the actions of fellow Soldiers who are serving with distinction.
Executive Summary: Detainee Operations
1. Background: On 10 February 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to conduct an assessment of detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to satisfy this directive, the DAIG inspected internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inspection focused on the adequacy of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), standards, force structure, and policy in support of these types of operations.
This inspection was not an investigation of any specific incidents or units but rather a comprehensive review of how the Army conducts detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The DAIG did not inspect the U.S. military corrections system or operations at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base during this inspection. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense HUMINT Services (DHS) operations were not inspected.
2. Purpose: Conduct a functional analysis of the Army’s internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures, policies, and practices based on current Department of Defense and Army policies and doctrine. The inspection is to identify any capability and systemic shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required.
3. Concept: Two teams conducted inspections of 26 locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Continental United States (CONUS). The CONUS team consisted of seven personnel, including augmentees, and visited 10 locations while the OCONUS team consisted of nine personnel, including augmentees, and inspected 16 locations. We interviewed and surveyed over 650 leaders and Soldiers spanning the ranks from Private to Major General. We also reviewed 103 reports of allegations of abuse from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and 22 unit investigations that covered the period from September 2002 to June 2004.
4. Objectives: The DAIG Team had four objectives for the inspection: war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures.
b. Determine the standards for Army Forces charged with internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures (e.g., size, equipment, standardization, and training).
c. Assess current and future organizations and structures for Army Forces responsible for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.
d. Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.
d. Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.
5. Synopsis: In the areas that we inspected, we found that the Army is accomplishing its mission both in the capture, care, and custody of detainees and in its interrogation operations. The overwhelming majority of our leaders and Soldiers understand and adhere to the requirement to treat detainees humanely and consistent with the laws of land warfare. Time and again these Soldiers, while under the stress of combat operations and prolonged insurgency operations, conduct themselves in a professional and exemplary manner.
The abuses that have occurred in both Afghanistan and Iraq are not representative of policy, doctrine, or Soldier training. These abuses were unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate monitoring, supervision, and leadership over those Soldiers. These abuses, while regrettable, are aberrations when compared to their comrades in arms who are serving with distinction.
The functional analysis of the Army’s internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures, policies, and practices can be broken down into two main functions: (1) capture, care, and control of detainees, and (2) interrogation operations.
We determined that despite the demands of the current operating environment against an enemy who does not abide by the Geneva Conventions, our commanders have adjusted to the reality of the battlefield and, are effectively conducting detainee operations while ensuring the humane treatment of detainees. The significant findings regarding the capture, care, and control of detainees are:
• All interviewed and observed commanders, leaders, and Soldiers treated detainees humanely and emphasized the importance of the humane treatment of detainees.
• In the cases the DAIG reviewed, all detainee abuse occurred when one or more individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases abuse was accompanied by leadership failure at the tactical level.
• Of all facilities inspected, only Abu Ghraib was determined to be undesirable for housing detainees because it is located near an urban population and is under frequent hostile fire, placing Soldiers and detainees at risk.
We determined that the nature of the environment caused a demand for tactical human intelligence. The demands resulted in a need for more interrogators at the tactical level and better training for Military Intelligence officers. The significant findings regarding interrogation are:
• Tactical commanders and leaders adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures, and held detainees longer than doctrinally recommended due to the demand for timely, tactical intelligence.
• Doctrine does not clearly specify the interdependent, and yet independent, roles, missions, and responsibilities of Military Police and Military Intelligence units in the establishment and operation of interrogation facilities.
• Military Intelligence units are not resourced with sufficient interrogators and interpreters, to conduct timely detainee screenings and interrogations in the current operating environment, resulting in a backlog of interrogations and the potential loss of intelligence.
• Tactical Military Intelligence Officers are not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of the collection and analysis of human intelligence.
• Officially approved CJTF-7 and CJTF-180 policies and the early CJTF-180 practices generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaty obligations and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that policies were not clear and contained ambiguities. The DAIG Team found implementation, training, and oversight of these policies was inconsistent; the Team concluded, however, based on a review of cases through 9 June 2004 that no confirmed instance of detainee abuse was caused by the approved policies.
We reviewed detainee operations through systems (Policy and Doctrine, Organizational Structures, Training and Education, and Leadership and Discipline) that influence how those operations are conducted, and have identified findings and recommendations in each. While these findings are not critical, the implementation of the corresponding recommendations will better enable our commanders to conduct detainee operations now and into the foreseeable future, decrease the possibility of abuse, and ensure we continue to treat detainees humanely.
The findings and observations from this inspection are separated into the following three chapters: Chapter 3 - Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees, Chapter 4 - Interrogation Operations, and Chapter 5 - Other Observations. A summary of the Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees and the Interrogation Operation findings is provided below.
Capture, Care, and Control of Detainees
Army forces are successfully conducting detainee operations to include the capture, care, and control of detainees. Commanders and leaders emphasized the importance of humane treatment of detainees. We observed that leaders and Soldiers treat detainees humanely and understand their obligation to report abuse. In those instances where detainee abuse occurred, individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases individual misconduct was accompanied by leadership failure to maintain fundamental unit discipline, failure to provide proper leader supervision of and guidance to their Soldiers, or failure to institute proper control processes.
We found through our interviews and observations conducted between 7 March 2004 and 5 April 2004 that leaders and Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq were determined to do what was legally and morally right for their fellow Soldiers and the detainees under their care. We found numerous examples of military professionalism, ingrained Army Values, and moral courage in both leaders and Soldiers. These leaders and Soldiers were self-disciplined and demonstrated an ability to maintain composure during times of great stress and danger. With the nature of the threat in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Soldiers are placed in extremely dangerous positions on a daily basis. They face the daily risks of being attacked by detainees, contracting communicable diseases from sick detainees, being taunted or spat upon, having urine or feces thrown upon them, and having to treat a detainee humanely who just attacked their unit or killed a fellow Soldier. Despite these challenges, the vast majority of Soldiers and other U.S. Military personnel continued to do their duty to care for detainees in a fair and humane manner.
Our review of the detainee abuse allegations attempted to identify underlying causes and contributing factors that resulted in abusive situations. We examined these from the perspective of the Policy and Doctrine, Organizational Structures, Training and Education, and Leadership and Discipline systems. We also examined them in terms of location on the battlefield and sought to determine if there was a horizontal, cross-cutting system failure that resulted in a single case of abuse or was common to all of them. Based on this inspection, we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. These incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline. We also found that our policies, doctrine, and training are being continually adapted to address the existing operational environment regarding detainee operations. Commanders adjusted existing doctrinal procedures to accommodate the realities of the battlefield. We expect our leaders to do this and they did. The Army must continue to educate for uncertain environments and develop our leaders to adapt quickly to conditions they confront on the battlefield.
Using a data cut-off of 9 June 2004 we reviewed 103 summaries of Army CID reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries conducted by the chain of command involving detainee death or allegations of abuse. These 125 reports are in various stages of completion. 31 cases have been determined that no abuse occurred; 71 cases are closed; and 54 cases are open or undetermined. Of note, the CID investigates every occurrence of a detainee death regardless of circumstances.
Recognizing that the facts and circumstances as currently known in ongoing cases may not be all-inclusive, and that additional facts and circumstances could change the categorization of a case, the Team placed each report in a category for the purposes of this inspection to understand the overall numbers and the facts currently known, and to examine for trends or systemic issues. This evaluation of allegations of abuse reports is not intended to influence commanders in the independent exercise of their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other administrative disciplinary actions. As an Inspector General inspection, this report does not focus on individual conduct, but on systems and policies.
This review indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 48% (45 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at the point of capture, where Soldiers have the least amount of control of the environment. For this inspection, the DAIG Team interpreted point of capture events as detainee operations occurring at battalion level and below, before detainees are evacuated to doctrinal division forward or central collecting points (CPs). This allowed the DAIG Team to analyze and make a determination to where and what level of possible abuse occurred. The point of capture is the location where most contact with detainees occurs under the most uncertain, dangerous, and frequently violent circumstances.
This review further indicates that as of 9 June 2004, 22% (21 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at Internment/Resettlement (I/R) facilities. This includes the highly publicized incident at Abu Ghraib. Those alleged abuse situations at I/R facilities are attributed to individual failure to abide by known standards and/or individual failure compounded by a leadership failure to enforce known standards, provide proper supervision, and stop potentially abusive situations from occurring. As of 9 June 2004, 20%, (19 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse occurred at CPs. For the remaining 10% (9 of 94) of the alleged incidents of abuse, a location could not be determined based on the CID case summaries.
The Army estimates that over 50,000 detainees have been captured or processed. While even one case of abuse is unacceptable, we conclude that given the volume of detainees and the potential for abuse in these demanding circumstances, the overwhelming majority of our Soldiers and leaders are conducting these operations with due regard for the detainees right to be treated humanely and properly.
Detainee abuse does not occur when individual Soldiers remain disciplined, follow known procedures, and understand their duty obligation to report abusive behavior. Detainee abuse does not occur when leaders of those Soldiers who deal with detainees enforce basic standards of humane treatment, provide oversight and supervision of detainee operations, and take corrective action when they see potentially abusive situations developing. Our site visits, interviews, sensing sessions, and observations indicate that the vast majority of Soldiers and leaders, particularly at the tactical level, understand their responsibility to treat detainees humanely and their duty obligation to report infractions.
We inspected I/R facilities at Bagram, Baghdad, and Camp Bucca and found only Abu Ghraib overcrowded, located near a densely populated urban area, on a dangerous main supply route, and subject to frequent hostile enemy fire from enemy mortars or rockets. The physical design of the camps within the prison was not optimal for the mission: towers were not properly placed to support overlapping fields of fire and cover blind spots; entrance/egress routes were hampered by make-shift gates; and sally ports were not used correctly. The supply of fresh water was difficult to maintain and the food quality was sub-standard. Detainees did not have access to bunkers or shelters with overhead cover to protect them from hostile enemy mortar or rocket fire from outside the walls of Abu Ghraib.
Interrogation Operations
The need for timely, tactical human intelligence is critical for successful military operations particularly in the current environment. Commanders recognized this and adapted by holding detainees longer at the point of capture and collecting points to gain and exploit intelligence. Commanders and interrogators also conducted tactical questioning to gain immediate battlefield intelligence. Commanders and leaders must set the conditions for success, and commanders, leaders, and Soldiers must adapt to the ever changing environment in order to be successful.
Of the interviewed point of capture battalion and company leaders, 61% (25 of 41) stated their units established CPs and held detainees at their locations from 12 hours up to 30 days. The primary reason units held detainees at these locations was to conduct screenings and interrogations closer to the point of capture. The result of holding detainees for longer timeframes at all locations was increased requirements in facility infrastructure, medical care, preventive medicine, trained personnel, logistics, and security. Organic unit personnel at these locations did not have the required institutional training and were therefore unaware of or unable to comply fully with Army policies in areas such as detainee processing, confinement operations, security, preventive medicine, and interrogation.
Doctrine does not clearly and distinctly address the relationship between the MP operating I/R facilities and the Military Intelligence (MI) personnel conducting intelligence exploitation at those facilities. Neither MP nor MI doctrine specifically defines the interdependent, yet independent, roles, missions, and responsibilities of the two in detainee operations. MP doctrine states MI may collocate with MP at detention sites to conduct interrogations, and coordination should be made to establish operating procedures. MP doctrine does not, however, address approved and prohibited MI procedures in an MP-operated facility. It also does not clearly establish the role of MPs in the interrogation process. Conversely, MI doctrine does not clearly explain MP internment procedures or the role of MI personnel within an internment setting. Contrary to MP doctrine, FM 34- 2, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992, implies an active role for MPs in the interrogation process: "Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings." Subordination of the MP custody and control mission to the MI need for intelligence can create settings in which unsanctioned behavior, including detainee abuse, could occur. Failure of MP and MI personnel to understand each other’s specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and procedures.
Doctrine that addresses the establishment and operation of interrogations contains inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure, and function of these facilities. At the time of the inspection there were facilities in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM that conducted intelligence exploitation as Joint Interrogation Facilities and as a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. The intelligence sections of each were uniquely structured to meet mission requirements.
Shortfalls in numbers of interrogators and interpreters, and the distribution of these assets within the battlespace, hampered human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts. Valuable intelligence—timely, complete, clear, and accurate—may have been lost as a result. Interrogators were not available in sufficient numbers to efficiently conduct screening and interrogations of the large numbers of detainees at collecting points (CPs) and internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, nor were there enough to man sufficient numbers of Tactical Human Intelligence Teams (THTs) for intelligence exploitation at points of capture. Interpreters, especially those Category II personnel authorized to participate in interrogations, were also in short supply. Units offset the shortage of interrogators with contract interrogators. While these contract interrogators provide a valuable service, we must ensure they are trained in military interrogation techniques and policy.
Due to the demand for immediate tactical intelligence, tactical intelligence officers were conducting interrogations of detainees without thorough training on the management of HUMINT analysis and collection techniques. They were not adequately trained to manage the full spectrum of HUMINT assets being used in the current operating environment. The need for these officers to understand the management of the full spectrum of HUMINT operations is a key for successful HUMINT exploitation in the current operating environment.
Current interrogation doctrine includes 17 interrogation approach techniques. Doctrine recognizes additional techniques may be applied. Doctrine emphasizes that every technique must be humane and be consistent with legal obligations. Commanders in both OEF and OIF adopted additional interrogation approach technique policies. Officially approved CJTF-180 and CJTF -7 generally met legal obligations under U.S. law, treaties and policy, if executed carefully, by trained soldiers, under the full range of safeguards. The DAIG Team found that some interrogators were not trained on the additional techniques in either formal school or unit training programs. Some inspected units did not have the correct command policy in effect at the time of inspection. Based on a review of CID case summaries as of 9 June 2004, the team was unable to establish any direct link between the proper use of an approved approach technique or techniques and a confirmed case of detainee abuse.
6. Conclusion: The Army's leaders and Soldiers are effectively conducting detainee operations and providing for the care and security of detainees in an intense operational environment. Based on this inspection, we were unable to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. This report offers 52 recommendations that are designed to improve the ability of the Army to accomplish the key tasks of detainee operations: keep the enemy off the battlefield in a secure and humane manner, and gain intelligence in accordance with Army standards.
Chapter 1: Background and Inspection Concept
1. Background: On 10 February 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to conduct an assessment of detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to satisfy the Acting Secretary of the Army's directive, the DAIG inspected internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The inspection focused on the adequacy of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), standards, force structure, and policy.
2. Inspection Concept: The detailed concept for this inspection is as follows:
a. Purpose: The purpose of this inspection was to conduct a functional analysis of detainee operations based on current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policy and doctrine.
b. Objectives:
(1) Assess the adequacy of DOTMLPF of Army Forces for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures.
(2) Determine the standards for Army Forces charged with internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures (e.g., size, equipment, standardization, and training).
(3) Assess current and future organizations and structures for Army Forces responsible for internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.
(4) Identify and recommend any changes in policy related to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations and interrogation procedures.
c. Scope: Two teams conducted inspections of 25 locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Continental United States (CONUS). The CONUS team consisted of seven personnel, including augmentees, and visited seven locations while the OCONUS team consisted of nine personnel, including augmentees, and inspected 16 locations. We interviewed and surveyed over 650 leaders and Soldiers spanning the ranks from Private to Major General. We also reviewed 103 reports of allegations of abuse from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and 22 unit investigations that cover the period of September 2002 to June 2004.
d. Focus: The inspection focused on the functional analysis of the Army's internment, enemy prisoner of war, and detention policies, practices, and procedures as the Army executes its role as the DoD Executive Agent for Enemy Prisoners of War and Detention Program. Numerous DoD Policies, Army Regulations, and Army Field Manuals provided the guiding tenets for this inspection.
e. Task Organization: Two teams from the DAIG Inspections Division, with augmentation from the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (USAMANSCEN), U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIC), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) conducted the inspection by traveling to 25 locations in CONUS and OCONUS. The composition of these teams was as follows:
f. Inspection Process:
(1) Preparation Phase: Research and Training (February - March 2004)
(2) Execution Phase: On-Site Inspections (March - April 2004)
(3) Completion Phase: Final Report Preparation (April - June 2004)
g. Inspection Locations and Schedule: See Appendix C.
h. Inspection Approach: The Inspectors General (IG) for Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), and local IGs served as coordinating agents for all DAIG inspection activities at those locations. These IGs were telephonically and electronically notified by DAIG with the Notification Memorandum and Detailed Inspection Plan that was sent to all affected Commanders/IGs on 20 February 2004.
i. Other Reports: This report mentions the Ryder Report, Miller Report, and Taguba Investigation throughout its inspection results. These two reports and investigation deal with the following: the Ryder Report is an assessment of detention and corrections operations in Iraq; the Miller Report is a classified assessment of the Department of Defense's counterterrorism interrogation and detention operations in Iraq; and the Taguba Investigation is a classified investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 into the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade's detention and internment operations.
j. Definitions: The DAIG used the following definitions throughout the report.
(1) The DAIG defined the term "detainee operations" as the range of actions taken by Soldiers beginning at the point of capture, the movement of detainees through division forward and central collecting points (CPs), to internment at internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities, and release. This includes the administrative and medical processing of detainees, medical treatment of detainees, sanitary conditions at I/R facilities and CPs, and interrogation procedures. The term "detainee operations" does not apply to confined U.S. Military personnel.
(2) Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997, defines the term detainee as "any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force." The DAIG uses the term as defined by AR 190-8 in this report. The term "detainee" includes enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), retained persons (RP), civilian internees (CIs), and other detainees (ODs). When making a differentiation between the different classifications of detainees, the report will specifically mention EPWs, RPs, CIs, or ODs. The report will also point out the use of non-doctrinal terms sometimes used as detainee classifications.
(3) The battlespace of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) included an enemy that deployed asymmetrically with adaptive tactics; a battlespace in which there was not always a clear forward line of troops, massing of forces, or an identifiable rear area to which detainees could be rapidly evacuated. The battlespace of OEF and OIF was non-linear with combat and stability operations taking place simultaneously throughout the areas of operation. Combatants included both uniformed and non-uniformed state and non-state sponsored forces who fought using conventional and non-conventional methods to include terrorist actions against both military and civilian targets. Detainees were, and continue to be, more than compliant civilian internees and enemy prisoners of war. They are primarily a noncompliant hostile population that requires more intensive screening, interrogation and segregation. The Army is in a new and unique operational environment stemming from the need for immediate tactical level intelligence coupled with the significant numbers of non-traditional combatants/detainees encountered.
(4) We define a problem as systemic if it is widespread and presents a pattern. We attempted through observations, sensing sessions, interviews, site visits, surveys, and reviews of documents, other reports, and investigations to identify failures in the systems that comprise detainee operations.
Chapter 2: Inspection Methodology
The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Team developed a baseline approach to the inspection that focused on gathering information and data from five primary domains: interviews, sensing sessions, document reviews, surveys of commanders, leaders, and Soldiers, and site visits. This approach allowed the Team to glean perceptions and attitudes about detainee operations from selected individuals and populations; to assess detainee operations in doctrinal manuals, unit policies, unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs); and to determine compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policies. The Team visited U.S. Armed Forces-controlled internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities and division central and forward collecting points (CPs), as well as units conducting patrol missions, to gather overall trends and observations on detainee operations from point of capture to the processing conducted at U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities.
This baseline methodology afforded the Team a standard, systematic approach to conducting an inspection at each location, which proved essential since the DAIG Team conducted split operations with two teams that traveled separately to continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) locations. The Team had to tailor their trips to look at units that had already returned from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) as well as those units currently deployed.
The methodology established a three-phase plan for executing the inspection.
a. Phase 1: Preparation. This phase included travel planning, pre-deployment training, administrative requirements, a review of documents the Team requested in advance from the unit IGs, pre-inspection visits to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and development of a detailed inspection plan.
b. Phase 2: Execution. This phase outlined the physical execution of the itinerary developed by the local IG in accordance with the Detailed Inspection Plan. Each visit began with an inbrief to the unit's senior leadership and ended with an outbrief. The DAIG Team conducted interviews, sensing sessions, and a survey of Commanders, leaders and Soldiers currently in the area of responsibility (AOR) and those who recently returned from OEF and OIF to determine detainee operations tactics, techniques, and procedures from point of capture to arrival at the CPs; inspected CPs from receipt of detainees to the transfer of detainees to U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities; inspected U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities and operations; and reviewed policies, plans, records, programs, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and other related documents.
c. Phase 3: Completion. The DAIG Team returned to home station and conducted post-trip data analyses of the information gathered. The Team then crafted detailed trip reports of the visit that captured the critical information gleaned from the trips. These trip reports formed the basis from which the Team developed the findings outlined in the report. Additionally, team members cross-walked information and traveled to the MI and MP schools for coordination and confirmation of information used in the findings.
The following section outlines the baseline methodology in detail to include the specific requirements for interviews and sensing sessions based upon the type of unit visited.
a. Inspection Methodology. The local IG served as the coordinating agent for all DAIG inspection activities. The coordinating agent worked with his or her respective DAIG Team point of contact (POC) to develop an itinerary for a four-day inspection for CONUS units and a 30-day period for OCONUS. The coordinating agent and DAIG Team POC fine-tuned the itinerary to maximize the Team's ability to meet the inspection's baseline requirements.
b. Personnel Interviewed:
(1) OCONUS
(a) The Team conducted interviews at CFLCC, CJTF-7, CJTF-180, U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities, and division CPs. The Team interviewed selected leaders from CFLCC/CJTF/division/brigade/battalion staffs and company level personnel. Individual interviews occurred in the interviewee's office or in a similar location free from interruptions and telephone calls. The coordinating agent scheduled these interviews to last no more than 1.5 hours. The coordinating agent also considered geographical dispersion and travel times between events. The interviews were conducted by one or two DAIG Team members with the unit interviewee.
(b) The DAIG Team conducted sensing sessions at each U.S. Armed Forces controlled I/R facility, division CPs, and at the company level, one for junior enlisted (Private through Specialist, but not including Corporals) and one for junior noncommissioned officers (Sergeant and Staff Sergeant). Units provided eight to twelve Soldiers per session. Each sensing session required a classroom or similar facility that was removed from the unit's normal work location. The area was relatively quiet and free from interruptions and telephone calls. In addition, the room needed no less than 14 chairs or desks formed in a circle or square. The coordinating agent scheduled 1.5-hour time blocks for each sensing session. The sensing sessions were conducted by two DAIG Team members with the unit Soldiers.
(c) The coordinating agent adjusted the interview schedule, in coordination with the Team, based upon the availability of personnel. The Team recognized that only full-time manning personnel might be available in Reserve Component units.
(d) The matrix below was a strawman that was finalized by the DAIG Team POC and the local IG for the OCONUS inspection.
(2) CONUS
(a) The Team conducted interviews of division, brigade, battalion, and company level personnel. The Team interviewed selected leaders from each of these type units. Individual interviews occurred in the interviewee's office or in a similar location that was free from interruptions and telephone calls. The coordinating agent scheduled these interviews to last no more than 1.5 hours. The coordinating agent considered geographical dispersion and travel times between events. The interviews were conducted by one or two Team members with the unit interviewee.
(b) The DAIG Team conducted sensing sessions with collecting point and I/R facility guards and with Soldiers who captured personnel during OEF and OIF. Sensing sessions included one for junior enlisted (Private through Specialist, but not including Corporals) and one for junior noncommissioned officers (Sergeant and Staff Sergeant). Units provided eight to twelve Soldiers per session. Each sensing session required a classroom or similar facility that was removed from the unit's normal work location. The area was relatively quiet and free from interruptions and telephone calls. In addition, the room needed no less than 14 chairs or desks formed in a circle or square. The coordinating agent scheduled 1.5-hour time blocks for each sensing session. The sensing sessions were conducted by two Team members with the unit Soldiers.
(c) The coordinating agent adjusted the interview schedule, in coordination with the Team, based upon the availability of personnel. The Team recognized that only full-time manning personnel might be available in Reserve Component units.
(d) The matrix below was a strawman that was finalized by the DAIG Team POC and the local IG for the CONUS inspection.
d. Administrative Support Requirements. The DAIG Team conducted this inspection with minimal disruption to ongoing unit missions. The Team required special arrangements from the field Inspectors General (IGs), including assistance with country clearances, travel in the AOR, in-country travel, sleeping arrangements, convoy security arrangements, body armor, weapons and ammunition, communications, scheduling of inbriefs and outbriefs, interviews and sensing sessions, and an appropriate work space for up to nine personnel conducting DAIG business.
e. Documents Reviewed In Advance (OCONUS Only):
(1) All inspections related to detainee operations, including command products, Inspector General products, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), legal, etc.
(2) All case histories of punishment (judicial and non-judicial) relating to detainee abuse.
(3) Past and current Rules of Engagement (ROE).
f. Documents Reviewed on Site (OCONUS Only):
(1) Unit TACSOPs relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings).
(2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs.
(3) I/R BDE/BN/CO unit manning documentation.
(4) DD Form 2745 (EPW Capture Tag) log.
(5) DD Form 629 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person) log.
(6) DA Form 4137 (Receipt for Evidence/Property Custody Document) log.
(7) DD Form 2708 (Receipt of Inmate/Detained Person) log.
(8) DD Form 1594 (Duty Logs).
(9) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facilities reporting system database.
(10) Facility maintenance and repair documentation.
(11) Facility security SOP.
(12) Detainee in/out-processing documentation.
g. Documents Reviewed During Inspections (CONUS Only):
(1) Unit Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) relating to detainee operations (e.g., 5Ss and T, collecting point procedures, and inventorying EPW belongings).
(2) U.S. Armed Forces-controlled I/R facility SOPs.
(3) I/R Brigade (BDE)/Battalion (BN)/Company (Co) unit manning documentation.
h. Inspection Itineraries.
DAIG requested each coordinating agent develop a draft itinerary that met the requirements listed in paragraph b. DAIG requested the coordinating agent include the necessary travel time between scheduled locations. The DAIG Team POC and the coordinating agent developed an itinerary that allows the DAIG Team to meet the objectives listed in Chapter 1 paragraph 2b. The DAIG Team conducted an inbrief with the senior commander/representative at each location.